We’ve devoted much
discussion to amphibious assaults in this blog and we should given that it’s
both a traditional US military capability and the foundation of an entire
branch of the military – namely the Marine Corps. We’ve talked about specifics like connectors,
naval gun support, LST’s, logistics, etc.
Let’s back off a bit and look at the larger picture – the strategic
level, as opposed to the operational level.
The first, and only,
question is whether amphibious assaults are even needed from a strategic
level. I’ve repeatedly addressed this in
comments and, obliquely, in posts and it’s time to formally address this.
From a geopolitical strategy
perspective we have five foreseeable “enemies” that we can identify that will
be concerns for the next twenty years.
The enemies are,
- China
- Russia
- Iran
- North Korea
- Third World / Non-State
Let’s take a hard look at
each enemy and consider the likelihood of needing to conduct an amphibious
assault against each.
China. Unless we
are insane, we are never going to want to land troops on mainland China. There is no
geopolitical need to do that. The land,
itself, has nothing we need and comes with many problems (extensive land
borders, cultural and ethnic issues, population problems, etc.) that make
forcible entry into, and occupation of, China undesirable. That
only leaves the artificial islands that China has constructed and militarized or similar small,
natural, militarized islands. However,
those islands will never be subject to amphibious assault if for no other
reason than they are too small to hold any troops! They’ll be destroyed with cruise missiles and
forgotten – somewhat akin to the island hopping strategy of WWII. The only conceivable use for an amphibious
assault would be to reclaim a foreign country that China has seized, such as Taiwan, Philippines, or Vietnam.
From a geopolitical
perspective, the only one of those that would realistically justify an assault
is Taiwan. We simply
don’t care enough about Vietnam to fight for it.
China has already begun the annexation of the Philippines but will conclude that “peacefully” as they’ve done
with the South China Sea. China will conduct political maneuvers aimed at ousting US influence and enhancing Chinese influence, as
they’ve already started to do. They’ll
flood the country with state sponsored immigration (already underway) until the
balance of population shifts to Chinese and then simply and slowly absorb the
economy and government and the “Philippines” will align with China and become a
Chinese state in all but name. At that
point, the US will have no internationally recognizable rationale
for an invasion.
Within the context of a
Chinese Philippines (Chilippines?), seizing the Philippines as part of a larger war effort might be a possibility. However, we are likely looking at a Chinese
fortified Philippines scenario as being 20+ years down the road and,
therefore, beyond the time frame of this post subject.
Taiwan remains the one possible amphibious assault scenario. In any war scenario, Taiwan will be seized by
China as the first order of business for two reasons: one, China has always stated that Taiwan
belongs to them and the opportunity of a war simply makes the seizure
inevitable and, two, China cannot afford to leave Taiwan as a possible base of
operations for the US so deep in its territory and so close to its
mainland. The seizure will occur quickly
– far quicker than the US could possibly respond. The US will be faced with a fait accompli. If the US wants to retake Taiwan, it will have to be after a massive amphibious force
buildup. Given the proximity of Taiwan to mainland China, an amphibious assault to reclaim the island would
be conducted under the very near umbrella of mainland China’s air power, missile power, naval power, and with a
close and ready resupply of an almost unlimited amount of manpower. This is the farthest possible scenario from a
“quick” Marine Corps assault using existing forces. Such an assault would require years of build
up. Is the US likely to do that?
I think not. A Taiwan seizure will, unfortunately, be a one-way
affair. China will seize it and it will not come back.
Thus, there is very little
need for amphibious assaults in a China war scenario.
Russia. There is
very little usable or useful Russian shoreline to assault! That’s one of the geopolitical problems that Russia faces and is probably one of the reasons they seized
Crimea. A war with Russia will be a land war conducted through Europe. The Cold War plans still
largely apply. There is a very remote
possibility that an assault against the far eastern regions could occur which
would be intended to seize military bases along the Sea of Ohkotsk. Far more likely, though, is that those
bases would be neutralized with cruise missiles and relegated to unimportance. There is just no reason to attempt to seize
the bases or the region. There is
nothing there that the US would want.
Further, there is no
foreseeable scenario in which US troops would attempt to enter mainland Russia. Combat would
occur around the periphery of the Russian borders and would be aimed at
restoring the pre-war boundaries.
Thus, there is no need for
amphibious assaults in a Russian war scenario.
Iran. Most combat
forces would enter Iran through Iraq. While there
is a possibility of wanting to land troops somewhere along Iran’s coastline, this would not be an amphibious assault
but just an unopposed unloading of troops and supplies through an already
seized port or across an uncontested beach.
Iran simply does not have the capability to oppose a
landing.
Thus, there is no need for
amphibious assaults in a Iranian war scenario.
North Korea. There is
some small possibility of the need for an amphibious assault along the northern
shoreline. This would be a diversionary
assault or raid rather than a major, sustained assault. The bulk of combat will be land based and
troops and supplies will enter through South Korea via secured ports and airbases.
NKorea possesses a vast
inventory of mines which will be used to protect the northern shoreline. Coupled with our almost complete lack of mine
countermeasures, there is probably little likelihood of attempting even a small
scale diversionary assault.
Thus, there is no need for
amphibious assaults in a NKorean war scenario.
Third World /
Non-State. This is the case that is most likely to
require amphibious assaults. Assaults
into Middle East locations or Africa to deal with terrorist threats or, less likely, South America to stabilize collapsing countries are conceivable. However, given the nature of the threats, any
amphibious assault would be limited in size and scope and the assault itself
would likely be unopposed and revert to a simple unloading. A single MEU/ARG would be the likely force
size required, at the high end.
Thus, there is a conceivable
need for amphibious assault of a limited and, likely, unopposed nature.
As a general observation, unless
someone miraculously takes over the entire Pacific, as Japan did, we’re never going to need to island hop our way
across an ocean again. That recognition,
alone, eliminates a huge chunk of the need for amphibious assaults. Similarly, unless someone miraculously seizes
all of Europe, we’re never going to need to conduct another Normandy invasion.
That recognition eliminates most of the remaining chunk of need for
amphibious assaults.
We see, then, that there is
no compelling geopolitical need for major amphibious assaults and no resulting
military strategy requiring major amphibious assaults to support the geopolitical
needs. There remains a possibility of
small assaults that would be more akin to unopposed unloadings than opposed
assaults.
So, what does this tell us
about our amphibious fleet force structure?
The obvious conclusion is
that we don’t need 33 large deck amphibious ships! A single MEU/ARG consisting of three ships is
sufficient. If we want to play it safe
and call it six ships to allow for reinforcement and overhaul unavailabilities,
that’s fine. So, six amphibious ships
should be sufficient.
In fact, since we just
concluded that amphibious assaults are so unlikely, we now have to ask, why do
we have forward deployed MEU/ARG’s? And,
if we don’t need forward deployed MEU/ARG’s, we don’t need the traditional
3-ships-to-support-one-forward-deployed.
Instead, we can take our six amphibious ships and keep them home ported
until needed and provide proper maintenance along with occasional training
stints.
The one valid argument for
forward deployed, amphibious Marines is crisis response: embassy protection, evacuation, terrorist
response, short term stability operations, etc.
There is a valid and ongoing need for this capability but this leads to
the next question which is, is an Amphibious Ready Group the best way to
provide this kind of response? Is
keeping several major warships and an entire Marine Epeditionary Unit afloat
for months at a time the best way to meet the need? Alternatively, could the Army’s rapid
response, aviation transported units better meet the needs? There is a valid argument to be made that
keeping crisis response troops home-based with aviation transport available on
short notice is a more economical and more effective method of providing crisis
response. A MEU can only be in one area
at a time and can only respond within that specific area. An aviation transportable Army unit, however,
can respond anywhere.
The problem that any crisis
response force faces is escalation – the threat rapidly escalates beyond the
original level and reinforcements are needed very quickly – Mogadishu, for example.
That specific issue – excalation/reinforcement – is, however, a topic
for another time.
We should also note that
crisis response forces have historically been small and very light compared to
a full MEU. Again, this argues against
the need for a forward deployed MEU/ARG.
All of this suggests that we
should reevaluate our amphibious doctrine.
Rather than prepare for major amphibious operations that are extremely
unlikely, perhaps we should be preparing for small, uncontested
landings/unloadings and, perhaps, the Marine’s aviation-centric shift is not
without merit.
To sum up,
- We only need around 6 major amphibious ships.
- We should keep our amphibious ships home ported.
- We should investigate whether a MEU/ARG is the
most economical and effective crisis response force.
- We should reevaluate the MEU force structure in
light of the historical “light” nature of crisis responses.
- We should reevaluate Marine manning levels.
I love the Marines and
desperately want to see them remain part and parcel of the US Armed
Forces. However, I just don’t see the
need for major amphibious assaults in the next 20+ years. That doesn’t mean that the Marines should be
eliminated but it does mean that we should reexamine their missions and force
structure.
Now, there is one other
potentially useful function that the Marines can perform and which I see as far
more likely than the classic amphibious assault and that is port/airfield
seizure. In any war, we are going to
need access to ports for unloading the massive amounts of supplies required to
keep any invasion going. To a much
lesser extent, the same applies to seizing airfields although it is simply not
possible to keep an invasion going via airlifted supplies. The tonnage and volume movement is just not
there.
Port seizure is a completely
different game than an amphibious assault.
The operations, tactics, and equipment are radically different. Also, since most (all?) major ports are intimately
and physically intertwined with cities, a port seizure becomes a specific case
of urban warfare which brings its own set of challenges which are entirely
different from the classic amphibious assault.
The likelihood of port
seizures within the context of geopolitical and military strategies should be
carefully evaluated. Unfortunately, I’m
simply not in a position to make that evaluation.
All that said, my
conclusions can and would change if we felt port seizure was a likely strategic
need and made it a Marine mission. Right
now, however, port seizure is not a specific Marine mission in the sense that
they have the equipment, doctrine, tactics, and training to accomplish it. To the best of my knowledge, the Marines/Navy
have never practiced a port seizure. If
you ask a Marine general whether port seizure is a mission, I’m sure they would
say yes but it’s not really a mission if you aren’t equipped for it and have
never trained for it.
I understand that most of
you are going to disagree with the conclusion of this post. That’s fine.
Feel free to tell me why.
However, do not engage in “what if”.
What if Russia takes over Europe and we need to conduct another Normandy invasion?
What if China suddenly launches an instantaneous seizure of the entire Pacific Ocean? “What if” is
not a viable or logical argument. If you
think we need to retain significant amphibious assault capability, tell me,
specifically, where and under what circumstances it would be needed. Nothing else is reasonable or logical.
Also, do not engage in “you
never know” – we need to keep our current Marine force structure because you
never know what will happen. “You never
know” is an argument that has no logical basis and can’t be countered. It’s also an argument for unlimited
capabilities because … well … you never know. Using that argument, we should have 98 super
carriers, a ten million man Marine Corps, and a thousand B-2 nuclear armed
bombers in the air continuously because …
you never know.
The practicalities of
budget, industry, and manpower preclude “you never know” force structures. Therefore, “you never know” is not a valid
argument.
Give me something specific
or accept the conclusions of the post.
