US Uses One-Way Attack Drones Against Iran

Among military websites, the headlines are all atwitter about the US’ use of the one-way, LUCAS, attack drone in the strikes against Iran. 
 
Here’s a Military Times website headline[1]:
 
US Confirms First Combat Use of LUCAS One-Way Attack Drone in Iran Strikes
 
This is a simply stunning development and marks a new chapter in strike warfare.  From the LUCAS performance specs, never before has any country had the ability to deliver a maximum 40 lb payload to a distance of 500 miles at a cruise speed of 85 mph (74 kts).  The closest the US has come to this in the past is the one-way Tomahawk attack drone (sometimes referred to as a cruise missile) with a 1000 lb warhead and a range of 1000 miles at a speed of Mach 0.74. (570 mph).
 
It’s embarrassing the way we’ve made a habit of proudly trumpeting “new” technologies that have actually existed for many decades.  That’s not to say that there isn’t a use for a small, very slow missile (which is what a one-way drone is) with very low end lethality but to brag that we’ve accomplished something remarkable is humiliating and deceptive (or ignorant).
 
Here’s an example of an embarrassing attempt at praise from Army Recognition website.
 

U.S. Central Command has moved Task Force Scorpion Strike into an operational posture, giving deployed forces a low-cost one-way attack drone capability designed to multiply strike capacity, absorb attrition, and overwhelm defenses through massed, distributed effects. Beyond adding another munition to the inventory, it effectively creates a new layer of “magazine depth” that can be launched quickly from dispersed sites, complicating enemy targeting and imposing unfavorable cost trades on air defenses. The shift matters less for a single drone’s performance than for what it signals: the U.S. military is now treating expendable systems as a scalable combat arm, not a niche experiment … [2]

“overwhelm defenses” ?  Isn’t that what we’ve done repeatedly when we’ve launched dozens of cruise missiles at targets over the years?
 
“massed, distributed effects” ?  Isn’t that a contradiction?
 
“expendable systems” ?  Haven’t missiles always been expendable?
 
“scalable” ?  Haven’t we always scaled operations as needed?
 
Well, sure, we’ve done all that for many decades but never before have assembled all the accolades into a single press release.  Now that’s an accomplishment!
 
Again, at $35,000 per unit, there may be a use for such a weapon but to believe it is something new is just ignorant and embarrassing.
 
 
Warning:  As usual, we are not going to discuss the politics of the US decision to strike Iran, only the military aspects. 

 

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[1]Military Times website, “US Confirms First Combat Use of LUCAS One-Way Attack Drone in Iran Strikes”, JD Simkins, 28-Feb-2026,
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/02/28/us-confirms-first-combat-use-of-lucas-one-way-attack-drone-in-iran-strikes/
 
[2]Army Recognition website, “U.S. Central Command Deploys First Operational LUCAS Drone Unit for Potential Iran Strikes”, 28-Feb-2026,
https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2026/u-s-central-command-deploys-first-operational-lucas-drone-unit-for-potential-iran-strikes#google_vignette

Air Superiority Fighter Range

ComNavOps has long proposed a very long range fighter aircraft for the Navy.  One of the persistent objections has been that it is physically impossible to achieve the desired 1000+ nm combat radius (see, "Long Range Carrier Fighter") despite the overwhelming evidence that it is eminently possible.  Well, now it appears that the military agrees with me as evidenced by the requirements for the new F-47 under development.  Amazingly, for modern times, at least, the prototype is due for first flight in 2028.
 

The Air Force has said the F-47 will have a combat radius of more than 1,000 nautical miles and be capable of flying at speeds greater than Mach 2. That would make the aircraft’s combat radius nearly double that of the F-22.[1]

AF wouldn’t be making the claim if they (and industry) didn’t think they could do it.  Of course, claims are just that and nothing is proven until demonstrated.  However, we have sufficient examples of very long range aircraft from decades ago to expect that today’s more efficient engines and better aerodynamics should deliver the range we want.
 
We also need to ensure that firepower, speed, stealth, and maneuverability also join with range to make a truly formidable fighter.  Range, alone, will not make an air superiority fighter … but it’s a good start!
 
Let’s hope the military doesn’t try to turn the F-47 into a do-everything, nothing well abomination.  Make it a fighter and leave it alone.
 
This is encouraging if yet premature.
 
 
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[1]Redstate website, “Air Force's New F-47 Fighter Hits Stride for 2028 Takeoff”, Ward Clark, 26-Feb-2026,
https://redstate.com/wardclark/2026/02/26/air-forces-new-f-47-fighter-hits-stride-for-2028-takeoff-n2199600

Where Did It All Go Wrong?

Clearly, today’s Navy is badly broken in almost every respect but that wasn’t always the case.  In WWII, the Navy was an efficient, deadly, fighting force that knew how to produce warriors and ships on a routine basis.  What changed between then and now?  Where did it all go wrong?
 
Let’s start with the “what changed”.
 
What changed is the focus. From the early 1900's (pre-WWI) on, the Navy had an intense focus on combat effectiveness (with a few notable exceptions such as the WWII faulty torpedo fiasco).  After the late 1950's and early 1960's, the war veterans (those who understood combat and designed ships to meet that requirement) retired leaving people whose focus shifted from combat to career. The focus became empire building, budget pursuit, and career enhancement rather than combat-effective ship and fleet design and procurement.  Without the crucible and filter of combat to weed out the incompetent, idiots who were politically adroit took over and foolish policies became the norm.
 
Okay, that’s clear enough.  Now, when did it happen?  What event triggered the shift?  Let’s check some noteworthy events in history that lead to our current state of affairs.  Some of the events were even hailed at the time as great achievements.  Here’s a chronology (nowhere near all-inclusive!) of events that clearly traces the rise of incompetence:
 
 
General Board (1951) – The Board was dissolved by CNO Forrest Sherman in a move to consolidate his power.  This began the shift in focus from combat to bureaucracy and career.
 
Spruance (1970) – This was the point at which the Navy abdicated its design responsibility and relinquished it to industry as a result of the Total Package Procurement concept originated by the Whiz Kids of SecDef Robert McNamara.  There has been a steady downhill erosion of technical capability and competence by the Navy ever since.
 
Adm. Zumwalt’s Hi/Lo Policy (1970’s) – instead of building the fleet we needed, he settled for the fleet he could get; he compromised the nation’s security and naval strength and institutionalized mediocrity and acceptance of inferiority.
 
Note that my rejection of hi/lo does not mean that we want a fleet of all battleships and carriers.  We need smaller combatants because there are some functions they can fill better than larger ships.  A mix of large and small combatants is not an example of a hi/lo mix, it is an example of a balanced fleet whose needs are all met.  Hi/lo, on the other hand, is an example of an unbalanced fleet that lacks vital levels of warships and attempts to compensate by substituting larger numbers of smaller ships.
 
Offsets (1980’s) – This introduced the pursuit of technological leaps instead of consistent, steady, evolutionary development.  Unfortunately, it has failed every time.
 
Fall of the Soviet Union (1991) – This eliminated all the remaining intense focus on combat that the Navy had.
 
2-1/2 War Abandonment (1993) – Being able to fight and win 2-1/2 wars was the long time standard requirement by which we sized and composed our military.  When that proved expensive (duh!), instead of making the case for it to Congress, the military began adopting a series of ever-shrinking requirements leading to the current “1 regional conflict (not even a war) plus holding against another.  The threat level did not change and yet the requirement shrank, justified by budget rather than threat.
 
Minimal Manning (1990’s) – This began the physical decline of the fleet as maintenance was deferred and ships were allowed to, literally, rot.  This also instituted and formalized the Navy’s acceptance of cripplingly lowered standards of readiness.
 
Concurrency (2000’s) – This god forsaken practice has cost the Navy dearly and has failed miserably every time it’s been attempted and yet the Navy continues to practice it.
 
Unmanned (2000’s) – This marks the Navy’s public and formal acceptance of insufficient combat power in the pursuit of technological fads.  Instead of doing the hard work of evolutionary development, the Navy institutionalized the pursuit of magic beans and the delusional, lazy, easy way forward.
 
Diversity (2010’s) – This marked the Navy’s formal recognition of priorities other than combat effectiveness.
 
 
 
And here we are, today.  It’s clear that there was no single event that crippled the Navy but, rather, a creeping rot evidenced by a series of misguided (to be polite) actions over the years.
 
Ironically, many of the flawed actions were praised at the time they were implemented but only by people who did not have a combat focus.  Looking back, it is easy to see the actions for the mistakes they were.  Our current failure is our inability to see the failings and course correct.

New Swedish Frigate

ComNavOps has long considered the Swedish Visby class corvette as the gold standard of modern, total stealth warship design (not perfect ... just the best out there).  That makes the conceptual design for the next Swedish frigate, a larger vessel than the Visby, seemingly obvious:  simply upsize the Visby and add a few more weapons.  However, that seems not to be the case.  The candidates for the next Swedish frigate appear to be the existing (parent??) designs listed below:
 

• Saab/Babcock - Arrowhead 120 (variant of the Arrowhead 140)
• Naval Group (France) - FDI frigate
• Navantia (Spain) - Alfa 4000 light frigate

 
As a quick reminder, Visby is 238 ft and 840 tons.  For comparison, the Arrowhead 120 is 406 ft and 4,650 tons.
 
None of the candidates exhibit anything approaching the maximum stealth and total signature reduction the modern naval battlefield requires and all would seem to be a significant step back from the Visby in that regard.  Honestly, the parallels between this and the US Navy’s failed Constellation program which attempted to build a “new”, 20+ year old, already obsolete frigate from a parent design, are eerie.
 
Sweden is looking to acquire four frigates from one of the companies listed above.  The contract for four ships is estimated to be between $4.5B -$6.7B(USD) which would be $1.1B - $1.7B(USD) per ship and, of course, no estimate ever comes in on budget so the real cost would likely be pushing $2B or more which seems excessive for relatively simple, dated frigates.
 
I assumed Sweden would simply scale up the Visby design for frigtes/destroyers.  That would be eminently logical and, indeed, that was the original idea for the Visby Generation 2 design.
 

Initially in 2021, FMV [Swedish Defence Materiel Administration] awarded Saab Kockums a contract for the product definition phase of the Visby Generation 2 corvettes, a new class based on the existing Visby-class stealth vessels … [1]
 
However, the program was canceled in 2023 amid Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and Sweden’s push toward NATO membership (finalized in 2024), leading to Saab teaming up with Babcock for a new, larger design.[1]

Somehow, in moving from the world’s stealthiest corvette to a “new” dated frigate, Sweden lost sight of what’s important for survival and combat-effectiveness on the modern naval battlefield.  Did some US admirals join the Swedish navy?
 

Arrowhead 120

I fully support the idea of a larger ship than the Visby but why go for a less capable and less survivable one?  Surely, the Visby could be scaled up from a corvette to a frigate without violating any “laws” of shipbuilding.
 
I guess it’s not just the US Navy that engages in perplexing behavior.
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense website, “Saab, Babcock bank on Arrowhead 120 design for Sweden’s next frigate”, Jonas Olsson, 13-Feb-2026,
https://breakingdefense.com/2026/02/saab-babcock-bank-on-arrowhead-120-design-for-swedens-next-frigate/

Constellation Lessons

Christopher Cavas has a maritime podcast and recently offered a ‘lessons learned’ episode about the Constellation.[1]  In it, he speaks with former Under and Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly and retired Rear Admiral and former Fincantieri executive Chuck Goddard about lessons from the Constellation disaster.  Both Modly and Goddard were intimately involved with the Constellation.  Modly’s contribution was the usual worthless civilian nonsense.  Goddard’s thoughts are what we’ll focus on.  The podcast is interesting and worth listening to but not for the right reasons.
 
As you listen to the podcast, understand that both men were involved with the Constellation and, given the magnitude of the program failure, clearly neither man was part of the solution which means they were part – a very large part! - of the problem.  The entire interview, then, is the problem explaining what went wrong without being aware enough to even recognize that they were what went wrong!  The problem was trying to explain what the problem was!  The resulting discussion was exactly what you’d expect:  a mishmash of delusion and obvliviousness.
 
Before we go any further, it is important to understand Goddard’s background.
 

• Senior Vice President responsible for the FFG 62 Program for Fincantieri Marinette Marine (FMM)
• Capture Executive for the $5.5 billion FFG(X) program at Fincantieri Marine Group
• CEO, President and GM of FMM from Jun 2011 – Jul 2014
• Lockheed Martin director of Aegis Program Integration and Capture Manager for the Aegis Combat Systems Engineering Agent (CSEA) competition
• During his thirty-year career with the Navy, he led a variety of complex ship programs from destroyers to sealift ships, culminating in his role as the Navy Program Executive Officer, Ships
• Vice Commander Naval Sea Systems Command
• Chairman SUBSAFE Program review
• DDG 1000 Major Program Manager during design and development
• New Construction Officer at Supervisor of Shipbuilding, San Diego, CA overseeing AOE-10, Sealift Conversion and Sealift New Construction programs

 
He has been involved in a lot of failures and had an entire career to effect positive changes and completely failed to do so.  Almost every group he was with has been heavily criticized on this blog.  He has been part of, and known nothing but, failure his entire career.
 
As a general observation, Goddard utterly fails to grasp any actual lessons learned beyond the superficial and nearly irrelevant level which is typical of managerial incompetence.  Such managers simply can’t see or grasp the real lessons.  If they could, they would have changed things while they were in a position to do so.
 
For example, one of the major (perhaps the main) lessons from the Constellation was something we’ve harped on relentlessly:  the failure to generate a comprehensive Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  The Constellation never had a sharply defined mission/function.  It was a mini-Burke which is to say that it was all things to all people.  Goddard himself offers an observation that simultaneously demonstrates this and illustrates his complete failure to grasp what it means.  He noted that the Constellation eventually sank under the weight of the never-ending flood of change orders emanating from NAVSEA’s attempt to spec and build the frigate as a destroyer because they had no experience designing and building a frigate so they fell back on what they knew:  the Burke!  They designed and spec’ed the Constellation as if it were a Burke.  This demonstrates the lack of a CONOPS that would have filtered out any destroyer-like, non-frigate changes.  Absent a sharply defined CONOPS, there was no basis to reject any change order since each change, in isolation, seemed justifiable.  
 
While he fails to understand the true relevance of his observation, Goddard nevertheless identifies a key failing of the Navy:  they only know how to make one type of surface combatant, the Burke.  All their expectations, requirements, specifications, etc. are from the Burke.  I’ve repeatedly talked about the folly of continuing to build the Burke class (see, “Burkes – TheAnchor Around the Navy’s Neck”) and the folly of building large, multi-function ships, in general.  We should be building many types of single function ships and this is yet another reason why.  We need a Navy/NAVSEA that is comfortable with multiple ship types and understands why they exist, what their roles are, how they differ, and how to spec and build them.  The Chinese have extensive classes of missile boats, corvettes, frigates, destroyers, and destroyer/cruisers.  We have Burkes and that’s it.  We are a one-trick pony surface fleet and one-trick NAVSEA.  We know nothing else but Burkes.
 
Goddard’s comment about NAVSEA attempting to spec the Constellation as a Burke finalizes and confirms the observation that the Constellation was a mini-Burke rather than an ASW frigate or convoy escort or whatever else some observers wished it was.  Again, Goddard recognizes the change orders as a problem but fails to see that the mini-Burke mindset was a problem stemming from the lack of a CONOPS and that NAVSEA should have been “educated” and squashed from day one.
 
The entire NAVSEA attempt to spec the Constellation as a Burke also offers the larger issue of how to appropriately “downgrade” a ship from a high end destroyer to a low level frigate.  What degree of reduced structural strength is appropriate?  What level of reduced survivability?  How much redundancy?  What degree of separation of key components? And so on.  A frigate must be “less” than a destroyer or else it is a destroyer.  Navy/NAVSEA have clearly not come to terms with the appropriate level of downgrading for a frigate.
 
Goddard and Modly go on to offer other, multiple, supposed lessons learned but fail to accept even the slightest blame for their own involvement and failings.  For example, Goddard notes that the Constellation, still only partially complete, had already gained 1000 ton on what was intended to be a 7000 ton ship.  That’s more than a 14% growth even before the ship was half complete!  Despite that stunning failure, no one made any attempt to figure out why the weight gain was occurring and what to do about it.
 
The podcast is interesting but ultimately worthless in terms of any actual lessons learned and illustrates that the people running the Navy are so completely incompetent that they are inherently incapable of recognizing and learning any actual lessons.
 
 
 
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[1] Defense & Aerospace Report CAVASSHIPS Podcast [Dec 04, ’25] Ep: 220 Tom Modly & Chuck Goddard on Constellation Lessons Learned, 4-Dec-2025,
https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/defense-aerospace-report-cavasships-podcast-dec-04/id1573063059?i=1000739767674

Still Not Serious About Passive Sensing

Naval News website has an article, relevant to the US Navy, about the French navy installing electro-optical/infrared sensors on various ships.[1]  That’s a nice step but nowhere near enough. We’ve talked about the future naval battlefield requiring purely passive sensing systems and individual ships needing a dozen or more such sensors spaced around the ship for complete hemispherical coverage and battle damage resilience (redundancy and separation).  Adding one or two sensors to a ship is woefully insufficient and indicates a peacetime mindset where the threat level is low to non-existent.  In other words, it is an action by a navy that is not serious about war.
 

According to TRAKKA Systems, … The TC-375M [ed. one of the EO/IR systems the French are using] is ideally suited for long-range naval and coast guard missions including search and rescue, illegal immigration protection, drug interdiction, economic exclusion zone (EEZ) protection, anti-piracy, maritime patrol, naval C4ISR, and naval vessel force protection.[1]

That’s quite a list of suitable tasks and none of them have anything to do with combat.  Even the French navy’s “high end” threat is laughably weak, as indicated below.
 

… the French Navy previously moved to fit Safran’s Paseo XLR advanced electro-optic infra red (EO/IR) system on all FREMM frigates and Horizon type Air Defense destroyers. The decision was taken as part of an “urgent operational requirement” in response to the escalating threat posed by kamikaze unmanned surface vehicles (USV) and unmanned air vehicles (UAV).[1]

UAVs and USVs?  That’s not a threat, it’s an annoyance, at most, for a competent navy.  Saturation missile attacks are a threat.  Ballistic missiles are a threat.  Hypersonic missiles are a threat.  Submarines are a threat.  Believing that a few tiny, unmanned drones are a threat shows the absence of a combat mentality.
 
As we’ve previously discussed, the modern battlefield requires passive sensing.  Ships need long range, hemispherical passive sensors (see, “PassiveHemispherical Sensing”) that can search, detect, track, and provide fire control.  To radiate is to die unless you’ve got missiles coming at you and, if you do, you’ve already screwed up and are already on the losing side of the battle ledger.  Ships need to be able to sail, establish situational awareness, search for enemy assets, and engage, all while remaining passive and undetected (see, “The Passive Warship”). 
 
Ship designers need to regain a combat design philosophy.  Battle damage will occur and that requires significant redundancy and separation of all key equipment.  A single EO/IR sensor is not a combat fit – it’s a peacetime design failure.
 
I’m not picking on the French.  The US Navy is doing exactly the same thing and this should serve as a lesson for us.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “French Navy fits new EO/IR systems aboard Mistral-class LHDs”, Xavier Vavasseur, 3-Feb-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/02/french-navy-fits-new-eo-ir-systems-aboard-mistral-class-lhds/

Where’s the Lethality?

Having failed so many times, the Navy’s primary shipbuilding criteria is no longer lethality (if it ever was in modern times) but the [incorrectly] perceived need to get hulls – any hulls – in the water as quickly as possible to stop the criticisms and fend off Congressional anger.  As Naval News website notes about the new frigate program,
 

… speed [of production] is now the primary factor driving the program.[1]

Speed of production.  Not firepower, not stealth, not lethality, not operational usefulness or anything else one might think would be of importance … just the speed with which hulls can be put in the water.  Why not just buy combat canoes?  We can get them in the water quickly.
 
The new Frigate’s armament will consist of a 57mm main cannon and a RAM launcher with 21 Rolling Airframe Missiles.  A payload space will be constructed (so much for no changes to the parent design!) at the stern of the ship capable of carrying 16 Naval Strike Missiles, 48 Hellfires, or other containerized weapons or modules.[1]
 
50-65 ships will be built …  So, we’re committing to a large production run before the first design is even finalized.  Does sound identical to the LCS?
 
The horrifying concern is that this level of armament relegates this vessel to the level of a patrol boat (and not a particularly impressive one at that!) and yet it will make up something like a third of our combat fleet.  Absorb that for a moment.  A third of the combat fleet will be patrol boats.  Add in the Navy’s desire for all manner of unmanned vessels and we’re looking at half or more of the fleet being nearly devoid of serious combat capability. 
 
Sure, the Navy will talk about future upgrades but when has that ever actually happened?  Ask the LCS how those future module upgrades that we were promised are coming along.
 
If I were China, I’d bankroll this program for the United States just to ensure we field a fleet of non-lethal ships!
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “New U.S Navy Frigate: FF(X) Program Specs Revealed”, Ethan Gossrow, 16-Jan-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/01/new-u-s-navy-frigate-ffx-program-specs-revealed/