Let’s start the new year with a post that may ruffle a few
feathers and contradict some dearly held beliefs..
The LCS is an abject failure. Even its staunchest supporters have been
reduced to talking not about what LCS is but what it might have been. Yes, the LCS failed but, oh,
Streetfighter! The Mighty
Streetfighter! If only the LCS had remained
true to the Streetfighter concept, what a magnificent combat vessel we would
have had!
Streetfighter … it has assumed the status of myth and
legend; capable of total domination of
the seas and able to defeat vast fleets of the most powerful ships. It would have ensured world peace, solved
global hunger, and established democracy throughout the known universe! … And now we have the LCS. What happened? Where did Streetfighter go? Why was its self-evident superiority not
developed?
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| Streetfighter? |
Let’s take a look and see if we can figure out what
happened.
Here’s a timeline to help keep track and make sense of the
various events that led from the origin of Streetfighter to the LCS we have
today … or was it the reverse?
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Streetfighter
/ LCS Development Timeline
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1987
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SC-21 (Surface Combatant for the 21st Century) predecessor
studies begin
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Jan
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1991
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End of the Cold War
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1992
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DD-21 / SC-21 officially begins
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1993
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Navy begins to focus on small combatant ships (approx.
time period)
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1995
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LCS foundational design wargames (Joint Multi-Warfare
Analytical Game) take place in mid-1990’s
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Nov
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1999
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Cebrowski and Hughes publish “Rebalancing the Fleet” which
is the first mention of Streetfighter
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Jul
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2001
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Cebrowski unveils Streetfighter ship in Wall Street
Journal article by Greg Jaffe
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Oct
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2001
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Cebrowski appointed to head Office of Force Transformation
by SedDef Donald Rumsfeld
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Late
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2001
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DD-21 terminated
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Apr
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2003
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Lockheed Martin shows initial LCS concept offering
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2003
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Adm. Clark declares LCS his number one budget priority
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May
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2004
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Initial LCS construction contracts awarded
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Jun
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2005
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LCS Freedom laid
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Nov
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2005
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Cebrowski died
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As we see from the timeline, the end of the Cold War, in
1991, left the Navy with a fleet of large combatants and no peer enemy. Faced with potentially declining budgets, the
Navy opted to create a new enemy which it dubbed ‘littoral’. Despite having absolutely no evidence that ‘littoral’
required anything new or unique, the Navy latched onto it as a rationale for
continued funding (see, “Littoral Warfare – Is There
Such A Thing?”). The solution to
defeating the littoral bogeyman was the LCS, according to the Navy. Well, wait ... what about Streetfighter? Wasn’t it the answer to the littoral challenge?
Here’s where we start to see the myths surrounding
Streetfighter.
One of the [many] misconceptions surrounding Streetfighter
was that it preceded the LCS. In fact, as
we see in the timeline, the LCS originated with a series of wargames in the
mid-1990’s (see, “LCS Conceptual Origin”). The first mention of Streetfighter does not
occur until 1999, some four or five years later.
Whether Cebrowski/Hughes got their inspiration for
Streetfighter from the LCS origin games or whether they developed their concept
independently is unknown. I can find no
reference to Cebrowski having participated in or referencing the LCS origins.
In fact, I can find no actual link between Streetfighter and
LCS. There is no document stating that
one flowed from, or morphed into, the other.
As best I can tell, the two concepts never overlapped. Possibly there was informal, undocumented
cross pollination but, if so, there’s no evidence of it.
Again, the timeline demonstrates that the LCS concept arose prior
to Streetfighter as evidenced by the mid-1990’s design wargames. Streetfighter first appeared several years after
the original LCS design beginnings. Thus,
all the questions and moanings about the LCS failing to ‘stick’ to the original
Streetfighter concept appear to be after-the-fact fantasies and reversed
fantasies, at that!
To sum up, the Navy’s official response to the end of the
Cold War was, initially, the DD-21/SC-21 program which began in 1992. However, within a few years, small combatant
studies and wargames had begun and the SC-21 program was on the road to
termination. The LCS concept took hold
and quickly began to metamorphose into the directionless,
do-everything-but-do-it-poorly fantasy ship that we have today. Streetfighter appears to have been a very
brief, parallel but not overlapping, side road on the LCS development path.
Now, let’s take a closer look at Cebrowski and Hughes
article, “Rebalancing the Fleet”, that first mentions the word ‘Streetfighter’.
“Rebalancing the
Fleet”
Cebrowski and Hughes published their landmark piece
describing a future fleet structure that incorporated small combatants dubbed
Streetfighters, in Nov-1999.
While the piece discussed several important, noteworthy
issues such as the cost-risk relationship, it failed to offer any details and
relied heavily on non-existent technologies and unproven concepts for its envisioned
success. The article was more of a
marketing brochure than a substantive technical analysis. For example,
Foremost,
Streetfighter will be able to clear out the clutter and sort friend from foe.[1]
That’s a great marketing campaign slogan but offers no
actual, technical insight or methodologies for its claimed ability to “clear out the clutter and sort friend from
foe”.
Another myth about Streetfighter is that it was a single,
specific ship. However, in the
‘Rebalancing the Fleet’ article, Streetfighter is described as a family of
‘capabilities’, not a ship.
The
Economy B force is a family of capabilities—often referred to as the
"Streetfighter Concept"—that, in conjunction with power-projection
forces, will enable the U.S. Navy to operate anytime, anywhere … [1]
Indeed, Cebrowski/Hughes never actually described what
Streetfighter was beyond generalities. There
are suggestions of vessels in the 300-1200 ton range with no specifics. There was no description of size, speed,
weapons fit, sensors, etc. This has led
every subsequent naval analyst to assign their own vision to Streetfighter,
just as happened to the LCS.
The reality is that ‘Streetfighter’ seems to have originally
been a reference to a concept of a family of smaller vessels acting as a
group. It was described as a ‘family of
capabilities’, not as a type of ship.
A noteworthy follow up piece by Hughes addresses
Streetfighter concerns that were raised at the time.
“22 Questions for
Streetfighter”
Hughes, himself, offers criticisms of the Streetfighter
concept although he does so in what he believes are positive statements. For example,
One
of the first things learned by a task analysis of coastal operations is that
low-flying aircraft, not big ships or submarines, are the alternative to
streetfighters.[2]
Thus, Hughes, himself, offers a far more cost effective and
combat effective alternative to Streetfighter in the form of aircraft!
In attempting to extol the virtues of Streetfighter, Hughes
falls back on the common claim that the enemy will be paralyzed with fear at
the thought of a single vessel roaming undetected no matter how individually
incapable that vessel might be.
…
if there is a flock of small ships, each powerfully armed yet hard to detect,
then the enemy will live in continuing fear over whether he has found them all.
An
enemy probably also will see deviltry and cunning in a squadron of
streetfighters.[2]
This is, again, great as a marketing slogan but woefully
short on combat reality.
Regarding Streetfighter’s self-defense,
A
300-ton streetfighter would depend on stealth characteristics, soft kill,
numbers, and the ability to lose itself "in the clutter." It could
carry light antiair weapons such as Stingers. The design philosophy should be
that visual detection of it will predominate, no present missile guidance
system will detect and home on it, and added safely comes from confronting an
enemy with a swarm of targets.[2]
Even a larger 1200 ton Streetfighter was recognized as
having inherent defensive problems,
A
larger version of 1,200 tons might carry not only soft kill systems but also
deployable decoys and Rolling Airframe missile (RAM) or the equivalent, while
accepting that low observability and active defense are conflicting
characteristics.[2]
As Hughes recognizes, you can’t defend without broadcasting
(radar) your position and if you broadcast your position, you die since you
have no credible defense.
Hughes does offer one brilliant and prescient observation,
The
biggest danger is that streetfighter will be conceived as a junior variation of
the projection navy: the same habitability standards, spacious bridge,
electronically comprehensive combat information center, offices, and paperwork;
a galley with cooks and mess cooks; defenses that are supposed to defeat every
attack; stocks for months at sea; standard damage-control teams and procedures;
and a guarantee for each young captain that one grounding or failed inspection
will send him packing.[2]
Indeed, this is exactly what happened to the LCS!
Analysis
‘Wired’ website offers interesting thoughts about the lack
of CONOPS, which doomed the LCS.
The
confusion over the LCS' roles has gone on so long it has created a bizarre
feedback loop, with the Navy, its shipbuilders, the Pentagon and America's
regional commanders each developing plans and technologies for the LCS based on
conflicting assumptions. The result is a warship theoretically capable of
almost anything, and increasingly optimized for nothing.[3]
This vagueness and lack of a concept of operations also extended
to Streetfighter.
For
all Cebrowski's and Hughes' passion about small-ship theory, and Clark's and
Rumsfeld's determination to build the diminutive vessels, no one had clearly
defined exactly what a small warship should look like, and what it should and
shouldn't do. On at least one key point – expendability – the strategists and
the mainstream Navy were totally at odds.[3]
This fundamental flaw – the lack of a viable CONOPS -
continues to this day and not just for the LCS but for any conceptual small
combatant. I have yet to hear any viable
CONOPS for any small combatant in US service.
Supporters of small combatants are wildly enthusiastic about the ships,
themselves (meaning, the weapons, speed, stealth, and other physical
characteristics), but totally ignore the fundamental question of how the ship will be used.
This was the problem with Streetfighter.
This was the problem with the LCS.
This is the problem with any small combatant.
We’ve thoroughly discussed the problems that arise from the
lack of a CONOPS when a ship is designed.
Well, here’s someone else’s discussion of the problem as it relates to
the LCS.
The
only thing everyone agreed on was that the LCS would sail close to shore. But
no one specified how close "close" really was. One mile? Twenty-five
miles?
As
theorists, Hughes and Cebrowski never had to be specific. Rumsfeld, for his
part, was notorious for ignoring the nitty-gritty details of running the
military. Clark tried his best to keep his boss happy and grow the fleet.
"As
a result, the Navy’s leadership was forced to test out arguments for the new
ship on the fly," [DepSecDef] Work recalled. "Sometimes the LCS was
labeled transformational because of its high speed ... other times it was
because the ship was designed to defeat 'asymmetric' littoral threats." On
still other occasions, the Navy chose to emphasize LCS' supposed
"transformational impact on the American shipbuilding industry."
"The
constantly changing rationale for the new ship helped to confuse both the
Navy’s internal and external audiences," Work concluded.
In
short, the circumstances of the LCS' genesis were a perfect recipe for a
shipbuilding fiasco.[3]
And the utterly predictable result occurred.
The
[LCS] plan was, in a word, ambitious – which was not what Cebrowski and Hughes
had in mind when they argued for the Navy to add smaller, simpler, cheaper
ships. In the course of just four years, the Navy fought, embraced, and then
completely corrupted the small-ship philosophy. Instead of compact,
brute-simple coastal brawlers, it would get over-inflated, gas-guzzling,
gutless ships dependent on ultrahigh-tech gizmos.
In
the absence of clear missions and realistic capabilities, LCS became everything
to everyone, as long as no one thought too hard about anything.[3]
More generally, the following illustrates a (the?)
fundamental flaw in all the ‘streetfighter’, small combatant type ship designs
and force structures. It makes the
assumption that large ships are unable to function in a littoral scenario – an
assumption that is utterly unsupported by any evidence and, in fact, a great
deal of evidence exists to support the exact opposite conclusion! For example, the destroyers at Normandy that
sailed right up to shore to do battle with German shore batteries conclusively
proved that large, ocean-going ships had no problems operating and fighting
successfully in shallow waters.
In
the late 1990s, the Navy realized it had a problem. Its 9,000-ton cruisers and
destroyers, inherited from the Cold War, were great for open-ocean warfare
against the Soviets. But the same ships were considered too vulnerable to
safely operate in the shallow, crowded, chaotic coastal waters – aka, the
"littorals" – that were fast becoming the next naval battleground.
Here,
dangers might include gun-armed speedboats, missile-firing fast-attack craft,
small submarines and sea mines, plus antiship missiles and aircraft launched
from land.
The preceding assumption, that large, ocean-going ships
can’t function and survive in shallow waters is valid only if one cedes all
offensive operation to the opponent … which is exactly what we’ve done; witness Iran’s constant harassment (to
include mining of merchant ships – an act of war or piracy or both). If, on the other hand, one retains the right
of offensive action, any large, ocean-going combatant can wipe away littoral
threats with no effort.
Conclusion
It seems clear that the common belief that Streetfighter
preceded the LCS is incorrect. The
corollary belief that LCS ‘abandoned’ the Streetfighter design is also false as
there is no evidence that the LCS ever had any formal connection with
Streetfighter. Further, Streetfighter
was never a Navy program of record and, therefore, there was never any official
embrace of Streetfighter other than, perhaps, some informal and undocumented
hope that Cebrowski’s appointment by Rumsfeld to head his pet Office of Force
Transformation might result in some degree of incorporation of the
Streetfighter concept into the LCS. By
that time, however, the LCS was already pretty well set, at least in concept.
Most importantly, Streetfighter appears to have never been
given any definitive form in the way of specifications. In fact, I can find no Cebrowski-Hughes
artist’s concept drawing of what the Streetfighter vessel might have looked
like. The lack of any formal description
has given rise to endless versions proposed by subsequent naval commentators
but none have the slightest connection to Cebrowski and Hughes’ concept which,
indeed, never actually specified an actual vessel – only a ‘family of
capabilities’.
Thus, all the romanticism about Streetfighter is just
that: romantic notions that were never
actually espoused by Cebrowski and Hughes.
All subsequent Streetfighter discussion has been pure,
individual speculation with no attached CONOPS – just a vague array of
marketing slogans by people who are more enamored of ship weapons than any
useful description of how a Streetfighter would actually function. If you want to begin to get an understanding
of just how flawed the small combatant concept is, read the post, “Undisputed and Unaccepted”, which discusses some of
the flaws in Hughes small combatant concept as described in his fleet tactics
book.
We can blame the LCS for a host of failings but failing to
follow the design of Streetfighter is not one of them.
Disclaimer: Information from the beginnings of the LCS
and Streetfighter are hard to find. If
someone can produce information I haven’t found, I’ll gladly consider it and
modify my conclusions, if appropriate.
________________________________
[1]USNI Proceedings, “Rebalancing the Fleet”, Vice Admiral
A. K. Cebrowski, USN, and Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN (Ret.), Volume
125/11/1,161, Nov-1999
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1999/november/rebalancing-fleet
[2]USNI Proceedings, “22 Questions for Streetfighter”, Captain
Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN (Ret.), Vol. 126/2/1,164, Feb-2000
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2000/february/22-questions-streetfighter
[3]https://www.wired.com/2011/08/future-warship-ran-aground/
