C-RAM Performance

It’s exceedingly difficult to get actual combat data on weapon systems.  Here’s some glimmers about the Centurion Counter Rocket, Artillery, Mortar (C-RAM) derivative of the Navy’s Phalanx CIWS.

 

The U.S. military says five rockets targeted the Kabul airport on Monday morning and U.S. forces on the airfield used a defensive system to intercept one, Army Maj. Gen. William D. “Hank” Taylor, Joint Staff deputy director for regional operations, told reporters Monday morning at a Pentagon press briefing.

 

“The force protection C-RAM did work. It did engage and had effect on the one, and then one did land in an area, and it was not effective,” Taylor said. (1)

 

Taken at face value, the C-RAM successfully intercepted 1 of 5 rockets.  I say, face value, because I no longer believe anything the military says that I cannot independently verify.  The Army spokesman acknowledges at least one failed intercept.  What happened to the remaining 3 is unknown.  They may or may not have been deemed a threat and may or may not have been engaged.  I also have no reason to believe that only 5 rockets were used to attack Kabul.  This is what happens when you lie repeatedly – people don’t believe you even when you might be telling the truth.

Centurion C-RAM

So, we have a reported success rate somewhere between 20% (1 of 5) and 50% (1 of 2).  Regardless – and acknowledging that it is a very small data set – this is not exactly great performance.

 

Why is this important?  It’s important because the Marines want to establish forward bases and will be placing small units in harm’s way and some sort of C-RAM protection is needed.  Of course, the Marines don’t address this need and have long since abandoned most of their AAW defenses and have no C-RAM protection, at all.

 

We desperately need to test the C-RAM unit under realistic conditions and find out what it can and cannot do and we need to develop an effective C-RAM capability if the Centurion C-RAM turns out to not be effective.

 

 

 

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(1)Navy Times website, “US defense system downed one rocket in Kabul attack”, Associated Press, 30-Aug-2021,

https://www.navytimes.com/flashpoints/afghanistan/2021/08/30/us-defense-system-downed-rockets-in-kabul-attack/

C-RAM

In any opposed amphibious assault scenario, the Marines will be landing light infantry, unsupported by armor, artillery, or naval gunfire.  The enemy will have artillery, rockets, missiles, and mortars.  Unfortunately, and bafflingly, the Marines have no Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) capability.  They will be heavily outgunned and with no viable defense.

 

Even the Commandant’s ridiculous platoon size hidden units would, presumably, require some type of C-RAM defense unless he considers the units to be sacrificial pawns.

 

Let’s look a bit closer at the C-RAM issue and let’s start by taking a look at some of the available C-RAM systems.

 

Centurion C-RAM – This is the land, C-RAM version of the Navy’s Phalanx CIWS.  It uses a 20 mm gun firing 4500 rpm and uses M940 ammunition designed to self-destruct beyond 2,000 meters to minimize collateral damage.  The unit requires a 35 ton trailer mount which makes getting a unit ashore during an assault problematic.  Centurion is claimed to have a 70-80% success rate. (1)

Centurion

 

Israeli Iron Dome – This is probably the best known and most combat tested C-RAM system although it’s mainly (only?) an anti-rocket defensive system.  I’m unaware of any counter-artillery or counter-mortar capability.  The system uses missiles rather than guns.  Israeli sources claim ridiculously high success rates, up to 90%+.  These claims are highly doubtful and are most likely just public relations claims based on manipulated data.  Nevertheless, the system has had hundreds of successful intercepts. 

Iron Dome

 

MANTIS – This is a Rheinmetall German Air Force C-RAM system intended for base defense.  The system consists of six 35 mm guns each firing 1000 rpm of AHEAD programmable ammunition and linked to a central control and two sensor units.  As such, the unit is not mobile or portable.

Mantis

 

Porcupine - This Oto Melara system typically consists of four firing units, one central control post for target designation and weapon control, and a 3D radar system "track while scan type" for surveillance and target tracking. Each remote firing unit consists of a 20 mm M61A1 Gatling cannon, its ammunition handling system and an infra-red (IR) tracking system.  A single firing unit covers an area of 400x400 meters.

Porcupine

 

With some understanding, now, of available C-RAM systems, let’s consider some aspects of C-RAMs in an amphibious scenario.  C-RAM systems have many problematic issues in an amphibious assault application, including,

 

Cost Per Shot – Any system that involves missiles, such as the Iron Dome, is on the losing side of the cost curve.  Mortar and artillery shells are almost free by comparison.  Given that an engagement for a gun-based C-RAM system would involve hundreds of rounds per incoming projectile, the cost for even ‘cheap’ gun rounds quickly adds up.

 

Short Range – Most systems incorporate guns which are quite limited in range.  The Israeli Iron Dome is notable in its significantly longer range due to the use of missiles instead of guns but that comes with a significant cost and engagement sustainability limit.

 

Sensors – You can’t shoot down what you can’t see.  All C-RAM systems need to radiate continuously which provides the enemy with the location of the system – well, the sensor portion of the system, at any rate.  C-RAM systems have been developed to deal with terrorist, third world scenarios where the enemy does not have the ability to pinpoint the sensor’s location and destroy it.  A peer opponent would have no trouble locating a continuously radiating sensor and eliminating it.

 

Saturation – In an opposed landing, it is reasonable to assume a steady and heavy rain of artillery, mortars, and rockets.  This would almost certainly cause oversaturation of any existing C-RAM system.  Imagine the sheer number of shells from just an artillery barrage.  Most C-RAM systems have enough ready ammo to engage only a few targets before requiring reloading.  The susceptibility to saturation is due to the limited magazine depth.  This suggests the need for significant numbers of C-RAM units in order to be effective.

 

Magazine Depth – All the systems have quite limited ready ammo limitations and reloads look to be difficult and time consuming in the context of an opposed landing where one might reasonably expect a sustained, steady rain of artillery, mortars, and rockets.  This is especially true for missile based systems.  Reloading under active combat conditions is not easy or safe in most systems. 

 

Mobility/Portability – As indicated in the example systems described above, none of the systems are even remotely portable or mobile within the context of an amphibious assault, meaning that none can be transported ashore during the initial stages of an assault when they would be most needed.  By the time the assault site is secure enough to make transport ashore viable, the need will have passed.

 

 

Conclusion

 

Current C-RAM systems seem to have been designed as static base defense systems intended to deal with occasional, brief attacks rather than sustained combat.  Therefore, none are suitable for use in amphibious assaults or even the Marine’s small, missile shooting units.  Of course, the Marines have publicly stated that they're out of the opposed landing business … and yet they continue to procure ACVs and operate AAVs from amphibious assault ships so ...

 

The limitations of existing C-RAM systems are blatant and obvious, as discussed above.  Recognition of the limitations leads directly to recognition of the characteristics that an amphibious assault C-RAM system should have. 

• Mobile (vehicle based)
• Light weight
• Long range
• High volume ready ammo
• Easy and/or automated reload
• Extensive magazine capacity
• Individual sensors as opposed to a central shared sensor so that one destroyed sensor doesn’t incapacitate many ‘shooter’ systems

 

If we’re going to maintain the fiction of amphibious assault capability then we need an amphibious C-RAM capability to support it.  Of course, with amphibious assault being a fictional capability maybe the C-RAM requirement is moot?

  

 

 

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(1)https://www.armyrecognition.com/united_states_us_army_artillery_vehicles_system_uk/centurion_c-ram_land-based_weapon_system_phalanx_technical_data_sheet_specifications_pictures_video.html

Up Close And Personal

We’ve discussed and noted many times that the Navy/Marine doctrine of conducting amphibious assaults from 25-50 miles off the beach is not feasible and is completely at odds with the need for naval fire support given that the Navy’s only gun is the 5” which has an effective range of 9-15 miles, depending on version.

We need to recognize that  the 5” gun’s limited range means that a fire support ship would have to be within a mile of shore to have any useful range beyond the immediate beach area.  That’s close!  That puts the ship within range of enemy artillery, rockets, and mortars as well as anti-ship missiles.

So, how will the Navy provide fire support?  The short and bitter answer is they can’t.  Even if the Navy wanted to bring its 5” guns (meaning Burkes) into range, they’d be risking high-tech, multi-billion dollar, capital, AAW ships to conduct low tech fire support – not a reasonable risk.  We’ve discussed the need for dedicated fire support ships of both larger caliber (8” – 16”) and small (5”).  Assuming the Navy won’t build such a ship, is there anything they can do to modify a Burke to allow it to operate near shore and give it a better chance of survival and success?

As it happens, there are a couple of simple modifications that would enhance the Burke’s chances.

C-RAM – The Army has adapted the naval Phalanx CIWS to the C-RAM (Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar) function, apparently successfully.  The addition of three or four C-RAM units to a Burke would enhance its near shore survivability.  Given that the CIWS is a self-contained unit, requiring only ship’s utility hookups, installation of multiple units should be reasonably easy.  This would provide the ship with a degree of protection from artillery, rockets, and mortars.

Counterbattery – Aegis is, theoretically, capable of counterbattery sensing and computing with appropriate software modifications.  This would provide the Burkes with the ability to conduct counterbattery fire against both artillery, rockets, mortars, and anti-ship missiles.

The major near-shore threats to a ship are artillery and small anti-ship missiles and the modifications noted above would go a long way towards providing enhanced protection from both artillery and anti-ship missiles.  Thus, it would be possible to operate Burkes near shore with an enhanced chance of surviving.

Burke DDG - $2B and 1 Gun, Not Exactly Fire Support

Now, this doesn’t mean that this is a good idea.  Risking multi-billion dollar ships that constitute our main AAW defense is still a bad idea but, since the Navy adamantly refuses to build a dedicated, simple, cheap fire support ship, this at least offers a viable, if still unwise, option.

Failing this approach, any Marine assault will be operating without any fire support whatsoever which is one of many reasons why I say that our amphibious assault doctrine is non-executable and pure fantasy.

Assault Support Ship

The most vulnerable phase of an amphibious assault is the landing of the initial waves and the subsequent initial defense until follow on troops and equipment can land.  This vulnerability is due to the initial waves being mainly infantry with little or no armor or heavy weapons support. 

During this initial beachhead and buildup period, the assault force will be trying to get more troops, heavy weapons and equipment, and supplies ashore.  This will, inevitably, result in the proverbial mountain of supplies, much as everyone wants to avoid it.  Conversely, the enemy defending force will be raining artillery, mortars, rockets, and cruise/ballistic missiles on the beach area.  Enemy helos and fixed wing aircraft will be attempting to hit the area, as well.  The stacked up supplies will be a prime target as will the LCACs and whatever other logistics landing craft we use –take out the logistics landing craft and the assault withers.  The enemy knows this.  Really, the presence of Marines on the ground is almost irrelevant to the enemy.  I would expect most enemy defensive efforts to be focused on the amphibious fleet (the MLP is an exceptionally critical target) and the supply shuttle to the beach.

Naval gunfire support is lacking, to put it mildly and, against a peer, aerial support will be lacking or non-existent as the available aircraft are tied up trying to defend the fleet and establish local air superiority.  

So, who’s going to defend the ground forces from aircraft, helos, mortars, artillery, and cruise/ballistic missiles since they won’t have any significant weapons of their own?

Specific support needs for the ground forces during the initial phase includes:

• Cruise missile defense
• Ballistic missile defense
• AAW against enemy strike aircraft
• Counterbattery
• C-RAM (Counter Rocket, Artillery, Mortar)
• Heavy gun support

None of these capabilities will be available initially and most are simply not Marine capabilities at all.

How do we defend the beach, initially, until sufficient heavy weapons can be brought ashore?

A few of you will, undoubtedly, suggest that surprise will compensate for the lack of these capabilities – the enemy will be unable to muster a significant response before we get sufficient follow on forces ashore.  This is just wishful thinking against a peer.  Today’s plethora of cyber surveillance, satellites, UAVs, submarines, and all manner of land, sea, and airborne radars preclude the element of surprise.

So, who will provide these initial capabilities and how will they do it?  The “who” is easy.  There is, of course, only one conceivable answer and that is the Navy.  The “how” is the challenge. 

For example, the Navy has no useful gunfire support.  A handful of 5” guns are woefully insufficient and the Navy has stated that they will not risk major ships such as Burkes and Ticos within 50+ miles of an enemy beach.  Thus, the 5” guns with a range of 15 miles or so are useless as they can’t even reach the shoreline.

The Navy has no counterbattery capability.  Aegis is theoretically capable of performing the function but it is not a currently supported capability.  Major Hammond discusses the subject, poorly, in a Proceedings article (1).

Aerial support against a peer will be severely lacking and is only marginally useful as a protective, defensive capability anyway.  Assault force fixed wing aircraft will be fully occupied attempting to establish and maintain local air superiority and will not be available for close air support or local air defense.  Even if available, aircraft are not effective at anti-cruise or anti-ballistic missile defense and have no C-RAM capability.

What’s needed is a two-tier capability consisting of longer range anti-missile defense and a very short range AAW, counterbattery, and C-RAM defense.

We need the ability to reach out and intercept incoming cruise/ballistic missiles, preferably far from the beach.  Fortunately, we have that capability.  Aegis ships can stand off 50+ miles from the beach and still provide cruise/ballistic missile protection although the closer they are to the target area, the easier the geometry of the intercept and, thus, the higher the kill probability.

With long range missile protection available, that leaves the need for short range defensive fires (C-RAM, counterbattery, AAW) and offensive firepower.  As stated, none of this is available in the initial assault.  What’s needed is a specialized Assault Support Ship (ASS – an unfortunate acronym but I’m sure the Navy can come up with something better) that encompasses all these capabilities on an inexpensive hull. 

An LCS sized ship with two dual 8” gun mounts, two dual 5” gun mounts, 64 quad packed ESSM in two 8-cell VLS modules, and two SeaRAM mounts would provide the needed capability along with a yet-to-be-developed C-RAM gun or missile mount.  In addition, a counterbattery radar and a medium range AAW radar would provide the needed sensors.  Helos, flight decks, and hangars are specifically not needed for this ship type.  The Ship would have only a minimal superstructure (think WWII style/size superstructures) in order to reduce costs and radar signature.

• The 8”/5” guns would provide both the offensive firepower support for the ground forces and the counterbattery fire.  A navalized version of the Army’s TPQ-37 Firefinder radar ought to suffice to provide the counterbattery fire control.

• The ESSM would provide ship self-defense, beach cruise missile defense, and beach/inland AAW coverage.

• SeaRAM would provide ship self-defense.

• C-RAM is the missing capability.  Existing C-RAM weapons, like the Phalanx (2), are too short ranged to be based off the beach and still provide effective inland coverage.  The Phalanx C-RAM, for example, is reported to be able to defend a 0.5 sq. mile area which is nowhere near enough range.  What’s needed is a C-RAM with around a 10 mile range.  If an assault force has managed to establish a 10 mile deep beachhead, then we can probably safely bring land based C-RAM units ashore.

CONOPS.  The concept of operations for this vessel is simple.  It would accompany the initial assault wave and take station as close to the beach as feasible so as to extend its C-RAM coverage as far inshore as possible.  An assault would require one to two dozen or so vessels, depending on the size of the assault, to allow for the expected attrition and to be able to mass enough firepower to have a significant impact on the ground combat.

An Assault Support Ship is needed to provide the initial firepower and defense that an amphibious assault lacks due to equipment gaps and doctrinal limitations.  All the components for such a ship already exist except the extended range C-RAM so developmental costs should be minimal.  Due to expected attrition rates, the ship must be as cheap as possible which means no functions beyond those stated.  If we’re serious about amphibious assaults – and I have severe doubts that we are – we need to provide the assets to enable and support them.

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(1)USNI Proceedings, “Counterbattery From The Sea”, Maj. James W. Hammond, III, Apr, 1998,

http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1998-04/counterbattery-sea

(2)http://www.armyrecognition.com/united_states_us_army_artillery_vehicles_system_uk/centurion_c-ram_land-based_weapon_system_phalanx_technical_data_sheet_specifications_pictures_video.html