Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss

Marine Corps Commandant Berger’s term of office has ended.  While that is cause for celebration, the celebration is exceedingly short lived and subdued due to the fact that his presumed successor, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Eric Smith, is almost certainly a clone of Berger.  Berger’s number two is assuredly a near carbon copy of Berger or else he wouldn’t have been Berger’s number two.
 
I hope Smith will be a better Commandant but the odds on that are vanishingly low.  We’ll see …

Marine’s View of Themselves

As we’ve often discussed, the Marines currently have an identity crisis.  They have no viable mission or, at least, none that they’re articulating very well.  We’ve discussed this and offered our view of things.  Now, let’s approach this from the Marine’s side of things.  What do the Marines think about themselves as documented in their own Force Design 2030 annual update report for 2022?  As we look at this, bear in mind that the document is written by the Marines and, as such, is a self-congratulatory, public relations piece.  Still, let’s see what we can learn about the Marines from their own mouth.

 

Campaign of Learning - One of the interesting sections of the report is titled, Key Findings From the Campaign Of Learning.  For those of you who might be unfamiliar with The Campaign of Learning, it is described as an on-going series of examinations to ensure that the Marines are covering all the bases and making all the right decisions.  An alternative description might be that it is a public relations exercise designed to validate decisions already made.  Be that as it may, let’s see what the Marines claim to have learned.

 

Regarding the Campaign, itself,

 

This past year we invested in the Campaign of Learning itself by taking a more structured approach to collaborating with partners and by applying sophisticated modeling and simulation methods and tools. This is reflected through the refinement and analysis of mission engineering threads we developed in partnership with the Navy.[1]

 

How’s that for some Class A, unadulterated, worthless, buzzword vomit?

 

Communications - Moving on, we come to our first nugget of useful information:

 

Our FD 2030 communication has not been effective with all stakeholders.[1]

 

Read the phrase, ‘not been effective with all stakeholders’, and remember that statement was written by a Marine Corps desperately trying to put the best possible spin on it.  If ‘not been effective with all stakeholders’ is the best possible spin, what are they really saying when the spin is removed?  They’re saying that they’ve had an abysmal communications failure that has utterly failed to convince people and generate support.

 

On the one hand, it’s good that the Commandant recognizes his communication failure but, on the other hand, he clearly has no intention of actually communicating any useful information.  Secrecy has been the hallmark of his vision and there is no sign that anything about that will change.  If you recall, the Marines promised to begin releasing information about their wargames, as documented in the passage below.

 

MCWL will publish unclassified executive summaries of all Service-level war game reports related to FD 2030 no later than 1 November 2022 and make these available on the FD 2030 website. Going forward, MCWL will publish unclassified versions of all Service-level war game reports within 90 days of event completion.[1]

 

To date, I’ve heard found no information about war games.  Commandant, are you puzzled why you have a communications failure?  You promised information and have not provided anything useful.  There’s your problem.

 

Here’s the referenced FD2030 website, as best I can tell:

 

https://www.marines.mil/Force-Design-2030/

 

 

Missions - Here’s an interesting tidbit:

 

… a modernized Marine Corps must still be capable of performing global crisis response operations.[1]

 

On the face of it, this suggests that the Marines want to maintain their traditional roles and missions while adding the small unit, missile-shooting force.  That might be fine except that their actions, as opposed to their words, point to an abandonment of their traditional roles and missions.  They’ve totally eliminated tanks, the most powerful weapon they had and significantly reduced artillery, their second most powerful weapon, while simultaneously publicly stating that they are out of the amphibious assault business.  Does that sound like they want to ‘still be capable of performing global crisis response operations‘?  This statement sounds to me like they’re trying to hang on to their traditional funding while abandoning the missions.  This demonstrates the identity confusion that has gripped the Corps.

 

Effectiveness - Continuing, we find what may be the most profound passage in the document:

 

… our initial observations linked to A Concept for Stand-in Forces, especially for reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, indicate we focused the MLR [ed. Marine Littoral Regiment] too much on lethality and not enough on sensing, the ability to make sense, maneuverability, and deception.  While our initial assumptions about the value of the MLR to the FMF and fleets were anchored on the enhanced lethality it could provide via long-range fires, further analysis demonstrates the even greater value of resilient sensing and enabling of kill chains.[1]

 

What they’re saying that they found that the small, missile-shooting units could not produce enough lethality to make a difference.  This is exactly what we’ve discussed many times.  A handful of scattered units, working with only a handful of missiles, and lacking any long range targeting, simply can’t generate any significant combat impact.  That’s just common sense that becomes readily apparent with just a moment of logical consideration.  You didn’t need a Campaign of Learning to come to that conclusion but, hey, better incredibly late than never.

 

Re-read the quote and un-spin it.  It’s saying that the Marines have come to the realization that the Commandant’s vision of defeating China with a handful of missile-shooting, platoon size units is not viable.

 

It is noteworthy that they are belatedly recognizing that simple surveillance may be more useful than a scattering of nearly useless missiles.  This is the old WWII coastwatcher concept.  Of course, this doesn’t require entire Marine Littoral Regiments and a fleet of Light Amphibious Warships (LAW).  A couple of guys with binoculars and a radio can do the job.  Perhaps this is also why the Navy seems so unenthused about acquiring the LAW.  If the Marines would give up on the missile-shooting and convert to simple surveillance than the Campaign of Learning would have been worth the effort and the Marines would have a worthwhile, if exceedingly small, mission.

 

Of course, if coastwatching is the new mission, one can’t help but wonder why we need the Marines when we already have an abundance of SEALs who could do the job.  But, I digress …

 

Logistics - Here’s an issue that has screamed for an explanation since day one and yet gone unaddressed the entire time:

 

To persist inside an adversary’s weapons engagement zone, our Stand-in Forces must be set and sustained by logistics capabilities designed for distributed operations over long distances in a contested environment.[1]

 

How long have I been harping on this gap in the Commandant’s concept?  So far, the Marines have hand-waved away the challenge of transporting, landing, establishing, and resupplying a force without detection.  The challenge seems impossible under the conditions of the concept and the Marines have utterly ignored it, at least publicly.  Now, it seems some glimmer of recognition of the problem has emerged.  The statement sums up the requirement – that is, a logistic contribution under challenging circumstances – yet still ignores the solution.  Oh well … I’ll keep harping on it.

 

By the way, you recall the recent post wherein the Marines stated that the LAW would never operate in a combat zone (see, “The LAW is Confusing”)?  Is the above quote the first public glimmer of recognition that the LAW concept is not viable?

 

Delusional Foundation – The following statement exemplifies the delusional foundation of the Marine’s missile-shooting concept:

 

Our continued experimentation demonstrates that infantry and LAR battalions that field teams or small units with the organic ability to sense, decide, and shoot have a competitive warfighting advantage on a modern battlefield.[1]

 

If small units truly have an inherent competitive warfighting advantage on a modern battlefield, why do we have brigades, divisions, and armies?  Why do we have tanks and artillery?  Wouldn’t a handful of squads be sufficient to win any war?  Reality, as seen through history, demonstrates the opposite:  that small units are simply targets waiting to die and that massed firepower is what wins battles and wars.

 

 

Summary

 

So, what do the Marines say about themselves in the Force Design 2030 annual update report?

 

• They think they’re identifying and solving problems from their Campaign of Learning.
• They acknowledge a communications/’sales’ problem.
• They believe they still retain all their previous missions/capabilities and remain a ‘global crisis response’ force.
• They believe their emphasis on missile-shooting and ship killing was somewhat misplaced.
• They believe they should be emphasizing reconnaissance over lethality.
• They acknowledge the necessity of logistics but offer no solutions to the challenge.
• They believe small units have some type of inherent advantage on the battlefield.

 

That’s what they say.  However, it is clear that the Force Design 2030 annual update report is heavy on spin and light on reality.  The impression one gets is that the Marines – meaning the Commandant – are brooking no alternative opinions or dissent and that the report is purely a public relations tool intended to support continued or increased funding.  However, an analytical reading and ‘un-spinning’ of the document reveals numerous serious problems, as we’ve just discussed, and suggests that the Marines, themselves, are beginning to recognize and, ever so grudgingly, admit that the Commandant’s grand vision is not viable.  The Commandant won’t say it in those words, of course, but the ‘un-spun’ reading is saying it.  The Commandant won’t easily give up his dream but the handwriting is on the wall.  When his term expires in July of 2023, I suspect his successor will begin walking back the Commandant’s failed vision.

 

 

___________________________________

 

[1]Marine Corps, Force Design 2030, Annual Update, May 2022

The LAW is Confusing

Surprisingly, Marine Commandant Berger does not share his plans and thinking with me.  I know, he should but he doesn’t.  The problem is that I’m left to try to understand his plans and thinking based on the occasional public statement he or his cronies make and it seems that every statement made contradicts the one before it.

 

Now, one might think that it’s irrelevant whether I understand his plans except that he desperately wants and needs to get agreement and support from me as a taxpayer, Congress as the provider of funds, and the Navy as the builder of ships.  To date, he’s gotten support from none of those and his plans and programs are floundering.  Specifically, the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) transport/landing ship that is key to the missile-shooting concept is in danger of being eliminated or delayed so long that the entire concept dies before it can be implemented.

 

Every new statement just confuses the issue even further.

 

For example, I was led to understand that during war with China the LAW would transport Marines to secret, hidden locations, conduct resupply, and relocate the Marines when necessary.

 

Well, the latest statements suggest this is not the case.  According to Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, the deputy commandant for combat development and integration, the LAW will not be anywhere near a combat zone.

 

The Marines don’t envision using this vessel during combat operations either, the general said.

 

If there are indications a conflict may break out, the combatant commander would order the light amphibious warships, or LAW, to quickly relocate Marines or resupply units, “and then it goes into hiding, it goes into bed-down somewhere. Nowhere do we envision the LAW out transiting the sea lanes in the middle of a kinetic fight.”[1]

 

Wait, what now?!  The Marines don’t envision the LAW being anywhere near combat?  Well, then, how will they locate, resupply, and relocate the Marines?  Will they call a time-out during the war to conduct those tasks while the Chinese obligingly pause and wait for the LAW to do its job and then leave the combat area?  If you recall, the concept was supposed to have been that the Marines could not be found by China but, if they were found, the LAW would nimbly and quickly relocate them to another hidden location to continue raining destruction down on the befuddled Chinese.  Now we see that the LAW won’t be anywhere near the combat zone so how will the Marines relocate, if discovered?  Will they swim to a new island, towing their missiles behind them?  I’m confused.

 

Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) - total confusion

Moving on, am I to now understand that any Marines not already in place at the start of the war won’t be able to take part in the fight because the LAW won’t be ‘transiting the sea lanes in the middle of a kinetic fight’?  And, am I to now further understand that Marines won’t be resupplied, evacuated, or relocated during the war and that once they’ve shot their small handful of missiles they won’t be receiving any reloads since the LAW will be ‘bedded down’ somewhere?

 

Another new aspect is some fantasy-level hiding scheme, according to the general,

 

Heckl said the light amphib is meant to appear like a commercial craft — to “hide in plain sight.”

 

“The [Indo-Pacific] sea lines of communication are the most traversed sea lines in the world; it would be a challenge for any power to surveil everything all the time in that area,” he said.

 

I keep hearing variations of this idiotic notion from both naval observers and uniformed Marine/Navy personnel.  There is a belief that looking like a commercial vessel is somehow going to provide immunity and ‘stealth’.  I hate to be the bearer of bad news – meaning, reality – but in a war the Chinese are going to sink everything that they can’t positively identify as friendly.  How do I know this?  Because it’s common sense and every belligerent did it in WWII.  Remember the Doolittle raid?  We didn’t hesitate to sink Japanese fishing boats during the carrier’s run in to the launch point.  That’s just elementary common sense.  If you can’t identify something as friendly, you destroy it.  Simple.  Straight forward.

 

According to Lt. Gen. David Furness, the deputy commandant for plans, policies and operations,

 

Furness said the way the light amphibious warships operate would mitigate the risk China defeats them. These ships would operate in and around the 7,000 islands of the Philippines, for example, blending in with local commercial craft and not likely to become a target for Chinese precision missiles.[1]

 

Setting aside the fantasy that the Philippines will allow us to operate on their islands and in their territorial waters in a war with China, it would be remiss to fail to note that the Philippines has a significant Chinese population and no US ship is going to operate unobserved and unreported.  Further, China is going to destroy any and all unidentified vessels without bothering to ask questions.

 

Also, in a China-US war there won’t be any commercial sea lanes.  Sea lanes are a peacetime construct.  During war, no commercial vessel is going to sail anywhere near a combat zone because they know they’ll be sunk.  The only vessel sailing in a combat zone will be known, friendly ships/warships or unknow and presumed hostile ships.  No unidentified ship, regardless of what it looks like, is going to get a free pass.  This is just unrealistic, fantasy level, wishful thinking.  I can’t excuse civilian naval observers for this type of idiotic thinking and I absolutely expect better from uniformed, professional (clearly, they aren’t) warriors.

 

But wait, there’s even more confusion.  I thought the Commandant’s vision was a concept for fighting and defeating China in a high end war.  Now I find out that war/combat is not the purpose of the Marines and their missile-shooting concept.

 

[The Marines] say their small units will be focused on deterrence, but also outfitted with the sensors and weapons to fight if necessary.[1]

 

So now I’m led to believe that these missile-shooting Marines are not combat forces but are deterrent units that will be given sensors and weapons as a last resort, to fight ‘if necessary’?

 

How will a platoon or company size unit deter China?

 

“One of the strengths of the stand-in force is to cause the adversary that moment of guessing and second-guessing their decision, and ratchet down and deescalate,” Heckl said.[1]

 

Yes, I’m sure China will halt their Taiwan invasion plans because we have a platoon of Marines hiding in the Philippines.

 

These new statements completely contradict every previous statement and understanding about this concept that I’ve had.

 

Berger wants support for his concept but every new statement just ups the level of confusion and apparent idiocy surrounding this plan. 

 

Sorry, Commandant.  Until you can elucidate a coherent plan you’ll get no support from me.

 

 

 

_______________________________

 

[1]Defense News website, “Marines, Navy near agreement on light amphibious warship features”, Megan Eckstein, 5-Oct-2022,

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/10/05/marines-navy-near-agreement-on-light-amphibious-warship-features/

You Can’t Have It Both Ways

A reader, ‘BM’, recently offered a comment about the Marine’s small, missile-shooting units that sparked some interesting thoughts regarding the logic of the entire concept.[1]

 

To ever so briefly review the Commandant’s concept, he envisions small units of missile-shooting Marines hidden on islands scattered throughout the enemy’s zone of control and exercising sea control in order to assist the Navy.

 

The objective is clear, if highly questionable.  However, we’ll set the wisdom of the objective aside and focus on the logic of the execution.

 

Reader ‘BM’ posed the question, "how is [a Marine missile unit] better than a flotilla of ships sailing around to actively hunt enemy ships?"

 

I offered the reply that the Commandant's response would be that a flotilla of ships will be quickly spotted by the enemy and attacked whereas his small, missile units will be able to operate undetected. He has basically stated this in so many words.

 

That lead to recognition of [one of] the gaping logical discontinuities with this concept.  The Commandant believes that ships will be easily spotted.  Indeed, his vision takes the detection of enemy ships as a given – witness the fact that he hasn’t even devoted any thought to what kind of detection and targeting assets will be needed and yet – and this is the discontinuity - he believes that his own ships, the LAWs, will operate undetected, transporting Marines through enemy waters, and flitting back and forth to conduct resupply and relocation.

 

So, Navy ships would be quickly spotted and the Marines will quickly and easily detect enemy ships for hundreds of miles around (without, apparently, even requiring any special surveillance assets !) and yet the Marine’s own ships, the LAWs, will be able to sail through enemy waters (at 14 kts !) for days at a time, penetrate enemy controlled seas, beach and spend hours/days unloading a large assortment of vehicles, supplies, equipment, gear, and troops, and be able to resupply and transport Marines from island to island in a cat-and-mouse game that the enemy will never detect and never catch on to.

 

You can't have it both ways. Either ships can be easily spotted, both the enemy’s and our own LAWs, in which case the Commandant’s entire concept falls apart or they can't, in which case the Commandant’s entire concept of spotting enemy ships and attacking them falls apart.  Either way, the concept falls apart due to the logical discontinuity.

 

LAW - It's either invisible or it's not.  You can't have it both ways.

Frighteningly, this kind of logical discontinuity is the norm in military thinking today.  We’re enthusiastically running down paths that exist only on the basis logical disconnects.  We’re building a force whose foundational principle is that everything we do will work and nothing the enemy does will work.  This is delusion taken to an extreme and it is preventing the development of realistic doctrine and tactics and the creation of a force structure that will actually work..

 

 

 

 

_______________________________

 

[1]https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2022/07/marine-missiles.html?showComment=1657889719975#c6280158136513416774

Navy Lays Down the LAW

The just-released CNO Navigation Plan 2022, aside from being a buzzword-filled, worthless piece of garbage, contains a piece of information that dooms Commandant Berger’s entire missile-shooting concept.  The document calls for 18 Light Amphibious Warships (LAW) to be built by 2045.[1, p.10]

 

Berger’s entire concept is predicated on the LAW which will transport his small units and their massive missiles, clandestinely, to hidden bases deep inside enemy waters.  The LAW will then relocate the Marines in the unlikely event they’re spotted and will conduct resupply on a regular basis, again, undetected.

 

Setting aside any mocking of the LAW or the concept, it is clear that the LAW is the foundation of the concept.  Without transport and logistics there is no concept, right?  The Navy appears to be providing only very limited support to the Marines.  Eighteen LAW is woefully insufficient to support the concept.

 

Even if a single LAW could fully transport, relocate, and indefinitely resupply a single unit, the maximum number of units deployed is, then, limited to eighteen.  Now, factor in the need for the LAWs, like any ship, to return to base regularly to repair, replenish, rest, etc. and you see that multiple LAWs are needed to support a single missile-shooting unit. 

 

Add in attrition – does anyone really think that 14 kt, non-stealthy, defenseless vessels trying to operate deep in enemy waters are not going to suffer significant attrition? – and 18 LAWs can only support a few Marine units for a short time;  and even that’s wildly optimistic.  With any realistic attrition factor, it is clear that the concept needs something north of forty LAWs for the concept to have even a small chance of working.

 

Light Amphibious Warship - Artist's Concept

Thus, it appears that the Navy is not on board with the Marine’s concept and is only paying token lip service to the concept. 

 

At best, the Marines may get a couple of LAWs per year over the next couple decades.  The Commandant will be retired in a year or so.  Will his concept still be around by the time the Navy gets around to building LAWs?  It seems unlikely.

 

If the Navy’s forecasted war with China occurs in the next several years, the Marines won’t have any transports and will be relegated to the sidelines.

 

Even if you think Commandant Berger is a genius whose concept will revolutionize warfare and bring China to its knees, it is clear that he has utterly failed to get buy-in from the Navy.  He has failed to convey and communicate the merits, as he sees it, of his concept.  Navy buy-in should have been one of the very first things he accomplished but it appears that was not the case.

 

Eighteen LAWs by 2045, Commandant?  The Navy is telling you what you can do with your concept.

 

 

 

______________________________

 

[1]https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/22121320/navigation-plan-2022_signed.pdf

 

Marine Missiles

Marine Commandant Berger keeps talking about hidden bases with small units that will rain missiles of death and destruction down on the hapless Chinese who won’t have a clue where the Marines are.  Well, let’s attempt to be fair and take a look at the missiles that the good Commandant envisions using.  Are they small enough to remain hidden?  Can they be easily moved as the Marines nimbly relocate from island to island on Light Amphibious Warfare (LAW) ships?

 

Note:  The inspiration and, indeed, much of the organization and content of this post is taken from a Naval News website article by Peter Ong.[1]

 

 

Naval Strike Missile

 

The smallest of the potential missiles for the Marines is the Naval Strike Missile (NSM). 

 

The Marine Corps’ Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) mounts two Naval Strike Missiles (NSM) on a remote-operated, driven, and NSM launched unmanned Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) 4×4 vehicle.  … The 900-pound (410 kilogram) NSM (or 910 pounds with booster) can be internally loaded aboard a CH-53 and onto the flatbed of a Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) 6×6 truck via a forklift.  … it is possible to push an NSM container on a trolley cart but loading it onto the JLTV will require a … forklift.[1]

NMESIS Naval Strike Missile on JLTV

That’s a hefty brute of a vehicle.  Note that it carries two missiles.  To be operationally relevant and combat effective, a unit is going to need … what ? … twenty or so missiles, at a minimum?  That would be a minimum of ten such vehicles.  That’s no longer a small, secretive, hidden footprint.  Of course one could always use fewer launch vehicles and just use reloads but that would require forklifts and some type of missile storage facility which, again, is not a small, secretive, hidden footprint.

 

These vehicles (JLTV or forklifts) give off very large infrared signatures, especially in the tropical sun.  Again, not conducive to remaining hidden.

From Wikipedia, here's a description of the components of a Norwegian coastal defense battery which is, essentially, what the Marines are trying to set up:

An NSM coastal battery consists of three missile launch vehicles, one battery command vehicle, three combat command vehicles, one mobile communication center, one mobile radar vehicle with TRS-15C radar, one transport and loading vehicle, and one mobile workshop vehicle. 

Again, that's not a small footprint ! 

 

 

Tomahawk

 

Another missile option is the cutting edge, brand new, ultra advanced, futuristic  Maritime Strike Tomahawk ... which you knew this as the 1980’s – 1990’s era Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile (TASM).  In any event, the Tomahawk will be deployed on 40 ft long, 34 ton, M872 trailers.

 

The semitrailer is designed to be towed over smooth, hard-surfaced roads with loads up to 34 tons (68,000 lbs payload) at speeds as high as 55 mph (88 km/h). It can also be towed over unimproved roads, trails and open rolling terrain with the same load limit, but at a sustained speed of no more than 10 mph (16 km/h).[2]

 

The M872 semitrailer is designed to be towed by the M915 Series 6x4 Truck, Tractor.[2]

 

Tomahawk Launching From Trailer Mounted VLS Cell

Note the immense size of the trailer, VLS cell, and then factor in the trailer tow vehicle.  The photo depicts a feasibility demonstration but the final launch vehicle will not be any smaller.  Again, assuming we want more than a single missile shot, we’ll need dozens of these trailers, tow vehicles, and, potentially, large cranes to handle the VLS cells.  Imagine a large city freeway with a string of twenty giant tractor-trailers and you’ll get an idea of how hidden this operation will be.

 

Also, note the 10 mph speed limit for movement over unimproved roads and terrain.  This will not be a quick, agile, shoot and scoot operation !

 

The MST uses a two-way communications link for mid-course guidance and targeting updates.  This could prove problematic during combat as it violates EMCON and allows the enemy to locate the communications source. 

 

 

 

HIMARS

 

Another missile option is the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HiMARS) which is a podded rocket system with six rockets per HiMARS pod and are launched from a modified USMC Family of Medium Tactical Vehicle (FMTV) 6×6 truck.[1]  HiMARS rockets may require new seekers to target moving ships.

 

HIMARS Pod on FMTV 6x6 Truck

Note the size of the 6x6 truck.  Again, several such trucks/pods would be needed.

 

 

 

Conclusion

 

The options discussed above all involve dozens of sizeable vehicles – no easy thing to hide on an island inside your enemy’s zone of control.  Also, bear in mind that other necessities must be provided including large amounts of fuel, fuel handling equipment, vehicle maintenance and repair capabilities, spare parts, etc. in addition to the operator’s food, health, and shelter needs.  All of this is in addition to the gear and supplies that the regular Marines will require.  While the Commandant may have some fanciful notion of Marines living off the land (that has actually been discussed in various published articles), that is simply not feasible for any sustained period of time.  There is also the matter of health.  The tropics are renowned for myriad diseases and Marines weakened by malnourishment will be quickly rendered sick and ineffective.

 

We’re also ignoring the challenges associated with transporting and loading/unloading large vehicles to/from islands in secret.  Does the Commandant really believe he can transport and unload dozens of large vehicles without being noticed?

 

The other aspect that is not covered is targeting.  The Marines will need some type of UAV or radar or something to provide targeting beyond the 12 mile horizon.  That thousand mile Tomahawk sounds great on paper but how are you going to get thousand mile targeting?  Whatever vehicle or sensor the Marines use will further reduce their ‘hiddenness’.  Sensor assets will require two-way communications which, again, point back to the Marine’s location.

 

When all the vehicles, UAVs, sensors, support equipment, storage facilities, etc. are considered, it is difficult to see how anyone can believe that missile-shooting units will remain undetected even assuming that they can penetrate the enemy’s zone in a small, non-stealthy, painfully slow LAW and establish themselves on an island in the first place.

 

Finally, the Commandant has stated that in the unlikely event that the Marines are discovered, they will simply hop aboard a LAW  and relocate, thus regaining their secrecy.  Of course, loading and unloading all the equipment we’ve discussed is not an insignificant feat in itself.  Trying to load all the vehicles and equipment onto a LAW will be a pretty noticeable event, one would imagine.

 

By the way, when this unlikely relocation becomes necessary, where will the multiple transport LAWs come from?  Will they be floating offshore, waiting?  If so, wouldn’t they be quickly spotted?  If they’re not waiting and, instead, they’re back on, say, Guam.  It will take weeks to get them to the Marine’s island.  That’s not exactly going to allow for quick, agile relocations, is it?

 

Nothing about this concept appears feasible.  The Commandant either needs to come out and address some of these issues, at least in general terms, or he will continue to face resistance.  He appears to have successfully stifled internal dissent but has run into staunch resistance from former Marine generals and other top-ranking former officials.  Commandant, if you want support you’ve got to provide some information and address the gaping holes in the logic of the concept.

 

 

 

 

 

Side note:  Does anyone recall the Cuban missile crisis?  The Soviets attempted to secretly transport missiles using small, slow, unarmed transport ships (sounds like a LAW !) and place the missiles on the island of Cuba without being noticed and yet they were instantly spotted with 1950’s – 1960’s technology.  How’d that work out?

 

 

______________________________________

 

[1]Naval News website, “A Look At The Sizes Of U.S. Land-Based Strike Missiles”, Peter Ong, 29-Jun-2022,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/06/a-look-at-the-sizes-of-u-s-land-based-strike-missiles/

 

[2]https://olive-drab.com/idphoto/id_photos_m872_trailer.php

Force Design 2030 Update Analysis

Marine Commandant Berger has torn apart the United States Marine Corps with a series of controversial decisions and actions.

 

Best case, Berger is a genius who sees what no one else does but has failed to convey that vision in a persuasive manner and, as a result, is struggling to find support and get buy-in.

 

Worst case, Berger is a bona-fide idiot who hasn’t got a clue what he’s doing and the communications deficiencies simply reflect that general ineptitude.

 

Whether you believe his vision to be a change for the better or for the worse is up to you (hint:  it’s for the worse, by a huge amount !)

 

With that as a backdrop, Breaking Defense has presented an article analyzing the latest Marine Corps Force Design 2030 update document.  Let’s see what gems are offered.

 

Concurrency - One of the issues that just leaps off the pages of the 2030 update is that the design has no defined end state.  It is an unfinished product with no defined end state that is constantly evolving as the changes are being enacted.  If this were a ship, do you know what we’d call this?  That’s right … concurrency.  Berger is designing as he’s building.  We’ve documented the abject failures that every attempt at concurrency has produced.  Why would applying concurrency to FD2030 be any different or produce a better result than concurrency applied to a ship?  It wouldn’t … and yet we’re knowingly and intentionally doing it.  The US military adamantly refuses to learn lessons even when the lessons are etched on a board and then the board is used to smack the military leadership across the forehead.

 

Marine Littoral Regiment - From the article,

 

The update also notes that “We focused the MLR [Marine Littoral Regiment] too much on lethality and not enough on sensing.”[1]

 

Hasn’t ComNavOps been harping for years on targeting being far more important than weapons?  For years!  And Berger and the Marines are just now beginning to vaguely grasp this fundamental concept?  The highest ranking Marine in the Corps didn’t have an inherent grasp of targeting?  And he wants us to believe he understands everything else well enough to destroy the Marines in pursuit of his vision?

 

Amphibious Ships – The update repeats the need for 31 big deck amphibious ships despite the public statements that the Marines are out of the assault business.  The ineptitude in the communication of this issue is emblematic of the Marine’s overall floundering communications.  Are the Marines in the assault business or not?  If not – as they have stated – then they have no need of any big deck amphibious ships.  The logical discontinuity in this is gapingly wide!

 

The article offers this apt summary of amphibious force planning,

 

… the “dumpster fire” that constitutes amphibious fleet planning today … [1]

 

Also of note,

 

One minor change is that the light amphibious warfare program is now being referred to as the landing ship, medium (LSM).[1]

 

This is the kind of change for the sake of change that permeates today’s military (and, to be fair, industry!).  This is just unproductive churn in search of a public relations gain.

 

Wargames – Part of the reason Berger can’t get any buy-in for his vision is that he’s released almost no supporting information so that people could look at it and understand his rationale.  While insisting that it’s all based on exhaustive wargaming, there has been zero information about those games.  Apparently, -and perhaps recognizing the communications problem – the Marines are going to release some wargame summaries.

 

The Marine Corps now plans to publish unclassified executive summaries of its wargames beginning in November 2022.[1]

 

This will be a welcome development if, indeed, the Marines follow through and offer something informative and substantial … I’m not counting on it.  You don’t generally go from paranoid secrecy to openness.  I expect the summaries to be bereft of useful information and to read like a sales brochure extolling the virtues of the game and the Marine’s masterful vision … but we’ll see.

 

Focus – One of the [many] criticisms of Berger’s strategy is that it seems myopically focused on China and ignores the rest of the world.  Stung by that criticism, FD2030 is now being referred to as a global strategy despite nothing about it having changed.  That’s reprehensible marketing spin that is disingenuous, at best, and fraudulent, more accurately.  Changing the name doesn’t change the concept.  It’s still a one-theater, single enemy strategy.

 

Logistics – A major weakness/flaw in Berger’s concept is logistics.  The belief that we can establish large footprint units (yes, those missile launching trucks, supporting trucks, machinery, supplies, etc. automatically constitute a large footprint) and keep them resupplied pushes the limits of credulity and the Marines still have not addressed the issue.

 

… the update identifies logistics as the major unresolved issue since resupplying widely distributed units inside an adversary’s defensive zone is extremely challenging.[1]

 

Hey, Berger … logistics is the very first issue you should have addressed.  Remember the saying about professionals practice logistics?  What does the fact that logistics remains unresolved say about your professionalism?  Why are you proceeding with a concept that has unresolved logistics issues and no defined end state?

 

 

Conclusion

 

FD2030 is an undefined concept that lacks targeting concepts and a viable logistics support plan.  Targeting and logistics are the two fundamental pillars of any force/operation design and neither have a viable solution.  Despite those fundamental deficiencies, Commandant Berger is pushing ahead and concurrently designing as he goes which never turns out well.

 

FD2030 should never have seen the light of day.

 

 

 

 

_____________________________________

 

[1]Breaking Defense, “Analyzing the biggest changes in the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 update”, Mark Cancian, 14-Jun-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/06/analyzing-the-biggest-changes-in-the-marine-corps-force-design-2030-update/

Lessons From Ukraine

What are the combat lessons from Ukraine?  There are no lessons from Ukraine!  Huh???

 

I didn’t want to do this post but the analysis from military observers is getting out of hand and we’re being fed a bunch of invalid conclusions and lessons that are beginning to take hold and that’s got to stop.  Everyone is spouting lessons they think they see from the Ukraine-Russia conflict but there are no valid lessons to be had.  Commenters on this blog have offered conclusions about the efficacy of UAVs, the demise of armor, and so on.  Now, the Marine Commandant seems to be doing the same thing.  From an interview he did,

 

The success of Ukrainian forces in countering Russian armored vehicle columns with missiles and rockets in the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine shows the vulnerability of tanks to missile-armed infantry, the Marine Corps commandant said, and seemed to reinforce his decision to shed tanks from the Corps as part of his Force Design 2030 concept.[1] 

 

Unless Berger has inside information direct from both Ukraine (unlikely but possible) and Russia (impossible), then he’s just speculating on largely public domain news bits just like the rest of us and, just like the rest of us, he’s lost sight of what that public information is.  It’s propaganda!  Whichever side is offering it, it’s propaganda.  As yet, there is absolutely no authoritative combat information in the public domain, that I’m aware of.  That being the case, how can he, or anyone, draw any valid conclusions?  Attempting to do so is a classic example of garbage in, garbage out!  Invalid information in, invalid conclusions out.

 

Here’s an example … I just watched a video on YouTube purporting to be a Ukrainian attack on a lone Russian tank.  The video showed an isolated tank with not another Russian unit visible within the quarter mile radius or so of the scene.  The tank was meandering along a road, in the open, by itself and it was hit by some weapon and blew up.  A tremendous individual victory for Ukraine and proof that tanks can no longer survive on the modern battlefield in the face of individual soldiers with anti-tank weapons.  …  …  …  …  Or is it? 

 

How do I know that the video wasn’t staged by Ukraine using a captured Russian tank and was intended as propaganda?  The mere fact that there was someone with a video camera in this remote, isolated area, in perfect position to capture this event clearly and cleanly on film strongly suggests that it was, in fact, staged.  So, now what’s the conclusion?  There isn’t any!  There’s no conclusion and no lesson to be had from this because it isn’t authoritative and verifiable.

 

In addition to the total lack of authoritative information, it also seems as if this is a very atypical ‘war’ for the following reasons:

 

• Initially, Russia appears to have significantly restrained their firepower, presumably to avoid angering the populace that they hoped to eventually rule.
• Multiple reports suggest that many Russian units did not even know they were in a combat situation and believed it was all part of an exercise.
• Reports suggest that some Russian units have refused to fight.

 

Note:  Bear in mind my own warning:  these reports may or may not be accurate.  I’m looking at the pattern of the totality of reporting to discern broad truths but, again, they may or may not be correct.

 

 

All those videos showing Ukraine UAVs roaming freely over the battlefield and raining destruction on the Russians clearly demonstrates the power of UAVs and the ineffectualness of Russian anti-air systems, right?   Wrong.  For a variety of reasons, it is likely that the Russians weren’t even trying to operate anti-air systems during the period those UAV videos were made.  Again, no valid conclusion or lesson can come from that.

 

The atypical nature of the Russian’s conduct of the war was acknowledged by Commandant Berger:

 

During a live-streamed conversation with Washington Post columnist David Ignatius, Gen. David Berger said the Russian forces seemed to be ineffective in using a combined arms approach in that they were not using “maneuver to bolster your fires or using fires to set up your forces for maneuver. In both cases, one without the other … is very ineffective.”[1] 

 

So, Berger acknowledges that Russian forces were not using maneuver or firepower in a supporting manner as any semi-competent military would.  This lends credence to the reports that the Russians were initially restraining themselves to avoid civilian casualties and civil facilities destruction.  Despite this recognition of the atypical behavior of the Russian forces by Berger, he then proceeds to draw conclusions!

 

What other atypical indicators does Berger recognize?

 

Berger also said Ukrainian forces seemed to be effective at causing confusion among Russian forces by stripping away Russian reconnaissance — which he said parenthetically that U.S. Marines “were very, very good at.”[1]  

 

So, another atypical behavior by the Russians in that they apparently didn’t conduct reconnaissance in force or in a supportive manner and did not, apparently, operate screens or counter-recon forces.  Despite this recognition of the atypical behavior of the Russian forces by Berger, he then proceeds to draw conclusions!

 

Is there more atypical behavior?

 

The commandant also noted Russian forces seemed to have planned for a very short war and lost momentum with poor logistics planning. He said the Ukrainian forces seemed to be able to strike at the Russian “logistics backside.”[1]  

 

So, acknowledging that Russia seemed to have planned for a very short conflict and did not bring the necessary logistic support, he then proceeds to draw conclusions!

 

Berger’s invalid conclusions are not limited to the Ukraine war.

 

“Instead of tank-on-tank formations, I would say if you look at Armenia and Azerbaijan, Lebanon, or even right now in Ukraine, it’s pretty clear the top-down missile attacks on the top side of heavy armor makes [tanks] pretty vulnerable,” he said.[1]  

 

None of those regions saw armor deployed in doctrinally correct fashion.  Every report I’ve seen indicates that tanks were deployed piecemeal and unsupported by air or infantry.  The only valid conclusion is that stupidity is a good way to die on the battlefield.  I’m pretty sure China isn’t going to be that stupid.

 

As best I can tell from very questionable reports, Russia attempted to half-ass a war with Ukraine in an attempt to pre-emptively placate a populace that they would eventually control and want to have good (or at least not fanatically hostile) relations with when the fighting ended.  If true, that’s theoretically laudable but realistically stupid.  As we’ve harped on in this blog, ‘in it to win it, or don’t get in it’.  You can’t half-ass a war.

 

As far as attempting to draw conclusions and lessons, I’m pretty sure China is not going to half-ass a war with us like Russia seems to be doing in Ukraine so why are Berger and the rest of us drawing conclusions from an atypical war?

 

My fear and suspicion is that Berger is doing the same thing with the secret war games he claims to be using to reshape the Marine Corps.  I suspect that he’s generating invalid war games and, therefore, drawing invalid conclusions.  If he’s clearly doing it with the Ukraine lessons, why wouldn’t he do the same with his war games?

 

For the rest of us, be patient and withhold your judgment.  Lessons will eventually come from the Ukraine war but not yet.

 

 

 

__________________________________

 

Though not relevant to this post, Berger did make one baffling statement:

 

Berger noted that amphibious operations are very complex and the Russian forces seemed to unnecessarily delay their limited amphibious operations. He said amphibious operations remain very much the core mission of the Corps.[1]    

 

So, despite publicly and repeatedly stating that the Marines are out of the frontal amphibious assault business and saying that large deck amphibious ships were of limited value, Berger is now saying that amphibious ‘operations’ (he didn’t use the word assault but what other significant amphibious operation is there for Marines?) are the core mission of the Corps.  Wait, now.  I thought small unit, missile shooting was the core mission?  How many core missions do the Marines have?  By definition, you can only have one core mission.  That’s what the word, ‘core’, means!  Okay, Berger, which is it?  What is the Marine’s single, core mission?  If amphibious ‘operations’ is the core mission, why have the Marines shed their tanks and reduced their artillery? 

 

Does this guy have any idea what he’s doing?  It doesn’t seem like it.  He seems to be floundering and flinging everything he can think of at the budget wall to see what sticks and can get funded.

 

 

 

___________________________________

 

[1]Seapower Magazine, “Berger: Ukraine War Demonstrates Vulnerability of Tanks to Missile-Armed Infantry”, Richard Burgess, 16-Mar-2022,

https://seapowermagazine.org/berger-ukraine-war-demonstrates-vulnerability-of-tanks-to-missile-armed-infantry/