Monday, December 15, 2025

The Next Frigate Disaster

Now that the Constellation has failed miserably, the Navy has semi-formally stated that the next frigate will be a modified Coast Guard National Security Cutter (NSC, Legend class) and will be in the water by 2028.[1]  …  …  …   Sorry for the pause, there.  I had to retype that sentence several times because I kept making mistakes trying to type while laughing hysterically.  From vague concept to in the water in three years or less – that’s hilarious!
 
“We believe the future frigate can be in the water in 2028,” Jason Potter, the Navy’s acting acquisition executive, told attendees today at the Defense Forum here in Washington.[1]
 
[SecNav] Phelan also recently told attendees at a private dinner that the new frigate would be a modified National Security Cutter … [1]
 
Navy Secretary John Phelan said the new frigate would be based on an American design and stressed that any change orders would have to go through him.[1]

While such a timetable ought to be easily achievable, the recent record of Navy shipbuilding renders it a laughable fantasy.
 
Let’s set that aside and take a quick glance at the NSC and examine some potential issues.
 
National Security Cutter

Concurrency.  It’s not even a formal program, yet, and there’s already a potentially troubling bit of news, as indicated below.
 
He [Jason Potter] said the service was focused on using a design approach that separates finalizing the ship’s design from the construction of the lead ship … [1]

That’s a frightening statement because I don’t know what it means.  One of the Navy’s persistent, major problems with shipbuilding is concurrency which results in construction without a complete design.  In other words, unbelievably, the construction is treated as a separate issue from design.  Potter’s statement could be interpreted as saying that construction will NOT be linked to a requirement for a complete design (the “separation” he mentions).  If so, this would be simply repeating an approach that has failed every time it’s been used.  Did Potter just lay the groundwork for the failure of this program before it’s even become a formal program or did he mean something different and, if so, what did he mean?
 
Size.  The NSC, as it exists in Coast Guard service, measures 418ft long and 54ft in beam.  In comparison, the Constellation is 496ft x 65ft.  Thus, the NSC is 16% shorter and 17% narrower.  That’s a significant chunk of deck space and internal volume “gone”.  The Constellation was not exactly heavily armed to begin with and the reduced size of the NSC is, presumably, going to require significant reductions in the weapons fit compared to the Constellation.  If it comes with a commensurate reduction in cost, that might be okay but we’ve seen time and again that costs do not decrease in scale with capability decreases.  The Constellation was, itself, a third the capabilities of a Burke at 80%, or so, of the cost.  If the NSC “shrinks” at the same rate from the Constellation, we’ll have something on the order of 20% of the capabilities of a Burke at 60% of the cost.
 
CONOPS.  The discussion of capabilities leads us into the next troublesome issue and that is … of course you know what it is … CONOPS!  SecNav has apparently already chosen a ship to build, established a timetable, and is talking about design and construction processes but …  …  where is the CONOPS?  The Constellation never had one so they won’t be reusing that.  What is this frigate supposed to do?  What is its focus?  Its mission?  It’s going to have fewer capabilities than the Constellation, presumably, so it really needs to have a tight mission focus to ensure that it can be effective in whatever its role will be.  Otherwise, we’re going to wind up with a mini-mini-Burke.  Mini2-Burke?  I’m already sensing a ship that will attempt to do a very small amount of everything and will do absolutely nothing even slightly well.  To paraphrase … Jack of no trades, adequate of none?
 
Change Orders.  As noted above, SecNav has, apparently, identified change orders as a problem in shipbuilding, claiming that change orders will have to go through him.  If, by that, he means he won’t be approving any, that’s great.  On the other hand, if he simply means he’ll rubber stamp the change orders than we just have a sound bite with no actual improvement in the shipbuilding process.  As a reminder, all waivers for ship construction and trials must go through the CNO, personally.  The problem is that no CNO has ever met a waiver he didn’t approve so what’s the point of the approval process?  Will SecNav just become an automatic approval for change orders?  The mere fact that he even states that change orders must go through him implies that he will approve some/all.  This is the wrong approach.  He should have flatly stated that once the design is set there will be no change orders … period!  But … he didn’t.  Again, this is establishing the groundwork for failure, already.
 
Structure.  It is unknown whether the NSC meets Navy structural standards as regards strength, compartmentation, weight margins, etc.  The NSC is reportedly built to 80-90% military standards but what is lacking and how critical it is, is unknown.  As you recall, the Constellation program got in trouble trying to modify the FREMM to USN construction and survivability standards.  Will history repeat itself, here?
 
Testing.  The NSC has a near mythical reputation among naval observers who have constantly called for the Navy to adopt/adapt the NSC to naval use.  The reality, however, is that the NSC, like every ship, has problems that may render it unsuitable for naval service without extensive redesign and modifications (bye, bye budget!).  The Jan 2016 GAO report [2] noted,
 
The U.S. Navy, the Coast Guard’s independent test agent, completed initial testing for the National Security Cutter (NSC) in April 2014 and rated the NSC as operationally effective and suitable. Still, testing revealed 10 major deficiencies (some are shown in figure). Initial testing is an event designed to verify performance of critical systems to ensure assets are capable of meeting mission requirements. The event tests critical operational issues and key performance parameters. The NSC fully met 12 of 19 key performance parameters. Tests of one key performance parameter, as well as other critical systems, were deferred to follow-on testing. The Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy disagree on the NSC’s requirements for cutter boat operations. Without clear requirements the Navy and Coast Guard will not have a basis for determining actions to resolve any performance issues. Coast Guard officials acknowledged that clarifying these requirements would be beneficial.[2]
 
According to Coast Guard documentation, it may choose not to correct all deficiencies due to the cost of changes.[2]
 
During operations, the NSC has experienced performance issues that were not identified during initial testing, and the Coast Guard has planned design changes to some of the cutters’ equipment [ed. from an accompanying diagram, problem equipment includes CIWS, CIWS ammo hoist, engines, generators, boat, boat crane, 57mm gun, 57mm gun ammo hoist, TRS 3D radar, Nulka decoy launcher, and midships boat davit] …  However, the Coast Guard has not yet found the causes for problems affecting the NSC’s propulsion systems. As a result of these and other equipment failures, the NSC has been operating in a degraded condition in some mission areas. DHS has no plans for additional acquisition review boards for the NSC, which would provide oversight going forward.[2]

 
Discussion
 
The failure of the Constellation program presents an opportunity for the Navy to course-correct.  Assuming the NSC platform can be successfully adapted to meet naval combat and survivability standards at an affordable cost – no sure thing – the platform offers the ability to construct a small, focused vessel for the ASW frigate mission.    Instead of a bloated, overpriced, under armed, and unfocused ship with no defined purpose, the Navy has the chance to design a small, focused, affordable ASW-centric ship.  What the NSC does not offer is the ability to be a mini-Burke like the Constellation.  Whether the Navy will be wise enough to recognize this limitation and the opportunity it presents is an open question with an all too likely failed answer but time will tell.
 
 
 
_________________________________
 
[1]Breaking Defense, “Navy wants new frigate in 2028, says service’s acquisition head”, Justin Katz, 10-Dec-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/12/navy-wants-new-frigate-in-2028-says-services-acquisition-head/
 
[2]Government Accountability Office, “NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER, Enhanced Oversight Needed to Ensure Problems Discovered during Testing and Operations Are Addressed”, Jan 2016, GAO-16-148,
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674924.pdf
Posted by at
Labels: , , , ,

145 comments:

  1. SRBDecember 15, 2025 at 11:13 AM

    We're almost at the point of war time quickie shipbuilding. For all its faults, it's probably the best and quickest shot we got. Give it a decent gun (3in), VLS for ASROC/ ESSM, a CIWS and TT. Basic sensor suite for self-defense and a hull mounted sonar and VDS. No flight deck/hanger. CONOPS should be ASW / escort. Have three FFs paired with a Burke for a hunter killer/ escort squadron. The Burke provides command and control, AAW and aviation support. Just a thought.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsDecember 15, 2025 at 11:48 AM

      "Just a thought."

      Not a bad thought. Better than the Navy's!

      Delete
  2. AnonymousDecember 15, 2025 at 11:55 AM

    It is not to design a frigate based on whatever but same operations from many interests just like them did on the Constellation.

    Your Congressmen want local jobs plus pay his real bosses (who finance their careers).

    Many business interests want pieces of this pie. Best way is to add features to base design by saying if this doesn't have **** it would not #####

    The Constellation all over again!

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsDecember 15, 2025 at 12:14 PM

      You're putting way too much blame on Congress and industry. Congress does not design ships. They merely fund what the Navy requests. Industry does not conceptualize ships. They build what the Navy requests. The common denominator is the Navy.

      Delete
    2. AnonymousDecember 15, 2025 at 8:54 PM

      Congressmen use funding as leverage to force Navy to add equipment built in their districts. Most people are exciting on new toys been added without think what this ship's missions are. Keep adding features will repeat the Constellation saga.

      Delete
    3. AnonymousDecember 15, 2025 at 9:01 PM

      Congress has power to selectively funding on items than either prove or reject the whole project. It is a big problem.

      Delete
    4. ComNavOpsDecember 16, 2025 at 5:33 AM

      Congress does not design ships or equipment and they have never, to the best of my recollection, specified ship's equipment beyond the "made in America" requirement. Certainly, Congress will vote for anything that brings manufacturing to their districts but that's a far cry from designing or spec'ing ships and equipment. Congress can only vote to fund or not fund what the Navy proposes. The closest Congress has come, in modern times, to dictating procurement is when they refuse to close out a specific weapon production such as the A-10 aircraft.

      Congress should be exerting their oversight responsibility more extensively but they don't. I'd love to see Congress dictate that the Navy build a small ASW corvette or return to building Forrestal size carriers!

      Delete
    5. AnonymousDecember 16, 2025 at 2:31 PM

      Congress pushed the pick an existing design and specifically added the requirement for SM-6 and tomahawk integration after the second ship. Likely why they cut the order to 2 ships when cancelling the program.

      Delete
    6. ComNavOpsDecember 16, 2025 at 5:18 PM

      "Congress pushed the pick an existing design"

      I have never heard that. Do you have a reference? As far as I know, that was purely a Navy choice.

      "specifically added the requirement for SM-6 and tomahawk integration"

      Have not seen that anywhere. Give me a reference.

      Delete
  3. AnonymousDecember 15, 2025 at 12:21 PM

    What exactly is the mission of this warship? 'Frigate' is just a term, and an ill defined one in 2025 (were USN frigates actually Destroyer Escorts (DE) for convoys?).

    A lot of USN surface combatant woes seem to originate with confusion as to what the ship should actually do. I am dubious about the convoy escort mission as we have no ocean going convoys to escort. Surely we could buy large container ships from Japan or Korea at ~$200 million per copy, militarize them properly (RAS, aviation facilities, communications, weapons, etc.) and then employ them as amphibious cargo ships or even as escorts. Atlantic Conveyor is an example, albeit one that was mobilized too quickly and without the desired active/passive defense systems.

    GAB

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsDecember 15, 2025 at 12:55 PM

      "What exactly is the mission of this warship? "

      You've asked the key question and the Navy has no answer. They don't do CONOPS anymore. The Navy has substituted technologies for CONOPS. We no longer design ships to meet a mission/CONOPS. We now design ships to carry disparate technologies, the newer (or non-existent!), the better.

      In WWII, the General Board defined a ship's mission and, from that, generated the general specifications for the major equipment (propulsion, armor, weapons). We lack a General Board, today.

      Delete
    2. SRBDecember 15, 2025 at 4:41 PM

      During my time period in the Navy ( 70s -80s), frigates were ASW mission centric ships. My last ship (Knox FF) we pretty much spent all time deployed and training doing ASW. We didnt ever spend time with carriers because all frigates then only had a flank speed of 28/30 kts max. Escort of amphib groups was normal though (same speed). Destroyers I was on though were carrier escort oriented (36kts), especially DDG (AAW).Best tin can duty I had was Turner Joy, all gun and TT. We spent all our time on the gun line for fire support missions. It seems that the NSC has about the same speed as the FF's of the past.

      Delete
    3. AnonymousDecember 19, 2025 at 8:35 AM

      The general idea behind the FFGX program was to produce an economy of force ASW combatant, so that's the likely mission of whatever the new frigate will be.

      Delete
    4. ComNavOpsDecember 19, 2025 at 9:56 AM

      "The general idea behind the FFGX program was to produce an economy of force ASW combatant, so that's the likely mission of whatever the new frigate will be."

      I have seen zero indication that was ever the intent of the Constellation program. The Constellation was clearly NOT intended as a focused ASW platform but, rather, as a multi-purpose mini-Burke. You, and many observers, might have though an ASW frigate was the logical intent but that was never the Navy's intent.

      I also have to chuckle at the "economy" of force aspect. Not positive what you mean by that but I assume you mean an affordable vessel. If so, only you and the Navy ever believed the Constellation would be affordable. At the time of cancellation, the price had already ballooned to well over a billion dollars and was likely going to wind up near $2B per ship. Not affordable!

      As far as the likely mission for the NSC frigate, the Navy has no more idea what they want now then they did when they started the Constellation program.

      Delete
    5. AnonymousDecember 21, 2025 at 2:54 AM

      I'm not quite sure what you mean by a "multi purpose mini Burke," but if your intention was to posit the Constellation as a smaller major surface combatant I can't quite see where you're getting such an idea from. It doesn't have a large VLS capacity and the radar, while good on its own, would not lead me to trust the defense of any major asset on its own.

      By economy of force, there is a concept within the military called economy of force wherein a smaller/cheaper unit/group/etc would take over any lower end job of a more expensive unit so that its attention can be put towards more intensive tasks which the smaller unit could not achieve. For example, you would not use a supercarrier for something as trivial as transporting a single person. If you used a small boat transport, that would be, in a sense, an economy of force mission. This is a more extreme example but I hope you understand what I mean.

      As for the price, I'm not quite aware where you got your cost numbers from. From the 2024 FFG(X) MSAR (https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Selected_Acquisition_Reports/FY_2023_SARS/FFG%2062%20MSAR%20Dec%202023.pdf) the projected per unit cost was 953 million dollars. The undersecretary of defense fy26 acquisitions report (https://comptroller.war.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2026/FY2026_Weapons.pdf) and the fy26 navy shipbuilding procurement request (https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/26pres/SCN_Book.pdf) says that the procurement cost of the ship runs somewhere between 1.1-1.3 billion per ship, which while not very good is still half or less than half of a Burke. Just as an off-note, I'm not quite sure how the variance exists, though I suspect it may be due to the navy including ordnance costs plus extra or some such. Considering these are the leading ships, though I wish that costs were lower, I wouldn't say that this is some unexpected ballooning of costs. I also don't know how it could get to 2 billion dollars. I'd appreciate if you could elucidate me with some more recent source on the ship cost.

      Delete
    6. ComNavOpsDecember 21, 2025 at 7:06 AM

      "I'm not quite sure what you mean by a "multi purpose mini Burke,"

      That was redundant. "Burke" means multi-purpose.

      "posit the Constellation as a smaller major surface combatant I can't quite see where you're getting such an idea from."

      Oh come on, now. EVERYONE recognizes that the Constellation is just a scaled down Burke: same weapons, same sensors, same everything ... just less of each. It's exactly a mini-Burke.

      "economy of force wherein a smaller/cheaper unit/group/etc would take over any lower end job of a more expensive unit so that its attention can be put towards more intensive tasks which the smaller unit could not achieve."

      Ah, I misunderstood. You know, however, that the concept is invalid, at least for the Navy? I've posted on exactly this. There has never been a single documented example of a lesser vessel "freeing up" a larger vessel for a more important task. We've got around 80 Burkes and most of them sit around pierside, doing nothing or cruise aimlessly on endless deployments, doing nothing. There is no backlog of "more important" tasks waiting for some less vessel to do so that a Burke can become available.

      Delete
    7. ComNavOpsDecember 21, 2025 at 7:14 AM

      "As for the price, I'm not quite aware where you got your cost numbers from"

      The latest cost estimates put the Constellation at something around $1.3B AND INCREASING! Setting aside the fact that Navy cost estimates do not include much of the fitting out costs ($0.5B+), no Navy shipbuilding program has yet come anywhere near meeting target costs. That $1.3B (plus $0.5B) is guaranteed to continue increasing.

      EVERY ship delivered in recent decades has been delivered incomplete and additional construction was funded separately from the SCN budget. Thus, the true cost is $1.3B + ($0.5B+) + ($0.3B-$0.5B additional const) = around $2B

      If you recall, the original Navy cost estimate was $800M with some public statements suggesting that follow on ships would cost less than that. How's that for fantasy?!

      So, yeah, I'm pretty confident that the Constellation would have come in at around $2B.

      Delete
    8. AnonymousDecember 22, 2025 at 12:22 AM

      While the Burke is multi mission capable, its primary role is to act as a major anti air warfare combatant for carrier strike groups. I was presuming you would consider its primary mission as an air warfare asset, considering that, while it is capable of any mission, it is best suited (and largely optimized towards) anti air warfare. But that's just my opinion.

      I haven't read anything you've written on economy of force, but I'm rather confused on what you mean by "invalid." The existence of any non major combatant in any navy throughout history necessarily proves this point. Just to make myself clear, I do not mean the complete taking over of some job, say for example ASW, by a certain kind of unit and barring another kind of unit from participating. What I mean is the optimization of time and financial economies for certain units. Say for example you have the USS I Cost Ten Billion Dollars, and it is capable of any mission, technically speaking. However, it is primarily designed to defeat other large groups of surface ships in a missile duel. Now, there are a list of tasks which must be accomplished at any given time. One of the most important ones could absolutely be the defeat of the enemy surface fleet, yes, and that is what the USS ICTBD would be focused on. However, there are other less important yet still critical tasks which must be accomplished. Perhaps you need to conduct broad scale ASW in some area. Perhaps you need to bombard some coastal site. Who knows. The point being, is that it would be uneconomical for you to produce two more ICTBDs to accomplish these other missions because doing so would be gargantuan overkill. Yes, sure, they would accomplish their task thoroughly, but you could accomplish much more by building cheaper ships and then using that saved cash towards something else. At the same time, your currently existing ICTBD can be spent towards conducting ASuW instead. Consider the existence of any DD or DE in WW2, or not first rate/second rate ships, etc etc. It is simply more economical to not conduct overkill.

      As for your point on cost, I feel we may be reading differing figures, or that there might have been some misinterpretation of some figures. I don't see how a half billion dollar per unit fitting could be remotely possible. As per the FY26 navy budget declaration that I linked earlier, the cost of every Burke getting fitted is roughly around 3 billion dollars for 97 ships. For the San Antonios the fitting costs have been roughly around 100 million. I would greatly appreciate whatever source you can provide so I can clear up my confusion.

      Delete
    9. ComNavOpsDecember 22, 2025 at 8:25 AM

      "While the Burke is multi mission capable, its primary role is to act as a major anti air warfare"

      That's correct and, since that's the case, one has to wonder why we would pay to have designed and built in the extra capabilities that will never come into play? That's the problem with multi-mission. You can only do one thing well and the other capabilities will remain unused, serving only to drive up the cost of the ship. Imagine if the Burke were truly AAW focused. We'd eliminate the flight deck, hangar, helo crew/support tech berthing, maintenance shops, parts, magazines, fuel, etc. The resulting Burke would be around half the size and half the cost while remaining fully capable of AAW. That's the ONLY reasonable approach to ship design. With the savings, we could build small, dedicated ASW vessels.

      "economy of force"

      The theory you describe is valid but the practice is non-existent in the Navy. There is NO backlog of high level tasks waiting for a Burke to be freed from pirate skiff chasing. We have far more high level ships than we do high level tasks. Thus, the concept of economy of force, as you describe it, is invalid in peacetime. In war, it might be valid and that's what a balanced fleet is for.

      "cost, I feel we may be reading differing figures"

      No, you're ignoring actual costs which I've described. The Navy makes it difficult (or impossible!) to obtain actual costs on the undocumented construction costs of post-delivery completion and fitting out but the bits of information that are available all support my estimates. I read every scrap of information on such matters and I'm quite confident. This isn't even debatable. I might be off a couple hundred million dollars either way but I'm solidly in the neighborhood. Go research the LPD post-delivery costs since there is some information on that. It's stunning! Look up the costs for the Zumwalt post-delivery weapons/sensor fit installation work. Read any of the reports about the degree of post-delivery refit/construction combined with starred card remediation work. The costs are not readily available but we can reasonably estimate the number of hours and costs per hour as well as equipment.

      I'm quite confident.

      Delete
    10. AnonymousDecember 22, 2025 at 7:50 PM

      There's a school of thought that if you are shipyard constrained and crew constrained, and thus limited in the number of hulls you can put in the water, you may as well make those hulls as powerful as possible.

      Your mileage may vary how much you agree with that school of thought....

      Delete
    11. ComNavOpsDecember 23, 2025 at 6:04 AM

      "There's a school of thought"

      There's a school of thought that the Earth is flat.

      "may as well make those hulls as powerful as possible."

      Which leads to even fewer ships which leads to more expensive ships which leads to fewer ships which leads ... It's called a death spiral.

      Delete
  4. hokie_1997December 15, 2025 at 2:14 PM

    The Navy's strategy with frigate seems to amount to "we'll [somehow] do better this time". There is nothing about this that should inspire any confidence.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsDecember 15, 2025 at 2:21 PM

      "we'll [somehow] do better this time"

      There is the potential for something significantly better but doing so would entail the Navy doing everything different than they have been and that seems vanishingly unlikely.

      Delete
  5. RobtzuDecember 15, 2025 at 2:50 PM

    A lot of commentators have been asking for this. We shall see if getting what you want really is one of the great tragedies in life. My question is why this wasn't announced same time as the Constellation cancelation. Presumably these decisions were intertwined.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsDecember 15, 2025 at 3:26 PM

      I wonder who made the decision. SecNav is not a professional warrior and would have no basis for making a decision. So, who recommended the NSC approach to him? Who has his ear? And whoever that is, what vision (meaning CONOPS/mission) do they see for a small Coast Guard ship converted to Navy use?

      Delete
    2. AnonymousDecember 16, 2025 at 2:34 PM

      You don't seem open to hearing it, but follow the money. Follow the political interest. Its a large/massive part of how Constellation was selected and the facts scream to it again here.

      Delete
    3. ComNavOpsDecember 16, 2025 at 5:20 PM

      If you have some factual information about the selection of the NSC, by all means, please share it.

      Delete
  6. LonfoDecember 15, 2025 at 4:03 PM

    "That’s a frightening statement because I don’t know what it means. "

    Pretty sure that's just good ol' concurrency, yeah.
    Doomed from the start.

    ReplyDelete
  7. NICODecember 15, 2025 at 4:43 PM

    Pretty much agree with everything above.
    For starters, why? Why does the USN need this frigate?
    For what? what's it's purpose?

    USN still really isn't clear what it wants so yeah, Connie was starting to look like another repeat of LCS, repeat of Ford, repeat of the Zummies....but is NSC really that much better?
    I guess if USN keeps it to a minimum change to get hulls in the water fast, it could be "ok" BUT what are the odds of that happening?!? It appears to have all the problems the Connie had: small hull, needs to be designed to better higher standard, more "stuff" needed, etc so are we really better off?

    And even if USN does get it in the water fast, what's it's job? Show the flag? Fight pirates? Presence? It can't do high end work so it all has to be low end which is necessary but is that what USN needs now and the next 3 to 5 years? what about China/Taiwan, if that is what is pacing this, does a minimum change NSC contribute or not? The simple off the shelf version probably doesn't since it won't survive high end combat, even the minimum upgrade version probably doesn't either so why now and why rush it? Haven't seen anything about ASW/MCM capability, it's not designed for it from ground up so even if adapted, it will be nowhere near a full up designed ASW hull should be, it's at best a poor stop gap.

    I would almost prefer not to bother with FFX program and just buy more Burkes and get as many of them in the water than whatever this NSC comes out since it won't help any for China conflict.....

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsDecember 16, 2025 at 5:24 AM

      "NSC comes out since it won't help any for China conflict....."

      I understand your sentiment but I have to somewhat disagree. Properly modified (and it's highly questionable whether it could be sufficiently modified at an affordable cost), a small ASW/patrol vessel could prove quite useful conducting lower threat escort and patrol duties which would free up Burkes to go do front line combat stuff.

      Delete
    2. AnonymousDecember 16, 2025 at 2:36 PM

      Its part of a team. If it can successfully quarterback for effective unmanned systems, its combat value as a command node goes up.

      Delete
    3. ComNavOpsDecember 16, 2025 at 5:22 PM

      "effective unmanned systems"

      Well, there's the problem. There are NO effective unmanned systems. Can you offer one that would be a candidate to be controlled from an NSC?

      Delete
  8. AnonymousDecember 15, 2025 at 5:17 PM

    The genesis of this goes back to the 1970s. AEGIS changed everything and at a relatively low cost. The Ticonderoga class was quickly followed by the Burkes making frigates unnecessary and by comparison costly given capabilities. And that is still the case. The next program SC 21 was begun far too early for specious reasons. Then the USN second guessed itself on small combatants with the ill fated LCS concept. SC 21 culminating in the Zumwalt disaster. Suddenly a frigate program looked appealing. But the USN botched the deal. Worse a far too late Tico/Burke follow on has resulted in a less than desired outcome to date.
    I have no idea how or even IF the USN can recover from the self-inflicted debacles of the last 30 years.
    There certainly is no coherent strategy or visionary concept of operations to properly
    assess future combatant needs.
    How given this can a program be started with any hope of success?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsDecember 16, 2025 at 5:26 AM

      "making frigates unnecessary and by comparison costly given capabilities."

      That depends on your definitions. Burkes make modern frigates, which are just mini-Burkes, unnecessary. However, a true, small, low cost, ASW frigate would be highly useful (I would say mandatory).

      Delete
    2. MikeDCDecember 17, 2025 at 10:39 AM

      "The Ticonderoga class was quickly followed by the Burkes making frigates unnecessary and by comparison costly given capabilities. And that is still the case. "

      What you say is true in that the Constellation seems to have been developed with no distinguishable CONOPs from the Burkes. Which is to say, at most "be an escort ship".

      But really, I don't think that was ever the case. The OHPs were developed with the specific CONOPs of convoy escort. You would maybe put one Aegis ship with a convoy to provide more air defense, but you wouldn't waste multiples of them chasing subs.

      One wonders if there is any plan at all for escorting troops and war materials across the Pacific, but I don't see any circumstances where Aegis ships would be cost effective over a purpose designed frigate.

      Delete
    3. ComNavOpsDecember 17, 2025 at 11:27 AM

      "I don't think that was ever the case. The OHPs were developed with the specific CONOPs of convoy escort."

      There is nothing wrong with a mission focus that is convoy escort. HOWEVER, that mission does NOT require long range radars and long range Standard missiles. The Perrys were intended to provide local AAW, not area AAW, for example.

      The main convoy threat is submarines which is an ASW mission. If you believe a convoy faces cruise missiles and aircraft then you provide a Burke(s), as you note.

      Delete
  9. AnonymousDecember 15, 2025 at 6:03 PM

    Quick question. If we assume (may be incorrectly) this new ship is to be more ASW focused, with the Burkes doing AAW, how quiet is th Hull for ASW?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. NICODecember 15, 2025 at 6:29 PM

      Good question. The BD article stated USN would like to install a towed array so ASW is being somewhat considered but I think its going to be a sub par ASW ship since all the gear is add-ons. Haven't heard anything about hull quieting or dedicated ASW gear....kind of makes one wonder then why didn't USN just keep the regular off the shelf FREMM design if they wanted ASW?!?

      Delete
    2. ComNavOpsDecember 16, 2025 at 5:20 AM

      "how quiet is the Hull for ASW?"

      The key question and I don't know the answer. ASW vessels are typically built with acoustic signature reduction affecting every aspect of design and construction including machinery isolation/rafting, hull shaping, prop cavitation suppression, Prairie/Masker, etc. Has the NSC been designed and built for that? I don't know but I suspect not and, if not, that would, in my mind, disqualify it for ASW work.

      Delete
  10. TomcatTweaker63ADecember 15, 2025 at 7:03 PM

    https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2025/u-s-navy-eyes-coast-guard-cutter-as-new-frigate-class-after-constellation-cancellation

    From this article is the following excerpt:

    Adapting the NSC into a Navy frigate would require careful decisions about combat system integration, because each added capability affects displacement, power margins, and overall ship balance. Industry concepts previously associated with NSC-based patrol frigates illustrate the range of possible modifications, from relatively limited changes to more extensive variants. One such concept, often referred to as Patrol Frigate 4921, was described as adding a 12-cell Mk 56 launcher for ESSM, upgrading the main gun to a 76 mm Super Rapid, integrating Harpoon launchers and a torpedo launcher, and modifying sonar arrangements to include a towed array. These additions were associated with a reduction in range from 12,000 to about 8,000 nautical miles, highlighting the tradeoffs between combat capability and endurance. For the US Navy, the challenge would be to define a stable configuration early, because reopening design decisions during construction would risk recreating the problems perceived with the Constellation-class.

    In addition, this is pretty much a useless, irrelevant, thought but I will type it anyway. Why wasn't the UK's Type 26 ASW frigate not selected for the FFG(X), well the FF program?

    https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2025/uk-and-norway-prepare-type-26-frigates-to-guard-cables-and-track-russian-subs-in-north-atlantic

    Just the armament alone is more along the lines of what the Navy needs:

    Type 26 is built around Sea Ceptor cells for local area air defense and a 24-cell Mk 41 vertical launcher designed to host next-generation cruise and anti-ship missiles, supported by a 127 mm Mk 45 gun for surface and naval gunfire support missions. Under the Lunna House framework, Royal Navy ships will standardize on Kongsberg’s Naval Strike Missile already in Norwegian service. This sea-skimming strike weapon combines stealth shaping with high subsonic performance, a range that can exceed 185 to 300 kilometers depending on variant, and a 120-kilogram programmable warhead guided by imaging infrared for terminal discrimination.

    Beneath the surface, the exercises will emphasize the Sting Ray lightweight torpedo, for which the agreement calls for deeper cooperation and harmonized stockpiles. Sting Ray Mod 1 is an electrically powered, pump jet-driven 324 millimeter weapon capable of reaching roughly 45 knots across an 8 to 11 kilometer engagement envelope. Its acoustic homing seeker is designed to counter both modern diesel electric and nuclear submarines, delivering a shaped charge designed to breach a pressure hull. The torpedo can be launched from frigates, Merlin helicopters, and fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft, enabling a fully integrated UK-Norway training environment.

    Instead of the Sea Ceptor SAMs, the Navy substitutes the SM family and or the 4-pack of ESSMs which allow for more VL-ASROCS to be loaded, in place of the Stingray ASW torpedo, the Mark 54 LWT is substituted.

    Just my unqualified opinion.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. AnonymousDecember 15, 2025 at 7:39 PM

      Type 26 was not considered because it didn’t exist and, therefore, did not meet the parent requirement which, of course, the Navy immediately discarded once the selection was made.

      Delete
    2. TomcatTweaker63ADecember 15, 2025 at 10:27 PM

      Thank you.

      Delete
    3. ComNavOpsDecember 16, 2025 at 5:17 AM

      As noted, the Type 26 was just a design concept at the time of the Constellation procurement competition and the Navy had specified that the winning design had to be an existing, operating ship (the parent design concept). One can certainly debate the merits of the parent design requirement but it's clear why the Type 26 was not eligible for consideration. Even today, there are no operational Type 26 ships. The lead ship, HMS Glasgow, is still building and not expected to be operational for another year or more.

      Delete
    4. TomcatTweaker63ADecember 16, 2025 at 8:57 AM

      It's certainly a hell of a lot closer to being completed than the Constellation is. May be, it's time the Navy creates a "clown" fleet. The Zumwalt's, the LCS, and now the Constellation.

      Delete
    5. ComNavOpsDecember 16, 2025 at 9:19 AM

      "a lot closer to being completed than the Constellation is"

      Not really. Had we taken the Type 26 design and done to it what we did to the FREMM that was the supposed Constellation parent design, meaning altered its structure to increase compartmentation and survivability, change hull dimensions, changed all the internal layouts, re-spec'ed all the Type 26 equipment to US standards, and made never ending change orders, etc., it would be no closer to completion that the Constellation is now.

      Now, if we had taken the Type 26 and built it EXACTLY as it is/was designed for the UK at the time of contract award then, maybe, we'd be closer to completion. Of course, if we had built the FREMM EXACTLY as the parent was, we'd have already completed it, too.

      Delete
    6. ComNavOpsDecember 16, 2025 at 9:25 AM

      The entire point of the parent design concept (whether you think it was a good idea or not (it wasn't!)) was to eliminate changes and built it quickly. Of course, the Navy abandoned that concept even before contract award and changed almost everything which took commonality with the parent design from 85% to <15% and then the Navy acts surprised that the cost ballooned and the schedule slipped badly. The only people in the world who didn't see this coming was the Navy. I predicted disaster from the very start just as I can already clearly see the beginnings of disaster with the NSC approach. Can the Navy salvage the NSC approach? Yes ... if they abandon every shipbuilding practice they have and do it right, instead. Will they? Not a snowball's chance in a hot place! Navy shipbuilding is so badly broken that they can't even recognize that it's broken despite the gargantuan mountain of evidence proving it.

      Delete
    7. TomcatTweaker63ADecember 16, 2025 at 12:05 PM

      Do you think that the Navy was aware of how much the FREMM design had to be modified/tailored to suit their needs? I never understood the FFG(X) program to begin with. Essentially, building a mini-Burke or Burke Light.

      Delete
    8. ComNavOpsDecember 16, 2025 at 12:39 PM

      You've raised multiple issues. Why did/does the Navy want to build a mini-Burke? It's because they have no strategic plan to deal with China (War Plan Orange equivalent) so they have no idea what operations will be needed and without operational plans they can't identify what ship types/numbers are needed. So, they revert to the only thing that has been even a partial success in the last 45 yrs: the Burke. Instead of risking yet another failure of a shipbuilding program, they opt for the "safe" choice of a mini-Burke. Now, even that has failed. At this point, Navy leadership is so scared of failure that they're incapable of even imagining a fleet of anything other than Burkes or smaller Burkes.

      Did they know how much the FREMM had to modified? Well, they had complete access to the builder's plans and specs so ... yes. In fact, most people don't realize but the construction award was NOT for a FREMM which then got modified; it was for a modified FREMM from the start so, yes, they completely knew. The various DOT&E, GAO, etc. reports clearly document this. The Navy then took a bad situation and made it worse by continuing to make more modifications after contract award and reverting to concurrent redesign and construction which caused costs to skyrocket and schedules to implode. There's no situation so bad that the Navy can't make it worse!

      Does this clarify things for you?

      Delete
    9. TomcatTweaker63ADecember 16, 2025 at 3:56 PM

      Absolutely, very much so. Thank you.

      Delete
    10. NICODecember 16, 2025 at 4:31 PM

      You know what's really scary is the number of people who are saying we should hurry up and start building it before we finish the design, so again, back to concurrency....because that has worked so well for DoD and USN!!!!

      Delete
    11. ComNavOpsDecember 16, 2025 at 5:25 PM

      "back to concurrency."

      Yep! Those who will not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.

      Delete
    12. AnonymousDecember 17, 2025 at 1:25 AM

      I'm not sure if this is possible (and i'm not remotely qualified), I think an article on the differences in “Naval Standards” between different countries would be interesting. I would have thought (probably naively) the UK standards (i.e. on Type 26) would be as good as US? I know following the losses of ships in the Falkland’s they were re-assessed. And as the UK has lost more ships in combat in the last 50 years than any other western navy you would have thought they were some of the best?
      Clive F

      Delete
    13. ComNavOpsDecember 17, 2025 at 8:19 AM

      "article on the differences in “Naval Standards” between different countries"

      I would LOVE to do that but, unfortunately, there is almost no definitive information on the subject. Peripheral evidence suggests that European ship designs are built to significantly lower standards of strength and survivability. There is no evidence, of any kind, about Korean and Japanese ship standards, that I've seen. The UK's standards seem okay although their ships are plagued by quality control issues, as are ours. Sadly, that's best, most in depth analysis I can offer. There just isn't publicly available information.

      Delete
    14. Clive FDecember 17, 2025 at 3:53 PM

      Thank you

      Delete
    15. ComNavOpsDecember 17, 2025 at 4:00 PM

      The Constellation saga was enlightening as regards structural strength and survivability. As you know, I'm highly critical of the US Navy's watered down survivability standards and yet they deemed the FREMM design as being woefully inadequate and had to make major changes just for survivability. That tells me European designs are pretty poor as regards survivability.

      The sinking of the Norwegian frigate, Helge Ingstad, further confirmed for me the poor survivability of the designs when the report blamed the sinking in large measure on the passage of water through the prop shaft and other supposedly watertight fittings.

      This is just peripheral evidence but highly suggestive to me.

      Delete
  11. AnonymousDecember 16, 2025 at 12:50 AM

    The USN has got itself into a no win situation. US Industry is about capable of producing about 2 Burkes a year. There is no real evidence that rate can be improved without years of lead time and many Billions of $'s.
    2 Burkes a year supports a surface combatant force of somewhere between 75 and 80 vessels. Burkes have been in production since the later 1980's so very shortly the production rate of 2 vessels a year will just replace the retirement of early DDG 51 class vessels starting with Burke itself.
    There are no obvious replacements for the remaining Tico's within any credible time frame and no one is suggesting that the LCS is combat capable of anything.
    If something is not achieved and achieved quickly the USN will struggle to remain a one and a half ocean Navy (probably the Pacific and the East Med/Western Indian Ocean).
    To turn the NSC into a proxy frigate you would have to reduce it to single role (probably ASW with some self defense) and leave the rest of the vessel pretty much as is.
    Not a pretty prospect but there aren't to many options in view.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsDecember 16, 2025 at 5:37 AM

      "without years of lead time"

      Correct. It took years of ever-shrinking construction orders to reduce industry to today's meager capacity and would take years of increased orders to regrow the capacity. That means we should start now!

      The problem is the Navy has gotten itself firmly wedded to a cycle of ever larger, more costly ships which means fewer ships and fewer ships means larger, more expensive ships which means fewer ships which means ...

      We need to break the cycle and start building smaller, cheaper, focused ships so that we can build more and grow our industrial capacity.

      Delete
  12. AnonymousDecember 16, 2025 at 3:38 AM

    “To turn the NSC into a proxy frigate you would have to reduce it to single role (probably ASW with some self defense) and leave the rest of the vessel pretty much as is.”

    In WW2, Treasury class coastguard cutters were more than 5 times as successful at sinking U boats as USN destroyer escorts and they achieved that with ships 100 ft shorter than the current cutters. If the USN needs to enhance ASW, then converting the latest cutters for that purpose could make sense as long as it was one of a tiny number of changes. A USNI article suggests that adding a towed array to the cutters would not create huge difficulties for shipyards. The article also suggests that the current helicopters should be swapped for helicopters with dipping sonars. Would these changes be too much for the NSC?

    The article (https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2025/september/asw-should-be-coast-guard-mission-again) also mentions a WW2 cutter ramming a U boat, which made me wonder how many modern naval hills could cope with that.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsDecember 16, 2025 at 5:13 AM

      "Treasury class coastguard cutters were more than 5 times as successful at sinking U boats as USN destroyer escorts"

      You're making a highly misleading statement. In one statistical measure, this is a technically true statement. The class achieved a kill rate of 0.57 per ship. HOWEVER, for the seven ship class that means a total wartime score of 4 sub kills (4 kills / 7 ships = 0.57 kills per ship) although I can only find documentation of three kills. In contrast, the destroyer escort USS England, DE-635, alone, scored 6 kills in a matter of days. Thus, DE's scored dozens of kills whereas the Treasury class scored a grand total of 4 kills. So, statistically the Treasury class rate was high but this is a function of there being only 7 ships in the class versus the hundreds of DE's that were built. The kill rate is merely an artifact of the small size of the class not any evidence of special ASW prowess of the class.

      I would also note that 1 of the 7 ships in class was sunk by a U-boat giving the class a sunk rate of 0.14, far worse than for DE's. Again, though, this is merely an artifact of the small size of the class not any evidence of unsuitability of the class.

      All that said, the Treasury class was a good ASW escort vessel, well suited to the purpose and the threat of the time period.

      Delete
    2. AnonymousDecember 16, 2025 at 5:18 AM

      Change of helicopter shouldn't be a major issue - the Coast Guard's Jayhawk is a Seahawk variant.

      Delete
    3. ComNavOpsDecember 16, 2025 at 5:46 AM

      "Change of helicopter shouldn't be a major issue - the Coast Guard's Jayhawk is a Seahawk variant."

      To the best of my limited knowledge, the Jayhawk is normally only operated from land. The NSC may be able to land a Jayhawk but does the ship have the hangar space, magazine, fuel storage, and machine shops to support a Jayhawk on an extended basis?

      Delete
    4. AnonymousDecember 16, 2025 at 3:20 PM

      I admit that I had not considered the numbers of cutters versus destroyer escorts produced but I had realised that how the vessels were used might be relevant. My point was, if the changes to the ship were limited to a specific purpose, the NSC conversion might not be a disaster. Sadly, your mini-Burke comments about the Constellation turned out to be true and I certainly can't see anything useful emerging in 2028.

      Delete
    5. TomcatTweaker63ADecember 16, 2025 at 4:59 PM

      Some quick research I did.

      MH-60R’s On Legend-class NSC

      NSC Hangar Dimensions: 50-by-80-foot (15 m × 24 m) flight deck, hangar for all aircraft
      AIRCRAFT MIX FOR WMSL: HH-60J, SH-60 (all), MH-60S
      From Chuck Hill’s CG Blog https://chuckhillscgblog.net/2024/08/28/change-is-coming-coast-guard-delivers-first-mh-60t-to-new-air-station-ventura-news-release/Aug. 23, 2024The program has since expanded to include increments for fleet growth as the service transitions to an all-MH-60T fleet. Still, the Coast Guard is in the process of giving the Jayhawks rotor and tail folding capabilities, like the Seahawks, so that they can be stored aboard cutters.

      An article that appeared on The War Zone website back in 2022 was about a Navy MH-60R deploying on the Legend-class NSC USCGC Midgett (WMSL-757) for RIMPAC 2022.

      Excerpt: Most everything the MH-60R detects is immediately transmitted back to Navy ships via the Common Data Link (CDL) “Hawklink.” As for the Midgett, the Coast Guard told The War Zone is passed from the Romeo through an “integrated tactical data link” but did not specify which one. But overall, the design of the Romeo variant of the Seahawk also makes it a good fit for working with the Coast Guard. Its foldable rotors and tail allow it to be kept safe in the hangar of Legend-class cutters like Midgett.

      https://www.twz.com/navy-deployed-mh-60r-helicopter-aboard-coast-guard-cutter

      Another TWZ article: https://www.twz.com/air/coast-guard-will-get-a-new-mh-60-variant-to-replace-mh-65-helicopters

      The U.S. Coast Guard is in line to get a new version of the H-60 helicopter based on the MH-60R Seahawk, which is in service with the U.S. Navy and other armed forces globally. The additional helicopters will supplement, at least initially, the Coast Guard’s aging MH-60T Jayhawks. The Coast Guard also plans to boost its overall capabilities by replacing its fleet of smaller MH-65s with H-60 variants.

      Delete
    6. ComNavOpsDecember 16, 2025 at 5:23 PM

      "My point was, if the changes to the ship were limited to a specific purpose, the NSC conversion might not be a disaster."

      Quite right! Unfortunately, this would require a CONOPS and the Navy, for unknowable reasons, absolutely refuses to develop CONOPS!

      Delete
    7. ComNavOpsDecember 16, 2025 at 5:29 PM

      "Some quick research I did."

      Good information. Thank you for the research! If I understand it correctly (correct me if I'm wrong), the NSC can land a -60 but not hangar it without folding rotors and tails.

      On a related note, the NSC appears to have some sort of RAST-type system. I wonder if it's rated for -60 size/weight helos?

      Does the NSC have the magazine capacity for helo torpedoes/missiles/whatever and helo fuel storage along with shop maintenance support facilities?

      Delete
    8. TomcatTweaker63ADecember 16, 2025 at 8:13 PM

      Since it has helicopter hangars, I'm not sure how much aviation fuel the NSC can hold. I'm going to research the rest further and I will post it as soon as I find it. The Coast Guard is modifying the current fleet of MH-60Ts (I think there are currently around 40 something) to have the folding rotors as well as the folding tail like the Navy MH-60R/Ss.

      Delete
  13. AnonymousDecember 16, 2025 at 6:42 PM

    Japan's Mogami Class frigate new FFM would be the best drop in. You google the web to find its specs. FFM has 32 MK41 VLS, more than latest 16 MK41 VLS. It exceeds the Constellations in many areas.

    Sign contracts with Japan to set productions in US to meet legal requirements. Don't change any major designs to speed up the project.

    Pentagon cannot wait, right?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. AnonymousDecember 16, 2025 at 6:48 PM

      If Navy can wait, then, they can learn from China to do step-by-step design-test-redesign.

      Let's use type 052 destroyer. China first built two in 1994-1996. After deployed in services, they built two 052B in 2001-2004. Later, they built 6 052C, first version with VLS. Later, they built 052d - looks like final version except minor changes. PLAN usually uses power system to name a model within a class. Type 052 is diesel-gas turbine combination. Type 055 is all gas turbines.

      Delete
    2. ComNavOpsDecember 17, 2025 at 8:12 AM

      The Mogami class is not bad but it is also not optimized for any particular role. It tries to do many things and, inevitably, none well. Because of this, it is overpriced for any given function. It's a mini-mini-Burke just as I fear the NSC will become. As a mini-mini-Burke, it's superior to the NSC but that's all I can credit it with. For a smaller navy that doesn't have, say, 80 full size Burkes, it might be a useful addition but for the US Navy, it would serve no useful purpose.

      Delete
    3. AnonymousDecember 18, 2025 at 1:13 AM

      The Mogami is really a product of its nation. Ultimately the JMSDF is facing a bigger manpower crunch than the USN; they would like to have a larger number of specialist ships, but they don't have the crews and manpower, so they have to make do with multipurpose ships that are qualitatively better in order to compensate for their declining quality.

      Delete
    4. AnonymousDecember 18, 2025 at 1:06 PM

      Unlike China in 30 years ago, US doesn't have time to design/test/re-design a frigate. At the same time, Navy cannot afford to build frigates limited to certain missions thus limited functionality. Reluctantly, a mature mini Burke is the most cost/time effective choice.

      Yes, Mogami has another benefit - saving man power. It can operated with 60 crews.

      Delete
    5. ComNavOpsDecember 18, 2025 at 1:13 PM

      "Navy cannot afford to build frigates limited to certain missions"

      In reality, the Navy cannot afford NOT to build single purpose ships. Single purpose drastically reduces the cost allowing, conceptually, two or three single purpose ships for the price of one muti-purpose.

      Single purpose ships allow GREATER flexibility than multi-purpose ships. Should I send my advanced AAW/ASW ship to go play tag with a sub or keep it close for AAW? That's limited flexibility. With single purpose ships, you can do BOTH missions.

      Reduced manpower is a fool's goal. In combat, as has been demonstrated throughout history, the single most important factor in damage control and combat effectiveness is robust manning.

      Delete
    6. AnonymousDecember 18, 2025 at 7:37 PM

      Reduced manpower is very soviet thinking, not gonna lie. NATO uses 4-man crews for their tanks, which means you need 16 men for a 4-tank platoon. Soviets use 3-man crews with autoloader, so they only need 12 men for a 4-tank platoon, which means that for the same number of manpower as NATO, the Soviets could generate a 25% larger tank force.

      However, we don't have that problem. We're america. If the will and funding is there, we could reallocate our manpower into more ship crews from eliminating shore positions and generating more recruits.

      Delete
    7. AnonymousDecember 18, 2025 at 8:52 PM

      Tank is a different case. With auto loader, you can make tank smaller yet having same thickness of armor. USSR used auto loader to shrink size of tank. Look the 74 ton M1A3 tank, it is too heavy in many places.

      Delete
    8. ComNavOpsDecember 19, 2025 at 9:37 AM

      "Soviets use 3-man crews with autoloader, so they only need 12 men for a 4-tank platoon"

      You need to examine both the benefits AND drawbacks of tank autoloaders in order to make credible observations or conclusions. For example, autoloaders are generally acknowledged to be more complex, less reliable, more difficult to repair, have ammo storage/safety issues, etc. Be sure to present both sides of an argument.

      Delete
    9. AnonymousDecember 19, 2025 at 8:54 PM

      It was an illustrative point to support you. Automation and reduced manning are measures undertaken by countries that have a manpower crunch. We don't have that problem. We're America. We can reassign shore positions and increase recruitinf and generate more sailors.

      Delete
    10. AnonymousDecember 19, 2025 at 10:02 PM

      Face the reality that Pentagon and many Americans won't accept anything other than a mini Burke frigate. Look what they had modified the Constellation from the original Italian frigate! Because of this, rather let Pentagon, Navy, ..... redesign NSC, buy Mogami Class frigates is a reluctant but realistic choice.

      Delete
    11. ComNavOpsDecember 20, 2025 at 7:36 AM

      "Automation and reduced manning are measures undertaken by countries that have a manpower crunch."

      Automation is great IF it doesn't negatively impact other critical aspects such as manning levels for damage control and attrition or ship's onboard maintenance and repair capacity (looking at you, LCS and Zumwalt!).

      "We can reassign shore positions and increase recruitinf and generate more sailors."

      People forget that we fully manned a 600 ship fleet in the 1980's with a much smaller population.

      Delete
    12. ComNavOpsDecember 20, 2025 at 7:39 AM

      "Face the reality that Pentagon and many Americans won't accept anything other than a mini Burke frigate."

      What uninformed idiots want is irrelevant. What's relevant is what PROFESSIONAL warriors deem necessary and it's not a mini-Burke. Unfortunately, our supposed professional warriors are incompetent so, yes, they do propose worthless mini-Burkes.

      Delete
  14. AnonymousDecember 16, 2025 at 9:07 PM

    Just waiting on the other shoe to drop they also be buying the MMSC.

    NSC for ASW
    MMSC as missile sponge err.... Radar Picket

    It'll be the Circle of Naval Procurement

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsDecember 17, 2025 at 8:14 AM

      "they also be buying the MMSC."

      That would be a horrible mistake so ... yeah, quite possible!

      Delete
  15. AnonymousDecember 16, 2025 at 10:32 PM

    It's possible the NSC based frigate might be a bit faster to complete (though 2028 still unrealistic for the USA), because it's been discussed before.

    Google AI search:

    "Yes, in the past, Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) has repeatedly presented a naval version of its Legend-class National Security Cutter design as a model at trade shows, specifically labeled as a "Patrol Frigate".
    HII developed two main variants of this concept:
    Patrol Frigate 4501: A design very similar to the basic National Security Cutter hull, with minor modifications like a changed stern ramp and a knuckle boom crane.
    Patrol Frigate 4921: A more heavily armed, multi-mission version designed for anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare. This variant included a 12-cell vertical launch system (VLS) for missiles, a 76mm gun, anti-ship missile launchers, torpedo tubes, and advanced sonars.
    HII notably entered a variation of this "Patrol Frigate" concept into the U.S. Navy's FFG(X) competition, which ultimately led to the Constellation-class frigate. The company displayed models of these concepts at various trade shows, such as the Surface Navy Association symposium and DIMDEX, to highlight the potential for a cost-effective, American-built frigate based on a proven hull design"

    Now, 12 cell VLS is very small. And the USN is highly unlikely to use Italian gun calibres.

    But.

    The USN does not have good choices now. It squandered a 25-30 year lead over the rest of the world and if it can only produce upgunned Coast Guard ships for now, then that's what they'll have to build, until they can finish their dextroyer program design and start that. Then the Arleigh Burkes will become the "frigates".

    Can only say that luckily other countries have been boosting their navies in Asia, so China will still face some pushback despite the decline in USN numbers and capabilities

    Andrew

    ReplyDelete
  16. NickDecember 17, 2025 at 4:50 AM

    What is the CONOPS as the NSC does not have basics to be a ASW platform as it does not have a silenced hull and the propulsion system is not silenced, diesels for ASW frigates normally mounted on double resilient rafts and electric motors used that do away with need for noisy gearboxes and specialized propellors designed with tips that create the minimal very noisy vortices, its complicated and not cheap. Would also note NSC is also only rated at the lowest survivability Level 1 (Burke is Level 3).

    ReplyDelete
  17. AnonymousDecember 17, 2025 at 5:41 AM

    Brit here, how flawed were the OHP? Had they been modified as far as practicable? Was there life left in the hulls? We dragged a few more sea miles out of the Leander class by modifying to suit various purposes.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsDecember 17, 2025 at 8:24 AM

      The OHP's had a great deal of life left in them as evidenced by the many countries that obtained and upgraded them. An upgraded OHP would have been far superior to the entire LCS program, as has been discussed on this blog many times.

      The OHP had inherent limitations that would render it unsuitable for use today (no stealth being a major problem) but we could, and should, have gotten another 10-20 years of use and skipped the entire LCS debacle.

      A "stealth-ified" Perry would have made a suitable follow on (Flt II) to bridge our ASW capabilities into today while we designed and started a dedicated ASW corvette/frigate.

      Delete
  18. AnonymousDecember 17, 2025 at 10:49 AM

    I think that the NSC is a little bit too 'thick' for the job.

    Assuming these would be ASW ships, we'll want them to be able to escort aircraft carrier battle groups, the 28 knots maximum speed might be a little bit slow.

    While speed is not as tactically important as it was in 1945, it can still matter.
    The ASW escorts need to be able to keep up with a battle group while still being able to sprint and drift. At 418' feet long and 54' of beam, it is no surprise that the NSC can only achieve 28 knots.

    The lack of top end speed might also be a hindrance when playing tag with submarines. Being able to immediately accelerate to a fast top speed can make all the difference when being chased by a torpedo. The faster the ship can move, the more time it has to employ counter-measures against the torpedo.

    A better choice, in my opinion, is to start the design of the ship with the proven Gearing hull. It might make sense to add a bulbous bow to it, or raise the bulwarks forward to improve seakeeping, but it is a solid place to start.

    The Gearing is also a leaner and faster design. The length to beam is superior to the NSC:
    390 x 41 vs 418 x 54
    and its draft is less at 14.3 feet instead of 22.5 for the NSC.
    Even adding a foot of beam for increased buoyancy still puts the Gearing at 390 x 42.

    The modernized Gearing could also have far superior power production as well.
    The original ships had steam power plants that provided 60k shp to the screws. The engines, boilers, and boiler water weighed in at about 1000 tons.

    With 1000 tons and the designed engine spaces to work with, we could put three LM2500 gensets in the engineering spaces and produce up to 90 MW of electrical power on a Navy Standard Day. Each turbine genset would be approximately 47' x 13' x 10', so three should fit in those spaces without serious design challenges.

    To power the screws, each shaft would get a pair of 15 MW electric motors. That aggregate of 60 MW of power would provide 80k HP to the screws, more than paying for the one or two foot increase in beam without losing top end speed.
    And the ship would still have 30 MW of electric power available for sensors, weapons, ECM, coffee makers, etc.

    Replace two of the original ship's 5" gun turrets with ASROC launchers and design in MK48 torpedo launchers and CIWS in place of 40mm and 20mm guns and the weight should be about a wash.

    With a bow sonar, VDS, and towed array these ships should be highly capable when paired with another type of ship (even a Burke) that provides helicopter support.

    And coming in at around 3000 tons standard displacement it should be able to be had at a reasonable cost.

    Lutefisk

    ReplyDelete
  19. AnonymousDecember 17, 2025 at 10:51 AM

    Do they think they can launch in 2028 because NSC Hull 11 was in progress but cancelled by the USCG?

    It won't happen but perhaps it explains the imaginary thinking?

    -LP

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. NICODecember 17, 2025 at 3:43 PM

      The last NSC was canceled by the Coast Guard and plenty have asked the same question about that last one, was some of it built, can it be finished? Can't find any info, you think USN could get some money to finish it and keep the production line "warm" so to get the new version out faster, we'll see what happens. There's really not a lot of info right now.

      Delete
    2. ComNavOpsDecember 17, 2025 at 4:03 PM

      I can find no information about the degree of completion but I note that construction began in May '21 and was cancelled in Jun '25. That's a four year period so one assumes a significant amount of construction must have occurred but who knows?

      Delete
    3. TomcatTweaker63ADecember 19, 2025 at 12:14 AM

      Maritime Executive reports, “construction of the 11th ship had been halted since at least November 2024 with the ship 15 percent complete.” Delivery had been expected in 2024.

      https://chuckhillscgblog.net/2025/06/05/national-security-cutter-11-cancelled/

      Delete
  20. NICODecember 19, 2025 at 7:50 AM

    Not a lot of info but this just came out:

    https://news.usni.org/2025/12/19/secnav-new-frigate-will-be-based-on-national-security-cutter-first-ffx-to-be-built-at-ingalls

    ReplyDelete
  21. AnonymousDecember 19, 2025 at 9:35 AM

    USNI report the boat deck will be plated over to mount mk70 containerised launchers, source: https://news.usni.org/2025/12/19/secnav-new-frigate-will-be-based-on-national-security-cutter-first-ffx-to-be-built-at-ingalls. Perhaps the boat ramp could accommodate a USV with a lightweight towed array, like the KraitArray? Then if the sea state permits either tow the USV or send it ahead as an advanced passive asw sensor.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsDecember 19, 2025 at 9:50 AM

      "either tow the USV or send it ahead as an advanced passive asw sensor."

      Wow! That was an impressive wave of the hand dismissal of lots of potential problems!

      Have you taken a look at the cable drum and mechanism? It looks quite heavy and bulky for a USV to mount. What is the tow speed (a function of drag, vessel power, and flow noise)?

      Tow a USV so that it can tow an array? That's an overly and unnecessarily complex arrangement. For an ASW focused ship, why not just permanently mount the array on the ship?

      In a moving group (and no group stands still in combat!), how does the USV get ahead of the group in a useful time frame since most USVs cruise at pretty low speeds?

      So, we'll only do ASW in good weather and calm seas?

      What's the range and sensitivity of a short, lightweight array when looking for stealthy subs given that our most powerful sonars and arrays are only marginally effective?

      Delete
    2. NICODecember 19, 2025 at 9:56 AM

      It also looks like USN back in the modular business again with the weapons package....worked so well the last time!

      Delete
  22. AnonymousDecember 19, 2025 at 4:08 PM

    Next post I suggest "Naval Power off Venezuela"

    Admirals have been unable to explain to the Trump team why only one of their ten carriers can be there. The USS Ford has been deployed six months and now Admirals must explain that it must return home soon with no replacement.

    The Marines must explain that after months of buildup, all it has there is a MEU that can land fewer than 1000 Marines.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsDecember 19, 2025 at 5:36 PM

      Not knowing what the military plans are, I do not yet see any need for multiple carriers or MEUs, do you? Sinking an occasional smuggler boat doesn't require multiple aircraft carriers or thousands of Marines.

      Delete
  23. AnonymousDecember 19, 2025 at 6:59 PM

    So, ignorant infantry soldier here. Just wondering why we cannot mass produce Mogami frigates as a standard thing for Aukus + Japan and whoever else? There’d be 80+ hulls across several navies, interoperability, scale, multiple repair depots…

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsDecember 20, 2025 at 7:29 AM

      Aside from the political-economic issues with pushing Japan aside from producing their own product, we lack the industrial capacity to produce the ships we want for our own use and producing ships for other countries would cripple our own fleet production efforts. We saw exactly this issue come up with the recent Australian nuclear sub production issues.

      Of course, we could increase our industrial capacity, which would be a good thing, but we're trying to do that now with very limited success due to a lack of skilled trades workers thanks to our society pushing the idea that if every young person doesn't go to college they're a failure.

      Beyond that, every country would want their own version with their own unique modifications so it wouldn't exactly be mass production of identical units.

      Delete
  24. AnonymousDecember 19, 2025 at 8:42 PM

    Ignorant infantry soldier again.

    What is the CONOPS for a frigate?

    Are they spread our 25k all sides of a convoy banging away with active sonar supported by a helicopter carrier and numerous Seahawks? I’m guessing the noise would make it difficult for anything to approach. If so, given that the Condor was the scourge of the Atlantic, wouldn’t the escorts need a bit more than ESSMs? Between Chinese Condors and SLCM air defence would be a big deal wouldn’t it?

    Given likely convoy routes being Perth to India and Sydney STH West of Solomons to US West coast, Chinese Subs would have to pass through a lot of choke points and anti submarine assets to even get to the convoys. Diesels will be close to the limit of endurance while Chinese nukes are comparatively few in number.

    Chinese aircraft will have to pass through multiple air defence layers putting refuelling and AWACS aircraft at risk.

    If not convoys then taking the fight to China? What part would they play in that? Don’t really know what I’m talking about but they seem unsuited to Carrier defence operations. Burkes carrying three times as many missiles and with much more capable radar seem to be the go, or, given the Tomahawk capable VLS are thy being protected by the Burkes and carriers?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsDecember 20, 2025 at 7:33 AM

      "the noise would make it difficult for anything to approach."

      There would be no need for anything to approach! With that kind of noise, the enemy would pinpoint your location from a thousand miles away and everyone has thousand mile cruise missiles now so ...

      Would an infantry squad patrol at night with flashlights blazing? Nothing would be able to approach closely ... right?

      "seem unsuited to Carrier defence operations."

      Frigates are not suitable for carrier task force ops.

      Delete
    2. AnonymousDecember 20, 2025 at 10:12 AM

      "Frigates are not suitable for carrier task force ops."

      It would seem to me that perhaps we might need to have two lower classes of ship - a general purpose frigate of some 25 knots or so, as a sucessor to the Perrys, which served as general purposes ASW / ASuW / local AAW ships, and perhaps a fast ASW corvette to keep up with carrier groups to extend the screen? The corvette should not need much beyond self defense RAM, with its focus on weapons being the sonars, torpedoes, and perhaps a flight deck to launch drone helicopters to prosecute targets (ala DASH, back in the days of the FRAM Gearings).

      Delete
    3. ComNavOpsDecember 20, 2025 at 10:39 AM

      "we might need to have two lower classes of ship"

      You're using the ship type nomenclature incorrectly but setting that quibble aside, you're correct. We need the equivalent of the WWII Fletcher which was an affordable but capable escort ship for fast task forces and convoys. The modern version would have more of an ASW emphasis than the WWII version but same general idea. We also need smaller, cheaper ASW escort/patrol vessels for convoy duty and general patrolling.

      "drone helicopters to prosecute targets (ala DASH"

      I'm dubious about this. A flight deck and hangar is a LOT of space to give up just to deliver a single (perhaps two?) torpedo. The alternative would be a true ASW helo provided by another ship or a longer range ASROC. I see no reason why we can't develop a long range ASROC give that we have thousand mile cruise missiles.

      Delete
    4. AnonymousDecember 20, 2025 at 7:32 PM

      "We need the equivalent of the WWII Fletcher..."

      It's no secret that I feel that they should use actual new-construction Fletchers (actually the improved variant - the Gearing class). Some of my ideas for this ship are described further up in the thread.

      Two or three of these Gearings would be matched with a slightly bigger ship that carries the helicopter assets.

      My first thoughts on these ships would be to use a slightly enlarged Perry class for this.
      But I think that the cold-war era Mitscher class would actually be the best choice.

      At 490' in length and 46.5', with a standard displacement of 3700 tons, these would be an ideal starting point for the design of these ships.

      Since these ships would not be responsible for battle group AAW, the aft 40% of the ship could be dedicated to aviation assets - flight deck and hangar.
      This could realistically accommodate 4 ASW helicopters.
      If you assign 8 flight crews, you can have them on opposite 12-hour shifts, staggered throughout the 24 hours of the clock. Four aircrews always on duty with a fresh crew coming on every 3 hours.

      And you can maintain that operational tempo if you are doing missions instead of extended deployments.

      CNO has pointed out the substantial need for helicopter assets to prosecute suspected contacts, so I don't think the 4 helicopters is overkill.

      If those are not enough, the Burkes will likely have under utilized ASW helicopters, as the Burkes will be concentrating on their battle group AAW responsibilities and, at most, playing a little bit at ASW.
      Even if the Burke is 30 miles from the ASW team, that is only 20 minutes of flight time.

      These two ship designs, the modernized Gearing and modernized Mitscher, should prove to be both capable and affordable to purchase in large numbers.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    5. AnonymousDecember 20, 2025 at 9:40 PM

      I neglected to mention that this Mitscher class ship would also be a sub-hunter.

      It would be equipped with a bow sonar, VDS, towed array, and ASROC launcher and MK48 torpedoes.

      That's the other 60% of the ship.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    6. ComNavOpsDecember 21, 2025 at 6:42 AM

      "actual new-construction ... Gearing class"

      I certainly get the concept and agree with it, however, in order to be survivable in the modern battlefield, they would need a completely new hull shape (slanted) and total stealth superstructure as well as all the latest quieting, electronics, weapons, sensors, etc. In other words, it would be a completely new design having nothing other than the broadest strokes in common with a Gearing such as a narrower hull and overall size and, hopefully, mission focus. So, yes, a Fletcher/Gearing as a CONCEPTUAL starting point but not as an actual starting point.

      Delete
    7. ComNavOpsDecember 21, 2025 at 6:53 AM

      "This could realistically accommodate 4 ASW helicopters."

      The smallest DDH I can think of off the top of my head are some of the earlier Japanese DDH classes that were 500+ ft long and carried 3x helos. That's not to say that a 490ft destroyer couldn't carry 4x helos but it would be a snug fit!

      You're being optimistic about helo pilot/crew requirements. If you have four helos, on average you'll have two operational with the other two down for maintenance. In other words, you'll be helo limited long before you're pilot/crew limited. Four helos would probably allow continuous coverage by one helo and sporadic coverage by a second.

      This is why a ASW-helo carrier is a must for a group. Of course, a DDH is good for occasions when a helo-carrier isn't around.

      Delete
    8. AnonymousDecember 21, 2025 at 9:56 PM

      It does beg the question for us of whether we actually do need to return to dedicated ASW helo carriers, or whether we should instead have more DDHs. Starting at the America LHA as a starting point for the notional American ASW helo carrier, we'd be paying 4 billion dollars for a ship that can carry 22 helos, which is a lot of eggs.

      My gut feeling is that for the same price, we could buy multiple DDHs, but then it's a question of wether we could get the same number of helos carried in those multiple DDHs. Assuming the DDH's cost about what a Spruance would cost today, (the Spruances cost 100 million in 1970, which is equivalent to 857 million today), for the price of an America-class LHA helo carrier, you could get 4 DDHs. Assuming an air wing of 4 helos, that's 16 helos.

      Maybe it's something worth exploring in a blog post - a study of helo carrier vs dispersed DDHs.

      (It's interesting to note that the Japanese have replaced their DDHs with helo carriers, but then they always wanted helo carriers to start with, and went with DDHs as a compromise option due to budget constraints.)

      Delete
    9. ComNavOpsDecember 22, 2025 at 8:11 AM

      "whether we actually do need to return to dedicated ASW helo carriers, or whether we should instead have more DDHs."

      The answer, as is usual with any military question, is BOTH! Unless you can guarantee that we will have an ASW-helo carrier always available (would require several dozen carriers which isn't going to happen!), then there will always be a need for some kind of smaller ASW-helo platform such as a DDH.

      "America LHA as a starting point for the notional American ASW helo carrier"

      NO, no, no!!! The LHA is vastly oversized and poorly designed. A closer starting point is a converted cargo ship! Put a flat "top" on it and you're halfway there! Yes, there's a little more to it than that but the concept is there. We don't need/want a helo carrier that carries 22 helos. We only need around 12.

      If you want to think about a LHA then imagine reducing the flight deck area by half or 2/3 (only 12 helos with only a couple operating at any given moment), eliminate the entire well deck, eliminate the vast vehicle/cargo storage spaces, eliminate the entire troop berthing (and support facilities like galley, heads, showers, laundry, food storage, water storage, etc.), eliminate the majority of the weapons and sensors, reduce the power plant by half, etc. and what do you have? You have what amounts to a merchant ship with a flat deck! Add in a hangar level and maintenance shops and you're about done.

      Delete
    10. AnonymousDecember 22, 2025 at 8:56 AM

      "That's not to say that a 490ft destroyer couldn't carry 4x helos but it would be a snug fit!"

      It would at that.
      Of course, it would require folding rotor blades which they already have.

      And since you would need to have the aircraft at least partially hangared nose to tail, jockeying them around would be a pain in the butt.
      But it should be possible.

      "You're being optimistic about helo pilot/crew requirements."

      I think that the Navy needs to figure out their downtime issues.
      When I was an aeroscout platoon leader, I had 8 scout helicopters. Now, it has been over 30 years, but I don't remember having these types of downtime problems.

      The big preventive maintenance bugaboo, as I recall, was a major event called a 'phase' inspection at 300 hours. There were also 25-hour inspections, which IIRC are not a big deal but required oil samples that needed to be tested.
      Are they sitting on the birds until the oil samples come back, and taking their own sweet time to get it done?

      In my opinion, your missions instead of deployments concept would play perfectly into this.

      The Navy would need to have a pool of aircraft available, and the ships heading out only take the birds that are going to be usable for the duration of the mission.

      Even if the turnaround between wartime missions is only a day, you can still swap out the aircraft.
      And with that high operational tempo, you might need to swap out crews as well. Their are crew-rest requirements that accumulate over time, it's just been so long that I can't remember the details.

      The Navy would need to have 'excess' aircraft and aircrews, but that would be a small price to pay in the grand scheme of Navy budgets to ensure adequate aviation assets during wartime operational tempo.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    11. AnonymousDecember 22, 2025 at 9:11 AM

      Actually the oil sampling may have been required at 100 hour inspections....sorry, I can't remember the details.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    12. ComNavOpsDecember 22, 2025 at 10:42 AM

      I don't know what the Navy's helo maintenance issues are. I'm guessing you flew the OH-58 Kiowa? If so, that visually looks to be a lot less complex, mechanically and electrically, than an SH-60 type helo. The more complex the aircraft, the more maintenance it needs, I guess.

      The Navy does pool its helo squadrons. Dets of one or two aircraft are parceled out to ships as required.

      Delete
    13. SRBDecember 22, 2025 at 1:48 PM

      I always liked the French Jeane d'Arc as the basis for a ASW carrier. Not to big and not to small, could carry 4-8 Super Frelon helo's, which is a decent size bird. Got to see her pier side in Toulon, really nice looking ship.

      Delete
    14. AnonymousDecember 22, 2025 at 4:24 PM

      "I'm guessing you flew the OH-58 Kiowa"

      You're guessing correctly!!!
      And you are also correct that they are way less complex in every way than the Blackhawks.

      We also had slick Blackhawks and Cobras. I wasn't closely involved with those aircraft except to know that they got a lot of attention. But we didn't have substantial availability issues, now I wish I had paid closer attention, haha.

      I still think the mission style usage of the Navy works better for the ASW helicopters (and lots of other things as well) than the endless deployments.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    15. AnonymousDecember 22, 2025 at 8:03 PM

      "NO, no, no!!! The LHA is vastly oversized and poorly designed. A closer starting point is a converted cargo ship!"

      I was actually thinking of the British Invicibles or the Japanese Izumos actually, but I didn't have their procurement costs on hand, so I used the America's 4 billion as a quick shorthand.

      I thought about converted cargo ships as ASW helo carriers, but that's basically the Expeditionary Sea Base and I recall you weren't a fan of it - and I'm not sure the hullform allows it to keep formation with a carrier.

      Delete
    16. ComNavOpsDecember 23, 2025 at 6:09 AM

      "Expeditionary Sea Base and I recall you weren't a fan of it"

      I'm not a fan of it because the Navy has no purpose for it and it's ill-suited for the supposed purpose it has. Strip out half its functions (all the LCAC and cargo storage/handling) and you'd be left with a simple, basic ASW-helo carrier, in concept which takes us right back to the converted cargo ship!

      Delete
  25. AnonymousDecember 20, 2025 at 2:39 AM

    Something to consider: the NSC is built to NAVSEA survivability standard 1. Commercial grade. The LCS and OHP were built to NAVSEA survivability standard 2.

    So how much time do you think is going to be wasted modifying the NSC to the higher survivability standard?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsDecember 20, 2025 at 7:42 AM

      "The LCS and OHP were built to NAVSEA survivability standard 2."

      Incorrect. The LCS was built to survivability standard 0, if you actually read the standards. I've thoroughly documented this and discredited this belief in past posts.

      Beyond that, there ARE NO SURVIVABILITY STANDARDS anymore. The Navy abolished the old, simple, common sense standards in favor of a survivability matrix that is, essentially, the equivalent of a survivability group hug that imposes no standards, whatsoever. Check the archives to come up to speed on this.

      Delete
    2. ComNavOpsDecember 20, 2025 at 7:46 AM

      "modifying the NSC to the higher survivability standard?"

      This is a worthwhile debate. How survivable should a ship be? The answer is survivable enough that you don't throw away the ship's cost every time one gets a tiny bit of damage. Of course, you don't want to triple the cost of a ship trying to give it uber-survivability. There's a balance - a compromise between survivability and cost.

      Is it worth making a small vessel excessively survivable? Depends on the cost and on how badly your overall fleet effort would be hurt if you lost it.

      Delete
    3. AnonymousDecember 20, 2025 at 10:08 AM

      There's also the political costs involved. Note that NSC and LCS are below the survivability standard that the Perrys were built to, and despite the horrific problems of aluminum structure plus rocket fuel fire, Stark managed to survive and was returned to service. I'm not sure Congress and the American people are willing to accept the fact that casualties are an unfortunate inevitability in war.

      Delete
    4. ComNavOpsDecember 20, 2025 at 10:33 AM

      " I'm not sure Congress and the American people are willing to accept the fact that casualties are an unfortunate inevitability in war."

      The LCS was explicitly designed to be abandoned at the first serious receipt of damage. This was how the Navy rationalized the absence of survivability and the desire to avoid casualties. Just give up the ship if you get hurt! While I might mock this approach, it's a legitimate approach IF THE COST OF THE SHIP IS LOW ENOUGH. Unfortunately, the LCS cost ballooned from $200M to something in the neighborhood of $700M+ (without a module!) so that invalidated the "abandon at the first damage" concept.

      Delete
    5. AnonymousDecember 21, 2025 at 8:05 PM

      Pretty much. Consider the South Korean Patrol Killer Medium Rocket boats, which sport a 76mm gun on the foredeck, and afterdeck 12-cell rocket launcher for shore bombardment (PKX-B variant) or 4 antiship missiles (PKX-A variant). Each boat costs 37 million dollars and has a crew of about 3 dozen. This is absolutely something that is expendable because it's cost is low enough. It's also a boat that was built specifically for the Korean CONOPS and paradigm.

      Delete
  26. AnonymousDecember 20, 2025 at 7:05 AM

    The long shadow of the elimination of BuShips.

    Lutefisk

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsDecember 20, 2025 at 7:50 AM

      More so the General Board. The Board did the conceptual design and determined fleet numbers and types. Once the conceptual design was finalized, it was turned over to BuShips for actual blueprint design and construction.

      Industry, today, is capable of doing the blueprint design and construction but no one is [intelligently] doing the conceptual design and fleet composition analyses. We miss the Board.

      Delete
    2. AnonymousDecember 20, 2025 at 10:19 AM

      Yes, it is like there isn't really any comprehensive, cohesive plan being followed.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    3. ComNavOpsDecember 20, 2025 at 10:29 AM

      "it is like there isn't really any comprehensive, cohesive plan being followed."

      No plan IS the plan!

      Just as the military/Navy has substituted technology for CONOPS, "get whatever you can get through Congress" has been substituted for force structure analysis.

      Delete
  27. John GaltDecember 20, 2025 at 7:34 AM

    The definition of insanity is doing the same thing again and expecting different results. The people in charge have never built anything themselves and rotate every 2 years so they have no time to learn and only want a quick result for the next promotion board. So let's take existing ships modify the load out with out recognizing the design was not meant for that and issue a press release saying we will have it "soon".

    ReplyDelete
  28. NICODecember 20, 2025 at 3:23 PM

    https://youtu.be/VWtVfPPNCck?si=1xCu5KZ4RtYY9Qx2

    Unrelated but this just popped into my feed a few hours ago even though it looks like it happened a few months ago so I don't know if this was released just now by the French Navy or I missed earlier release.

    French Navy resumes full ship shock trials, these are the first trials since 1995! I also thought it was interesting since we can see the prep work and ship crew from the inside of the ship, I don't think I ever seen the inside video of what it looks and feels like to go thru one of these tests, I thought it was interesting enough to share.

    Nico

    ReplyDelete
  29. AnonymousDecember 21, 2025 at 1:54 AM

    This was precisely why I stood by the opinion that the decision to cancel the constellation class as it is without a proper plan for a replacement was folly to the max.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsDecember 21, 2025 at 7:00 AM

      So, just like the LCS, you think it would have been better to go ahead and spend billions of dollars on a ship that has no vital purpose, is over cost, and behind schedule rather than try a better approach? Presumably, you would have chosen to build all 55 original LCS and all 32 original Zumwalts?

      Admittedly, the Constellation would be of more use than the LCS but it would still not have filled any of the Navy's vital needs like minesweepers, ASW corvettes, a true destroyer, smaller/cheaper carriers, a ASW-helo carrier, non-aviation attack transports, non-nuclear subs, etc.

      Of course, simply starting over doesn't guarantee that the next attempt (the NSC frigate) will turn out any better but I'd much rather cut bait on an obvious poor choice and hope the next attempt is better than follow an obvious mistake out the bitter end.

      Delete
  30. AnonymousDecember 21, 2025 at 11:07 AM

    In my opinion, a clean sheet design would have been best , following a CONOPS , producing an ASW centric ship. The Constellation became a multi purpose ship ! The navy seems to favor designs with a multirole function ! So the aquisition is heading in the wrong direction , so far !

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsDecember 21, 2025 at 11:18 AM

      Spot on.

      Delete
    2. ExJuniorSailorDecember 21, 2025 at 1:20 PM

      ship with the latest iterations of proven tech. It really shouldn't be that hard, but somehow the Navy manages to make it such.

      Delete
    3. PhilDecember 22, 2025 at 10:17 AM

      Italy's ASW-focused version of the FREMM boasts: A hull sonar (that I am fairly sure is a bow sonar), CAPTAS-4 towed array sonar, torpedoes, anti-submarine missiles, facilities for up to two helicopters, some anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, a 127 mm (5-inch gun), two 76 mm guns, and two 25 mm guns. I recognize it doesn't meet US survivability standards, but otherwise it has the traits of the good ASW frigate. At least more so than the Constellation class.

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_frigate_Alpino_(F_594)

      Delete
    4. ComNavOpsDecember 22, 2025 at 10:49 AM

      "it has the traits of the good ASW frigate."

      Any idea what it has in the way of quieting? An ASW vessel needs to be designed from the first rivet with quieting and acoustic isolation in mind along with prop cavitation suppression, hull flow noise reduction, machinery rafting, etc. I don't know but nothing I've read suggests it has any of that.

      Of course, the main trait of any platform that is going to tangle with submarines is affordability since, by definition, an ASW ship is not only expendable but very likely expendable. Regardless of what foreign countries might claim for costs, the true cost, when built for US service, is, as we've seen, well north of $1B which is not my idea of an affordable/expendable vessel.

      As best I can tell, European ships are built to significantly lower design standards than the US. Foreign costs inevitably exclude govt subsidies, reused equipment, "for but not with" fits, etc. which makes their costs misleading, at best, and significantly understated in reality.

      Delete
    5. PhilDecember 22, 2025 at 11:03 AM

      "Any idea what it has in the way of quieting?"

      I do not. You got me there. The only hint I have is the ship uses combined diesel-electric and gas (CODLAG), and I've read that electric motors turning the propellers that make less noise than mechanical connections.

      I thought you might like the weapons density. Whether you think every one of the weapons is needed for the ASW mission, the weapons density is relatively high for a modern warship.

      Delete
    6. ComNavOpsDecember 22, 2025 at 1:28 PM

      "electric motors turning the propellers that make less noise than mechanical connections."

      That's true but the power producer (the diesel or gas engine) makes noise/vibration and must be acoustically isolated from the hull to avoid transmitting the noise through the hull and into the water.

      "I thought you might like the weapons density. "

      No, not really. A WWII ship had good weapons density. This may be slightly less bad than, say, and LCS but that doesn't make it good ... just slightly less bad. An automobile with two wheels instead of one is slightly better but it's still not got the four wheels it should have.

      Delete
    7. AnonymousDecember 22, 2025 at 3:09 PM

      https://chuckhillscgblog.net/2025/12/19/secnav-new-frigate-will-be-based-on-national-security-cutter-first-ffx-to-be-built-at-ingalls-usni/comment-page-1/
      "The USNI report indicates the ships will be built with no organic ASW capability,"

      “… things that are more intrusive to install, like anti-submarine warfare equipment, would be something we would look to do in the future.”

      '"They will have a space on the fantail for containerized mission modules,"

      “One of the few changes the Navy intends to make to the NSC design is to construct a platform above the open boat deck for containerized mission packages, the officials said…The Navy is developing more containerized packages that can be swapped from ship to ship…“Those containers could do a host of missions. That’s a core element of the future force design.”
      So ASW is being put off , According to this peice.

      Delete
  31. NICODecember 22, 2025 at 3:03 PM

    https://www.twz.com/sea/navys-new-frigate-will-not-have-vertical-launch-systems-for-missiles

    Not a huge surprise but the first flight NSCs won't have a VLS and will use "modules" so we back to LCS 2.0.....I guess the hull/engine combo will work a little bit better this time so that's some progress.

    ReplyDelete
  32. AnonymousDecember 22, 2025 at 4:03 PM

    This is not humorous satire from "The Onion", its Fox news!

    https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-unveils-golden-fleet-navy-battleships-touts-them-more-powerful-than-any-ship-ever-built

    G2mil

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. ComNavOpsDecember 22, 2025 at 5:52 PM

      Come on, now. You should know by now that you have to take everything Trump says with a battleship size grain of salt. He routinely puts forth ideas that are not meant to be serious and/or never come close to fruition. Remember Canada as the 51st state, buying Greenland, eliminating EMALS, etc.? Sometimes he makes these statements as part of negotiating ploys and sometimes just for amusement value. I note the article indicates he wants to have the ships operational in 2.5 yrs! We barely built BBs in 2.5 -3 years even during WWII. The Navy can't even build a LCS or frigate in 2.5 yrs let alone a BB.

      This is an amusing story but ain't gonna happen. Just treat it as fun!

      Delete
  33. SRBDecember 22, 2025 at 5:19 PM

    No sonar array of any kind, towed or hull mounted. No Torp tubes or ASROC this pathetic thing is totally worthless for ASW missions. More modular garbage. I say we call it the sitting duck class.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. AnonymousDecember 22, 2025 at 6:20 PM

      The NSC frigate hull & propulsion with no acoustic silencing !

      Delete
  34. AnonymousDecember 22, 2025 at 5:35 PM

    Ultimate stupidity! Trump will construct 35,000 ton battle ships to replace DDG(X):

    https://news.usni.org/2025/12/22/trump-unveils-new-battleship-class-proposed-uss-defiant-will-be-largest-u-s-surface-combatant-since-wwii

    ReplyDelete
  35. NtxTwenty6December 24, 2025 at 1:04 AM

    By now I’m guessing that some of the commenters here have seen the news that the first flight of these legend-variant frigates will NOT have any VLS directly integrated into the hull. It will, likely, not carry a SPY 1/6 radar either.

    There are more than a few weekend-sailors losing their minds over this, but I’m of a different opinion…that this is actually a good sign.

    I’m not saying that a few VLS wouldn’t be a nice boost to the ship’s self defense or offensive capability, nor am I saying that having another powerful radar array out there would be bad…but I think both of those factors wildly increase cost, complexity, and contribute to the desire among the USN brass to “Burke all the things”.

    From my laymen’s chair, choosing to NOT add VLS or an offensive radar means that they DO WANT to minimize design changes, hopefully with the aim of getting these things built much faster than otherwise.

    But, I do wonder about their intent to make these things suitable for ASW.

    Again, from my layman’s chair, the USN needs dedicated ASW escorts to free up Burkes for the high end fight or carrier defense.

    - How much modification are required to make the Legend meet USN damage control requirements?

    - How much modification is required to provide enough sound attenuation to allow these things to do ASW?

    - And how will they be spec’d for ASW, assuming the Navy does intend for that to be their role?

    As far as the comments that we don’t have convoys to escort…that is true (not really)…now. The next peer level war that we get into will require both the merchant marine and commercial industry to transport equipment, supplies, and even manpower…across oceans that will have enemy subs trying to prevent those men, supplies, and equipment from getting to theater. That is the use of a proper frigate in the modern USN, imo. “Build now for what you need later.”

    We can’t make frigates appear the moment we end up in peer level LSCO.

    Furthermore, while there are arguments that these frigates might need AAW capability once they’re maneuvering deep in the SCS, the majority of their voyage to that theater will put them up against subs…not enemy missiles.

    As a final note on the purported design of the “Legend Frigate”, for lack of a better term, there has been some concern about the stated “modular” mission packages that the Navy intends to put on the tail of these things…concerns about more LCS repeats. From my perspective, the Navy is talking about a relatively simple and unobtrusive concept…platform on the back that can take a 40 foot CEU. Obviously the intent is to throw Mk70 on there, which could give these things a little missile defense punch if needed, and perhaps other containerized capabilities as they’re developed for the MASC drones. But again, this seems like the most unobtrusive and simple way of integrating “new” or different capabilities…much unlike the LCS.

    ReplyDelete

Comments will be moderated for posts older than 7 days in order to reduce spam.

Subscribe to: Post Comments (Atom)