The Admiral stood on the catwalk outside the bridge of the carrier, scanning around the horizon. Sure, he had all the fancy displays and charts and staff feeding him updates but there was no substitute for simply standing out in the weather, absorbing the feel of the situation. He was a throwback to an earlier time, he supposed, but it worked for him. For the moment, there were no flight operations and the quiet time allowed him to gather his thoughts and consider his decisions.
Distantly, he could see an occasional escort ship, one of 33 in the 4-carrier task force, but the group was far too spread out to see most of the ships. That was one of the things he and his ship captains had had to get used to after a life of peacetime sailing in relatively close formation instead of true battle formations. He liked it, though. It had never seemed right to sail with ships so close together. It wasn’t combat-ready. It was just a lazy, bad habit developed in peacetime. He felt comfortable, now, with the group spread out over fifty miles or more.
Overhead, a small UAV passed by on its way out to its designated scouting point. No one controlled the UAV. It was flying simple waypoints and would remain communications-silent unless it found a reportable target and then it would issue only a momentary micro-burst transmission.
Far off, a contrail marked one of the CAP aircraft going about its business. At least a dozen CAP aircraft were always in the air. Death could approach far too fast to depend on aircraft sitting on the carrier decks to respond. If aircraft weren’t already in the air when a threat appeared, it would be too late.
Hundreds of miles away, far out of sight on all sides of the task force, additional aircraft were conducting counter-scouting sweeps to deny the enemy targeting data on the group. The semi-stealthy F-35Cs had, at last, found a task they excelled at. The task force had already destroyed three enemy search aircraft before they had been able to spot the task force. In fact, it was quite likely that the enemy search planes had never even detected the F-35s. The searchers had simply ceased to exist in the space of a heartbeat, never knowing what had happened. In addition, two enemy commercial fishing boats had been destroyed hundreds of miles out from the group. The Admiral was taking no chance that the fishing boats would radio the group’s location. Maybe the boats were simply eking out a living and represented no threat but this was war, not some half-measure, semi-peacetime operation where avoidance of collateral damage and concern for civilians was more important than combat objectives. If it wasn’t a US warship, it died.
A blinking light on a distant escort caught his eye. A message was being relayed back to the carrier from an escort far over the horizon. Who would have thought that blinker lights would have become the standard means of communication on today’s maritime battlefield? The necessities of EMCON had resurrected the role of the signalman.
The admiral almost thought he could hear the silence of the inactive radars that normally poured massive amounts of electromagnetic noise into the world. It felt right to him. A task force should be silent. Silent but not blind. The group was constantly monitoring their surroundings using every passive EO, IR, and signal collection sensor they had. In every ship, operators strained to pick out the faintest hint of a threat.
Far ahead, the Admiral glanced at the dark, rolling clouds that signaled a storm. The carrier group was headed straight for that storm and it was a blessing. The weather would provide safety and concealment, at least for a while. Peacetime sailors on deployment had bemoaned bad weather but that had quickly changed. Now, every sailor who appeared on deck looked first at the sky, hoping to see clouds and storms and the added safety they offered.
A twitching movement of one of the forward CIWS units caught his attention. The operators were running non-stop combat drills, he knew. The unit pointed towards an empty patch of sky and the gun fired a couple of seconds burst, its ripping sound disturbing the quiet. This was not peacetime where weapons were left idled for months on end and fired once a year during some checklist exercise. This was war and every gun and missile system in the fleet was test fired every day. Every weapons station was continually manned and those systems that had the capability were left in full auto mode. At any given moment, a third of the crew was at their battle stations. When the enemy appeared – and they eventually would – it would likely be with little warning. The ships were poised and straining at the leash. This level of readiness could not be sustained indefinitely but they only needed to do so for the several days that the actual combat portion of the mission would last. After that, they would return to port and they could rest all they wanted … those who survived. This was not a several month long peacetime deployment. The task force was on a mission and they would strike fast and hard and then retire just as quickly.
Glancing around, the Admiral noted with immense satisfaction the several extra SeaRAM and CIWS that had been hurriedly installed in various locations around the carrier. After the first few carrier losses of the war, the Navy had quickly realized that its standard defensive weapon fits were inadequate, to say the least. The Admiral had pounded on higher command and demanded the additional weapons. It was amazing how the engineers, when challenged and turned loose, had managed to find room to mount the additional units.
Below him, on the flight deck, the Admiral watched as the various colored shirts went about their tasks. EMCON had been extended even to the flight deck crew. Radios and headsets had been abandoned and the crews had been trained to accomplish their jobs with just hand signals. It was riskier to operate that way but the crews had enthusiastically embraced the new procedures that reduced emissions and lessened the likelihood of enemy attack.
Taking a final deep, satisfied breath, the Admiral returned to the bridge and was struck, yet again, by the eerie quiet. Because of the absolute EMCON, there was none of the usual peacetime background buzz of constant communication updates, radar reports, orders, useless information churn, and pointless discussion. The task force had trained relentlessly for the mission and was now executing it in total silence. When they spoke, the crew spoke almost in whispers, as if the enemy might hear them. Cold War carrier groups had trained to launch entire strikes in total radio silence and this group’s EMCON was taking even that to new levels. Not a single stray electron was being emitted for the enemy to suck up and analyze. Until incoming missiles appeared at the horizon, the task force would remain a silent ghost.
Smiling slightly, the Admiral acknowledged to himself that he was thoroughly enjoying combat operations. It was immensely satisfying to not have to continuously answer to higher command. It was just him. He knew what the mission was. He knew how he wanted to execute it. For once, there was no one looking over his shoulder. This was the way it should be.
The Admiral had drilled his captains to exhaustion so that they thoroughly understood the mission, his intent, and the required doctrine. Now, they would execute the mission without him looking over their shoulders. They did not need micro-managing from him any more than he needed it from those above him. His captains knew what to do and they would fight their ships with his intent firmly in mind. Simplicity was the foundation of the group’s doctrine and it was simplicity that would maintain some degree of order when the inevitable chaos of battle arose.
The Admiral nodded slightly to himself. The task force was combat-ready.
This was just a short vignette to try to convey a sense of what a combat task force should be and some of the ways it would differ from a peacetime cruise. Too many people still have the impression that ships will conduct deployments during war just as they do during peace. I’ve tried to capture many of the individual elements that we discuss and tie them together in a single, coherent picture.
"Overhead, a small UAV passed by on its way out to its designated scouting point. No one controlled the UAV. It was flying simple waypoints and would remain communications-silent unless it found a reportable target and then it would issue only a momentary micro-burst transmission."ReplyDelete
You could have the UAV do micro-bursts in order to try to survive to fight another day. But the other possiblity is to have the UAV's to scream their little heads off electronically when they found something. That makes it less likely the UAV will be undetected and therefore survive, but makes it more likely that the fleet will get the info.
Two different ways to go wrong, but also two ways to get it right. That is one of the issues that would need to hammered out (hopefully in peace time). When to do which.
The ideal objective in scouting is to detect and report without the enemy knowing they were spotted.Delete
If we can't even reliably do a micro-burst then our entire concept of military communications in combat is suspect.
"The ideal objective in scouting is to detect and report without the enemy knowing they were spotted."Delete
If you can pull that off the commander controls the decision of how, when, where or if to engage the enemy.
That is how battles are won.
"...have the UAV's to scream their little heads off electronically when they found something..."ReplyDelete
I guess it depends on what you are trying to accomplish.
Following that procedure would certainly be a signal flare to the enemy.
The role of the Spanish Navy at Manila Bay will be played by the US Navy. 20 PLAN drones will appear overhead and transmit briefly before they are downed.ReplyDelete
4 minutes later 50 Sunburns are fired from 200 clicks away. 10 get through. As the carrier breaks up in a haze of visible radiation, the US Admiral, lets call him Montojo, wishes the US Navy had developed a new surface missile sometime between 1990 and 2030. But at least the defense contractors got wealthy.
Agree with going back to true old methods that work. Someone posted on a different blog (I couldn't verify since article was behind payroll but sounds plausible) that UKRAINE military has refurbished and given to forward units old WW2 radio sets and landlines! Im sure they have new sets with all the bells and whistles but the old sets have advantages: they are unhackable and modern ECM doesn't effect them. Now, lots of artillery will eventually get to some landlines BUT it's better than nothing. Its good to have a balanced mix of old and new tech!ReplyDelete
We will rediscover in a fight with China that we should have kept more old reserve ships and gear and will have relearn a bunch old lessons.
CNO watch out folks will accuse you of being Van Riper in Millenium Challenge. Good person to be but boy Navy folks hate him and that exercise.ReplyDelete
What about the thousands of cell phones aboard the task force. Despite orders, dozens of jackasses will be trying to text their lovers hoping a signal can reach a nearby island. This is common in peacetime exercises. Even officers use cell phones from offshore to cooridate things since it's simple and convenient.ReplyDelete
After a few warships are sunk, "leave the cellphone on land or watch it be tossed into the sea" will become standard.Delete
I didn't think the cellphone issue even needed mentioning! All electronic devices will be removed and left ashore. No video games, no phones, no music devices, no smart watches, no electronic exercise equipment … nothing electronic.Delete
The bad habits we're developing today will have to be shed in a hurry when war comes.
Cell phones require cell towers. No cell towers at sea.Delete
Ships do have unclass wireless networks, but leakage from those should be very short-ranged (inverse square law).
I don't think the issue is actual cell phone conversations as much as the fact that cell phones are constantly trying to broadcast data back to app developers and manufacturers. Whether there's a tower to receive it doesn't matter; it's still broadcasting.Delete
What I don't know is how sensitive military signal detection equipment is. While the signal strength required for actual communications may drop quickly with distance, the outgoing signal wave can be detected over a much greater distance. I don't know what that distance is. Maybe someone who knows this stuff can chime in?
We can detect electromagnetic radiation across the spectrum from distant galaxies. It wouldn't surprise me that we can detect the signals from hundreds/thousands of cell phones that would otherwise be in the hands of sailors in a surface group.
I'm sure it wouldn't surprise to you learn that the US Navy doesn't know either, and had no plan to find out, even though the cost would be tiny.Delete
"This was war and every gun and missile system in the fleet was test fired every day."ReplyDelete
The implications on missile inventory would be interesting...
War is not a cheap business!Delete
This also touches on an issue I've raised many times - that we should be developing a range of front line, SIMPLE, CHEAP weapons to hugely supplement our expensive, precision guided weapons.
The precision guided weapons path is a peacetime path. War demands unimaginable quantities of munitions. It was a mistake to abandon area weapons in favor of precision weapons. Yes, there is a place and use for precision weapons but with enough area weapons, precision isn't required.
We've made many mistakes in assembling our current force structure and they will all become apparent after the first couple of battles.
Yet our Navy declares useful missiles obsolete and scraps them! This should never happen. Disassemble some parts and place in dehumidified storage in the region. As the inventory of modern missiles quickly falls, test and reassemble them for use. I'd even keep some "obsolete" missiles in the fleet to fire at suspected targets and fire them first to attract and absorb enemy defensive systems. At times, they may prove more effective than newer designs that cost $3 million each. Or give them to the Marines to fire from shore.Delete
"As the inventory of modern missiles quickly falls, test and reassemble them for use."Delete
I am all for this. There is, however, one significant challenge in doing so and that is software. As we have moved away from 'dumb' bombs/shells/rockets, we have gone down the computerized path which requires that each new (or old!) weapon be integrated into the overall combat system and interfaced with all the available sensors and fire control systems. As we have seen, software has become the stumbling block for more and more systems (ALIS, anyone?). So, keeping older weapons requires a burdensome software integration and update effort which is not something we're good at (still waiting for the F-35 Block 4 which has almost now been abandoned as unachievable).
This should suggest to us the folly of 'exquisite' weapons. For example, the new cruise missile that can take mid-course updates/guidance from a Boy Scout in Montana who is relaying the guidance from a submarine in the Pacific who was handed off the guidance from an F-35 over the Arctic who took over the guidance from a Burke in the Atlantic … is an absolute waste of programming effort because that kind of fantasy of any asset can guide any weapon is never going to happen in a real war. Instead, it should be sufficient for a missile to be given a destination and that's it; fire and forget. If one out of a million missiles misses a target of opportunity because we couldn't re-designate it in flight, who cares? Just fire a new missile at the new target.
There's a lot to be said for 'dumb' weapons whose only interface is a mechanical release switch!
The same concept applies to those anti-ship cruise missiles that have the capability to generate a multi-spectral image of the target and select a precise impact point. That's a lot of software to control a highly dubious function that likely isn't going to work anyway as the missile tries to contend with decoys, chaff, jamming, EW, obscurants, weather, etc.. As long as the missile hits the target, does it really matter where? Today's thin skinned, unarmored ships don't have particularly vulnerable spots - the entire ship is vulnerable! We're doubling the cost and complexity of the missile for a very doubtful gain in capability.
I'm belaboring the point but it's important. Yes, we need some precision guided weapons but it will be far more important to have staggeringly massive quantities of cheap, reasonably effective weapons that can be quickly manufactured in war. I have visions of China and the US engaging in a massive war for two weeks and then both sides running out of weapons and saying, 'well, now what do I do?'. That 500 lb general purpose bomb looks pretty good when all the guided weapons have been used up!
Thouroughly enjoyed this, and its certainly a good veiw of "what should be". The fact that this "new" procedure set was predated by "...the first few carrier losses of the war...." drives home the difference between peace- and wartime doctrine.... Hopefully someone is wise enough to not let that part of your tale be prophetic!!!ReplyDelete
Agree, start should read:" After losing that solitary carrier and pitiful few escorts, USN fired the remaining old peacetime timid commanders, the ones not at the bottom of the ocean already and promoted some new aggressive ones that cracked open the history books on how to PROPERLY operate at ocean war...."Delete
We should be training and practicing this way now. If we do, I am sure we would find that some things work and some things don't, and we could fix the ones that don't. On the present path, we are going to find a bunch of things that work in table top war games that fail miserably when it's boots on the ground.ReplyDelete
I have a question that this prompts. I would imagine that most of us spent some time on active duty in the last 20-50 years, and in the course of that were involved in some training exercises. How many of the training exercise in which you participated were conducted under realistic wartime conditions?
Army here. Our FTXs and CTXs sucked bad, very boring and huge waste of time IMO, maybe they were good for the more "offensive" guys like infantry or tanks but for support, boring as hell.Delete
And worse, the last 20 years of the forever war has resulted in an entire generation of senior NCOs, senior field grades, and general/flag officers who are used to screaming on phones and datalinks constantly, voice and messaging.
"How many of the training exercise in which you participated were conducted under realistic wartime conditions?"Delete
I did a post where an Army general (as I recall) acknowledged that they don't use electronic warfare (jamming, in particular) because it was too effective and wound up confusing everyone. So, without training with and against EW, your answer is that none of our exercises are conducted under realistic war conditions.
Yet another answer to your question is that ship's captain after ship's captain, once they're retired and are interviewed, have acknowledged that the exercises were uniformly worthless and unrealistic.
Yeah, the big brass can't micromanage effectively under radio silence.Delete
"How many of the training exercise in which you participated were conducted under realistic wartime conditions?"Delete
I was in the divisional cavalry (air) for the 101st Airborne in the mid-'90s.
Our typical one or two week field problems were reasonable.
We would camouflage our tents and vehicles, establish defensive perimeters, and dig fighting positions.
We would freq hop on the radios.
The most realistic training I participated in was a deployment to JRTC at Ft Polk.
JRTC is the low to mid-intensity conflict equivalent of NTC.
Everyone and every vehicle was MILES up. There was a very competent and aggressive OPFOR. When you were hit, you had a wound card which required medical treatment.
When you died you went to the dead tent until your unit submitted the personnel requests to fill your position.
Units even had to unload 'ammo' from trucks. If you wanted to load 2.75" rockets on your Cobras, you had to unload ammo crates weighted with sand from supply trucks, etc. etc.
I was never at NTC, it was for armor, but the guys in Desert Storm said that NTC was tougher than the Iraquis.
Is NTC still that demanding?
I don't know, but they always strived to make it as tough and realistic as real combat, just without the blood.
I was just a junior sailor, and being on an AFS, didnt see much in the way of exercises or battle problems. But at the shipboard level drill and training, the realism and intensity varied by CO. My first was a good officer and training was a priority. The second CO was lackluster and the readiness followed suit. The one place where the intensity and realism skyrocketed was GITMO. I can say my multiple RefTras there made me highly competent in damage control and shipboard security,and I had the opportunity to use it my last cruise, but it went well, and Im sure that was 100% due to the intensive sessions there...Delete
Sadly, my understanding is that Gitmo RefTras are a thing of the past, which Id say is just ignorant, and the fleet will pay dearly for it...
The lack of realistic exercise training folds back into a previous post on CONOPS. When a Battalion CO gets to take his entire unit into the field maybe once or twice in his command tour and then as a Regimental CO only gets to do the same. He has 4 times handled "large" units in the field. Against watered down or scripted opponents. Then he gets maybe 1-2 Staff Exs for a total of 6-8 times to see what works and does not work. When alot of these experiences are scripted and exclude using aspects (EW, unscripted opponents, realistic losses and ammo use, etc.), the new fast riser is sent to a Requirements command with a limited and skewed set of data points to determine what the services need. On top of that there is no requirement to do rigorous study of how combat works and DOES NOT work, and how effective weapons systems are created, along with their failures. This almost complete lack of realistic training and experience is one reason we get NO CONOPS or requirements that do not help a system perform in combat.Delete
I'll note that the Japanese Pearl Harbor strike force practiced extremely strict radio silence to the point where radios were disabled to prevent use. When surprise is mission critical, you don't take any chances.ReplyDelete
To answer my own question, none for me either.ReplyDelete
I did have one experience that may be illustrative of something. I spent two years as staff ops officer for a mine division. We had 6 MSOs in the division, and the staff consisted of the division commander, me as LTJG, a YN1, and a SM/QM1. We had a two-week MINEX to plan. Because of a bunch of other stuff going on, I finally came in on Thursday morning and said, “Let’s get started.” The SM/QM worked out all the navigation and communication stuff, the commodore and I worked out the timeline, the yeoman typed it all up, and we made copies and distributed the OpOrder that afternoon. Pre-sail conference Friday morning and sailed following Monday. In addition to sweeping and hunting drill mines, we also tried out an experimental deep sweep for ASW mines and rendezvoused with a tanker for a silent UNREP. One other thing to mention is that our ship COs were all fast-track LTs who had already had a department head tour, and all ended up being deep selected for LCDR, so they had been around the block and knew their stuff. Anyway, coming back into port the last day of the exercise, the CO of the flagship we were riding said to me, “I think that’s the best planned exercise I have ever been on.” I did not have the heart to tell him how quickly we had slung it together.
I am offering this story not to brag about what a great planner I was (I make no claims there) but as a commentary on quality of Navy training generally in 1973. The one thing I can think of is that a lot of staffs were very fond of burying gotcha stuff in obscure parts of exercise OpOrders, and then putting you on report if you missed them, apparently to prove how smart they were, but we always made a point to make ours very straightforward and to the point.
I think the basic problem with a lot of training is that we dare not expose that some of our stuff (feel free to insert your noun—not pronoun, I don’t do the pronoun thing—of choice there) doesn’t work, because too many careers are invested in it. But doesn’t it make more sense to know before people get killed rather than after?
From everything I have been able to read, by Sandy Woodward and others, I get the impression that the Brits’ trifecta of Perisher (for submarine PCOs), FOST (like our GITMO used to be), and Springtrain (maybe like a smaller version of our old Fleet Problems) provided pretty effective warlike training. I do recall operating with the RN on several occasions and getting the distinct impression every time that 1) our kit was better than theirs, but 2) their sailors were better than ours. I would like to see the USN adopt something like Perisher for all PCOs, FOST for all ships’ companies at least every 3 years and prior to any deployment, and Springtrain/Fleet Problem annually for all ships not otherwise employed.
Have read comments from Brits. Agree, general feel I get is our "kit" is better than their's but we don't get as good use out of it because we just don't train as much or lack of initiative. Funny thing, its not new. Just finished a history of RN during Napoleon eras and interesting that UK sailors would readily admit the French Navy ships were better than their's but sailors weren't. Even Admirals would admit the best force would be French ships with RN crews!!! They do seem to relish that underdog material with can do attitude.Delete
"I would like to see the USN adopt something like Perisher … FOST … Springtrain/Fleet Problem …"Delete
Why? We already have all those things and many more albeit with different names. We have courses for prospective commanding officers. We have all manner of sea training for crews. We have entire pre-deployment work up cycles of training. We have multitudes of individual training courses. We've re-established Fleet Problems. And the list goes on nearly endlessly.
The problem is two-fold:
1. We routinely waive required training and certifications. The investigative report on every naval disaster reads exactly the same: training, manning, and certification requirements were waived. Take the recent AAV sinking in which several Marines were killed. The list of required maintenance, training, and safety was impressive. Unfortunately, it was all waived.
2. There are no standards. No one fails. Have you ever heard of a pre-deployment group failing to get 'certified'? Have you ever heard of anyone failing a training course? The recent survey of SWOs that showed 80% (or whatever the actual number was) couldn't pass the navigational test resulted in zero consequences. No one failed. No one was reprimanded. No one was dismissed from service.
So, why would we want to waste time adding more of the same training but using RN names? It's like gun laws. We've already got all we need if we'd just enforce them. We don't need more. We already have all the training programs we need if we'd just insist that they be done (not waived) and that people actually meet the standard.
"So, why would we want to waste time adding more of the same training but using RN names? It's like gun laws. We've already got all we need if we'd just enforce them. We don't need more. We already have all the training programs we need if we'd just insist that they be done (not waived) and that people actually meet the standard."Delete
Because I'm not proposing adding more of the same. I'm proposing that they be done and not waived and that people actually meet the standard. The difference is not changing the names, it's changing the substance.
"The difference is not changing the names, it's changing the substance."Delete
Why would the 'substance' of these be any different or better?
Can't we just apply the 'substance' to the programs we have?
It seems to be a human (bureaucratic) tendency to want to continually make new programs/laws rather than use what we have. We already have more training programs on the books than we can effectively do so why add more?
"Why would the 'substance' of these be any different or better?Delete
Can't we just apply the 'substance' to the programs we have?
It seems to be a human (bureaucratic) tendency to want to continually make new programs/laws rather than use what we have. We already have more training programs on the books than we can effectively do so why add more?"
I'd probably go with fewer but more stringent. No reason I can see why we can't just apply the substance to the programs we have. I don't think we are disagreeing here.
I served aboard five SSBN's in my 25 years in the Navy; 78 - 03. In the mid 80's I was stationed at NOTU in Cape Canaveral, for DASO missile launches. I rode three Brit "R" class boats. I have to say, if I had to ride a boat in a real shooting war, I would ride a Brit boat any day over one of ours. Their submarine CO's are trained from Sub Leftenent to command on how to fight the ship. They are not nukes who got promoted. MEO's - Marine Engineering Officers stay in their specialty. As a result, the Seaman officers know how to fight the ship, and the MEO's know how to make it go. But the US Navy had the system inherited from Rickover. I don't see that ever changing until a real shooting war with a peer Navy and we lose a lot of boats.Delete
"I get the impression that the Brits’ trifecta of Perisher ..."ReplyDelete
The British armed forces have known since the latter part of WWII that they were never going have as good (or at least as expensive) equipment as American forces. So they've tried hard to be more professional. Sometimes, this works.
So why doesn't the USA try to combine British training and professionalism with American numbers and equipment? Sounds a pretty potent combination.Delete
Not arguing. Just a question. Since the weapons most likely to be used by escorts are relatively short range (I'm thinking of you, ESSM), my initial guess would have been that escorts would be a little closer to the carrier, in order to better support it. What am I missing?ReplyDelete
'Closer' and 'farther' are relative terms. You want to be close enough to provide some degree of mutual support but far enough so as not to interfere in fields of fire, decoy use, EW, etc. You also want to be as far out as possible for the greatest warning time, sensor coverage, and for the most effective ASW.Delete
ESSM has an effective range of 20 miles or so. SeaRAM/RAM has a range of 6 miles or so. CIWS has a range of mile or so.
If an escort is too close to the ship it's protecting, it will mask the fire of the protected ship or get blasted by that ship's fire.
With that information in mind, you should be able to reason out the ballpark kind of spacing required for optimal escort placement.
There is also the issue of air space for carrier groups. Each carrier needs a minimum amount of air space for its aircraft to take off, land patterns, overhead tanking,etc. We established that even in WWII. I don't know today's carrier spacing requirement but give the speed of modern jets, I'm pretty comfortable that something on the order of 5 miles separation would be the minimum. Anything closer and the aircraft risk mid-air collisions and interferences.Delete
Carrier PriFly is 5 nautical miles.Delete
It is a published distance, so not Opsec or anything
"Carrier PriFly is 5 nautical miles."Delete
There are other air space requirements, as well, for example, the marshal point.
I don't understand. You decry this sort of writing from other sources including DOD because you say it is cherrypicked to present a scenario/setting... but you do the same thing yourself?ReplyDelete
Is this not a tad inconsistent?
????????? Who are you addressing and what are you talking about?Delete
"You decry this sort of writing from other sources"
????? Who else writes fictional pieces?
The post is a piece of fiction intended to illustrate how a task force in combat would operate.
Whatever point you're trying to make is unclear.