The Miracle of HIMARS

HIMARS … the unending miracle weapon system!
 
To briefly review, HIMARS is the single pod version of the dual pod MLRS.  The pod contains either six 227 mm rockets or a single ATACMS missile.  The pod/launcher is mounted on a FMTV 5-ton truck.  HIMARS was developed as a lighter weight, lighter firepower version of the standard M270 MLRS.
 
Marines, naval observers and analysts, and blog commenters have called for HIMARS to be mounted on all manner of ships for land attack and anti-ship as well as for the Marine’s small unit, hidden bases to sink enemy fleets and control the seas.  Proponents credit it with 120% accuracy.  Truly, a miracle weapon system.
 
Of course, HIMARS, as is, is totally unsuited for naval mounting and would require a nearly new launcher/mount (materials of construction to deal with corrosion, multi-axis stabilization, fire control integration with existing ship’s systems, electronic signal deconfliction and interference checks, etc.) and a significantly redesigned host vessel (magazines, ammo storage and movement mechanisms, reload mechanism, magazine armor and firefighting systems, etc.).  As we’ve noted in the past, there are very few examples of successful adaptation of land weapons to naval use.  However, let’s set that issue aside.
 
An interesting data point has come to light from the recent US-Philippines Balikatan 2023 SinkEx.  It seems that the HIMARS system missed all six of its shots.  As reported by Naval News website,
 
The performance of the Army HIMARS was also questionable, with it being reported on the SINKEX’s live stream that the system missed all six of its shots at the World War II-era corvette. In previous SINKEXs, such as those held at RIMPAC exercises, targets were relatively static which allowed for munitions that struggle or cannot hit moving targets to participate. One of these systems that cannot hit moving targets is HIMARS with its current set of rockets. Due to unknown circumstances, BRP Pangasinan developed a drift that threw off the HIMARS’ targeting.[1]
 

U.S. Army HIMARS “Tommy”
from the 5-3 Long Range Fires Battalion
of the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force fires at BRP Pangasinan.
(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Samuel Fletcher)

 

So, it would appear that HIMARS has some challenges in the anti-ship role due to target movement – assuming one classifies ‘drift’ as target movement.  If it can’t handle slow drift, is it really the miracle weapon so many are claiming?
 
Here’s a worrisome thought:  if the target vessel hadn’t developed a drift and the HIMARS had hit the target we’d be reading about how wonderful it is and no one would know it’s useless against moving targets.  Do the Marines know about this shortcoming?  Do they care?  Do proponents know or care?
 
HIMARS may be a useful, effective weapon on land – or it may not - but it’s clearly not ready for naval combat and would require an enormous effort to make it so.
 
Why do people keep calling for this?
 
This is yet another in the endless list of systems whose claims far exceed their actual performance.  We have got to stop believing manufacturer’s and the military’s claims about weapon performance.  With 100% certainty, they’re significantly overstated.  I keep hammering on this and yet people keep buying into claims. 
 
We’ve already got multiple anti-ship weapons (Hellfire, Naval Strike Missile, Harpoon, LRASM, Tomahawk, Standard, ESSM, etc.) that are already adapted to naval use.  Why do we need another system, especially one that is not adapted to naval use?
 
In the land attack role, MLRS/HIMARS has some potential but, again, would need an extensive and expensive development program to adapt it to naval use.  No, you can’t just bolt it to the deck of a ship and call it a day.
 
While I like the idea of an MLRS-ish weapon as a suppressive fire (area bombardment) system to support amphibious assaults and ground forces, I would much rather spend development money on an 8” naval gun that could be used against land and sea targets.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Kill Chain Tested At First-Ever Balikatan SINKEX”, Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, 27-Apr-2023,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/04/kill-chain-tested-at-first-ever-balikatan-sinkex/
 

Marine Missiles

Marine Commandant Berger keeps talking about hidden bases with small units that will rain missiles of death and destruction down on the hapless Chinese who won’t have a clue where the Marines are.  Well, let’s attempt to be fair and take a look at the missiles that the good Commandant envisions using.  Are they small enough to remain hidden?  Can they be easily moved as the Marines nimbly relocate from island to island on Light Amphibious Warfare (LAW) ships?

 

Note:  The inspiration and, indeed, much of the organization and content of this post is taken from a Naval News website article by Peter Ong.[1]

 

 

Naval Strike Missile

 

The smallest of the potential missiles for the Marines is the Naval Strike Missile (NSM). 

 

The Marine Corps’ Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) mounts two Naval Strike Missiles (NSM) on a remote-operated, driven, and NSM launched unmanned Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) 4×4 vehicle.  … The 900-pound (410 kilogram) NSM (or 910 pounds with booster) can be internally loaded aboard a CH-53 and onto the flatbed of a Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) 6×6 truck via a forklift.  … it is possible to push an NSM container on a trolley cart but loading it onto the JLTV will require a … forklift.[1]

NMESIS Naval Strike Missile on JLTV

That’s a hefty brute of a vehicle.  Note that it carries two missiles.  To be operationally relevant and combat effective, a unit is going to need … what ? … twenty or so missiles, at a minimum?  That would be a minimum of ten such vehicles.  That’s no longer a small, secretive, hidden footprint.  Of course one could always use fewer launch vehicles and just use reloads but that would require forklifts and some type of missile storage facility which, again, is not a small, secretive, hidden footprint.

 

These vehicles (JLTV or forklifts) give off very large infrared signatures, especially in the tropical sun.  Again, not conducive to remaining hidden.

From Wikipedia, here's a description of the components of a Norwegian coastal defense battery which is, essentially, what the Marines are trying to set up:

An NSM coastal battery consists of three missile launch vehicles, one battery command vehicle, three combat command vehicles, one mobile communication center, one mobile radar vehicle with TRS-15C radar, one transport and loading vehicle, and one mobile workshop vehicle. 

Again, that's not a small footprint ! 

 

 

Tomahawk

 

Another missile option is the cutting edge, brand new, ultra advanced, futuristic  Maritime Strike Tomahawk ... which you knew this as the 1980’s – 1990’s era Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile (TASM).  In any event, the Tomahawk will be deployed on 40 ft long, 34 ton, M872 trailers.

 

The semitrailer is designed to be towed over smooth, hard-surfaced roads with loads up to 34 tons (68,000 lbs payload) at speeds as high as 55 mph (88 km/h). It can also be towed over unimproved roads, trails and open rolling terrain with the same load limit, but at a sustained speed of no more than 10 mph (16 km/h).[2]

 

The M872 semitrailer is designed to be towed by the M915 Series 6x4 Truck, Tractor.[2]

 

Tomahawk Launching From Trailer Mounted VLS Cell

Note the immense size of the trailer, VLS cell, and then factor in the trailer tow vehicle.  The photo depicts a feasibility demonstration but the final launch vehicle will not be any smaller.  Again, assuming we want more than a single missile shot, we’ll need dozens of these trailers, tow vehicles, and, potentially, large cranes to handle the VLS cells.  Imagine a large city freeway with a string of twenty giant tractor-trailers and you’ll get an idea of how hidden this operation will be.

 

Also, note the 10 mph speed limit for movement over unimproved roads and terrain.  This will not be a quick, agile, shoot and scoot operation !

 

The MST uses a two-way communications link for mid-course guidance and targeting updates.  This could prove problematic during combat as it violates EMCON and allows the enemy to locate the communications source. 

 

 

 

HIMARS

 

Another missile option is the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HiMARS) which is a podded rocket system with six rockets per HiMARS pod and are launched from a modified USMC Family of Medium Tactical Vehicle (FMTV) 6×6 truck.[1]  HiMARS rockets may require new seekers to target moving ships.

 

HIMARS Pod on FMTV 6x6 Truck

Note the size of the 6x6 truck.  Again, several such trucks/pods would be needed.

 

 

 

Conclusion

 

The options discussed above all involve dozens of sizeable vehicles – no easy thing to hide on an island inside your enemy’s zone of control.  Also, bear in mind that other necessities must be provided including large amounts of fuel, fuel handling equipment, vehicle maintenance and repair capabilities, spare parts, etc. in addition to the operator’s food, health, and shelter needs.  All of this is in addition to the gear and supplies that the regular Marines will require.  While the Commandant may have some fanciful notion of Marines living off the land (that has actually been discussed in various published articles), that is simply not feasible for any sustained period of time.  There is also the matter of health.  The tropics are renowned for myriad diseases and Marines weakened by malnourishment will be quickly rendered sick and ineffective.

 

We’re also ignoring the challenges associated with transporting and loading/unloading large vehicles to/from islands in secret.  Does the Commandant really believe he can transport and unload dozens of large vehicles without being noticed?

 

The other aspect that is not covered is targeting.  The Marines will need some type of UAV or radar or something to provide targeting beyond the 12 mile horizon.  That thousand mile Tomahawk sounds great on paper but how are you going to get thousand mile targeting?  Whatever vehicle or sensor the Marines use will further reduce their ‘hiddenness’.  Sensor assets will require two-way communications which, again, point back to the Marine’s location.

 

When all the vehicles, UAVs, sensors, support equipment, storage facilities, etc. are considered, it is difficult to see how anyone can believe that missile-shooting units will remain undetected even assuming that they can penetrate the enemy’s zone in a small, non-stealthy, painfully slow LAW and establish themselves on an island in the first place.

 

Finally, the Commandant has stated that in the unlikely event that the Marines are discovered, they will simply hop aboard a LAW  and relocate, thus regaining their secrecy.  Of course, loading and unloading all the equipment we’ve discussed is not an insignificant feat in itself.  Trying to load all the vehicles and equipment onto a LAW will be a pretty noticeable event, one would imagine.

 

By the way, when this unlikely relocation becomes necessary, where will the multiple transport LAWs come from?  Will they be floating offshore, waiting?  If so, wouldn’t they be quickly spotted?  If they’re not waiting and, instead, they’re back on, say, Guam.  It will take weeks to get them to the Marine’s island.  That’s not exactly going to allow for quick, agile relocations, is it?

 

Nothing about this concept appears feasible.  The Commandant either needs to come out and address some of these issues, at least in general terms, or he will continue to face resistance.  He appears to have successfully stifled internal dissent but has run into staunch resistance from former Marine generals and other top-ranking former officials.  Commandant, if you want support you’ve got to provide some information and address the gaping holes in the logic of the concept.

 

 

 

 

 

Side note:  Does anyone recall the Cuban missile crisis?  The Soviets attempted to secretly transport missiles using small, slow, unarmed transport ships (sounds like a LAW !) and place the missiles on the island of Cuba without being noticed and yet they were instantly spotted with 1950’s – 1960’s technology.  How’d that work out?

 

 

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[1]Naval News website, “A Look At The Sizes Of U.S. Land-Based Strike Missiles”, Peter Ong, 29-Jun-2022,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/06/a-look-at-the-sizes-of-u-s-land-based-strike-missiles/

 

[2]https://olive-drab.com/idphoto/id_photos_m872_trailer.php

Marines, Sea Control, and HIMARS

I love the Marine Corps but, I’m sorry, they’ve gone off the rails.  What is their core mission?  Well, actually, that’s a good question because I don’t think Marine leadership currently has a viable answer – they’ve forgotten their mission.  Presumably, though, the answer ought to involve some form of amphibious operations (I won’t say assault because it doesn’t have to be although that would be the classic example).  With that in mind, the Marines should be focusing on how to get as much firepower and armor ashore against peer opposition as possible, right?  But, that’s not what the Marines are concentrating on.  Instead, they’re concentrating on becoming a third air force, a light infantry force (for what reason, I can’t imagine since light infantry will get annihilated on the modern battlefield), a social/psychological warfare service (hearts and minds), a 3D printing force, and all kinds of other non-core activities.  Their latest is an apparent desire to become a land based navy to conduct anti-surface ship operations using their high mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS).  The Marines want to get into the business of sea control from the land.  I guess they’ve solved every other problem they face and are looking to expand.

We’ve talked about this recently in somewhat general terms but let’s get into the weeds and really look at this.

A Breaking Defense website article describes the Marine’s newly desired mission (1) thusly,

“It also means the Marines need a highly mobile system that can come ashore with the grunts and keep moving to evade retaliatory fire while staying connected to Navy fire control networks. That’s a much more demanding mission than static coastal defense, the role of most anti-ship missile batteries around the world …”

The article hints at some of the challenges.

“But buying the missile is just the start. You need to integrate it with a launcher, a fire control network and a supply chain.”

The launcher is the easy part, in the Marine’s eyes.  They already have the HIMARS so they just need to find a missile that can fit it.

How is all this going to work?  Here’s the Marine’s vision.

“The Marines would provide additional “distributed” firepower from Expeditionary Advance Bases. Carved out of hostile territory by landing forces, kept small and camouflaged to avoid enemy fire, EABs would support F-35B jump jets, V-22 tiltrotors, and drones, as well as anti-ship missiles for the fleet. It’s a high-tech version of Henderson Field on Guadalcanal (part of the Solomons) in 1942. Like Henderson Field, the EABs would provide a permanent presence ashore, inside the contested zone, to support Navy ships as they move in and out to raid and withdraw.”

The unspoken assumptions that go into this vision are staggering in their magnitude and fantasy.  Let’s examine them.

That we’re going to be able to enter a “contested zone” with a big enough force to land heavy construction equipment, build a base, equip it with advanced computers, comm. gear, sensors, spare parts, fuel, and munitions without the enemy noticing is wishful thinking at its best – and we’re going to have several of these bases!

That we believe we’re going to be able to operate the highly temperamental F-35B which, under ideal and pristine conditions on a highly advanced and well equipped airbase, has only a 50% readiness rate is ludicrous. 

That we’re going to be able to transport fuel, food, munitions, spare parts, etc. to these bases in the “contested zone” without being seen is pure fantasy.

It also occurs to me that another unspoken assumption in this concept is that the expeditionary base will either be on a previously unoccupied island or chunk of land or the Marines will have to seize it.  If the Marines have to seize the land then there is no secrecy.  The enemy, having had the location wrested away from them, will be fully aware of our presence and any base that we might construct there.  That kind of defeats the fantasy of secret bases with missiles and aircraft appearing and disappearing as if by magic.  That leaves the use of previously unoccupied land.  Are there really that many unoccupied pieces of land in a “contested zone” and near enough to something of value that the enemy will have ships passing by but will not be monitoring the land for just such secret bases?  I’ve got to believe that the number of such locations are exceedingly few.

I’ve got to stop here.  We’re wandering off topic by discussing the fantasy of these disbursed, magically invisible bases.  The topic is the use of HIMARS anti-ship missiles so let’s get back to that.

There’s a fundamental problem with launching a missile, any missile.

“Once you launch a rocket, however, the enemy can see your location on radar and infra-red, so the missile batteries must practice “shoot and scoot” tactics: move to a firing point, launch, and move again to a hiding place before enemy retaliation rains down.”

Shoot and scoot!  Well that’s easy.  The HIMARS will be able to move before any counterfire can arrive.  Just out of curiosity, though, how does a 12 ton HIMARS scoot through the jungle, mountains, or whatever that the Marines have carved their forward expeditionary bases out of?  And if we limit ourselves to only relatively flat, open areas that a HIMARS can easily travel, doesn’t that negate the “hidden” part of the expeditionary base concept?  Plus, doesn’t the act of firing kind of call attention to the base itself?  Presumably the enemy can reason out that an anti-ship missile didn’t just appear from land by magic.  Once alerted, the enemy has only to conduct a cursory scan of the area and they’ll notice any base big enough to operate F-35B’s, MV-22s, drones, HIMARS.  Plus, they’ll likely notice the buildings, warehouses, comm. facilities, sensors, etc. that even a “primitive” base requires.  Henderson Field was not a secret to the Japanese!

Let’s consider the missile’s range.  The Marine Request For Information to industry (2) cited a range of “80 miles or greater”.  The problem, here, is that the longer the range, the bigger the missile must be and the bigger and less mobile the launcher must be – refer back to the “shoot and scoot” issue.  Further, the larger the missile, the more expensive it is.  This strongly suggests a fairly short range missile.  Range leads us directly to the next problem which is sensor/targeting.

HIMARS - Scooting Through The Jungle?

An 80+ mile missile is useless if you don’t have 80+ mile sensors to provide targeting data.  What are these sensors and where are they going to come from?  The obvious sensor is radar.  The problem is that a land based radar has a range of only the radar’s horizon, say, 20 miles or so.  Of course, the radar could be mounted on top of a high hill or mountain (how do we get it there from a primitive expeditionary base without calling attention to the effort?) if one happens to be handy.  Data transmission from a remote radar sensor presents another problem. 

Also, if we have a powerful 80+ mile radar scanning the area, that will certainly call the enemy’s attention to it and our “secret” base won’t be secret anymore.

Well, why not use networked sensors from other assets in the region, like the Navy?  The Navy has made an extensive investment in, and commitment to, distributed sensor networks so tapping into that should solve the problem, right?  Of course, if the Navy has to be in the area to provide sensor coverage then that means that the Navy can’t leave the area and if the Navy is in the area, why do you need a land based anti-ship missile since every ship that floats will be armed with anti-ship missiles anyway, according to the Navy (remember the Navy’s oft-repeated, “If it floats, it fights.”?)?

This smacks of budget grabbing at its worst.  With all the problems the Marines currently face, is trying to take on a new, non-core mission really the best use of their time and budget?  The Marines are on an out-of-control power (meaning budget) grab and need to be reined in.

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “Marines Seek Anti-Ship HIMARS: High Cost, Hard Mission”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 14-Nov-2017,

https://breakingdefense.com/2017/11/marines-seek-anti-ship-himars-high-cost-hard-mission/

(2)https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=378c096f930cebbeb4447552a90074a3&tab=core&_cview=0

HIMARS For The Navy

ComNavOps, along with many readers, has called for looking into the possibility of mounting a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) on ships to provide firepower support for troops ashore. 

To refresh your memory, the Army’s M270 MLRS  can fire, among other munitions, 12 guided rockets with a range of 60+ km (37+ miles) with a unitary high explosive (HE) warhead or a payload of 404 M85 submunitions.  Alternatively, the MLRS can fire the MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) which is a ballistic missile with a range of 300 km (186 miles) and a 500 lb HE warhead.  ATACMS is being upgraded with a new seeker to enable it to hit moving targets including targets at sea.  The missile occupies the same space as six of the smaller rockets in the MLRS launcher enabling two to be fired from a single launcher.

The Army seems to be replacing the MLRS with the M-142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) which is a lighter version of the MLRS but with only half the weapon capacity.  Thus, a HIMARS can fire 6 smaller rockets or 1 ATACMS.

We see, then, that the Army already has the long range rocket system that the Navy has spent $24 billion dollars on in the form of the Zumwalt program and which has totally failed due to the prohibitive cost of the rockets.

To bring us completely up to date, USNI News website reports that the Marines have test fired a HIMARS system from the deck of an amphibious ship (1).  This is both good news and stupid news.

HIMARS - Publicity Stunt With Potential

First, the stupid …  Firing HIMARS from the deck of a ship is a publicity stunt, at best.  Such an application is unworkable for a variety of reasons.  The HIMARS system includes a launcher vehicle, resupply vehicle, and two resupply trailers.  This is space and volume that no ship has to spare.  Someone, at least, seems to recognize this.

“And then,” said O’Connor [Rear Adm. Cathal O’Connor, ESG-3 commander], “there is the question of trade-offs because ships are limited in volume, weight and personnel. So in order to bring X, we’d have to give up Y. So it’s something to consider.” (1)

That’s why the idea of placing trucks on the deck of an amphibious ship is silly.  The deck space is already completely accounted for and utilized.  Some essential function, like helos and MV-22s, would have to be sacrificed to accommodate the MLRS.

Further, a non-marinized HIMARS truck sitting out on the deck of a ship, subject to saltwater and the elements, will quickly corrode into inoperability.

Frankly, this stunt just smacks of more of the Marine’s recent trend to try to be and do all things instead of concentrating on its unique role and doing it well.

Now, the good news …  It appears that someone is at least thinking along the right lines.  As stated in many previous posts and comments, a MLRS system adapted to naval vessels is an outstanding idea.  The base system and munitions are already fully developed and in production with fully matured and understood costs.

The two main challenges to adapting MLRS to a ship are developing a naval launcher and writing code to allow the launcher to function on a constantly moving ship as opposed to the rock solid base of dry land.

Developing a permanent naval launcher, possibly a box launcher along the lines of the old Mk112 ASROC or the Mk29 Sea Sparrow launcher should not be that difficult.  We already know how to build both if we can resist the temptation to reinvent the wheel and gold plate it.

The software, or at least the basis for it, has already been developed, according to the article.

Having noted the stupidity of a truck on the deck of an amphibious ship, a viable alternative is a purpose built ship designed to operate MLRS launchers.  Such a system would possibly be a good fit for the LCS.  The ample flight deck and hangar space could be converted to launchers, magazines, reload mechanisms, and support mechanisms.  The resulting modified fire support LCS could be highly useful as a ground forces firepower support vessel.  Add in three or four SeaRAM launchers for self-defense and the ship would be well suited for close in fire support work.  There you have it – a useful purpose for the LCS!

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(1)USNI News website, “Marines Fire HIMARS From Ship in Sea Control Experiment With Navy”, Gidget Fuentes, 24-Oct-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/10/24/marines-fire-himars-ship-sea-control-experiment-navy