7th Fleet and Deterrence

Despite having thoroughly discredited the notion of deterrence (see, “Forward Presence Deterrent EffectDisproved”), there is a faction of naval observers who continue to insist that deterrence is real and works despite the overwhelming evidence of China, Russia, Iran, and NKorea’s expansionism, terrorism, and general disregard for international laws, treaties, and norms which more than disproves the validity of deterrence.  In fact, many of these people believe that the only thing wrong with the Navy’s approach to deterrence – if there is anything wrong – is that we aren’t devoting enough ships to it.  If only we’d use even more ships our deterrence would be even more effective, they say.
 
Well, it’s time to take an analytical approach to the Navy and deterrence as regards our main enemy, China.  Is deterrence working?  What assets are we devoting to deterrence?  Do we need more? 
 
Is deterrence working?  -  Well, this one is easy to answer.  China has, for all practical purposes, annexed the entire South and East China Seas despite them being mainly international waters.  They’ve built illegal artificial islands and militarized them.  They’re continually encroaching on the territorial waters and air space of Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and other countries in the region.  They’ve made public claims about ownership of Japanese territories and most or all of the second island chain.  There are even reports stating that China has made claims on a third island chain which includes Hawaii and most of the Pacific.[2]
 
In addition to territorial expansion, China has also engaged in the seizure of US military assets and ignores the UNCLOS treaty to which it is a signatory (demonstrating that China’s word is worthless).
 
 
What assets are we devoting to deterrence?  -   The US Navy’s entire 7^th Fleet is devoted to deterring China.  As a reminder, 
 

It is headquartered at U.S. Fleet Activities Yokosuka, in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan. It is part of the United States Pacific Fleet. At present, it is the largest of the forward-deployed U.S. fleets, with 50 to 70 ships, 150 aircraft and 27,000 sailors and marines.[1]

Seventh Fleet includes a permanently forward deployed aircraft carrier, currently the USS George Washington, CVN-73.  Yokosuka, alone, typically includes a command ship, an aircraft carrier, Ticonderoga class cruisers, and a dozen or so Burke class destroyers.
 
In addition to the 7^th Fleet, numerous other carriers, ARG/MEUs, and aircraft regularly rotate into the 7^th Fleet’s control.
 
We are devoting an enormous number of ships, aircraft, and personnel to deterring China.
 
 
Do we need more?  - 
 
The facts are crystal clear.  If the 50 to 70 ships, 150 aircraft and 27,000 sailors and marines aren’t deterring China, no additional forces will suddenly, magically alter the situation.  Think about it, though, that’s a lot of ships, aircraft, and personnel.  Why isn’t China deterred?  Why aren’t they behaving very cautiously, in not cowering?  The answer is simple and painfully obvious:  China does not believe we’ll use our forces.  If your enemy does not believe you have the will to act, no amount of forces in the region will alter their thinking.  We could pack the entire US Navy into the South China Sea and it wouldn’t deter China for one second.  They believe, correctly, that we won’t use our force so any gathering of naval forces is a hollow, empty gesture.
 
The only force we’ve ever used in peacetime is against third rate countries and China does not see themselves as a third rate country.  In fact, history proves their view of things is correct.  China has seized US military aircraft and drones while they were in use, disrupted naval operations, successfully threatened and chased away US ships in international waters, established and militarized illegal islands while the US Navy stood back and watched, enforced illegal territorial water claims, violated the air space of Taiwan, etc.  All the while, the US Navy did nothing.  Ironically, the only substantive action the US Navy has taken, Freedom of Navigation exercises according to the conditions of UNCLOS Innocent Passage, has only reinforced the validity of China’s illegal territorial water claims!
 
No will to act means no deterrence and no amount of additional forces will change that.
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]Wikipedia, “United States Seventh Fleet”, retrieved 18-Aug-2025,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Seventh_Fleet
 
[2]The National Interest website, “China’s Next Territorial Claim: Hawaii and Almost the Entire Pacific Ocean?”, Harry J. Kazianis, 10-Sep-2016,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/chinas-next-territorial-claim-hawaii-almost-the-entire-17658

Get the US Out of NATO

NATO once served a valid purpose and did so admirably.  That purpose, however, is long gone and with it NATO’s reason for existence or, at least, the US’ reason for remaining a member of NATO.  Unfortunately, the mere mention of the faintest possibility of the US exiting NATO seems to trigger angst and panic among so many observers in Europe and the US.
 
Panic among European observers is especially ironic given that so many in Europe despise the US to begin with and work to actively undermine and obstruct any US action or desire.
 
Let’s examine some of the arguments against the US pulling out of NATO.
 
Isolation.  Many seem to feel that pulling out of NATO would automatically lead to the US being isolationists on the world stage.  This is ridiculous.  Aside from erasing our name from a piece of paper, we’re just talking about removing our military presence from Europe.  We would still have extensive and intimate financial, trade, cultural, and scientific interactions.
 
Russian Threat.  This argument has been forever laid to rest by the Ukraine war.  If a single, small country with almost no military to begin the war and a population a quarter the size of Russia can fight Russia to a standstill, albeit with significant munitions resupply help from the West, then the Russian threat is overblown to the point of irrelevance.
 
Political Balance.  Some suggest that the US presence balances political and territorial ambitions among the European countries as if our absence from NATO would trigger all out wars between European countries.  This seems patently absurd if for no other reason than the European countries don’t have much in the way of extensive or effective militaries, as evidenced by their very low defense expenditure levels and nearly non-existent munitions inventories (remember Libya?)!
 
Mutual Military Support.  The contention is that the US would lose the military cooperation and support of European countries and access to bases.  Well, any country can assist the US at any time and in any way they choose without the US needing to be part of NATO.  The reality, however, is that all too often European countries already refuse to assist the US militarily.  Overflight permissions have been refused during US actions and foreign ships have pulled out of US naval task forces when the possibility of US action has arisen.  Sometimes foreign countries assist us and sometimes they don’t.  They have their political objectives and we have ours.  Short of invoking Article 5 of the NATO agreement, nothing would change the degree of cooperation with the US.
 
Defense of Europe.  Some seem to think that if the US is not a member of NATO, that precludes the US from helping to defend Europe.  This is absurd.   If Europe is threatened, the US will most certainly step in to help, treaty or no treaty.  It’s in our best interest.
 
 
Options
 
An option, for those too queasy about the US formally pulling out of NATO, is that the US could simply pull out of Europe while remaining a member of NATO.  Nothing that I’m aware of obligates us to be physically present on the continent.  This would allow all the resources currently devoted to Europe to be redirected at the real threat which is China.
 
Another option would be to use US withdrawal from NATO as a major bargaining chip in a Ukraine-Russia peace settlement.  For example, the US might agree to withdraw from NATO if Russia returns Crimea and returns to pre-war borders and Ukraine is granted NATO membership.
 
 
Conclusion
 
In summary, there is no valid argument for the US remaining in NATO and every reason for the US to leave NATO.  The world faces an extreme threat from China and US resources need to be focused on that threat not babysitting a Europe that faces no realistic threat.  It is past time for Europe to stand on its own.

NATO Spending

ComNavOps has opined that it is long past time for the US to pull out of Europe, militarily, and that Europe/NATO can more than stand on its own.  The bogeyman specter of the Russian bear has been shown to be an illusion, thwarted by the tiny state of Ukraine.
 
Here’s some interesting data on NATO spending for 2023.
 
Here’s the top 10 countries for defense spending as a percentage of GDP.[1]
 
Poland              3.9%
United States    3.5%
Greece              3.0%
Estonia              2.7%
Lithuania           2.5%
Finland              2.4%
Romania           2.4%
Hungary            2.4%
Latvia                2.3%
UK                     2.1%
 
 
Here’s the top 10 countries for total defense spending (million USD).[1]
 
United States   $860,000
Germany            $68,080
UK                      $65,763
France                $56,649
Italy                    $31,585
Poland               $29,105
Canada              $28,950
Spain                 $19,179
Netherlands       $16,741
Turkey                $15,842
 
 
 
The US spent $860B.  The rest of NATO spent $400B combined.
 
 
The reason for NATO’s existence has ended.  It’s past time to leave NATO and let Europe take care of itself.
 
 
__________________________

 
[1]https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/nato-spending-by-country

Protecting the Sea Lanes?

The Navy is out there, every day, protecting the sea lanes.  That’s why we do deployments, right?  So, how’s that sea lane protection working out?  According to shipping giant, Maersk,
 

Attacks in the Red Sea by Iran-aligned Houthi militants have disrupted a route vital to east-west trade, with prolonged rerouting of shipments, pushing freight rates higher and causing congestion in Asian and European ports.
 
Maersk said recent data showed that the number of ships crossing through the canal has fallen 66% since carriers began diverting their vessels around Africa.
 
Maersk in July said disruption to its container shipping via the Red Sea had extended beyond trade routes between the Far East and Europe to its entire global network, and warned of a "cascading impact" causing congestion.[1]

 
So, what is the mightiest navy in the world doing about this threat to the sea lanes?  Well, we’ve shot down a few drones and missiles and bombed some suspected launch sites … to no effect.  Attacks on shipping continue and ships continue to get hit.
 
Similarly, Iran continues to harass shipping, attacking, seizing, and mining passing ships while our navy stands by and does nothing.
 
 
Conclusion
 
I know I’ve criticized our endless deployments but if we weren’t out there protecting the sea lanes, bad actors might attack shipping with drones and missiles so thank goodness we’re out there, continuously deployed.
 
Our presence is deterring nothing.  We’re clearly not effectively protecting the sea lanes.  Tell me again, why are we doing deployments?
 
 
 
___________________________

 
[1]Newsmax website, “Maersk: Impact From Red Sea Attacks Intensifying”, 5-Sep-2024,
https://www.newsmax.com/finance/streettalk/maersk-red-sea/2024/09/05/id/1179157/

Lead Before You Ask Others To Follow

As you undoubtedly know, Iran has been increasing its attacks on international shipping in the Persian Gulf.  These attacks can be categorized in one of two ways: 

1. Acts of war against the victim’s home (flagged) country
2. Acts of piracy

In either case, the appropriate response, as allowed by international law and treaty, is, at a minimum, destruction of the attacking force.
 
Rather than taking legal, allowable, forceful action, the US Navy has stood by and watched, doing nothing.  An article by two retired Navy admirals, and others, calls for other countries to “accept greater responsibility”, whatever that useless phrase means, as the way to address Iran’s increasing lawlessness. 

In order to convince Tehran to stop its illegal activities in some of the world’s most important sea lanes, determined American leadership is necessary to convince our partners to accept greater responsibility for protecting freedom of navigation.[1]

So, rather than take forceful action, the authors would have the Navy beg other countries to do something.  What that something might be is left unarticulated. 

… the epicenter of US-led naval cooperation in the Middle East, Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), recognizes the need to more effectively encourage and integrate regionwide cooperation, including by leading the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). This 38-nation partnership includes five task forces addressing freedom of navigation, counterpiracy, counternarcotics, and, most recently, training for partner navies. However, amid this most recent bout of unchecked reprisals from Tehran, the United Arab Emirates suspended its voluntary contribution of maritime assets to CMF task forces.[1] 

The problem with begging other countries for help is that it sends the clear message that we, far and away the most powerful force in the region, are unable/unwilling to do anything.  The result of that is that other countries will wonder why they should contribute resources when the US isn’t willing to take any forceful, productive action.  As the authors note, 

Despite these admirable efforts, they are apparently insufficient to convince our partners that the United States is fully committed to countering Iranian aggression and, thus, will also be inadequate to deter or deny further Iranian aggression.[1] 

We’re attempting to substitute group hugs, meetings, and wishful thinking for forceful, effective action.  This is why no amount of forward presence can accomplish anything.  We could have ten carriers in the Persian Gulf and it wouldn’t deter Iran in the slightest since we clearly won’t take any action.  Iran is seizing ships and shooting at others and we merely watch.
 
Rather than calling for other countries to “accept greater responsibility”, perhaps we should try leading.  If we would exert some force then other countries might be more willing to contribute resources.
 
If we want others to follow us, we have to actually lead and that means taking forceful, effective action.  No one is going to follow a trembling coward.
 
This mindset, as evidenced by these two admirals, demonstrates the lack of courage endemic throughout the Navy today.
 
 
 
____________________________ 

[1]Breaking Defense website, “To counter Iran at sea, US must sell partners on doing more”,Donegan, Miller, Ruhe and Cicurel, 12-Jul-2023,
https://breakingdefense.com/2023/07/to-counter-iran-at-sea-us-must-sell-partners-on-doing-more/

Yokosuka Pearl Harbor

The US Navy has, for several decades, maintained a permanently forward deployed carrier at Yokosuka, Japan.  Here’s the sequence of carriers that have been based at Yokosuka:
 
1973  Midway
1991  Independence
1998  Kitty Hawk
2008  Washington
2015  Reagan
2024  Washington
 
 
To have maintained a carrier at Yokosuka for so many decades, the Navy must perceive some value in it.  What is that value?  I ask because I’m not seeing it.  Let’s examine some possible benefits and risks.
 
 
Deterrence
 
The obvious potential benefit – and the one that I’m sure the Navy believes - is deterrence of the Chinese.  In general terms, we’ve discredited forward presence as a deterrent.  Let’s look at the history of China’s actions over the last several decades and see whether deterrence has worked.  Note, this is attempting to prove a negative which is not possible so we’ll try to discern a pattern to see whether we’re succeeding at deterring China.  Consider the following Chinese actions:
 

• China has annexed every unclaimed or disputed island/reef in the East and South China Seas.
• China has built and militarized several artificial islands, illegally and in violation of the UNCLOS treaty of which they are a signatory.
• China forced down and seized a US EP-3 surveillance aircraft in international airspace.  They then held the aircraft and crew, stripped the aircraft of equipment, and dismantled the aircraft before eventually releasing the crew.
• China seized a US underwater drone vehicle.
• China has routinely violated Philippine and Vietnam territorial waters.
• Chinese fishing fleets have routinely encroached on the territorial waters of various countries.
• China has routinely threatened Taiwan and violated its territory and air defense zones.
• China has interfered with US military operations in international waters (McCain towed array incident near Subic Bay, Philippines, for example).

 
Does this sound like we’ve deterred China?  Does this sound like a pattern of deterrence?  Not in the least!  It sounds like a pattern of unrestrained, non-kinetic conquest!
 
Some of you are going to attempt to claim the fact that China hasn’t initiated a war demonstrates that deterrence must be working.  Of course, there is absolutely no indication that China had any intention of going to war with the US, prior to now.  You can’t deter someone from doing something they weren’t going to do anyway. 
 
Even now, why would China want to go to war with the US?  They’re getting everything they want without needing a war!  They’ve annexed and fortified the entire East and South China Seas.  For all practical purposes, they’ve kicked us out of the E/S China Seas.  They’re expanding into the Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, South America, and Cuba.  They’re in the process of annexing the Philippines through a combination of emigration, intimidation, and foreign assistance.  They’re isolating Taiwan and working to encircle Japan.  They’re attempting to intimidate Australia and gain control of various strategic resources via financial and business manipulations.  And the list goes on and on.
 
They don’t need or want a war when they can get everything they want thanks to our policy of appeasement.
 
Is a single carrier in Japan deterring China from anything?  No.
 

USS Reagan at Yokosuka

 

Combat
 
Another potential benefit is combat.  Can a single carrier conduct initial, forward, combat operations to disrupt Chinese operations and buy time for a more forceful US response?
 
Unfortunately, as we’ve repeatedly proven, a single carrier is not an effective combat force.  It’s a ship waiting to be sunk.  A single carrier is incapable of effective self-defense let alone able to simultaneously mount any kind of useful offense.  A single carrier serves no purpose other than to provide China with a live fire, carrier SINKEX.  So, if a single carrier is not survivable in combat and serves no useful combat purpose … why are we maintaining one there?
 
 
 
Risk
 
Okay, so a Japan-based carrier offers no benefits but what’s the harm?  Why do we care whether there’s a carrier in Japan?  The answer is that we care because of the concomitant risk of losing that carrier.
 
There are only a couple of possibilities for a Japan-based carrier at the start of a war with China:
 

• The carrier is sunk in the first hour of the war.  China is not going to pass up a free sinking of a carrier.
• Japan opts to remain neutral and the carrier is interned for the duration.

 
Neither of those options provides any useful combat capability and both result in the loss of the carrier.  The inescapable conclusion is that a Japan-based carrier is a certain loss in a war with China.  Is the loss of a hideously expensive carrier and air wing for no positive return really what we want?  I would hope not!
 
A carrier in Japan is a ‘Pearl Harbor’ waiting to happen.  You might be tempted to say that we’ll simply pull the carrier back to the US if war seems likely.  That’s possible but history suggests that’s unlikely.  We had ample warning about the actual Pearl Harbor and opted to do nothing.  China is all but telling us they’re just about ready to initiate the invasion of Taiwan and we haven’t pulled our carrier out of danger.  History – and our current inactions – strongly indicate that our carrier will still be sitting, docked in Japan, when war starts.
 
 
Summary
 
So, if a single Japan-based carrier isn’t providing any discernible deterrent effect, isn’t survivable in combat, can’t contribute any useful offense, and is certain to be ‘Pearl Harbored’ in the first hour of a war  …  why do we have a carrier there?  There are two answers:
 

1. Inertia – we’ve always had one there so we’ll continue to do so.
2. Stupidity – our so-called professional warriors are too stupid to understand the situation and change it.  As we’ve repeatedly documented on this blog, the extent of stupidity by Navy leadership is staggering and this is yet another example.

 
The conclusion is obvious – we need to end the Japan-based, forward deployment of a carrier and bring the carrier back home.

A Pacific Naval Air Wing (Scrap Two Carriers – Part 4)

In previous blog posts (see, “Scrap Two Carriers – Part 3”), I suggested that operating eleven supercarriers has become so expensive that it left our Navy imbalanced, with too few aircraft and surface combatants. This could be corrected by downsizing to nine carriers, which will probably occur anyway because of the flawed USS Ford program. I suggested this loss could be offset by establishing two shore-based overseas Carrier Air Wings. These could be called Naval Air Wings (NAW) and absorb Marine Corps aviation assets to support Navy sea control missions from existing American airbases.

 

To understand the value of a NAW in the Pacific, one must consider the US Navy’s strategy for war with China. It must be classified, but evidence suggests there is no strategy. Most admirals agree that sending a single carrier strike group toward the Chinese coast is foolish given its massive numbers of land-based fighters and anti-ship missiles. A huge task force of at least four carriers must first be assembled. How long will that take? Based on past crises and the current readiness of the fleet, at least four months will be required. Who will contain the Chinese Navy until then? The US Air Force will be busy defending Japan from air strikes. It has plans to surge airpower to its big airbase on Guam, but that will prove difficult after the airfield is hit with a hundred missiles after air defense systems shoot down just a dozen of them.

 

Chinese strategy is easy to predict. First, they will destroy the massive American military base complex on nearby Okinawa. Hundreds of short-range missiles will pummel airfields while several hundred Chinese fighters arrive to bomb and strafe the island as some 150 American and Japanese aircraft are destroyed in the first two days. This will leave some 30,000 American civilians and 20,000 military personnel stranded on Okinawa with a dwindling food supply who might face an amphibious invasion. This situation is dire and represents gross incompetence in the US military that I wrote about a few years ago. [1]

 

China will try to sink any US navy ships in the region before they flee eastward. Ships foolishly homeported at Sasebo, Japan will be sunk as that logistics base is wrecked. I also wrote an article about this a few years back. [2] The big prize is the supercarrier USS Ronald Reagan and its escorts based at Yokosuka, Japan where it remains pierside half the time and thus an easy target for a mass missile attack. The Chinese always know the exact position of this ship in Tokyo Bay and could time an attack to sink it in the port entrance! The US Navy keeps this carrier in ultra-expensive Yokosuka because, well, it’s had one there since the end of World War II. It is there as part of an outdated “forward presence” concept, even though it often deploys to the Persian Gulf. If war threatens, most US Navy ships in Japan will be ordered to sail eastward to safety, leaving thousands of family members in a war zone. The evacuation of Americans from Japan will become a military priority at the beginning of a war, tying up substantial assets.

 

The US Navy maintains Carrier Air Wing 5 in Japan for the USS Ronald Reagan, with jets based at MCAS Iwakuni, Japan and helicopters at NAF Atsugi. Both airfields are within range of short-range Chinese missiles and land-based fighters so most aircraft will be quickly destroyed unless embarked on the Reagan as it flees eastward. Basing two dozen US Navy ships in Japan is costly and mindless. US military bases in Asia have mostly remained unmoved since the end of the Vietnam war, with the exception of closing bases in the Philippines and downsizing in Guam in the 1990s. Nothing has been done to address growing Chinese power in the region. The only major project is an insane effort to build a new $20 billion dollar airbase for the Marines on Okinawa that will be smashed by Chinese airpower on day one! I’ve written about that too. [3]

 

This strategic overview may shock those who have not followed the dramatic rise of Chinese military power, nor read my articles linked below. China now has more ships than the US Navy and will have twice as many by 2040. Moreover, China can quickly mass all of its air and naval power in the Western Pacific, where the USA maintains just 10% of its force, while the rest is on the other side of the globe! Even if time allowed for a build-up airpower in the Pacific, the USA has very few airfields in the Pacific with stockpiles of munitions.

 

This situation is familiar to students of World War II history. Japanese aircraft from Formosa quickly destroyed most US Army Air Corps aircraft forward-deployed to the Philippines nine hours after the Americans were alerted to the attack on Pearl Harbor. US Navy bases there were smashed as ships fled south to the Dutch East Indies. The US Navy had three carriers in Hawaii that were not ready to confront the Japanese Navy. Japan quickly established airbases in the Dutch East Indies where the Japanese hunted down and sunk two dozen Allied warships in a disaster known as the “The Battle of the Java Sea.”

 

The US Navy doesn’t need to close bases in Japan, which are really Japanese bases anyway. But the three amphibs at Sasebo should move to Hawaii and the minesweepers to Yokosuka or Guam. Sasebo can remain operational but a long-term plan is needed to move its logistical support facilities somewhere in the Central Pacific or Australia. Yokosuka should remain as a logistics and support base in hopes that Japanese and American Air Forces can provide protection. However, the huge USS Ronald Reagan and its families should move to the United States. A squadron with four destroyers can remain to assure Japan of American support. Most Marine Corps aircraft should move off Okinawa where they now sit as easy targets.

 

The airbase at MCAS Iwakuni should remain as Carrier Air Wing 5 instantly becomes the Pacific NAW, absorbing the two Marine Corps attack squadrons based there. Savings from scrapping two aircraft carriers will free billions of dollars each year to ready two dozen existing airfields in the Central Pacific for wartime use with stocked munitions bunkers, support equipment, and fuel stores so this NAW can disperse to operate outside the range of most Chinese missiles and all land-based fighter aircraft. Most Chinese missiles are cheap short-range missiles whose range roughly matches that of land base fighters. Planning to operate airbases within this range is foolish, although operating Forward Arming and Refueling points may be possible. See the missile range chart linked below. [4]

 

This NAW would be key to US Navy strategy during the first months of war with China. It would engage Chinese naval power venturing out for long range attacks or amphibious operations. The Navy and Marine Corps may fly additional squadrons to operate from these bases until Navy submarines and American bombers weakened the Chinese and a huge American fleet arrives. Details on NAW basing options will be presented in the next blog post.

 

________________________

 

[1] “Downsize Kadena”; Carlton Meyer; G2mil; 2012; http://www.g2mil.com/kadena.htm

 

[2] “Vacate Sasebo”; Carlton Meyer; G2mil; 2012; http://www.g2mil.com/sasebo.htm

 

[3] “The Okinawa Solution”; Carlton Meyer; G2mil; 2012; http://www.g2mil.com/okinawa-solution.htm

 

[4] Chart of Chinese missile capabilities; The Missile Threat; CSIS; https://i2.wp.com/missilethreat.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Chinaregionalmap.jpg?ssl=1

This Is A Carrier Strike Group?

The USS Ronald Reagan carrier strike group (CSG) is now operating in the South China Sea, according to Navy reports.(1) 

 

China considers the South China Sea to be their property and has threatened the US Navy on many occasions and has, in the past, seized US aircraft and unmanned assets.  If there’s a high risk operating area in the world for the US Navy, the South China Sea would be it.  Therefore, if we’re going to operate a CGS within easy range of the entire Chinese military, it’s only prudent to send a massive carrier strike group.  Here’s a list of the many ships of the Reagan CSG:

 

USS Ronald Reagan (Nimitz class)

USS Shiloh (Ticonderoga class)

USS Halsey (Burke class)

 

A carrier with two escorts operating in the highest risk area in the world ...  do I need to say anything else?

 

 

 

_________________________________

 

(1)https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2654610/commander-us-pacific-fleet-visits-uss-ronald-reagan-carrier-strike-group/

More Marine Insanity

Having previously gotten into the long range strike, air force, anti-ship, and anti-submarine businesses, the Marines are now getting into the business of unmanned naval vessels.  They have ordered Metal Shark ‘40 Defiant’ Long Range Unmanned Surface Vessels. 

 

Louisiana-based shipbuilder Metal Shark announced on Monday that Marine Corps Systems Command had selected the company to develop the so-called Long Range Unmanned Surface Vessel (LRUSV) for the service. (3)

 

What do we know about this craft?  The manufacturer describes these 40 ft long vessels:

 

The 40 Defiant satisfies the visual-deterrent requirements of today’s naval forces with a futuristic design featuring a chiseled and menacing profile and unique faceted hull. Unlike other available welded-aluminum military patrol boat offerings, which are often hard to distinguish from a commercial work boat or even a private recreational vessel, the 40 Defiant is immediately identifiable as a no-nonsense military machine ready to respond with overwhelming force to any hostile threat. The 40 Defiant flaunts its capability and bristles with armament. As configured for the US Navy, the vessel features six MK 16 weapons foundations plus a large forward foundation for stabilized, remote operated, optically guided MK 49 / MK 50 weapons systems. Like all Metal Shark offerings, the 40 Defiant may be customized to suit operator requirements and may be configured to accommodate the complete range of available weapons systems. (2)

 

 

Metal Shark Manned Version

Metal Shark Unmanned Version

 

So, the craft is ‘chiseled’ and ‘menacing’.  Well that should sink some Chinese ships because, as we all know, appearance is the most important characteristic in determining lethality and successful naval engagements.

 

‘Visual-deterrent requirements’?????  Who made that one up?

 

The craft has ‘overwhelming force’  …  consisting of up to 6 machine guns.  I’m not sure that constitutes ‘overwhelming’ unless you’re fighting an unprepared Boy Scout troop.

 

What will the Marines do with these vessels?  I’ve been unable to find any description of how the Marines intend to use these boats but we have this from the Naval News website:

 

This tiered, scalable weapons system will provide the ability to accurately track and destroy targets at range throughout the battle space. (1)

 

Presumably, the Marines will use these boats in their anti-Chinese, hidden, small unit, anti-ship/anti-sub concept.  That being the case, what will a boat with a maximum of 6 machine guns destroy ‘throughout the battle space’?  If all it takes is a 40 ft boat with 6 machine guns to ‘destroy targets at range throughout the battle space’ then we’re wasting a lot of money on Burkes, Fords, and frigates!

 

There is also this from the Task and Purpose website announcement,

 

The LRUSV is “an unmanned platform capable of traveling autonomously for long distances and launching loitering munitions to address sea and land targets,” according to a December request for information regarding the vessel’s autonomy systems.

 

Loitering munitions, also known as kamikaze drones, are best described as bombs that are designed to loiter above a set area, search for targets, and attack once a target is formally identified. (3)

 

So, the Marines may be looking to conduct naval battles using some kind of minature, kamikaze UAVs?  It would take, what …  ten thousand of them to sink a ship?  This is getting more bizarre by the second. 

 

From the manufacturer,

 

The 40 Defiant has been designed to carry a power projection capability far beyond that of a traditional force protection boat. The vessel therefore boasts a superlative array of capabilities. Available ballistic protection enables the vessel to sustain extended firefights, allowing crews to respond with overwhelming force to asymmetric threats such as swarm attacks while remaining secure and protected from hostile fire. The armored, climate-controlled pilothouse may be configured with a wide range of shock-mitigating seating options. The vessel delivers enhanced situational awareness and fleet connectivity through an advanced communications and sensor suite. These capabilities allow operators to expand the mission profile of their patrol boats, allowing them to operate in permissive environments during asset protection and port security missions, and also to make forays into hostile environments. (2)

 

 

Well, we don’t have much on the performance specs of the vessel but I’ll give the manufacturer full marks for creative writing.  The boat description reads like the Star Wars Death Star brochure.

 

I have no idea what operating concept the Marines have in mind but whatever it is they’re way out of their lane.  At this rate, it’s only a matter of time until they start operating submarines (subMARINES … see, it’s right there in the name!) and intercontinental stealth bombers.

 

The Marine Corps has gone insane.

 

 

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(1)Naval News website, “Metal Shark Developing Long Range USV for the U.S. Marine Corps”, Xavier Vavasseur, 26-Jan-2021,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/01/metal-shark-developing-long-range-usv-for-the-u-s-marine-corps/

 

(2)https://www.metalsharkboats.com/40defiant/

(3)Task and Purpose website, “The Marine Corps is eyeing a long-range robot boat that can nail targets with kamikaze drones”, Jared Keller, 27-Jan-2021,

https://taskandpurpose.com/news/marine-corps-long-range-unmanned-surface-vessel-contract/

Forward Presence Deterrent Effect Disproved

Long time readers know that ComNavOps believes that forward deployments (forward presence) provides no effective deterrence.  ComNavOps turns to history for proof.  There is no documented example of forward presence actually deterring an enemy from any action.  To be fair, this is trying to prove a negative which is not possible.  Approached from the other direction, there is a great deal of evidence that forward presence has NOT deterred our enemies.  Despite a significant Middle East presence by the US military, Iran continues to foment terror, attack shipping, disrupt shipping lanes, export weapons to terrorists, support terrorists, develop nuclear weapons, and harass US forces.  Despite significant US forces in South Korea, North Korea continues to develop ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, sink SKorean ships, and conduct special operations penetrations of SKorean territory.  Despite a massive US force presence in Europe, Russia continues to annex and invade countries, destabilize countries, violate international weapon control treaties, and harass US forces.  Despite significant US force presence in and around the Pacific and South/East China Sea, China continues to build illegal artificial islands, ignore international treaties, violate territorial waters of neighboring countries, engage in a massive military build up, make illegal territorial claims, seize US military assets, engage in massive cyber attacks, engage in massive intellectual property theft, and harass US forces.  Clearly, US forward presence has no deterrent effect.

While ComNavOps view is obviously correct, most military observers continue to cling to the misguided belief that forward presence equates to deterrence.

The Stimson Center (non-partisan US policy think tank) has now come out with an analysis showing that forward presence has little or no deterrent effect (2) – exactly as ComNavOps has long stated.  They analyzed 100 events since the end of the Cold War and found that the number of forces forward deployed in a trouble spot had no deterrent effect but that the movement of new forces into the region did.

As Breaking Defense website sums up,

The Stimson Center recently completed an analysis of more than 100 events since the end of the Cold War, when the US used the armed forces to coerce another country without resorting to actual war. For example: US leaders have sent aircraft carriers into the Persian Gulf to convince Iran to change its behavior, and held frequent military exercises with South Korea to demonstrate US resolve to the North. One key finding of the Stimson research is that, during a crisis, moving new forces into the region does significantly increase the chance that an adversary will back down. But the number of troops, aircraft, and ships already in the region prior to a crisis had no impact on the outcome.

The statistics show that permanent deployments are seen by our adversaries as part of the woodwork – factors that can be discounted when judging America’s seriousness. What caught the attention of the decision-makers the U.S. was trying to coerce was the demonstration of resolve when additional American forces are put at risk. Moreover, it was the fact of moving forces — not the types of forces moved –that mattered. (1)

For example, the Stimson analysis shows exactly what ComNavOps has noted about Russia’s behavior:

… the temporary deployment of US ground and land-based air forces to Eastern Europe in recent years seems to have put Russia’s threats to move beyond Ukraine on hold, at least temporarily, whereas the 30,000 troops based primarily in Germany did not seem to have been noticed. (1)

Stimson also noted that firepower trumps other forms of coercion.

Unlike other forms of escalation – such as economic sanctions, which may be interpreted as signs of weakness — adding firepower is what got the attention of potential adversaries. (1)

This finding simply reflects basic human behavior.  Our enemies are enemies because they are evil, corrupt, dictatorial bullies.  They are not rational human beings.  They function at an animal level of stimulus and response.  They display classic playground bully behavior that every school kid understands but which our government leaders on both sides of the aisle have forgotten.  Bullies respect and respond to physical pain which means firepower AND THE WILLINGNESS TO USE IT.  So, yes, economic sanctions and the like are seen as weakness, not strength.  Only the threat of physical harm is effective and that can only be effective if it is occasionally (or regularly!) applied.

To be fair, the article notes that forward deployments may serve purposes other than deterrence.

Permanent troop deployments overseas do serve many purposes. They seem to reassure allies about our security commitment, and that has value. (1)

An example of forward presence that serves a larger, positive purpose that is divorced from deterrence would be Guam.  Assuming we’re willing to seriously defend it - and there’s currently no evidence that we are – the base serves as a forward staging area rather than as a deterrent.  As a forward staging area it has value and is worth maintaining even though it clearly has no deterrent value.

Consider the Stimson findings in light of ComNavOps’ calls for ending deployments and removing our military from Europe, among other similar recommendations.  It is clear that our forward presence accomplishes nothing as far as deterrence is concerned.  We need to bring our forces home and spend our time training, maintaining, and executing missions.  Some of those missions may well be exactly the kind of rapid movements into a trouble spot that the Stimson analysis suggests actually produces positive results.

We also need to begin applying force on a more regular and consistent basis so that force movements are treated as threats to be taken seriously rather than just empty posturing.

Note:  The Stimson analysis is available as a book length treatise and I have not obtained it or read it.  I’ve only seen the Breaking Defense website article on it.  Thus, I’ve been unable to analyze the analysis.

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “Fast Deployments Deter Better Than Bases: Stimson ”, Barry Blechman, 7-Aug-2020,

https://breakingdefense.com/2020/08/fast-deployments-deter-better-than-bases-stimson/?_ga=2.29636351.1577885854.1596477103-1757035925.1542652267

(2)”Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy”, co-edited by Melanie Sisson, James Siebens, and Barry Blechman, ISBN 9780367459963, Published May 13, 2020 by Routledge

CNO Gilday Remembers The LCS

Let’s be honest, after many years of enjoyable LCS-bashing, we’ve kind of forgotten about them, haven’t we?  They can’t do anything.  The Navy has pretty much given up boasting about their single-handed, war-winning capabilities.  They don’t deploy.  They have no useful modules.  Four have already been designated for very early retirement in an admission of uselessness by the Navy.  The rest just sit pier-side and pass time waiting for their own early retirements.  We’ve moved on to other, more relevant issues.

Well, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Gilday seems to have suddenly remembered the LCS and wants to see them deployed a few more times.  Of course, what they would usefully do on deployment, he didn’t say and I can’t imagine but at least it might give the crew some sea time.

We’ve known the LCS has had major reliability and maintenance problems, all along, despite the Navy’s constant glowing affirmations about the miracle of the LCS maintenance model – you know, the model that involves no at sea maintenance and requires excessively costly dock side maintenance every couple of weeks.  Well, CNO Gilday now acknowledges the problems.

We know enough about that platform [ed. the LCS] and the problems that we have that plague us with regard to reliability and sustainability, and I need them resolved.” (1)

LCS reliability problems have impacted deployments with some stunning failures and the specter of systemic propulsion problems looms large for future deployments.

“The propulsion architecture’s unreliability means you are going to have to come up with a different way to deploy the ship that doesn’t require every deployment to be transoceanic,” Clark [Bryan Clark, a retired submarine officer and senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.] said. “By the time the ship gets to Singapore, it needs a lot of work done to it and your deployment time is cut down by the fact that you have to repair the ship once it arrives. (1)

What does this systemic inability to transit tell us about the Navy’s fantasy vision of distributed lethality operations deep inside enemy waters?  It tells us that it’s pure fantasy.  If we can’t even transit from one port to the next, how can the LCS operate for extended periods in combat?  Oh wait, we can’t because even if we can get to the operating area without breaking down, we have to return to port every two weeks for dock side maintenance.  Seriously, who came up with this maintenance model and then what genius ignored the model and decided it made the LCS ideal for distributed lethality?

Reliability and maintenance aside, there’s also the matter of the non-existent modules.  The only module that exists in any semi-functional form is the anti-surface warfare (ASuW) module and it’s only semi-functional because the original specifications and requirements have been downgraded so completely.  The anti-submarine (ASW) and mine countermeasure (MCM) modules have been in development for decades and show no signs of being ready in our lifetimes.

CNO Gilday acknowledges the modules failures.

“I have to deliver ... both the mine and ASW modules.” (1)

Good luck, CNO!  You’re running out of time.  Four of the ships are being immediately retired, never having seen a module, and the rest are rapidly running through their lifespans, again without any functional modules.  We’re going to see more LCS retiring without ever having carried a useful, functional module.  That’s just embarrassing.

Just Park It Off To The Side Somewhere 

And We'll Dispose Of It When We Get Some Time

Without modules, the LCS is barely a Coast Guard cutter.  Gilday acknowledges this,

The Navy deployed the LCS Detroit to South America — the 4th Fleet area of operations — last year on a counternarcotics mission, and it returned earlier this month. Those are the kinds of missions for which the LCS is perfectly suited, Gilday said.

“I can deploy these things with a [law enforcement detachment] and a signals intelligence capability, and I can do that on LCS with carry-on gear,” Gilday said. “It’s the right kind of platform for that. (1)

So, CNO Gilday acknowledges that the Navy built a supposed warship whose only suitable purpose is low end, Coast Guard type missions.  Nicely done, Navy.

One of the major problems for the LCS is that it no longer offers anything unique.  For example, the new frigate will offer superior ASW capability – that actually works when the ship is delivered, one hopes!  That said, why would the Navy continue to pour money into the LCS and ASW module when the LCS is only marginally deployable and will begin retiring soon?  It is not hard to foresee the Navy deciding to suspend LCS ASW funding. 

Similarly, the LCS ASuW module offers nothing that the new frigate doesn’t offer ten times over.

The LCS MCM capability would be useful since there is no alternative but it’s still years away and, again, the ships are going to begin retiring before the modules start showing up!

Gilday sums his LCS objective up, thusly,

“LCS for me is something, on my watch, I’ve got to get right.” (1)

Seriously, the opportunity for the LCS to ‘get right’ was before the program started, when it was still a concept.  That was the time to develop a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and understand what you would and would not get from such a ship.  The opportunity for the LCS to ‘get right’ was before you committed to using non-existent technology.  The opportunity for the LCS to ‘get right’ was before you conceived an idiotic no-maintenance-at-sea concept.

I’m sorry, CNO Gilday but the opportunity for the LCS to ‘get right’ ended on day one of the program when the Navy committed to 55 ships with no CONOPS, non-existent technology, and an idiotic maintenance plan.  There’s nothing left to ‘get right’.  The best thing that can be done, at this point, is to stop kidding yourself that this class has anything to offer, retire the entire class, and move on to more pressing matters.  Stop pouring money into an acquisition money pit and acknowledge what all the rest of us could see from day one – that the program was an ill-conceived, dismal failure – and take your lumps and move on. 

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(1)Defense News website, “US Navy prepares major surge of littoral combat ship deployments”, David B. Larter, 1-Aug-2020,

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/07/31/the-us-navy-is-preparing-a-major-surge-of-lcs-deployments/

Mobile Submarine Support

Here’s an interesting and encouraging bit of news …

The Los Angeles class submarine, USS Key West (SSN-722), exercised with a dry cargo logistics ship, USNS Richard E. Byrd (T-AKE-4), to demonstrate forward, mobile logistics support for submarines.  This is kind of the second half of what’s required for forward support of submarines with the other half being a submarine tender for mechanical support.

Apparently, this was a first of its kind event which seems hard to believe but, hey, better late than never! 

Dry cargo class ships are responsible for providing logistic lifts to deliver cargo (ammunition, food, limited quantities of fuel, repair parts and ship store items) to U.S. and allied ships at sea. (1)

The demonstration was performed to highlight the submarine’s ability to go safely alongside a dry cargo class ship, which could facilitate the transfer of weapons, stores, critical repair parts, and provide the ability to support crew rest. (1)

USS Key West is one of four Los Angeles class SSNs based in Guam along with the submarine tenders USS Frank Cable (AS-40) and USS Emory S. Land (AS-39).  The combination of submarine tenders and dry cargo logistics ships offers the ability to support submarines in a mobile, forward deployed setting, independent of a land base.  This offers a degree of resilience in the face of attacks against Guam naval base facilities.  Someone is beginning to think in terms of combat operations and that's a good thing!

USS Key West Alongside USNS Richard E. Byrd

Submarine Tender USS Frank Cable, AS-40

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(1)Commander, US Pacific Fleet website, “USS Key West conducts mobile logistics demonstration”, Lt.j.g. Meagan Morrison, 11-Dec-2019,

https://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/130541

Forward Presence - Deterrent or Provocation?

One of the tenets of US naval policy is forward presence which, the Navy believes, has a deterrent effect on potential enemies.  ComNavOps has repeatedly stated that forward presence, at least as practiced today, has zero deterrent effect.  However, for the sake of this discussion, let’s set my misgivings aside, accept the Navy’s premise, and examine it a bit closer.

To repeat, the premise is that forward presence equals deterrence.

However, what if the reverse is actually true – that forward presence not only fails to provide deterrence but actively encourages war?  Huh?  Well that can’t be right.  I mean, sure, maybe forward presence is debatable as far as accomplishing deterrence but it surely can’t encourage war … can it?

Well, where is the first place we always turn for answers?  That’s right, history!  What does history tell us about forward presence?  Let’s look at some examples.

Pearl Harbor – The Pearl Harbor naval base was developed during the 1920’s and ‘30s and became the home of the US Pacific fleet in 1939 and beyond.  It was hoped that the forward presence of the Pacific Fleet would temper Japanese encroachments on China and the surrounding region.  Many US analysts believed that the Japanese, if they initiated hostilities, would strike the Dutch East Indies, Singapore or Indochina.  Instead, as we know, the Japanese took advantage of the concentration of US naval and air power to deal what they hoped was a crippling blow.

It seems almost certain that the Japanese viewed the concentration of vulnerable US military power as too good an opportunity to pass up.  Instead of acting as a deterrent, the Pearl Harbor forward base acted as a stimulus for the Japanese who believed that destroying that much of the US Pacific forces would ensure their successful occupation of the various South Pacific islands and facilities that were their ultimate objectives. 

We see, then, that far from deterring Japan, the forward base of Pearl Harbor encouraged and hastened the onset of war by presenting a target too good for Japan to pass up.

Admittedly, this is pure speculation, though well reasoned.  We have no documents or contemporaneous statements to the effect that Pearl Harbor’s concentration of military might encouraged the war.  On the other hand, we have no statements to the contrary and many documented writings and statements about the attractiveness of Pearl Harbor as a target so the conclusion that the forward base encouraged war is eminently logical.

Falklands – The Falkland Islands (and South Georgia) provided forward presence and served as a forward base of sorts for UK interests in the Antarctic  region and minor trade activities.  The islands were the subject of disputed territorial claims by the UK and Argentina.  Argentina, which was suffering from domestic unrest and economic troubles, seized on the opportunity to use the Falklands to deflect internal political criticism and create a rallying point for the population.  With the UK’s main military forces far away and having witnessed the UK initiate territorial transfer discussions, Argentina believed that the UK would not respond to a seizure of the islands.  As we know, the British did respond and the Falklands War resulted.

While not a forward base in the classic military sense, the islands were still a forward base for UK interests and presented a convenient and irresistible target for Argentina.  The British forward presence encouraged the conflict.

United States Colonies – The forward presence represented by the British colonies in America in the early to mid 1700’s were a trigger for numerous conflicts between the French and British, including the well known French and Indian War of 1754-1763.  Just a little later, the American Revolution resulted in the formation of the United States.  Clearly, the British forward presence, in the form of colonies and military forces, acted as a trigger for multiple conflicts.

Poland – Germany began WWII by invading Poland.  While Poland was not a forward base/presence in the strict definition of such, it did, by aligning itself with the UK (1939 Agreement of Mutual Assistance, for example), become a de facto UK forward base/presence for hostilities and operations against Germany.  While there were multiple reasons for Germany’s selection of Poland as the initial strike of WWII (Lebensraum, for example), did Poland’s forward location (adjacent to Germany) and vulnerability make it too good a target for Hitler’s Germany to pass up and thus encouraged the start of war?

To be fair, this example is a bit of a reach and may be a case of attempting a bit of tortured reasoning to support the premise.

Guam – Although a war has not yet occurred, the US forward base at Guam offers the Chinese the same type of overwhelmingly enticing target that Pearl Harbor offered the Japanese.  Elimination of Guam as a forward base would severely impair US military operations in a war and the Chinese obviously recognize this.  Will a strike on Guam prove to be a temptation to good to pass up for the Chinese and encourage them to initiate a war?

US Middle East and Pacific Fleets – While not forward bases in and of themselves (though they are forward based in the respective regions), it is clear that the forward presence of the US Middle East and Pacific Fleets is stimulating aggressive acts, some meeting the definition of acts of war, by Iran and China – acts that would not occur if not for the presence of US naval assets.  Thus, forward presence is encouraging aggressive, war-tending acts.

Spanish-American War of 1898 – The Spanish forward presence/base in Cuba ignited various United States economic, strategic, and humanitarian interests.  The sinking of the USS Maine provided the trigger that allowed the US to justify the initiation of war but it was a war that was stimulated by the Spanish forward presence and was likely to happen with or without the Maine incident.

It seems clear that forward presence has the inherent tendency to encourage conflict rather than deter it.  That makes the US geopolitical strategic policy linking forward presence and deterrence highly suspect.  Thus, the entire rationale for the US Navy’s global forward presence is founded on an untrue premise that forward presence equals deterrence when, in fact, history suggests the exact opposite effect. 

While forward presence has a clear antagonistic effect, it is important to recognize that forward presence also accomplishes beneficial objectives and that an accelerated movement to war may be a ‘good’ and necessary step to those ends.  While the reverse case, meaning no forward presence, might have prevented many conflicts it would also have allowed many undesirable situations to arise.  For example, without the forward base of Pearl Harbor, the Japanese would have been able to achieve their Indo-China goals and might have been able to prevail in any subsequent conflict.  Had the British refrained from establishing forward bases in colonial America, the territory might well have been completely occupied by the French.  If the US naval presence were absent from the Middle East and South/East China Seas, Iran and China would likely have established a militant and military presence (China has annexed the South China Sea even with our presence!).  And so on.

Thus, the mere fact that forward presence encourages conflict is not, in and of itself, reason to avoid it.  Instead, the use of forward presence should be entered into with careful forethought as to the repercussions and should be balanced against the desired gains and benefits.

One final thought is that forward presence, when combined with a policy of appeasement, which is how the US implements its forward presence, promotes all the negatives of aggressive behavior with none of the benefits.  It is the worst of both worlds.

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Comment note:  The examples offered have varying degrees of validity and none are absolute, clear cut, indisputable proof of the premise.  Any one example could be argued.  Further, the reverse of the premise which would be that forward presence prevents war and, if true, would disprove the post premise, is impossible to prove, absent statements from foreign leaders stating that they wanted to initiate war but were discouraged from doing so by the forward presence of their enemy and, of course, there are no such statements on record.  Thus, the way to read this post is to consider the totality of the examples and logic and consider the pattern described herein.  I am specifically NOT going to entertain individual arguments about the examples.  If you wish to comment, do so about the overall premise rather than individual examples.  Fair warning.

Finally, regarding forward presence and deterrence, someone is inevitably going to claim that our forward presence in, say, Europe, has resulted in no Soviet/Russian war and, therefore, must be true.  This is a case of correlation versus causation.  Just because there is a correlation (presence and no war) does not mean there is a causation.  One could just as logically argue that our implementation and use of fluoride in our water supply in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s correlates to no wars with the Soviets/Russia.  Therefore, fluoride must prevent wars as well as cavities!  Well, obviously fluoride doesn’t prevent wars – that’s correlation without causation.