Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar

The Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar (EASR) is the radar system that is replacing the ill-conceived Dual Band Radar (DBR).  EASR is intended to replace the DBR on the Ford class carriers and the older rotating SPS-48/49 systems on a variety of ships.  It appears that the Navy intends the EASR to become the standard for non-Aegis ships such as amphibious ships, carriers, LX(R), and others.  Aegis SPY-x will remain the primary anti-air radar system for Burke class destroyers. 

Unfortunately, information on the EASR is scarce but naval-technology.com website offers a glimpse of the system (1).

Raytheon is developing the EASR and the Navy has conducted a Preliminary Design Review (PDR) of the system.

As with any new system, Raytheon/Navy claims that the new radar will perform better, be easier to maintain, require fewer personnel to operate, be more reliable, and cost less.  Of course, history assures us that most of these claims will turn out to be marginal improvements or totally false but at this stage of development, claims are typically unlimited and bordering on magical so this is nothing new or noteworthy.

The interesting aspect of this radar system is that it will be modular and scalable.

“The new air surveillance radar is designed on Radar Modular Assembly (RMA) technology, which has been matured through development and recent test successes of the US Navy’s AN / SPY-6 air and missile defence 3D radar for the DDG 51 Flight III destroyers.

Each RMA is a self-contained radar housed in a 2ft by 2ft by 2ft box, and the systems can be linked together to form radar chains of various sizes.

The EASR will be offered to the US Navy in two variants: Variant one, which will be a single face, rotating radar, and Variant two, which is a three face, fixed-array unit.” (1)

The concept of a rotating version is fascinating and leads one to wonder how and why it will be a significant improvement over the older rotating SPS-48/49 units?

EASR Variant 1 - Rotating

The system is, apparently, derived from the SPY-6 Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) (2).  In fact, Raytheon claims that the AMDR and EASR are built with the identical AMDR cubical 2 ft. building blocks which leads one to wonder how and why the two systems are different and why we’re spending more money on an AMDR with a different name?

According to Raytheon, the difference between the systems is simply the number of RMAs, with the AMDR having 37 and the EASR having 9 (2).  As Raytheon describes it (2),

AMDR is comprised of 37 RMAs – which is equivalent to SPY-1D(V) +15 dB in terms of sensitivity. To give this perspective, it means that SPY-6 can see a target of half the size at twice the distance of today’s radars.

EASR is a 9 RMA configuration – which is equivalent to the sensitivity of the current SPY-1D(V) radar on today’s destroyers, and at only 20% of the size of the legacy SPS-48. These are considerable enhancements over the radars in service on current (and future) EASR-designated ship classes.

Raytheon stresses the reliability and maintainability of the system, citing the commonality between the AMDR and EASR due to the identical radar modules.

Raytheon also claims that the system will be more affordable due to having only a single radar type across the entire fleet.  They claim that training, logistics, spares, etc. will be streamlined and cheaper.

Of course, what new system in history hasn’t made those exact claims?  Some pan out, to a degree, many don’t.

So, if the AMDR and EASR are identical, differing only in the number of RMAs, why are we paying for an EASR “development” program?  From USNI News website,

“Radar maker Raytheon has been awarded a $92 million contract to develop a new Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar for the U.S. Navy’s new Ford-class carrier fleet and big deck amphibious warships, company officials told USNI News on a Monday conference call.

Based on Raytheon’s SPY-6 S-band Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) planned for the services Arleigh Burke-class (DDG-51) guided missile destroyers, the Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar (EASR) will be the volume air search radar for most of the Gerald R. Ford-class carrier (CVN-78) — starting with John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) and the planned LHA-8 amphibious warship.

“It’s using identical hardware, identical signal processing software, data processing software.  It’s as near identical as possible. The goal of the program to drive affordability and commonality,” Tad Dickenson [Raytheon company spokesman] told reporters.”

Again, if it’s identical, why are we paying for a new developmental program?  It seems like $92M is a lot of money to simply change the number of RMAs.  But wait, there’s more money coming!

“Following the EMD phase, there are up to $723 million in contract options to support 16 ship sets of the radar – 6 fixed face for the Fords and 10 for amphibious ships.” (3)

And, of course, there’s always the actual construction/purchase funds still to be had! 

Interestingly, the EASR does not completely meet the Navy’s radar requirements.

“The service also plans to procure a separate X-band radar to compliment the EASR for both the future carriers and the amphibs.” (3)

I believe the separate X-band radar is intended to cover the low level, short range (horizon) region, meaning sea-skimming anti-ship missiles.  Currently, the SPQ-9B performs this function.

Raytheon has a nice little gig going for itself.  They’ve managed to direct the Navy into a single radar, sole supplier situation in which they can dictate unlimited prices and exorbitant “developmental” costs.  That’s nice work if you can get it!  The Navy now has no choice but to keep shipping barges of money to Raytheon.

There’s always the more mundane aspects of this arrangement to consider, as well.  If Raytheon’s facilities should suffer a major catastrophe like a fire or sabotage, the Navy will have no source for radars for, potentially, years while Raytheon rebuilds.  A prime target for sabotage at the start of a war with China, huh?  But, I digress …

In summary, the EASR seems to be just a renaming and repackaging of the already developed AMDR.  That leads to questioning the need for additional developmental funding.  Raytheon can’t have it both ways.  They claim the EASR is identical to the AMDR and, therefore, offers all kinds of commonality benefits and yet they want barge loads of money to “develop” the EASR.  Which is it?  Are the two systems identical or not?  I think the Navy is being gouged and has, through mismanagement, backed themselves into a no-choice corner.

__________________________________

(1)naval-technology.com website, retrieved 8-May-2017,

http://www.naval-technology.com/news/newsus-navy-conducts-pdr-for-raytheons-easr-5798198

(2)Raytheon website, retrieved 8-May-2017,

http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/easr/

(3)USNI News website, “Raytheon Awarded $92M Navy Contract for Future Carrier, Big Deck AESA Radars”, Sam LaGrone, 22-Aug-2016,

https://news.usni.org/2016/08/22/raytheon-awarded-92m-navy-contract-future-carrier-big-deck-aesa-radars

Burke Flt III Shortcomings

The most recent Congressional Research Service report on the Navy’s DDG programs has an incredibly damning statement concerning the Navy’s surface combatant roadmap(1).

You’ll recall that the Burke class has pretty well used up its growth margins and, therefore, the announcement that the Navy would use the Burke as the foundation for the new AMDR radar system was a bit of a head scratcher.  The Burkes lacked internal volume and ship’s utilities to properly support the Navy’s stated AMDR requirement.  Despite this lack, the Navy opted to go with the Burke class (Flt III) as the AMDR host with the predictable outcome that the installed AMDR will be significantly less capable than the Navy’s stated requirement.  The Navy’s response to the shortfall is that the smaller AMDR will meet the immediate needs but may be inadequate to deal with future threats. 

Thus, we see that the Navy is committing to building a ship with little growth margin at a time of blossoming new technologies such as lasers and rail guns which will have voracious appetites for ship’s volume and utilities.  Further, the Navy is committing to building a ship that they have admitted is inadequate for dealing with future, reasonably foreseeable threats.  The Navy is committing to a 35 year lifespan ship that it acknowledges won’t be able to meet the threats over that time period.  Is this wise???

Anyway, here is the report’s statement on the subject.

“The Navy’s pre-2008 plan to procure DDG-1000 destroyers and then CG(X) cruisers based on the DDG-1000 hull design represented the Navy’s roadmap at the time for restoring growth margins, and for introducing into the cruiser-destroyer force significant numbers of ships with integrated electric drive systems and technologies for substantially reducing ship crew sizes. The ending of the DDG-1000 and CG(X) programs in favor of continued procurement of DDG-51s leaves the Navy without an announced roadmap to do these things, because the Flight III DDG-51 will not feature a fully restored growth margin, will not be equipped with an integrated electric drive system or other technologies that could provide ample electrical power for supporting future electrically powered weapons, and will not incorporate features for substantially reducing ship crew size or for otherwise reducing ship O&S costs substantially below that of Flight IIA DDG- 51s.”

So, not only will the Flt III Burkes have little growth margin, less than desired radar performance, and known shortfalls over the course of their lifespans, but they will not be equipped with the Navy’s Holy Grail of propulsion/power, integrated electric drives, and will not be minimally manned.

Does anyone have any idea how this sounds like a good idea to the Navy?

Of course, if you’ve followed this blog you already know the answer.  The Navy has purposely chosen an unwise course strictly to avoid Congressional oversight that would come from a new ship design.  The Navy has passed the Burke Flt III off to Congress as a minor upgrade of an existing design.  Setting aside the fraudulent nature of that maneuver, the Navy is knowingly accepting a very poor design just to avoid critics and critical review of a major acquisition program. 

They were burned so badly with the LCS that they’ll do anything, no matter how unwise, to avoid more criticism.  That doesn’t need to be the case, though.  If the Navy would simply be upfront with Congress and run a disciplined program they could have their new design and reasonable oversight, too.  Consider the Zumwalt program.  That’s a major undertaking and the Navy is receiving no undue criticism so it can be done (we’ll set aside the value and wisdom of the Zumwalt for the sake of this discussion).

When the criticisms are being formally written into Congressional Research Reports, you have a problem.  Assuming the Navy was being honest with us about the need for the full version of the AMDR (and that’s a big assumption given the Navy’s habit of manipulating the truth!) they need to terminate the Flt III immediately and move the AMDR to some other platform.  The Internet has offered plenty of alternatives any of which would be an improvement over the worst option which is the Flt III.

(1)Congressional Research Service, “Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress”, Ronald O'Rourke, Jun 2015

Burke Flt III

The Burke Flt III was originally intended to be the Ticonderoga replacement and mainstay of both the AAW command vessel and the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) role.  As such it was intended to receive the new AMDR radar which could handle simultaneous BMD and AAW roles.  Unfortunately, it turned out that the optimum sized AMDR required more space, weight, and resources than the Burke could provide.  A new design ship was briefly considered but coming hot on the heels of the LCS fiasco, the Navy believed that the challenges in getting a new design approved and funded were too great. 

The Navy is now committed to fielding a down-sized AMDR which it acknowledges is too small to meet the desired performance criteria.  This is admission of an odd situation.  The Navy is, essentially, acknowledging that it is going to build a ship that is inadequate for the intended mission.

The other disturbing aspect of the Flt III is the growth margin.  The Navy is going to have to squeeze the AMDR and its attendant resources into an already overloaded hull.  The resultant ship will have no growth margins during a future in which the Navy anticipates lasers and rail guns reaching the fleet.  We’ll set aside whether that anticipation is realistic and simply consider what the Navy believes.  Why would you begin building the future backbone of the fleet with no significant growth margins for the developments you believe are coming in the relatively near term and which you know are going to require substantial weight, volume, and ship’s utilities, especially for the early versions?

Let’s take a quick look at some Flt III options that the Navy could pursue.

New Design – This would undoubtedly be the best approach from a purely technical point of view.  However, the Navy has been burned so badly on recent acquisitions that they are gun shy and devoid of credibility so they’ve opted to pass on this option.

Zumwalt – The Zumwalt has the size and power to fully field the AMDR and would be a good option, on paper.  However, there are significant questions about the seakeeping characteristics of ship and my guess is that the Navy felt that was too much risk.  The Navy did examine this option though how seriously, I’m not sure.

Lengthen – A lengthened Burke is a viable option and would provide at least some additional weight and space for the AMDR.  Whether it would provide the necessary superstructure mounting without raising the center of gravity unacceptably is unsure.  Again, the Navy supposedly examined this option and rejected it though I’ve never heard why.

Pure AAW – Another option would be to reconfigure the Flt III to be a pure AAW vessel - no guns, ASW, hangar, or anything else.  This would fill the AAW and AAW command requirements while freeing up space and weight.  Again, whether that would allow the full AMDR to be fit is unknown.

Distributed AAW – The AMDR doesn’t have to be mounted on the shooting platform.  Various proposals have been made to mount the AMDR on a ship dedicated to that purpose.  Such a ship would have the required space, weight, and power to support the radar and would be relatively cheap in that it would have no other functions or capabilities.

LPD-17 Variant – Proposals have been made to modify the LPD-17 to an AAW vessel.  Again, the ship would have the space, weight, and power to support the full AMDR.

The point is that when all the possibilities are considered, the Navy’s chosen path of shoehorning the AMDR into the existing Burke hull is arguably the worst option.  It’s just another in the seemingly endless string of poor decisions emanating from Navy leadership.

Aegis Cruiser Replacement

As you all know by now, the Navy has announced that it will idle 11 Aegis cruisers.  These are the most powerful AAW vessels in the world.  The Navy says it only needs half the current number of Aegis cruisers given the budget constraints that currently exist.  OK, that’s fair.  But, if that’s the case, doesn’t that inexorably lead one to ask why we’re pursuing new Burke Flt III ships that are the intended replacements for the Aegis cruisers?  If we already have 11 extra of the most powerful AAW vessels in the world why do we need to build more?  Couldn’t we just skip the first 11 Burke Flt IIIs? 

Some will say that the Flt III’s BMD capability is what we need.  Think about that.  The Navy has already told us that Aegis ships can perform BMD and that many Aegis ships already possess that capability so what does the Flt III gain us?  The only real difference between the Tico/Burkes and the Flt III will be the AMDR radar.  As I understand it, the advantage of AMDR over Aegis/SPY is that it gives us the ability to perform AAW and BMD simultaneously which is something that Aegis/SPY can’t do.  OK, that’s fair.  But, does that alone justify scrapping (cause that’s what will ultimately happen to the 11 cruisers – once laid up, they’re never going to sea again) 11 of the most powerful cruisers in the world and spending billions for new ships? 

If BMD is that important and the AMDR is the key to that capability, then why are we skimping on the dimensions of the AMDR for the Flt III so that it’s not anywhere near as powerful as its statement of needs says it should be?  If BMD/AMDR is that critical shouldn’t we be building whatever size ship we need to gain the full advantage of the AMDR?

Alternatively, and most logically, given the very limited applicability of the BMD mission, wouldn’t it make more sense to develop a dedicated BMD sensor vessel and keep the Aegis/SPY ships as more general purpose combat ships?  I’m thinking, of course, of the proposal to base a BMD sensor suite on an LPD-17 derivative.  A handful of LPD(BMD) vessels to sail with carrier/amphib groups would take care of the BMD mission without requiring that we scrap 11 Aegis cruisers while simultaneously building Aegis cruiser replacements that only partially meet the stated need. 

I just don’t understand the Navy’s ongoing path of early retirements to fund ever-decreasing numbers of new construction vessels.  This is a classic death spiral in action.

Burke Flt III Status

The Navy appears firmly committed to the development of the Flight III Burke as the next generation air defense ship which will replace both the Ticonderogas and Burkes.  You’ll recall that the now cancelled CG(X) was to have been the Ticonderoga replacement and the DDG-1000 was to have been the replacement for the Burke class.  In an abrupt turnaround of historic and baffling magnitude, the Navy terminated the DDG-1000 program at three ships and restarted production of DDG-51 Flt IIa’s.  The first Flt III will be procured in 2016. 

The key characteristic if the Flight III will be the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) which will allow it to perform AAW and BMD, simultaneously.

The Navy estimates the cost of the first Flt III at $2.3B according to CRS.  This is a patently low ball (fraudulently deceptive) figure.

Regarding funding of the Flt IIa restarts and the Flt III’s, CRS had this to say (1),

“As part of its action on the Navy’s FY2013 budget, Congress granted the Navy authority to use a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for DDG-51s to be procured FY2013-FY2017. The Navy awarded the contract on June 3, 2013. The Navy plans to use an engineering change proposal (ECP) to shift from the Flight IIA design to the Flight III design during this MYP contract.”

The MYP is intended as a cost savings procurement measure for use on stable designs and, for the Flt IIa, that’s a fair and prudent action.  The ECP is a deception on the part of the Navy to pass off an almost totally new ship, the Flt III, as a minor change to the previous Flt IIa design. 

AMDR size will be 14 ft on Flt III which is substantially less than what was envisioned for the CG(X) and will provide insufficient sensitivity to meet the performance requirement.  The Navy claims that 14 ft will meet the threshold requirement while ignoring the fact that the stated requirement for the CG(X) was a 20+ft AMDR.  The Burke’s existing power and cooling for the AMDR is also deemed inadequate to accommodate likely future developments.  Interestingly, the Flt III will not incorporate an integrated electric drive.

One option the Navy has hinted at for compensating for the reduced radar sensitivity (despite contradictorily stating that the AMDR meets threshold requirements!) is to make use of off-board data sources such as aircraft or dedicated radar ships (Cobra Judy).  This is an interesting possibility but would require a radical change in doctrine.  It also opens the possibility of degraded performance if the off-board sensors suffer data link degradation due to enemy ECM, jamming, or the simple destruction of the off-board sensors (such as shootdown of satellites or UAVs).

The Navy’s schedule for construction of Flt III’s is probably not realistic as it pertains to the development of the AMDR.  It is unlikely that the AMDR will be ready in time.  Just as the Ford’s EMALS and AAG and the LCS’ modules were not ready in time, so too, it is apparent that the AMDR schedule is not realistic.

DOT&E has disapproved both the Navy’s proposed test plan for the Flt III and the test plan for the AMDR due to the lack of a test ship and the Navy’s unwillingness to include one as part of the program (2).

Growth margin is a concern for the DDG-51.  The current Flt IIa’s have used up most or all of the growth margin in the original design.  A new Flt III will have little or no growth margin for future developments.

Often, we look at a flawed acquisition program and supporters deflect blame and criticism by saying that no one could have foreseen the problems that arose.  Well, here’s a clear cut example where the problems are easily foreseeable.  The time to take corrective action is now, not years in the future.  Unfortunately, the Navy is going to push full speed ahead with yet another program that, at best, won’t meet the performance requirements, hasn’t got the power and cooling to support future growth, and has little or no growth margins.  We don’t need to wait several years down the road to see the problem.  The problem is quite evident today.

The most baffling aspect to this is that there is no penalty to slowing down a bit and addressing the problems now.  Worst case, we build a couple extra brand new Flt IIa’s while we wait for the AMDR technology to mature, the software to be written and debugged (ask JSF how their software issues are working out!), test ships to be outfitted, actual data to be collected and, most unlikely of unlikelies(?), develop a new ship design that actual meets the performance requirements!

(1) Congressional Research Service, “Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer

Programs: Background and Issues for Congress”, Ronald O'Rourke, October 22, 2013

(2) Director, Operational Testing and Evaluation, Annual Report, 2013

AMDR - Successor to Aegis

The Navy’s Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) will be the next generation radar for the Navy’s surface fleet.  It is intended to address Aegis’ limitation which is the inability to simultaneously perform ballistic missile defense (BMD) and air defense.  AMDR will consist of two radars, an S-band radar for BMD and air defense and an X-band for horizon search with some overlap of functionality between them.  At this time, I am uncertain whether the system’s arrays will provide mid-course guidance or whether separate illuminators will be required as is the case for Aegis systems.

AMDR will be initially applied to the Burke Flt III.  Unfortunately, space, power, and cooling limitations inherent to the Burke limit the size of the AMDR that can be supported to 14 feet.  The Navy’s stated performance specifications require a 20 foot or larger version although the Navy claims that the 14 ft version will meet the minimum threshold requirements.  Thus, the new construction Burke Flt III’s which will form the backbone of the Navy for the next 40 years or so are going to start life with a sub-standard radar suite with no margin for improvements or growth.  Is that really a limitation we want to build into our newest multi-billion dollar ships?

Worse, the AMDR is going to start life without the X-band radar.  Instead, an upgraded SPQ-9B rotating radar will be substituted.  The full X-band radar will be developed as a separate program at a future date.  Thus, in addition to being too small to meet the full Navy requirements, the AMDR will not even be the complete system.  The Navy hopes to develop and incorporate the X-band radar around the 13^th delivered unit or so which means the first dozen Flt III’s will have only a partial, sub-standard AMDR.  The Navy, of course, hopes that even the limited version of AMDR will be an improvement over Aegis, however, that is nowhere near certain and remains to be seen.

What about cost?  The March 2013 GAO weapons assessment report (1) lists the AMDR unit procurement cost as $209M.  Remember, that’s for only half the system with the X-band radar being developed in a separate, future program.  It’s not clear but I think that also does not include funding for development and procurement of the upgraded SPQ-9B.  The unit cost also does not include new equipment such as bigger power generators and enhanced cooling equipment required by the Burke Flt III’s to support the radar.  Assuming that the X-band procurement doubles the cost and factoring in upgraded power and cooling equipment, the full AMDR will cost upwards of $500M per unit.  Yikes!!

It’s clear that the AMDR needs a larger ship than the Burke Flt III to support the full capability of the sensor.  It also seems clear that the reason the Navy is trying to shoehorn the AMDR onto the Burke is to avoid the scrutiny that would come with designing and building a new ship class.  A new class would trigger Congressional oversight and various departmental reviews, none of which the Navy wants to be subjected to.  So, just like the Navy claimed the Super Hornet was a simple upgrade to the legacy Hornet despite being virtually an entirely new aircraft, they’re claiming that the Burke Flt III is a simple upgrade to the Flt IIa.  Unfortunately, by trying to manipulate the system, the Navy has backed themselves into yet another corner;  the Flt III can’t support the needed AMDR but the needed AMDR can’t fit on the Flt III.  Can you say “Catch-22”?

The Navy did briefly consider adapting the Zumwalt to the Flt III/AMDR role but quickly abandoned that path, if indeed, it ever was a legitimate possibility.  I suspect the reason the Zumwalt can’t be the AMDR platform is because the Navy has publicly stated that the Zumwalt can’t perform area air defense and to put AMDR on the Zumwalt would be a total contradiction of their official position.  Again, the Navy’s manipulations of the truth have lead them into yet another corner.

Sadly, this is how a program goes from being a potentially useful system to a major problem.  It is still possible to salvage this program but it would require the Navy to face reality and stop trying to manipulate the acquisition process.

(1) GAO, Defense Acquisitions, Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs,

GAO-13-13294SP, March 2013