Can You Afford To Lose It?

Newsmax website has an article about a Chinese jet powered VTOL drone intended for surface ships.[1]  The article goes on to rave about the advantages this will confer upon the Chinese navy … according to Chinese sources/propaganda.  Setting the dubious nature of the claims aside, the article does raise an interesting and highly relevant issue that the US Navy/military is struggling with, generally unsuccessfully, and that is the question of whether the supposed warfare-changing technology of the moment actually has any value.
 
For example, let’s consider a hypothetical example of an advanced drone with all kinds of near-magical capabilities for surface ships.  Who wouldn’t want it, right?  I mean, it could potentially change the future of warfare … until you start asking a few simple questions.
 

• Can it be produced in quantity?  -answer: no, it’s so magically advanced that it’s hideously expensive
• Can it be produced in large quantities?  -answer: no, it’s too expensive and its complexity and advanced technology means it takes months or years to produce
• Can it be serviced in the field?  -answer: no, its advanced technology and complexity requires advanced depot level maintenance support
• Can it do anything combat-useful?  -answer: it can probably carry only one small munition which is almost insignificant in the big picture;  ISR might be a useful function
• Is it small enough to not impact existing ship’s functions?  -answer: no, complexity, range, capability etc. all come at a cost and one of those costs is size
• Can a ship carry enough to compensate for attrition or simple mechanical failure?  -answer: no, its size and cost preclude large quantities on a single ship
• Can it perform its function without giving away the host ship’s location?  -answer: no, it will require frequent/continuous two-way communication for sensor analysis and command/control

 
 
Conclusion
 
Sounds good on paper but fails the real world, value test.
 
The US (and good to see China is susceptible to this, as well) is so focused on the technology that we forget to ask the real world combat questions.  Sometimes (well, most of the time!) that amazing feat of technology simply has no real world value.  LCS … Zumwalt/LRLAP … EMALS … magic elevators … large non-stealthy UAVs … etc.

 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]Newsmax website, “China Makes Major Leap With 'Jet Drone'”, Sandy Fitzgerald, 15-Aug-2025,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/china-navy-jet-drone/2025/08/15/id/1222629/

Claims

As we discuss ship and aircraft design, we often repeat statements we hear and read from various sources and then proceed to make arguments to support or refute those statements.  We typically pick and choose specific features of the given weapon system or platform that we favor and use those specifics to batter detractors into submission.  That’s fine.  It’s fun and it keeps blogs in business.  However, if we’re interested in serious discussions and want to actually learn rather than just engage in arguments and try to chalk up “wins”, it’s vitally important to recognize where the various claims that we rely on come from.  The claim is only as good as its source – that’s a variant of the venerable programming adage, Garbage In, Garbage Out (GIGO).

 

Regarding weapon system claims,

 

-       the only reliable source of claims is from authenticated combat reports.

-       the second best source of claims is from rigorous, systematic, statistically based, realistic testing such as that conducted by DOT&E.

-       the most common source of claims is manufacturers.

-       the least reliable source of claims is US Navy program managers and spokesmen.

-       blogs vary widely in the reliability of their claims but the good ones are far more accurate than the Navy’s official claims.

 

 

Here’s some examples of wildly exaggerated claims that never panned out:

 

• VDS – The LCS VDS was going to revolutionize anti-submarine warfare – ignoring the fact that VDS systems have been around for decades – and yet the LCS ASW function has been officially terminated.
• Modular warships – Modularity was going to revolutionize warfare, allowing ships to convert from one function to another in a matter of hours.  Of course, the Navy abandoned that when it was found to be impractical.
• Distributed lethality – Small, isolated, forward deployed ships with a handful of weapons would wreak havoc on enemy navies.  We’ve discussed the folly of that claim and the reality of war waits patiently to further emphasize the folly.
• Anti- Torpedo System – The anti-torpedo system was a proven system developed as an urgent need program and was claimed to provide protection for carriers.  It was installed on a carrier and quickly shown to be a complete failure and removed from service.
• Amphibious Escorts – The Navy claimed to have discovered that escorted amphibious ships would be more survivable than unescorted ships;  a fact known since the earliest sailing days.
• IRST – The Hornet’s IRST was going to revolutionize aerial warfare, again ignoring the fact that it has been around for decades.
• Networks – Networks are claimed to allow us to compensate for lack of firepower and quantity.  Reality has demonstrated, however, that we can’t even keep track of giant, hulking cargo ships, reefs, and Iranian territorial waters.
• Lasers – Fully functional, instantaneously destructive lasers have been claimed to be just around the corner … and have been for several decades, now.
• Rail Guns – These were going to revolutionize warfare by causing the unstoppable, instantaneous destruction of any enemy asset, at near zero cost.  The Navy has terminated the rail gun effort.
• Zumwalt AGS – The Advanced Gun System was going to allow the Navy to provide pinpoint naval firepower 70-100 miles inland.  Of course, the AGS was cancelled after its one-of-a-kind munition reached the $1M per round cost and it failed to come anywhere near its claimed range or accuracy.

 

 

Keep the source and credibility of claims firmly in mind as you evaluate and discuss various systems.

Adaptive Engines

One of the programs that’s causing excitement among military aircraft observers is the adaptive engine (AE) effort which is intended to be applied to the F-35 and the next generation aircraft.

 

What kinds of benefits are being sought?  From Wikipedia,

 

The AETP [Adaptive Engine Transition Program] goal is to demonstrate 25% improved fuel efficiency, 10% additional thrust, and significantly better thermal management.[1]

 

From Wiki, here’s a brief description of the technology and hoped for benefits:

 

The XA100 is a three-stream adaptive cycle engine that can adjust the bypass ratio and fan pressure to increase fuel efficiency or thrust, depending on the scenario. It does this by employing an adaptive fan that can direct air into a third bypass stream in order to increase fuel economy and act as a heat sink for cooling; in particular, this would enable greater use of the high speed, low altitude part of the F-35 envelope. The increased cooling and power generation also enables the potential employment of directed energy weapons in the future.  When additional thrust is needed, the air from the third stream can be directed to the core and fan streams. In addition to three-stream adaptive cycle configuration, the engine also uses new heat-resistant materials such as ceramic matrix composites (CMC) to enable higher turbine temperatures and improved performance. According to GE, the engine can offer up to 35% increased range and 25% reduction in fuel burn over current low-bypass turbofans.[1]

 

Currently, the F-35A has an unrefueled range in the region of 1,350 miles, which would be increased to around 1,800 miles with the new engine. [ed. 33% increase][2]

 

So, to sum up, what are the benefits?  From the above description, we see claims of :

 

• 25% fuel efficiency
• 35% increased range
• 10% additional thrust
• Better thermal signature management

 

On the other hand, what do we know about developmental programs?  Well, with 100% historical certainty, we know that developmental programs always overpromise and underdeliver.  Thus,

 

• Costs always increase
• Schedules always slip
• Claimed capabilities are never met
• The new technology will be vastly more complex and less reliable then the preceding technology

 

In addition, the claimed benefits are obtained only under perfect conditions.  For example, the claimed increase in range is only if the engine is used under ideal conditions for the entire distance.  In reality, no aircraft is going to cruise under perfect, maximum economy conditions for an entire mission.  Therefore, the increase will be significantly less than claimed.

 

So, combining the three factors of claims, historical reality, and realistic operating conditions, what would more realistic benefits be?

 

• 15% fuel efficiency
• 20% increased range
• 5% additional thrust
• Slightly better thermal signature management

 

 

Even those are likely on the optimistic side!

 

We don’t know the costs but, like any cutting edge technology, they’ll be eye-watering.  Now, let’s combine the more realistic benefits with the massive costs, greater complexity, and lower reliability that goes hand-in-hand with greater complexity and ask ourselves, are the benefits worth the cost, complexity, and lower reliability (reduced aircraft readiness/availability)? 

 

Given that aircraft readiness rates are already in the toilet, is introducing an even more complex and less reliable engine really a step in the right direction?

 

Are we sure this isn’t a case of pursing a technology for its own sake rather than for any actual gain in combat effectiveness?  In fact, let’s think about combat effectiveness.

 

Fuel efficiency is a cost savings but is not a direct improvement to combat effectiveness.  Similarly, increased range may offer some improvements in flexibility of operational planning or loiter time but is not really a direct improvement to combat effectiveness.  Thrust, on the other hand, can enhance combat effectiveness but not significantly in the small amount we’re talking about.  Thermal signature reduction also offers a direct improvement to combat effectiveness but the degree of improvement is unquantified and will likely be minor.

 

Without a doubt, gains in thrust (even small gains), fuel efficiency, and range are all nice to have.  No one would argue with them or turn them down … if they were free.  However, as with any new, cutting edge technology, they most certainly will not be free in terms of dollars, time, or reliability.  There will be staggering prices to be paid.

 

Consider the examples of the LCS, Zumwalt, F-35, and Ford.  All promised huge gains but the reality is that the gains have been non-existent to minimal and, in some respects, have resulted in decreases in combat effectiveness while incurring horrific costs and massive schedule delays.  Do we really think that never before done adaptive engines will be the breakthrough technology that will achieve all its goals and do so affordably?  Only a fool would believe that.

 

So, again, is it worth it?

 

I would suggest, no.

 

 

Conclusion

 

An adaptive engine will, without a doubt, result in staggering costs, increased complexity, decreased aircraft readiness and minor improvements mainly financial and logistic in nature.  Are the improvements worth the cost and problems?  K.I.S.S. rules the battlefield.  Is a more complex and less reliable engine the way to follow the K.I.S.S. mandate?

 

We also need to consider the implication for war.  When the war with China comes, we’ll need lots of engines.  The more complex the engine, the fewer we’ll be able to produce and the longer they’ll take to make.  During war, it’s better to have a simpler engine that meets 80% of the performance needs and can be quickly and easily produced than to have complex engines that are difficult to make and cannot be produced in the required quantities.

 

China is coming for us and we need to reorient our thinking to wartime production requirements instead of long, drawn out, unaffordable, complex peacetime requirements.  The adaptive engine appears to be more of a business case than a combat case.

 

 

 

_____________________________________

 

[1]Wikipedia, “General Electric XA100”, 14-Apr-2022,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Electric_XA100#:~:text=The%20General%20Electric%20XA100%20is%20a%20three-stream%20adaptive,fighter%20program%2C%20the%20Next%20Generation%20Air%20Dominance%20%28NGAD%29

 

[2]The Drive website, “F-35s Could Get New Engines As Soon As 2027”,Thomas Newdick & Joseph Trevithick, 11-Dec-2021,

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43456/f-35s-could-get-new-engines-as-soon-as-2027

Requirements Drift

In theory, an acquisition program, be it aircraft, ship, software, or whatever, lays out a set of requirements, locks them in, designs the product to those requirements, and then produces the product.  In reality, the Navy constantly alters the requirements all the way through the design and construction phases which leads, inexorably, to massive cost overruns and schedule delays.  However, for the sake of this discussion, we’ll ignore that reality and consider the ideal acquisition process.

 

Having produced a product that meets the requirements, that product then enters service and, if the requirements were well designed, the product winds up being reasonably useful and productive because it meets requirements that are relevant to the fleet’s needs – a win all the way around.

 

Let’s consider requirements.  Even in the best case, where the requirements were reasonably and logically established and meet actual needs, the needs – and hence, requirements – begin changing the day after they’re established.  Why?  This isn’t a trick question.  The answer is obvious.  Threats change, circumstances change, technology changes, geopolitical strategies change, and, therefore, the needs of the fleet change on a daily basis.  The longer the time span from the locking in of the requirements to the time of entering service, the greater the deviation will be between the design requirements and the current requirements.  Thus, the longer the time span from the locking in of the requirements to the time of entering service, the more pronounced the loss of applicability and usefulness of the product will be relative to the current requirements. 

 

The blindingly obvious conclusion from the preceding is that we must do everything possible to minimize the time between locking in of acquisition requirements and entry into service.  The shorter the time span, the greater the usefulness of the product.

 

To illustrate what happens when we fail to minimize that time span, consider the example of the F-35.  Conceptual design and, hence, the process of establishing requirements, began as far back as 1993 with the establishment of the Joint Advanced Strike Technology program and prototype construction contracts were awarded in 1996.  Thus, requirements were being locked in as early as the early to mid 1990’s.  It is now thirty years later and the F-35 is just now entering service and has yet to achieve full combat status as provided by Block 4 software and a functional ALIS support program.  Without a doubt, requirements have changed drastically over the intervening thirty years.  What might have been an applicable, useful, and capable aircraft if it had been fielded twenty years ago has become a marginally applicable, barely useful aircraft that is ill-suited for the Pacific/Chinese challenge we face today.  The time span between establishment of requirements and entry into service was too long for the aircraft to retain applicability and usefulness.

 

Now consider the example of the WWII F6F Hellcat.  The contract for the prototype XF6F-1 Hellcat was issued in 1941 and the Hellcat entered fleet service two years later in 1943.  The Hellcat was relevant and useful because the time frame between requirements and service was short.

 

Well, sure, the Hellcat could be quickly fielded because the technology was so primitive.  Okay, how about a more modern example? 

 

The Grumman F-14 Tomcat contract was issued to Grumman in 1969.  First flight occurred in 1970 and Initial Operating Capability was declared in 1973.  First deployment occurred in 1974.  The Tomcat went from design (requirements locked) to deployment in 5 years.  The Tomcat was relevant and useful because the requirements were still applicable thanks to the short time frame.  The Tomcat was every bit as advanced for its time as the F-35.  We’ve just forgotten how to produce aircraft (or anything else!) in short, relevant time frames.  Can we still produce aircraft quickly?  Of course we can!  See, “How To Build A Better Aircraft”.

 

Lest anyone think that the lag between requirements and service is only an aircraft issue, the same concerns apply to ships. 

 

The LCS, for example, was conceptualized in the 1990’s and requirements were locked in in the 2003-4 time frame.  Now, 12-17 years or so later, as the vessels are entering service and the Navy looks to actually employ the ship, the requirements have changed so much that the LCS is nearly useless - of course, a total absence of useful modules doesn’t help!  The 12-17 year lag between requirements and entry into service proved too long and the ship had no role by the time it was completed.  The littoral combat role it was intended for had vanished to be replaced by a Pacific/China focus that the LCS was entirely unsuited for.

 

Another example is the Zumwalt whose conceptual origins date back to the SC-21 program in 1994 and, subsequently, the DD-21 program whose requirements were being locked in via a 1997 Operational Requirements Document and an Advanced Development Memorandum.   Many of these requirements eventually carried over to what became the Zumwalt program.  Final requirements were set by 2005 when the detailed design phase began.  Now, 16 years later, the Zumwalt, the lead ship of the class, has just completed the final combat systems installation and is undergoing final testing.  There’s no rush, of course, because the ship no longer has a purpose and the Navy is relegating the ship to experimental unmanned squadron testing – of course, the utter failure of the Advanced Gun System didn’t help!  The 16-27 year lag between requirements and entry into service proved too long and the ship had no role by the time it was completed.  The littoral combat/bombardment role that the Zumwalt was intended for had vanished to be replaced by an open ocean, naval warfare need directed towards China and for which the Zumwalt was unsuited.

 

 

Summary

 

What we learn from this is that the time between requirements and entry into service is, arguably, the most important factor in determining whether a ship or aircraft will prove useful.  An asset, no matter how well conceptualized and designed, will lose relevance with every day that passes after the requirements are set.  It is imperative that the lag between establishment of requirements and entry into service be minimized.  We need to recall the example of the F-14 development time frame and relearn how to quickly produce new ships and planes.

 

Contemplating the various programs that have come and gone over the last few decades, a very good argument can be made that any lag period that exceeds 5 years from requirements to service will result in an asset that is highly likely to have lost the majority of its usefulness.  Recognition of this constraint mandates that we abandon our fascination with attempting to build in non-existent, fantasy level technology and, instead, stick to existing technologies – a theme ComNavOps has repeatedly preached. 

New Aircraft Frequency

For generations, we’ve built multiple aircraft at a time and had many more waiting in the wings of industrial research and development.  Now, however, we’ve devolved to the point where we produce only one new aircraft every forty years or so.  Consider the frequency of introduction of new Navy combat [meaning fighter or attack] aircraft as demonstrated in the tables below.  I’ve tried to list them all but I’ve likely overlooked one or two.

 

 

 

	Introduced
F4F Wildcat	1940
TBM Avenger	1942
F6F Hellcat	1943
SB2C Helldiver	1942
F4U Corsair	1942
F7F Tigercat	1944
F8F Bearcat	1945
A-1 Skyraider	1946
FH Phantom	1947
F2H Banshee	1948
F9F Panther	1949
F7U Cutlass	1951
F9F Cougar	1952
FJ-2 Fury	1954
A-4 Skyhawk	1956
A3D Skywarrior	1956
F3H Demon	1956
F11F Tiger	1956
F8U Crusader	1957
A-5 Vigilante	1961
F-4 Phantom II	1961
A-6 Intruder	1963
A-7 Cosair	1967
F-14 Tomcat	1974
F-18 Hornet	1983
F-35 Lightning	2019

 

 

 

Now, if we take that data and tabulate the number of new aircraft introduced by decade, the declining frequency trend jumps out, as shown in the table below.

 

 

 

Decade	Number of New Aircraft
1940’s	11
1950’s	8
1960’s	4
1970’s	1
1980’s	1
1990’s	0
2000’s	0
2010’s	1
2020’s	0

 

 

And here it is in graphical form:

  

 

 As we can clearly see, the frequency of new aircraft introductions has dropped dramatically from several per decade in the 1940’s through the 1960’s to nearly non-existent now. 

 

Incredibly, stunningly, unbelievably, we’ve introduced only one new aircraft since the Hornet in 1983.  That’s one new aircraft in the subsequent 38 years.  One aircraft in nearly four decades.  I’m going to pause for a second to give you a chance to let that sink in …   …   …  

 

As a result of the reduced frequency, we’ve gone from having multiple aircraft to choose from and new technology introductions occurring on a regular basis to one mammoth aircraft program every 40+ years and with no possibility of significant new technology introductions.  All we can do is apply peripheral upgrades around the margins of obsolete aircraft in an attempt to keep them even a little bit relevant.

 

We’ve lost the flexibility and adaptability that came from having multiple aircraft types to choose from.  You say the F4U Corsair turned out not to be a great carrier aircraft?  That’s okay, we had other aircraft to choose from and we could make the Corsair a land based aircraft where it was better suited.  We had options.

 

Today, if we were to find out that the F-35 is not well suited for the anticipated Pacific theatre role (spoiler … it’s not!) we have no other choice.  Our next new aircraft is going to be 10-20 years down the road – if we fast track it ... longer if we don’t.

 

When we had multiple aircraft, the aircraft manufacturers engaged in internal research and development and developed new aircraft on their own dime because they knew that new aircraft would be purchased every few years and that they had a good chance of being a provider and making sales.  Now, with only a single aircraft purchased every 20-30 years, there is no incentive for the manufacturers to develop a new aircraft on their own.  The odds are that they won’t get any sales and, if they do, the quantities will, inevitably, be cut and they’ll be lucky to break even on their investment.

 

We’ve also lost the variety that comes from having multiple manufacturers developing multiple aircraft on their own.  Now, we get one aircraft and no variety.  This must change and I've described how (see, "How To Build A Better Aircraft").

There's also the issue of preserving a robust industrial base but that's a topic for another post.

USS Albacore and Submarine Development

The submarine USS Albacore prototyped the now-standard US tear drop shaped submarine hull and represented a major leap in technology.  During that same general time period, the US Navy made additional extensive improvements in submarine technology which saw the introduction of nuclear reactors, new hull shapes, new propeller systems, new diving/control plane systems, greatly enhanced quieting, deeper dive limits, new ‘flight’ control systems, and much more.

USS Albacore

So, what’s our interest in the Albacore, today?  It’s the lessons that Albacore offers about how to develop technology.  We’re so used to the incessant drum beat of developmental and acquisition - often, the two being concurrent! - failure that we’ve forgotten that we once completely understood how to engage in technological advancement and acquisition and, most stunning to us today, we’ve forgotten that we used to be able to execute large leaps in technology in very short time frames – times that, frankly, seem like fantasy to us and, if anyone proposed similar time frames and similar degrees of advancement today, we’d laugh them off as unrealistic dreamers.  So, let’s look at the Albacore and its lessons.

At the end of WWII, the Gato/Balao class subs represented the peak of US submarine technology but, even then, it was apparent to naval designers that there was so much more potential in submarines but that it would require some radically new technology.  Not even the evolutionary advancement of the Tang class, essentially an improved WWII sub, could realize the submarine potential.

Tang Class

The missing, necessary piece of the potential puzzle was a way to transform the submarine from a surface ship that could, on occasion, submerge to a true undersea vessel that was inherently more at home under the water than on the surface and would perform better underwater than on the surface.  Thus, in 1949, Navy designers began conducting extensive hydrodynamic research into new hull forms.  The Navy wanted to design and build a prototype new hull form and they embarked on that effort the right way, with extensive wind tunnel and water testing prior to construction of the actual sub.  By the time the prototype submarine, the Albacore, was built, the Navy already knew the new tear drop shape hull would work.  The purpose of the prototype Albacore, then, was to find the small problems and map out the performance envelope.

What you can’t do – and we didn’t – is leap straight into a production commitment of 55 ships (the LCS) before the conceptual design was even done and before research and development was even partially begun.

The Albacore lessons tell us exactly how to develop new technology:  theorize, research, test, develop, refine, test some more and when you have a solid concept, design and build a prototype – a single prototype, not an entire class based on unproven technology.  Albacore proved the validity of this approach.  Unbelievably to us, today, Albacore went from a theory in 1949 to a commissioned prototype in 1953 – just 4 years.  Today, it takes us 4 years just to line up all the component manufacturers in all 50 states that will supply parts for a new program!

Lest you think this was some kind of fluke occurrence, the Navy went from WWII style submarines in 1952 to true, modern, nuclear powered, attack submarines in 1959.  That’s right … in seven years the Navy developed a completely new submarine with all the features we now recognize in modern submarines and they did so using a series of developments and prototypes, as listed below.  Study the table below and contemplate the incredible advances, the unbelievably short time frames and the extensive use of one-off prototypes.

US Navy Submarine Development and Prototyping
Class	Commissioned	No.	Comments
Tang class	1951-1952	6	improved conventional WWII design
Albacore	1953	1	tear drop hull
Nautilus	1954	1	first operational nuke sub; S2W reactor; prototyped on land at the S1W facility by Argonne National Laboratory in the early 1950’s
Darter	1956	1	improved Tang; new acoustic sensors; new fire control; new maneuvering control
Seawolf	1957	1	tested liquid metal cooled reactor
Skate class	1957-1959	4	first production run of nuclear subs;  based on the conventional Tang class
Barbel class	1959	3	tear drop hull; combined control room, conning tower, attack center in one space, bow torpedo tubes;  diesel engines; hydraulic ballast controls
Skipjack class	1959 – 1961	6	nuclear power; single shaft; tear drop hull
Triton	1959	1	nuclear powered fast surface radar picket submarine
Halibut	1960	1	first guided missile submarine, carrying Regulus missiles

Note the speed of construction with many classes being entirely commissioned within a one or two year period.  In fact, in the 4-5 year period from 1957-1961 we commissioned 16 submarines including 3 prototypes which, today, we accept as an article of faith that they take many times longer to build.

Skate Class

Also, note the small size of the classes.  We didn’t commit to production runs of dozens of units while we were still developing the technology.  Small runs of 3-6 vessels was sufficient to populate the fleet while avoiding the inevitable obsolescence that accompanies rapid technological change.  We built small classes, comfortable that as the technology advanced we could feed the developments into the next small class.  Contrast that with today’s desire to build classes of up to 55 ships with unproven technology.  Even the new frigate represents a risk in that we’re locking into a design for a production run of 20 despite the pace of technological advancement.  One can easily predict that we’ll soon be trying to shoehorn new technology into frigates that weren’t designed to receive it.

Barbel Class

Note, too, the concurrent development of different technologies: nuclear and diesel, for example, and the use of multiple, different prototypes.  Contrast that with the LCS or Ford where we attempted to combine every new technology into a single ship – and were puzzled why the effort failed.

USS Halibut Guided Missile Submarine

Today, we’d take all those improvements and force them into a single new design which would be three decades overdue and cost a bajillion dollars.  In contrast, the Navy wisely broke the developments up into small chunks and built single prototypes or small runs to evaluate the improvements and then fed the lessons learned back into the development and production cycles.

History screams lessons at us but we steadfastly refuse to listen.  Albacore and the early developmental efforts that produced today’s modern submarine provide us the lessons and template for our own development efforts and yet we ignore the lessons.  We need to study our own history, learn the lessons, and readjust our expectations to much faster and more productive standards.  We cannot afford to keep making the same stupid mistakes over and over.

___________________________________

Here’s a few more interesting tidbits about Alacore:

Albacore’s design was authorized in late 1950 and the submarine was commissioned in 1953.  By comparison, the first LCS required over 4 years to go from contract award to commission and the Zumwalt required 11 years!

Albacore used conventional diesel engines.

Not only did Albacore prove out the tear drop shape hull but the sub was used for other developmental advancements as her career progressed.  She was used to test various stern configurations and propellers including concentric contra-rotating propellers, various noise reduction measures, and various sonar equipment fits.  Albacore was decommissioned in Dec 1972 due to diesel engine obsolescence.