Dropping Like Flies

The Air Force has publicly stated that large UAVs are not survivable on the modern battlefield.  ComNavOps has emphatically stated that, also.  Despite that, many commentators remained convinced that our UAVs will somehow, magically, provide us with total situational awareness.  Well, here’s some evidence that supports ComNavOps’, and the Air Force’s, belief.  From the Atlantic Council  (a supposed non-partisan think tank) website,
 

Since November 2023, the Houthis have claimed responsibility for downing fourteen MQ-9 Reaper drones …[1]

I’ve read unverified, updated reports that the Houthis have shot down as many as 20 MQ-9 Reapers.
 
I have no verification of the reports and no sense of the credibility of the Atlantic Council but it does fit exactly with what I believe and what seems patently obvious:  that slow, non-stealthy, non-maneuverable UAVs are simply target drones on the modern battlefield.  Similar reports from other sources vary in number of Reapers shot down but all are in the 14-20+ range.
 
 
Further evidence comes from the current strikes against Iran, as reported by Air & Space Forces website,
 

MQ-9 Reapers are flying numerous orbits over Iran, gathering intelligence and taking out missile launchers in Operation Epic Fury. Yet Iran has managed to down about 10 of the armed drones …[2]

If a thoroughly decimated military like Iran can manage to down that many drones, imagine what a coherent, peer enemy like China could do.  Large UAVs have a lifetime measured in minutes against a competent peer enemy and have no place on the modern battlefield.
 
One of the fears that I have is that the US will take “lessons” from this Iran conflict and apply them inappropriately to a future war with China just as we seem to be doing with the Ukraine “lessons”.  Both conflicts involve utterly inept militaries which renders any “lessons” invalid.
 
The only valid lesson is that large, slow, non-stealthy, non-maneuverable UAVs are not survivable in a contested air space and we are foolish to count on them.
 
 
 
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[1]Atlantic Council website, “How the Houthis’ strikes on US MQ-9 Reaper drones serve a wider regional agenda”, Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco, 26-Feb-2025,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/houthi-strikes-on-us-mq9-reaper-drones/
 
[2]Air & Space Forces Magazine website, “MQ-9s Over Iran: Striking and Finding Targets—But Taking Some Losses”, Chris Gordon and Stephen Losey, 11-Mar-2026,
https://www.airandspaceforces.com/mq-9s-over-iran-striking-and-finding-targets-but-taking-some-losses/

LCS Mine Countermeasures Assessment

Surprisingly, two of the Navy’s MCM configured LCS have been moved from the Middle East to a port in Malaysia despite the obvious possibility of Iranian mines in the Strait of Hormuz.  The ships were relocated about a week or so before the US strikes began.  If the Iranians do lay mines (there are no confirmed reports yet), we’ll desperately miss the LCS MCM capabilities … or will we?
 
From a Hunterbrooks website report, we learn that the LCS MCM capability is even more problematic and limited than we already knew.  The report provides information from a US Navy briefing.[1]
 
As you read it, bear in mind that the summarized information presented below is the Navy’s information, not mine.  If you want to dispute anything, you’ll have to take it up with the Navy.
 
By trying to be multi-mission, training time available for mine countermeasures is being significantly reduced to support ASuW, VBSS, and other missions.
 
The entire MCM package is pretty minimal and consists of just:

- 1x MH-60S Seahawk

• Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS)
• mine neutralization system (underwater suicide drone)

- 2x Common Unmanned Surface Vehicles (CUSV) that can tow:

• AN/AQS-20 side-scan and volume-search sonar
• Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS)

Each CUSV/AQS-20 mission is consuming large amounts of prep time, significantly reducing the overall clearance rate of an already glacially slow process.

• 4+ hrs pre-mission maintenance
• 1.5 hrs post-launch sonar calibration

 That’s 5.5+ hrs of time before the mission even begins!
 

AQS-20 sonar has a habit of failing to record data which is not detectable until after the mission, during the post-mission analysis.
 

CUSV still has a tendency to “runaway”, out of control.
 

CUSV comms are unacceptably short range requiring the LCS to operate in or near the minefield.
 

Navy MCM doctrine requires a visual ID of mines and the camera fails even in relatively clear waters.
 

The single CUSV crane is a single point of failure and is prone to failure.

 

 
With the preceding in mind, are we really missing much if the LCS-MCM vessels aren’t in the Middle East?  No matter how you slice it, this is an epic embarrassment for the Navy.
 
 
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[1]Hunterbrook website, “Demining Hormuz How The U.S. Navy Arrived At Worst-Case Scenario Unprepared”, Spendley & Johnston, 13-Mar-2026,
https://hntrbrk.com/demining-hormuz/

Moderation of Comments

Due to a spate of idiotic comments, largely by one or perhaps two people, I suspect, I’m going to institute moderation of comments until we move on to less “charged” topics.  Thank you.

This is Why You Don’t Depend on Allies

In my ongoing theme about the extremely questionable usefulness of training with, and depending on, allies, we get this:
 

President Donald Trump said Sunday that he has demanded about seven countries send warships to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, but his appeals have brought no commitments as oil prices soar during the Iran war.[1]

Any country that complains about increased oil prices has to explain why it won’t send military forces to ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil.
 
Any commentator who criticizes the US military for not keeping the strait open and shipping moving has to explain why they aren’t also asking why the affected countries aren’t providing military forces to ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil.
 
Each country has their own agenda but when those agendas frequently conflict with US interests, one has to wonder why we waste time, money, and resources training with countries that we can’t rely on.  Devoting resources to unreliable allies is illogical in the extreme..
 
The US is once again shouldering the burden of protecting the Middle East from terrorism, nuclear threats, and evil regimes with only Israel to aid us.  The rest of the world is content to stand off and reap the benefits without offering any support. 
 
Japan is bracing for potential gas shortages and increased prices.  Yeah?  Where are their military forces ensuring the safe passage of shipping through the strait?  Don’t complain if you’re not willing to do something about it.
 
This is entering into political commentary so I’ll leave it at that.
 
 
 
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[1]Navy Times website, “Trump asks ‘about 7′ countries for help to open the Strait of Hormuz”, Sam Metz, Will Weissert, Julia Frankel and Cara Anna, 16-Mar-2026,
https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/03/16/trump-asks-about-7-countries-for-help-to-open-the-strait-of-hormuz/

On Balance

There’s never been a 100% one-sided war and the strikes on Iran are no exception.  According to Newsmax website, as reported on 12-Mar,
 

… at least 11 American military bases or installations have been damaged …[1]

Now, compare that to the reported hundreds or thousands of targets hit per day in Iran.  That’s about as lopsided as you can get.
 
Too many people are trying to portray this as some kind nearly even war with Iran effectively fighting back.  Well, that’s about as far from reality as you can get.
 
 
 
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[1]Newsmax website, “Report: 17 US Sites Hit Across Mideast Since Iran War Began”, Charlie McCarthy, 12-Mar-2026,
https://www.newsmax.com/world/globaltalk/u-s-military-iran-war/2026/03/12/id/1249244/

Secondary Effects From Iran Strikes

‘Multi-domain’, that beloved catchphrase of the US military, applies not only to combat but also to results as noted below.
 
 
Oil
 
Here’s an aspect of the strikes against Iran that you may not be aware of.  One of the secondary effects from the strikes on Iran and the toppling of the Venezuela Maduro regime has been the impact on China’s oil imports.
 

Almost all of Iran’s exported oil, and more than half of Venezuela’s, went last year to China, which remained one of the only purchasers of goods from the two heavily sanctioned nations. The two countries combined represented some 17 percent of China’s overall oil purchases …[1]

17% is not an insignificant amount of oil to lose!
 
In addition, the steady crackdown on the so-called shadow fleet of tankers is further reducing oil supplies to China and Russia.
 
 
Hezbollah
 
Apparently Lebanon is growing tired of Iran’s influence on Hezbollah, brought to a head by the strikes on Iran and Hezbollah.  From Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, as reported by Redstate website,[2]
 

… Lebanon called for direct talks with Israel on “permanent arrangements for security and stability on our borders,” while accusing the Iranian-backed militant group Hezbollah of betraying the country.
 
But it is his criticism of Hezbollah that is significant. Calling the Shiite Muslim group “an armed faction … that places no value on Lebanon’s interest nor on the life of its people,” Aoun said Hezbollah “wanted to achieve the fall of the State of Lebanon, under aggression and chaos.” He accused the group of working “for the sake of the calculations of the Iranian regime.” [...]
 
Aoun called for a new initiative, backed by the international community, which would establish a truce between Israel and Lebanon while helping the Lebanese armed forces disarm Hezbollah and confiscate its weaponry. The initiative would put in a place a “complete truce” with a halt to Israeli attacks as the two countries begin “direct negotiations under international sponsorship” to achieve a “final cessation of hostile acts” and “permanent arrangements for security and stability on our borders.[2]

Well directed force does produce positive results.

 
 
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[1]Politico website, “5 charts show China’s oil dilemma after US strikes”, Paroma Soni and Catherine Allen, 2-Mar-2026,
https://www.politico.com/news/2026/03/02/iran-us-strikes-china-oil-supply-charts-00806415
 
[2]Redstate, “Lebanon Drops Some Bad News on Those Anti-American Hezbollah Terrorists”, Nick Arama, 10-Mar-2026,
https://redstate.com/nick-arama/2026/03/10/lebanon-wants-talks-with-israel-n2200042

Joint Bases

If you can’t use it when you need it, it’s not really a joint base, is it?  So why are we paying towards foreign “joint” bases?