Let’s assume China makes an invasion of Taiwan part of
whatever war they initiate. In fact, this
is an absolute certainty since they can’t allow an enemy base of operations to
exist just a hundred miles off their mainland.
Let’s further assume that the US opts to defend Taiwan (by no means a
certainty). How would the defense play
out from a US Navy perspective?
Carrier Activity
The main function of a carrier group would be to provide air
cover for Taiwan. Basically, this becomes
a large scale battle for air superiority to relieve Taiwan’s forces from the
threat of aerial bombardment and missile attack … an ambitious and exceedingly
challenging effort!
The main invasion effort will likely be along the southern
beaches due to Taiwan’s geography. That
dictates our carrier defensive location.
With aircraft only having, at best, a two hundred mile or so combat
radius (remember, you have to include sufficient loiter/combat time!), our
carriers will have to operate within two hundred miles or so radius of the midpoint of the Taiwan Strait at
the southern end of the strait.
Unfortunately, this ‘anchors’ the carrier group to a fairly
fixed location. Yes, the group would
sail back and forth a bit but the necessities and constraints of aircraft range
and endurance (loitering and combat time) dictate that the carrier remain in a
very limited and predictable location. A
carrier constrained to a limited and predictable location is a good way to get
a sunk carrier due to cruise/ballistic missiles and enemy subs.
The scale of air superiority action would demand all
the carrier’s aircraft to operate in the air-to-air role. There would be few, if any, available for
ground support.
Surface Ship Activity
Aegis ships will be quite active – and one hopes successful
– providing an anti-air ‘umbrella’ over the strait. Standard SM-2/6 missiles are credited with
ranges of 150-200 miles which, unfortunately, would suffice to cover, if
barely, the strait from the eastern (seaward) side of Taiwan. In conjunction with carrier aircraft, this
would help establish local air superiority.
One should also note that the mountainous geography poses
radar problems for ships operating on the eastern side of Taiwan and trying to
exert anti-air influence over the strait and the western side of the island.
Submarine Activity
Offense – Our subs will attempt to attack Chinese
naval forces at the northern and, most especially, the southern end of the
Taiwan Strait. Unfortunately, the strait
is only a hundred miles wide or so which greatly restricts the submarine
operations. Only a single sub can
operate at each end at a time without risking blue-on-blue engagement. Thus, our large submarine force will be
limited by geography to a minimal combat presence.
Defense – As noted above, our carrier groups will be
tied to a fairly fixed location and this will attract enemy subs. Thus, one of the main functions of our
submarine force will be to act as distant screens for the carrier group to
intercept Chinese subs/ships approaching from around the southern tip of Taiwan
or north from Philippines. Again,
though, only a relative few subs can operate in the area at a time before the
crowding of subs becomes counterproductive.
It is obvious that the blue-on-blue concern will be a huge
factor. As described, that concern will
severely limit the number of subs we can effectively employ in the fairly
restricted Taiwan operating area. We
could have a thousand subs but if we can only safely and effectively employ
four in the operating area, the remaining 996 are useless except as attrition
replacements. We need to begin
addressing ways to safely and effectively operate more subs in the restricted
area. I cannot offer any specific
thoughts on how to do that but I can and do raise the issue. To be fair, this is an issue dating back to
WWI and no one has satisfactorily solved it.
Philippines
The importance of the Philippines cannot be overstated. For the Chinese, control of the Philippines
provides protection for the southern invasion force. For the US, the Philippines provides the
approach from which a counterattack can be staged and launched against the
southern invasion force. The key
question, therefore, is which side will seize and control Luzon and surrounding
air and seas?
Amphibious Landing
While not an opposed landing, per se, landing troop
reinforcements from the eastern side of the island would be a likely
scenario. This would require Aegis ships
to move very close to shore to provide anti-air protection for amphibious ships
during the landing/unloading process.
Guam
We can’t even begin to successfully defend Taiwan without a
functional Guam so defending Guam is part of the Taiwan defense. Guam’s defense is, however, a separate topic
so I’ll leave it at that. Just be aware
of the vital role Guam will play in terms of logistics, basing, staging,
repair, etc.
Issues
ASW - Chinese subs will be a major threat and we lack
effective ASW. Large, slow,
non-stealthy, defenseless, fixed wing P-8 ASW aircraft will be unable to survivably
operate in the area. Helos will be unable
to operate at any great distance from their host ships due to survivability
concerns. Possibly, Burke/helo
hunter-killer units could be effective, however, that places a multi-billion
dollar, high value, Aegis vessel squarely in the enemy submarine operating
area. We lack a dedicated, expendable
(cheap) ASW ship.
Aircraft – We have no useful airbases near Taiwan
unless Japanese bases are viable. This
would require Japan to enter the war, offer the use of their bases, and be able
to defend those bases well enough to keep them effectively operating – no sure
thing! This leaves only carriers as a
source of aircraft. Unfortunately, our
carrier fleet is shrinking in numbers and our air wings are half the size they
once were.
Further, the F-18 is not a state of the art fighter and will
be hard pressed to hold its own.
Ground Support – We will have few, if any, carrier
aircraft available for ground support.
The Air Force won’t have any bases within useful distance to provide
support. We might be able to base Air
Force aircraft on Taiwan bases but the likelihood of Taiwan bases remaining
operational is not good.
This might be a scenario where big deck amphibious ships,
configured for pure ground support (maximize the F-35Bs), could be effective
assuming we can establish local air superiority. I assume attack helos would be
non-survivable due to Chinese anti-air weapons and contested skies.
Conclusion
Why is it important to understand how a Taiwan conflict will
play out? It’s because that will
determine what capabilities and, therefore, what platforms and weapons we
need. Currently, the Navy designs ships
in a complete vacuum with no consideration for strategic and operational
requirements (CONOPS). We need to stop
this ‘blind’ design practice and begin designing to our specific needs.
Consider the Navy’s obsession with unmanned assets. Do we need unmanned assets? Well, it all depends on how we intend to
fight a war with China. Unmanned assets
may be useful or they may not. We don’t
know because we don’t have a war plan.
I’m offering this brief outline of how a defense of Taiwan
will play out. You can agree or disagree
with my vision but it offers a concrete set of operational requirements which,
in turn, allows us to design assets that will directly and effectively support
the plan instead of designing assets that we just cross our fingers and hope
can somehow prove useful but we’re not sure.