Philippines Strategy

You’ve probably noticed that several of ComNavOps’ fictional stories revolve around the Philippines.  This is not by random chance.  The strategic value of the Philippines cannot be overstated.  The country, along with Taiwan, forms two gigantic ‘forts’ that China must deal with in any war.
 
From China’s perspective, those two countries act as forward enemy bases that dominate the surrounding seas and impact any operations the Chinese would attempt.  Their removal from the strategic equations is imperative.  Ideally, China would turn the tables by seizing both countries and using them as forts against any American response.
 
Taiwan’s seizure (or ‘reunification’ as the Chinese would euphemistically put it) is absolutely mandatory for both strategic and cultural reasons.  Wisely or foolishly, China’s leadership has linked themselves to the seizure of Taiwan as a national and cultural imperative.  For those reasons, Taiwan will be the first operation in any war.
 
The Philippines present a somewhat different situation for China.  The Philippines cannot be allowed to become a US forward base but it is not necessarily a requirement that the country be physically seized and occupied.  Forcing Philippines to declare neutrality is almost as good as seizing it.  A declaration of neutrality would eliminate Philippines as a forward base for the US and would have the added benefit of not tying up any Chinese forces in an occupation. 
 
Ideally, of course, China would like the Philippines to enter a war as an ally of China, thereby allowing China to use it as a base without the difficulties of an invasion and occupation.
 
By far, the most likely course of action is that Philippines would declare neutrality rather than place themselves as a target between the US and China.
 
Neutrality, however, will not prevent China, which cares nothing for international laws, from occupying areas of the Philippines that it finds advantageous in its war efforts against the US.  This, of course, leaves Philippines in a bit of a no-win situation.
 
All of this is fairly obvious so where is this going?  Let’s consider scenarios in which the US has access to the use of the Philippines, either because the Philippines enters the war as an ally of the US or because Philippines declares neutrality and China ignores that and attempts to seize or operate from the country, thereby negating Philippines’ neutrality. 
 
In this case, the US would attempt to set up bases and, perhaps more importantly, surveillance assets (radar, elevated optical sensors, etc.).   Obviously, China is not going to sit back and allow that to occur without hindrance. This raises the scenario of the US having to fight to establish and operate a base – something that we haven’t had to do since Guadalcanal.  Do we have the capability to seize suitable land, set up a base while under fire, and defend that base well enough to keep it operational?
 
The answer is no and certainly not with the equipment, units, and training we have currently.  This strongly suggests that we should be developing – quickly! – the capability to seize, set up, and defend a major base.  I’ve often suggested that the Marine’s core mission should be port seizure and this type of operation would be a logical extension of that.  Note that the Army does have existing units dedicated to the seizure of existing airbases.
 
Seizure of land for a not yet existing base could range from ‘walk in unopposed’ to a full fledged, contested, amphibious assault depending on how extensively the Chinese manage to get established.  As we’ve thoroughly discussed, our ability to conduct an opposed landing is extremely limited as we lack naval gun support, sufficient ship-to-shore connectors to allow for attrition, armor, logistic support, sea bases (if we don’t seize a port), mines to protect our sea flanks, and mobile anti-air defenses to protect forces ashore.  In addition, our ability to establish local air superiority is highly suspect and would be largely limited to the understrength air wings of our carriers which would be hard pressed to conduct simultaneous air-to-air and ground support operations with just thirty or so combat aircraft per air wing.
 
 
As we contemplate seizing land and establishing a base, consider these questions:
 

• Do we have the ability to transport and very quickly (instantly!) set up anti-cruise and anti-ballistic missile defenses to protect a base?
• Do we have ground forces who have been trained for base defense?
• Can we transport armor to the Philippines for base defense.  Yes, we’ll certainly be facing Chinese armored forces.
• Do we have sufficient numbers of C-RAM (counter rocket, artillery, and mortar) weapons to defend a base against constant, high volume attacks?
• Do we have sufficient portable, mobile sensors to establish effective surveillance and early warning systems?
• Are we doctrinally willing, and trained, to move our Aegis ships in close to land to provide anti-air protection for the ground forces until they can establish their own defenses?
• Are we capable of quickly constructing hardened and/or underground hangars and fuel/weapons storage?
• Do we sufficient airbase repair equipment that can be transported to the site?
• Do we have sufficient engineering units to build a base under fire, continuously repair it, and keep it operational under fire?
• Can we operate modern, finicky aircraft under primitive conditions with few spare parts, computers, and no modern state of the art repair facilities?  That’s what a forward, contested base would be, after all.  Our abysmal aircraft readiness rates during peacetime suggest that this, alone, almost rules out establishing an airbase in the Philippines.  If you can’t keep aircraft operational, there’s little point having an airbase.  If you recall, we were only able to sporadically operate F4F Wildcats from Guadalcanal and they were robust, easy to maintain aircraft by comparison, requiring only a wrench and duct tape to repair!

 
This kind of thought exercise is exactly what the US military should be doing all day, every day and yet we’re not.  Not even a little bit.  Instead we’re engaged in all manner of social programs, diversity, gender issues, environmental issues, climate concerns, etc.
 
We must start planning for the China war.  If the war never comes, that’s fine but failure to plan for it is dereliction of duty at its most extreme.

Port Seizure Example

ComNavOps has stated that the Marine’s primary mission should be port seizure.  The Ukraine-Russia war has provided an illustrative example of exactly that mission so let’s take a look and see what we can learn from it.

 

 

Incident

 

Russia had seized the port of Berdyansk and was using it as a logistics and resupply point.  However, on 24-Mar-2022, Ukraine struck a Russian Alligator class amphibious landing ship (reportedly, the Orsk) while it was docked in Berdyansk along with two other amphibious ships.[1]  Satellite photos confirm the ship has sunk. 

 

Sunken Ship and Damaged Facilities

 

After the attack, the other two Ropucha-II class landing ships were observed quickly leaving the port.  Some reports suggest that one or both also suffered damage from the attack.  In addition, facilities on the dock were damaged, as confirmed by satellite photos.

 

It is unknown whether the Orsk was loaded and, if so, what the cargo/troops was.  The Orsk can carry 1000+ tons of cargo or around 400 troops and vehicles.  Presumably, since it was docked, it was in the process of unloading though, if so, to what degree it had completed its unloading is unknown.

 

The weapon used was speculated to be an OTR-21 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab) which, depending on the version, has a range of 43-70 miles, an accuracy (CEP) of 229-490 ft, and a thousand pound HE or fragmentation warhead.  The Tochka missile is unguided and uses inertial navigation.

 

It is hard to believe that an inertial guided missile with a CEP of hundreds of feet could hit a single ship which is only 370 ft long and 50 ft wide.  Of course, that ship may or may not have been the intended target.  Regardless of the delivery method, the Orsk suffered some type of major explosive attack.

 

 

Berdyansk

 

Berdyansk is a port city of about 100,000 people and is located along the northwestern shore of the Sea of Azov.  The port is some fifty miles or so directly across from Russia territory and ports on the eastern side of the Sea of Azov.  Berdyansk fell to the Russians sometime around 27-Feb-2022, shortly after the start of the invasion.

 

Berdyansk Location

Implications

 

This incident demonstrates both the vital importance of having a secure port to provide logistical support for ground forces and the extreme difficulty in securing said port and operating it under combat conditions.  One of the consistent reports from Ukraine concerns the apparent lack of logistical support for Russian ground troops with reports of shortages of food, ammo, fuel, and parts.  Thus, a port such as this is mandatory for successful sustained ground operations.

 

It shouldn’t need to be said but let me say it clearly and forcefully, anyway:  it is not possible to logistically support a significant ground war by air.  A secure and functional port is an absolute necessity.

 

Russian state media reports that the Russian Navy is using the captured port of Berdyansk - located on Ukraine's Sea of Azov coastline - in order to funnel more arms, armor and ammunition to the front lines of the invasion of Ukraine.

 

Berdyansk is just 50 road miles west of the city of Mariupol, which has been encircled and besieged by the 8th Combined Arms Army and the Russian Black Sea Fleet. From the start, the operation has been characterized by heavy artillery bombardment, which requires extensive logistics support for sustainment. With relatively limited in-house trucking capacity, Russian maneuver units need to stay within about 90 miles of a supply stockpile or risk running out of ammunition, according to U.S. Army analyst Lt. Col. Alex Vershinin. The early seizure of Berdyansk has helped the invading force to meet this distance requirement for operations between Crimea and Mariupol.

 

According to Russian state-controlled outlet Zvezda, 10 ships are assigned to resupply runs from nearby Russian-controlled ports to Berdyansk.[2]

 

Clearly, the port is vital to Russian logistical support efforts.  Russia managed to seize the port but has, thus far, been unable to secure it, as demonstrated by this attack.  On the other hand, no matter how secure the port, a docked ship is at risk unless the port is out of range of enemy weapons.  Of course, if it is out of range of enemy weapons it is also probably quite far from the very ground forces that it is supposed to support. 

 

This incident suggests that we need to come to grips with the reality of combat losses when trying to operate a port while under fire. 

 

The incident also points out the need to have specialized rapid port repair capability for when the inevitable port damage occurs. 

 

In addition, there is a need to be able to clear sunken ships so that port operations can continue.

 

 

Port Seizure

 

We’ve discussed port seizure in previous posts (see, “Amphibious Assault – Port Seizure”).

 

As a reminder, here are some of the requirements to seize and secure a port facility:

 

• Elimination of enemy forces from the immediate area
• Establishment of C-RAM (Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Mortar) protection
• Establishment of cruise and ballistic missile defenses
• Establishment of long range attacks against enemy rocket, artillery, mortar, cruise, and ballistic weapons (best defense is a good offense)
• Establishment of secure transportation routes out of the port to enable distribution of supplies to the ground forces

 

Since most (all?) ports are intimately associated with surrounding, built up, urban areas, eliminating enemy forces from the area will be difficult and will require a degree of urban fighting with all its attendant challenges.  This will require a very highly trained and specialized force, thoroughly familiar with the unique tactics of urban warfare.  This will also require a great deal of specialized equipment such as breeching equipment for anything from doors to smashing through reinforced walls.  Another example might be barricade erection machinery to provide a secure barrier for cleared areas.

 

Hand in hand with specialized tactics and equipment is the requirement for specialized rules of engagement.  Urban warfare simply cannot be fought with any regard for civilian casualties or collateral damage to structures.  To do so is to guarantee unnecessary friendly casualties.  In urban warfare, lots of people are going to die.  There’s no way around it.  The goal is to make sure that as few of the deaths are US soldiers as possible.  The only good thing about a war is ending it as quickly as possible and the way to do that, with as few deaths as possible, is to conduct the war with overwhelming force and violence.  If there’s a sniper in a building, you don’t do a floor by floor, room by room search which winds up with a dead sniper and a dozen of your own soldiers killed;  you demolish the entire building, with no friendly casualties, and move on.

 

Verticality is another consideration in port seizure and defense.  In most built up areas, tall buildings are a reality and they impose their own unique impact on both offense and defense.  For example, tall buildings may block lower arcing artillery, rockets, and missiles while allowing higher arcing mortars.  Buildings will block the field of fire of defensive weapons.  A C-RAM, for example, has to be placed where it has a clear field of fire and that will be a challenge to accomplish.  It may be that we would need an entirely new type of defensive weapon, one that is much more vertically oriented.

 

 

Conclusion

 

Port seizure is a highly specialized military action and requires dedicated, specially trained units to accomplish the mission.  Despite the difficulty, ports are a mandatory requirement to logistically support ground forces.  Currently, we have no forces trained or equipped to accomplish this mission.  The logical organization to take the mission is the Marines.  Unfortunately, they seem to have zero interest in the mission.  To be fair, no one in the entire US military seems to have any interest in the mission and I’m unaware of anyone having even spoken about it.  The US military seems to assume that free and easy access to ports is our birthright, just as we assume that we’ll have uncontested and unhindered use of air bases.  Unfortunately, when China comes knocking, we’ll find ourselves having to fight for ports and bases, if we want them.  We’re going to have to learn how to fight for ports and how to defend and operate them while under fire – something we haven’t had to do since Guadalcanal.

 

‘Conquest is easy, control is not’ and this adage certainly applies to port seizure.  Merely seizing a port is not enough.  The port has to be secured sufficiently to enable shipping operations with a reasonable degree of safety and the ability to deal with the damage from successful attacks, should they occur.

 

 

 

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[1]Naval News website, “Ukraine Strikes Russia’s Alligator Class LST With Ballistic Missile”, Tayfun Ozberk, 24-Mar-2022,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/03/ukraine-strikes-alligator-class-lst-with-ballistic-missile/

 

[2]The Maritime Executive website, “Russia Uses Captured Port of Berdyansk to Resupply Southern Front”, 21-Mar-2022,

https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/russia-uses-captured-port-of-berdyansk-to-resupply-southern-front

Amphibious Assault Perspective

We often discuss the Marine Corps and amphibious assaults while noting that the Navy/Marines are currently unable to even implement an assault that would adhere to their own doctrine.  This is true enough, however, I suspect that part of our dismay about the Marine’s assault shortcomings lies in unrealistic expectations.  Too many of us, I think, envision the Normandy D-Day assault and use it as the basis of comparison.

Recall, though, that D-Day involved the best efforts of multiple nations, required years to build up the forces and equipment, and required the invention of multiple, specialized equipment (Hobart’s Funnies, for example, and the Landing Ship Tank, LST).  The ability to conduct D-Day was not a capability that we entered the war with.  We may have, debatably, had the germ of the concept prior to the war but it took wartime experience to refine and much effort to assemble and develop the necessary force.

We also need to firmly keep in mind that D-Day was the ultimate amphibious assault of all time in terms of scope.  We should not be comparing the Marine’s current capabilities to the D-Day assault and expecting the Marines to be able to conduct another D-Day at a moment’s notice.

Rather than looking at the D-Day assault, let’s look at a much smaller assault, Tarawa (Gilbert Islands), which occurred early in the Pacific Island campaign.  Despite being a smaller assault, the assembly of forces was still substantial.

The American invasion force to the Gilberts was the largest yet assembled for a single operation in the Pacific, consisting of 17 aircraft carriers(6 CVs, 5 CVLs, and 6 CVEs), 12 battleships, 8 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, 66 destroyers, and 36 transport ships. On board the transports was the 2nd Marine Division and a part of the Army's 27th Infantry Division, for a total of about 35,000 troops. (1)

A small portion of the forces were assigned to seize Makin Atoll.  The naval force directly assigned to Tarawa included, (2)

Fleet Carriers             6

Light Carriers             5
Escort Carriers            5
Battleships                8
Heavy Cruisers             5
Light Cruisers             2
AA Cruisers                3
Destroyers                43
Minesweepers               2
Transports/Landing Ships  18

The ground force counted 35,000 troops.  By comparison, a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) consists of a Ground Combat Element of 18,000 troops and an Air Combat Element. (3)

While it is more appropriate to ask whether the Marines can, currently, conduct a Tarawa size assault we should note that the pre-WWII Marine Corps and Navy were not capable of that either.  They needed time to build up to that level.

Okay, so if we can’t fairly expect the Marines to be capable of even a Tarawa size assault on day one of a war, what is it that we do expect the Marines to be capable of?  Honestly, I don’t expect the Marines to be capable of anything on day one.  What I do expect is for the Marines to develop and maintain the institutional memory and knowledge of two main tasks:

Amphibious Core

Arguably, the Marine’s main responsibility is to keep the institutional memory of how to conduct amphibious assaults alive.  Unfortunately, a decade or more of land combat has largely allowed that memory to fade from existence.  Indeed, in recent years the Marines have begun conducting amphibious assault training exercises, to some limited degree, and have publicly expressed the need to “re-learn” how to conduct such assaults which, of course, means that they have forgotten how.  The institutional memory is gone.  This is tragic and will cost lives somewhere down the road when we have to re-learn the lessons in combat.  Allowing the institutional memory to be lost is unforgivable and many Marine leaders, current and recently retired, should live with the shame of that failing.

Setting aside blame, what is required from the Marines is to maintain and exercise a core of amphibious capability and knowledge which can be used to build a much more extensive wartime capability if/when needed.

This also suggests that maintaining a peacetime amphibious fleet of 33 ships or so is unnecessary.  If all the Marines need to do is to maintain the institutional memory, that can be accomplished with just 6-9 amphibious ships – basically, just a few ships conducting training exercises (institutional memory) or undergoing maintenance.  When war comes, we can build more amphibious ships, if needed.  This, in turn, suggests that we need a far more basic, cheaper amphibious ship design that we can build quickly during war.  A modified commercial ship is adequate for troop and cargo transport.  Our current big deck aviation/amphibious ships are far too large and far too expensive for rapid wartime construction.

Port Seizure

A subset of general amphibious capability is port seizure and it is this which I consider to be the Marine Corps’ main mission.  We’ve discussed the challenges presented by an over-the-beach amphibious assault and noted that the logistics, in particular, are currently unlikely, bordering on impossible.  With that in mind, the only way to currently insert a large force into a hostile area is via a port.  Only ships can transport the required mass of materiel and ships must have a functioning port.  The fantasy of moving an entire invasion force and all its follow on materiel through Mobile Landing Platform (MLP or whatever the Navy’s label of the day is) ‘sea bases’ is just that, a fantasy.  We’ll need a port and if a nearby, friendly port is not available then we’ll have to seize one.  That, after all, was the immediate objective of the Normandy D-Day assault – to seize the ports of Cherbourg and Le Havre through which would pour the millions of tons of subsequent supplies for the assault on Germany.

As with general amphibious assault, I don’t expect the Marines to have everything they need to conduct a major port seizure on day one of a war.  What I do expect is for the Marines to have the institutional knowledge about how to conduct a port seizure along with detailed plans and equipment lists that can be realistically and readily implemented when war comes.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, the Marines have lost the institutional memory of how to conduct general amphibious assaults and they never had any knowledge about port seizure.  Peacetime is the golden opportunity to practice these capabilities and develop the required institutional knowledge.  Unfortunately, the Marines are practicing neither capability.  The occasional, extremely limited, small amphibious exercises the Marines do conduct are so unrealistic as to be worse than worthless – worse, because they develop bad habits and false confidence.

In summary, I don’t fault the Marines for not being able to conduct a D-Day or Tarawa assault on day one of a war but I do fault them for not knowing how and not having detailed plans and equipment acquisition lists ready to go.  With this in mind, we can see that day one capabilities are a red herring.  What’s more important is ‘day two’ capabilities after you’ve had a chance to build up.

____________________________________

(1)Wikipedia, “Battle of Tarawa”,  retrieved 28-Aug-2018,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Tarawa#American_order_of_battle

(2)Wikipedia, “Gilbert Islands Naval Order of Battle”,  retrieved 28-Aug-2018,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilbert_Islands_Naval_Order_of_Battle#TF_53_Southern_Attack_Force_(Tarawa)

(3)Global Security website, note – the table of data is not completely current but serves as an indicator,

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usmc/mef.htm

Amphibious Assault - Port Seizure

I’ve previously discussed amphibious assaults and stated that I consider the need for such assaults to be extremely unlikely under any foreseeable strategy.  Sure, there could be the odd small scale raid or diversionary feint but there just is no need for large scale assaults. 

However, the Marine Corps insists that such a capability is needed so let’s address what I consider the most likely amphibious assault scenario: a port seizure.  The Marines refuse to discuss it or even consider the possibility so we’ll do it for them. 

Short of a massive, multi-year buildup there is just no possibility of logistically sustaining a sizable invasion across a beach.  That only leaves the option of seizing an existing port to support the unloading of cargo ships at a rate sufficient to sustain a major invasion.  The astute historian will note that this is exactly what the objective of the WWII Normandy D-Day assault was.  Since all ports are associated with city structures and infrastructures, the roads leading to and from the port will prove every bit as critically important for quickly dispersing the unloaded supplies as the port itself.

Here are the main aspects of an amphibious port seizure and the more detailed points associated with them.

Initial Seizure

Port – The port, itself, must be seized, obviously.  The key is to seize it as quickly as possible, to minimize the time the defenders have to destroy the facilities such as cranes, piers, docks, ramps, and warehouses.  The best method of seizure is an initial airborne assault to quickly place infantry in and around the port to seize the facilities.  Simultaneous with the airborne assault must be an amphibious assault with heavier weapons, artillery, and armor to relieve the airborne troops and secure and defend the port.

Roads – Airborne troops should also be used to seize key roads leading in and out of the port so as to prevent immediate counterattack.  As with the port, additional amphibious troops will be required to relieve the airborne troops and secure and defend the roads.

Warships – It will be necessary to operate warships in the closed and congested waters of the harbor/port to provide cruise and ballistic missile defense, gun support, and counterbattery fire.  This is completely contrary to current Navy doctrine and will require new doctrine and tactics.

Mine clearance – It is hard to imagine that any modern port will not be heavily defended with mines.  Given that speed is the key to successful assaults, in general, and seizure of an, at least, semi-functioning port, mine clearance must be accomplished extremely rapidly to allow warships, supply ships, transports, and repair vessels access to the port.  For example, the WWII D-Day assault involved hundreds of minesweepers to achieve the necessary clearance in a combat-useful time frame.  Currently, we utterly lack the capability to perform this chore.

Holding/Defending

C-RAM (Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar) – Being a known, fixed location, a seized port will be subject to intense mortar and artillery fire.  Mobility, the mantra of modern militaries and the presumed solution to mortar and artillery fire, does not apply to seizing and holding a port.  Our forces will be static and fixed.  Uh, oh!  That’s an operational and doctrinal oversight!  C-RAM protection will be required. 

Missile Defense – Aegis warships will be required to establish a protective missile defense umbrella over the port.  This may be complicated by large buildings obscuring the radar view of the ships and may require an offboard, networked sensor.  However, we currently lack a communications and network system that is proven capable of functioning in the face of electronic and cyber countermeasures.

Road Defense – Roads are simultaneously the avenue for enemy counterattacks and the means of moving supplies out to the main invasion effort.  Defending the road system, especially early on, will be manpower (infantry) intensive and require large quantities of armor for mobile defense.

Repairs and Rebuilding

Barring some incredibly good luck, the enemy will likely destroy the port facilities to a very large degree.  We will need to rebuild most of the facilities.  We will need the ability to unload with only minimal port support while repairs are on-going.  We will need to rebuild under fire.  Who will do this?  How will they be protected?  What equipment is needed?  Are we trained to rebuild port facilities while under fire (hint:  we aren’t)?

Loading/Unloading Operations Under Fire

Since the port’s cranes will have likely been destroyed, we’ll need ships with their own large cranes as a stopgap unloading measure until we can rebuild facilities.  A dedicated crane ship or two would also come in very handy.  We’ll also need large numbers of fork lifts, trucks, etc. for quickly moving the unloaded supplies out and to the invasion force.  Initially, all of this will occur while under fire.  Are we prepared and trained to unload and disperse supplies while under fire?  Are we prepared to disperse supplies very quickly so as to avoid the buildup of large stockpiles (meaning very attractive targets)?

Dispersal

The key, and the entire point, to seizing and using a port is the ability to quickly disperse incoming, unloaded supplies out to the main invasion force.  The dispersal (meaning transport of supplies) will be complicated by the fact that there will only be one or two routes and those routes will be known to the enemy and, thus, subject to continual attack.  Are we prepared to fight our supply convoys through?  Do we have the necessary doctrine to secure roads, establish defended zones around the roads, and protect convoys?  Are we mentally prepared to inflict the degree of collateral damage on the surrounding areas that will be required to clear them of enemy forces?  Ironically, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mines, the bane of our Iraq/Afg efforts, will be a non-threat in this scenario since, presumably, we’ll kill anyone/anything even remotely approaching the transport roads – unless, you know, we try to fight a zero-casualty, zero-collateral damage type of war which would be incredibly stupid but is exactly what we’ve done in Iraq/Afg.

Summary

Other than for occasional small scale raids, over the beach assaults are neither feasible nor operationally warranted.  Port seizure, however, is mandatory.  There is simply no other way to logistically supply a modern, major assault force with the required volume and tonnage of supplies.  I believe that this is, or should be, the Marine’s core mission. 

It is obvious from the preceding discussion that port seizure requires a specific and specialized force with specialized equipment, doctrine, and tactics – almost none of which exists, today.  Being amphibious, the Marines are ideally situated to provide much of this capability although it would require a complete rethinking of their purpose and a complete rebuilding of their force structure. 

The issue of airborne troops, alone, is an interesting one.  Would these troops come from the Marines or from existing Army units?  Would the preferred airborne delivery be parachuting or helo insertion?  These are the kinds of questions that need to be explored in realistic exercises.  Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge, there has never been a port seizure exercise by the US military in recent decades.

If port seizure is as important as I believe it to be then we need to begin developing the force necessary to do it.  If one would argue that port seizure is not important then I need to hear how we’ll logistically support a major invasion force.