The Next Frigate Disaster

Now that the Constellation has failed miserably, the Navy has semi-formally stated that the next frigate will be a modified Coast Guard National Security Cutter (NSC, Legend class) and will be in the water by 2028.[1]  …  …  …   Sorry for the pause, there.  I had to retype that sentence several times because I kept making mistakes trying to type while laughing hysterically.  From vague concept to in the water in three years or less – that’s hilarious!
 

“We believe the future frigate can be in the water in 2028,” Jason Potter, the Navy’s acting acquisition executive, told attendees today at the Defense Forum here in Washington.[1]
 
[SecNav] Phelan also recently told attendees at a private dinner that the new frigate would be a modified National Security Cutter … [1]
 
Navy Secretary John Phelan said the new frigate would be based on an American design and stressed that any change orders would have to go through him.[1]

While such a timetable ought to be easily achievable, the recent record of Navy shipbuilding renders it a laughable fantasy.
 
Let’s set that aside and take a quick glance at the NSC and examine some potential issues.
 

National Security Cutter

Concurrency.  It’s not even a formal program, yet, and there’s already a potentially troubling bit of news, as indicated below.
 

He [Jason Potter] said the service was focused on using a design approach that separates finalizing the ship’s design from the construction of the lead ship … [1]

That’s a frightening statement because I don’t know what it means.  One of the Navy’s persistent, major problems with shipbuilding is concurrency which results in construction without a complete design.  In other words, unbelievably, the construction is treated as a separate issue from design.  Potter’s statement could be interpreted as saying that construction will NOT be linked to a requirement for a complete design (the “separation” he mentions).  If so, this would be simply repeating an approach that has failed every time it’s been used.  Did Potter just lay the groundwork for the failure of this program before it’s even become a formal program or did he mean something different and, if so, what did he mean?
 
Size.  The NSC, as it exists in Coast Guard service, measures 418ft long and 54ft in beam.  In comparison, the Constellation is 496ft x 65ft.  Thus, the NSC is 16% shorter and 17% narrower.  That’s a significant chunk of deck space and internal volume “gone”.  The Constellation was not exactly heavily armed to begin with and the reduced size of the NSC is, presumably, going to require significant reductions in the weapons fit compared to the Constellation.  If it comes with a commensurate reduction in cost, that might be okay but we’ve seen time and again that costs do not decrease in scale with capability decreases.  The Constellation was, itself, a third the capabilities of a Burke at 80%, or so, of the cost.  If the NSC “shrinks” at the same rate from the Constellation, we’ll have something on the order of 20% of the capabilities of a Burke at 60% of the cost.
 
CONOPS.  The discussion of capabilities leads us into the next troublesome issue and that is … of course you know what it is … CONOPS!  SecNav has apparently already chosen a ship to build, established a timetable, and is talking about design and construction processes but …  …  where is the CONOPS?  The Constellation never had one so they won’t be reusing that.  What is this frigate supposed to do?  What is its focus?  Its mission?  It’s going to have fewer capabilities than the Constellation, presumably, so it really needs to have a tight mission focus to ensure that it can be effective in whatever its role will be.  Otherwise, we’re going to wind up with a mini-mini-Burke.  Mini²-Burke?  I’m already sensing a ship that will attempt to do a very small amount of everything and will do absolutely nothing even slightly well.  To paraphrase … Jack of no trades, adequate of none?
 
Change Orders.  As noted above, SecNav has, apparently, identified change orders as a problem in shipbuilding, claiming that change orders will have to go through him.  If, by that, he means he won’t be approving any, that’s great.  On the other hand, if he simply means he’ll rubber stamp the change orders than we just have a sound bite with no actual improvement in the shipbuilding process.  As a reminder, all waivers for ship construction and trials must go through the CNO, personally.  The problem is that no CNO has ever met a waiver he didn’t approve so what’s the point of the approval process?  Will SecNav just become an automatic approval for change orders?  The mere fact that he even states that change orders must go through him implies that he will approve some/all.  This is the wrong approach.  He should have flatly stated that once the design is set there will be no change orders … period!  But … he didn’t.  Again, this is establishing the groundwork for failure, already.
 
Structure.  It is unknown whether the NSC meets Navy structural standards as regards strength, compartmentation, weight margins, etc.  The NSC is reportedly built to 80-90% military standards but what is lacking and how critical it is, is unknown.  As you recall, the Constellation program got in trouble trying to modify the FREMM to USN construction and survivability standards.  Will history repeat itself, here?
 
Testing.  The NSC has a near mythical reputation among naval observers who have constantly called for the Navy to adopt/adapt the NSC to naval use.  The reality, however, is that the NSC, like every ship, has problems that may render it unsuitable for naval service without extensive redesign and modifications (bye, bye budget!).  The Jan 2016 GAO report [2] noted,
 

The U.S. Navy, the Coast Guard’s independent test agent, completed initial testing for the National Security Cutter (NSC) in April 2014 and rated the NSC as operationally effective and suitable. Still, testing revealed 10 major deficiencies (some are shown in figure). Initial testing is an event designed to verify performance of critical systems to ensure assets are capable of meeting mission requirements. The event tests critical operational issues and key performance parameters. The NSC fully met 12 of 19 key performance parameters. Tests of one key performance parameter, as well as other critical systems, were deferred to follow-on testing. The Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy disagree on the NSC’s requirements for cutter boat operations. Without clear requirements the Navy and Coast Guard will not have a basis for determining actions to resolve any performance issues. Coast Guard officials acknowledged that clarifying these requirements would be beneficial.[2]
 
According to Coast Guard documentation, it may choose not to correct all deficiencies due to the cost of changes.[2]
 
During operations, the NSC has experienced performance issues that were not identified during initial testing, and the Coast Guard has planned design changes to some of the cutters’ equipment [ed. from an accompanying diagram, problem equipment includes CIWS, CIWS ammo hoist, engines, generators, boat, boat crane, 57mm gun, 57mm gun ammo hoist, TRS 3D radar, Nulka decoy launcher, and midships boat davit] …  However, the Coast Guard has not yet found the causes for problems affecting the NSC’s propulsion systems. As a result of these and other equipment failures, the NSC has been operating in a degraded condition in some mission areas. DHS has no plans for additional acquisition review boards for the NSC, which would provide oversight going forward.[2]

 
Discussion
 
The failure of the Constellation program presents an opportunity for the Navy to course-correct.  Assuming the NSC platform can be successfully adapted to meet naval combat and survivability standards at an affordable cost – no sure thing – the platform offers the ability to construct a small, focused vessel for the ASW frigate mission.    Instead of a bloated, overpriced, under armed, and unfocused ship with no defined purpose, the Navy has the chance to design a small, focused, affordable ASW-centric ship.  What the NSC does not offer is the ability to be a mini-Burke like the Constellation.  Whether the Navy will be wise enough to recognize this limitation and the opportunity it presents is an open question with an all too likely failed answer but time will tell.
 
 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “Navy wants new frigate in 2028, says service’s acquisition head”, Justin Katz, 10-Dec-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/12/navy-wants-new-frigate-in-2028-says-services-acquisition-head/
 
[2]Government Accountability Office, “NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER, Enhanced Oversight Needed to Ensure Problems Discovered during Testing and Operations Are Addressed”, Jan 2016, GAO-16-148,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674924.pdf

Constellation Construction Progress

We’ll probably never know the real reason why the Navy decided to terminate the Constellation program but one of the factors certainly had to be the glacially slow pace of construction progress.
 
Constellation was laid down 12-Apr-2024 although, as with most modern ships, construction of subassemblies had already begun.  Now, Nov-2025, 19+ months later, the ship is reportedly 12% complete.[1]  That’s 12% in 19+ months.  That’s an average of 0.6% construction progress per month.  At that rate, it would require 167 months (13.9 years!) to complete the construction and even then, that would only be the basic hull.  Fitting out would require many more months.
 
Fourteen years to partially build a frigate?
 
If you were SecNav, would you have continued this program?

 

Constellation Under Construction?

 

 
________________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “Navy Cancels Constellation-class Frigate Program, Considering New Small Surface Combatants”, Sam LaGrone, 25-Nov-2025,
https://news.usni.org/2025/11/25/navy-cancels-constellation-class-frigate-program-considering-new-small-surface-combatants

Small Potatoes

I’ve previously stated that I am, thus far, disappointed in SecDef Hegseth.  I had hoped he would come in and clean house and, while he has fired a handful of people, the vast majority of incompetent military leaders are still firmly in place.  Similarly, SecNav Phelan has disappointed me.  An example is his latest announcement that he is cancelling some $570M in various DEI, climate, and AI-logistics contracts.  While I applaud these cancellations, they are incredibly small potatoes.  They are the kind of thing that could have been done between bites of his sandwich at lunch on the first day.  How about going after some large, truly catastrophically wasteful programs?  Can’t think of any?  Well, how about cancelling the rest of the Constellation class?  How about terminating the Ford class in place?  How about retiring the entire remaining LCS class and saving billions in operating and maintenance costs?  How about terminating all unmanned contracts until someone comes up with a viable CONOPS that demonstrates that they have any combat value?  How about firing 90% of the flag officers and returning their hundreds of staffers to sea duty?  I could go on all day but you get the idea. 
 
There are unimaginable savings to be had but SecNav Phelan is, so far, focused on the nearly trivial and almost free items (on a relative basis).  Come on, Phelan, do something significant.  It doesn’t require years of study groups.  If you can’t come up with tens and hundreds of billions of dollars of savings off the top of your head, you have no business being Secretary of the Navy.  On the other hand, if you can come up with the list … START CUTTING !!!

SecNav Phelan

Businessman John Phelan has been confirmed as Secretary of the Navy and I have severe anxiety about this pick.
 
Phelan has no military experience or even exposure, as far as I can ascertain.  While I firmly believe that a non-military person can succeed in the position by leaning on the subject matter experts that are available to him, I have grave misgivings in this situation.  Who will Phelan look to for honest assessments of the Navy’s problems, needs, and possible solutions?  Will it be the admirals who created and continue all the current problems?  Will it be Congress who has abetted the current situation and refused to exercise effective oversight?  I’m concerned that Phelan has no subject expertise and, far worse, no one to turn to for guidance in the areas he is not knowledgeable about.
 
Beyond that, some of his public statements do not inspire confidence.  For example, here’s something he told the Senate Armed Services Committee about his plans: 

The Navy and the Marine Corps already possess extraordinary operational expertise within their ranks. My role is to utilize that expertise and strengthen it to step outside the status quo and take decisive action with a results-oriented approach.[1]

That’s just buzzword bingo gibberish.  That does not sound like a decisive, focused, knowledgeable Secretary of the Navy.  I hope I’m wrong but what’s the odds of that? 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Newsmax website, “Senate Confirms Phelan as Navy Secretary, Landau at State”, Mark Swanson, 24-Mar-2025,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/senate-phelan-navy/2025/03/24/id/1204177/

CNO Franchetti Fired

In a not entirely unexpected, and very welcome move, SecDef Hegseth has fired CNO Franchetti.  During her tenure, she accomplished nothing, perpetuated the problems she inherited, and solved no existing problems (see, "CNO Franchetti - Another Failed CNO in the Making").  She had a notably undistinguished resume for the position and, I suspect, was a DEI hire.
 

Good riddance.
 
Of course, it remains to be seen who the replacement will be and whether they’ll be any better.  Still, this is a possible first step towards fixing the Navy.  Well done, SecDef.

We’re Doomed

An organization is only as good as its leadership.

 

Here’s what SecNav Del Toro says are the four biggest challenges facing the Navy:

 

I have characterized the most pressing challenges facing the Department of the Navy as the “Four Cs”: China, Culture, Climate Change, and COVID. (1)

 

Three of the four have nothing to do with the Navy’s reason for existing.  To even mention them in the same sentence as China amply demonstrates the incompetence of Navy leadership at the very top.

 

______________________________

 

(1)USNI News website, “SECNAV Del Toro’s Strategic Guidance to Navy, Marines Corps”, 11-Oct-2021,

https://news.usni.org/2021/10/11/secnav-del-toros-strategic-guidance-to-navy-marines-corps

The 2020 National Defense Authorization - Senior Technical Authority

Today, we're going to look at a new, little noticed provision in the law that is a potential game changer impacting how the Navy conducts shipbuilding programs.  We previously noted that Congress has, at long last, begun to exercise its oversight responsibilities over the Navy (see, “Congress Is Doing Its Job – Why Isn’t The Navy?”).  Now, we’ll take a look at what Congress has enacted into law in an attempt to control the Navy’s repetitive shipbuilding fiascos.  Specifically, the 2020 National Defense Authorization (NDA) Act mandates that the Navy provide a ‘Senior Technical Authority’ (STA) for each new naval vessel class undergoing acquisition and prohibits the Navy from funding lead vessels until the class has been certified the by the STA as described in

“10 U.S. Code § 8669b - Senior Technical Authority for each naval vessel class”

New vessels includes both new classes and new ‘flights’ or blocks of existing classes as defined in definitions section of the Code 10/d/(1)/B: 

(i) a substantially new class of craft (including craft procured using “new start” procurement); and

(ii) a class of craft undergoing a significant incremental change in its existing class (such as a next “flight” of destroyers or next “block” of attack submarines).

The Code also notes that the definition applies to both manned and unmanned vessels.

Thus, Congress is looking to exercise oversight on all new or significantly altered ship construction.  The latter is important as it closes one of the Navy’s favorite loopholes for getting around already established oversight controls by claiming that essentially brand new ships are just modifications (flights or blocks) of existing ships.  The new Burkes (Flt III) and the new LX(R) amphibious ships (now LPD-17 Flt II) are examples of the Navy’s attempts at evading Congressional oversight.

This legal requirement is the result of the Navy’s cumulative and systematic naval vessel acquisition failures (Ford, LCS, LPD-17, Zumwalt, etc.) over the last few decades.  Congress’ intent is to force the Navy to exercise better program management.  The question is, what is a ‘Senior Technical Authority’ (STA) and what will they do?

The full text of the relevant U.S. Code can be found in reference 1.

The following are some passages from the Code to help us try to understand what the STA is, and will do.

Senior Technical Authority – As described in the Code text below, the key characteristic of the STA is that it is a person who is independent of the acquisition program chain-of-command.  The hope is that this will free the person from Navy pressure and allow the STA to make decisions free of command influence.  It is also worth noting that the person would be a Senior Executive Service member which is the civil equivalent to military flag rank.  Again, the hope is that this will allow the person to act independently and free of influence.

(2) Individuals eligible for designation.—Each individual designated as a Senior Technical Authority under paragraph (1) shall be an employee of the Navy in the Senior Executive Service in an organization of the Navy that—

(A) possesses the technical expertise required to carry out the responsibilities specified in subsection (b); and

(B) operates independently of chains-of-command for acquisition program management.

Responsibilities - STA shall establish, monitor, and approve standards for the vessel class.  Exactly what types of standards and what level of detail this refers to is not spelled out.

Each Senior Technical Authority shall be responsible for, and have the authority to, establish, monitor, and approve technical standards, tools, and processes for the class of naval vessels for which designated under this section in conformance with applicable laws and Department of Defense and Department of the Navy policies, requirements, architectures, and standards.

Standards aside, the main responsibility of the STA is to certify new construction as being ready for production.  The certification process and actions are described below.

• Description of engineering and technology risks
• Designation of critical technologies
• Test plan approval dates
• Technical objectives and demonstrated performance
• Determination that knowledge objectives are achievable prior to detail design and construction
• Certification that test plans are effective
• Other risk reduction efforts
• Certification that each critical system has been prototyped or proven via identical components
• Certification by SecNav that test plans are fully funded in future years
• STA will approve, in writing, ship specifications before Request For Proposals for detail design and construction.  This is an attempt to prevent concurrent development and production.
• Certification process must be complete 30 days prior to first funding of the lead vessel.

While some of the details, such as the exact type of standards that the STA will establish are not explicitly spelled out, the intent of the law seems quite clear.  Congress is attempting to prevent future concurrent development and production fiascos and intends to withhold funding until an independent overseer, the STA, certifies that the vessel is ready for production.

Okay, that’s clear enough.  What remains to be seen is how the Navy will respond.  We’ve seen a consistent pattern of the Navy ignoring or working around Congressional intent for the last few decades (recall that Congressionally mandated shipbuilding plan that is now long overdue and the Navy continues to ignore the law?) so it is unlikely that the Navy is going to meekly accept Congressional oversight.  Instead, the Navy will find workarounds, loopholes or, failing that, will simply ignore the law.  In fact, we can already see the Navy trying to find loopholes and ways around the law.

… last year lawmakers mandated more careful ship design reviews in the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. Lloyd [Rear Adm. Jason Lloyd, the Navy’s chief engineer and the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) deputy commander for ship design, integration and engineering] said the Navy is still working its way through that language, which requires that each class of naval vessel have a senior technical authority who is outside the chain of command – and therefore independent from influence for cost or schedule reasons, for example – who would be responsible for signing off on ship designs before they can move into the construction phase, among the senior technical authority’s responsibilities.

“We’re trying to work through that now, what that really means. That was kind of put in because there’s concerns with the fact that we may have built some ships before they were ready to be built. And we’re starting to see some of those issues come up as cost,” Lloyd said. (2)

Consider the Admiral’s statement, “We’re trying to work through that now, what that really means.”  The meaning is plain – it’s only the Navy’s plan to work around it that’s unclear, as yet.  The Admiral’s statement makes it clear that the Navy has no intention of being bound by any authority that isn’t under its direct control.  I have no doubt that an entire Navy legal task force is hard at work crafting workarounds and identifying loopholes with the objective of ignoring the legal mandate.

Do you, perhaps, think that I’m overstating the degree of the Navy’s willingness and intent to ignore the law?  Well, overwhelming precedent exists for my belief that the Navy will do everything it can to subvert Congress’ intent and the law.  Here's a few examples to jog your memory.

Ticonderoga Retirements – The Navy tried to early retire the Ticonderoga class and Congress intervened and instructed the Navy not to.  Despite Congress’ clear intent that the ships not be early retired, the Navy persisted in their attempts and eventually concocted the fraudulent ‘modernization’ scheme that had the effect of idling and early retiring half the Ticonderoga fleet (see, “Ticonderoga Class Modernization” and “Still Trying To RetireCruisers”).

Cost Caps – Congress imposed construction cost caps on the Ford and LCS.  Of course, the Navy simply ignored the caps, blew right through them, and then went to Congress after the fact and got the caps increased (see, “LCSCost Cap”).  When Congress ran out of patience and refused to further increase the caps after multiple increases, the Navy came up with the practice of partial deliveries of incomplete ships to meet the caps, followed by additional ‘second phase’ construction which did not count against the caps.

Carrier Numbers – The carrier fleet is legally mandated at 11 carriers.  The Navy simply ignored the law and reduced the carrier fleet below the legal limit when the Enterprise was retired, knowing full well that the Ford would not be ready for many years.  Further, the Navy has dropped the number of air wings to 9 which means we only have, at most, 9 active carriers.

Give the Navy's blatant disregard for the law, we see, then, that we have two considerations regarding this law:

1. What the legal statements dictate.

2. What the Navy thinks the legal statements allow them to get away with and to what degree the Navy will simply ignore the law.

The Navy has been operating above and beyond the law for many years and it is long past time for Congress to exercise their Constitutional oversight responsibility.  However, Congress needs to be prepared for a long battle since the Navy will not willingly accept oversight.  This law is an excellent start but I can’t help but wish that Congress had included criminal penalties in the law for SecNav and CNO failure to comply.

If the Navy would put the same energy, effort, and creativity into training and maintenance that they put into evading the law, we wouldn’t have any problems.

____________________________________

(1)https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/8669b

(2)USNI News website, “Columbia SSBN Program Doing Land-Based Testing to Avoid Past Shipbuilding Mistakes”, Megan Eckstein, 5-Aug-2020,

https://news.usni.org/2020/08/05/columbia-ssbn-program-doing-land-based-testing-to-avoid-past-shipbuilding-mistakes

The Rot Starts At The Top

ComNavOps has long criticized Navy leadership and called – hopelessly – for their mass firing.  ComNavOps firmly believes that an organization’s character and characteristics start at, and are derived from, the top.  An organization takes on the attributes of its leaders, good or bad.

Navy leadership has, once again, shown its true, deplorable, colors.  Secretary of the Navy, Richard Spencer  – you remember him, right? the guy who promised Trump that he could fire him if the Ford’s elevators weren’t fixed by the end of summer? – has now come out and blamed Congress and anyone else he could think of for the Ford’s problems.  Let’s take a look at his alternate reality view of the world, as reported by USNI News.

The problem starts with Spencer utterly failing to understand where he and the Navy stand in the United States government scheme of things.

Spencer called out Congress, who he refers to as his “board of directors, …” (1)

Mr. Spencer (I’ll forego giving him the courtesy of addressing him by his title since, by his own statement to the President, he has forfeited his right to the title), let me set you straight.  Congress is not your ‘board of directors’.  Congress is the people of the United States and, as such, YOU WORK FOR THEM.  THEY ARE YOUR BOSS.  You are subservient and serve at the pleasure of the people.  Now that we have that most fundamental of understandings cleared up …

Spencer was, apparently, especially upset with comments and questions from Rep. Elaine Luria (D-VA) who referred to the Ford as a “$13-billion nuclear-powered floating berthing barge” during a House Armed Services readiness subcommittee hearing. (1)  Spencer’s response was,

“Not one of her comments was, how can I help?” Spencer said. “I consider that disparaging. (1)

Apparently, Mr. Spencer has utterly forgotten that Rep. Luria and the rest of Congress gave Spencer and the Navy over $10B dollars to build the Ford – all the money that Navy said they needed.  Then, when the Navy failed to properly do that, Luria and Congress gave the Navy several billion dollars more and obligingly increased the spending cap multiple times!  As delays and costs have continued to mount, Luria and Congress have continued to supply Spencer and the Navy with ever more money and time.  How much more helpful can they be, Mr. Spencer?  They did everything you asked and backed you up and supported you when you failed, time after time.  

What Congress did wrong was to aid and abet the Navy as they built their floating debacle.  What they should have done was refuse to give the Navy any more money past the original budget request until those in the Navy who were responsible for that original failure were fired.  Perhaps that would have motivated the next set of program managers to perform better and more honestly.

By the way, lest you think Rep. Luria is an uninformed, know-nothing, Congressional hack, you should know that she is a retired nuclear-trained surface warfare officer and U.S. Naval Academy graduate.  That is some top notch qualifications. 

Apparently, Spencer believes that anyone who has the temerity to ask questions is ‘disparaging’.  I guess Mr. Spencer does not know that Congress’ job is to exercise oversight AND ASK QUESTIONS.  In fact, if Congress had exercised more extensive and effective oversight maybe Ford wouldn’t be such a disaster.

Here is Luria’s statement on the matter,

“I find it disappointing that the Secretary finds Congressional oversight disparaging. Here are the facts: The USS Ford will be six years delayed in its initial deployment, which causes incredible strain on the carrier fleet. Secretary Spencer himself promised the President that the weapons elevators would be fully functional by the end of this past summer. It is now fall and no elevators accessing the ammunition storage areas are functioning, which results in a carrier with no combat capability. I have yet to see a detailed plan to fix the multitude of problems with these new technologies. The Navy accepted the design of these systems and accepted the ship in an incomplete state from HII so it is absolutely my role to question Navy leadership on their current failure to deliver an operational ship to the fleet.” (1)

She could not be more on point.

Spencer also blames Congressional cost caps.

Spencer added it was Congress that placed a price cap on the carrier’s construction. The result, Spencer said, was that contractors made production decisions focused on saving money. (1)

Mr. Spencer again betrays both his ignorance and his total absence from reality.  The cost caps were established by the Navy’s cost estimates as supplied to Congress.  If the cost caps were inadequate, it was because the Navy lied utterly failed to accurately predict the costs.  In fact, Congress has increased the cost cap twice beyond the original cap, from $10.5B to $11.8B to $12.9B, as the Navy has blown through each cap (which leads one to ask what the point of a cost cap is if it’s simply raised every time the budget is exceeded – but, I digress …) .  Apparently, Mr. Spencer believes that it is Congress’ job to give him unlimited money.

Mr. Spencer, instead of disparaging Congress and trying to tell them how to do their jobs, why don’t you do yours?

Mr. Spencer has already demonstrated that his word is worthless, now he’s demonstrating that he’s living in some kind of twisted, alternate reality.

It’s no wonder the Navy is in the shape it’s in.  It’s no wonder that the Navy works harder at evading and circumventing Congress than they do at preparing to defend the country.  It comes from the top.

The rot starts at the top and the top is rotten.

Mr. Spencer, show us you have a tiny modicum of integrity and resign, as you vowed to do.  You promised, you failed, now do it like you said corporate America does and resign.

___________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “SECNAV Spencer Rebuts Congressional Criticism of Ford Carrier Program”, Ben Werner, 23-Oct-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/10/23/secnav-spencer-rebutts-congressional-criticism-of-ford-carrier-program

You're Fired !

As you know, the USS Ford has had numerous problems with EMALS, the Advanced Arresting Gear, and, perhaps worst of all, the Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE).  We documented this in a post (see, “USS Ford – Ups and Downs”).

The Ford was delivered and commissioned without functioning weapon elevators.  How do you accept delivery and commission a carrier that can’t move weapons from its magazines to the flight deck?  But, I digress …

Secretary of the Navy, Richard Spencer took responsibility for getting the elevators working, telling President Trump he could fire him if they weren’t ready by the end of summer when Ford is scheduled to complete its post-shakedown availability (PSA).

Spencer said this morning at an event hosted by the Center for a New American Security that he spoke to Trump at length last month at the Army-Navy football game in Philadelphia.

“I asked him to stick his hand out; he stuck his hand out. I said, let’s do this like corporate America. I shook his hand and said, the elevators will be ready to go when she pulls out or you can fire me,” Spencer said, adding that someone had to take accountability over the ongoing elevator challenges.  “We’re going to get it done. I know I’m going to get it done. I haven’t been fired yet by anyone; being fired by the president really isn’t on the top of my list.” (1)

Well, it now appears that SecNav Spencer is in line to be fired.  The Navy has announced that Ford’s PSA completion date will be delayed an additional three months, pushing it into October.  That’s beyond the original summer PSA deadline.  Time to send your resume out, Mr. Spencer.  You failed.  You’re fired.  If you have any integrity, you’ll submit your resignation and save the President the trouble of firing you.

SecNav Spencer

As of this writing, only two of the ship’s 11 elevators have been delivered.  Ford commissioned in July 2017 and now, 20 months later, the ship has only two functional elevators.  Wow!  Still, I remain confident that most of the elevators will be working by the time Ford retires in 2067.

It’s also interesting to note that the Ford’s PSA has been delayed more than once.

In July 2018, when Ford entered PSA, the Navy said the maintenance availability had been extended from a planned eight months to a full year, to accommodate both the typical work that arises in PSA but also deferred work such as the construction and installation of weapons elevators and an upgrade to the AAG, whose technical challenges greatly contributed to the delayed delivery and commissioning of the ship. (1)

So, the original 8 month PSA was extended to 12 months and now is being extended to 15 months.

Ford - Delayed Again

Elevators are not the only problem the Ford is experiencing.  In addition to the well known EMALS and AAG issues, Ford has severe problems with the propulsion system.

Problems with the propulsion system are less understood publicly. The problem isn’t resident in the two nuclear reactors aboard but rather the ship’s main turbines generators that are driven by the steam the reactors produce.

Sources familiar with the extent of the repairs have told USNI News two of the main turbine generators needed unanticipated and extensive overhauls. As Geurts told Congress, the ship’s company discovered the problem during sea trials. (2)

So, brand new turbine generators need ‘extensive overhauls’?  What kind of quality control is the Navy practicing?  None, apparently?  Nice job, inspecting and accepting the Ford, NAVSEA.  NAVSEA is a joke.  They’re absolutely worthless and need to be abolished. 

SecNav Spencer, I know you didn’t design the flawed elevators and you aren’t, personally, attempting the repairs but you accepted responsibility and you freely offered your conditional resignation last fall.  Well, you failed to deliver.  Accountability is what’s been missing from the Navy for quite some time.  Show us you have a sense of integrity.  Show the Navy you have a sense of accountability.  Set an example for the Navy.  Resign and take CNO Richardson with you.  

Failing that, you’re fired.

_____________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “SECNAV to Trump: Ford Carrier Weapons Elevators Will be Fixed by Summer, or ‘Fire Me’”, Megan Eckstein, 8-Jan-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/01/08/secnav-to-trump-aircraft-carrier-weapons-elevators-to-be-fixed-by-summer-or-fire-me

(2)USNI News website, “USS Gerald Ford Delivery Delayed Due to Extensive Nuclear Propulsion, Weapons Elevator Repairs; Carrier Won’t be Ready Until October”, Sam LaGrone, 26-Mar-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/03/26/uss-gerald-ford-delivery-delayed-due-extensive-nuclear-propulsion-weapons-elevator-repairs-carrier-wont-ready-October

Spencer For SecNav?

The Trump administration is, apparently, set to announce that they will nominate Richard Spencer for the position of Secretary of the Navy (SecNav).  Mr. Spencer is a former Marine Captain (1976 – 1981) and has since held various positions in the private financial sector mostly dealing with venture capital and investments along with serving on some military advisory boards.  Some reports indicate that he was a Marine aviator though I haven’t been able to confirm that and his short service time may indicate otherwise.  Helo pilot, maybe?

In any event, his nomination would be curious.  A Marine with limited service time and a private sector financial background seems like a weak resume, on the surface, for the position of Secretary of the Navy.  At this point, let me say that I know nothing about Mr. Spencer other than what I’ve just described.  He may be an outstanding candidate.  This post is not about his suitability for the job but, rather, the seeming oddity of choosing someone with such an apparently marginally relevant background given the tens of thousands of former Navy people out there.

Don’t get me wrong, I’m not advocating for a former Admiral because, if you’ve followed this blog for any length of time, you know that I think Admirals, serving or retired, are worthless.  Surely, though, there must be some mid-level former Navy personnel who served for an extended period, have a good understanding of naval matters, and have a private background in something a bit more relevant such as technology, defense, electronics, computers, business management, etc.

I’m also not against a non-Navy person who has a strong management background in a large organization.  After all, the Navy is a large bureaucratic organization and an experienced, outside person who could cut through the traditional Navy games would be an invaluable asset in the SecNav position.

The point is that there must be thousands of people with better qualifications for the SecNav position.  This choice seems odd.  I’ll be curious to learn more about Mr. Spencer.