One of the reasons I started this blog was that I had
observed far too many misconceptions involving naval matters. I’m not talking about differences of opinion
but factually incorrect beliefs that had taken on an air of ‘truth’ and
acceptance due to sheer repetition with no one challenging the fallacies. One of my goals for this blog is to remove
the mystery and misunderstanding from these commonly accepted but incorrect
beliefs. Doing so allows us to have
discussions that are based on fact and can, therefore, be more logical and
productive.
Here’s a partial list of some of the misconceptions we’ve
corrected, so far, along with links to the relevant posts - a compendium of
myths, so to speak. In no particular
order,
Torpedoes – Most
people believed that torpedoes were miracle weapons that would sink any ship,
instantaneously, with a single hit by breaking the ship’s back by suspending
the ship over a giant bubble of air.
Torpedoes, while seriously dangerous weapons, cannot one-shot kill a
ship much larger than a corvette and the bubble-back-breaking phenomenon is
purely a myth and does not exist even for a small vessel.
See, “Torpedo Lethality Myth”
Explosive Effects
– Most people believe that explosive filler weight is the only thing that
determines damaging effects. In reality,
containment, in the form of thicker walls, determines the degree of damage for
a given weight of explosive filler.
See, “Explosive Effects”
Armor - Most people seemed to believe that armor would
sink a ship under its weight or, if not, would slow the ship to that of a
drifting barge. We demonstrated that
every WWII warship had armor appropriate for its class while maintaining 30+
knot speed and fantastic range. We also
dispensed with the belief that the main function of armor was to provide total
immunity to every weapon, past, present, and future. In reality, the purpose of armor is to
mitigate damage and allow the ship to stay in the fight, effectively, for
longer periods.
See, “Armored Ship Misconceptions”
See, “Armor for Dummies”
Escorts – So many
people have grown up never seeing more than three escorts for a carrier that a
common belief had sprung up that that was all that was needed for a carrier in
war. We analyzed the historical escort
requirements and the current escort needs and determined that we need around 38
escorts for a carrier group.
See, “Escorts”
Kinetic Energy –
There was – and still is! – a widespread belief that kinetic energy, alone,
will vaporize a target. This belief has
been applied to supercavitating torpedoes, Mach+ missiles, naval shells, and
any other weapon that ‘goes fast’. We’ve
analyzed the kinetic energy effect of several of these weapons and found that
the kinetic energy contribution ranges from insignificant to present but not
terribly damaging. Kinetic energy is,
typically, simply not all that much of a factor.
See, “Supercavitating Torpedo Kinetic Energy”
Rail Guns – Related
to the kinetic energy misconception, most people believed that rail guns would
instantaneously vaporize anything they hit.
We demonstrated that rail guns actually have a very small and limited
target set that they could be effective against. We noted the bullet and paper analogy which
applies to soft targets and renders rail gun projectiles nearly useless against
such targets. Even a modern, unarmored
ship is likely a soft target for a rail gun and nearly immune to significant damage
from a rail gun.
See, “Rail Guns in Combat”
Helicopters – We
disproved the common assumption - almost article of faith - that every ship must have helicopters, a
flight deck, and hangar. We noted that helos
require a 1/3 larger ship to accommodate flight deck, hangar, and support
facilities.
See, “Does Every Ship Need aHelicopter?”
Deployments –
Most people believed that ships would conduct deployments during war, just as
in peacetime, and that we would need the traditional 4 ships to support 1
deployed ship. We debunked that belief
by examining the conduct and missions of the Enterprise during the first full
year of war.
See, “War Deployments”
Sequestration –
The Navy tried to sell us on the idea that sequestration was the root cause of
the Navy’s problems and we thoroughly debunked that notion.
See, “Sequestration is Not the Problem”
Looking at the list of myths and misconceptions we’ve
debunked and corrected, it’s amazing how much misinformation and erroneous
beliefs were impacting naval discussions and preventing us from reaching
correct and logical conclusions.
Fortunately, we are now better equipped to examine and discuss naval
matters.
See, “Armor for Dummies”