F-35 On Carriers? Sorry, Can't Use 'Em

When the USS Ford was being built, we all assumed, quite logically, that the ship would be able to operate the F-35 which had been around for twenty years or so, in various stages of development.  The timing was looking about right – the carrier and the F-35C would both be ready about the same time.  Well, in yet another disappointment for the Ford, it turns out that the carrier wasn’t actually built to operate F-35s.  No, this is not an April Fools post or some ComNavOps comedy piece.  This is real.  The Navy’s newest carrier can’t operate the F-35.

 

As it turns out, most of the Navy’s carriers and amphibious ships (LHA/LHD) can’t operate the F-35. 

 

Yes, the F-35C can take off and land on the carriers but the ships lack the communications, data integration, and maintenance facilities to fully utilize the supposed capabilities of the F-35 – those much hyped surveillance capabilities.  Without the proper comms and data handling facilities on the carriers, the F-35 can collect data but can’t effectively relay it to the carrier and allow the carrier to make use of it. 

 

On a related and stunning note, the US Navy has almost no ability to transfer F-35 engines to carriers.  The Ford is the only carrier that has the equipment to receive an engine.  The MV-22 has demonstrated the ability to transport a single engine to a carrier but this can only be done over very short distances.

 

As far as the amphibious ships, none can land the F-35B due to its excessive exhaust heat which damages the flight deck unless it has been specially modified.  You’ll recall that even the new USS America was unable to operate the F-35B, as the ship was built.  It had to be modified with special deck heat treatments, thermal and structural modifications to compartments immediately beneath the flight deck, and relocation of equipment in the path of the F-35B’s downward landing exhaust in addition to numerous communications and data handling facility installations and modifications.  Yes, America, the ship that was purpose built for the F-35B was unable to operate the F-35B without extensive and expensive modifications.

 

In fact, of 11 carriers and 33 amphibious ships, currently only 4 amphibious ships can fully operate the F-35.(1)  The lucky four are listed below.

 

• USS Essex
• USS Makin Island
• USS America
• USS Wasp

 

Even with the modifications, the F-35B can only land on a couple of limited spots.  For the America, the F-35B can only land on spots 7 and 9.(2)

 

It is worth noting that none of the supercarriers can operate the F-35.

 

The USS Bonhomme Richard, LHD-6, which recently suffered a massive fire that burned out of control for several days, would have been the fifth ship altered to operate the F-35.  The Bonhomme Richard is now, officially, being scrapped.

 

So, for those of you who envision air armadas of Navy F-35s sweeping the skies clear of enemy aircraft, that vision is still a long way in the future because we only have four amphibious ships that can even operate the F-35!

 

It is worth noting that the modifications required to operate the F-35 require many months and hundreds of millions of dollars to install (I assume the F-35 proponents are dutifully adding that to the cost of the F-35?).  It is not a capability that can be quickly installed when needed.  It will take decades to bring the current ships up to the standard required to handle the F-35.  If a war were to start today, we’d be limited to four amphibious ships operating our F-35s.

 

What is all this telling us?  What lessons are being demonstrated (and ignored!)?

 

• In our pursuit of technology, we created an aircraft too complex to even communicate with our carriers.
• Concurrency kills.
• Even the modified ships have only a limited F-35 operating capability and, in the event of battle damage, we might lack the ability to operate the aircraft due to damage to the couple of specific landing spots.
• In pursuit of the big, expensive, flashy toys, we’re ignoring the mundane support and infrastructure needed to even fully operate the toys.

 

 

 

Just a reminder … When the F-35C reaches squadron service, the Navy is planning to reduce the squadron size from the current 12 aircraft to 10, further shrinking the already shrunken air wings.  The F-35 is the gift that keeps on giving!

 

 

 

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “USS Bonhomme Richard Heads For Scrapyard After Devastating Fire ”, Paul McLeary, 30-Nov-2020,

https://breakingdefense.com/2020/11/uss-bonhomme-richard-heads-for-scrapyard-after-devastating-fire/

 

(2)Jalopnik website, “Navy Builds Ship For F-35, Ship Needs Months Of Upgrades To Handle F-35”, Tyler Rogoway, 13-Apr-2015,

https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/navy-builds-ship-for-f-35-ship-needs-months-of-upgrade-1697523492

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Aviation Amphibious Assault Ships

The centerpiece of the US amphibious assault force is the aviation capable, big deck LHA/LHD ship such as the America (LHA) and Wasp (LHD) classes.  Even the smaller amphibious ships such as the now standard San Antonio (LPD) class have a significant aviation capability.

The USS America (LHA-6), for example, is a monument to aerial flexibility and power.  The aviation component can vary according to mission needs but a typical mix of aircraft might be 12 MV-22 transports, 6 F-35B strike aircraft, 4 CH-53K heavy transport helicopters, 7 AH-1Z/UH-1Y attack helicopters, and 2 MH-60S helos for search and rescue, according to Wiki (2).  The ship can also be configured to operate as a mini-carrier by dropping the helos and MV-22s and embarking 20 F-35Bs instead.

Even the smaller San Antonio (LPD-17) can operate a mix of several helos and MV-22s.

Collectively, this impressive aviation capability leads me to refer to these imposing vessels as … useless.

Wait, what?

How can that much aviation capability be useless?

For starters, I’ve repeatedly stated that there is no strategic need for amphibious assaults in any war against Russia, NKorea, and China (with the possible but unlikely exception of retaking Taiwan).  There is a slight chance of an amphibious assault against Iran but that would be more along the lines of an unopposed unloading rather than an assault.  With that said, our amphibious fleet offers no useful capability because it simply will never be needed.

For the sake of continued discussion, let’s assume that there is some undefined, non-specific need for amphibious assault.  Let’s take a closer look at the large deck, amphibious fleet of 30+ ships.  What do these aviation amphibious assault ships offer?

The Marines seem to desperately want to become an aviation vertical assault force.  By definition, that means that they can only be a light infantry force since they can’t transport tanks, heavy vehicles, etc. by air.  Worse, such a force can only be a very, very short duration force since it is not possible to sustain an assault by MV-22/helo resupply especially when the likely attrition rates are factored in. 

So, what kind of action does this translate to?  At most, it would be a low intensity, short duration raid or rescue type scenario.  This low level of combat power is simply not useful in peer combat and certainly does not justify the construction and maintenance of a 30+ ship amphibious fleet.  Really, 30+ amphibious ships to service light infantry?  Does that make sense?

Let’s look now at close air support.  Supposedly, the Marines want their “own” carriers so that they can always be assured of air support.  Okay, how much firepower does that air support provide?  A standard Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) consists of three amphibious ships:  an LHA/LHD, an LPD, and an LSD.  The typical attack aircraft totals are 6 F-35Bs and 7 attack helos.  So, what kind of firepower does that represent?

An F-35B can carry a total of 6 air-to-ground weapons (2 internal + 4 external with 2 additional near-wingtip hardpoints for smaller, air to air weapons only).  Therefore, 6 F-35s can deliver a theoretical maximum of 36 weapons per attack “wave”.  Also, note that the F-35B model is limited to 2x 1000 lb bombs internally (the remaining internal mounting points are for smaller, air to air weapons).  So, assuming a maximum 2000 lb bomb on the external hardpoints (I don’t know if this is even a permissible arrangement) plus two 1000 lb bombs internally, the maximum munitions load for a single aircraft would be 10,000 lbs.  Thus, 6 F-35Bs can deliver a theoretical maximum of 60,000 lbs of munitions.

An AH-1Z can carry up to 16 Hellfire missiles or 76 unguided 2.75 inch rockets or 28 guided rockets.  This is a nice “sniper” capability to have in a low end scenario but is almost insignificant in terms of firepower in high end combat.

So, the aviation element can deliver 36 munitions (10,000 lbs) once every few to several hours.  Assuming no aircraft combat losses and minimal maintenance (an invalid assumption since all modern military jets require extensive maintenance for every flight hour), we could, theoretically, generate an aviation attack wave once every, say, six hours, at best.  Doing the math, that’s an average of 6 munitions per hour.  Does that sound like it would have the slightest effect on a Marine assault/battle? 

Of course, the numbers cited are for a Marine Expeditionary Unit and they values would scale up as we move to a MEB/MEF but the relative contributions would remain unchanged.

Now, just for fun, let’s look at a Burke class destroyer providing fire support with its single 5”/54 or 5”/62 gun.  The gun can fire 68 lb shells at a rate of 20 rounds per minute with a magazine of 680 shells (1).  Thus, a single Burke with a single 5” gun can provide 46,240 lbs of munitions and can deliver that amount in 34 minutes, firing at a rate of 20 rpm.  Further, the naval gunfire is always on call, cannot be jammed or decoyed, is impervious to weather conditions, and puts no pilot’s lives at risk.  Of course, this assumes that the Navy is courageous enough to risk a Burke within a few miles of shore and that the targets are within range of the ship’s guns!

At this point, the astute military analyst should be asking, why do we even bother with amphibious aviation ships given the very marginal firepower support they can provide?  Wouldn’t all that aviation money be better spent on naval gun support?

To be fair, we should note that amphibious aircraft can offer weapons delivery further inland than current naval gun support.  Of course, the further inland, the fewer the number of attack waves (sorties) we can generate so that’s a double-edged sword.  Again, the astute military analyst should be asking, wouldn’t all that aviation money be better spent on long range, amphibious, self-propelled artillery that the Marines can bring ashore with them?

Wasp Class LHD

We should also note that much of the amphibious aviation element is geared towards transport rather than weapons delivery.  However, given that current aircraft can’t lift/transport tanks, engineering vehicles, artillery, or any other heavy equipment, the Marines are, by definition, limited to being light infantry when using aviation as the ship-to-shore transport mode.  The astute military analyst should be asking, is it worth the incredible expenditure to build and maintain a 30+ large deck, amphibious fleet just to provide light infantry combat capability?  Couldn’t the Army/Air Force combination provide light infantry anywhere in the world for a lot less money?

So where does that leave us and what can/should we do?

There are several possibilities.

• In recognition of the Marine’s (now) light infantry capability combined with the unlikelihood of major amphibious assaults in the foreseeable future, eliminate the bulk of the amphibious fleet.  We can retain around 9 ships (3 ARGs) for training and core competency retention or for use in low end scenarios.  Turn the rapid response light infantry role over to the Army/Air Force.

• Greatly increase our naval gun support capability.  As we have no effective naval gun support, currently, this would entail designing and building a new class of naval gun support ship.

• Greatly increase the Marine’s organic self-propelled artillery capability.  The challenge with this approach is to get the equipment ashore quickly and early in an assault.

• Figure out a way to get the current heavy equipment, armor, and firepower from ship to shore in a faster, more survivable way that can put the equipment ashore from outset of an assault.  Since it’s highly unlikely that aircraft could be developed that could provide the necessary lift, this means designing landing craft that are small (sized for individual tanks as the maximum size requirement), fast, and reasonably survivable as part of the initial assault wave.

• Eliminate aviation-capable amphibious ships and transfer the aviation responsibility to the regular aircraft carriers.  This would greatly streamline aviation maintenance and efficiency.  It would also eliminate the need for the F-35B since the carriers can operate the “C” model.  This would also have the effect of increasing air wing size and employing the wing more effectively until that rare moment, if ever, when we need amphibious air support.  Hand in hand with this would be the relocation of the ground element to smaller, cheaper, pure transport vessels (Attack Transports – APAs, to use the WWII terminology).

Considering that we’re maintaining a fleet of 30+ multi-billion dollar aviation-based amphibious ships for a marginal aviation capability, one has to wonder if the expense is worth it.  Our big deck amphibious ships simply don’t offer high end combat capability sufficient to justify their existence.

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(1)NavWeaps website

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_5-62_mk45.php

(2)Wiki, “USS America (LHA-6)”, retrieved 7-Jun-2018,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_America_(LHA-6)

More Austere Forward Operating Base Nonsense

We’ve totally debunked the austere, forward operating base concept for the F-35 and yet there are still people who believe it’s viable.  Well, we’ll just keep beating it down.  Here’s the latest proof that it can’t work.  Defense News website reports that low observability (LO) features, meaning stealth, account for half of all production quality defects on the F-35. (1)

Examples of stealth related defects cited in the article include,

• Holes drilled too big
• Dings
• Small deviations in panel alignment
• Scratches to the LO coating
• LO coating overspray or misapplication

Do you understand what that list of defects means?  Those are incredibly minor problems that commonly occur, indeed, are almost unavoidable, when performing mechanical/maintenance work on machines and yet they’re enough to impact the stealth of the aircraft.

Do you understand what else that list means?  Those are defects that are occurring in a pristine, carefully controlled environment with highly trained technicians who have access to all the tools and parts they need.  It’s the best possible world for working on the aircraft and yet the defects are still occurring.  What’s going to happen when the aircraft is sitting out on some austere field with shrapnel flying around, insufficient parts, people under the gun (literally) to maintain and patch up aircraft?  When LO coatings are applied and before they can dry they’re covered in dirt, bugs, and debris?  When no one has the time or tools to align panels to micron accuracy?  When an aircraft has holes in it from shrapnel and someone has to rivet a patch on?

After a couple of days, that stealthy F-35 is going to look like a 747 airliner on radar!

Consider this telling and damning statement,

“Speaking to reporters at Lockheed’s media day on Monday, Jeff Babione acknowledged that low observability, or LO, capabilities in particular are posing a challenge to the company.”

If achieving LO is a challenge in the quiet, calm, pristine, factory with highly trained technicians equipped with all the tools and materials they need, it’s going to be impossible in muddy, humid, debris filled bases with clouds of dirt and debris kicked up every time an aircraft lands or takes off.

The Lockheed spokesman just basically said that the fantasy of an austere, forward operating base is just that: a fantasy. 

We are not going to be operating a couple of F-35’s, rising silently out of the jungle to wreak havoc.  The logistics are impossible.  Base defense is impossible.  Maintenance is impossible.  LO preservation is impossible.  Aircraft availability will be 25%.  And the list of impossibilities goes on.

Give up the fantasy or admit that you also believe in unicorns.

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(1)Defense News website, “Stealth features responsible for half of F-35 defects, Lockheed program head states”, Valerie Insinna, 6-Mar-2018,

https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/03/06/stealth-features-responsible-for-half-of-f-35-defects-lockheed-program-head-states/

F-35B Landing Considerations

Here’s a little more information relevant to those hidden, secret bases deep inside enemy territory that F-35Bs will supposedly use to wreak havoc on the enemy from within.  We all understand that Harriers and F-35Bs are not really vertical takeoff aircraft, at least not with any useful range and payload.  They require a rolling takeoff.  According to Aviation Week website (1), the runway needs to be 3000 ft long.

“… the Pentagon bought the F-35B for two reasons: it can land on an LHA/LHD-class amphibious warfare ship, and it can operate from an improvised forward operating location (FOL), created around a 3,000-ft. runway.”

A 3000 ft runway hardly supports the concept of a secret base “carved out” of enemy territory and hidden from the enemy.  I don’t think any enemy is going to have trouble spotting a 3000 ft runway in its territory!

The problems extend beyond the mere size of the runway.  The heat from the downward directed exhaust is immense and melts or tears up normal runways.

“The main engine exhaust, the engineers said, was hot and energetic enough to have a 50% chance of spalling concrete on the first VL [vertical landing]. “Spalling” occurs when water in the concrete boils faster than it can escape, and steam blows flakes away from the surface.”

“And what Navfac calls “standard airfield concrete” is military-grade, made with aggregate and Portland cement. Many runways are built with asphaltic concrete—aggregate in a bitumen binder—which softens and melts under heat.”

There are solutions.  Protective pads can be used.

“At the Navy’s Patuxent River, Md., flight-test center, F-35Bs perform VLs on a pad of AM-2 aluminum matting, protecting the concrete from heat and blast.”

“The Marines could use AM-2 landing pads. But AM-2 is not a friend to the agility that justifies the F-35B over other forms of expeditionary airpower. An Air Force study calls it “slow to install, difficult to repair, [with] very poor air-transport-ability characteristics.” A single 100 X 100-ft. VL pad weighs around 30 tons and comprises 400 pieces, each individually installed by two people.”

AM-2 Runway Under Construction

Rolling takeoffs and landings can spread the heat and blast load somewhat but comes at the expense of requiring longer runways.  A recent comment suggested the use of barges to act as refueling pads for F-35Bs.  This would be problematic in terms of physical damage to the barge although it is undoubtedly possible to protect the barge sufficiently to allow such operations.  The bigger problem is that a true vertical takeoff from a barge would limit the aircraft to very small fuel and payload weights – an unacceptable and useless scenario.

We see these same concerns even in the attempt to use the F-35B on amphibious ships – ships designed for vertical and short takeoff  and vertical landing operations (VTOL/STVOL) and helo/Harrier operations.  Our entire amphibious fleet has to be modified to handle the added heat from the F-35B exhaust.  It was originally assumed that the F-35B could land anywhere a Harrier could but, like so many aspects of the F-35 program, that turned out to be a false assumption.

“Lewis [Vice Adm. Andrew Lewis, deputy chief of naval operations for operations, plans and strategy (OPNAV N3/N5)] added that the amphibious assault ships are spending more time in maintenance than planned due to the F-35B LIghting II Joint Strike Fighter interoperability upgrades taking more time than anticipated. The upgrade is meant to boost the ships’ computers and communications to keep up with the sophisticated new fighter, and to strengthen the flight deck to withstand the extreme heat of the exhaust in the vertical-landing jet.” (2)

All of these landing concerns and requirements are proof that the concept of basing F-35B’s on unimproved landing strips hacked out of the jungle and a complete and utter fantasy even neglecting the unsustainable logistical aspects.

All you “jungle flyers” out there …  let it go.  Your fantasy is just that.

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(1)Aviation Week website, “Opinion: F-35B Vertical Landings In Doubt For U.K.”, Bill Sweetman, 26-May-2014,

http://aviationweek.com/defense/opinion-f-35b-vertical-landings-doubt-uk

(2)USNI News website, “Exacerbating Shortfall in Available Ships for Marines’ At-Sea Training”, Megan Eckstein, 1-Dec-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/12/01/14-amphibs-tied-maintenance-exacerbating-shortfall-available-ships-marines-sea-training

Henderson Field

A recent article about the Marines, sea control, and HIMARS cited Henderson Field (Guadalcanal – WWII Solomons campaign) as an example of an expeditionary base.  This is an interesting case that warrants a bit of examination.

Many military observers and, apparently, many professional military thinkers seem to have a vision of austere, hidden jungle bases from which a handful of F-35B’s wreak havoc on the surrounding enemy, immune from discovery.  I swear, most people seem to have this image:  the chirping and chatter of jungle life will momentarily pause, the jungle canopy will rustle, the branches will part, and an F-35B, dripping with all manner of weaponry, will rise, vertically, out of the jungle, undetected, and fly off to decimate enemy forces and return to repeat the cycle until the enemy is brought to their knees.

The Marines are not immune to the lure of this vision. 

“The Marines would provide additional “distributed” firepower from Expeditionary Advance Bases. Carved out of hostile territory by landing forces, kept small and camouflaged to avoid enemy fire, EABs would support F-35B jump jets, V-22 tiltrotors, and drones, as well as anti-ship missiles for the fleet. It’s a high-tech version of Henderson Field on Guadalcanal (part of the Solomons) in 1942. Like Henderson Field, the EABs would provide a permanent presence ashore, inside the contested zone, to support Navy ships as they move in and out to raid and withdraw.” [emphasis added] (1)

Let’s look at the historical example of Henderson Field and see what we can learn from it that can be applied to today’s Marine Corps Expeditionary Advance Base concept.

-The most obvious characteristic of Henderson Field was that it wasn’t hidden or unknown to the enemy.  The Japanese knew exactly what it was and where it was!  The assumption that any airbase large enough to operate multiple modern aircraft, sensors, warehouses, fuel depots, munition dumps, etc. will remain hidden is pure fantasy.

-Henderson Field was bombarded on an almost nightly (and daily!) basis by both aircraft and ships.  Because the Navy didn’t control the sea, the Japanese were able to bombard the field almost at will.  The Marine’s concept of a base located in enemy controlled sea (or, at best, no man’s sea) that will be somehow immune from attack is delusional.  Worse, unlike WWII where the bombarding forces had to come near the field and were subject to counterattack, today’s enemy can simply launch ballistic and cruise missiles without ever exposing their own forces to direct counterattack.

-The regular bombardments, combined with the primitive conditions and lack of spare parts and skilled maintainers, meant that the field usually only had a handful of operational fighters at any given moment.  How much worse would this be with modern, finicky stealth aircraft that require advanced technology for diagnostics and maintenance and require pristine conditions to perform maintenance and maintain the stealth characteristics of the aircraft?  The very nature of a forward area, austere base guarantees that readiness rates will plummet.  Considering the F-35 is struggling to achieve 50% readiness under ideal conditions with highly trained factory service personnel and ample spare parts, it’s a certainty that aircraft readiness will be abysmal.

-Henderson Field was a very large base!  Now, the jump jet supporter’s response is that we’ll operate vertical landing and takeoff F-35B’s so we’ll only need ten feet of runway!  Of course, that’s incorrect.  With any useful weapon and fuel load, the F-35B won’t be taking off vertically.  It needs a runway.  It may not need a 10,000 ft runway but it will need a significant one in terms of visibility to the enemy.  Of course, there’s also the parking areas for each aircraft (you don’t park a modern aircraft in the mud, under a tree), hangars to perform clean maintenance in, computer facilities for diagnostics and mission planning, munition dumps, spare part warehouses, fuel storage tanks, barracks for all the pilots, maintenance personnel, and command staff, radars, control towers, aircraft support vehicle storage/parking, food facilities, and sanitary facilities.  On top of all that, an expeditionary base is, by definition, in enemy territory so there will have to be a defending force with vehicles, anti-aircraft vehicles/sites, radar, more housing, food, and sanitary facilities, etc.  How all of this is “kept small and camouflaged to avoid enemy fire” is a mystery that the Marines have yet to explain.

-Let’s also recall that because Henderson Field was in enemy controlled air/water space, we had difficulty resupplying it, especially early on.  Resupply and reinforcement was sporadic, at best.  A modern aircraft and expeditionary base needs immense amounts of fuel, munitions, computers, electronics, spare parts, etc.  Keeping a modern expeditionary base supplied would be even more challenging than in WWII.

-Trying to operate an expeditionary base in enemy air/water space is going to be costly.  Recall that we lost many cruisers, destroyers, and one carrier (Wasp) trying to defend Guadalcanal.  In WWII, ship losses were relatively quickly and easily replaced.  Today, with only a couple of shipyards in the U.S., we’ll be hard pressed to replace our losses and to believe that we’ll be able to “carve” out a base, equip it, operate it, and resupply it without being noticed and without suffering significant losses is pure fantasy.  Does it really make sense to lose dozens of ships to defend an expeditionary base?  It might, if it’s strategically beneficial.  The point is that any base large enough to be operationally beneficial will be noticed and we will have to fight to defend it and the heavy losses must be factored in rather than just blithely stating that we’ll “camouflage” the base and the enemy won’t see us.

-Recall that we lost many aircraft at Henderson Field to combat, bombardment, and poor ground conditions.  For example, from Wiki,

“Between 21 August and 11 September, the Japanese raided Guadalcanal a total of ten times, losing 31 aircraft destroyed and seven more heavily damaged, primarily due to the defensive efforts of CAF fighter planes. …  During this same time, the CAF Marine Corps fighter squadrons lost 27 aircraft with nine pilots killed.”

Again, in WWII, aircraft were very easy to replace.  Today, F-35’s and MV-22’s can’t be as readily replaced.  Will the losses be worth it?  Again, perhaps but we need to acknowledge and factor in the enormous losses as we discuss these things rather than just hand-waving away the problems.

-Henderson Field was a very primitive base.  Huts, mud, rain, dust, dirt, insects, humidity and accompanying rust and corrosion, and disease were the hallmarks of the base.  An expeditionary base “carved” out of enemy territory won’t be any better.  Those conditions took their toll on pilots, maintainers, and aircraft alike.  How will modern, exquisite, stealth aircraft stand up to such conditions?  Not well!  The F-35 has only a 50% readiness rate now, at fully equipped, pristine bases with ample supplies of spare parts, manufacturer tech reps, and maintenance personnel.  What do you think it will be when mud, rain, dirt, and rust start working their magic?  Sure, we could pave the runways, taxiways, and parking.  We could build insulated buildings with climate controlled atmospheres to house the computers.  We could build filtered air hangars with moisture control to work on the aircraft.  We could set up advanced hospitals with extensive medical staffs to keep the pilots and maintainers healthy.  We could do all that but then it’s not an expeditionary base, is it?  And it certainly won’t be hidden with all that!

F-35 Operating Base?

Henderson Field is an example of a forward base but it certainly isn’t an example of a secret expeditionary base, small and camouflaged and hidden from the enemy. 

There’s nothing wrong with the idea of a forward base, if the strategy requires it, but let’s be realistic about what that means.  It means a base that will be well known to the enemy, a base under constant attack, a base that will struggle to achieve aircraft readiness rates of 25%, a base that will consume unbelievable quantities of supplies, a base that will require the efforts of the entire Navy to defend and supply, and a base that will cost us almost as much as we gain from it.

Let’s drop this fantasy of hidden bases once and for all.

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “Marines Seek Anti-Ship HIMARS: High Cost, Hard Mission”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 14-Nov-2017,

https://breakingdefense.com/2017/11/marines-seek-anti-ship-himars-high-cost-hard-mission/

F-35 Cost Update

The F-35 program is hideously expensive and yet supporters continue to claim that sub-$80M F-35s are just around the corner.  The reality, however, is quite different as shown in this Defense News website article.

“Meanwhile, the Navy asked for $270 million for two additional carrier-based F-35Cs, and the Marine Corps requested $759 million to procure two each of the F-35Cs and F-35Bs.” (1)

Some quick arithmetic gives a cost of $135M for the F-35C’s and $244.5M for the F-35B’s.  Well that’s a bit different from the supporter’s claims!

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(1)Defense News website, “House Armed Services Committee Markup Will Restore 11 F-35s”, Lara Seligman, 21-Apr-2016,

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/2016/04/21/house-armed-services-committee-markup-restore-11-f-35s/83330904/

America Class and the F-35B

The F-35B is, or will be, inextricably linked to the America class LHA.  The F-35B was built to operate from the America and the America was built, specifically, to operate the F-35B since the ship has no well deck.  My suspicion is that the America was built to be a mini-aircraft carrier rather than an amphibious ship.  America can operate 20 F-35Bs when configured as a mini-carrier.

America was informally commissioned in Jul 2014 and proceeded to sail to San Diego where the ship was formally commissioned in Oct 2014.  In the ensuing 17 months, the ship has spent the majority of the time in dock and has just now returned to duty after spending the previous ten months undergoing upgrades to accommodate the F-35B.  Upgrades included strengthening the flight deck, adding soundproofing, rearranging and restructuring compartments immediately under the flight deck due to noise issues, hangar modifications, and treating the flight deck with a specially designed thermal coating to accommodate the massive heat load of the F-35B.  As a USNI News article puts it,

“The aviation-centric big deck was commissioned in late 2014 but required additional work to take the day-to-day strain of operating the short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) strike fighters that will operate from the ship.” (1)

Apparently, no one realized the impact the F-35B would have on the ship that was designed to operate it.  That’s some pretty major design flaws in a ship that was specifically designed to operate the F-35B! 

This also illustrates the on-going impact of the F-35B on the entire military.  The cost of the F-35B program extends well beyond the “mere” cost of the aircraft’s construction.  I have seen no figures beyond an initial $32M contract for normal post-shakedown work but what do you think a 10 month upgrade/rebuild effort on the America cost?  It’s got to be hundreds of millions of dollars.  Further, the next ship in the class, LHA-7, will also require extensive refits after completion which is more money to make the F-35 program work.  The Navy’s website makes it clear that the vast majority of the 10 month upgrade period is due strictly to the F-35.

“America is more than halfway through its post-shakedown availability period (PSA) in which the ship's crew and contractors make improvements to the ship's design. About 20 percent of the work being performed is the normal maintenance associated with PSAs for newly constructed ships. The rest of the maintenance consists of the upgrades designed to support the JSF.” (2)

Beyond the cost, the work required the ship to be idled for 10 months.  Thanks to the F-35B, the America has been in dock for 10 of its 17 months in commission.  The ship’s two year anniversary is coming up and it has yet to deploy.

(1)USNI News, “USS America Back to Sea After Completing 10-Months of Deck Strengthening for F-35s”, Sam LaGrone, March 22, 2016,

http://news.usni.org/2016/03/22/uss-america-back-to-sea-after-completing-10-months-of-deck-strengthening-for-f-35s

(2)navy.mil, “America Modifications Increase Air Capabilities”, USS America (LHA 6) Public Affairs, 8-Dec-2015,

​http://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/lha6/Pages/America-Modifications-Increase-Air-Capabilities.aspx#.VvKU_tIrJxA