Initial Ticonderoga Retirement

I get tired of hearing people call for ship designs with 40-50 year service lives and designed in upgradability.  Aside from being an extremely questionable concept, the reality is that the Navy almost always retires perfectly good ships far earlier than their service life limit calls for.  The only exception is carriers and that, only to an extent. 

 

For example, the Ticonderoga class cruisers were designed with a 35 year service life and yet the first five ships of the class were retired barely halfway through their designed lifespan.  The actual service lives are shown in the table below.

 

 

 

Ship	Years at Retirement
CG-47, Ticonderoga	21
CG-48, Yorktown	20
CG-49, Vincennes	20
CG-50, Valley Forge	18
CG-51, Gates	18

 

 

Why were these ships retired?  The Navy has offered numerous explanations with most centering around the ineffectiveness of the twin arm missile launchers and the prohibitive cost to upgrade the ships to VLS.  We’ve already demonstrated the fallacy of the claim that arm launchers are substantially inferior … they’re not (see, “VLS versus Arm Launchers”)!  They’re just as good and, in some circumstances, better than VLS!

 

At the very least, the twin arm launcher Ticonderogas were, and still are, the equal or superior to any other ship in the world.  Does it make sense to have thrown them away?  Even if one believes that VLS is superior, the difference in performance is minimal and nowhere near enough to justify early retirement of five world class ships.

USS Ticonderoga

 

For the sake of further discussion, let’s accept the Navy explanation at face value.  This perfectly illustrates the folly and the degree of self-deception in designing a ship to have a long service life and undergo modernization – it just doesn’t happen!  When the time comes to modernize, the Navy always claims that the ship under consideration is too expensive and obsolete to modernize.  This was true for the Spruance, the Los Angeles, the Perry, the Tarawa, the Ticonceroga, and other classes.  If we know, with near 100% certainty that the ship won’t be upgraded and modernized and will, in fact, be retired early, why do people persist in trying to argue for long design service lives?  Clearly, the rationale - that modernization will occur - is false.

 

ComNavOps has argued for building ships with a 20 year life span.  In this example, two of the five ships didn’t even make it that far!  I guess I need to reduce my goal!

 

Had the Ticonderoga class been designed for a 20 year life, maintenance costs would have been far cheaper since maintenance costs go up with time.  In addition, the mythical modernization would have actually occurred because brand new ships would have been built at the 20 year mark.  New ships … cheaper to operate … it’s a Navy dream come true!

 

Let’s stop deluding ourselves and acknowledge that designing long service lives is pointless, useless, more expensive, and results in a fleet of older, less capable ships.  It is obvious that the Navy has no interest in properly maintaining ships to achieve their full service life and even less interest in performing mid-life modernizations.  The Navy attempted to retire the entire remaining Ticonderoga class early and proposed foregoing the mid-life RCOH for a couple of carriers.  In each case, Congress has slapped the Navy down and yet the Navy keeps trying to early retire its ships.  The Navy uses long service lives as a ‘bait and switch’ tactic to obtain funding from Congress. 

 

Having acknowledged that (admitting a problem is half the battle!), we can then begin a rational force structure design process based on 20-year ship lives and continual, timely modernization (new ships).  The result will be a younger fleet with lower construction costs and significantly lower maintenance and operating costs, as well as a more robust shipbuilding industry thanks to building twice as many ships.

Navy Rescinds Ship Service Life Extensions

As we previously noted and discussed, in July of 2018 the Navy arbitrarily extended the design service life of most ship classes by ten years or so (see, “Ship Service Life Extensions”).  The Burke class was extended from 35-40 years (an utterly unrealistic target to begin with, given the Navy’s failure to provide proper maintenance and tendency to early retire ships) to 45-50 years!  I chuckle as I type this but such is the nature of the Navy’s delusions.

Of course, we roundly mocked this flight of pure fantasy.  Given the Navy’s repeated disregard for maintenance and near 100% record of early retirements, arbitrarily extending service lives with no concomitant plan to improve and fund maintenance was obviously just a fictitious ploy to make some plan or admiral look good on paper.  We knew it would never actually happen.

Reality has now reared its head and the Navy is rescinding the service life extensions as a cost savings measure.(1)  Everyone outside the Navy knew it wasn’t going to happen and now the Navy has officially admitted it.  This is why you come to this blog.  You were informed in no uncertain terms two years ago that the Navy’s service life extension plan was pure fantasy and would never happen.  This is just simple confirmation.  If the Navy would just read this blog they could save themselves a lot of effort and embarrassment.  But, I digress …

So, what does this do to the Navy’s plan to grow to a 355 ship fleet?  Do I really need to lay it out for you?

I’ll simply note that the Navy is furiously retiring ships early (Aegis cruisers, the first four LCS, Los Angeles subs, and so on) while claiming to want to build the fleet.  Extending the service lives of Burke destroyers could have aided in that endeavor if their maintenance was properly funded.  Instead, as they always do, the Navy has opted for new hulls over maintained hulls – anything for a new hull even if it’s a useless LCS, an experimental unmanned vessel, a non-functional Ford, or a non-functional Zumwalt.

Do you recall how vital the Burke modernization effort supposedly was?  This will remind you,

The decision to ax the service life extensions for the Arleigh Burke class comes after years of assurances from Navy leaders that the destroyers would be modernized with an eye to growing the fleet over the coming decades. (1)

In its FY20 30-year shipbuilding plan, the Navy said extending the lives of the Arleigh Burkes was an imperative to growing the fleet to a battle force of 355 ships. Instead, the cancellation of the service life extensions means that between 2026 and 2034, the Navy is slated to lose 27 destroyers from its battle force. (1)

The Navy changes its mind more frequently than a girl with multiple prom proposals. 

In testimony that year, Merz [then Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems Vice Adm. Bill Merz] said ballistic missile defense [BMD] was the biggest requirement driving the retention of the DDGs to 45 years. (1)

I guess BMD wasn’t really that important, after all?

So, the Navy is set to lose 27 Burkes between 2026-2034.  And we’re going to replace them with … small and medium displacement unmanned surface vessels????  China doesn’t have to build a bigger, stronger navy than us – they just have to wait while we dismantle our navy for them!

______________________________

(1)Defense News website, “Destroyers Left Behind”, David B. Larter, 7-Mar-2020,

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/03/07/destroyers-left-behind-us-navy-cancels-plans-to-extend-service-lives-of-its-workhorse-ddgs/

Air Force 5-Year Fighter Production Plan

The Air Force must be reading this blog since they’re copying one of ComNavOps’ posts almost verbatim.  The Air Force wants to build a new aircraft in just five years.  What?!!!  Five years?  How is that possible?  Well, ComNavOps explained how to build an aircraft in five years in a post a couple of years ago (see, “How To Build A Better Aircraft”).

Now, the Air Force is jumping on the bandwagon.  Presumably, the F-35 debacle has scared them to the point of recognizing that the current acquisition process is not viable.

The U.S. Air Force is preparing to radically alter the acquisition strategy for its next generation of fighter jets, with a new plan that could require industry to design, develop and produce a new fighter in five years or less. (1)

Build a new aircraft in just five years?!  Astoundingly, that’s exactly the time frame that ComNavOps put forth.

How will the Air Force accomplish this?  Why, the same way that ComNavOps has repeatedly stated should be done – by building with only existing technology and building in small batches!  To wit,

… the NGAD [Next Generation Air Dominance] program will adopt a rapid approach to developing small batches of fighters with multiple companies … (1)

Instead of maturing technologies over time to create an exquisite fighter, the Air Force’s goal would be to quickly build the best fighter that industry can muster over a couple years, integrating whatever emerging technology exists. The service would downselect, put a small number of aircraft under contract and then restart another round of competition among fighter manufacturers, which would revise their fighter designs and explore newer leaps in technology. (1)

… instead of trying to hone requirements to meet an unknown threat 25 years into the future, the Air Force would rapidly churn out aircraft with new technologies … (1)

This is exactly the process I’ve called for in both aircraft and ship acquisition.  Stop designing mega-programs that try to future proof platforms (not possible and hideously expensive) and, instead, build for shorter lifespans (see, “Ship Service Life Reduction”) and smaller batches of specialized assets.  The small batches and shorter lifespans allow future tech to be incorporated as it becomes available.  There’s no need to future proof that new aircraft because you’ll be building a new batch in a few years anyway and you can incorporate the future tech then.  This is just common sense on a cracker.

This approach also has the added and hugely important side benefit of keeping more industrial companies current and viable as opposed to the winner-take-all mega-project that ensures we wind up with just one or two companies.

I may have to sue the Air Force for plagiarism!  They are almost literally copying my posts.  Relax Air Force, it’s okay.  I don’t mind if you copy and adopt my ideas.  You should and you have my blessing!

Okay, Navy, the Air Force has seen the light of ComNavOps’ brilliance now what about you?  Get on board!  Let’s start building smaller, specialized ships with 15-20 year lifespans (you aren’t conducting maintenance so they won’t last long, anyway) and no need for future tech concurrency which has proven to be the downfall of the last several ship programs.

_________________________________________

(1)Defense News website, “The US Air Force’s radical plan for a future fighter could field a jet in 5 years”, Valerie Insinna, 16-Sep-2019,

https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/2019/09/16/the-us-air-forces-radical-plan-for-a-future-fighter-could-field-a-jet-in-5-years/

LCS Service Without A Module

The LCS program has many problems.  One of the major ones is that there are no combat-useful modules available despite years of development effort.  Without a module, the LCS is just a large patrol boat.

Here’s a table showing the commissioned LCS vessels and the number of years that they have, thus far, served without a module.  Recalling that the target service life span of the LCS is 25 years and noting that almost no Navy vessel has made it to their full life span in recent decades, we’re seeing LCS’s that are expending significant portions of their service lives without any useful capability whatsoever.

Ship      Commissioned   Years Without a Module

LCS-1         2008               9

LCS-2         2010               7

LCS-3         2012               5

LCS-4         2014               3

LCS-5         2015               2

LCS-6         2015               2

LCS-7         2016               1

LCS-8         2016               1

LCS-9

LCS-10        2017               0

The troubling aspect to this is that there is no readily discernible end to the module development in sight.  The Navy claims that each module is just a few years from operation but they’ve been claiming that for the last decade.

This is the equivalent of a battleship being built, commissioned, and serving for years without its main battery.

If a war starts tonight, what can the commissioned LCS’s contribute?  Nothing.

That’s what 9 of our commissioned warships bring to the combat table.  Nothing.

Congress Versus Navy

It’s been fascinating to watch the Navy battle with Congress over the years.  Naively, one would think that the Navy and Congress are on the same side – the side of the United States – but that is clearly not the case.  The Navy has come up with one maneuver after another designed to thwart or bypass the intent of Congress. 

The recent back and forth over the issue of early retirement of Aegis cruisers is the latest example.  The Navy is determined to early retire the cruisers, presumably to remove competition with the Flt III AMDR, while Congress is determined to preserve the cruisers in active service.

You’ll recall that the Navy announced several early retirements a few years ago and Congress countered by passing additional funding and directing the Navy to retain the cruisers.  Undeterred by Congressional intent, the Navy hit upon the ploy of “idling” 11 cruisers pending “modernization”.  Of course, no one believes that the cruisers will ever be modernized and returned to duty and even the Navy’s own stated plan is for the cruisers to be modernized and returned to duty on a one-for-one replacement basis for older cruisers.  Thus, there will only ever be 11 active cruisers – a point the Navy glosses over.  Just as ComNavOps sees this for the transparent ploy it is, so to Congress appears to understand what the Navy is doing.  The House Appropriations Committee (HAC) report (1) states,

“The Committee is concerned that this long term lay up will lead to decommissioning of some or all of these cruisers in the near future.”

The HAC passed its version of the FY2015 defense bill and directly addresses the Navy’s cruiser plans with the following provisions.

• The Navy is limited to idling no more than two cruisers per year beginning in 2016.
• The Navy is limited to a maximum of six idled cruisers at any given time.
• No cruiser can be kept idled for more than four years.

Of course, the bill must still pass the complete House so changes are possible, though unlikely.

There you have it.  Congress is once again making its wishes known.  Will the Navy acquiesce and accept the legal authority of Congress or will the Navy come up with yet another creative scheme for bypassing Congressional intent?  My money’s on the Navy.  If they would apply half the creativity to warfighting that they apply to thwarting Congressional oversight, we’d have twice the Navy we do now!

Now, before any of you tell me how inept Congress is, recognize that that’s not the point.  The point is that Congress has legal budgetary and oversight authority over the Navy.  Given our system of civilian control of the military, the Navy is bound to obey Congress whether right or wrong.  If the Navy feels Congress is wrong then it’s on the Navy to make the case for what they want.  It is not the right of the Navy to continually thwart Congressional intent.  Doing so is dishonorable and unethical if not illegal.  It is unworthy of uniformed leadership and violates the spirit and tradition of civilian control.

The Navy should not be asking how they can bypass Congress in the next iteration of the battle but, rather, why they can’t make a compelling case for what they want.  Maybe, just maybe, the answer is that there isn’t a compelling case to be made! 

Navy leadership has sunk awfully low over the last few decades and it may be that Congress, as inept as they are, are actually seeing things in a clearer light than the Navy.

(1) http://news.usni.org/2014/06/11/house-panel-passes-defense-bill-limiting-cruiser-lay-ups-funds-carrier-refueling

Frigates – Build To The Immediate Threat

Many people greeted the announced truncation of the LCS build as the advent of a true frigate.  ComNavOps has already gone on record as stating that the Navy won’t build a frigate but will simply build an upgunned version of the LCS – watch, though, they may designate it a “frigate” as a PR move to placate Congress and the LCS critics.  That said, what if the Navy did actually build a frigate?  Well, here’s a thought on the subject.

Frigates are smaller and lighter built vessels which are, theoretically, cheaper than their full featured, larger cousins such as destroyers and cruisers.  As such, they aren’t expected to last as long.  A 20-25 year life would be typical as opposed to a 40 year life for a larger ship.  This imparts a potentially valuable characteristic to a frigate:  it doesn’t need to be built with the long term in mind.  Properly recognized and utilized, this characteristic offers the basis for significant cost savings, speed of construction, and flexibility.

If we’re not building for far future threats that we can only barely imagine right now, we can, instead, focus on the immediate threats that are clearly defined.  Those threats can be dealt with using currently available technology and existing, proven weapons and systems.  In other words, the threats won’t change significantly enough over the life of the frigate to warrant investment in non-existent, what-if technology that will escalate costs, delay construction, and provide only portions of the promised or hoped-for performance.



Frigates - Inherently Adaptable?



For example, consider AAW.  A frigate, by definition, is not an area AAW platform.  It only needs to defend itself and a few nearby ships it might be escorting.  While future ballistic missile defense concerns might suggest a need to invest in sophisticated BMD radars and missiles, that threat does not yet exist and won’t for many years.  We don’t need to invest in imaginary technology to defeat a non-existent threat for a ship whose lifetime won’t see the threat.  We can limit ourselves to existing threats and existing solutions – a much cheaper approach.

Or, consider the current darlings of naval development:  lasers and railguns.  Oooh my …  I got a tingle just typing that!  Despite the Navy’s public relations announcements, these weapons are many years, probably decades, away from full functioning versions.  For a frigate with a 20-25 year lifespan, there’s no need to build in enormous electrical capacity, cooling capacity, and whatever other structural or utility support they might need.  We can save all that money and effort and in 20 years, if the weapons have panned out, we can build new frigates that are designed to support the systems.  Plus, we’ll know by then what’s actually needed instead of building in guessed-at capacities that may or may not meet the needs.

We see, then, that the shorter lifespan of a frigate actually offers the potential for greater flexibility and adaptability than a larger warship.  If the lifespan is around half that of a larger warship (say 20 years versus 40 years, to illustrate) we can build an entirely new frigate halfway through the lifespan of a larger ship and the new version can be completely adapted to the threats that exist at that time. 

If executed correctly, the more limited lifespan of the frigate offers some advantages.  The build can be cheaper since we don’t have to worry about far future, non-existent threats and can use off-the-shelf weapons and systems.  The ships, as a class, offer a larger degree of flexibility thanks to their shorter lifespans.  The use of existing technology should allow a much quicker design to construction timeframe instead of the usual R&D concurrency delays so prevalent today.

Of course, this is all predicated on being able to build a “cheap” frigate with a focused mission and specific, limited capabilities.  If we try to build a frigate with all the capabilities of a Burke then it won’t be cheap and it won’t be on-time and we won’t be able to afford to retire them at 20-25 years. 

The Navy has an opportunity, now, to adjust the fleet’s size and composition in a more useful and effective direction.  Will they?  History suggests not.  We’ll see.

Budget Cuts

A 25-Jan-13 San Diego Union – Tribune website article (1) reported on CNO Greenert’s initial efforts to implement anticipated budget cuts.

“The Navy’s top officer Thursday outlined plans for spending cuts that could affect a large segment of San Diego’s naval and shipyard communities.

The Navy plans to cancel some ship and aircraft maintenance, fire temporary employees, freeze civilian hiring, drastically limit travel and halt pier and runway projects, according to a memo from Adm. Jonathan Greenert.

The issue is a $4.6 billion shortfall in the Navy’s $39.4 billion operations budget. About $3.2 billion of that is because Congress has not yet passed a 2013 appropriations bill. The Navy must spend at 2012 levels until it does.

“Because of this, we need to cut back on ops and maintenance to get our spending rate down,” Greenert said in a memo to his admirals and senior civilian leaders. “We are making the following reductions, starting now, to ensure we can fund ongoing deployments and other mission-critical activities.”

He offered a list of near-term reductions. He also outlined more drastic steps that would be taken if Congress doesn’t pass legislation by March 1 to avert sweeping automatic spending cuts known as sequestration.

Cuts the Navy is planning now:

- Cancellation of the majority of surface ship maintenance at private shipyards between April and September. This would affect about 30 of 187 warships, but Navy officials couldn’t say Thursday how many of those are in San Diego.

- Cancellation of all aircraft work at maintenance depots from April to September, affecting about 250 aircraft.”

 

This is what I’ve come to expect from CNO Greenert and Navy leadership, both civilian and uniformed.  The logical reaction to draconian budget cuts would be to cut new construction spending in order to ensure that existing ships and aircraft are well maintained, fully combat capable and deployable, and available for their maximum lifespans.  In fact, the entire $4.6B budget shortfall is about the cost of a single new Zumwalt.

Instead, CNO Greenert proposes further shortening the lifespans of ships and aircraft by deferring maintenance and accelerating the effects of wear and tear.  Sending sailors to sea in poorly maintained ships and aircraft is a gross violation of the trust of the people for whom CNO is responsible.  I’ve previously pointed out that the Navy worships at the altar of new construction to the exclusion and detriment of everything else.  This is merely further proof. 

Of course, it’s not outside the realm of possibility that this is political gamesmanship being played by the military.  The Navy deliberately sets up a scenario involving actions that they don’t really intend to take but that intentionally lead to all manner of dire results with the idea being to put pressure on Congress to revoke the budget cuts.  This is not a political blog so I’ll leave that aspect alone beyond saying that I would hope that the military was above that sort of thing.  Sadly, my read of the situation is that the Navy is, indeed, posturing in an attempt to influence Congress but that if the budget cuts happen, the Navy will do exactly as CNO outlined.  The entire naval force will be further hollowed out to ensure that new construction continues unabated.

(1) http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2013/jan/24/Navy-outlines-cuts-due-to-budget-shortfall/

CBO Shipbuilding Analysis Report

The Congressional Budget Office has published its analysis of the Navy’s current shipbuilding plan.  It’s worth noting several points from the report. 

First, the Navy’s cost estimates are, charitably, incompetent or, more realistically, intentionally misleading, bordering on fraudulent.  The Navy’s estimate is that it will build 268 ships over the next 30 years at an average yearly cost of $16.8B.  CBO estimates the yearly required cost will be $20.0B and even suggests that their estimates may be too low.  By comparison, the current actual yearly cost is $14.9B.  Does anyone believe that figure is going up in the foreseeable future, given the budget problems, looming cuts, and possible sequestration?

Setting aside the incredible unlikelihood of budget increases, does the Navy’s history of cost estimating inspire any confidence?  The LCS, LPD-17, CVN-78, Virginia, etc. all wound up costing 30% - 100% more than the Navy’s estimates.  So, it would seem that CBO’s estimates are likely to closer to reality than the Navy’s. 



300 Ship Fleet?  Not Likely!



Now, the interesting part of this cost estimating is that the Navy knows its own history of estimating failures and yet continues to insist on using the same methods it always has.  That’s either incompetent or fraudulent.  You decide for yourself.

Moving on, the Navy plans to build 268 ships to achieve a 300+ fleet.  However, using the CBO’s estimate of the average cost per ship of $2.2B, the build rate for new ships under the current budget is only 6.7 ships per year which gives a total of 203 over the 30 year period as opposed to the Navy’s goal of 268 ships.  The more realistic CBO numbers show that the Navy is not going come anywhere near a 300 ship fleet.  To be fair, no one knows what the yearly shipbuilding budget will be ten or twenty years from now.  It may be higher than now but, then again, it may well be smaller.  I’m guessing that it will remain unchanged for the next several years.

Speaking of achieving a 300+ ship fleet, CBO notes that the Navy is assuming that the Burke class destroyers will have a service life of 40 years even though no previous destroyer class has even come close to that.  If they have a more realistic life of 25-30 years, the 300+ ship fleet becomes even more of a fantasy.  And, of course, the Navy is now counting the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) and ocean surveillance ships as part of the fleet.  Throw in the absolutely toothless LCS which will make up a quarter of the fleet and the fleet numbers may look better on paper but it illustrates how much less capable the future fleet will be.

Finally, CBO notes that the Navy’s cost estimates fail to include the costs for post-delivery fitting out, nuclear refuels, and various other things that come from the new construction account.  These push the actual construction costs up by about $2B per year which means the yearly construction budgets should actually be $18.8B (Navy) and $21.9B (CBO) which are even less likely to be achieved.

The CBO report makes it pretty clear that the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan is just a fantasy of wishful thinking rather than a realistic plan.  To me, it looks like a political ploy to enable the current administration to be able to claim that they are maintaining the fleet even though it is actually shrinking.  The really sad part is that the uniformed Navy leadership is going along with this.

(1) Congressional Budget Office (CBO) – An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2013 Shipbuilding Plan, July 2012, Pub. No. 4456

Fleet Size - Going Up or Down?

Publicly, at least, the Navy talks about wanting to maintain a fleet size of 300+ ships;  313 being a commonly cited goal.  Desired fleet size should be a function of strategic requirements rather than available budget or whatever factors but let’s set that issue aside for the moment and look, instead, at the arithmetic of fleet size.

In order to maintain a fleet size of X ships and given an average ship life of Y years, one has to build (X/Y) new ships per year.  So, for a 300 ship fleet with an average ship life of 30 years we need to build 10 new ships per year (300 ships / 30 years = 10 ships/year). 

Speaking in general terms, an average life of 30 years per ship sounds about right.  Thus, the Navy must build 10 new ships per year to maintain a 300 ship fleet. 

A Shrinking Fleet ?

Listed below are the actual life spans for ships in recent history.  For the 39 major class ships retired from 2008-2012, inclusive, as reported in the annual Naval Review issues of the Naval Institute Proceedings, the average age at decommissioning by class was,

Carriers (CV) –              44 years

Aegis Cruisers (CG) –    21 years

Frigates (FFG) –            29 years

Submarines (SSN) –      33 years

Amphibious (LHA) –       32 years

Amphibious (LPD) –       41 years

Minesweepers (MHC) –  11 years

For discussion purposes we’ll use 30 years as the average life span of a ship.

The Navy’s shipbuilding construction budget is around $15B per year.  From the 2012 Dept of Navy Highlights (1) the specific budget figures are,

2011  $15.3B

2012  $14.9B

2013  $13.6B

For sake of discussion let’s stick with a round figure of $15B per year for new construction.  So, if 10 ships per year are needed and $15B per year is the budget then the average cost per ship is $1.5B.  However, if ships actually cost more than that then the Navy can’t build 10 per year and the fleet size will shrink.  If the ships cost less than that the Navy can build more and the fleet will grow. 

What do ships actually cost?  From various sources, here are some individual ship costs.  The number in parentheses is the source reference citation listed at the end of the post.

Ford (CVN) -                          $13.4B each (4)

Virginia (SSN) -                       $2.5B each (5)

DDG-51 Flt III -                        $3.6B each (2)

DDG-51 Restart -                    $1.9B each (2)

LPD-17 -                                $2.0B each (3)

LHA-6 -                                  $3.8B each (4)

Zumwalt (DDG-1000) -             $3.9B each (7)

Ohio Replacement (SSBN(X)) - $5.6B each (6)

All of these ships cost more than the $1.5B average cost for the required build rate of 10 ships per year.  In fact, most cost significantly more and the average cost of the listed ships is $4.6B;  of course, that’s not a realistic average because the average would depend on the relative numbers of each being built each year and that varies widely from year to year.  Nonetheless, it’s instructive.  An average cost of $4.6B means that only 3 ships per year can be built with the $15B annual shipbuilding budget.

So, how many ships have been built recently?  For the years 2008-2012, inclusive, 21 combat ships have been built (commissioned) according to the Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review Issues, for the corresponding years.  Non-combat vessels such as JHSV, patrol craft, and the like are not included in this count.  That’s an average of 4.2 ships built per year.

What does this mean?  A build rate of 4.2 ships per year with an average life of 30 years equates to a fleet size of 126.  Given that the current combat fleet size is 210 (Naval Vessel Register website, www.nvr.navy.mil;  total fleet size is 285 which counts various non-combat support ships), that’s quite a potential drop coming. 

Why, then, does the administration and the Navy still say that they are on course to a 300 ship fleet?  This quote from the Dept. of Navy budget highlight report (1) may explain things a bit.

“In FY 2013 seven battle force ships will be delivered: one Nuclear Attack Submarine (SSN), one Transport Dock (LPD), one Dry-Cargo Ammunition ship (TAKE), one  Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), two Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs), and one Mobile Landing Platform (MLP).

Eleven battle force ships will be retired: one Aircraft Carrier (CVN), six Frigates

(FFGs), and four Cruisers (CGs).”

Note that of the “seven battle force ships” to be delivered in FY2013, five are non-combat vessels as counted in this discussion.  Compare the combat capability of the ships being retired to that of the ships being delivered.  One way to reach a fleet size of 300 ships is to count non-combat ships that were not previously counted.  This has been discussed on other websites and I’ll let the subject go, for the moment.

In summary, it’s clear that the Navy’s stated goal of a 300 ship fleet cannot be achieved with the current shipbuilding budget and individual ship costs.  The Navy has averaged only 5.8 new combat ships per year over the last 20 years.  The combat ship fleet will continue to decrease in size.  It’s clear that the administration and Navy leadership know this and have already begun to lay the groundwork for counting hospital ships, patrol craft, JHSVs, and other clearly non-combat ships so as to be able to claim to have a 300 ship fleet.  Unfortunately, it will be a very hollow fleet.

(1)   Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2013 Budget, Feb 2012, http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/13pres/Highlights_book.pdf

(2)   GAO, Arleigh Burke Destroyers, Jan 2012, GAO-12-113

(3)   CRS, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, Ronald O'Rourke, March 16, 2011

(4)   Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), Program Acquisition Cost Summary, 31-Dec-2010, http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110415pacs.pdf

(5)   CRS, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement:  Background and Issues for Congress, Ronald O'Rourke, April 2, 2012

(6)   CRS, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program:  Background and Issues for Congress, Ronald O'Rourke, April 5, 2012

(7)   CRS, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:  Background and Issues for Congress, Ronald O'Rourke, March 14, 2011