Naval Air Wings (Scrap Two Carriers – Part 2)

Once again, we are honored to have a guest post from Carlton Meyer.  You may know him as username ‘G2mil’ and the author of many outstanding articles posted on his website at www.g2mil.com.  Today’s post is the companion piece to his recent post, “Scrap Two Carriers”.  In today’s writing, he proposes an alternate use for the carrier air wings freed up by scrapping two carriers.  Enjoy!  

 

______________________________

In a past blog post, “Scrap Two Carriers” I argued the US Navy’s fleet has become imbalanced and Admirals should scrap two supercarriers to free manpower and aircraft for the remaining nine carrier strike groups. This would also free billions of dollars each year for other Navy programs. I noted this will probably occur anyway because of the flawed Ford class carrier program. I suggested that two Carrier Air Wings (CAWs) could conduct sea control missions from existing American airbases overseas. This idea was considered in the past, calling them Navy Tactical Support Wings, a term still used for the Navy Reserve air wing. My proposal would incorporate Marine Corps squadrons and call land-based CAWs-- Naval Air Wings (NAW).

 

During World War II, most naval missions were flown from land bases, not from aircraft carriers. Since then, the US Navy has mostly refused to operate fighter squadrons from land bases, even though it has airbases at key sea control locations like in Sicily and Crete. NAWs will not require an ultra-expensive supercarrier, not require frequent resupply at sea, nor escort ships. On the other hand, large long-range precision guided missiles can blow big holes in fixed runways. However, such missiles cost at least $5 million to construct and require months to produce. If airfields are properly supported by rapid runway repair teams, they can fill a big hole in an hour and top it with gravel for emergency use. When a few hours can be spared, the team can top it off with quick dry concrete that can cure in four hours.

 

The composition of US Navy CAWs is always changing. The US Navy is short of needed aircraft, which explains today’s F-35C squadrons with just ten aircraft. This is the Navy's goal for future CAWs:

 

• Two Navy Strike Fighter (VFA) Squadrons with 14 FA-18E/Fs each. Several aircraft are often tasked as refuelers.
• One Marine Fighter Attack (VMFA) Squadron with ten F-35Cs.
• One Navy Strike Fighter (VFA) Squadron with ten F-35Cs.
• One Electronic Attack (VAQ) Squadron, with five EA-18G Growlers.
• One Carrier Airborne Early Warning (VAW) Squadron, with four E-2D Hawkeyes
• One Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Squadron of eight MH-60S Seahawks
• One Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) Squadron of eleven MH-60R Seahawks, 3–5 are typically based on other ships of the carrier strike group.
• A Fleet Logistics Support (VRC) Squadron Detachment of two CVM-22 Ospreys.

 

My proposed land-based NAW would consist of:

 

• Two Navy Strike Fighter (VFA) Squadrons with 14 FA-18E/Fs each.
• Two Marine Fighter Attack (VMFA) Squadrons with 16 F-35Bs each.
• One CONUS based Marine VMGR Aerial Refueler Squadron with 15 KC-130Js tasked with support via rotational deployments, so perhaps four will be in theater to support the NAW with more during wartime.
• One Navy Electronic Attack (VAQ) Squadron, with five EA-18G Growlers.
• One Navy Carrier Airborne Early Warning (VAW) Squadron with four E-2D Hawkeyes
• One Navy Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Squadron of eight MH-60S Seahawks based at several locations or aboard surface ships in the region.
• One Navy Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) Squadron of eleven MH-60R Seahawks based at several locations or aboard surface combatants in the region.
• A CONUS based Marine Fleet Logistics Support (VMM) Squadron of 12 MV-22 Ospreys tasked with support via rotational deployments, so perhaps three will be in theater to support the NAW with more during wartime.

 

The Marines should support this idea because Marine Aviation lacks a clear purpose in peer wars where amphibious operations will not be viable until the latter stage of a conflict. Marine Air lacks vital electronic warfare aircraft that Navy EA-18Gs provide, and lacks the long-range aerial radar that Navy E-2Ds provide. The Marines recently focused on support for expeditionary airfields during major wars. Supporting forward airfields for dispersed land based naval aircraft as part of NAWs fits perfectly. NAWs also can also support small dispersed units of Marines ashore. Finally, NAW staff will include many Marine Corps personnel and command should rotate between Navy and Marine aviators.

 

The Marines have provided squadrons to support US Navy carrier deployment for decades and currently provide four, hence the purchase of F-35C (Navy CTOL version) for four Marine VMFA squadrons. NAWs would each include two squadrons of F-35B (VSTOL) that can easily operate from shorter runways or those damaged from missile attacks. Modifying two CAWs into land-based NAWs with four Marine VMFA squadrons frees four Navy VFA squadrons to fill the gaps in other CAWs, or provides half the aircraft needed to form another CAW should the USS Ford finally become ready for a real deployment.

The basic mission of a NAW is sea control. This will involve support of CAW operations wherever possible with both combat aircraft and logistics support. A CAW may embark extra aircraft from a NAW or even an entire squadron. It may choose to swap types of aircraft depending on the threat and mission. The NAW can also supplement or swap aircraft with an LHA/LHD deployed in the region during smaller conflicts. Perhaps moving some helicopters ashore and adding F-35Bs, or the opposite.

 

NAW aircraft will be based at small Naval Air Facilities that will include medical and maintenance capabilities, thus ideal places to offload damaged CAW aircraft and sailors and acquire replacements. A CAW in combat with China may lose a dozen aircraft in a day! NAWs can instantly provide replacements. On the other hand, a heavily damaged carrier may need to transit stateside for months of repairs so her aircraft can continue to fight ashore as part of a NAW. In the early days of a war with China, cautious Admirals may keep their carriers “east of Guam” and out of range of Chinese submarines, long-range ballistic missiles, and bomber launched cruise missiles. Some of this reluctance is because our Navy will lack escorts for ships that supply underway carrier strike groups.

 

NAW and USAF airbases in WestPac may have been pummeled with strikes that continue every few days, but their airfields remain usable. The NAW in WestPac has fought varied engagements with the loss of many aircraft. Admirals may choose to use their supercarriers as home bases far from threats, deploying their squadrons forward to NAW airbases for days at a time to fight, then returning to their carrier for rest and replenishment. CAW aircraft may use battered NAW bases or forward Marine expeditionary bases as FAARPs (forward arming and air refueling points) to fly more sorties before returning to their carrier. These bases could also recover damaged aircraft or those low on fuel that can’t reach their carriers.

 

NAWs do not require the establishment of new airfields. The US military has dozens of airbases at key locations around the world for sea control.  NAWs will simply utilize existing airfields to conduct sea control missions and support CAW and Marine Corps operations in theater, although they could utilize wartime expeditionary airfields the Marines are keen to establish. One can criticize the lack of mobility of a NAW compared to a CAW, but it provides the same capabilities without a $15 billion Ford class carrier, without the worry that a carrier might be sunk, without the need for escort ships, and with a half of the support manpower. NAWs will require a few billion dollars to improve and expand existing airbases, but this costs far less than ships needed for a carrier strike group, without the massive annual operating costs for ship fuel and maintenance.

 

Moreover, overseas presence requires the rotation of three CONUS based aircraft carriers with their three CAWs to match what a single overseas based NAW provides! One can argue that naval aircraft can quickly deploy to overseas bases during wartime as needed, but it takes years to establish support facilities in the form of munitions stockpiles, ground support equipment, and aircraft spare parts blocks. Permanent overseas squadrons with regular peacetime interaction with allied forces will ensure better wartime cooperation. A major war will result in a rapid consumption of anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, and precision strike munitions that the Navy’s supply system cannot quickly replenish. CAW aircraft would soon draw upon the munition stockpiles at NAW bases ashore.

 

The Marine Corps traditionally publishes a very detailed “Marine Aviation Plan” each year, yet the last one was in 2019[1], probably because changes underway makes it difficult to plan.    The Marines tout the value of its forward-deployed MEUs, yet these require support from less than half the squadrons in Marine Aviation. Public literature indicates the Marines are unable to articulate a role for the remainder. The Department of Navy needs to find a role for Marine Air, and NAWs are part of the solution. Ideas for the exact basing of two NAWs will be addressed in a future blog post.

 

 

________________________________

 

Carlton Meyer is a former Marine Corps officer whose writings appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette, Naval Proceedings, and the Navy Times. He became irritated when some articles approved by editors never appeared after the Marine Commandant’s office and the CNO’s office began to preview publications and block articles they didn’t like. This explains why their articles have become bland. He began posting his ideas at www.G2mil.com in 2000.

 

________________________________

 

[1]https://www.aviation.marines.mil/portals/11/2019%20avplan.pdf

Scrap Two Carriers! - Part 1

We are honored today to have a guest post from Carlton Meyer.  You may know him as username ‘G2mil’ and the author of many outstanding articles posted on his website at www.g2mil.com.  Carlton has a two (maybe three?) part series of posts describing his proposal to scrap two carriers.  In today’s post, he lays out the background and basis for his proposal.  The second part, which will come later in the year, will describe the results and ramifications of his proposal.

 

_____________________________________ 

 

 

Scrap Two Carriers!

Carlton Meyer

The US Navy is out of balance. Most funds are devoted to maintaining a fleet of eleven supercarriers to keep two or three "on patrol" for eight months at a time, ready for the Soviet Navy to reappear. If war begins with a major power, carriers should remain far from danger. Aircraft carriers are useful, but must remain in safe seas until land-based aircraft and submarines clear the seas of most enemy subs and destroy enemy long-range missile sites and air bases. Then they can arrive for strike missions or to escort amphibious groups to support an invasion. They are also useful against weak nations, but the USA doesn't need 11 supercarriers, in addition to the 10 large carriers used by the Marines, which are larger than World II Navy carriers. Shrinking to nine supercarriers frees funds and manpower to rebalance the fleet with more surface combatants and aircraft.

If admirals quickly dispatch carriers to the Western Pacific in time of war with China, they will suffer the fate of the mighty British battleship HMS Prince of Wales along with the heavy cruiser HMS Repulse when they sailed from Singapore to confront the Japanese Navy at the beginning of World War II. As their respected admiral executed World War I era tactics for a great ship battle, his first-class warships were attacked by a swarm of pesky land-based aircraft and sunk. Experts agree that if Japan had focused production on aircraft and submarines rather than battleships, it would have taken the USA another year or two to prevail. For example, tremendous resources were devoted to the three massive Yamato class battleships. Admirals feared committing them to any serious naval engagement knowing the embarrassment should one be sunk, as will be the case with current American supercarriers. When forced to deploy toward the end of the war, all three super-battleships were easily sunk by torpedoes from submarines and aircraft. 

This occurred before torpedoes and bombs had guidance systems! Japanese kamikaze attacks were the first guided attacks on ships. These older aircraft were flown by new pilots with no experience and 81% were shot down or crashed at sea. Yet these attacks killed more American sailors than kamikaze pilots, sunk 47 ships and damaged 365 others. This tactic may not be dead. A nation may send four dozen old supersonic fighters flying Mach near sea-level toward an American carrier, loaded with dumb bombs and blazing away with 20mm gatling guns. These need not even be suicide missions if pilots eject prior to impact.

American admirals fear war with a peer nation because they know a single hit may explode an aircraft carrier filled with aviation fuel, missiles, and bombs, alongside 6000 sailors. One hit below deck and the ship may blow up like an ammo ship - killing everyone! Or carriers may be sunk by a single lurking submarine or a volley of long-range cruise missiles. The USS Forrestal was severely damaged during the Vietnam war after a minor fire caused a single 20mm round to fire, which set off a chain of explosions that caused mass casualties and set the ship ablaze. In 1969, a small rocket fired off an aircraft aboard the USS Enterprise set off a series of 18 explosions, blowing eight holes into the flight deck and killing 28 sailors, with 314 injured and 15 aircraft destroyed.

The US Navy needs only nine supercarriers that can still rotate deployments so that one can arrive anywhere within a week or two for small crises. Carrier cuts may soon occur automatically because of the USS Ford disaster this blog has recently covered. It looks certain that the Ford program will require billions more dollars and several years to modify the two completed Fords and two more under construction. Will cuts to naval aviation and surface combatants be required to fund this, making the current imbalance worse? Today’s US Navy fleet has become imbalanced as the number of escorts for each carrier has fallen to about half that common in the Cold War, so each carrier is even more vulnerable. Two fewer carriers solves this problem as it frees their escorts for other carriers and frees funding and manpower to procure more escorts, and helps solve the Navy 5000 man shortage for at-sea billets recently covered in this blog.

Half of the savings from two carrier deactivations would allow for increased purchases of naval aircraft to fill the decks of the remaining carriers. US Navy carriers now deploy with around 25% fewer aircraft than during the Cold War due to rising aircraft costs. Admirals excuse this by claiming carriers need fewer aircraft since they are now more capable, although they can’t deny that more aircraft are better. In addition, the Navy and Marine Corps have almost no spare aircraft for wartime attrition. Downsizing to nine carriers would allow them to deploy with a full complement of aircraft and fleet replacement or reserve squadrons with 100 spare aircraft for wartime attrition. Another option is to maintain two carrier air wings ashore overseas that incorporate Marine Corps squadrons. A post about this concept will appear later this year.
 

 

 

_________________________________________

 

Carlton Meyer is a former Marine Corps officer whose writings appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette, Naval Proceedings, and the Navy Times. He became irritated when some articles approved by editors never appeared after the Marine Commandant’s office and the CNO’s office began to preview publications and block articles they didn’t like. This explains why their articles have become bland. He began posting his ideas at www.G2mil.com in 2000.

F-35 On Carriers? Sorry, Can't Use 'Em

When the USS Ford was being built, we all assumed, quite logically, that the ship would be able to operate the F-35 which had been around for twenty years or so, in various stages of development.  The timing was looking about right – the carrier and the F-35C would both be ready about the same time.  Well, in yet another disappointment for the Ford, it turns out that the carrier wasn’t actually built to operate F-35s.  No, this is not an April Fools post or some ComNavOps comedy piece.  This is real.  The Navy’s newest carrier can’t operate the F-35.

 

As it turns out, most of the Navy’s carriers and amphibious ships (LHA/LHD) can’t operate the F-35. 

 

Yes, the F-35C can take off and land on the carriers but the ships lack the communications, data integration, and maintenance facilities to fully utilize the supposed capabilities of the F-35 – those much hyped surveillance capabilities.  Without the proper comms and data handling facilities on the carriers, the F-35 can collect data but can’t effectively relay it to the carrier and allow the carrier to make use of it. 

 

On a related and stunning note, the US Navy has almost no ability to transfer F-35 engines to carriers.  The Ford is the only carrier that has the equipment to receive an engine.  The MV-22 has demonstrated the ability to transport a single engine to a carrier but this can only be done over very short distances.

 

As far as the amphibious ships, none can land the F-35B due to its excessive exhaust heat which damages the flight deck unless it has been specially modified.  You’ll recall that even the new USS America was unable to operate the F-35B, as the ship was built.  It had to be modified with special deck heat treatments, thermal and structural modifications to compartments immediately beneath the flight deck, and relocation of equipment in the path of the F-35B’s downward landing exhaust in addition to numerous communications and data handling facility installations and modifications.  Yes, America, the ship that was purpose built for the F-35B was unable to operate the F-35B without extensive and expensive modifications.

 

In fact, of 11 carriers and 33 amphibious ships, currently only 4 amphibious ships can fully operate the F-35.(1)  The lucky four are listed below.

 

• USS Essex
• USS Makin Island
• USS America
• USS Wasp

 

Even with the modifications, the F-35B can only land on a couple of limited spots.  For the America, the F-35B can only land on spots 7 and 9.(2)

 

It is worth noting that none of the supercarriers can operate the F-35.

 

The USS Bonhomme Richard, LHD-6, which recently suffered a massive fire that burned out of control for several days, would have been the fifth ship altered to operate the F-35.  The Bonhomme Richard is now, officially, being scrapped.

 

So, for those of you who envision air armadas of Navy F-35s sweeping the skies clear of enemy aircraft, that vision is still a long way in the future because we only have four amphibious ships that can even operate the F-35!

 

It is worth noting that the modifications required to operate the F-35 require many months and hundreds of millions of dollars to install (I assume the F-35 proponents are dutifully adding that to the cost of the F-35?).  It is not a capability that can be quickly installed when needed.  It will take decades to bring the current ships up to the standard required to handle the F-35.  If a war were to start today, we’d be limited to four amphibious ships operating our F-35s.

 

What is all this telling us?  What lessons are being demonstrated (and ignored!)?

 

• In our pursuit of technology, we created an aircraft too complex to even communicate with our carriers.
• Concurrency kills.
• Even the modified ships have only a limited F-35 operating capability and, in the event of battle damage, we might lack the ability to operate the aircraft due to damage to the couple of specific landing spots.
• In pursuit of the big, expensive, flashy toys, we’re ignoring the mundane support and infrastructure needed to even fully operate the toys.

 

 

 

Just a reminder … When the F-35C reaches squadron service, the Navy is planning to reduce the squadron size from the current 12 aircraft to 10, further shrinking the already shrunken air wings.  The F-35 is the gift that keeps on giving!

 

 

 

_____________________________________

 

(1)Breaking Defense website, “USS Bonhomme Richard Heads For Scrapyard After Devastating Fire ”, Paul McLeary, 30-Nov-2020,

https://breakingdefense.com/2020/11/uss-bonhomme-richard-heads-for-scrapyard-after-devastating-fire/

 

(2)Jalopnik website, “Navy Builds Ship For F-35, Ship Needs Months Of Upgrades To Handle F-35”, Tyler Rogoway, 13-Apr-2015,

https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/navy-builds-ship-for-f-35-ship-needs-months-of-upgrade-1697523492

• 
  

Carrier Deployments and Combat Readiness

USNI News website has a lengthy article about carrier deployments and maintenance.(1)  It makes for sobering reading and I urge you to read it.  I want to analyze the implications but, first, it is necessary to understand the fundamental conditions so here are some of the main points from the article (this does not relieve you of the responsibility of reading the entire article for yourself!):

 

• Carrier operations are up 40 percent this year over last year;  from Jan. through Oct. 31, U.S. carriers had spent a combined total of 855 days at sea – 258 days more than all of 2019.
• Carriers are regularly conducting back-to-back, double deployments and suffering shortened or skipped maintenance periods as a result.
• The East Coast has just one deployable carrier for the next year and that one is the Eisenhower which has just returned from deployment and will have to execute a double deployment with a shortened maintenance interval.
• Carrier maintenance is routinely running significantly longer than planned due to the deferred maintenance resulting from double deployments and longer deployments. 

 

The current status of our carriers illustrates the problems.  Right now, two carriers are tied up with mid-life refueling and complex overhaul (RCOH) activities instead of the normal one carrier at a time: USS George Washington (CVN-73) is in the second half of its four-year overhaul, and USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74) is in pre-RCOH activities and should begin its overhaul late next year. 

 

A third, the Ford, is still trying to achieve operational status and is years away from doing so.  The first deployment is likely 2024 and that assumes that all goes well, including shock tests.

 

Of the remaining 8 carriers, 4 are home ported on the West coast, 3 are on the East coast, and 1, the Reagan, is ported in Japan.  The West coast carriers are generally adhering to the planned operational schedule although the Roosevelt is scheduled for a double deployment.  The East coast carriers have Bush in the 20th month of a planned 28 month maintenance period, Truman is in a maintenance period after undergoing a double deployment, and Eisenhower is halfway through a double deployment.

 

The carrier status is summarized in the table below. 

 

 

Carrier	Assigned	Status
Nimitz	West Coast	deployed
Vinson	West Coast	training
Roosevelt	West Coast	executing double deployment
Lincoln	West Coast	maintenance after record deployment
Eisenhower	East Coast	executing double deployment
Truman	East Coast	maintenance after double deployment
Bush	East Coast	20 months into 28 month maintenance
Ford	East Coast	unusable
Reagan	Japan
Washington	RCOH
Stennis	RCOH

 

 

Deployments, and double deployments, are eating up our carrier lifespans, ruining their material condition, and reducing readiness.  Why are we doing this to ourselves?  Deployments are intended as a deterrent but they do not accomplish anything.  I know that’s trying to prove a negative but we do have evidence.  If carriers are what’s preventing Iran, Russia, NKorea, and China from initiating hostilities with us or our allies then hostilities should have occurred during any of the extended periods of carrier coverage gaps that have occurred over the last decade or so in the various regions.  The fact that they haven’t demonstrates that the presence of a carrier has no deterrent effect and the absence of a carrier has no detrimental effect.  In other words, carrier deployments serve no purpose. 

 

If carrier deployments serve no purpose, why are we burning up carrier readiness conducting deployments?  Why are we conducting double deployments with deferred maintenance that is worsening the readiness situation?  At the moment, our carrier combat readiness is abysmal. 

 

Deferred maintenance in order to conduct double deployments is robbing Maintenance Peter to pay Deployment Paul and Deployment Paul isn’t giving us anything for our effort.

 

It is important to understand the devastating effects of double deployments and deferred maintenance.  Let’s look at one example:  storage tanks.  Carriers have enormous numbers of tanks that store all manner of fluids.  Those tanks corrode and need regular maintenance.  If the maintenance is performed on a regular basis, the tanks never get too bad and the work is fairly straightforward, easy, and quick.  However, if the regular maintenance is deferred then the tanks are much more corroded by the time maintenance is performed and what should have been a fairly straightforward, easy, and quick effort becomes much more difficult and time consuming.  An analogy would be if you take care of little spots of rust on your car as they appear, it’s no big deal but if you wait until the car is covered in rust and the corrosion has eaten through some panels then the repair is a major effort and cost.

 

This is exactly what’s happening with the carriers.  The planned maintenance work is being hugely increased as the extent of the deterioration is revealed when the equipment is actually opened up and examined.  Maintenance time is being doubled from what was planned.

 

We are generating crippling maintenance requirements faster than we can perform the required maintenance.  Every deployment increases the carrier maintenance backlog and makes the situation worse.  We need to step back, take a pause in carrier operations, focus on maintenance, and then return to operations with a sane concept of use instead of the blind attempt to fulfill the Combatant Commander’s ego-driven requests for carriers.  

 We need to say no to the Combatant Commanders.  I know that some of you are going to say that the Navy has to obey orders and can’t just arbitrarily say no.  Well, that’s incorrect.  The National Defense Strategy in January 2018 called on the military to prioritize building up readiness and lethality for a future fight over routine low-end operations today.  There’s the permission to say no.  Combatant Commanders do not ‘outrank’ the National Defense Strategy.  The Navy has, essentially, been given an order to prioritize readiness over routine operations.  Instead, we are doing the opposite of that. 

 

There you have it … Deployments (generated by the Combatant Commander’s pointless requests for carriers) are degrading our carrier readiness to an alarming state and the situation is getting worse with each deployment and double deployment.  Carrier usage is increasing while maintenance is decreasing.  This is insanity and must stop.  The National Defense Strategy gives the Navy the ‘cover’ they need to say no to the endless and pointless requests for carriers from the Combatant Commanders.  Now we just need a Chief of Naval Operations with the courage to actually say no.  Unfortunately, CNO Gilday has demonstrated that he is not that man.

 

 

_______________________________ 

 

By the way, we only have 9 air wings. 

 

By the way, the same problems are happening with all ships, not just carriers and the problems are only going to get worse.  If we can’t maintain 280 ships how are we going to maintain 350-500 ships?

 

_______________________________

 

(1)USNI News website, “No Margin Left: Overworked Carrier Force Struggles to Maintain Deployments After Decades of Overuse”, Megan Eckstein, 12-Nov-2020,

https://news.usni.org/2020/11/12/no-margin-left-overworked-carrier-force-struggles-to-maintain-deployments-after-decades-of-overuse

Navy Sets Ford Timeline !

Acting Navy Secretary Thomas Modly has laid out a timeline/schedule to get the Ford operational. (1)

What?  Did the Ford not have previous timelines?  Is that what the problem has been, no timeline?  That’s all it will take to get the Ford operational?  Just a timeline?  Why didn’t anyone think of that before?  That’s brilliant!

Oh wait … Didn’t the last SecNav set a timeline for getting the Ford’s elevators working?  Yeah, yeah he did – and it didn’t happen.  So, Mr. Modly, why will your timeline work when none of the previous timelines have? 

The answer is it won’t.  Or, maybe it will.  The point is that simply declaring a timeline won’t change a thing and won’t make the Ford operational.  If the Ford happens to meet your timeline (history suggests it won’t) it won’t be because you had a timeline, it will be because enough time has passed and enough money has been spent that it eventually just happened.

Publicly declaring a timeline is just a publicity stunt and one that is likely to backfire – just ask your predecessor!

Speaking of timelines,

Vice Adm. Thomas Moore, head of Naval Sea Systems Command, conceded during the hearing that Ford was supposed to deploy in 2018, but the sea service is now working to go to sea by 2024. (1)

So much for timelines, I guess.

Modly told Defense News this week that he thinks the Ford’s failure to deploy until 2024 “is not acceptable.” (1)

Not acceptable … and yet he’s accepting it.  Has he fired anyone?  If not – and he hasn’t – then he’s finding it perfectly acceptable.  You’re a hypocrite, Mr. Modly. 

Wait, though, there’s more.  Not only did Mr. Modly establish a timeline but just to be absolutely sure the timeline is met, he appointed some more Admirals to oversee the project.

To meet his deadlines, Modly pointed to a series of “concrete steps” the sea service has taken, including moving Rear Adm. James Downey — the head of the Program Executive Office Aircraft Carriers — to Newport News permanently “so that he can be the accountable party.”

Norfolk-based Fleet Forces Command also has assigned a two-star to “make sure we’re headed in the right direction,” Modly said. (1)

Wow!  Not just one, but two!  Two Admirals!  That should cut the timeline in half, shouldn’t it?  Wait, though … why do you need more Admirals overseeing this?  I thought the timeline guaranteed the desired result, by itself?  Well, we’ll just ignore that and move on …

If all it takes is having Admirals to oversee the project, did we not have Admirals overseeing this project from Day 1?  Since they failed disastrously, why haven’t they been fired?  Where’s the accountability, Mr. Modly?  Or, are you accepting the unacceptable?

Just out of curiosity, Mr. Modly, you’ve put this RAdm. Downey in charge to be the ‘accountable party’.  What are you going to do if he fails and Ford doesn’t meet your timeline?  Are you going to fire him or just give him a promotion like the other Admirals who have overseen this project?

Mr. Modly, your predecessor declared himself ‘accountable’ and shook the President’s hand as a guarantee.  When he failed to meet his timeline and promise, he accepted his accountability and … … … well, he did nothing.  So much for accountability.

Well, since ComNavOps is ridiculing the Acting SecNav’s timeline, is there anything that would have any positive effect?  Honestly, at this point … no.  Ford will be ready when it’s ready and there’s nothing anyone can do to speed the process along.

However, there is something concrete and effective that could be done with the Ford, today, that would greatly benefit all future Navy acquisition programs and that is to apply some accountability with serious consequences.

How about starting with firing every Admiral associated with the project from its inception?  Do that and maybe the next Admiral that gets put in charge of some future project will say, ‘Hey, stop!  You’re not going to include non-existent technology in my project.  The last guy who accepted that got fired.  I’m not going to allow that’.

Let’s take it a step further.  Let’s court-martial every Admiral associated with the project and take away their pensions.  That ought to motivate some future Admirals to not accept unrealistic projects.

Until you apply true accountability – which means, serious consequences for failure – this cycle of failed programs (LCS, Zumalt, Ford, etc.) will continue endlessly.  The fact that you didn’t mention any consequences for failure in your public pronouncements about timelines and Admirals tells me that you aren’t serious and are perfectly happy to accept the unacceptable.  In other words, Mr. Modly, you’re just like every one of your predecessors.

___________________________________

(1)Navy Times website, “Timeline set to get troubled flattop Ford to sea”, Geoff Ziezulewicz and David Larter, Defense News, 8-Jan-2020,

https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2020/01/08/timeline-set-to-get-troubled-flattop-ford-to-sea/

Nuclear Carrier Refueling Cost

There are certain naval topics that are guaranteed to spark arguments and debates and one of them is the question of nuclear versus conventional power for carriers.  Proponents and critics toss ‘data’ back and forth at each other, each proclaiming that the data unequivocally supports their side of the debate.  How can that be?  How can each side muster seemingly incontrovertible data and arguments?  Shouldn’t the data provide a straightforward, clear cut answer?  Well, it all depends on what you include or exclude in your data set.  Does the cost of the extra tankers needed to support conventional powered carriers get included?  What about the cost of the crews that have to man those tankers?  Or the cost of the fuel storage tanks at some land base that the tankers refuel from?  Or the cost of the refineries that supply the fuel?  And on and on.  The same kinds of questions apply to nuclear power, as well.

From the many studies I’ve read, the costs of conventional versus nuclear power tend to be a wash when all the pertinent factors are included.  For that reason, ComNavOps is ambivalent on the issue.  I have a slight leaning towards conventional power, not for any cost reasons but for the damage control aspects and repairability in battle.  But, I digress …

The point of this post is not to settle the issue but to offer one semi-relevant data point.

One of the major costs for a nuclear carrier is the mid-life Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH).  Costs seem to run around several billion dollars, if the Navy is to be believed.  Common sense, however, suggests that this kind of oft cited cost is not true.  Unfortunately, we have no itemized breakdown of the refueling costs to look at.  Remember that carrier refueling is always combined with a massive overhaul effort, the total of which is the cited cost but no one knows how much of the cost is direct nuclear refueling costs and this leads, inevitably to a large part of the ambiguity about nuclear refueling costs.

Well, here’s a related data point.  It’s the SSBNs which also undergo a mid-life refueling overhaul (Engineered Refueling Overhaul – ERO).  As an example, the USS Louisiana (SSBN-743) is currently at the start of a 2-1/2 year refueling overhaul at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard.

The project is expected to finish in 2022 and will take approximately 729,000 man-days to complete with a cost of around $400 million. (1)

Note that the $400M includes both conventional overhaul work and the nuclear refueling work.  The non-nuclear refueling portion of the work – the overhaul  portion – will include hull/tank preservation, a modernized reverse osmosis system, and modifications to accommodate female crew.  Thus, the nuclear refueling costs are something less than $400M.  The overhaul work does not seem terribly extensive or complex so I’d venture a guess that the nuclear portion of the costs is, perhaps, $300M.

That cost, $400M, is immensely less than the RCOH cost of multiple billions of dollars.  Why the enormous cost discrepancy?

One major reason is the sheer scope of the overhaul work – work that has nothing to do with the nuclear refueling.

During the dry dock phase of the RCOH, George Washington underwent significant upgrades and repair work both inside and outside the ship. In addition to defueling and refueling its power plant, Newport News shipbuilders have re-preserved approximately 600 tanks and replaced thousands of valves, pumps and piping components.

On the outside, they performed major structural updates to the island, mast and antenna tower; upgraded all aircraft launch and recovery equipment; painted the ship’s hull, including sea chests and freeboard; updated the propeller shafts, and installed refurbished propellers.

During the next phase of the complex engineering and construction project, shipbuilders will finish up the overhaul and installation of the ship’s major components and test its electronics, combat and propulsion systems before the carrier is redelivered to the navy. This period also will be dedicated to improving the ship’s living areas, including crew living spaces, galleys and mess decks. (2)

It is obvious from that brief description of the non-nuclear overhaul work that the scope and, therefore, cost is enormous. 

What is the split between overhaul and nuclear refueling cost for a carrier RCOH?  Is it 50% each?  Is it 90% nuclear?  Is it 90% overhaul?  Unfortunately, I’ve never seen even a crude breakdown of the cost split and that leads to the aforementioned arguments and suspect data.

On the surface of it, the SSBN ERO cost suggests that the actual nuclear refueling cost is not the major portion of the carrier RCOH and that the overhaul work is, instead, the major portion.  I would go so far as to venture a guess that the overhaul cost is on the order of 70% of the total RCOH cost.  If that’s even remotely correct, that drastically alters the financial arguments that are typically used to debate the nuclear power question.

Of course, a submarine ERO and a carrier RCOH are not directly comparable, even for the nuclear refueling portion of the work.  A carrier’s immense size means that the reactor is buried much deeper in the vessel and access is more difficult.  A carrier presumably has larger reactors and two of them as opposed to the single reactor in a submarine.  And so on.  Presumably, those factors add to the nuclear refueling cost but how much they add to the cost is unknown.  I would guess, perhaps, a 10%-20% premium?

The takeaway from the submarine ERO is that nuclear refueling costs are not inherently obscenely expensive which is the impression so many critics of nuclear power would have us believe.

As I said, this post makes no attempt to settle the nuclear versus conventional power debate.  It only adds a related data point to help guide discussions. 

_________________________________

(1)navaltoday.com website, “Ballistic missile submarine USS Louisiana docks for refueling overhaul”, 17-Sep-2019,

https://navaltoday.com/2019/09/17/ballistic-missile-submarine-uss-louisiana-docks-for-refueling-overhaul/

(2)navaltoday.com website, “USS George Washington undocks during nuclear refueling overhaul”, 1-Oct-2019,

https://navaltoday.com/2019/10/01/uss-george-washington-undocks-during-nuclear-refueling-overhaul/

Forrestal - Ford Comparison

The Ford class aircraft carrier represents the pinnacle of carrier development.  Its features represent the best aircraft carrier characteristics ever conceived and have never before been matched.  The Ford instantly obsoletes every other carrier that has come before.  Or so the Navy would have us believe.  In true ComNavOps fashion, let’s take a level-headed, objective look at a comparison between a supposedly hopelessly obsolete carrier design, the Forrestal, and the revolutionary Ford.

Here’s a quick comparison.

	Forrestal	Ford
Cost, FY19 dollars	$2.1B	$13.5B+
Length Overall, ft	1067	1106
Displacement Full Load, tons	81,101	100,000
Speed, kts	33	30+
Range, miles	12,500b	unlimited
Propulsion, Shaft Hp	260,000	?
Air Wing, number of aircraft	82-86	63-70
Combat Aircraft, number of aircraft	58-60	40-44
Crew without Air Wing	2700	2832a

^a Reportedly around 700 less than a Nimitz class

^b Estimated – USS Enterprise, CV-6, had a range of 12,500 nm at 15 kts (Wikipedia);  I’ve been unable to find an actual range for Forrestal

USS Forrestal

USS Ford

So, how do the two carriers compare?  Well, two factors just leap off the page.

Cost.  The Ford just explodes any previous carrier cost by a staggering amount.  Ford costs over 6x a Forrestal !!!!!!  We could build 6 Forrestals for one Ford.  Even compared to the Nimitz class, the Ford is about 60% more expensive (see, “Carrier Costs”).

The Ford cost is simply not sustainable.  A single Ford represents nearly a full year’s shipbuilding budget all by itself.  There’s no mystery about why our carrier fleet is steadily declining and why our air wings are steadily shrinking – it’s all about the cost.

Air Wing.  The other number that leaps off the page is the size of the air wings and the number of combat aircraft (fighters and strike).  Despite a whopping 23% increase in displacement, the Ford carries far fewer aircraft:  only ¾ of the Forrestal air wing and 70% of the combat aircraft (less when F-18 tanker aircraft are excluded from the count). 

Note that F-35C squadrons will be only 10 aircraft, further reducing the air wing and combat aircraft numbers. (2)

Combat.  The reason a carrier exists is, of course, combat.  Does the Ford offer any combat enhancements over a Forrestal?  None.  The only combat related claim ever made for the Ford was the now-debunked (by GAO and others) sortie rate claim.  In fact, the Ford has a few features that actually decrease its combat capability such as the EMALS catapults that can’t be individually or easily repaired without taking all the catapults off line in a massively time consuming electrical flywheel spin down and spin up procedure.

All other combat characteristics are identical between the two carriers:  same number of catapults, same launch capacity, same flight cycle operations, same aircraft recovery capacity, same number of elevators, etc.

Conclusion.  So, what do we gain from our staggeringly expensive $13B+ state of the art Ford class carrier?  Absolutely nothing!  In fact, the Forrestal cost a fraction of the Ford and carried a larger air wing.  Some of you may be saying that the Ford could carry a larger air wing and you’d be right, in theory.  The reality, however, is that the carrier costs so much that we can’t afford the air wing.  What’s a carrier without an air wing?  A floating paperweight!  What’s a carrier with a reduced air wing?  A marginally useful combat carrier. 

Note: You know that we only have 9 air wings for our 11 carriers, right?  That means we only have a maximum of 9 operational carriers.

Consider, however, if we were to build modern versions of the Forrestal for $2.1B.  Compared to the Ford, that would leave us with $11.4B to buy more carriers and more more/larger air wings.

A modern Forrestal sized air wing (say, 85 aircraft), at an average of $100M per aircraft, just to use a round number, costs around $8.5B – well within our $11.4B savings and still leaving us with $2.9B we could use for another carrier or escorts.

So, why are we building 100,000 ton, $13B+ Fords when we’ve just demonstrated that a modern Forrestal could provide the same combat capability and larger air wings for a tiny fraction of the cost?

___________________

Reference – Air Wing Composition

Typical air wing composition in mid-1980’s with number of squadrons, type of aircraft, and number of aircraft per squadron. (1)

2x F-14 Tomcat, 12 ea = 24

2x A-7 Corsair, 12 ea = 24
1x A-6 Intruder, 10-12 plus 4 KA-6D
1x E-2 Hawkeye, 4-6
1x EA-6B Prowler, 4
1x SH-3 Sea King, 6
1x S-3 Viking, 10

Total = 82-86

Combat = 58-60

Typical current air wing composition with number of squadrons, type of aircraft, and number of aircraft per squadron. (1)

4x F-18 Hornet, 10-12 ea = 40-44

1x E-2 Hawkeye, 4-5
1x EA-18G Growler, 5
1x MH-60S Seahawk, 8
1x MH-60R Seahawk, 6-8

Total = 63-70

Combat = 40-44

_____________________________________

(1)Wikipedia, “Carrier Air Wing”, retrieved 16-Oct-2019,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrier_air_wing#Cold_War_(1974–1990)_and_the_1983_Invasion_of_Grenada

(2)https://news.usni.org/2014/10/02/navy-base-f-35cs-nas-lenmoore