The Marines want a new Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV) to replace the venerable Light Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle (LAV-25). They want 533 units from a 5-year production run.[1] Okay … that’s fine. Seems simple enough. A vehicle to transport a few scouts, see what’s around, and report back. Cheap … simple … basic. Quick and easy to procure. What could go wrong?
Of course, the Marines – like the Navy and the military, in general - can’t just leave well enough alone, can they? They can’t just do basic. No, they want to turn a simple recon vehicle into a land version of a battleship; a do-everything vehicle capable of fighting a war single-handed. Take a look at the variants they want from what ought to be a simple recon vehicle:
ARV Variants [1]:
Command, Control, Communications, and Computers-Unmanned Aerial System (C4-UAS)
Organic Precision Fire-Mounted (OPF-M)
Counter Unmanned Aerial System (CUAS)
30 mm Autocannon and Anti-tank Guided Missile (ATGM)
Logistics (LOG)
Recovery (R)
Well, there goes simple, heading for the bus stop out of town!
Now, take a look at some of the features they want:
Features [1]:
Munitions upgrades including loitering munitions
Electronic warfare
Air defense
Cannon with programmable air burst munitions
Javelin missiles
Spike II missiles
Aerial drone threat sensors
And cheap just hopped the train out of town!
So, instead of a simple, basic, cheap, small recon vehicle, the Marines are looking to turn the vehicle into a land battleship with strike, anti-air, electronic warfare, anti-tank, drone control, etc. along with six different variants. That should only take about twenty years to field and cost several times what a main battle tank costs.
Hmmm …
What alternative is there?
You know … it occurs to me that we had a small, simple, cheap, basic recon vehicle in WWII. It was the M8 Greyhound and it performed quite well. Let’s compare specs for the M8 Greyhound and the Marine’s ARV. Of course, we have no specs on the ARV but it won’t likely be any smaller or lighter than the existing LAV-25 and will probably be larger so let’s look at the LAV-25 and the M8 Greyhound.
|
|
LAV-25 |
M8 Greyhound |
|
Length, ft |
21’ 0” |
16’ 5” |
|
Width, ft |
8’ 2” |
8’ 4” |
|
Height, ft |
8’ 10” |
7’ 4” |
|
Suspension |
8x8 wheeled |
6x6 wheeled |
|
Weight, tons |
14 |
8.5 |
|
Power, hp/ton |
19.5 |
13 |
|
Range, miles |
410 |
350 |
|
Max Speed, mph |
62 |
55 |
|
Armament |
25 mm chain gun 2x 7.62 mm machine gun |
37 mm 1x 0.50 cal machine gun |
|
Transport |
3 crew + 4-6 scouts |
4 crew |
|
Armor |
4.7 – 9.7 mm, small arms |
9.5 – 25.4 mm |
 |
| M8 Greyhound |
The obvious question is, which of those specs actually matter in a combat recon role? Well, the specs that matter most are:
- Range – more is better
- Size – less is better
- Armor – more is better
- Weapons – more is better
Considering those specs that matter most, we see that the M8 Greyhound has 15% less range (that’s bad), 39% less weight (that’s good), 17% lower silhouette (that’s good), 22% shorter length (that’s good), 102%-162% more armor (that’s good), and heavier weapons (that’s good). Thus, the M8 Greyhound is smaller, lighter, better armored, better armed, and has only slightly less range. That’s a pretty strong endorsement for the simple M8 Greyhound.
Here’s a scaled silhouette comparison of the M8 Greyhound and LAV-25.
 |
| M8 vs. LAV-25 Silhouette Comparison |
If you’re trying to do clandestine recon, you want as small a vehicle as possible, right? Well, that’s the M8 Greyhound, without a doubt!
Another factor that seems important is the crew size. The LAV-25 (and recon Strykers) carries around 5 scouts per vehicle plus the vehicle crew. That’s around 8 people per recon vehicle. Does that seem necessary? The M8 Greyhound used a total of 4 people. That seems a lot more reasonable for a recon mission. Fewer people means a smaller vehicle (that’s good) and less risk to less people (that’s good). Seriously, what do 8 people productively do on a simple recon mission?
Summary
Well, there you have it. We have the example of the M8 Greyhound recon vehicle, a vehicle designed for a specific task and with nothing extra. It is a stellar example of a small, cheap, simple, basic, well armed, well armored recon vehicle and it is eminently suited to its function. On the other hand, we have the Marine’s desired ARV which is bloated, overloaded with tasks, risks too many crew, and is ill-suited to its function.
The Marines, like the rest of the military, are instantly leaping from a simple task – recon – to a multi-multi-multi-function do-everything behemoth of a gold-plated beast that will be decades in development and prohibitively expensive.
Conceptually, we need to take the M8 Greyhound and update its technology and call it a day. It will accomplish the task with half the risk to people and we’ll be able to buy it in quantity and without waiting decades to complete development.
__________________________________
[1]Task and Purpose website, “This Is The Marine Corps’ Wish List For Its Next High-Tech Recon Vehicle”, Max Hauptman, 17-Dec-2021,
Does it have to be amphibious? If not, why not use a variant of the M1117 Armored Security Vehicle (also marketed as the "Commando")? Remove the turret to make room for sensors, radios, and a UAV- as a scout vehicle, it shouldn't be getting into firefights and revealing its position, anyways.
ReplyDeleteThe Brits used to have a nice family of Recon vehicles, the CRVT (scorpion family). Not fully amphibious, it used a floation screen. Still, it was light, fast, good range, good armament options, fair armor protection and most of all, tracked.
ReplyDeleteThe Scorpion has been out of service- and out of production- for DECADES, meaning if the USMC wants them, they'll have to buy second-hand vehicles and then spend a fortune upgrading and maintaining them. Commando, on the other hand, is still in production.
DeleteThe could just, you know, have a company makes new ones using whatever advancements in technology in the construction of a new manufactured scorpion optimized to whatever the USMC desires.
DeleteIt was once before means it could be made again.
@SRB: The Scorpion is *very* lightly armored, and can be penetrated by 7.62mm GPMG. When an enemy rifle squad can kill your vehicle, well...
DeleteComNavOps thinks that the ACV being protected against HMG is too light, I don't think you're going to fnd much support here.
"Scorpion"
DeleteTrying to find a minimally acceptable vehicle is symptomatic of what's wrong with the military. We need a purpose designed vehicle that is OPTIMUM for the task BUT NO MORE THAN THAT. Trying to shoehorn a poor fit into the task is all kinds of wrong. Unfortunately, this is the military mindset, today. We, as intelligent observers, should know better. We need to stop looking for a sub-optimum vehicle.
"The could just, you know, have a company makes new ones using whatever advancements in technology in the construction of a new manufactured scorpion optimized to whatever the USMC desires.
Delete"It was once before means it could be made again."
It will require a MASSIVE investment to build the factories necessary to make new Scorpions as well as the replacement parts necessary to keep the new-build Scorpions in service- not to mention the opportunity cost, i.e., by investing resources to build new Scorpions, you're sacrificing new Bradley IFVs, Abrams tanks, etc.
Why do you think the US hasn't built a new battleship since World War II ended? New battleships will be useful in many situations, but new aircraft carriers will be so in MANY MORE, and the USN wasn't willing to pay the opportunity cost, i.e., sacrifice some carriers to get new battleships.
Some might no longer be in service, but there were anti-tank, mortar, air defense, recovery, command and control, and logistics variants of the LAV-25. Back in the day, a Marine light-armored reconnaissance battalion included 56 LAV-25s, 16 LAV-ATs, 12 LAV-Ls, 8 LAV-Ms, 4 LAV-Rs, and 4 LAV-C2s. This allowed a LAR battalion to operate independently, albiet with limitations, from the rest of the division.
ReplyDeleteI think the following article is right up your alley:
ReplyDeletehttps://taskandpurpose.com/analysis/navy-rust-ships-constant-deployments/
It concerns USN ships rusting away as constant deployments prevent their crews from properly maintaining them, as well as what appears to be an attempt to whitewash the results on a Zumwalt class destroyer.
"It concerns USN ships rusting away as constant deployments prevent their crews from properly maintaining them,"
DeleteThat's not really what the article said. The article blamed corrosion on lack of standards and a general attitude of neglect more than deployments.
Even on deployment, any port a ship pulls into can be used to do corrosion control. Indeed, corrosion control should be a daily occurrence. Yes, the hull cannot normally be worked on while underway but the superstructure, equipment, and fittings certainly can.
The Navy has simply dropped corrosion control as a priority in favor of a multitude of social programs and a general coddling of crew.
"Cannon with programmable air burst munitions"
ReplyDelete"Javelin missiles"
"Spike II missiles"
Just a note, these are essentially COTS items. the USMC is buying Javelin anyway for use in the Weapons Platoon and the rifle squad, it's the standard squad ATGM of the US Army, this is the least problematic part of the feature list. Spike-LR II and Spike-ER II (the article doesn't differentiate between the two) are would essentially serve as alternatives to the TOW missile. And programmable airburst fused 30mm HE-frag rounds have been a thing for years now.
These requirements, at least, ought to have the least development time involved, compared to some of the other features.
A reconnaissance vehicle armed with 30mm autocannon and ATGM is quite par for the course - a great many nations use IFVs as scouts. There's something to be said for having enough firepower to blow past enemy pickets and break contact upon discovering substantial enemy forces.
An 8-man crew on the proposed USMC recon vic breaks down into 2 vehicle crew (driver, commander/gunner), and two 3-man scout teams, although your mileage may vary as to whether or not you need two scout teams. In the Army's M3 Bradley cavalry scout (which is literally identical to the M2 Bradly IFV in every way), it carries a 3-man scout team instead of 6 dismounts, with additional ammo being carried in lieu of the three bodies.
As for the rest of the requirements... it really depends on how they're defined and executed. Air defense is not an inherently bad idea: a turret with sufficiently high elevation allows the autocannon to be used in a limited, Shored Range Air Defense role - consider the the IM-SHORAD Stryker's turret, which combines a high elevation 30mm autocannon with ATGM and MANPADS, or the Bradley Linebacker, which is just a Bradley with Stingers instead of ATGM. It gives you some measure of threatening and suppressing enemy scout helicopters and UAVs.
You can find someone who will justify every added capability. What if the scout vehicle is attacked by aircraft? What if the scout vehicle is attacked by a tank? What if the scout vehicle runs into an infantry company? What if the scout vehicle encounters a drone? And so on. After we add equipment and manning to deal with all the what ifs, we've got a vehicle with runaway costs that will require three decades to produce.
DeleteYou're losing sight of what the main mission is: to CLANDESTINELY scout and report. It's not to engage. It's not to fight aircraft. It's not to destroy tanks. it's not to conduct electronic warfare.
This constant desire by the military to pile on every imaginable function is why we can't produce simple, cheap platforms in a short period of time. The M8 Greyhound is the perfect example of a vehicle ideally suited to its task AND NOTHING MORE. We knew how to do this once. We've just forgotten.
Except, not all reconnaissance is done clandestinely. There is the concept of reconnaissance by fire, a tactic used since WW2, to provoke an enemy to respond so as to reveal their position and possible strength.
DeleteThen you send a tank.
Delete"There is the concept of reconnaissance by fire, a tactic used since WW2, to provoke an enemy to respond so as to reveal their position and possible strength."
Delete"Except, tanks can't go everywhere you want them to go."
Then why are you proposing we use UNSURVIVABLE units for reconnaissance by fire? It's like proposing we strap suicide bombs to our soldiers instead of arming them with antitank missile launchers.
"You're losing sight of what the main mission is: to CLANDESTINELY scout and report. It's not to engage."
DeleteIf that was the only mission recce units were expected to fulfil, we wouldn't be seeing armored reconnaissance units. If that's the only mission to be performed, then you don't need your M8 Greyhound, a jeep could do that just as well. But that's not the only kind of reconnaisance mission there is. It is one mission, but recon by fire is also a mission that reconnaisance units have to do, which is why the US Army, among other armies, doctrinally uses an IFV (the M3 Bradley) as a scout vehicle.
Arguably, the clandestine scout and report mission is better accomplished by SOF.
"Then you send a tank."
The point of reconnaisance by fire with IFVs is so you have them doing recon by fire, and you can keep your tanks massed to break through weak points the cav scouts have identified, instead of being split up in penny packet deployments. The IFV meanwhile carries autocannon and ATGM so that it can blow past pickets that would stop jeeps. If your recon element is purely running on jeeps and dirt bikes, an OP manned by a rifle squad will stop it dead and can report back to higher that scouts are trying to probe the line. An IFV will roll through that same OP, with a better than even chance it can kill it before it reports to higher.
While you're critical of high elevation autocannon turrets, it's interesting to note that the Russians favor high elevation for their autocannon turrets - borne of their experience fighting in Afghanistan and Chechnya, where insurgents from hilltops and apartment buildings were able to fire on their BMPs with impunity, because the BMPs couldn't elevate their guns high enough to return fire. All I'm saying is that if your gun can elevate high enough, you can use it against enemy helicopters for self defense SHORAD. It's the same rationale why Shermans had high elevation antiaircraft mounts for the tank commander's .50cal: it was to suppress attack by shooting at attacking enemy aircraft. Even your M8 Greyhound has an AA .50cal.
@CNO: "Then you send a tank."
DeleteThe Germans and the Russians included tanks along with a mechanized infantry company in their Cold War Reconnaissance battalions making those formations into true combined arms teams.
It is worth considering the mission and organization of reconnaissance battalions before picking apart individual elements. Motorcycles and armored cars like the BRDM-2 are examples of simple, decades-old technology that is still effective and used today.
We can, and should insist that reconnaissance formations perform counter-reconnaissance even if a component vehicle like, the armored cars, are not optimal for that role. We do not expect fuel trucks to shoot down aircraft.
Not a land vehicle expert, but does 8x8 give any benefit in improved off road performance compared to 6x6? Or is it just because it's bigger?
ReplyDeleteIn theory an 8x8 can have lower Mean Maximum Pressure (not the same as ground pressure) and thus greater soft soil performance. Also an 8x8 can loose multiple wheels and still function.
DeleteI wish they would define the mssion and not the vehicle. I think dismounts make sense for the mission. I also think organic sensing gear and ability to launch and recover an organix UAV or even ground unmanned mini scout are relevant. To control size and weight I might limit the shooting in to things which defeat an attack and less on anything that can shoot the shooter. That will be a tough sell. Given who is using it, I might also say it needs to fit in a C-130 still and be slung by CH-53K. I think they have a separate need for a shoot the shooter / heavy vehicle that at present would be best filled by Centauro II.
ReplyDelete"I wish they would define the mssion and not the vehicle"
DeleteWisdom in a nutshell !
I don't even think unmanned gear is needed but I could, possibly, be persuaded. My view is that a stealthy Scan Eagle size UAV, launched from some HQ group, can take care of any UAV scouting needs. It doesn't need to be done by a scout vehicle which will only result in the scout vehicle being bigger and more expensive than necessary.
It is telling that the USMC is trying to procure an AFV without a clear mission/CONOPs, no historical input to guide their efforts, and trying to shoe horn everything into an ill-defined force structure.
DeleteModern theorists like Douglas MacGregor, put heavy emphasis on reconnaissance strike/reconnaissance fire; this topic was featured in Chief of Russia’s General Staff General Valery Gerasimov’s address to the Academy of Military Sciences in
March 2018 and is driving Russian strategic and operational thinking, organization of forces, procurement, and of course training of forces. This is very far advanced of simple hardware decisions.
I also note that reconnaissance was traditionally a cavalry mission, which very much included combat beyond the simple battle field surveillance mission we see today; particularly the counter-reconnaissance mission (destruction of enemy scouting efforts), rear guard missions, screening operations, and fighting for/then holding key terrain (bridges, fords, rail/road crossings, etc.). It is not important that a given reconnaissance vehicle be capable of all these functions, but it is critical that the unit conducting the reconnaissance function be able of achieving all of them.
The term "scouting", like so many other terms, has as many definitions as there are people to speak of it.
DeleteThe history of scouting is fascinating. Going back to the colonial days, scouting was performed by 'civilians', Indians, and a few organized groups (Roger's Rangers, for example). Their task was to find and report back - no combat. As noted, in the civil war era, scouting was performed as one of multiple tasks by the cavalry and was often (generally?) performed by large groups (JEB Stuart's cavalry, for example) who were tasked with combat when they could find favorable conditions.
This combat tasking was a combination of at least two separate missions: simple scouting and screening/flanking.
Moving to WWII, scouting reverted to a stand alone function by small, almost individual, units/people/vehicles although large unit recon-by-fire was also practiced.
Having covered the entire history of scouting in a few sentences (yikes!), it is clear that scouting means whatever the person talking about it wants it to mean. My assessment from history and common sense is that scouting is a non-combat function. It is the clandestine gathering of information and, to that end, is best performed by very small units/individuals.
Adding combat functions, like screening, seems to simply be a means to unintentionally inform the enemy about the presence of one's own larger units (why else would a sizable, capable screen be operating in an area?) which defeats the goal of knowing about the enemy without him knowing about you.
Now, if some military organization is determined to combine scouting and combat, that's a doctrinal decision which, in turn, leads to other doctrine required to react to the 'scout's' combat inducing role. As best I can tell, the US Army and Marines have no coherent scouting doctrine. Anyone can feel free to correct me as I'm not a land combat person. Regardless of any doctrine that might or might not exist, common sense says that the goal of finding the enemy without him finding you or even knowing you found him is the preferred objective of scouting. With that in mind, the minimalistic M8/bicycle is the preferred method.
Hand in hand with the above is the concept of counter recon - denying the enemy's recon forces any information - but that is a separate function and should be handled as such rather than combined with other missions.
I am confused here: we are discussing an Armored Fighting Vehicle AFV) here, not intelligence forces, or SOF Special Reconnaissance missions right?
DeleteHistorically, reconnaissance was one of several missions assigned to light cavalry preceding Alexander the Great. Screening the main force, and skirmishing were also cavalry missions dating to the dawn of warfare.
I disagree with the 'dismount' idea, the vehicle crew can dismount for short periods, but see no disconnect with expecting an AFV to have some combat role.
The WW2 German Heer fielded an entire combined arms battalion (aufklärungsbataillon) around its reconnaissance forces (armored car and halftrack companies), and did not hesitate to attach additional forces as needed.
Light trucks are best.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.g2mil.com/toyota.htm
I've got to disagree a little bit with this or, at least, add a caveat. The truck concept is fine - possible ideal? - for a type of low intensity, 'non-war' where we're occupying a region and are intermixed with civilians in more of a peacekeeping role than actual combat.
DeleteFor a high end, peer war, there won't be intermingling of combat units with civilians. Civilians will be wisely hiding and staying out of the way. In this scenario, a civilian truck just 'driving around' near enemy forces will stand out and be attacked without anyone caring to verify identity. No enemy is going to allow civilian vehicles to approach them any more than we would allow, say, a Chinese supposed fishing vessel to approach a carrier group when we're at war. The peacetime niceties and concern for civilians disappears in high end war.
So, for the kind of stuff we do in the Mideast, yes, a simple truck is great. For all out war, we need a dedicated scout vehicle, as described.
I also see a need for off-road vehicles in a high end war where driving on roads will be dangerous, undesirable, and likely impassable due to abandoned and destroyed civilian and military vehicles. Our recent history of low intensity conflicts have made us forget that most high end combat will take place in undeveloped terrain. Desert Storm, for example, was fought largely off road as far as the forward combat and the flanking maneuvers through the desert.
Do you see a difference between high and low end war needs for scouting or do you see both using the same truck concept? If the same, how do you address the high end scenario where the enemy is going to shoot first and ask questions never?
Ah, the ubiquitous Toyota Hilux...
DeleteTechnicals, yes you can blend in. Also like ATVs, PLA have a nice 6 wheeled one that carries 6 men. Airmobile and amphibious, and low profile and easy to hide.
ReplyDeleteA cannon with programmable air burst munitions is not bad idea as it allows one to attack an enemy in defilade. Though they like to avoid them, reconnaissance units will encounter tanks and other armored vehicles, so having Javelins is appropriate.
ReplyDeleteThere is almost no end to what would be nice to have. The problem is that every item added that is not ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION is just added cost, weight, size, complexity, and maintenance.
DeleteThe debate is not whether something would be nice to have - everything would be nice to have! - but whether it is absolutely necessary. We need to stop building the maximum and start building the MINIMUM NECESSARY FOR THE MISSION. That is how you control costs, put programs into production quickly, and can afford useful quantities.
You think a cannon with programmable air burst munitions is not bad idea. The problem is that the next guy in the design process thinks a 120 mm mortar is not a bad idea because he can imagine a use for it. The guy after him thinks an anti-tank missile system is not a bad idea. The buy after him thinks an anti-drone system is not a bad idea. And then an electronic warfare capability. And so on. Now, we've gone from a simple, cheap, vehicle capable of executing the mission to a bloated, prohibitively expensive, delayed program that will be billions of dollars over budget and decades in development.
It's not a question of whether it's not a bad idea. It's a question of whether the mission cannot be executed without it.
Ground Combat Vehicle, EFV, Zumwalt, Ford, etc. How many bloated programs do we need to do before we understand that the best platform is the one that can execute the mission with the MINIMUM capabilities, not the maximum? Can we not learn the lesson?
The Marines are not asking for anything that would be considered a luxury or out of the ordinary for a modern reconnaissance vehicle.
DeleteLoitering munitions - The US Army already has them and our enemies will have them too. They provide small units with a precision strike capability.
Electronic warfare - Being able to detect or jam enemy signals is a bad thing?
Air Defense - Even the M8 was equipped with a .50 Browning for air defense. A canon with air-burst rounds would be useful against helicopters and drones.
Programmable air burst munitions - Useful against a variety of targets from enemy hiding behind terrain or in built-up areas to helicopters and drones.
Javelin missiles - Probably the best portable antitank weapon we have today. The Army is equipping their Strykers with them. Plus, they're upgrading their Strykers with a 30mm Canon as well.
Spike II missiles - A fire-and-forget weapon with greater range than our TOW missile. They would likely be mounted on a dedicated variant, much like the TOW-equipped LAW-AT.
Aerial drone threat sensors - Drones (and loitering munitions) will be a threat Marines will face. They are cheap, small, and difficult to detect. Drones have already been used against our troops in Iraq and Syria.
"The Marines are not asking"
DeleteYou're just repeating the Marine's wish list as documented in the post. Do you have anything new or worthwhile to offer?
Back in the 60s, the Army used to say that the ideal recon vehicle was a BICYCLE WITH A RADIO because a scout's job is RECON only - NOT FIGHTING. (This of course assumed that your scout was NOT carrying 100 pounds of non-scouting related "gear" in addition to the bike). The more offensive/defensive capability you add to the conveyance, the more people want to FIGHT PEOPLE WITH IT -- NOT THE MISSION. And, the biggest sin of all -- "if you make it LOOK like a TANK, the Brass will try to USE IT LIKE A TANK and get everyone killed without doing ANY recon at all. As a testament to this, when the Army and USMC tried motorcycles/ATVs (too noisy, too complicated, no range) and jeeps/trucks (if it looks like it can fight then people will send it to fight, NOT scout), they always failed.
ReplyDeleteSpot on! In fact, skip the bike. The ideal recon in WWII was the coastwatcher - a guy with just a radio!
DeleteIt seems like the M8 was based on the deuce and a half, which makes it quite simple. Its amazing how much things have grown in size and complexity. The original WWII jeep was small and very simple. Contrast that with todays Hummers and trucks.
DeleteIf a WWII jeep isnt the perfect recon vehicle, what is?? For recon duty, how mych firepower do you need?? Maybe a small bit of steel to hide behind if "caught"?? So maybe the 60s armored MUTT version of the Jeep is warranted?? Thats still simple enough. Im enamored with the Jeep because its absurdly simple...a stamped steel body, small, reliable, small 4cyl engine,etc... A new version with limited changes could still be built cheap, and in huge numbers.
Ive always wondered about the use of ATVs and what their utility might be. That seems like a way to create fast,highly mobile scouts. I think there are advantages and drawbacks to both the "ride" style, like quads and the "drive" style side-by-side. The biggest problem I see is the teaching/training to ride them. Like we've all probably seen on our local freeway, not everyone has the ability to ride/drive, and even the best scout just might not be an ATV rider candidate...
LOL: you have not seen a 1958 Swiss Army bicycle!
Deletehttps://qympt437y6t15jza3hs3hy1c-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/fahrrad_mit_panzerfaust.jpg
"LOL: you have not seen a 1958 Swiss Army bicycle!"
DeleteThat's outstanding!
The first thing I think about here is what enemy are the Marines going to be fighting?
ReplyDeleteI would not use the Marines to fight peer armored forces, that is the Army's job.
So I'm looking at a lower end threat, something with possibly light armored vehicles.
Having established that, all scouts have two primary missions:
1) Reconnaissance - looking for the bad guys. Typically a movement to contact in which you endeavor to see them before they see you. Part of this role is to win the cavalry fight to strip the enemy of it's own recon so you can locate and observe the enemy's main body...then the scouts can disengage and hand the battle over to our own main body before they become decisively engaged.
2) Screening - An economy of force mission in which the scouts (acting as cavalry) cover a less important area (ie; flanks) so that the commander can mass his combat power (either in the offense or defense) at the critical point
The M8 would be a terrific platform for the Marines for this role, although I would make some adaptations:
- Three man crew for the vehicle; commander, driver, gunner, and a 2-3 man dismount team.
- Move the engine to the front of the vehicle to enhance crew protection and open up the back of the vehicle for other uses
- Upgrade the armor to make the vehicle survivable against similar class recon vehicles
- Replace the 37mm cannon with a 25mm or 30mm autocannon
- Place a door/hatch/ramp on the back of the vehicle for use by a two to three man dismount team. There are times when you need a listening post forward of your vehicle, or you need someone to peek over that next hill before you drive there, or someone needs to go and look at the bridge supports to see if they can bear the weight of armored vehicles or if they've been wired with explosives, etc, etc.
*** Most importantly!!!! Incorporate a Mast Mounted Sight similar to that used on the OH-58D featuring telescopic, thermal, laser range finding and laser designating sights and place that MMS on a telescoping mast that could raise a dozen or so feet off the top of the vehicle.
That last feature is critical. It would allow the scout vehicle to observe without exposing the vehicle to enemy observation.
It would also allow the vehicle to use the scout's primary weapon system (artillery) effectively without being detected by the enemy.
If the enemy threat is expected to face heavy armor, then attach armor killing vehicles to the scouts (that would typically be tanks).
If the enemy threat is expected to face an air threat, then attach air defense vehicles to the scouts.
Don't try and hang all the weaponry to do those jobs off of the scout vehicle.
Lutefisk
Oops, at the end I meant to say that if the enemy threat is expected to FEATURE armor of air threats, not face.
DeleteSorry.
Lutefisk
Ugh, re-reading my post...I forgot to mention that screening also involves preventing the enemy scouts from observing your own main body, which is another reason that the scouts need to have enough combat power to win that cavalry fight.
DeleteLutefisk
"screening also involves preventing the enemy scouts from observing your own main body"
DeleteNow we're starting to combine multiple missions. Screening, as I understand it, is a separate mission from recon. Again, this is how bloated vehicles begin. In the name of efficiency, let's build a single vehicle that can screen, recon, control UAVs, conduct electronic warfare, engage tanks, provide anti-air protection, etc. Why can't we let one vehicle do one job so that it's a small, simple, cheap vehicle that we can acquire quickly and in numbers?
Why do we all want to pile multiple functions on everything? This is the antithesis of everything we learned in WWII. Why are we so insistent on ignoring the hard won lessons of WWII?
"Screening, as I understand it, is a separate mission from recon."
DeletePlease understand that I'm approaching this from an Army standpoint. I was an air cavalry scout (scout helicopters) and also graduated from the Armor School's Scout Platoon Leader Course at Fort Knox.
I'm not sure if the Marines do this stuff differently.
But in the Army, R&S (Recon and Security) is done by cavalry units. Each division has a cavalry squadron that performs these functions.
It can often be difficult to distinguish between recon (more or less offensive) and screening (more or less defensive).
I'll try and explain what I mean by that.
When performing recon, the intent is to move forward undetected and observe the enemy. The goal is to find out how many enemy units are there, what they're doing, and how they are equipped.
Of course, any adversary that is competent is going to be trying to prevent our scouts from getting that done.
At the same time, their recon is also looking for our guys and the cavalry is trying to prevent them from doing so, which would be screening.
What you want to do is win the cavalry fight between the opposing recon forces.
If it's a meeting engagement between the two, the distinction between recon and screening can be become muddled.
Screening as an economy of force action (like guarding a flank) is a separate mission.
In the Army, that function is often performed by cavalry units.
After the cavalry units (hopefully) defeat the enemy recon, whether on the attack or defense, they will hand over the battle and pass through the main forces.
After that they really have no immediate job, but they are typically highly competent units, well led, and accustomed to operating in space, so they are well suited to economy of force operations.
As I said, this is my interpretation of the Army way of doing business, the Marines may do things differently.
Cavalry operations are considered the most difficult job on the battlefield.
That's why I would have the mast mounted sight to help observe and engage without becoming decisively engaged.
The auto cannon would be to facilitate killing the enemy recon.
I'd have the dismount scouts to do all the up close and personal scouting jobs that can't be done from the vehicle.
If the enemy uses heavy tanks or aviation against my cavalry, I'd attach tanks or other vehicles designed to specifically, and efficiently, address those threats.
Within this context, I don't see guys on bicycles, or jeeps, or ATV's or motorcycles being able to perform these missions, at least not against a competent foe.
However, I'm not a savant on this stuff.
There may be other, better ways to get the job done.
Lutefisk
Clearly the Marine Corps is setting up for yet another bloated program that takes decades to crawl to the point at which it is cancelled it hard to see how this proposed effort aligns with the reconfiguring of the purposes and missions of the Corps.
ReplyDeleteHaving said which, the requirements, as outlined, seem to pretty much align with France's EBRC Jaguar reconnaissance and combat vehicle. On first glance at least. Though obviously USMC would want to change out the 40mm CT40 gun and the French AT missiles.
Would such changes provide sufficient potential for a drawn out development schedule spread across enough officer's careers, and spending a sufficiently large amount of money.
At some point a cynical person can suspect these are the true requirements for these programs, rather than the more mundane matters of range, armour, tactical employment, etc.
I guess I'm not surprised but so many of these comments are an orgy of piling additional missions and capabilities BEYOND WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR THE TASK.
ReplyDeleteHow many bloated, unaffordable, infinitely delayed programs do we have to suffer through before we learn the lesson of simplicity and minimalism? We knew these lessons in WWII but we insist on ignoring them today.
In my opinion (Army Infantry) a lot of this arises from the definition of the role, recon vs screening.
DeleteI am well aware of ComNavOps preference for single mission platforms, and I wholeheartedly agree. However, on the conventional mechanized land battlefield ground reconnaissance and screening (the LAV role) really are the same function. Ground recon vehicles inevitably operate in the same area of the battlefield as enemy mounted recon units, and whether they want to avoid combat or not, detection and combat will occur. When it does, they are engaged in screening whether they want to be or not. That is why both the LAV and the comparison vehicle, the M8 are well armed for the role (with weapns heavy enough to kill light armored vehicles and dismounts). Note that neither carries anti-tank weaponry (by the time significant numbers of M8s reached the front lines in WW2 that 37mm gun was useless against contemprary tanks, but plenty against armored cars).
Pure ground recon units are pretty much always dismounts on foot; sometimes also in bicycles as noted above or even on horseback.
The larger size of the LAV is driven, more than anything else by a requirement to be amphibious, a capability that the M8 lacks. This requires that the vehicle be larger and thinner skinned simply so that it will float. The Marines would have to decide whether this is a needed characteristic. In acquisition of the LAV, it was probably driven primarily by the amphibious nature of the Marine Corps mission. It is not a very usefull capability for a pure ground combat vehicle. Swimming across a river is a good way to get yourself cut off without support when detected.
Of course, from the description given at the beginning of the article, the Marines really are doing exactly what you describe, trying to pile every "nice to have" item into a single vehicle, including many that are not part of the mission. In particular I note the specification of two different antitank missiles. If it MUST have one (and that is a big if) then pick one. Operating and countering UAVs is also not a recon vehicle mission. Those are dedicated missions for separate UAV and air defence artillery units. The other specified missions are similarly separate functions that don't belong to a recon vehicle, and generally won't fit on the same chassis.
Or you know, they could just buy some Nikes for the scouts so they could jog over to the other side of the coral atoll they are setting up their anti-ship missiles on and see if China somehow deployed a tank there.
ReplyDeleteSeriously, where exactly are the Marines planning to fight? ConOps is important, but so is some basic conceptions of where you are going to fight. The Spratlys and the Parcel islands are tiny coral atolls like Midway or Tarawa. Or am I missing something? I mean aside from the general non-coherance of the Marines current doctrine.
"Seriously, where exactly are the Marines planning to fight?"
DeleteThis is one of the key questions. Strategy cannot be divorced from geography. I see little need for ground troops in any reasonable Chinese scenario. Now, if we're going to engage in a land war in, say, Vietnam to prevent a Chinese takeover then that changes our strategy and requirements.
Barring that, the Marines have described only small unit, isolated operations on small islands. Sniper missions with missiles, essentially. There would be no need for recon vehicles or much of anything except light infantry with jeep mounted missiles. Even large missiles on large trucks is delusional.
Geography is the foundation of strategy and strategy determines acquisition. The Marines have completely lost the sequence of dependencies and are floundering. Their only goal, now, is preserving their budget slice.
We just spent 20 years teaching the rest of the world how effective IEDs are, the vehicles need to protect from that.
ReplyDeleteThey also need to stand up to at least 50 cals.
Marines got rid of bridge units, so they have to swim.
You need a decent chain gun, may as well go 30mm like the gators.
Strapping on some anti tank missiles will help when the PLANMC has armor and the Marines got rid of theirs.
4 dismounts isn't very many, three LAVs for a single squad and ten for a platoon.
This comment is wrong just about point for point! Specifically:
Delete"We just spent 20 years teaching the rest of the world how effective IEDs are, the vehicles need to protect from that."
No, the lesson WE should have learned is that you don't drive on roads which provide a predictable location for IEDs. There's a reason our vehicles have tracks (recent road vehicles are a questionable development that is yet to be proven in actual combat). It's so they can get off the road and away from obvious danger points. We should have also learned that if you feel you must drive on a road then you SECURE the road first which means kill anyone approaching it so they can't lay IEDs. It's called war for a reason!
"They also need to stand up to at least 50 cals."
No, recon vehicles need to AVOID engagements although some degree of armor is good.
"Marines got rid of bridge units, so they have to swim."
No, that's how you get a bloated, unaffordable vehicle. If you absolutely can't cross a river anywhere then you use UAVs until you secure a crossing.
"You need a decent chain gun, may as well go 30mm like the gators."
No, recon needs to AVOID engagements.
"Strapping on some anti tank missiles will help when the PLANMC has armor and the Marines got rid of theirs."
It is NOT the job of recon to engage tanks. If you want to fight enemy armor you do so with your own armor, artillery, and air. This is a classic example of mission creep and we've seen repeatedly how that destroys acquisition programs.
"4 dismounts isn't very many, three LAVs for a single squad and ten for a platoon."
You don't recon in squads and platoons. You fight in squads and platoons and recon does not engage. Therefore, recon does not need squads and platoons. The only personnel needed are one or two people to peek over a hill.
You FIGHT in companies and battalions. Squad and platoon level is the level at which patrolling (reconaissance and ambush) takes place, not offensive or defensive operations.
DeleteComNavOps is quite right here but maybe even more than he knows (he isn't ground combat, no offense, I'm not
@Unkown: "We just spent 20 years teaching the rest of the world how effective IEDs are, the vehicles need to protect from that."
DeleteNo!
1. The term IED was invented to cover for the outrageous and preventable casualties taken by U.S. ground forces in SW Asia. We should concern ourselves with the wars we are forced to fight (high-intensity peer war), not interventions for the sake of intervention.
2. IEDs, booby traps, fougasse, etc. are land mines and they have been around in various guises since the Chinese invented gunpowder in the ninth century, although they were properly militarized around the U.S. civil war. The Roman caltrop was used in the era of Julius Caesar to inflict casualties on infantry and horses using an emplaced spike to impale the foot, or lower leg of a horse
3. The primary threats on the modern peer battlefield is inevitably artillery; even our body army is mis-aligned to that threat; air delivered munitions, sensor fused munitions, drones (AI controlled?), direct fire, and the pesky land mine.
@Unkown: "We just spent 20 years teaching the rest of the world how effective IEDs are, the vehicles need to protect from that."
DeleteNo!
1. The term IED was invented to cover for the outrageous and preventable casualties taken by U.S. ground forces in SW Asia. We should concern ourselves with the wars we are forced to fight (high-intensity peer war), not interventions for the sake of intervention.
2. IEDs, booby traps, fougasse, etc. are land mines and they have been around in various guises since the Chinese invented gunpowder in the ninth century, although they were properly militarized around the U.S. civil war. The Roman caltrop was used in the era of Julius Caesar to inflict casualties on infantry and horses using an emplaced spike to impale the foot, or lower leg of a horse
3. The primary threats on the modern peer battlefield is inevitably artillery; even our body army is mis-aligned to that threat; air delivered munitions, sensor fused munitions, drones (AI controlled?), direct fire, and the pesky land mine.
"Screening, as I understand it, is a separate mission from recon."
ReplyDelete"Please understand that I'm approaching this from an Army standpoint. I was an air cavalry scout (scout helicopters) and also graduated from the Armor School's Scout Platoon Leader Course at Fort Knox."
You are correct in that this was what Fort Knox taught BUT it was NOT a correct mission. "Screening" was just a justification for all of the LIGHT TANKS (and later, helicopters) that the Army bought since the 1930s attempting to copy what other armies were buying (M2, M3, M5, M24, M41, M551). During most of WW2, 1/3 of ALL the tanks that the US bought were LIGHT TANKS but they accomplished VERY LITTLE as they were NO GOOD for recon and too weak to fight other tanks successfully -- but the Army continued to BUY THEM anyway for "tradition". DIRECT FIRE aka "screening" never had ANYTHING TO DO with recon... Recon's effective weapons were always INDIRECT FIRE -- artillery and, more particularly, mortars. If the enemy could SEE YOU, you weren't a very good scout and you paid for it by getting shot. "Screening" was light tanks and helicopters getting killed pretending to fight "real" tanks and mechanized infantry.
I think a largely similar vehicle already exist, the Canadian AVGP Cougars. It uses a six wheel version of what is essentially the LAV-25 themselves... Which would suggest that this whole exercise is pointless.
ReplyDeleteThe marines simply need to update the existing LAV-25 vehicles with more armour and replace the 25mm gun with a 30mm one maybe in an armoured remote weapon station and call it a day. Add in more modern sensors and optics and we're done.
So many military platforms are scrapped, relegated, destroyed or sunk in the past 20 years for no good reason than to get something new, shiny, inherently more expensive, and as the trend seem to show these days, frequently broken.
Those old M48/M60 tanks languishing in the scrapyards, give them to someone who can use them instead!
Loc
"The marines simply need to update the existing LAV-25 vehicles with more armour and replace the 25mm gun with a 30mm one maybe in an armoured remote weapon station and call it a day."
DeleteWhile, granted, that would be a better approach than what the Marines want, it's still a bad approach. As documented in the post and the comparative specs, the LAV is poorly suited for the recon role. It's too big, too lightly armed, too lightly armored, and carrier too many people.
There is a time and place for a new vehicle, even if it's a throwback to WWII and IF (that's a high questionable proposition) the Marines need a new recon vehicle this is that time and place. There is NEVER a time and place for a bloated, gold-plated, monstrosity which is what the Marines are seeking.
I understand what you are saying and agree with it, I don't have a problem with WW2 hardware that serve a purpose. I even think there is a place for WW2 armour (updated of course) in low intensity modern battlefields.
DeleteI answered as such because I don't understand the basis of logic in which the marines seek to create a new vehicle for. My perception thus far (mostly from your blog because I don't follow American military affairs in depth) is that the U.S Marines is no longer capable of amphibious assault/landing, the single most important reason for their existance (core). Then how does that distinguish the marines to the army? This is a real question, I am sincerely curious. If there is no doctrine, no CONOPS... What are we talking about here? Are we just discussing a generic reconnaissance vehicle?
IF that is the case then yes, low intensity recon vehicle will be a bicycle, a motorcycle, or a truck! There isn't a need for anything new that doesn't already exist. Need armour? Grab an armoured car, the M1117 Guardian seem to fit the bill.
Peer warfare recon vehicle will be as you suggest, low silhouette, long range vehicle with modest armour to survive confrontation against enemy recon and be armed enough to destroy them. The M8 basis and replace the turret with one like the German Marder, it has both an autocannon, an MG and provision for an ATGM. If we can build that in the 1970s I'm sure it's not that hard to design and build something similar. Lutefisk's idea of a mast like a submarine's periscope is good one too. That's it really, the main purpose of the vehicle is to spot and remain unspotted and relay that information. Weapons are only there for self defence or targets of opportunities, such as finishing off remnants after an artillery strike. If this vehicle gets spotted by a modern MBT it needs to run.
Having said all that, my perception of this thus far is that the Marines doesn't even know what it wants to be yet. Hence wanting a new ARV is ridiculous when you don't even know what this thing is supposed to do, it's job is reconnaissance but it is not clear HOW... So I see it as a rich country with first world problems wanting a new toy just because it can. So IF you must have a new toy, the cheapest one I can think of is to upgrade an existing one and make it "new" thus my previous suggestion. Otherwise it's a vehicle without a clear purpose is it not? Which will always mean it will be sub optimal. That'd be a waste of resources and time, you should assume that your enemies are not doing the same thing.
Loc
I'm sorry I realize that I went on in explaining my thought process on the matter but didn't contribute much to the subject matter, the ARV in question!
DeleteA good generic ARV in my opinion will be a six wheeled vehicle, I've always found the eight wheeled variants (which is very popular) to be unnecessarily large while four wheeled ones may not be mobile or durable enough. Height to the hull roof should be kept as low as possible, the MOWAG spy apparently is under 1.7M in height. It should possess good range of at least 600km and no swim capability since it is to be armoured.
Armour is something modern vehicles seem to be lacking, at least resistant to 30mm on the frontal arc. This can be spaced, composite, ERA or a combination of them, whichever is most efficient and cost-effective. The vehicle is not meant to stay in a prolonged fight, the armour should thus be designed to survive long enough for the vehicle to retreat or complete the mission.
A sensor suite on a retractable mast is mandatory such as in the German Fennek/Dingo vehicles. The sensors should be removable as much as possible so that they can be operated by the crew should they need to dismount.
The weapons suite of the vehicle should probably be the lowest priority, used mostly for self defense or attacking targets of opportunities. An autocannon in a low profile turret/RWS will be ideal.
The ideal mission for this vehicle is one where it remains undetected whilst observing the environment/enemy movement. Should it encounter a situation where it is ambushed or detected, the armour on the vehicle is there to increase the chances of a successful disengagement and survive. The weapon should only be used as a last resort.
This is how I envision a generic Armoured Reconnaissance Vehicle should be used. For anything more mobile and less armoured there are already scout cars to fulfill a similar role.
Loc
"My perception thus far ... is that the U.S Marines is no longer capable of amphibious assault/landing"
DeleteThe Marines have flatly and publicly stated that they are out of the opposed landing (amphibious assault business). The only mission they seem to have embraced is small units shooting missiles at passing ships. Of course, that only requires a manning level of perhaps 2,000 people so if they truly think that's their mission then they need to downsize to nearly non-existence.
In short, the Marines are a mess right now and have no coherent idea what they should be doing.
I was taught in aeroscout school and scout platoon leaders's course that artillery was the primary engagement weapon system for cavalry.
ReplyDeleteLutefisk
Given the basic recon mission - to locate the enemy and report back - , what do you think of the Army method of executing that mission? Does it seem overkill? Does it seem to have been loaded with extraneous missions? Does it seem like a solution in search of a problem? Or … does it seem like the right way to do recon?
DeleteYou've been there and done that so what do you think? Army right or Army wrong?
"Given the basic recon mission - to locate the enemy and report back - , what do you think of the Army method of executing that mission? Does it seem overkill? Does it seem to have been loaded with extraneous missions? Does it seem like a solution in search of a problem? Or … does it seem like the right way to do recon?"
DeleteThis is a really thought provoking group of questions.
To locate the enemy and report back....
That is specifically what we did in my unit. We were the divisional cavalry for the 101st Airborne Div. (all peace time).
We flew small unarmed helicopters and were protected by a Cobra that would follow us around, but they had minimized armaments so they could maximize fuel and time on station.
Finding the enemy and reporting back was all that we did. Because we were so mobile, we didn't really need to worry about committing the great cavalry sin of becoming 'decisively engaged'. We would be able to simply fly away if necessary.
So we were basically all scout and no shooting at the enemy except to disengage.
If we were going to engage it was expected to be primarily with artillery.
But ground scouting is a different animal.
There job is to find the enemy while keeping the enemy recon from finding our guys.
When the opposing recons inevitably stumble into each other, it's going to be a fight. And whichever side wins that cavalry fight is going to have a significant advantage.
Ideally you spot them first and call artillery, helicopter gunships, or air strikes to kill their recon without giving away yourself. If needed, they engage with direct fire.
That's the plan anyway.
The cavalry fight is what drives a lot of the capability needs, and I don't really know how to get around that.
The mission creep danger for cavalry is that they do have some combat ability, and can end up being used to fill roles that regular combat units do. That will get the cav killed off in a hurry.
I like the idea of the M8 vehicle for the Marines (and Stryker type units in the Army).
That's assuming that they are not fighting enemy armor or heavy mechanized units (which is the Army's job).
I assume that Marine recon units fulfill a similar role to the Army's cav units, which is really similar to the job done by horse cavalry in the JEB Stuart era. Locate the enemy and keep the enemy cavalry off of the friendly infantry.
I'm trying to envision a way to perform recon with a lighter unit.
If you could find a way to use a small and quiet vehicle to infiltrate to the enemy main body, you might be cut off from any help when/if you are finally discovered. So that's not all that survivable.
I'm trying to envision how to do a simplified recon without the full role of cavalry in the Army style, but I don't see how to avoid the circumstances that necessitate the cavalry's role, specifically the inevitable recon/counter-recon fight.
Splitting the role of recon and screening just seems to lead to an artificial attempt to separate the roles, which will likely defy separation in practice, and a duplication of effort.
I'm sorry CNO, I can't seem to think through another way.
It may be that I am too invested in the Army cavalry methods to devise creative alternative
approaches. Maybe someone else can do better.
Lutefisk
There are two good, free ebooks on the subject,
Delete“ To Fight or Not to Fight?: Organizational and Doctrinal Trends in Mounted Maneuver Reconnaissance from the Interwar Years to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM”
https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cace/CSI/CSIPubs/cameron_fight.pdf
“ Scouts Out! The Development of Reconnaissance Units in Modern Armies”
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/scouts_out.pdf
900 pages of light, weekend reading.
Both essentially reinforce what Lutefisk said.
"Both essentially reinforce what Lutefisk said."
DeleteI haven't read either … and likely won't! However, the larger issue is not what has been done or is being done, it's what makes sense. The battleship proponents pre-WWII had reams of writings documenting how the battleship was and is (at that time) being used. That didn't make it a good idea … just an entrenched idea.
The larger issue is how scouting SHOULD be done and, given that, what equipment and doctrine is needed.
Beyond that, the premise of the post is the institutionalized tendency to gold-plate every vehicle, aircraft, and ship without consideration of whether it's actually REQUIRED to execute the mission.
It's clear to me that too many people have conflated scouting and screening.
One of the interesting historical examples is JEB Stuart's use of cavalry. For starters, he had a strong tendency (desire) to decisively engage, often in defiance of Lee's orders and wishes. This led to overall shortcomings for the Confederate army by creating battles that Lee didn't want or causing a lack of actual scouting while the cavalry was engaged. The cavalry units at the time were several thousand strong - hardly just scouts! They were clearly intended to engage in high end combat. Thus, the conflation of scouting and screening which has led to the current issues.
It’s important to understand the history of scouting, recc, and cavalry to understand what’s been tried, how they’ve been used and misused, and problems encountered. Otherwise how can one possibly advance an informed opinion?
DeleteThe two docs aren’t justifications for any current organization. They just go through the history and issues.
Scouts inevitably encounter enemy scouts. There’s no way around that. They have to be able to survive these meeting engagements. In effect these encounters are screening.
But if a scout unit is designed for stealth, does the parent unit then have to commit some of its main combat power just to screen its main combat power? Maybe. This has been proposed.
Most armies have chosen to let their scouts screen because meeting engagements will happen anyway. The US Army goes back and forth. This is one of the dilemmas of scouting. Too heavy and the scouts will tend to be misused as a regular combat formation. Too light and they are unsurvivable and thus unused.
In the case of the Marine ARV replacement, given their reorganization efforts, do the Marines even need the LAR units anymore? Maybe they can just use the ACVs and JLTVs they already plan to buy. Large unit action by Marines appears to be passé.
"JEB Stuart's use of cavalry. For starters, he had a strong tendency (desire) to decisively engage, often in defiance of Lee's orders and wishes. This led to overall shortcomings for the Confederate army by creating battles that Lee didn't want or causing a lack of actual scouting while the cavalry was engaged."
DeleteAn example of this is depicted in the "Gettysburg" movie, based on "The Killer Angles" book.
Stuart was out doing one of his raids and the Army of Northern Virginia was without recon or screening.
Buford's Union cavalry was in the Gettysburg area. Buford liked the high ground and wanted to hold it.
He used his cavalry in a defensive posture.
The Army of No Vir, without cavalry, bumbled into Buford's cavalry. They needed to redeploy from march order of battle to a battle formation, which took precious time.
Buford's cavalry was able to delay the confederates until Reynolds' I Corps of heavy infantry could arrive and take over the fight from the Union cavalry.
It won the battle by giving the Union the better ground at Gettysburg.
It's the best example I can think of where cavalry acted successfully in that role.
Lutefisk ^
DeleteI second the article "Scouts Out", also two books of the same name by Robert Edwards focused on German armored reconnaissance in WW2.
Delete@B. Smitty: "In the case of the Marine ARV replacement, given their reorganization efforts, do the Marines even need the LAR units anymore?"
DeleteNo. After the 1st Gulf War Commandant Krulak ordered a study into re-organizing part of the Corps into Combined Arms Regiments using LAVs and AAVs as 'place holder' vehicles for the marines to experiment with before choosing a IFV. At his retirement Krulak panned tanks saying he would eliminate them from the Corps. This opened the USMC to irrelevance in real wars and should have signaled for the Navy it was time to eliminate amphibious ships.
"This is one of the dilemmas of scouting. Too heavy and the scouts will tend to be misused as a regular combat formation. Too light and they are unsurvivable and thus unused."
ReplyDeleteYes.
We ( 2/17 Cav, 101st Abn Div) were very light. Out combat power was very limited and we were primarily recon.
But guess what?
The 101st Division Commanders didn't really appreciate us very much.
They had three battalions of Apache helicopters. That's who they prioritized in the deployment loadout plans. They preferred the firepower of the Apaches rather than the recon of the cavalry.
Lutefisk
So having said all of this, is there a way to fulfill what I believe is CNO's intention of splitting the combat and recon functions of scouting?
ReplyDeleteFor air cavalry (helicopters) you could replace their roles, IMO, with unmanned drones.
You'd lose some on the spot decision making ability/situational awareness. You'd also take on all the problems of controlling drones in contested territory.
But it would remove the problem of having 4 aircrew with each Scout Weapons Team out over contested ground needing to be rescued when their helicopter goes down (assuming that all or some survive).
On the ground it's a lot more difficult to envision.
You would need some kind of platform that could infiltrate to the enemy forces, gather the information, and then exfiltrate back out.
That would be a tough gig. And they would still need to have enough combat power, either intrinsic or on call, to disengage from enemy forces if discovered.
Could a 'small' M8 pull that off?
Maybe.
I'm going to put in a plug for my pet idea of an OH-58D style mast mounted sight on a telescoping mast.
Put that on the M8 and they could stay completely hidden (behind a building, hill, wadi, stream bed, etc), raise the mast, and only have that mast head visible, a much lower optical and IR signature than the vehicle.
With the magnification and thermal sights, they should be able to scan the area before bounding to the next hide spot.
If they spot something, they would have the option of using the laser rangefinder to get a pretty accurate fix on the enemy to call indirect fires, or use the laser designator for Copperhead artillery or Hellfire missiles, all without being detected.
Even with that feature added to the M8, it would still be tough to pull off. But depending on the density of forces, maybe possible?
Lutefisk
Sounds like you want the ill-fated FSCS Lancer.
Deletehttp://www.army-guide.com/eng/product2793.html
The Canadians have a LAV variant with a mast, the Coyote.
http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product933.html
"Even with that feature added to the M8, it would still be tough to pull off."
DeleteOne of the things that constantly astounds me is that we've come to believe that things we routinely did in WWII are now nearly impossible. The M8 (and other forms of scouting) successfully scouted. Today, we deem it nearly impossible. Why?
It's not just this topic, either. We no longer believe that it's possible to armor a ship and still maintain speed and range and yet we did that for every ship built in WWII. And so on.
The mast idea is excellent, by the way.
Fighting Irish pretty much stated what the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalions consist of and do. I'll just add that in our past Iraq wars, they served as blocking forces and those TOW missiles and mortars were really helpful in protecting the flanks of the attacking Marine divisions.
ReplyDeleteEvery variant you list is one the existing LAVs already have. There is an air defense variant of the LAV, and the Counter Unmanned Aerial System (CUAS) variant is a continuation of that role.
In regards to the features you do not believe are needed:
Munitions upgrades including loitering munitions - The little wars in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh indicate the loitering munitions can be devastating. The Marines would like to be prepared.
Electronic warfare - Knowing your opponent's electronic order of battle is part of any recon now and the Russians are really using such technology. The Marines don't want to be left behind and indeed have a LAV-MEWSS variant for the purpose presently.
Air defense - You cannot count on always having air superiority and counter-drone efforts are vital.
Cannon with programmable air burst munitions - shoot through a window of a building, explode inside, kill/wound opponents, protect your marines. Urban warfare is still a worry.
Javelin missiles - the US Army has them on their Stryker 8x8. Not really new and there is a LAV-TOW variant so it follows they would like a counter-AFV capability.
Spike II missiles - Fire and forget missile that targets tanks, helicopters and bunkers. If you are a marine, what's not to like?
Aerial drone threat sensors - your opponent will use aerial drones, knowing where they are is recon and protects you from attack.
The Marines have JLTV, Hummer, Growler, MRZR-D and even a Mercedes-Benz G Class. The JLTV is closest to the M8, though thankfully it has an armored roof and is mine resistant. They have plenty of potential recon vehicles, but none like the LAVs.
The successor to the LAV needs to do what LAVs do. The marines have a CONOPs for their Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalions. It is the same one they have used for 40 years. Just because you are unaware of it doesn't mean they don't have one.