Unmanned Systems Integrated Battle Problem 21

The Navy has recently conducted the Unmanned Systems Integrated Battle Problem 21 (USIBP21).  Supposedly, this is part of the return of the famous Fleet Problem exercises conducted in the 1920’s and 1930’s, prior to WWII and which proved so prescient and vital to the conduct of the war in the Pacific.  The Navy has loudly and proudly trumpeted the return of the fleet battle problems.  Let’s take a look at USIBP21.

 

The entire focus of USIBP21 was integrating manned and unmanned assets and it appears to have been a phenomenal success, accomplishing a never before achieved linkage between an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and a remote ship in order to direct the ship’s firing.

 

Using a blend of information from unmanned and manned ships and aircraft, a guided-missile destroyer launched an anti-surface missile from over-the-horizon to hit a target more than 250 miles away without using active sensors as part of the Unmanned Integrated Battle Problem 21, Navy officials said on Monday. (2)

 

The unmanned MQ-9B Sea Guardian operated in conjunction with a guided-missile cruiser, executing long-range, over-the-horizon targeting. Using sonobuoys and other assets, the Sea Guardian identified contacts and reported locations remotely to the commander on board the cruiser. (1)

 

Outstanding!  An unmanned vehicle provided targeting data to a remote ship?!  Wow!

 

“This was an important step in moving the ball down the field to getting unmanned plugged into that targeting solution,” U.S. Pacific Fleet Maritime Headquarters director Rear Adm. Robert Gaucher told reporters. (2)

 

You moved the ball big time, Admiral.  Getting an unmanned vehicle to provide targeting information is the stuff of dreams.  It’s science fiction brought to life!  This should be front page news around the world and rightly so.

 

How amazing and transformative is this new technology?

 

"The integration between unmanned and manned capabilities shown today provides an operations approach to strengthening our manned-unmanned teaming," said Rear Adm. James A. Aiken, UxS IBP 21 tactical commander. "Putting our newest technology into our Sailors' hands directly enhances our fleet." (1)

 

An enhanced fleet!  Outstanding!  But wait, it’s even more impressive than that!

 

The test also shows how the lethal radius of a surface-launched missile could expand well beyond a ship’s radar range, which is limited by the curvature of the Earth. (2)

 

Shooting a missile beyond the horizon?!  Wow!  Who comes up with these breakthroughs?!

 

Was it hard to do?

 

“It was really complex… We teamed manned and unmanned vessels together. We also used the fusing capability that we’re doing some experimentation on. It was totally passive where we didn’t have active sensors on target,” Aiken said.

“We also look for space as well to actually identify the target and then once we found the target, we were able to track it because of the [electromagnetic signal] that was coming off the target, develop lines of bearing, then launched the missile.” (2)

 

You developed the target’s location using lines of bearing?!  A pure passive location technique?  No radar?  That’s so advanced it borders on magic!

 

Do we know any details about the conditions of the exercise?

 

The target was equipped with a small radar reflector and a repeater that put out an electromagnetic signal. The signal from the repeater was detectable by sensors on the uncrewed aircraft and manned and unmanned surface vessels, said Carrier Strike Group 3 commander Rear Adm. James Aiken during a Monday call with reporters. (2)

 

The amphibious ship USS Anchorage disgorged a barge simulating an enemy warship. The barge apparently carried emitters duplicating radios, radars and other electronics. The destroyer USS John Finn stood off over the horizon—exactly how far away is a secret—and initiated a hunt for the pretend enemy ship. (3)

 

UAVs and robot boats crisscrossed the ocean. To avoid detection, they kept their active sensors off. Instead, they used their passive electronic receivers to “listen” for the enemy’s own electronic emissions. (3)

 

The drones pinpointed the barge and passed the data to a satellite, which relayed it to John Finn. The destroyer fired an SM-6 missile. The $5-million missile—which can hit targets on the sea or in the air—struck the barge “well beyond the line of sight,” according to the Navy. (3)

 

So, the Navy floated a barge, as a simulator for a Chinese destroyer, and loaded it with emitters of various types to ensure plenty of radiated electromagnetic noise … and we were able to find it passively?

 

I’m running out of adjectives to describe just how amazing this feat was!

 

I’m going to pause to catch my breath for a moment and let the excitement die down.  While I’m doing that, I’m going to jot down a few thoughts that the Navy’s exercise prompted in me.

 

 

Thought:  Didn’t we have remote unmanned (UAV) targeting decades ago?  I think we did!  From the mid-1980’s until the mid-2000’s, the battleships used RQ-2 Pioneer UAVs to spot for their guns in Desert Storm and elsewhere.  In fact, many Iraqi soldiers surrendered to a battleship UAV in a famous incident.  See, “Battleship UAVs”.

 

Thought:  Didn’t we develop beyond the horizon missiles decades ago in the form of Harpoon and Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile, among many others?

 

Thought:  Haven’t submarines, surface ships, and aircraft routinely used passive target locating for many, many decades?  In fact, it used to be called triangulation.

 

 

So, now that my initial euphoria has worn off, I’m left to wonder  … what’s the new part of this exercise?  You know, the part that hasn’t actually been done many decades ago?

 

In fact, I’m beginning to wonder if this near miraculous exercise might not have been all that miraculous?

Miracle UAV in USIBP21 … Oops!  My Mistake.  This is

the RQ-2 Pioneer UAV that provided passive targeting 

for battleships several decades ago.

  

Further, now that I’m more calmly thinking about it, there is one glaring omission from all the descriptions of the miraculous achievements … an enemy force.  One of the defining characteristics of the old Fleet Problems was the existence of an active, free-acting enemy force equal to the friendly force.  So, where was the enemy force in this exercise?  Where were the enemy SAMs and aircraft shooting down the Sea Guardian?  Where were the enemy ships, aircraft, subs, and missiles attacking our ships while they leisurely worked to develop the enemy’s location using purely passive means?  Where was the enemy back-tracking the Sea Guardian to its source and destroying the facilities and communication and control capabilities?  Where was the enemy satellite surveillance that finds and attacks us since we seemed able to use satellites?

 

Without a free-acting, unconstrained, well equipped enemy force the exercise is just a live presentation of a sales brochure.  Without an enemy, this exercise didn’t validate anything.  It was just an animated PowerPoint presentation.

 

Why not make this a real battle problem?  Instead of using a barge with noisemakers to simulate a Chinese destroyer, why not use a Burke?  Let the Burke use its passive sensors to try to detect our sensor platforms and let the Burke ‘shoot’ them down if they can find them.  Let the Burke use its helo and Fire Scout to conduct its own hunt for our cruiser and unmanned vehicles and destroy them, if they can.  Let the Burke call on long range, long endurance UAVs, as China would, to search for our ships.  Give the Burke a submarine to assist it.  …  …  …  Now you’ve got a real battle problem!  Well, not really.  The old battle problems involved huge portions of the entire fleet.  This barely qualifies as a cruise around the harbor.

 

This was an insult to every real Fleet Problem from the pre-WWII era and an embarrassment to the Navy.

 

So, aside from over-the-top exultation, what was the Navy’s reaction?

 

“We need to move things into the hands of sailors and then let sailors use their ingenuity,” Aiken said last week. (2)

 

Hey, Admiral, here’s a wild thought … why don’t you have a half-assed idea of what to do with ‘things’ before you give them to the sailors and tell them what to do with them rather than wait and hope they can tell you what to do?  If you’d like, Admiral, I’ll be happy to tell you what you can do with your things.

 

 

 

_______________________________________

 

(1)Commander, “Unmanned aerial vehicle Sea Guardian operates with naval assets”, US Pacific Fleet website, posted 21-Apr-2021

https://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/140164

 

(2)USNI News website, “Unmanned Systems, Passive Sensors Help USS John Finn Bullseye Target With SM-6”, Sam LaGrone, 26-Apr-2021,

https://news.usni.org/2021/04/26/unmanned-systems-passive-sensors-help-uss-john-finn-bullseye-target-with-sm-6

 

(3)Forbes website, “Robots Hunted A Mock Chinese Ship—Then a U.S. Navy Destroyer Lobbed A $5 Million Missile At It”, David Axe, 28-Apr-2021,

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/04/28/robots-hunted-a-mock-chinese-ship-then-a-us-navy-destroyer-lobbed-a-5-million-missile-at-it/?sh=4b63f1f45c1a

Fleet Problems - Then and Now

The Navy’s most famous exercises were the series of 21 major Fleet Problems conducted between 1923 – 1940.  These massive exercises not only presciently predicted the course of the WWII naval campaign but also developed the doctrine and tactics that would become the foundation of our WWII naval operations.

From the Wikipedia compilation of Fleet Problems, here is a summary of the exercises.(1)  Look them over and note the remarkable similarity they bore to the actual WWII naval operations.

Fleet Problem I

Held in February and March 1923 and was staged off the coast of Panama. The attacking Black force, using battleships to represent aircraft carriers, tested the defenses of the Panama Canal. A single plane launched from Oklahoma—representing a carrier air group—dropped 10 miniature bombs and theoretically "destroyed" the spillway of the Gatun Dam.

Fleet Problem II

Simulated the first leg of a westward advance across the Pacific.

Fleet Problem III

Focused on a defense of the Panama Canal from the Caribbean side. The Blue force was defending the canal from an attack from the Caribbean by the Black force, operating from an advance base in the Azores. It was to practice amphibious landing techniques and the rapidity of transiting a fleet through the canal from the Pacific side.

In the exercise, a Black force special operations action resulted in the "sinking" of Blue force battleship New York in the Culebra Cut which would have blocked the canal.

Fleet Problem IV

Simulated the movement from a main base in the western Pacific to the Japanese home islands—represented in that case by islands, cities, and countries surrounding the Caribbean.

Fleet Problem V

Held in March and April 1925 and simulated an attack on Hawaii. The Black force, the aggressor, was given the United States' first aircraft carrier, Langley along with two seaplane tenders and other ships outfitted with aircraft, while the defending Blue force had no carriers. In addition, aircraft aboard the battleship Wyoming could not be launched for lack of a working catapult. Langley's positive performance helped speed the completion of aircraft carriers Lexington and Saratoga.

One aspect of Fleet Problem V was conducted near Guadalupe Island off Baja California and involved attacking a lightly held position and refueling at sea.

Fleet Problem VI

Held off the west coast of Central America in early 1926.

Fleet Problem VII

Held March 1927 and involved defense of the Panama Canal. The highlight of the exercise was Langley’s successful air raid on the Panama Canal.

Fleet Problem VIII

Held in April 1928 between California and Hawaii and pitted Orange, a cruiser force from Pearl Harbor, versus Blue, the Battle Force.  It also involved a convoy search and anti-submarine operations.

Fleet Problem IX

This scenario in January 1929 studied the effects of an attack upon the Panama Canal and conducted the operations necessary to carry out such an eventuality, and pitted the Battle Fleet (less submarines and Lexington) against a combination of forces including the Scouting Force (augmented by Lexington), the Control Forces, Train Squadron 1, and 15th Naval District and local army defense forces. In a daring move, Saratoga was detached from the fleet with only a single cruiser as escort to make a wide sweep to the south and "attack" the Panama Canal, which was defended by the Scouting Fleet and Saratoga's sister ship, Lexington. She successfully launched her strike on 26 January and, despite being "sunk" three times later in the day, proved the versatility of a carrier-based fast task force.

This was the first major test of independent carrier task force operations which would eventually become the model for WWII naval operations in the Pacific.

Fleet Problem X

Held in 1930 in Caribbean waters. This time, however, Saratoga and Langley were "disabled" by a surprise attack from Lexington, showing how quickly air power could swing the balance in a naval action.

Fleet Problem XI

Held in April 1930 in the Caribbean.

Fleet Problem XII

USS Los Angeles moored to USS Patoka, along with other ships off Panama during Fleet Problem XII.

Held in 1931 in waters west of Central America and Panama. Black, attacking from the west, was to land forces and establish bases in Central America and destroy the Panama Canal, while Blue defended with an aviation-heavy fleet.

Blue's two carrier groups, centered on Saratoga and Lexington, attacked the invasion fleets but failed to stop the landings and got too close to the Black fleets.

Fleet Problem XIII

Fleet Problem XIII began in March 1932, one month after Army/Navy Grand Joint Exercise 4. Blue, based in Hawaii, was to sail east and invade three "enemy" ports on the North American Pacific coastline to try and gain a foothold for future operations. Blue had nine battleships, one aircraft carrier, and many lesser ships. Black defended with one modern aircraft carrier and some fictional battleships, as well as a number of actual cruisers, submarines, and many other ships.

Blue's advance was quickly located by Black's picket line of submarines which then took heavy losses from air attack. Both sides put a priority on destroying the enemy aircraft carrier, launching air attacks almost simultaneously after a few days of probing. Significant damage was laid on both carriers, with Blue's carrier eventually "sunk" by torpedo from a Black destroyer.

After-action critiques stressed the growing importance of naval aviation, and an increased need for the construction of aircraft carriers in the event of a war in the Pacific. Submarines operating at or near the surface were seen to be critically vulnerable to air observation and attack. The exercise showed that one carrier was insufficient for either fleet attack or area defense, so the practice of two or more carriers operating together became policy. Admiral Harry E. Yarnell said that six to eight carriers would be required for a Pacific campaign, but no orders were placed for new carriers, as Depression-era financial difficulties caused President Herbert Hoover to limit naval expenses.

Fleet Problem XIV

Held February 10–17, 1933, Fleet Problem XIV was the first naval exercise to test simulated aircraft carrier attacks against the west coast of the United States. Pacific cities had for decades vied for permanent stationing of U.S. military assets, and vulnerabilities exposed through the exercises were used by metropolitan navy boosters to leverage their cases. In spite of early Navy plans for San Francisco to be home port for the main west coast fleet, these plans had failed to materialize with San Diego incrementally gaining the majority of navy investments.

Fleet Problem XIV coincidentally occurred the month before Franklin D. Roosevelt, a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, took the office of the presidency. The results of the exercise between the U.S. Navy's 'black' and 'blue' fleets, were mixed. The simulated attacks had certainly been mitigated by the defensive 'blue' fleet, however the 'black' fleet had scored key victories with strikes on San Pedro and San Francisco, California, respectively.

Fleet Problem XV

Held in May 1934 in Hawaii, this was a three-phase exercise which encompassed an attack upon and defense of the Panama Canal, the capture of advanced bases, and a major fleet engagement.

Fleet Problem XVI

Held in May 1935 in the northern Pacific off the coast of Alaska and in waters surrounding the Hawaiian Islands, this operation was divided into five distinct phases which were thought to be aspects of some real naval campaign of the future in which the U.S. would take the strategic offensive.

Fleet Problem XVII

This problem took place off the west coast of the U.S., Central America, and the Panama Canal Zone in the spring of 1936. It was a five-phase exercise devoted to preparing the fleet for anti-submarine operations, testing communications systems, and training of aircraft patrol squadrons for extended fleet operations, and pitted the Battle Force against the submarine-augmented Scouting Force.

Fleet Problem XVIII

This exercise was held in May 1937 in Alaskan waters and in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands and Midway, practicing the tactics of seizing advanced base sites—a technique later to be polished to a high degree into close support and amphibious warfare doctrines.

Fleet Problem XIX

This operation in April and May 1938 gave the navy added experience in search tactics; in the use of submarines, destroyers, and aircraft in scouting and attack, in the dispositions of the fleet and the conduct of a major fleet battle. In addition, the exercise again dealt with the matter of seizing advanced fleet bases and defending them against minor opposition. Fleet Problem XIX also tested the capabilities of the Hawaiian Defense Force, augmenting it with fleet units to help to defend the islands against the United States fleet as a whole. The last phase of the exercise exercised the fleet in operations against a defended coastline.

Fleet Problem XX

Took place in February 1939 in the Caribbean and Atlantic, and observed in person by President Franklin Roosevelt. The exercise simulated the defense of the East Coast of the United States and Latin America by the Black team from the invading White team. Participating in the maneuvers were 134 ships, 600 planes, and over 52,000 officers and men.

Fleet Problem XXI

An eight-phase operation for the defense of the Hawaiian area in April 1940.

Fleet Problem XXII

Scheduled for the Spring of 1941, but cancelled.

Grand Joint Exercise 4 (GJE4)

Similar to the Navy’s Fleet Problems, the Army and Navy held a few large, combined exercises.  This particular exercise revolved around an attack on Pearl Harbor.  Lexington and Saratoga conducted an air strike on Pearl Harbor on Sunday morning, 7-Feb-1932.(4)  The attack was an unmitigated success with facilities, aircraft, and ships being decimated.  Attacking aircraft even dropped sacks of flour on battleships to simulate bombs!(5)  Army defenders protested the ‘inappropriateness’ of an attack on a Sunday morning and the unfairness of the attacking aircraft having deceptively approached from the direction of the mainland.(5)  As we know, this was almost an exact foretelling of the actual Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Operations During Fleet Problem X

What is striking about these exercises is the sheer size compared to what we laughingly call exercises today.  Today, a couple of ships that happen to pass each other is called an exercise whereas the Fleet Problems were actual, entire fleet exercises!  The commanders learned to operate entire fleets and squadrons for real.  Here’s an interesting explanation for the size of the Fleet Problems:

This large-scale participation was possible because very little of the U.S. Navy was forward-deployed, so forces could be brought in from the East and West Coast bases. (2)

Hmm …  Better training thanks to reduced forward deployments.  Does that sound familiar?  This is exactly what ComNavOps has been calling for and yet we had it back in the 1920’s!  History is shouting at us, telling us what we should be doing but we’re not listening.

Also noteworthy is that the exercises were not just technology demonstrations as today’s exercises are; they were scenarios that tested operations that we actually believed we might be called on to execute in a war.  The exercises tested specific aspects of War Plan Orange that we were unsure about which made the exercises highly relevant since they were taken from the actual operational plan of war with Japan.  Of particular note are Fleet Problems II (first leg of an advance across the Pacific), IV (advance on the Japanese home islands), V (attack on Hawaii), XVIII (seizing advanced bases in the Pacific via amphibious assault), XXI (defense of Hawaii), and GJE4 which exactly simulated the eventual Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  It was evident that as early as the 1920’s, the Navy was already anticipating war with Japan and developing the doctrine and tactics needed to conduct that war.  What are we exercising today?  What are we preparing for?  In a word … nothing.

Note all the techniques, tactics, and operations that were tested and exercised that eventually became the foundation of our WWII naval operations.

The Navy has revived some minor exercises and fraudulently given them the name of ‘Fleet Problem’ but they do not even remotely capture the essence, purpose, or magnitude of the real Fleet Problems.(6)

Another interesting aspect of the Fleet Problems was that they were real in the sense that problems were not hand-waved away and the results, good or bad, stood.

… the Fleet Problems assumed there often would be a clear loser—and not a junior officer designated to be defeated, but an officer of stature and accomplishment. Senior officers could and did fail dramatically, were critiqued candidly and publicly, and continued to advance and lead. Indeed, across the 21 Fleet Problems, timidity and inattention seemed to be the only unforgivable errors in command. (3)

This is how you learn … by doing and, often, failing!

We need to bring back real fleet problems, not the small, pathetic, watered down efforts that we call exercises today – exercises which are conducted for just a few days while transiting somewhere.(5)  We need to assemble entire fleets and conduct real war games.  Here’s a few examples of some large scale fleet problems we should be conducting.

• How to operate 4-carrier combat groups and their escorts
• How to penetrate a thousand mile A2/AD zone
• Where and how to attack China
• How to defend or reseize Taiwan (if that’s even part of our geopolitical strategy)
• How to operate groups when we don’t have aerial supremacy
• How to operate non-carrier surface groups
• How to escort convoys and defend against subs, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and aircraft

Of course, all of these possible Fleet Problems presuppose the existence of a modern War Plan Orange aimed at China and, sadly, I see no evidence that we have such a plan.  We need a War Plan Pacific aimed directly at China and we need to start exercising it.

____________________________________

(1)Wikipedia, “Fleet Problem”, retrieved 5-May-2020,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fleet_problem

(2)Naval History and Heritage Command website, “Fleet Problem IX”

https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/heritage/usn-lessons-learned/fleet-problem-ix.html

(3)United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Captain Dale Rielage, Jun-2017,

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017/june/bring-back-fleet-battle-problems

(4)http://oaktrust.library.tamu.edu/bitstream/handle/1969.1/2658/etd-tamu-2005B-HIST-Wadle.pdf

(5)https://www.military.com/navy/pearl-harbor-first-attack.html

(6)USNI Proceedings, “Fleet Problems Offer Opportunities”, Adm. Scott Swift, Mar 2018,

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/march/fleet-problems-offer-opportunities

Fleet Problem Exercises

The US Navy famously conducted extensive, full scale fleet problem exercises in the pre-WWII years and those exercises served to validate battle doctrine, explore scenarios, develop carrier operations and tactics, and even predicted the attack on Pearl Harbor (Fleet Problem V conducted a carrier attack on Hawaii).

The Fleet Problems were conducted from 1923-1940 (I – XXI) and were then abandoned after WWII.  Recently, the Pacific Fleet has revived a much scaled down version of Fleet Problem exercises beginning with Fleet Problem XXIII and continuing through XXVIII.

The resumption of Fleet Problems, even if scaled down and limited to the Pacific Fleet rather than the entire Navy, is welcome news.  The exercises were, apparently, reinstituted by Adm. Scott Swift.  He describes a bit of the impetus for the resumption,

Adding to my concern was the clear message from my intelligence team that our potential adversaries were investing in training that was ever more complex and challenging. We needed to raise our training bar. As fleet commander, I needed to know what we could do, exploring the art of the possible and testing our assumptions about fleet capabilities in a fight against a high-end adversary. (1)

It’s encouraging that Adm. Swift seemed to have recognized that many of our operational concepts (ConOps) were more fantasy than reality.

In other cases, as we considered how our ConOps would play out in reality, it became apparent there were warfighting tasks that were critical to success that we could not execute with confidence. This gap was not because deployers did not practice these tasks individually—the efficiency of the OFRP ensured they could—but because we as a force never practiced them together, in combination with multiple tasks, against a free-playing, informed, and representative Red. (1)

In one case, during an exercise planning session, we discussed a critical operational tactic that is used routinely in exercises and assumed to be executable by the fleet. In the course of the brief, a lone voice said, “Sir, you know we can’t actually do that.” (1)

One of ComNavOps’ criticisms of Navy training is that it is broken down into simplistic, scripted exercises and then the assumption is made that the limited result is applicable to an entire war.  For example, if a single ship can launch a single missile and hit a single, unrealistic drone surrogate target, then the assumption is made that our entire air defense concept is valid and has been ‘proven’.  Adm. Swift appears to have grasped the fallacy in this type of training.  For example,

For example, it is critical that we be able to operate carrier strike groups (CSGs) in areas of significant submarine threat. Our traditional approach to this challenge would be to create an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) exercise, tasking submarines to act as targets within a set geographic area. In a Fleet Problem, we instead would task the CSG to conduct a combat mission (“NLT 01100Z, conduct strikes on…”), giving it maximum flexibility in timing and mechanism. We then would create an environment rich in submarine threats. The CSG’s mission would not be ASW, but rather conducting a core combat mission (strike) in support of the joint fight in a robust submarine threat environment.

Managing the submarine threat is the means to the end —strike. (1) (emphasis added)

Brilliant!  This is how training should be.

Swift’s use of Fleet Problems also embraces failure.  He seems to recognize that failure is not only the best teacher but also a requirement for learning.  This is outstanding especially in today’s risk averse, zero-tolerance command environment.  I only hope that he is successful in implementing this philosophy of embraced failure.

One of the strengths of the new Fleet Problem series is that it does not involve future weapons and capabilities.  Participants use only the existing capabilities of their assets.  Thus, for example, there is no hand waving to magically sense enemy assets due to the anticipated, future all-seeing sensor.  The participants must fight with what they actually have – you know, kind of like how you have to fight an actual war.

An Opposing Force (OpFor) has, apparently, been created, the Pacific Naval Aggressor Team (PNAT).  Unfortunately, the article does not go into detail about the structure and assets of the OpFor or the degree of dedication and training they have.  The strength of the Navy’s famous Top Gun program was the core of people dedicated to nothing but studying the enemy’s tactics and capabilities and then using that knowledge to develop and teach tactics.  It is unknown to what degree this model is being followed.  Without a competent OpFor, the training loses much of its value.

Adm. Swift sums up the value of realistic Fleet Problems nicely,

Fleet Problems allow us to learn those lessons with bruised egos instead of combat losses. (1)

Unfortunately, there are some notable shortcomings with the Fleet Problem as currently practiced:

Limited Assets – The Pacific Fleet, though large, is still just a subset of the Navy and has a limited number of ships and aircraft assigned to it.  For example, it typically has only a single carrier or, occasionaly, two.  This means that any exercise will not be representative of how we’ll actually fight.  We’ll conduct carrier operations with groups of four and it just isn’t possible to simulate multi-carrier groups with only a single ship.  Further, it’s impossible to provide multiple carriers to both the OpFor and the Blue (US) groups.  Thus, we run the risk of developing bad habits.  We may develop tactics suited for a single carrier that are entirely unsuited for multiple carriers.  We certainly aren’t learning how to effectively command and utilize twenty or thirty escorts, for example.  By way of comparison, Fleet Problem XX in 1939 involved 134 ships, 600 planes, and over 52,000 personnel, according to Wiki. (2)

Limited Geography – Pacific Fleet can only operate in the Pacific Fleet area although given that China is the ultimate enemy this is not as bad a limitation as it might be.  It does, however, limit the ability to exercise in an area or against land targets that are better simulated elsewhere around the globe.

Limited OpFor – there just aren’t enough assets to properly equip a realistic OpFor.  Again, the Pacific Fleet normally has only one carrier assigned or, temporarily, perhaps two.  It just isn’t possible to provide multiple carriers to both the OpFor and the Blue (US) groups.  The same applies to submarines and aircraft.  Thus, the exercises are inherently limited in scope.

Limited Applicability – The ‘doctrine’ developed from the Pacific Fleet exercises is limited to just the current Pacific Fleet personnel.  It is not, to the best of my knowledge, adopted or applied Navy-wide.  Thus, the local commanders may benefit but the Navy, overall, does not.  The next logical step would be for the Navy to reinstitute Navy-wide Fleet Problems.

ComNavOps loves to report good news but there are so few opportunities.  Well, this is one such opportunity.  The resumption of Fleet Problems, even on a limited basis, is a great development.  The Navy needs to reinstitute this practice on a Navy-wide basis and provide the larger numbers of assets that a truly useful Fleet Problem requires.  Well done, Adm. Swift. 

Now, Admiral, get the Navy to expand this to a true Fleet Problem and let’s find out what 4-carrier battle groups can do.  Let’s put that distributed lethality concept to a large scale test.  Let’s see if we can sustain our logistical support for the fleet during combat.  Let’s explore what the Chinese will attempt to do.  Let’s see if we can retake Taiwan.  Let’s figure out how to penetrate the Chinese A2/AD zone.

Peacetime is our golden opportunity to prepare for the next war and we’re squandering it.  Let’s get back to the business of preparing for high end, peer war.

________________________________

(1)USNI Proceedings, “Fleet Problems Offer Opportunities”, Mar 2018, Adm. Scott Swift,

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-03/fleet-problems-offer-opportunities

(2)Wikipedia, “Fleet Problem”, retrieved 28-Dec-2018,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fleet_problem