Thursday, May 16, 2019

Up Close And Personal

We’ve discussed and noted many times that the Navy/Marine doctrine of conducting amphibious assaults from 25-50 miles off the beach is not feasible and is completely at odds with the need for naval fire support given that the Navy’s only gun is the 5” which has an effective range of 9-15 miles, depending on version.

We need to recognize that  the 5” gun’s limited range means that a fire support ship would have to be within a mile of shore to have any useful range beyond the immediate beach area.  That’s close!  That puts the ship within range of enemy artillery, rockets, and mortars as well as anti-ship missiles.

So, how will the Navy provide fire support?  The short and bitter answer is they can’t.  Even if the Navy wanted to bring its 5” guns (meaning Burkes) into range, they’d be risking high-tech, multi-billion dollar, capital, AAW ships to conduct low tech fire support – not a reasonable risk.  We’ve discussed the need for dedicated fire support ships of both larger caliber (8” – 16”) and small (5”).  Assuming the Navy won’t build such a ship, is there anything they can do to modify a Burke to allow it to operate near shore and give it a better chance of survival and success?

As it happens, there are a couple of simple modifications that would enhance the Burke’s chances.

C-RAM – The Army has adapted the naval Phalanx CIWS to the C-RAM (Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar) function, apparently successfully.  The addition of three or four C-RAM units to a Burke would enhance its near shore survivability.  Given that the CIWS is a self-contained unit, requiring only ship’s utility hookups, installation of multiple units should be reasonably easy.  This would provide the ship with a degree of protection from artillery, rockets, and mortars.

Counterbattery – Aegis is, theoretically, capable of counterbattery sensing and computing with appropriate software modifications.  This would provide the Burkes with the ability to conduct counterbattery fire against both artillery, rockets, mortars, and anti-ship missiles.

The major near-shore threats to a ship are artillery and small anti-ship missiles and the modifications noted above would go a long way towards providing enhanced protection from both artillery and anti-ship missiles.  Thus, it would be possible to operate Burkes near shore with an enhanced chance of surviving.


Burke DDG - $2B and 1 Gun, Not Exactly Fire Support


Now, this doesn’t mean that this is a good idea.  Risking multi-billion dollar ships that constitute our main AAW defense is still a bad idea but, since the Navy adamantly refuses to build a dedicated, simple, cheap fire support ship, this at least offers a viable, if still unwise, option.

Failing this approach, any Marine assault will be operating without any fire support whatsoever which is one of many reasons why I say that our amphibious assault doctrine is non-executable and pure fantasy.

68 comments:

  1. USN/USMC has put so many eggs into the Aviation basket, just not a lot of funding or good ideas on Navy fire support, anti-mine, plus others. Lots of R&D, EMD stuff, but nothing that works in the quantities that are required.

    Maybe some of the 232 UUV's will be fitted with 5 and/or 8 inch guns? They could get close to the beach, and if taken out, no KIA/MIA/POW Sailors, just a busted-up UUV.

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    1. "nothing that works in the quantities that are required."

      I think you're referring to quantities of weapon systems but you actually bring up a hugely important point that is almost totally overlooked and that is quantity of explosives. We all tend to focus on weapons (and quantities) without remembering that it's the quantity of explosives that you can apply that is what's important.

      This is why Tomahawk missiles, for example, can't be used for fire support. Our total inventory is a few thousand. When we recall a typical Pacific island assault we note that we used thousands of large caliber shells PER HOUR to provide the kind of area coverage needed to suppress enemy resistance. Whatever weapon system we come up with needs to be able to deliver thousands of rounds, not tens.

      Good comment.

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  2. I wonder if in a shooting war, after taking losses, we see a crash program of upgrades, like we did with the adding of tons of AA guns to ships in WWII(?) Would ships start sprouting more CIWS on any available deck space? Being standalone items and relatively cheap,it seems like we should be doing it already but.....

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  3. C-RAM
    If understanding correctly the Army Indirect Fires Protection System Increment 2 / Counter Rockets Artillery Mortar (C-RAM) program makes no mention of Phalanx, the interim short-range air defense solution based on a Stryker uses the Stinger MANPADS.

    To cover urgent needs Army asking Congress for $373M for two Israeli Rafael Iron Dome batteries with its Tamir missiles (~
    90kg, 3m x 160mm; $100K) with 12 launchers, two EL/M-2084 S-band radar systems, two battle management systems and 240 missiles by 2020. Israeli claim 90% success interception rate.

    Raytheon teamed with Rafael for Iron Dome, Raytheon calling it SkyHunter

    Raytheon also proposing the Accelerated Improved Interceptor Initiative (AI3) a variant of AIM-9M (~88kg, 2.9m x 130mm; $100K?), KRFS fire control radar, a modified Avenger launcher and C-RAM command and control system.

    Lockheed Martin proposing its MHTK, Miniature Hit-to-Kill missile, (~ 2.5 feet, 720mm x 40mm, 2.2 kg, range ~2.5 miles cost ~ $20K).

    Dynetics-Lockheed team beat Raytheon to build 100-kilowatt High Energy Laser Tactical Vehicle Demonstrator (HEL TVD) laser system for installation on the Family of Medium-Tactical Vehicles, $130M contract.

    Navy
    Has the equivalent RAM Block II to the Tamir/AI3, no missile similar to the MHTK, though may be could argue the Phalanx gun with approx half the range in similar role, though don't know if has capability/tested as to counter rockets artillery & mortar fire?

    The Navy HELIOS laser under development equivalent to the Army HEL-TVD.

    If Burke using the RAM and has similar success rate as Tamir 10% chance it will be hit, so unlikely Navy would risk ship, need short range system to stop leakers, would either HELIOS/MHTK/Phalanx be effective that Navy would risk a $2B ship.

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    1. Other than simply listing various developmental possibilities, I'm not sure what point you had, if any. That aside, I note that the list you presented aren't really C-RAM weapons, or only partially. Iron dome, for example, has not demonstrated any effectiveness against artillery or mortars, as far as I know. It would also be on the far, wrong side of the cost curve by using very expensive missiles to stop a very cheap artillery or mortar shell. We'd go broke very quickly! Iron dome is suitable for what it is intended to do but no more.

      And so on.

      I also note that most of the systems you mention are not suitable for mobile, amphibious assaults which is what we're concerned with, here. They're more suited for static defense of bases/installations.

      Do any of the systems you listed stand out to you as particularly well suited for mobile, amphibious assaults?

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    2. Thought to compare how Army and Navy approach in tackling the thorny question of defense against C-RAM and missiles, especially at short range to protect ships only a mile offshore giving fire support to an opposed landing, need to bring back the battleships and monitors with 8 inch + guns for firepower and heavily armoured.

      The white hope for short range C-RAM defense for both Army and Navy is lasers, as each individual "shot" only few $, numerous questions remain if the lasers operational technical limitations can be overcome to make them effective, rain, fog etc. and how it would be able to cope with saturation attacks.

      You do not need mobility if to be installed on ship, if mobility required for as part of the assault force the Army HEL TVD installed on a Family Medium Tactical Vehicle, FMTV, and the MHTK would be quad packed in the new Army 15 cell Multi-mission Launcher, MML, a smaller Mk 41 VLS, also fitted on FMTV. MML cell sized to take the 3m Tamir missile.

      As you imply possible options look the wrong side of the cost curve, if LM were able to hit target $20K per MHTK, it would cost 15 x 4 = 60 missiles x 20 = $1.2M loadout per MML, Tamir looking at ~ $100K x 15 = $1.5 M.

      The IDF claim that Iron Dome had a 86% success rate but after 4 died in latest May conflict with Gaza makes it a controversial claim, Hamas with their new tactic achieved success by overwhelming Israeli defenses with concentrated barrages of projectiles fired at same moment in time.

      Iron Dome missile defense system claimed to have intercepted 240 (Cost - Tamir x 240 x $100K = $24M +14% if 86% success) of the 690 projectiles fired from Gaza (understand Iron Dome only target projectiles that pose possible danger using the radar/ C4I for prediction of where rocket will land), the short-range Hamas rockets landing within a few kilometers of the border and IDF did not have enough batteries or time to intercept .

      Shows need for back up to take out the leakers, MHTK or lasers, which ever way you look at its big $, but at moment there appears no other option, would add think canon still effective on ship, like the Millennium 35mm 1000 rpm with its AHEAD shells:)

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    3. A couple thoughts:

      1. Israeli claims are ridiculously high and unsubstantiated. My reading between the lines suggests a success rate of 20%-50%.

      2. Ship mounted C-RAM type systems are limited in the area of coverage they can provide. As the assault moves inland, the ground forces quickly move beyond the range of coverage. The Phalanx C-RAM, for example, has only a 1-2 mile range. Amphibious assaults need a mobile C-RAM system that can be landed in the initial wave. Currently, we have no initial wave vehicle landing capability (shocking, isn't it?). The Marines need some type of AAV/C-RAM variant or something similar.

      3. Mobility is required. Against a peer defender, any significant piece of equipment that is static (such as Iron Dome) will be quickly targeted and destroyed (artillery/mortars can overwhelm any defensive system). A C-RAM system (or, at least the radar/sensor portion) needs to be almost continuously moving. This also suggests a need for a passive, electro-optical, sensor system that could remain static.

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    4. Agree with your thoughts that the IDF claims for Iron Dome look very high, but Army buying two batteries?

      Phalanx
      Would be surprised if effective max range is more than 1 mile, have seen 1,625 yds quoted, 100 cal barrel, 20mm x 102mm/.58 lbs round, shell sabot with single sub-caliber solid tungsten penetrator.

      The old WWII Oerlikon 20mm, 85 cal barrel, 20 x 128mm round, effective range given as 1,500m.

      Phalanx with its solid tungsten penetrator optimized for penetrating sea skimming missiles, would need to score direct hit to be effective against small C-RAM targets.

      The Oerlikon Millennium 35mm AHEAD round 35 x 228mm/3.9 lbs with effective range of 4,000m, shell disperses 152 small tungsten projectiles weighing 3.3 grams/ 0.12 oz each to form a lethal cone-shaped cloud to strike the incoming target, presume much higher probability at countering C-RAM targets.

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    5. "Phalanx with its solid tungsten penetrator optimized for penetrating sea skimming missiles, would need to score direct hit to be effective against small C-RAM targets."

      Phalanx C-RAM (Centurion) uses 20 mm HEIT-SD (High-Explosive Incendiary Tracer, Self-Destruct) ammunition. I don't believe it is proximity fuzed so it must still make direct contact with the target but that's what the radar aim-adjustment and 3000-4000 rd/min is for.

      I'm not sure that a fragmentation round would be effective against artillery or mortar shells as their casings are fairly thick and might be impervious to small fragments. I just don't know.

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  4. Burkes just aren't the right ship for this, regardless of what you put on it. If you're going to get that close to shore, you're going to get hit, even if it's just by 12.7mm, and that will wreck many very expensive radars etc. That means armor.

    Given that there are orders of magnitude more artillery/tank guns/ATGM etc, it also means larger magazine capacities to cope with the volume of fire as none of the systems noted can handle sustained fire for long.

    I also have no clue what a Burke would do against mines in shallow water, especially as the US has almost abandoned mine warfare.

    Would you trust current US skippers to navigate in shallower waters with sandbars or reefs etc right now?

    Realistically, if you want NGS in a hostile area, it's got to be much longer ranged guns, some kind of armored monitor, or a small, very fast ship/UUV. So the navy picked the F-35 and Tomahawk.

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    1. "Burkes just aren't the right ship for this"

      Who said they were?

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    2. "So the navy picked the F-35 and Tomahawk."

      Neither can provide effective fire support.

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    3. The US Navy said they were - hence the 5" on Burkes. I agree that F-35 and Tomahawk are inadequate - that was sarcasm!

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  5. Not only is the single 5" short ranged, it's shell is too small. Both the army and Marine Corps have switched to 155mm (approx 6") across the board.

    Dedicated gunfire support probably isn't happening, either. It would call for developing and manufacturing a new large caliber naval gun.

    One possibility that intrigues me is the GMLRS, the smart version of the rocket fired by MLRS. The range is over 40km and it's about the same size and weight as the Evolved Sea Sparrow. If it could be adapted for vertical launch and quad packed then an Arleigh Burke could carry enough to sink an island.

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    1. Studies long ago settled on the 8" as being the smallest caliber suitable for general fire support. Even the 155 mm (6") is less than ideal although better than the 5".

      "Dedicated gunfire support probably isn't happening, either."

      So, what does that tell you about the viability or likelihood of amphibious assault if we have no fire support? And don't say we'll use aviation. For starters, air simply can't deliver the volume of explosives that are required. Further, against a peer defender the entire fleet will be completely occupied with air defense and unavailable for ground support.

      So where does that leave amphibious assault and why are the Marines continuing to propagate the myth of being able to conduct an assault?

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    2. "One possibility that intrigues me is the GMLRS .. If it could be adapted for vertical launch and quad packed then an Arleigh Burke could carry enough to sink an island."

      Unfortunately, no, that's not even remotely adequate. Recall the lessons of WWII Pacific island amphibious assaults. We fired THOUSANDS of shells (5"-14/16") per hour for hours on end to provide sufficient degradation and suppression of enemy forces. Even a Burke with 400 GMLRS (to round to an easy number) falls woefully short of the necessary level of firepower. It would require many, many Burkes fully loaded with nothing but VL-rockets to even begin to touch on the necessary amount of firepower. Of course, none of those Burkes would be available or capable of AAW defense.

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  6. If we are going to hit the beach hard (which I doubt we will ever do again), my solution would be to stop using billion dollar DDGs that really have no business being so close to shore anyways and we just can't afford to lose a Burke.

    So: find the cheapest,easiest hull you can find: barges, tie multiple of them together; old medium size tankers, remove the superstructure and make them nice and flat, something simple to modify and hulls we can lose, move them in position or use tugs, partial sink them into place and just have the tops sticking out and just have whatever artillery US Army has, MLRS or better yet, some new 8" or 10" artillery (USN would probably completely screw it up but let's assume they pull it off), maybe some form of multiple canister launched Hellfires or whatever is it's replacement or a COMBO of everything....in resume: simple, affordable since nothing is new, just modified hulls we can lose and LOTS OF VOLUME OF FIRE! Just put good communications on board, no radar, no CIWS, I don't even think I would bother with any targeting gear, that should all be ashore, it probably could even be unmanned! If you have a couple of these platforms, you can afford to lose one or 2 since you should have enough "over capacity" of firepower and you aren't tying up valuable and EXPENSIVE DDGs near shore doing artillery support that isn't their forte.

    I bet you could pull this off for less than $1 billion for 5 to 6 hulls and maybe another $1 billion for ammunition, I think it's doable for less than the cost of a Burke with none of the downside if you loss one!

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    1. "cheapest,easiest hull you can find …"

      You're conceptually describing the planning for D-Day/Normandy. We had to invent all kinds of pieces of equipment in order to accomplish the assault. War has a way of focusing and streamlining thinking. Suddenly, billion dollar wastes give way to simple, basic, functional items.

      You're doing the same thing the D-Day designers did. You're coming up with simple, practical items.

      Unfortunately, the Navy is so caught up in budgets and technology that they can't even pretend to think like a warrior and start developing useful items.

      Whether your specific idea is the best approach is immaterial - what's important is that it's the right way to be thinking about combat and an assault.

      Good comment.

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    2. Hell we could go with something like monitors.

      Or rather Good armor and well compartmentalized, torpedo bulges maybe? Some well armored gun (At least 6-8in) and missile emplacements (Would really love some naval atacms)

      Other than that say some CIWS like CRAMM and Phalanx

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    3. I would be ok with some armor since you probably have some crew onboard and with 1 CIWS but nothing else, nothing much more sophisticated than that. For me, it's all about cheap build, lots of firepower and use it for assault and throw it away. The low cost makes it expendable. Once you start added Iron Dome or like SAMs, more electronics, lasers?!?, big engines, fancy crew compartments,etc,etc...you lose the whole point in my book. It should do the job for assault day and maybe couple of days after that, that's it. Keep it a light footprint, all this other stuff makes it expensive and a bigger target. Survivability comes from buying a bunch of them and hopefully you only lose 1 or 2 which is ok, you still have a couple left, think about it, even if you could modify a Burke to work in support role, how many could USN lose close to the beach before USN calls it quits?!? 2 maybe? Maybe after the first 1 goes down! You have to realize that enemy will target these things and sink a couple...Burkes or barges? Which one do you prefer to lose? I say it's better to lose a few barges....

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    4. "It should do the job for assault day and maybe couple of days after that, that's it."

      You've reminded us of another lesson from WWII: build for the war and then discard. The corollary to this is, build cheap and without frills.

      Excellent comment.

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    5. Yea I understand that the question is though could you ever actually convince someone in congress or what have you to do that?

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    6. "could you ever actually convince someone in congress"

      Oh, that's not a problem. When war comes we'll be frantically looking for ways to quickly produce massive quantities of ships, aircraft, tanks, munitions, etc. The challenge for us, today, is to develop the designs that will be needed when war comes. Now is when we should be designing and prototyping simple, basic, no-frills assets and figuring out the doctrine and tactics to use them. Then, when war comes, we just pull out the proven, debugged designs, and begin production.

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    7. "If we are going to hit the beach hard (which I doubt we will ever do again)"

      The logical conclusion from that statement is that once an enemy seizes a piece of ground, we have no hope or ability to retake it since we can't/won't do amphibious assaults any more.

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  7. Im all for a resurrection of the 8in gun. And although ideally we would build cheap "gun" ships with 4-5 of those 8in guns for gunfire support, the possibility of using Aegis in a counterbattery system is intriguing!! Somthing I never considered!! Would the expense be worth it, or would simple UAV spotters suffice, with larger magazines to offset the inaccuracy of fire?? I imagine the EW environment at an amphib landing to be very heavilly contested, so maybe UAV spotters arent plausible, but then even Aegis could be supressed or at least degraded. That takes us back to quantity over quality, and the need for either lots of these 8in ships (with large magazines), or modern BBs. And THAT, when faced off with today's reality means that, short of an uncontested landing, its all sadly moot.

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    1. Counterbattery is just a matter of backtracking the flight of the incoming weapon. I doubt that can be disrupted to the point of rendering it useless. Thus, counterbattery radar seems perfectly viable.

      In a peer defended assault, UAVs are going to have short lifespans so I don't see UAV spotters as being effective as counterbattery radar surrogates.

      All that aside, the most important aspect that you touch on is volume of fire AND AREA BOMBARDMENT. True, you didn't explicitly say 'area bombardment' but your remark about larger magazines to offset inaccuracy is implicit recognition of the value of area bombardment. We forget that the vast majority of WWII shore bombardment was not directed at any specific target but was intended as area bombardment. This recognizes that most targets are simply not visible. Area bombardment is also intended as suppressive fire to force the enemy to 'keep their head down' rather than calmly fighting back. Our abandonment of naval guns demonstrates that we have forgotten the value of area bombardment. We will come to regret this lapse of memory.

      Good comment.

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    2. Thats EXACTLY what I implied!! As youve stated many times before, even "smart" munitions arent always accurate. There is still a huge need for dumb(and the bigger the better) rounds", and will be far into the forseeable future...

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  8. I would load it with HIMARS. It would not have to be so close to shore... Where would we stack all the "rounds", no clue.

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    1. Research the Mk 102/105 5" rocket launchers of WWII. In many ways, they put the HIMARS to shame.

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  9. My favorite platform other than the Iowa class BB is a panamax plus
    240,000 ton loaded with everything. I don't know if it can be sunk.

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    1. Of course it can be sunk but not easily. What it can be, is easily targeted due to its size, easily hit, and easily turned into a fiery wreck that is no longer functional unless you build in lots of redundancy, armor, stealth, damage control, etc. which negates the cheapness. Several large anti-ship missiles would wreck the topsides and turn it into a blazing hulk.

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    2. I wanted to touch on this one.

      A "New Panamax" vessel is about 1400' long and 165' wide. Very few crew are required to operate the vessel itself.

      Consider treating it more as a series of bunkers on land as opposed to a traditional ship. Stick to shore bombardment weaponry only plus self-contained point defense as appropriate.

      You have enormous carrying capacity. You could pour a 30' thick reinforced concrete inner hull as your armor inside the double hull (and I suspect the double hull will give you a little added protection as well). You could use a variation of the same strategy to protect the deck from plunging fire.

      I wouldn't begin to pretend such a vessel was unsinkable, but with a bit of work you could make it pretty tough at a fairly low cost.

      You get the benefit of using a bunch of concrete which we make very well, very fast and pretty cheaply. You minimize steel usage which we don't make very much of any more and which is very expensive by comparison.

      Then you have to add the large capacity gun of your choice and you would have a heck of a platform to mount it on and buckets full of magazine space.

      The commercial sector has the ability to outfit the innards of such a vessel very quickly. Think of an offshore oil/gas production platform as an example of a structure that is designed to work in a hostile environment and absorb a certain amount of catastrophic damage while protecting it's crew. There is lots of capacity and expertise in this area that could be scaled up as required.

      I don't have the answers, but I can see a path forward that could be developed fairly quickly if the will was there.

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    3. "A "New Panamax" vessel … I don't have the answers, but I can see a path forward that could be developed fairly quickly if the will was there."

      The idea is interesting but I think you and others are too focused on the 'unsinkable' aspect. To give a somewhat ridiculous (though not all that much) example, that magnificent, unsinkable ship could be rendered a complete mission kill by one fairly small explosion if it had only one sensor because there's just no good way to armor a sensor and have it still function. What good's an unsinkable ship that can be easily mission killed?

      So, the question becomes not one of sinkability but one of mission robustness.

      Your description of layers of concrete and whatnot do nothing to protect the inevitable vulnerable sensors for the gun/missile that is the ship's weapon.

      Do you see the point I'm making? What do you think?

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    4. I do see your point.

      My thought links the lack of shore bombardment, the lack of armor for survivability, too much money invested in a jack-of-all-trades that you can't risk in battle, plus a platform that doesn't rely too much on a complicated battle management system in order to call the shots. You know my thinking on the combat EW environment rendering networks unusable.

      This is basically a big monitor that can survive being slapped around for a few days. With something the size I'm thinking of, you have the opportunity to build quite a lot of on-board redundancy purely because the square footage of the deck provides the opportunity to spread things out, but you also have the opportunity to off-load some/most of the sensors onto a remote platform(s).

      In addition, I've added some consideration of industrial capacity and how you would build enough survivable platforms at the right price and production rate to be of use in a real opposed landing.

      I see a real stumbling block in producing enough guns in a reasonable time to equip the platforms though. Something like this might help, but the caliber is really far too small to be ideal.

      http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNGER_61-52_MONARC.php

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    5. "This is basically a big monitor that can survive being slapped around for a few days."

      Okay, so what is the fire control system? You mention off-board sensors which now requires another asset (susceptible to destruction) and communication systems (subject to EW). You also mention lots of on-board redundancy, always a good thing, but every additional redundant component drives up the cost.

      This is one of those concepts that initially sounds great until you begin to dive into the details.

      I would also be concerned that a Panamax vessel, while massively large, would lack the structural strength to absorb the stresses from firing large caliber naval guns. Additional structural reinforcement could be built in, of course, but that's yet another spike in cost.

      Also, gun magazines require very stringent and specific structural requirements (containing and venting explosions in a controlled manner), firefighting, flooding capability, munition elevators (also with very stringent requirements for explosives handling!), etc. A magazine is not just any old spare compartment in a commercial cargo vessel. Again, costs spike up.

      And so on.

      I know the idea of a simple, large commercial vessel is appealing but the realities often (not always!) explain why the Navy does what they do and why the build the ships they way they do and why they cost what they do. The example of just the expertise and complexity of constructing a 'simple' magazine illustrate this. It's easy to say, hey, slap a big gun on a cargo ship and we're in business but the realities make the effort far more complex and costly than we think. That's not to say that we can't come up with something along this line but it's not quite as straightforward as we think.

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    6. Fire control system, don't know. Whatever is appropriate, preferably modular on as close to a "per turret" basis as possible.

      Redundant components can actually drop costs. If you can mass produce a given item, its frequently dramatically cheaper per unit than a short run of a theoretically better device. The Navy doesn't always seem to work with that logic however.

      It had crossed my mind that a really big auto-mortar system might make a great primary armament. Not sure if you could get adequate range however. Its a lot easier making mortar barrels than making really big rifled barrels for conventional guns.

      The primary idea for a Panamax was to created a series of holes within an armored space that you could drop a number of mostly pre-fabricated modular gun system into. That hole could easily be in the order of 100' x 100' x 50' tall for each gun system. If another form factor would be better, its a very simple matter to tailor the shape when you are using reinforced concrete as primary armor. The armor in this scenario takes all the loading, not the hull. The hull is basically a smooth skin and a mold for the interior concrete structure.

      You get power, hydraulics, internal networking and other services from another armored module on board, or two, or three. This is a plumbing project, the designs are readily modified from standard offshore use.

      Your concerns about magazine design and construction will be handled by the vendor providing the modular gun system. I'm not necessarily suggesting a turret module goes in as a single lift, but when you can place 10,000 ton platform modules in each lift offshore in less than ideal conditions I'm not sure what the practical limit would be.

      The armor on the top of the hole would have the rebar cage designed to distribute firing loads properly to the rest of the armor structure. You can do amazing things with the right rebar design and 5000psi concrete. The example below could be considered a conceptual model, although the real thing would be much bigger, heavier and stronger.

      https://www.reddit.com/r/Construction/comments/8x1tmn/rebar_for_a_wind_turbine_foundation/

      You can also design the top of the compartment to lock down more tightly when hit from above, while still retaining the ability to blow the top off if a catastrophic even occurs within the turret.

      I don't have the targeting remote thing locked down, but I would start with something very fast, small and fully autonomous. We will likely already have a fairly current map of the area in various spectrum from space assets, so the issue is keeping it updated.

      For networking, I suspect that you may need something very low frequency with a very low data rate. I joined the Navy just as Morse was being dropped as a requirement, but if you want to punch through interference there is nothing like continuous wave at low data rates. Modernize that with frequency agility and it would require enormous power to jam even if the jammer is fairly local. I suspect the days of getting a real time hi-res video feed from a drone are long-gone in a peer war. Someone much smarter than me can figure out cool things to do with a low data-rate feed.

      I think a team of ten people could knock up a pretty good hull armor concept in less than a month, and if it would't work at all you would know very quickly.

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    7. "I think a team of ten people could knock up a pretty good hull armor concept in less than a month, and if it would't work at all you would know very quickly."

      While I have severe reservations about a concrete Panamax gun scheme, it's certainly worth some paper investigation. You're absolutely right about that. If it could work, great, let's proceed. If it becomes apparent that it can't, we've lost nothing. This is the kind of study that I hope the Navy would be continually engaging in but I suspect not.

      If you have the interest and motivation, what about calculating the weight of concrete that you're talking about adding?

      I'm dubious about concrete standing up to the stress of large caliber gun recoil. Do you have any information along those lines? Kind of a tough one to answer, I know!

      What kind of gun are you thinking would go in these concrete pits? I ask because a.) we don't have any useful guns and b.) the guns we have, have no armor, whatsoever. It's almost pointless to have an impervious concrete pit (for sake of discussion) that houses a gun with nothing more than a fiberglass weather housing providing protection. The slightest hit, or even shrapnel, will incapacitate the gun instantly. The gun has to be exposed in order to train, elevate, and fire so the pit provides little or no protection unless I'm completely misunderstanding your scheme.

      I guess what I'm saying is, why don't you mock up your idea on paper and begin to fill in some of the engineering blanks? You may decide, without needing the Navy, that it's viable, or not.

      What is the hull plating thickness of a Panamax vessel?
      What is the cargo/lift capacity?
      What is the weight of concrete?
      What type of gun?
      Armored gun? Weight of turret?
      Magazine size?
      Magazine weight?
      Elevator, piping, electrical, HVAC penetrations through concrete and impact on structural integrity?
      How many guns?
      Total weight of all guns and magazines?

      You might want to research 'monitors' as the closest, real example of what you're talking about. That might give you some ideas and insights.

      Delete
  10. It seems like the flowchart on a lot of these issues ends at Battleship.
    I would think that it would be nice to have an updated Battleship to put in the Gulf next to Iran right now as well.

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    1. "It seems like the flowchart on a lot of these issues ends at Battleship."

      It does. Astutely recognized!

      Or, to put it another way, many of our possible combat options are viable only with a battleship. Without a battleship, many of those options are not viable. Our current Navy, with no large caliber naval gun, limited numbers of ships, almost no offensive or defensive mine warfare, no dedicated ASW, and so forth, has very few combat options. A battleship would open several options. A dedicated ASW vessel would open more. And so on. The goal of any naval force should be to have as many combat options as reasonably possible. Today's Navy has knowingly, and stupidly, limited its options to an unwise and unacceptable level.

      Really astute comment!

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  11. You talk about naval gunfire support but really the debate should be about fire support and the use of artillery. Any naval gunfire is always limied by the shoreline. The size of the naval gun always limits its effective range. A 16 inch gun fires a larger projectile at greater range than a 5 inch gun. Many in these blogs talk about bringing back the battleship but never do i ever see an analysis of the cost effectiveness of this strategy. The cost of building manning and maintaining a battleship is enormous. The old iowa class battleship used over 1000 men to run the ship. The cost of delivering an artillery shell on target needs to take this issue into account when comparing naval gunfire support to other methods of acheiving the same outcome. A m777 battery emplaced where you want it is possibly a better use of funds than building maintaining and funding a ship which is limited by the physical attributes of the shoreline.

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    1. You're conflating a few issues and working off an out of date, invalid paradigm.

      Let's start with conflating artillery and naval fire support. The central thesis of naval fire support is the requirement to supply large caliber, high volume fire support to an amphibious assault. Artillery is a separate discussion since it becomes applicable ONLY AFTER THE ASSAULT FORCE HAS LANDED AND SOLIDIFIED THE ASSAULT AREA. Artillery is NOT an initial wave item since it can only be landed by LCAC or LCU (possibly external sling loading, also but that's a minor gimmick evolution that would not survive a peer defended assault). Therefore, by definition, artillery is only a viable option once the initial assault is completed successfully. In other words, by the time it's available, it's no longer needed. Yes, artillery will be immeasurably valuable in the subsequent drive inland, if there is one, when the ground forces outrange naval gun support.

      So, comparing artillery and naval guns is invalid as they fill two different, mutually exclusive roles.

      Now, let's talk about your invalid paradigm, that the cost of manning a battleship precludes its operation today. That's wrong on a few counts:

      1. We fully manned and paid for a 600 ship fleet, including battleships, in the Reagan era. In fact, due to the absence of extensive automation, crew sizes were larger back then! So, history demonstrates conclusively that we can man and operate battleships (and a larger overall fleet!) if we spend out budget wisely.

      2. We currently man and pay for operating LHA/LHDs with thousand man crews as well as carriers with several thousand man crews. Therefore, a thousand man crew is not a valid reason for not operating battleships. We CAN AND DO operate dozens of ships that have as big or bigger crews than a battleship.

      3. You're comparing a WWII battleship manning requirement to today's operations. That's completely, factually false. Consider: why were WWII battleships manned to the level they were? Answer: weapons.

      The WWII battleship had 10x dual 5" guns each with a crew of around 15. That's 150 or so crew right there. A modern battleship would have all its 5" guns removed or replaced, possibly, with today's 5"/62 which has a crew of 6 per gun and would likely be less with combined magazines. BB's also had around 20x quad 40mm Bofors with a crew of around 8 or so on the mount and 2-4 more involved in passing ammo up. That's another 240 or so crew. The 40 mm mount no longer exists and has been replaced by CIWS and SeaRAM which don't really have operating crew. BB's also operated 49x 20 mm Oerlikons with a crew of around 4 each for another 196. Again, 20 mm guns no longer exist. In addition, the various fire control systems required a several dozen more crew.

      Adding up the weapons crew requirements we get somewhere around 630 crew. Thus, a modern BB would require around 600 less crew just from WWII weapons removal.

      Indeed, we some of this in the drop from the WWII manning level of 2700 to the 1980 level of 1800. Today, that level would drop further, drastically.

      A modern BB would operate turbines rather than the old labor intensive boilers. More crew savings.

      A modern BB would have the usual extensive level of automation which would further, drastically cut manning. The Zumwalt, for example, has a displacement of 15,000 t and a crew of 150. The Iowas had a displacement of 45,000-50,000 t. Scaling the Zumwalt crew up would give a BB manning of around 500. Crew size doesn't quite scale in a linear fashion with displacement but it gives some idea of the influence of modern automation on crew levels.

      Another crew size point of comparison is the America class LHA which has a displacement about the same as an Iowa and a crew of 1000 and that includes an air wing and the need to support 1500 troops when embarked!

      A modern BB, designed with automation, would likely require a crew of around 500 or so. We can easily afford that.

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    2. I am not conflating anything. There a many ways of providing fire support and it does not necessarily need to be naval fire support. It can be air support which is much more versatile. I was using a m777 battery as an example. If you wish to use artillery there is no reason why a force cannot be vertically emplaced and supplied by air at a location not defended by the enemy. Any amphibious invasion requires air superiority in any case. It does not as you said have to come across the beaches as the second phase. Remember there are many ways of fighting a battle now that were simply not available in 1944. They used amphibious assaults using large numbers of heavy guns in ships as a necessity not as a choice.

      I think you are using an outdated paradigm in thinking that an amphibious invasion 1944 style is how a peer war and for that matter any war will be undertaken in the future.

      The ww2 invasions were undertaken with heavy arms superiority. Even despite these odds the results of naval bombardment were less than impressive. As a student of history you must realise that the naval bombardment of Iwo Jima with large numbers of heavy calibre shells had little effect on a well entrenched defenders. What has changed to make you think that it will work now? I think it is a quaint notion that should be confined to the History books.

      I suspect that an amphibious invasion against a peer in contested airspace is actually ludicrous. It is much more likely that a battle of naval supremacy will take place for control of trade routes and resources. The Indian ocean is the key to this. Nearly everything China Needs comes through the Indonesian archipeligo. Control these straits and you control china. Any direct invasion of China will likely lead to large casualties with a nuclear weapon up youre arse. Now that you have hopefully discounted a direct Amphibious invasion of china then where would the naval fire support be used? The us forces already have the capacity to defeat any other non peer. The US navy needs to control the Indian Ocean to control China.

      In anycase my post was about cost effectiveness. What is the cost of designing, building a battleship and producing all the automated artillery systems say compared to flying two b1 bombers loaded with small diameter bombs over the battle location. A b1 bomber can carry hundreds of sdb with a range of over 50 km to anywhere you need it. Not just near the coastal strip. Each sdb is equivalent to an 8 inch shell. That is the point of the post. The same aircraft can then be reconfigured for another role.

      Where has this push for naval fire support come from? It has come from Congress. It is not coming from the professionals planning the next big war as i suspect that they realise that old fashioned naval support ww2 style is an outdated paradigm.

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    3. "many ways of providing fire support ... It can be air support"

      Air cannot even begin to supply the needed volume of firepower to support an amphibious assault. Do you sortie math and you'll instantly realize that. Add to that, that against a peer defender, there won't be any air support as the fleets entire air assets will be tied up in fleet defense.

      "no reason why a force cannot be vertically emplaced and supplied by air at a location not defended by the enemy."

      Ah, a secret, undefended location within artillery range of the enemy! This is hand-waving at its finest. There is no such thing and even if there were, there is no way a single artillery piece (or even unit) could supply the requisite volume of firepower to support an amphibious assault and even if they could, a peer enemy would destroy such an obvious (counterbattery radar) weapon. Hand-waving.

      "despite these odds the results of naval bombardment were less than impressive."

      Quite true and that makes your suggestions of air power or secret artillery batteries all the more ridiculous in their weakness of firepower and volume.

      "As a student of history you must realise that the naval bombardment of Iwo Jima with large numbers of heavy calibre shells had little effect on a well entrenched defenders."

      You appear not to be a student of history as you seem not to realize that the bombardment completely accomplished its primary goal which was to allow the assault force to get ashore, UNIMPEDED, along with all its supporting equipment and supplies. The secondary task of attriting enemy forces was accomplished to a degree. Again, you make my point that if days of 8"-16" shelling could not eliminate the enemy force then your suggestion that air power or a secret artillery battery will suffice is ludicrous.

      "I suspect that an amphibious invasion against a peer in contested airspace is actually ludicrous. "

      On that we agree! What I am addressing in this type of post is that the Marines/Navy claim amphibious assault as a core competency. That being the case, I address the deficiencies in that doctrine.

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    4. " b1 bombers loaded with small diameter bombs"

      Setting aside the fact that the B-1/2 are not certified for SDB (I assume they could be fairly quickly), and the fact that B-1s are not that survivable in a peer defended airspace, the bomber can deliver its load once every 2-3 days, depending on where its base is. The B-1 has a combat radius of 3000 miles, at best, likely less with a full load, which leaves us very few options in the Pacific/Chinese theatre.

      One sortie every 2-3 days (if the weather is okay and if the enemy can be persuaded to allow the aircraft to fly unimpeded through contested airspace) is hardly fire support!

      There is no getting around the fact that naval guns are the only persistent, all-weather, ECM-immune, instantly on-call, high caliber, high volume fire support that can effectively support an amphibious assault. If we're going to conduct amphibious assaults, as the Marines/Navy claim, then we need some kind of large caliber, high volume gun support ship. If we won't provide that then our claimed amphibious assault capability is pure fantasy, as I've often posted. No amount of airplanes or secret artillery can support an amphibious assault.

      The SDB is also nearly useless as a guided weapon since the vast majority of targets will not be visible or known. It would still work as a area bombardment weapon, though.

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    5. "There a many ways of providing fire support and it does not necessarily need to be naval fire support."

      You have offered a thesis that is unsupported by the facts and I've explained why. That aside, your thesis is intriguing and worthy of further examination. Why don't you do some thinking and research and come up with an alternate method that is actually viable in terms of lethality, volume of fire, timeliness of fire, immunity to weather, logistics of supply, etc. and present it. I don't think there is a viable alternative but I'd love to see you analyze it and find an alternative. If you can, I'd gladly give you a guest post to present it.

      Too many people, including our professional naval leaders, hand-wave problems away (like secret artillery locations!). When those ideas are subjected to realistic analysis, they instantly fall apart. So, find a solution that isn't hand-waving, run the numbers, crank a realistic scenario and if you still have a viable solution after all that, tell me about it!

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  12. Would it be safe to say that a modern BB would look more like a German WW2 era Panzerschiff (Pocket Battleship aka Deutschland class)? 2 twin or triple mounts in the 10-14 inch size backed by 2-4 5" guns.

    No need to rebuild 40K ton Iowas. A formidable pocket battleship capable of launching more and bigger shells than a land based SPG artillery battery is well within the realm of possibility.

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    1. "Would it be safe to say that a modern BB would look more like a German WW2 era Panzerschiff (Pocket Battleship aka Deutschland class)?"

      I hope not! The PB was 15,000 t which is the same as the Zumwalt. It had very little armor by WWII standards though quite a bit by today's. Still, the armor wouldn't stand up to a lot today. The PB was intended as a heavy hitting, lightly armored vessel - in other words, a purely one-dimensional offensive ship.

      If we ever get around to designing a modern battleship, we need to fully commit and make it the equivalent of a WWII BB: heavy hitting and heavily armored. This would not be the ship to cut pennies on.

      If all we want is a firepower platform then a simple monitor type vessel is sufficient.

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  13. I think part of this post that some might miss is that while the Burke is not anyone’s ideal fire support ship, you go to war with what you have not what to wish for. I think everyone who reads this blog would agree a purpose built armored cruiser with big guns would be better suited. But since an enemy might not be willing to wait for us to have the right vessel, here’s what we can do for now.

    Applying the same ideas of the post could be a way of saving the Ticonderoga class the Navy is begging to get rid of. Besides having two 5” they have a lot more deck space for C-RAm or equivalents. By making the primary mission fire support, the Navy could cut costs (their excuse for retirement) by removing the ASW mission (reducing personnel and upgrades) and a less expensive radar/equipment update focused on counter battery and general fire support with no need for anti-ABM or similar expensive AAW updates.

    For pre-invasions shore bombardment or long range counter-battery fire the solution seems expensive, the tomahawk. But remember the t-hawk is a sunk cost with thousands in inventory. Replacing the single warhead with a cluster based on / adapted from the MLRS would give the Navy “grid killer” capability with longer range than HIMARs, but actually save money and time as we would not be paying money for new naval launchers or new missiles. Even if a 30 missile costs 35 million, that’s cheaper than we spent just developing the zumwalt’s guns and we could field it rapidly. In fact with a cluster warhead you could take out an enemy artillery battery not just ansingle artillery piece which at least helps close the cost gap (though still not as well as naval artillery)

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    1. "while the Burke is not anyone’s ideal fire support ship, you go to war with what you have not what to wish for."

      Quite right although part of the purpose of this blog is to describe what we ought to be designing and acquiring so that we'll be better prepared to go to war. This is offered as a service to the Navy since they clearly lack the ability to analyze warfighting needs on their own!

      Converting Ticos is an interesting idea although they would be a less than ideal solution as they lack armor and are constructed of aluminum superstructures. Still, it would be better than scrapping them. Aegis might come in handy for targeting and counterbattery since it's already installed.

      "For pre-invasions shore bombardment or long range counter-battery fire the solution seems expensive, the tomahawk."

      No! Pre-invasion shore bombardment is largely an area bombardment exercise after the first, small group of known, fixed targets are eliminated. Tomahawk is not an area bombardment weapon - well, I guess it could be but at a $1M-$2M each that's just not an affordable area bombardment scheme. Plus, with a total inventory of only a few thousand Tomahawks, we can't waste Tomahawks on any but known, fixed targets and fairly high value ones at that. There's simply no getting around it, we need a large caliber naval gun (and lots of them!) if we have any hope of conducting amphibious assaults.

      Cluster munitions are great and we should resume development (air-fuel cluster, etc.) and production. HOWEVER, cluster munitions are small explosives and WWII demonstrated that sustained bombardment even by cruisers and battleships was insufficient to eliminate - or, in many cases, even significantly dent - enemy assets and resistance. What pre-invasion bombardment accomplishes is some attrition but, mainly, it suppresses initial enemy resistance (forces them into shelter rather than fighting back) which allows the ground forces to get ashore somewhat unhindered, get established, and, hopefully, get some heavier equipment and weapons ashore before the real fighting starts.

      MLRS/HIMARS is like the WWII LSM(R) 5" rocket bombardment ships - it is great at suppressive fire but doesn't actually kill a lot of enemy. Sure, if you catch an enemy unprepared and out in the open you can kill them with small cluster munitions and MLRS/HIMARS but that would be a very foolish enemy and I don't think anyone believes the Chinese will be that foolish. If China will obligingly set up an artillery battery in plain sight, in the open, then great but given their extensive hardening of submarine, naval, and air bases and their, so far, very methodical and intelligent pursuit of modern combat capabilities, I don't think they'll do that.

      So, while I'm all for a naval MLRS/HIMARS - I'm actually more in favor of a modern Mk105 5" rocket launcher! - it's not the answer to our naval fire support needs. At best, it's a peripheral supplement to real naval fire support. There's no getting around it. If we want to conduct amphibious assaults then we need large caliber naval guns and lots of them.

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    2. Just an added thought... The Spruances (no longer relevant), Ticos and at least the early Burkes were constructed with the additional strengthening to upgrade the 5in to the 8in gun,and would be almost plug-n-play. So some foresight existed into the 80s. But of course that still leaves us with billion dollar ships sitting just off the beach...

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  14. Not saying this is completely what we need today but packed quite a punch for 1200 tons!....interestingly, we got rid of them immediately after WW2. Which makes my point, use it and toss it.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LSM(R)-188-class_landing_ship_medium

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    1. Wow, great post from the past!

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    2. Cheap, small, simple.

      Perfect.

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    3. "Wow, great post from the past!"

      This is one of the problems and challenges of operating a blog. With the constant growth and turnover of readers, many readers aren't familiar with what has been covered in the past and we wind up 're-litigating' topics that have already been covered. That's okay, to a point, but it risks becoming repetitious for those readers who have been around longer.

      How to encourage newer readers to make greater use of the archives is a challenge I continually grapple with but have yet to find a solution to. Let me know if you have any ideas.

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    4. "Cheap, small, simple."

      That would make a good design philosophy, wouldn't it? Kind of like K.I.S.S. which the Navy seems to understand only in the sexual assault context.

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  15. The South Korean PKX-B boats are interesting in the context of "cheap, small, simple" as relating to fire support. Armed with a 76mm gun and 12-cell 130mm rocket launcher, their primary tasking is to counter North Korean small boats and hovercraft, but they have a secondary role of shore bombardment. To be sure, there are limits to what you can do with just a dozen 130mm rockets, but thats why the ROKN has a dozen of them. Admittedly, the korean context is very different - they can afford to build small because they expect to be fighting in their backyard, but it's still interesting to see what pther people are doing and consider whether that's applicable to the US context.

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    1. Never heard of it before so it's good to see what other countries come up with. Packs a decent punch for 230 tons. Couldn't find anything on costs but can't be too expensive.

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    2. "Packs a decent punch for 230 tons."

      To do what? Let me rephrase that, to do what that would be of use to the US Navy?

      We often get caught up in the attraction of weapon systems in isolation rather than considering how they would be used in reality. Does the US Navy have a use for a small boat with a 76 mm gun (oversized machine gun) and 12 rockets (I can't find any indication of reload capability)? It's certainly not useful for shore fire support which was the immediate topic. It could be useful for one portion of the LCS mission set: the anti-small craft task although the rocket min/max range presents a problem. The rockets have a minimum range of around 2 miles (see, "Rockets"). That's not good for the anti-small craft role where encounters may well occur inside 2 miles.

      'Cheap, small, simple' is good but only when combined with 'useful'. It may well be useful for SKorea but I'm struggling to find a use for the US Navy.

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  16. Don't know much about US shipyards and production but it would seem to me that something similar size or slightly bigger( under 1000 tons?) could be a perfect project to help small shipyards in USA. Building a small steel hull for fire support, maybe some other derivatives could be produced would bring a small but steady income to small shipyards around the country? No need for crazy electronics or anything fancy, just steel and conventional engines and screw, small superstructure for crews. It would be a small but valuable way to revitalize the industry....

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    1. Absolutely!! A local Portland shipyard got the contract for the Armys new landing craft, and bought a closed down shipyard in Vancouver to build them at... Its a shot in the arm for the economy, plus itll be neat to watch something military being built here again, which hasnt happened since the Henry Kaiser yards...

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    2. "Building a small steel hull for fire support,"

      Again, I remind and encourage you to carefully consider the requirements for effective fire support: caliber and volume. A small boat/ship can meet neither requirement.

      The WWII Pacific island assaults saw fleets of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers stand off an island and bombard it continuously for days on end prior to an assault. Caliber and volume!

      As you consider candidates for fire support, keep caliber and volume firmly in mind!

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    3. "bought a closed down shipyard in Vancouver"

      That would seem to be only a marginal aid to American shipbuilding. Yes, the parent company is in the US so there's some benefit but a foreign shipyard, even if owned/operated by a US company is less ideal than an American-located yard.

      Wasn't there some law about US ships only being built in US yards? Am I misremembering that or did it only apply to commercial vessels?

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    4. Idk if there was a misunderstanding or (?) The shipyard is in Vancouver, WA, right across the Columbia River from Portland, OR...

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    5. While the size jump from the Armys landing craft to somthing in the LSM range would probably push local yards capacity, nontheless its good to see some kind of hull being built somewhere other then at the big headline companies like BIW, Ingalls, etc, and the potential rebirth of shipbuilding here is encouraging. The Portland/Vancouver area was a huge Kaiser shipbuilding area during WWII, but sadly only a few small yards remain. Its interesting that only Kaiser medical remains of the giant shipbuilder, but there are still many housing tracts that were built overnight to house the workforce, so the legacy is still here if you look for it...

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    6. I cant site the actual law, but i do believe that US warships are required to be built domestically unless given a waiver by the President. Somewhat related is the roughly 100 yr old Jones Act, which requires merchant cargo thats moved from one US port to another be moved on US built, owned, and crewed ships. A protectionist move that is largely irrelevant today but still in force.

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    7. "The shipyard is in Vancouver, WA"

      Ahh! I assumed you meant in Canada. My bad!

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    8. Its ok...we here are used to being "the other Vancouver" haha!!!

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