Island Naval Warfare

Pre-WWII, naval analysts envisioned open ocean clashes between mammoth battle lines of opposing battleships.  Cruisers with float planes were designed to operate as far ranging scouts for the battle line, seeking out the enemy’s battle fleet.  Destroyers would support the battle line by launching torpedo attacks and defending against the enemy’s torpedo attacks.  The vision was well understood, doctrine was well established, and the concept was extensively practiced.
 
Of course, reality came and none of that materialized.  Instead, the Navy found themselves fighting as small, disjointed units amongst the Solomon Islands, lost in the darkness, blinded by the mass of the islands, utterly confused, and unable to form a battle line that lasted more than a minute when combat began.
 
What were a few of the relevant factors that rendered the pre-war vision and scenarios irrelevant?
 
Detection – Detection of the enemy, whether visual or radar, was reduced to very short ranges by darkness and by the blocking mass of the islands.  Visual detection of enemy ships was severely hindered by the blocking mass of nearby islands with ships either hidden behind the islands or obscured on the near side by the background of the dark mass of the islands.  Similarly, the islands cast concealing radar shadows and returned clutter which hid or obscured targets and rendered radar far less effective than was hoped.
 
In one notable example, US ships were fired on by Japanese destroyers and the US returned fire against a nearby island, believing that the flashes from the Japanese ship’s guns were actually land artillery batteries!
 
Range – The impaired detection meant that engagement ranges were incredibly short compared to the extended ranges envisioned pre-war.  The short range had major implications for torpedo and gunnery tactics, none of which had been envisioned or practiced pre-war.
 
Uncertainty – The difficulty in detection led to a great deal of uncertainty in target identification – what we now refer to as Identification Friend or Foe (IFF).  Many firing opportunities were passed by due to uncertainty about target identification.  The well known axiom, ‘attack effectively, first’, was extremely difficult to implement.  The lack of close combat doctrine contributed to the uncertainty.  Having no viable doctrine, uncertainty abounded;  no commander had any solid expectation of what other friendly ships would do and where they would go and so they were often forced to hold fire due to uncertain identification.  This cost us badly on numerous occasions.
 
 
Given that our pre-war exercises and planning (War Plan Orange, for example) correctly anticipated an island hopping strategy, it is baffling that we didn’t make the logical conclusion that we needed to practice naval combat in close proximity to islands … but we didn’t and so we had to learn on the fly.  Learning on the fly in combat is the most expensive and deadly way to learn and, unsurprisingly, we paid a heavy price for the knowledge.
 

 
Today
 
Bolstered, now, by a thorough understanding of history and its lessons, we can turn our attention to current events and a war with China.  It is quite likely that we will be fighting amongst the islands surrounding the East and South China Seas and yet we’re practicing for long range missile engagements in open ocean.  Does this sound eerily familiar?  We’re repeating the mistake of WWII by failing to train for naval combat amongst islands.
 
To offer some context, Wikipedia notes that Indonesia consists of 17,000 islands and the Philippines have 7,641 islands.  Given that those are likely combat areas, wouldn’t it make sense to anticipate island naval combat and begin training for it?
 
Of course, it’s possible that a war with China will avoid any proximity to islands (although that seems like wishful thinking more than reality) but we should, nevertheless, train for it.  If it doesn’t happen it’s no big deal and if it does, we’ll be prepared.
 
How will the various island factors impact naval combat today?
 
Radar – The physics of radar haven’t changed.  Islands will still cast radar shadows and generate cluttered returns that will hide or obscure targets.  Recall the supposed land-based, anti-ship missile attacks directed against the Burke class destroyer, USS Mason?  As it turned out, we couldn’t even determine whether attacks had even occurred (they didn’t!), likely due to the interference/obscuration of the land mass. 
 
Detection ranges will still be far shorter than expected.  Incoming missiles, especially sea-skimmers, will be hidden in radar shadows.  The same islands that hide us, hide the enemy.
 
Of course, no sane commander will be using radar, anyway, so radar detection will be an infrequent occurrence.
 
Optical – The wise naval commander will be using passive sensors, for the most part, and islands still obscure targets on both the near and far side of the land mass.
 
Missiles – Islands will degrade missile effectiveness.  Ships sailing close inshore will be obscured by the surrounding land mass and modern missiles will likely lack the ability to discriminate a ship from a rocky outcropping, atoll, or other mass.  To the best of my knowledge, no navy or manufacturer has considered missile performance near islands.  We need to conduct realistic testing of missiles in proximity to islands and find out how well they can identify and acquire targets obscured by land masses.
 
Islands will block missile approaches.  A sea skimming missile (which most modern anti-ship missiles are) will be unable to attack a target on the far side of an island or will have to take an altered path to navigate around the island to approach the target.  We need to factor this into our combat tactics.
 
UAVs – UAVs will be affected by islands.  They’ll have to fly higher, linger longer to search and clear/identify targets near land, compensate for island-blocked communications, etc.  UAVs may also take advantage of islands by hiding in their shadows and background.  A UAV operating against the background of an island mass may well be able to ‘approach’ a target quite closely without being detected.  Again, we haven’t made any attempt to study UAV operations near islands and develop appropriate offensive and defensive doctrine and tactics.
 
 
Conclusion
 
There is every reason to expect that we’ll find ourselves operating in, around, and near islands and there is no reason to believe that the various WWII factors that made such operations dangerous, difficult, and chaotic won’t still apply.  Detections and engagements will still be sudden, unexpected, and short ranged.  We desperately need to begin training for such operations. 
 
We have no idea how missiles will behave near islands.  We have no idea what doctrine and tactics will prove successful.  We can prepare for island naval combat or we can be surprised and pay the horrific price to learn on the fly.
 
Assuming the anticipated scenarios occur, one blindingly obvious conclusion is that large caliber guns will be of immense value.  With short detection ranges, large caliber guns can establish and sustain fire that missiles can’t match and can do so far more cost effectively.  As our Ukraine donations have amply demonstrated, we’ll run out of high end missiles very quickly.  Large caliber guns and cheap (free on a relative basis!) shells will seem a godsend, at that point.
 
Hand in hand with large caliber guns is armor.  Ships that can absorb damage and stay in the fight (a Burke cannot) will be the difference between victory and defeat.
 
Bear in mind that we aren’t just talking about opposing ships being nose to nose like they were at Guadalcanal.  The scenario could be an anti-ship attack from a hundred miles away, directed towards a ship in or near the first island chain islands.  All the factors we discussed apply.  How will the missiles identify valid targets?  Will the missiles need to be ‘waypointed’ around various islands?  Will the target ships be effectively hidden by the surrounding islands?  Will terminal guidance be required?  We need to understand naval combat in and amongst islands.
 
We’re repeating the mistakes of WWII by failing to prepare for combat scenarios that are likely to materialize and focusing exclusively on open ocean scenarios that are less likely.

Solomon Islands Issues Moratorium on US Naval Vessels

The recent denial of a scheduled port call by a US Coast Guard vessel (see, "US Denied Solomons Port Call") has now expanded to a blanket moratorium on visits and port calls by US naval vessels.

 

The US government was notified by the Solomons on Monday of a “moratorium on all naval visits, pending updates in protocol procedures,” … [1]

 

China signs a security pact with Solomons and suddenly the US is banned from port calls in the Solomons.  It doesn’t take a genius to see the connection. 

 

Chinese vessels, of course, are permitted by the recently signed security pact between Solomon Islands and China.

 

China has masterfully achieved a takeover of the Solomons and now calls the shots there.  The Solomon Islands are now a vassal state of China.  China will begin militarizing the islands in short order, no doubt.

 

China is conquering the Pacific without firing a shot while the US watches.  If the US doesn't start engaging diplomatically, the Marines are going to have to set up their small missile-shooting units along the coast of California!

 

 

 

[1]https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-30/us-disappointed-after-solomons-ignores-coast-guard-request

US Denied Solomons Port Call

We recently noted that the Chinese have secured the Solomon Islands as part of their expansion into the Pacific (see, “Chinese Seizure of Solomons Islands”).  Newsmax website reports that a US Coast Guard vessel was denied access to a scheduled port call at Guadalcanal in the Solomons for refueling and reprovisioning.

 

A U.S. coast guard cutter conducting patrols as part of an international mission to prevent illegal fishing was recently unable to get clearance for a scheduled port call in the Solomon Islands … [1]

 

Who do you think made that decision:  Solomons or China?  This was China’s way of demonstrating to the US who controls that area of the Pacific … and it’s not the US.

 

The Coast Guard vessel was forced to divert to Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea.

 

Apparently, the Chinese are also excluding the Royal Navy.

 

… reports that the HMS Spey, also taking part in Operation Island Chief, was also denied a port call in the Solomon Islands.[1]

 

Solomons appears well on its way to becoming a Chinese vassal state and a forward base for Chinese military operations.

 

China seized the entire South and East China Seas without firing a shot and appears well on its way to seizing the Pacific.  In addition to having seized the Solomons, in 2019 China re-established an embassy in Kiribati (Tarawa) which severed long-standing ties with Taiwan in favor of China.  Kiribati is the site of a Chinese satellite tracking station which, presumably, has been re-activated.  China is pushing hard to make inroads in Papua New Guinea, offering security, trade arrangements, and military training and aid.  Chinese medical teams have been dispersed throughout the Pacific and China is pursuing trade arrangements with almost every Pacific island nation.  Guam is being slowly isolated and surrounded as we speak.

 

 

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[1]Newsmax website, “Report: US Coast Guard Ship Denied Port Call in Solomons”, 26-Aug-2022,

https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/u-s-coast-guard-solomon/2022/08/26/id/1084721/

Chinese Seizure of Solomon Islands

The Chinese just completed a security agreement with Solomon Islands which gives China’s military access to the islands.  What, specifically, does the agreement allow?  No official copy of the agreement has been released but a leaked ?draft? copy reveals,

 

A draft of the deal leaked online said it would allow China to send armed forces to the Solomon Islands to protect Chinese investments. Chinese warships would also be permitted dock on the islands.[1]

 

Prime Minister Mannesseh Sogavare told his parliament in Honiara a day later that [the security agreement] will allow China to send police and military personnel to the Solomon Islands “to assist in maintaining social order”. Chinese warships also could stop in port there for “logistical replenishment.”[2]

 

According to the draft text, the agreement would allow China to “make ship visits to, carry out logistical replenishment in, and have stopover and transition in Solomon Islands”, leading to fears that China could secure a naval base less than 2,000km from Australia’s east coast.[3]

 

“The agreement states that China may, according to its own needs and with the consent of the Solomon Islands government make ship visits to the Solomons and carry out logistical replenishment and stopover and transition in the Solomons.”[4]

 

The above is bad.  It gives China the opening it needs to begin establishing a permanent naval base.  However, far worse is the following passage from the document:

 

… the relevant forces of China can be used to protect the safety of Chinese personnel and major projects in Solomon Islands.[5]

 

This passage gives China carte blanche to establish a permanent military presence in the Solomons in the name of ‘protecting the safety of Chinese personnel and major projects’.  How flimsy of an excuse would the Chinese need to justify bringing in military forces?  The thinnest of excuses would suffice.  Given the blatant lies the Chinese routinely engage in, they won’t hesitate to concoct some ‘safety’ issue when the time comes to establish their base.

 

Does anyone recall the Chinese assurances that the illegal artificial islands in the South China Sea would not be militarized?  Of course, they were militarized in short order.  China’s word means nothing and China has a habit of militarizing everything it touches.  There is absolutely no doubt that China will construct a naval base in the Solomons under the guise of ‘logistical replenishment’ facility improvements.

 

There is also a confidentiality clause in the agreement which prohibits either party from publicizing any of the terms or actions related to the agreement without the other’s consent.[5]  This provides further cover for the Chinese to act clandestinely.

 

So, what has been America’s response?

 

A high-level American delegation will go to the Solomon Islands next week.  The United States said it will re-open its embassy in Honiara, which has been closed since 1993.[1]

 

Talk about closing the barn door after the horse has got out! 

 

The US has talked about a Pacific Pivot but has utterly failed to do anything.  We haven’t substantially increased our military presence.  We haven’t made any significant attempt to conduct a political campaign in the region.  We’ve exerted no economic influence.  And so on.  Clearly, we’ve ignored relations with the various Pacific countries. 

 

Sending a delegation to the Solomons after the fact is simultaneously useless, embarrassing, and humiliating.

 

At this point, one might ask whether a Chinese base (and there will be one) in the Solomon’s is a serious concern for the US.  After all, the Solomons are around 3970 miles from the Chinese mainland coast, depending on exactly where one measures from.  Isn’t that an awfully distant and isolated base for China?  Is it really a threat?

 

A Chinese base in the Solomons gives them their Pearl Harbor … their far forward base to support deep Pacific air and naval forces in both times of war and times of war.  Huh?  Did I just repeat myself?  Don’t I mean times of war and times of peace?  No, I don’t because, for China, there is no difference between war and peace.  For China, peace is just the non-shooting portion of the war.  They are already at war with us and they’re winning.  We’re steadily retreating and appeasing.  They’re achieving all their objectives and we’re failing ours, to the extent that we even have any objectives. 

 

In the mind of the Chinese, peace and war are the same thing.  There’s no difference other than methods and means.  China is at war and we’re just sitting back in a Chamberlain appeasement mode.  A base in the Solomons gives the Chinese a resupply and support facility to further their expansion efforts.

 

Just for fun, let’s check the distance from Pearl Harbor to San Francisco … it’s 2400 miles.  That’s awfully isolated and far from the US mainland and resupply.  So, if the isolation/distance argument is valid for China in the Solomons, it’s also valid for the US and Pearl Harbor.  Of course, Guam is even more isolated and far from the US and resupply at 5800 miles.  On a related note, the distance from Pearl Harbor to Guam is 3800 miles.  So, as China acquires bases in the Pacific, who’s more isolated and distant? 

 

Consider these distances: 

• Distance from Chinese coast to Solomon Islands = 3970 miles 

• Distance from San Francisco to Solomon Islands = 5960 miles
• Distance from Pearl Harbor to Solomon Islands = 3560 miles
• Distance from Guam to Solomon Islands = 1914 miles
• Distance from Darwin to Solomon Islands = 2000 miles

 

It is the US that has far flung and isolated bases.  With a couple more security agreements with other Pacific island nations, it will be the US in the position of being isolated and unsupported in the Pacific.

 

Aside from Japan, the only other Pacific military of any note is Australia and they are an extremely small force.  For example, the entire combat fleet of the Australian navy[6] consists of :

 

• 8x Anzac frigates
• 3x Hobart destroyers
• 6x Collins submarines

 

That’s not a significant naval force. 

 

The US currently has a significant advantage in terms of global geopolitics, finances, economics, presence, and military force.  However, we are doing very little to maintain those advantages and almost nothing to enhance them.  Meanwhile, China is expanding their influence in all those areas at a breathtaking pace.  They are expanding and winning;  the US is shrinking and losing.

 

A Chinese Pearl Harbor in the Solomons is just the next step in China’s plan to conquer the Pacific.

 

We need to recognize that we are at war with China and start fighting back.

 

 

 

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[1]VOA News website, “Solomon Islands Sign Security Pact With China”, Phil Mercer, 20-Apr-2022,

https://www.voanews.com/a/solomon-islands-sign-security-pact-with-china-/6537279.html

 

[2]https://www.channelnewsasia.com/world/solomon-islands-china-pact-has-us-riled-2642971

 

[3]The Guardian website, “China requested heavily armed security team be sent to Solomon Islands, leaked documents reveal”, Kate Lyons, 12-Apr-2022,

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/12/china-requested-heavily-armed-security-team-be-sent-to-solomon-islands-leaked-documents-reveal

 

[4]https://asiapacificreport.nz/2022/03/25/leaked-draft-china-solomon-islands-security-pact-causes-pacific-stir/

 

[5]https://www.michaelsmithnews.com/2022/03/text-of-whats-reportedly-a-securitymilitary-cooperation-agreement-between-china-and-solomon-islands/comments/

 

[6]https://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/ships-boats-craft/current-ships