Passive Sensors and Aerial Combat

An Anonymous reader (please, everyone, add a username to the end of your comments;  there are too many anonymous commenters to keep straight who’s who and to give proper credit for good comments, such as this;  no, it’s not a requirement, just a plea!)  posed the following question in a comment: 

“Will losses of high end radiating sensors or reluctance to use them bring us back to aircraft that fight primarily with passive E/O [electro-optical] sensors?”[1]

As the anonymous commenter noted, ComNavOps has often stated that ships in combat will not radiate (EMCON) until an attack is actually incoming.  To do otherwise betrays one’s own location and invites destruction.  We have passive electro-optical and infrared (EO/IR) sensors but we need to fully develop them into a complete, hemispherical sensor system (with extensive redundancy, of course!) that is fully integrated into the ship’s combat software system.  In other words, we need to be able to scan, detect, identify, track, and establish firing solutions/fire control using purely passive sensors just as we now do with radar [question: how will we provide guidance for missiles requiring illumination?].
 
The ability to fully engage using only passive sensors would be a significant advantage as it would eliminate the enemy’s ability to detect and target our radars – no more ‘free’ guidance for the enemy and no more concern about anti-radiation (ARM-type) missiles!  The enemy would have to earn his targeting and if he uses active radar, as most current missiles do, that would give us the ‘free’ detection and engagement.
 
Returning to the main topic … will/can aircraft fight primarily with passive sensors and, if so, what would that look like?  How would it differ from what we do now?  What new tactics would we need?
 
As you know, passive aerial sensors are nothing new.  WWII aircraft fought using optical sensors (Mk1 eyeball) almost exclusively.  In more modern times, the F-14 Tomcat had truly impressive EO/IR capabilities (see, “Tomcat Eyes”) although the Navy then promptly abandoned those capabilities with the advent of the F-18 Hornet and only now, weakly, is claiming to have developed a never before seen Infrared Search and Track (IRST) capability that the rest of the world has had for decades.
 
Before we can go any further in describing a passive-only aerial battle, it is necessary to recognize some characteristics of passive aircraft systems and operations.
 
Field of View – This is the soda straw issue.  Aircraft are limited to small sensors and, therefore, have limited fields of view as compared to radar.  Some aircraft, like the F-35, have attempted to address this with total spherical coverage but with only limited success.  As far as I know, the F-35 remains incapable of using its ‘see through’ sensors effectively in a combat scenario.  Of course, the AF sends me surprisingly little classified combat information on the F-35.  I have to get most of my detailed, classified information off video gamer’s websites!  (Couldn’t resist that one! LOL)
 
The salient point, here, is that an aircraft using passive sensors is not capable of ‘sweeping’ the sky like radar.  The aircraft can see a fairly limited section of sky at any given moment.  This greatly increases the likelihood that detection and encounters will occur at much close ranges than we anticipate and that impacts doctrine and tactics.  The F-35, for example, was never intended to be an up-close dogfighter but was, instead, intended to stand off and be an aerial sniper.  With limited sensing, this is likely to mean the F-35 will find itself engaged in visual range dogfights, all too often.
 
Stealth – Stealth is completely negated by passive optical sensors and significantly negated by infrared (IR) sensors.  Thus, in a pure passive environment, stealth aircraft will possess no advantage over non-stealth aircraft as regards detection, tracking, and targeting.
 
Concealment – With radar, the traditional tactics of hiding in the clouds, flying low, etc. are largely useless.  Radar is relatively unaffected by weather, clouds, or terrain (look-down radar is pretty much the standard, today).  However, with passive sensors many of those tactics are once again effective.  Optical sensors are significantly degraded by clouds, IR sensors are somewhat affected by clouds depending on density and moisture content, optical and IR sensors are affected by terrain, and so on.
 
What this is suggesting is that passive-only aerial combat is likely to be much closer range affair than current doctrine and tactics envision.
 
AEW Control – Aerial combat is generally controlled by ground and/or airborne radar systems and controllers.  This can still take place, however, AEW active control has become a major risk, with active emitting AEW aircraft being susceptible to very long range A2A missiles (see, “GoodbyePoseidon and Hawkeye”);  I’ve proposed passive AEW (see, “Passive Hawkeye”) but that has not yet been implemented.
 
The US Navy and Air Force rely heavily on AEW for detection and battle management and that will be significantly impacted if not nearly eliminated.  In fact, one could envision aerial combat devolving into back and forth attempts by both sides to alternately attack and defend their high value AEW and EW aircraft.  Whichever side can establish AEW control of the battle will have a significant advantage.
 
BVR (Beyond Visual Range) – BVR combat, the ideal of the US military and exactly what the F-35 was designed to do, becomes a difficult, if not impossible scenario in passive-only aerial combat.  Radar is the sensor of choice to implement BVR combat and passive sensors simply can’t provide reliable 50-100+ mile detection and targeting against fighter size aircraft – large bombers or support aircraft, yes … fighters, no.
 
 
Scenarios
 
With the above discussion in mind, one can envision various aerial combat scenarios:
 
1. Low altitude combat with aircraft trying to get lost in the visual and IR ‘clutter’ of the ground.
 
2. High altitude combat with aircraft making use of the clouds as cover to hide from optical sensors although IR sensors would mitigate some of that advantage.
 
3. Fighter sweeps wherein one accepts the lack of long range sensing and compensates with sheer numbers of aircraft.
 
4. Aircraft might not even carry long range missiles such as AMRAAM, preferring to carry a larger number of shorter range heat seeking missiles.
 
 
Caution
 
What’s disturbing about all this is that the US military does not appear to have given this even a moment’s thought.  We believe that aerial supremacy is our birthright and AWACS/AEW control of the skies is an article of faith.  What will we do when China starts routinely shooting down our AWACS/AEW and we lose control of the aerial battle?  Are we training for it?
 
What will happen when the Chinese conduct fighter sweeps against us and achieve aerial superiority?  Are we developing alternate doctrine and tactics?    
 
The enemy gets a vote and we may not like their vote.
 
 
Conclusion
 
The future aerial battle will be a battle for control of the long range sensing capability.  With long range sensing comes the prize of control of the battle by airborne combat controllers.  The side that can establish and maintain long range sensing and, thus, control of the aerial battle will, most likely, win that battle.
 
Both sides will attempt to remain silent by using passive sensors and this will result in close range encounters likely involving the scenarios described above.  The close ranges will shift the emphasis from long range, radar guided missiles to short range, heat seeking missiles.  Aerial combat will return to optically-based (EO or eyeball), close range dogfights.
 
The exception to this will be the specialized hunter-killer (H-K) aircraft that will be tasked with finding and destroying the other side’s AEW aircraft.  The H-K aircraft will be armed with the longest range, fastest, air-to-air missiles the enemy has.
 
 
 
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[1]Navy Matters blog, “More Incorrect Ukraine Lessons”, Anonymous, March 26, 2023 at 6:23 AM,
https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2023/03/more-incorrect-ukraine-lessons.html?showComment=1679836994339#c418576362046182892

Loyal Wingman

‘Littoral’ – the term was appropriated by the Navy to describe a form of warfare that was, supposedly, unique and beyond the capability of then current Navy platforms.  The only solution, said the Navy, was to buy lots of Littoral Combat Ships and so the LCS debacle was birthed. 

 

The defining characteristic of the ‘littoral’ fiasco was that the conversation jumped immediately from theoretical concept to implementation.  What was ignored was reality and validity.  There were no studies, no exercises, no concepts of operation … nothing to establish the validity, or lack thereof, of the concept.  We went straight from concept to implementation and, from the Navy’s perspective and goals (budget) this was quite understandable.  The Navy knew there was nothing unique about ‘littoral’ as a form of warfare.  Ships have fought in shallow water for hundreds of years.  Images of WWII destroyers standing barely offshore to provide fire support on D-Day are iconic.  What the Navy wanted was to get Congress to fund more ships before someone had the forethought to question the concept.  Thus, we committed to a production run of 55 LCS without ever establishing the validity of the concept, analyzing alternatives, or establishing concepts of operation.

 

This phenomenon of jumping straight from concept to implementation is not unique to the military world.  It is common throughout industry and society.  For example, diversity (whether gender or racial) burst upon the scene and we leapt immediately over validity and straight into implementation.  Diversity would have us believe that a man and a woman or a black and a white are somehow inherently superior to two women or two blacks.  A moment’s reasoned thought would reveal this as ridiculous.  Despite that, we’ve jumped immediately to implementation.  There is hardly a corporate board or governmental organization today that does not mandate (formally or informally) quotas to ensure diversity.  Whenever there’s a Supreme Court vacancy the cries immediately arise from all corners for the position to be filled by a woman or a black or a Leprechaun or whatever gender/racial characteristic the particular group is advocating for.  That’s ridiculous.  The only ‘cry’ should be to find the best possible person regardless of gender, race, or type of car they drive. 

 

Corporations have moved from finding the best people for their boardrooms to finding the most diverse people.  Presidential cabinets have gone from finding the best people to finding the most diverse.  Army Rangers and Navy SEALs have gone from finding the best people to mandating diversity.

 

The latest example of this phenomenon is the ‘loyal wingman’.  It is the latest craze and we have already jumped right over validity and straight into implementation.  No one is asking whether the concept makes sense, whether it can work, whether an already combat task-overloaded pilot can control multiple other aircraft while fighting for his own life, and whether pale imitations of manned aircraft can perform well enough to make a difference.  No one has asked how a loyal wingman will work, what it will do, under what circumstances it can be useful, and what situations are not appropriate for it?  No one is asking why, if a manned combat fighter aircraft costs $100M each, we think we’ll be able to build unmanned versions cheap enough to be expendable?

Loyal Wingman Concept Art

 

What will the loyal wingman aircraft do?  Try this description:

 

The cornerstone of the concept is a low-cost unmanned platform to work alongside traditional manned combat aircraft and operate as a force-multiplier, adding “mass” while also undertaking more hazardous tasks and missions when required. (3)

 

How’s that for some truly impressive buzzword bingo that says nothing?  It leaves us with no worked out concept, no proof of validity, no exercises demonstrating effectiveness, no nothing.

 

 

No one asked about the LCS and we see how that turned out.

 

No one asked about the Zumwalt and we see how that turned out.

 

No one asked about the Ford and we see how that turned out.

 

No one asked about the F-35 and we see how that turned out.

 

Nope, it’s all about implementation.

 

Ignore the reality. 

 

Ignore the analysis.

 

Ignore validating exercises. 

 

Ignore the CONOPS. 

 

Ignore alternatives.

 

 

 

Just implement it.

 

 

 

 

Okay, that was the general warning about the loyal wingman concept.  Now, let’s look at some specific potential problems.

 

Communications – We don’t have artificial intelligence, yet, that even remotely approaches combat capability despite the public relations stunt put on by DARPA.  That means the wingman aircraft cannot perform on its own in any meaningful way.  It will need to be closely controlled by a human pilot/controller and that, in turn, requires constant communications.  Presumably, the comms will need to be omnidirectional because it will be impossible to maintain a direct, point to point comm link when both the transmitting control aircraft and the receiving wingman are engaged in high-g, violent maneuvers.

 

Situational Awareness – I’ve not heard of anyone talking about using two-seater aircraft to control the wingman aircraft so can a single pilot in the controlling aircraft establish and maintain situational awareness to direct the wingman aircraft while simultaneously engaging in aerial combat, himself, and fighting for his own life?  Can he do it for more than one aircraft?  There’s a reason why the F-14, EA-6B, and other aircraft have multiple crew.  The workload is too much for one pilot.

 

Or, is this a case where we fantasize that the single pilot will cruise around the aerial battlefield, undetected and unhindered by any enemy actions and leisurely direct swarms of wingman aircraft?

 

Combat Effectiveness – I have yet to hear what, exactly, the wingman aircraft is going to do.  It can’t successfully engage in aerial combat on its own or even with a controller.  There is no unmanned aircraft that can do that.  It could be an aerial missile ‘barge’ for the controlling aircraft but, again, can a single pilot, fighting for his life make effective use of such an aircraft?  It could be a decoy or missile sponge but we already have a variety of much cheaper chaff, flares, and decoys (towed and flying) so I don’t see what would be gained there.  So, if the wingman can’t defeat an enemy aircraft, what will it do?  I’m failing to see the combat effectiveness.

 

Some articles suggest its role is ISR and early warning.(1)  If so, that’s a lot of hype and cost (see the next section on cost) for an extended sensor and nothing I’ve seen indicates they’ll be able to supply another aircraft with a real time combat picture (see the section on communications).

 

Another article suggests that the loyal wingman will be tasked with ‘absorbing enemy fire’.(2)  If so, that’s an incredibly expensive way to defend another aircraft.  Plus, how would that work?  In order to be physically close enough to ‘absorb fire’, the wingman aircraft would have to be almost flying a welded wing formation.  Do we really think we can formation fly in combat without collisions?  And with an unmanned aircraft?

 

Cost – If the wingman aircraft is going to attempt to engage in aerial combat, it will need the same performance, speed, range, weapons, and sensors as our best manned aircraft which means it will cost the same as a manned aircraft and that’s not cheap.  Are we going to use $100M wingman aircraft as throwaway expendables?  We’ll go broke real fast doing that.  So many people have the mistaken notion that unmanned somehow automatically means cheap and that’s just not the case.  If you want high performance fighter aircraft capability it’s going to cost what high performance fighter aircraft cost.

 

Attrition – As noted, we don’t have the AI to produce aerial ‘Terminators’.  That means that the wingman aircraft are going to suffer extreme attrition which brings us back to the cost issue.

 

 

Summary

 

So, in our pursuit of technology as the magical solution to all our problems, we’ve latched on to this wingman concept and jumped right over validation and straight into implementation.  We’ve got to learn some lessons from our past failures and start asking questions before it’s too late.  We need a CONOPS for this concept and we need extensive validation exercises.  Failing that, the loyal wingman concept will be just another example to add to the list of poorly conceived disasters.

 

 

 

 

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(1)https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/loyal-wingman-unmanned-aircraft/

 

(2)https://militaryleak.com/2020/12/21/boeing-australia-loyal-wingman-stealth-ucav-conducts-first-high-speed-taxi-test/

 

(3)https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/35806/australias-loyal-wingman-drone-its-developing-with-boeing-has-been-photographed-in-the-wild

Sensors and Shooters

One of the recent concepts for employing the F-35 is the idea that it will not engage in combat itself but will provide targeting for other heavily laden shooter platforms.  Various shooter platforms have been proposed including B-1 bombers, F-18s, and F-15s.

What a great concept, right?  F-35s loitering around the aerial battlefield, unseen, picking out hapless targets to be dispatched with ruthless efficiency by shooter aircraft dripping with missiles.  What’s not to like? 

You know, though, I feel a vague sense of uneasiness about this concept.  Think about the history of modern aerial combat. It's not an ordered, neat affair. It's a confused, incredibly rapid, constantly changing melee and that's completely at odds with the idea of a sensor aircraft leisurely spotting targets and passing off to a somehow unseen, unhindered, non-stealthy shooter while the enemy obligingly remains lined up and relatively static, just waiting to be shot. If all that happens, I guess it could work. However, the reality, especially as the enemy employs more and more of their own stealthy aircraft, is that the sensor aircraft will be frantically engaged in their own life or death struggle to survive and won't be leisurely passing on targets to shooters. The shooters, being non-stealthy, will likely be targeted by enemy stealth aircraft and long range missiles and will also be frantically maneuvering for survival rather than calmly and methodically launching missile after missile.

Let’s think about the concept in a bit more depth.  What are the requirements for the concept to work?

For the sensor platform,

• It must be close enough to see the targets with its sensor(s).  Depending on the target, that could be a hundred miles away for a larger bomber or AWACS type aircraft or it could be a dozen miles to spot an enemy stealth fighter.  Even spotting modern semi-stealthy fighter aircraft will require moderate proximity, say 30 miles or so.  Now, the flip side of this requirement is that if the sensor is close enough to see a target, it’s also close enough to be seen unless we think the enemy doesn’t have the same kinds of radar, IRST, and other sensors that we have.
  
  
• It must be unengaged.  In order to calmly and methodically pick out target after target, the sensor aircraft can’t be engaged in its own frantic, twisting, turning, battle for survival.  So, the sensor must be able to loiter around the battlefield, unseen and unengaged.  Referring back to the previous requirement about range and mutual detectability, does this seem likely? 

Similarly, for the shooter platform,

• It must be close enough for the missiles to be in range.  Our standard long range missile is the AIM-120C/D which has ranges of 50-100 miles although the effective range is likely closer to 30-70 miles.  As with sensing, if the shooter aircraft is in range to shoot, it’s also in range to be shot.  In fact, Russia and China reportedly have longer range missiles in service than we do!
  
  
• It must be unengaged.  In order to calmly and methodically conduct launch after launch, the shooter aircraft can’t be engaged in its own frantic, twisting, turning, battle for survival.  So, the shooter must be able to loiter around the battlefield, unseen and unengaged.  Refering back to the previous comments about sensor and missile ranges, does this seem likely?  Is a non-stealthy, heavily loaded (further increasing detectability) aircraft going to be able to loiter near an aerial battlefield without being detected and engaged?

Now, some of you may be saying, wait, we do this kind of sensor/shooter operation all the time on the ground.  For example, a spotter, hiding in the mountains of Afghanistan, calls in shooter aircraft to bomb the enemy into defeat.  Yes, we do.  However, note the key differences.  The sensor (spotter) is able to remain completely hidden (thanks to long range optics, the presence of significant cover, and the ‘stealthy’ nature of a single human) while still spotting targets and the shooters are completely unengaged and unhindered because the enemies that we’ve used this tactic on have no aerial capability of their own.  Our shooter aircraft are able to loiter over the battlefield with no interference, whatsoever, from the enemy.  None of this will happen in the aerial sensor/shooter scenario against a peer enemy.  Thus, the ground example has no relevance to the aerial scenario.

We’re left with a concept that sounds appealing but seems unworkable under realistic combat conditions.  This seems like yet another example of the military's tendency to believe that everything we do will work and that the enemy will cooperate in their own destruction.

The military seems committed to this concept with absolutely no basis to support it.  Where is the realistic testing that has proven this concept will work?  As is so often the case, the military has latched on to a concept without any foundational study and testing to justify it.

That's my view of how this concept plays out. Do you see it differently?

Goodbye Poseidon and Hawkeye

It’s been reported that China is developing and has test fired a very long range, hypersonic air-to-air missile (VLRAAM) intended to destroy large, high value U.S. targets like the P-8 Poseidon and E-2 Hawkeye/E-3 Sentry.  According to Popular Science website (1), the missile’s characteristics are,

Length:  19 ft

Diameter:  13 in

Range:  300 miles

Speed:  Mach 6

Guidance:  AESA radar with backup IR/EO

Cruise Altitude:  19 miles

The missile has been photographed mounted on a J-16 during testing and reportedly uses a high altitude glide profile to achieve very long ranges. 

VLRAAM on J-16

Reportedly, the Russians have a similar missile, the R-37 (AA-13 Arrow) which is around 14 ft long, 15 inch diameter and has a range of around 200+ miles using a high altitude glide profile. (3)  It is deployed on MiG-31BM Foxhounds and, possibly, Su-35s.  Guidance is both semi-active and active radar homing.  The missile has a 132 lb fragmentation warhead.  It may have entered production in 2014. (2)

R-37 Missile

By comparison, the U.S. AMRAAM AIM-120D has a range of 90 miles.

For long range shots, the missile reportedly is launched at high altitude and climbs even higher to around 100,000 ft where it “glides” for much of the way to the target.

As we’ve noted on many occasions, range is a very misleading attribute.  Without accurate targeting the longest ranged missile in the world is useless.  This is why the “carrier killer” ballistic missile is such a hollow threat.  In this case, however, the U.S. aircraft may provide the Chinese with all the targeting they need.  An E-2 Hawkeye or AWACS has to radiate in order to do its job and, in effect, provides a massive “shoot me” beacon for the enemy.  This was acceptable in the past since no enemy had an air-to-air (A2A) missile with sufficient range to reach the Hawkeye/AWACS which typically operated well back from the active combat area.  Now, however, with missiles that can reach 200-300 miles, “well back” isn’t even remotely far enough back.  Of course, we can pull our radar aircraft even further back but that’s a mission kill, isn’t it?

The U.S. counts heavily on AWACS as a force multiplier in aerial combat.  Our individual fighters can remain passive and undetected while the AWACS/E-2 direct them.  If we can no longer count on this advantage then aerial combat becomes just a ‘who’s got the best fighter’ contest and the Russians and Chinese are steadily closing that gap thanks to the mediocre F-35 basket that the West has placed all their eggs in.

Consider some of the tactical implications of this (see, "Stealth Air To Air Combat Story").  A carrier group used to be able to count on nearly omniscient awareness for hundreds of miles around the group thanks to the E-2 Hawkeye.  If the Hawkeye is rendered a mission kill, or a real kill, the carrier group’s situational awareness advantage disappears and may, in fact, default to the enemy with a multitude of surface, subsurface, and aerial sensors operating in their “home” water and air space.

Since shooting down an incoming, hypersonic A2A missile cruising at 100,000 ft seems unlikely, we need to come up with other counters and alternatives. 

A purely passive sensor system would be ideal.  Such technology exists in the form of EO/IR (IRST) but the range is far too short to functionally replace the couple of hundred mile Hawkeye/AWACS radar range.

A stealthy and fast version of the Hawkeye/AWACS would allow the aircraft to shut down its radar upon detection of an incoming missile and stealthily and rapidly leave the target area but the aerodynamics of a large radome argue against effective stealth or speed though, perhaps, enough could be achieved to increase survival chances.  Regardless, this again equates to a mission kill.

Another alternative would be to distribute the AWACS function to a multitude (swarm?) of drones.  The logistics of hosting, launching, and coordinating such a continuous and revolving cast of drones would be daunting (UAV carrier?).  Even more challenging would be assembling the individual data streams from each drone into a single, coherent, comprehensive picture.  Even this would only be part of the function.  The E-2/3 act as battle management nodes and this function would also have to be duplicated.  Still, the idea is conceptually feasible.

The P-3/8 Orion/Poseidon that the Navy is counting so heavily on for broad area maritime surveillance will be a sitting duck against these kind of hypersonic, long range missiles.  This is one of many reasons that ComNavOps has been highly critical of Navy surveillance and targeting plans.

Frankly, this is a threat that the US has no ready counter for.

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(1)Popular Science website, “China is testing a new long-range, air-to-air missile that could thwart U.S. plans for air warfare”, Jeffrey Lin & P.W. Singer, 22-Nov-2016,

https://www.popsci.com/china-new-long-range-air-to-air-missile

(2)Military Today website,

http://www.military-today.com/missiles/r37.htm

(3)Wikipedia, “R-37 (missile)”,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R-37_(missile)

Stealth Air-to-Air Combat Story

The F-35C pilot was all too aware of the reason for this mission.  The latest Hawkeye shootdown had been just like the others.  The Chinese VLRAAM (Very Long Range Air to Air Missile) had used the American E-2D Hawkeye’s radar transmissions for detection and guidance and made its approach at Mach 6+ from well over 200 miles away.  The 350 kt Hawkeye had attempted to evade but the Hawkeye’s utter lack of stealth and slow speed made escape impossible.  For the Chinese, it was like shooting a turtle with a rifle – escape just wasn’t an option. 

The Chinese had shot down two of the carrier group’s Hawkeyes, so far, and forced the remainder to operate 50-100 miles behind the group instead of out in front and offset to the sides where they should be to provide early warning and long distance situational awareness.  The Chinese VLRAAM had effectively blinded the carrier group or, at the very least, substantially degraded their “vision” and shifted the operational and tactical advantages from the Americans to the Chinese.  U.S. carrier groups were not used to operating from a tactical disadvantage and it had unsettled the group and blunted its operational usefulness.

That was about to change.  The analysts on board the carrier had calculated the range of the Chinese VLRAAM and, combined with the location of known Chinese air bases, had predicted the launch point for the J-16 strike-fighter that carried the VLRAAM.  The point was above a somewhat sizable island that neither side had bothered to occupy.  Now, a U.S. F-35C had been tasked with ambushing the J-16. 

The F-35C carried two AIM-120 AMRAAM and two AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles in its internal weapon bays.  The small combat load was one of the weaknesses of the F-35 but, for this mission, it shouldn’t matter.  A simple ambush against an unsuspecting J-16 carrying a very large missile, which rendered the aircraft not very maneuverable, ought to be a straightforward affair.

The J-16 was China’s version of the Sukhoi Su-35, itself an advanced and upgraded version of the venerable Su-27.  To be sure, the base Su-35/J-16 was a very capable strike fighter with excellent maneuverability but it wasn’t terribly stealthy and, saddled with the VLRAAM, it wouldn’t be very fast or nimble.

As the F-35C closed to within 100 nm of the anticipated location, the pilot opted for a quick scan with the APG-81 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar in LPI (Low Probability of Intercept) mode.  The pilot was only expecting a single enemy aircraft but it didn’t hurt to be safe and sure.  The LPI mode ought to prevent detection with limited use.  As expected, the radar found its target and not more than 20 nm from the anticipated location.  The pilot smiled.  This was going to be a classic ambush.  The J-16 would never know what hit it.

The F-35C carried the AIM-120D AMRAAM with a claimed range approaching 100 nm but the pilot knew that was under ideal conditions.  Realistically, the probability of a hit increased with every mile closer to the target.  The pilot continued to close.  There was no need to rush the shot.  The pilot knew that his Chinese counterpart couldn’t see the F-35 at this range so the F-35 was in no danger.  As the range closed, the F-35 pilot attempted to establish an infrared track but was having trouble.  Several times he thought he had the J-16 but he couldn’t hold track. 

At 45 nm, the pilot opted for one more quick radar scan.  Sure enough, the J-16 was still there but it appeared that the aircraft had turned and was headed away at high speed.  Well, the pilot thought, this was why he hadn’t fired sooner.  At this range, the J-16 couldn’t outrun the F-35’s AMRAAM even though he was already headed away.  As the pilot readied the shot, alarm lights and audible missile warnings startled him out of his calm routine.  Frantically glancing at his threat warning screen, the pilot saw that a missile was approaching from ahead and to the left, at the 10 o’clock position.  The pilot was momentarily frozen with surprise.  There had been no aircraft there and yet a missile was rapidly approaching.  It wasn’t possible.  Shaking off the surprise, the pilot yanked the F-35’s nose into the threat to present the aircraft’s best stealth aspect, the front, waited a few more seconds to allow the missile to approach close enough, and began ejecting chaff and flares.  Having received no radar warning, he assumed the missile was an infrared heat seeker but he wasn’t going to take chances and, besides, he had chaff and flares to spare.

As the chaff and flares bloomed, the pilot rolled inverted, pulled maximum G’s, and dove down to get out of the flight path of the incoming missile and its sensor’s field of view.  He tried to twist his head back to look behind and see if the missile had been fooled but the F-35’s high fuselage and low canopy provided very poor rearward visibility – the F-35 was an aerial sniper not a dogfighter. 

After a couple of seconds that seemed to last forever, the pilot realized that the missile must have missed since he was still alive.  The frontal stealth and decoys had done their job. 

Unfortunately, he still had no idea who or what had shot at him.

Recovering from the dive, he pulled level and quickly initiated a radar scan.  There was still no target to be seen.  Glancing at the IR display, he noted a target indicator marker ahead and below him but the indicator was not updating continuously.  He knew from experience that kind of intermittent target was likely due to an aircraft with infrared suppression and a reduced heat signature.  The intermittent contact occurred as the enemy aircraft maneuvered and changed aspect.

A sickening awareness quickly crept over the pilot.  The only time he had encountered this type of situation had been during a series of training exercises against friendly F-22 Raptors.  Then, he hadn’t been able to get usable radar returns and only intermittent IR indications.  With a start, the pilot realized that he was likely facing a Chinese stealth aircraft.

The F-35 pilot was correct.  Ahead and below him, a Chinese J-20 was maneuvering for a second shot on the F-35.  In recognition of the F-35’s front aspect stealth, the J-20 had not even attempted to obtain a radar lock but had, instead, used its all aspect infrared search and track capability to find and track the F-35.  Low on the deck, the J-20’s own heat and visual signature had been lost in the ground clutter while the F-35, high above, had been highlighted against the cold and clear sky.

The entire encounter had been a setup.  The VLRAAM toting J-16 was actually a J-16D electronic warfare version mimicking a J-16 VLRAAM shooter and was now broadcasting both specific APG-81 jamming signals and broadband electronic noise to render the F-35’s radar ineffective.  The Chinese had anticipated an American ambush and turned the tables.  The stealthy J-20 had waited, low on the deck, watching for the F-35. 

Having evaded the first missile shot from the J-20, the engagement was rapidly developing into a close range, turning encounter.  The F-35’s radar couldn’t track the J-20 but neither could the J-20 track the F-35.  Both aircraft were now depending on their IRST tracking and, again, neither could maintain a track long enough to generate a high probability kill shot. 

The F-35 dove for the deck to negate the Chinese aircraft’s infrared advantage.  As he did, he got a momentary IR indication and launched one of his two Sidewinders.  Even as he launched, he saw the IR track fade as the enemy aircraft maneuvered and knew that the Sidewinder would miss as, indeed, it did.

The F-35 had catapulted from the carrier with its maximum stealth air-to-air load of 2 AMRAAMs and 2 Sidewinders.  With radar useless against the J-20 stealth aircraft, that left the F-35 with only 2 Sidewinders and the pilot had just wasted one.  In contrast, the J-20 had a large central belly bay which held 4x PL-21 medium range radar guided missiles, comparable to the US AIM-120 AMRAAM, and two smaller side weapon bays which held a total of 4x PL-10 short range, infrared, heat seeking, high off-boresight missiles.  At this point, the Chinese aircraft had three heat seekers left to the F-35’s one.

By now, the engagement had closed to gun range and devolved into a turning and maneuvering dogfight – exactly the kind of engagement that the US Air Force had bet would never happen again in aerial combat.  Unfortunately, for the US F-35’s, when two stealth aircraft meet, neither can effectively use their radar guided missiles and infrared missiles are unlikely to be able to track reliably enough to get a clean, high percentage shot from any aspect but the rear – the classic 6 o’clock position.  This mandates the classic maneuvering dogfight in order to obtain the required position.  This should have been easily predictable but the US Air Force had chosen to ignore the possibility.  Now, the lightly armed and poorly maneuverable F-35 was paying the price.

With the F-35 now down on the deck and neither pilot wanting to go vertical and highlight their infrared signature against the cold upper atmosphere, the fight became a one dimensional, level turning contest just like the ancient WWI dogfights.  Unfortunately, it was a dogfight the F-35 was ill-suited for with its poor turning performance, low g-limits, and poor maneuverability.  The F-35 had been designed with maneuverability on par with the legacy F-16/18 and now was facing a stealth fighter equivalent to an F-22.  Worse, the F-35C didn’t have an internal gun!  If the pilot couldn’t get the 6 o’clock firing position for his missile, he had no other option and with only one missile remaining, even that was only a one-time option!

As the dogfight wore on with ever tighter turns, the F-35’s airspeed bled off faster than the J-20’s and the F-35 reached a point where it had no choice but to break out of the turn and go vertical or else get outturned and become a sitting duck.  Getting another momentary IR lock, the F-35 pilot fired off his second and last Sidewinder and yanked back on his stick with full throttle to climb out of the turn – it was time to run for home!  The pilot could only hope that the Sidewinder would occupy the Chinese pilot just long enough to allow a clean break from the engagement. 

However, thanks to extensive pre-war intel obtained through cyberespionage, the Chinese pilot knew the F-35 almost as well as the US pilot did.  He knew that the F-35’s Sidewinder couldn’t reliably track his fighter from this aspect.  He ejected a series of flares but otherwise ignored the Sidewinder.  Seeing the F-35 go vertical, he waited a heartbeat to allow the F-35 to establish its direction and then turned his nose across the F-35’s path.  With better maneuverability, the J-20 was lined up and waiting as the F-35 momentarily settled on its hoped for escape path.  The J-20, with an internal 30 mm autocannon, fired a three second burst which shredded the F-35 and sent it cartwheeling toward the ground.

Leveling off, the Chinese pilot released a breath he hadn’t realized he had been holding and released the stick to shake the cramps out of his hand which had been maintaining a death grip.  The fight really hadn’t been a fair one given the F-35’s small weapons load and poor maneuverability but the pilot would gladly accept any advantage he could get.

The Americans would have to come up with another way to negate the Chinese VLRAAM advantage.  In the meantime, the carriers would have to be pulled back, out of range of the deadly Hawkeye-killing missile.

________________________________________

The VLRAAM is real. 

Launched by J-16, a multi-role strike-fighter that is roughly equivalent to the Russian Su-35.  The Very Long Range Air to Air Missile (VLRAAM) is 19 ft long and 13 in. diameter with a range of 250-300 miles.  Missile speed is Mach 6+.

“… large active electronically scanned (AESA) radar, which is used in the terminal phase of flight to lock onto the target. The AESA radar's large size—about 300-400% larger than that of most long range air-to-air missiles—and digital adaptability makes it highly effective against distant and stealthy targets, and resilient against electronic countermeasures like jamming and spoofing.” (1)

VLRAAM Mounted Underwing

The J-20 stealth fighter is real, however, its performance is somewhat speculative.

J-20 Stealth Fighter

The point of the story was to explore air to air combat between two stealth fighters and what I see as the inevitable degeneration of the combat to traditional dogfighting.

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(1)Popular Science, “China is testing a new long-range, air-to-air missile that could thwart U.S. plans for air warfare”, Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, November 22, 2016,

https://www.popsci.com/china-new-long-range-air-to-air-missile

(2)Air Force Technology website, “Chengdu J-20 Multirole Stealth Fighter Aircraft”,

https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/chengdu-j20/

Diversity In The Air

A comment was made in a post about the F-35 that has stuck with me and is worth some consideration.  Here’s the statement that caught my attention in the comment.

“The F-35 has monopoly in its sphere and we are led to believe that there is at least a reasonable chance that it will be outclassed by competitors. If air superiority turns out to be a decisive factor in the next war, I would argue that diversification is a sound choice. “ (1)

I believe the author is saying that our monolithic commitment to the F-35 to the exclusion of other fighter types may prove to be a mistake if our assumptions about future aerial combat are wrong and, if our assumptions are wrong, having other fighter types to choose from, each with their own strengths, would be very beneficial.

Consider the lesson of WWII.  From the outset of the war and as the war progressed, we had many fighter types to choose from:  Wildcat, Hellcat, P-40, Mustang, P-38 Lightning, Brewster Buffalo, Corsair, and P-47 Thunderbolt, among many others.  And those are just the U.S. fighters.  There were also dozens of bomber types and all manner of support aircraft as well as dozens of allied aircraft!  It is also important to recognize that the aircraft I’ve listed were just the ones that made it into substantial production.  For every aircraft that made it into production, several were proposed, designed, and possibly prototyped but were not produced.

Each aircraft had its strengths and weaknesses.  We were able to pick and choose which type was suited for which role.  Some aircraft failed at their intended role but were able to adapt and excel in other roles.  The Corsair was not entirely successful as the carrier aircraft it was intended to be but became an outstanding land based fighter.  Others, while not failing at their intended role, had strengths that allowed them to excel in unanticipated roles.  The P-47, for example, was intended as a high altitude fighter but eventually adapted to become a very effective low altitude ground attack aircraft.

As the war progressed, new missions arose.  Short range air-to-air combat gave way to long range escort missions.  Carrier fighter aircraft became reasonably effective bombers.  And so on.

The point is that as the needs of combat changed over the course of the war we had a wide selection of aircraft to choose from and could select the one best suited for the new roles. 

Today, our range of aircraft options is much more limited and, if the F-35 ever makes it into full production, we’ll quickly retire most of our other aircraft.  We’ll essentially be limited to a single aircraft.  If it should turn out that our view of future aerial combat is wrong and the F-35 is not the perfect fighting machine that the military would have us believe, we won’t have any other ready alternatives to choose from.  What if the Chinese figure out how to negate the F-35’s stealth and can detect it easily?  At that point the F-35 is just a mediocre fighter, at best, and we’ll have no other aircraft to turn to.

P-47 Thunderbolt - We Had Choices

While there was an inefficiency in having, supporting, and operating so many aircraft types in WWII, it provided a valuable flexibility and adaptability that we’ve lost today.

Instead of embarking on mega-dollar, once every 40 year, uber programs to produce one aircraft that replaces every aircraft in existence, maybe we should be producing much more frequent, smaller lots of aircraft, each a new design.  I’ve already discussed how that can be done in a very short time frame so I won’t bother describing it again.

War is not efficient.  War is not a business case.  If having multiple aircraft types is the price for flexibility and adaptability in war then it’s a price worth paying.  The only thing more expensive than waging a war with many different types of aircraft is losing a war due to lack of choices.

What would I suggest for some new aircraft types?  How about these?

• A very long range air superiority fighter for the Chinese theater
• A medium range, heavy weight fighter with very large missile capacity for the Russian theater
• A small, short range, very fast, very maneuverable, pure Boyd-like fighter for cheap export sales to allies – this would greatly boost total allied numbers and provide valuable support during war;  this would be aimed at European countries to counter Russia
• A very long range interdiction fighter for carriers – a modern F-14
• A very large, very long range missile “arsenal fighter”

Note:  I have no interest in debating the specifics of any particular proposed type.  The point is to have a more diverse inventory so that we have choices when the next war springs its inevitable surprises on us.

________________________________

(1)Navy Matters blog comment, “I Actually Hate The F-35”, Thursday, April 21, 2016, by username: Eric, April 22, 2016 at 6:50 AM,

http://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2016/04/i-actually-hate-f-35.html

F-35 And Dogfighting

The shilling for the F-35 is absolutely breathtaking in its scope and inaccuracy.  “Experts” of all varieties are regularly trotted out to talk up the aircraft and explain why it is the greatest flying machine ever built or that likely ever will be built.  Careful analysis invariably demonstrates the falsity of the claims.

Recall the Marines declaration of IOC after a stunningly successful operational test?  Of course, after we read the DOT&E report we found out that the mission availability rate was 50%, at best, and the evaluation relied on spare parts and even spare aircraft being flown onto the ship during the test.

We have the Red Flag exercise in which the military claimed the F-35 achieved a 10,000:1 kill ratio or maybe it was only 20:1.  When you’re making up numbers, it doesn’t really matter what they are, does it?  Of course, we have no actual data and conditions upon which to assess the validity of the claim and given the history of lies associated with this aircraft, I flat out don’t believe the claim.

Rather than tediously list all the exaggerated claims that have been made and disproved, let’s just skip ahead and look at the latest.  SNAFU website gets the credit for the heads up on this story about F-35 dogfighting which was posted on Business Insider website (1).

“But according to retired US Marine Corps Maj. Dan Flatley, who helped design the training syllabus for F-35 dogfights, the F-35's lackluster performance against legacy jets had more to do with old habits of the pilots and a weapons system in its infancy rather than anything wrong with the F-35 concept itself.”

Right off the bat, let’s note and acknowledge that Maj. Flatley is as biased as it is possible to be.  Anyone who helped design the training syllabus for the F-35 has a huge stake in the game and a clear bias.  However, let’s also be fair and recognize that merely having a bias does not mean that what he has to say is wrong.  What it means is that what he has to say has to be taken with a huge grain of salt until proven.  So, moving on …

The problem, according to Flatley, is not the aircraft but the bad habits of the highly trained fighter pilots.  Now that sounds like an excuse for a poor aircraft.  Again, though, to be fair, any weapon system has to be used to its strengths to be effective.  The Major, then, appears to be saying that the F-35 is not a dogfighter, which confirms the well known “secret” that we’ve heard for some time, but that it can be an effective aerial combatant if flown to its strengths.  Okay, let’s accept that for the moment and keep going …

“If you try to fight it like a fighter it isn’t, you’re going to have terrible results,” Flatley said of the F-35.”

“Flatley stressed that dogfighting, where the close range diminishes the F-35's stealth and sensor fusion advantages, is certainly not the purpose of the Joint Strike Fighter … “

Again, confirmation of the well known “secret”.

And now, the key part where Flatley explains how the F-35 can effectively engage in aerial combat.

“Unlike dogfighters from World War II, the F-35 mainly focuses on flying undetected while using its array of fused sensors to paint a clear picture of the threat environment for miles out and to engage with targets before they're ever seen.”

According to Flatley, the F-35’s aerial combat role is to be a sniper around the periphery of a battlefield – unseen but seeing all that is around it and sniping unsuspecting enemy aircraft who will never know what hit them.  I have no problem with that, whatsoever.  In fact, it’s kind of the ideal goal of aerial combat – to achieve that 6 o’clock position and gun down the enemy before they know you’re there.  Of course, with modern missiles, the 6 o’clock position isn’t necessarily required but it conveys the concept.

Do you see the problem – two problems, actually – with this concept?

The first problem is that the concept assumes that the F-35 can remain far enough away from the aerial battlefield to remain undetected and yet still be able to see all enemy aircraft.  If the enemy has nothing but early legacy aircraft, this will work and work wonderfully.  MiG-21/23/25/27’s will be toast, without a doubt, as will early Sukhois.  However, what happens when recent legacy aircraft that are semi-stealthy are in the air?  Modern, updated, late series MiGs and late variant Sukhois are moderately stealth, highly maneuverable, hard to detect, and harder to kill.  What happens when those aircraft don’t stand out like radar beacons and the F-35 doesn’t see all of them or has to move closer to the battlefield to get viable returns and images?  And – you can anticipate this coming – what happens when the F-35 encounters peer stealth fighters like the Russian T-50/PAK FA and Chinese J-20/31 on the near future battlefield?  What happens when the F-35 can’t see the enemy aircraft or, at least, no better then enemy aircraft can see the F-35?  In fact, enemy aircraft seem somewhat more advanced in IRST capability so they may actually possess the detection range advantage over the F-35!  How does the F-35 concept work when the F-35 can’t see the enemy aircraft?  The short answer is, it doesn’t!

“As exciting as dogfights are, it's been decades since a US jet engaged an enemy in a turning dogfight, and the F-35's design reflects that new reality.”

That leads us directly to the second problem which is, how many times, now, has the era of the dogfight been declared dead?  The first few times, it was over due to the advent of missiles.  Of course, that proved to be wrong and we had to scramble to relearn how to dogfight.  Now, dogfighting is over due to stealth.  Is it?  Or, will we wind up having to relearn how to dogfight, yet again?  When two stealth aircraft meet in combat and neither can reliably lock missiles on the other, the combat will, inevitably, devolve into a close range, guns-only, high-g, turning dogfight.  Recent anecdotal evidence from exercises suggest that this is exactly what happens.  Now, you have no choice but to dogfight and, according to Maj. Flatley, the F-35 is extremely ill-equipped to do that.

What happens when you can’t see the stealthy enemy but he, with his superior IRST, can see you and the F-35 is now the hunted?  Again, you’re going to be forced into a dogfight for which the F-35 is not designed and not capable.

Let’s put this in terms we can all understand.  Can an F-35 employ the peripheral sniping concept against another F-35/22, successfully?  If not, then the F-35 is a failure on the future aerial battlefield and is relegated to fighting only older legacy aircraft.  That’s a hideously expensive aircraft to be able to engage only older legacy aircraft.  Heck, we have F-15/16/18s that can already do that!

Had the F-35 made it to squadron service ten or twenty years ago, as intended, it would have been successful as an aerial sniper because there were no enemy stealth fighters.  Now, however, that advantage has been squandered due to the obscenely long development time of the F-35 and the near future battlefield is going to be populated by stealthy and semi-stealthy enemy aircraft.  The F-35’s design combat concept is already obsolete.  Once again, our unwise assumption that technology makes dogfighting a thing of the past will prove disastrous in combat.

Ironically, Major Flatley, in his attempt to praise the F-35, has told us all about the failing of the F-35. 

__________________________________

(1)Business Insider website, “Here's why the F-35 once lost to F-16s, and how it made a stunning comeback”, Alex Lockie, retrieved 19-Apr-2017,

http://www.businessinsider.com/f-35-vs-f-16-15-18-lost-beaten-flatley-comeback-2017-4

F-18 IRST Status

Infrared Search and Track (IRST) is one of the hot topics in aviation.  Supporters claim it greatly enhances the stealth of a fighter since it allows search and tracking via passive modes as opposed to active radar use.  It also allows detection of enemy aircraft that are radar stealth’ed and, thus, negates an enemy’s stealth advantage. 

The Navy has an IRST development program underway to equip the F-18E/F Hornet fleet with IRST as an effort to keep the non-stealthy F-18s relevant and combat effective in an age of stealth.

Following is a discussion of the F-18 IRST program as reported in the DOT&E 2016 Annual Report.

The F-18 IRST sensor will be mounted on the nose of a centerline fuel tank under the fuselage of the Hornet.  The current IRST21 unit is being developed by Boeing and Lockheed Martin and is descended from the F-14 IRST.  The Navy plans to procure 170 IRST units.  The current Block I will be fielded as test units and eventually upgraded to the future production Block II. 

Block I was originally scheduled to enter full rate production but the Navy decided to forego production in favor of the Block II version after a program review of the Block I test results.  This suggests that the Block I was deemed insufficiently successful to warrant production and, in typical Navy thinking, the unsuccessful Block I is bypassed in the hope that the non-existent Block II will somehow attain the success that the Block I did not.  There is nothing inherent wrong with this approach as long as we don’t commit to the Block II production before its capabilities are proven.  Too often, the Navy, faced with a failure, opts to incorporate undemonstrated “improvements” that exist only on paper and then immediately commit to production without waiting for demonstrated success.

The key development in the program thus far, Operational Assessment 2 (OA 2), took place in November 2015 when the IRST was tested under realistic combat conditions.  Unfortunately, the results were less than successful.

“The system … could not reliably detect and track targets well enough to support weapons employment in an environment that reflects realistic fighter employment and tactics.”

Immediately subsequent to this assessment, a program review was held.

“Assistant Secretary of the Navy (ASN) for Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA) held an IRST program review on January 27, 2016, and in a September 8, 2016, Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM), ASN (RDA) approved a restructured program that foregoes full-rate production of Block I sensors and proceeds directly to development of the Block II system. The Block I system will not be fielded and IOT&E did not begin in 2016 as planned.

The Navy plans to hold the Block II Preliminary Design Review in May 2017 and begin IOT&E in 2020.”

As discussed, it is clear that the results of the assessment test and subsequent review indicated that the Block I IRST was not successful.  Unfortunately, instead of pausing until development could overcome whatever problems were seen, the Navy has opted to leap into Block II and has already scheduled production.

It is noteworthy that the Hornet-IRST-fuel tank combination has been approved for the full flight envelope as long as the fuel tank is empty.  Some restrictions have been placed on both launch and flight conditions with varying loads of fuel in the tank.

With the tank empty, the IRST becomes, in essence, a giant sensor the size, weight, and drag of a fuel tank!  If the tank can’t be used for fuel or only in partial load conditions, one has to wonder at the wisdom of placing the unit in a centerline fuel tank to begin with as opposed to a wing or nose mounted location.  On the other hand, DOT&E points out that the flight restrictions may not be significant.

“Given the rate at which fuel is consumed from the centerline fuel tank, these restrictions are effective for only a short period at the beginning of the mission profile and should not have an operational impact.”

The under-the-fuselage location also restricts the field of view of the sensor.  Obviously, it can’t see anything above the aircraft.  Thus, it’s only 50% effective to begin with, even if it worked perfectly for the lower field of view.

Reliability is also an issue.

“Demonstrated reliability is below what was expected at this point in the flight test program. As of the time of DOT&E’s OA 2 report, the cumulative Mean Time Between Operational Mission Failure (MTBOMF) was 4.1 hours; the reliability after incorporating known fixes was 19.5 hours. The MTBOMF requirement is 40 hours and the system was expected to have a projected reliability of 38 hours when entering IOT&E.”

DOT&E’s report concludes with this criticism of the Navy and admonishment to learn a lesson.

“Many of the Block I system’s difficulties with detection and tracking seen in OA 1 and OA 2 did not require flight testing to uncover them, but could have been discovered earlier via analysis and modeling and simulation. The Navy expects that the Block II configuration (which includes sensor and aircraft hardware and software), will provide improved capability. This assumption should be tested as early as possible, prior to major decisions …,”

Unfortunately, the Navy seems determined to ignore this lesson, having already scheduled Block II production.

Please don’t read this post as being against fielding an IRST.  ComNavOps believes that a fully functional IRST would be a relatively cheap and highly effective combat aid and is well worth pursuing.  Successful and functional IRST units apparently exist around the world and there is no reason to believe that the Navy and its manufacturing partners cannot produce a functional unit.  However, we need to go about this intelligently.

I would recommend that the Navy reconsider the under-the-fuselage location.  Perhaps there is a good reason why the unit can’t be wing or nose mounted but it would be worth some extraordinary effort to do so.  The actual sensor is small and should be able to be mounted in a more advantageous position.

I also recommend that the Navy stop making production plans for an unproven and, thus far, unsuccessful unit.  By all means, continue development but set production plans aside and remove that artificial deadline from consideration.  Take the time needed to field a fully functioning unit.