F-35 Congressional Testimony

The following is testimony provided June 23, 2026, on the F-35 aircraft program presented to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Airland.  Testimony provided by U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Gregory Masiello, Program Executive Officer F-35 Lightning II Joint Program Office.[1]
 
Here are some illuminating quotes from the transcript.[1]
 
As you know, the readiness rates are abysmal.  Here’s a major reason why.
 

Gen. Masiello:  In this session, I think I can say one of our challenges, and you talked about it, is if I have over 1,300 operational aircraft out there.  I believe we have set and enabled a sustainment system for about 700 to 800.  So, there is our challenge in readiness. [p.10]

So, the military has sized the sustainment effort for only half the existing aircraft?????!  How are people not being fired on a daily basis?
 
As a result of the sustainment issues, readiness is in the toilet and the toilet is at the bottom of a deep pit.  Rather than acknowledge the problem, firing people, and then fixing the problem, the military is still engaged in accounting games trying to make it look less bad than it is.
 

Senator Kelly: Thank you.  So, the GAO [ed. Government Accountability Office]  FMC [ed. Full Mission Capable] rate is they said 25 percent.· Your office claims it's 56 percent. [p.18]

It’s 25% and even that is overestimated!
 
As a reminder, there are two sets of mission capable measurements:
 

• Mission Capable (MC) – The aircraft can perform at least one task.  Basically, this means the aircraft can get off the ground.
• Full Mission Capable (FMC) – The aircraft can perform any of its combat mission tasks.  This is what every aircraft should be.

 
One of the problems is low expectations.
 

Gen. Masiello:  We have a North Star for 80 percent MC across the entirety of the fleet, and we need to figure out how to do that. [p.11]

So, general, you’ve set a pathetically low MC standard (only 80% are even rated to be able to get off the ground) that you can’t meet and have no idea how to even achieve that low standard.  Wow.  How are people not being fired on a daily basis?
 

That's about as ready as it gets.

Sadly, these kinds of problems are not unique to the F-35 program.  For example, the Navy is building carriers and ballistic submarines without the dry dock capacity to support their maintenance.
 
Where is SecDef Hegseth?  How can he read this kind of testimony and not fire everyone connected to the program?  Hegseth has been a major disappointment and his lack of action is why this kind of problem persists across the military.

To be fair, how can Congress hear this and not fire people?
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “Testimony on the F-35 Aircraft Program”, staff, 1-Jul-2026,
https://news.usni.org/2026/07/01/testimony-on-the-f-35-aircraft-program

Iran War Status

Time for a quick Iran war status update.
 
As we’ve discussed many times on this blog, what are the requirements to actually win a war?
 

• Clear Objective and End State – This is mandatory before the first shot is fired.  If you don’t have a crystal clear objective/end state then you are guaranteed to fail.
• Total Commitment – In it to win it or don’t get in it.  Half measures have never won a war and lead, inevitably, to failure.
• Centers of Gravity – You can’t formulate an effective political or military strategy if you don’t correctly identify the enemy’s center(s) of gravity, meaning the “things” that are absolutely vital to the enemy and represent both the enemy’s strengths and vulnerabilities.  Every center of gravity is simultaneously a strength and, because it can be destroyed, a vulnerability.

With those basic requirements in mind, let’s check the status of the Iran war.
 
 
Objectives and End State
 
Although there has never been a formal, public listing of our objectives, certain objectives have clearly emerged.  They are:
 

• Decapitate Iranian leadership, meaning, kill the mullahs.  This has been achieved.  The leadership role has passed to (or been taken by) the Iranian military (IRGC).  We clearly failed to anticipate that this would happen.
• Destroy Iran’s nuclear capability forever.  This appears to have been totally or largely achieved based on the few public reports we have.
• Eliminate Iran’s ability to strike neighboring countries.  This has not been achieved although Iran’s strike capabilities have been severely degraded.  They are no longer capable of launching hundreds of missiles and are now reduced to a few launches at a time.
• Eliminate Iran as a functioning, rogue nation.  This has been partially achieved as Iran’s Navy has been destroyed, missile production has been severely degraded, missile stockpiles have been significantly reduced, Iran’s air force is non-existent, and Iran’s financial wherewithal has been crippled, all of which significantly reduce, but have not eliminated, Iran’s ability to export terrorism.

 
Total Commitment
 
At the start of hostilities, it seemed that the US was fully committed to the listed objectives.  Certainly, we were using significant portions of our military might.  However, after a few weeks, the force commitment declined sharply and became sporadic demonstrating that we were not fully committed.  A plausible, alternate explanation is that our weapon stockpiles have been reduced to levels that preclude additional, significant expenditures while maintaining an “adequate” reserve for dealing with China.
 
 
Centers of Gravity
 
Iran has a few readily apparent centers of gravity that should have been prioritized in any war.
 
Leadership – Iran was run by the dictatorial mullahs, as opposed to the people, and that group determined the country’s goals and objectives.  Eliminating them was vital.  This was achieved but the assumption of power by the IRGC was not anticipated and an adjustment should have been made when it became apparent what was happening.  For unknown reasons, the US has declined to go after the IRGC leadership in any significant manner.
 
Nuclear – Iran’s main world wide bargaining power stemmed from its nuclear threat.  Without a doubt, this had to be eliminated.  Without a nuclear threat, Iran is a severe nuisance but not an existential threat to anyone.  This was the true source of Iran’s geopolitical power.  It has been largely or totally eliminated.
 
Strait of Hormuz – Along with its nuclear threat, control of the strait was another source of geopolitical power for Iran and the importance of control of the strait was painfully obvious to all.  The US failure to quickly and thoroughly establish control is inexplicable and the continued failure to establish control is even more baffling.
 
Finance – Though of a somewhat lesser degree, Iran’s financial resources represented a source of power and great vulnerability.  The US has imposed sanctions and degraded Iran’s financial resources and access to an extent but has stopped well short of total financial war.  Much more could be done, as evidenced by the periodic announcement of additional sanctions.  Obviously, if additional sanctions can be imposed then that means that financial combat options were left unused which is inexplicable.
 
Financial combat is one of the overlooked “domains” of modern regional war.  It can be devastating and the US has the ability to pretty much totally isolate and “starve” Iran financially but, for inexplicable reasons, has opted not to do so.
 
 
Discussion
 
We see, then, that the US has recognized a couple of Iran’s centers of gravity while missing/ignoring or only partially acting on a couple others.  This points back to the war requirement of total commitment.  It is clear that the US is not completely invested in winning this war and, thus, has worked itself into a stalemate despite achieving some goals and inflicting a great deal of damage.  Unless the situation changes drastically, the cost of this war will continue to rise while the gains stagnate.  This is what happens when you enter a war without total commitment and a clear vision of the desired end state.  To be fair, I suspect that the Administration did have a clear vision of the end state but it did not match reality and now we are floundering.  We have overwhelming strength but no clear idea how to best use it.
 
As I have posted in the past, failure to pursue a war to total victory inevitably leads to having to refight the war down the road.  Disappointingly, it seems we are firmly on that path.
 
 
Note:  This is purely a military assessment and we will not be discussing the political aspects and I will not tolerate personal attacks on President Trump.  Discuss his military policies, if you wish, but refrain from personal attacks.  You are warned.
 

Light Amphibious Warship / Landing Ship Medium Update

As you know, the key to the Marines idiotic missile sniping (and ASW!) concept is the Light Amphibious Warship, now being called a Landing Ship Medium (some admiral-wannabe probably got another star for that reclassification!) in the latest churn which attempts to look like progress.  The LAW/LSM is already a few years late as the Marines have already stood up their littoral regiments (they haven’t explained how they’ll transport those Marines since the LAW/LSM does not yet exist).
 
The Navy has seemed reluctant to embrace the Marine’s concept and has slow-walked the LAW/LSM program, as noted in the GAO annual report.[1]
 

… after years of delays and affordability concerns, the Navy shifted to a two-block acquisition strategy in December 2024 that reduces requirements for the ships in the first block and defers pursuit of a ship that will fully meet requirements to a later block.[1]

So, the Navy is going to purchase ships that they know will not meet the requirements?  Do you know what a ship that can’t meet the requirements is called?  That’s right, it’s a reef, paperweight, target drone, LCS, embarrassment .
 
Is the Navy at least moving quickly on the Block 2 version that fully meets the requirements?
 

… program officials said they have yet to start planning the details of the transition to the second block, such as the timing of the transition or the requirements of the next block.[1]

They haven’t even defined the requirements, yet? 
 
I can’t see anything going wrong with this program.
 
 
 
___________________________________

 
[1]Government Accountability Office, "Weapon Systems Annual Assessment", Jul 2026, p.144

Stupidity Served on an Unmanned Platter

It seems as if the wonders of unmanned technology never cease.  New, miraculous accomplishments are happening every day.  In the latest development, unmanned boats can now resupply US Navy ships at sea. 
 

As part of the ongoing Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2026 naval exercises, a Splash Industries Typhoon Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV) successfully landed in the well deck of the Wasp-class Landing Helicopter Dock USS Essex (LHD-2), marking the first instance of a USV performing an underway replenishment for a larger, crewed vessel.[1]

Amazing!  Outstanding!  This means the fleet can stay at sea indefinitely, being resupplied eternally by unmanned boats!
 
Now, take a look at the boat that was used in the RimPac exercise as seen in this photo from manufacturer Splash Industries on a Linkedin site.[2]
 

Replenishment at Sea - one suitcase at a time!

Despite my earlier enthusiasm, do you note anything interesting about the boat and its cargo?  That’s right, the boat is about the size of a rowboat and the cargo was a suitcase.
 
Is this someone’s idea of the future of at sea replenishment ?  - a suitcase at a time?  Someone thinks we’re going to resupply the fleet one suitcase at a time delivered by tiny boats?  Was this a joke?  Is it April Fool's?
 
It’s one thing to tinker around with technology for its own sake.  That’s a minor, cheap, zero-impact foray into pure science.  Doesn’t hurt anything.  Doesn’t cost anything.  However, it’s a completely different scenario when that pointless playing around ties up major US amphibious warships, wastes the time and resources of crews, and leads to false expectations.
 
If you want to play with your tiny, remote controlled, unmanned boat in the bay near your house and have it drive up onto someone’s boat ramp … go ahead.  You’re wasting your time but who cares and you’ll have a fun day at the beach.   However, when you tie up amphibious ships, waste sailors time, and cost the taxpayer money then you need to stop and whoever authorized this for the Navy needs to be fired.
 
Splash Industries, you took an oversized kid’s remote control boat, tied a box to it, and drove it up a ramp just like we did as kids when we drove our remote controlled boat up onto the beach.  Congratulations.  You’ve reinvented a technology that kids have played with for decades and somehow got some idiot in the Navy to sponsor you.
 
Note:  the video of the boat beaching itself on the ship’s ramp is widely available on the Internet if you want to see it.  It appears the boat may have missed the intended ramp point but I can’t be positive.
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Typhoon USV Completes First-Ever At-Sea Resupply with USS Essex”, Ethan Gossrow, 16-Jul-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/07/typhoon-usv-uss-essex-at-sea-resupply/
 
[2]https://www.linkedin.com/posts/splashindustries_rimpac2026-activity-7481404591633485824-aoDy

Book Review – The Sixth Battle

Have you wondered what a modern carrier battle would look like?  Of course you have!  Well, wonder no longer.  The Sixth Battle [1] describes the clash between Russian carrier task forces and a US carrier (fictional Forrestal class complete with ... yes! ... Tomcats!) isolated off the southeastern coast of Africa against the setting of a Russian sponsored invasion of South Africa. 
 
The geopolitical situation is nicely setup without being tedious and boring and offers solid context.  The land battle is described with engaging detail and personal interest but the focus of the book is on the naval battle with the Russian carriers (Kiev and Kuznetsov classes) attempting to support the invasion with land attacks while simultaneously preventing the badly outnumbered American carrier from interfering.  The Russian plan to isolate the US carrier group from reinforcement is brilliant and quite plausible as are the American attempts to respond.  In the end, the plot comes down to the battle between the Russian naval and land based aviation and the American carrier group and is told with a fantastic combination of suspense, realism, and detail.
 
Along the way, the plot presents scenarios involving chemical/nerve gas warfare and the use of tactical nukes in anti-submarine warfare.  The tactical nuke scenario, in particular, draws the reader into the debate and gives a feeling for the complexities of the decision making involved as well as the tactical considerations and methodology of employment.  I know we have readers who are firmly convinced that tactical nukes should be used and this offers a window into that scenario.
 
Anti-ship strike scenes assemble and make clear all the factors that go into a strike and how they fit together.  Essentially, they merge all the aspects discussed on this blog, and which so many people struggle to understand, into clear, detailed, riveting descriptions.
 
One can’t help but come away with a profound understanding of why carriers should operate in groups of four.  The sheer number of aircraft required to carry out a strike is daunting and the relegation of so many aircraft to supporting roles (CAP, BarCAP, tanking, EW, etc.) which results in shockingly meager “full” strikes of only a dozen or so aircraft hammers home the very small size of a single carrier air wing.  Of course, today’s downsized air wings have even fewer aircraft available for actual strike action.  Disturbingly, today’s carriers could not possibly execute the actions described in the book.
 
The book also offers a clear feel for the vast operating area of the oceans when conducting naval/carrier warfare and the difficulties in finding and engaging a surface group – another aspect that blog readers often struggle to comprehend.
 
Yet another key facet of the book is that it grants an appreciation for the force multiplication value of tactics as opposed to the pure evaluation of individual weapons as so many of today’s naval observers and analysts tend to do.  The reader comes to understand that people and tactics rank ahead of weapon specifications in importance to overall combat effectiveness.
 
The value of EMCON and electronic warfare is quite evident in both the detection efforts and the actual strikes and demonstrates how it all ties together in the overall maneuvering, tactics, and combat.
 
The role of Tomahawk carrying ships such as the Burkes is noteworthy and, again, emphasizes the need for large escort groups and the value of tactical flexibility that numbers grant.
 
To summarize, in addition to being a hugely entertaining and believable story, the author presents what amounts to a primer on naval battle and carrier warfare.  This book should be required reading for followers of this blog. 
 
The book is very well researched and offers great detail without becoming tedious.  A perfect balance between detail and story telling.
 
Read it!
 

 

 
______________________________

 
[1]Tillman, Barrett, The Sixth Battle, Bantam Books, 1992, ISBN 0-553-29402-8

GAO Report Tidbits

The annual Government Accountability Office weapons assessment report is out and here are some the lowlights.

AARGM-ER – The anti-radiation missile is experiencing production delays.
 

The AARGM-ER program continues to experience production delays. The program reported that the delays were related to missile qualification, hardware capability, and software problems discovered during testing.[1]

That’s what you get from concurrency.
 
As GAO notes,
 

We found that starting production before demonstrating a system will work as intended—which the Navy did—increases the risk of discovering deficiencies that require costly, time-intensive rework.[1]

Does the Navy have a regulation against doing anything smart?  It certainly seems so.
 
 
Ford Class – The class is a money pit;  a black hole of finances.
 

CVN 79 costs have increased by over $1.5 billion since 2021. Further, since last year, CVN 80 and 81 costs increased $500 million and $1.2 billion, respectively. The program began lead ship construction before completing design and implemented design changes on CVN 79 during its construction—out of line with our leading shipbuilding practices. According to officials, changes resulted, in part, from installing immature technologies that required further development.[1]

The Navy continues to demonstrate their inability to learn any lessons.
 

The Navy delayed planned delivery of CVN 79 by almost 2 years, until March 2027, since last year. Program officials attributed this delay to continued challenges with an elevator subsystem and a landing subsystem.[1]

Elevators and the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) are the same problems the Ford encountered and the Navy went ahead and installed the problematic equipment on the succeeding ships and are now surprised that they’re causing delays.
 
GAO now reports that the unit cost for the carriers is over $16B [1] and that’s with a LOT of buried and deferred costs since the Ford is still not fully operational.  The true cost is likely around $20B each.
 
 
Burke Flt III – Delays plague the program.
 

According to Navy estimates from June 2025, the first 13 follow-on DDG 51 ships are now up to 55 months behind schedule compared with up to 41 months, as we found in our last review. Further, cumulative delays across these ships grew from 323 months to 414 months since last year … [1]

Here’s an interesting aspect of ship costs that no one considers:
 

Additionally, the DDG 51 program office has invested nearly $1 billion since fiscal year 2021 in infrastructure initiatives at both shipyards.[1]

Thus, the cost of Burkes is the unit cost PLUS infrastructure money donated to the shipbuilder.  You won’t see that reported in any explanation of the ship cost.
 
 
F-18 IRST – The IRST program is an unmitigated disaster.
 

DOD and Navy independent testers assessed that IRST was neither operationally effective nor suitable based on test results, due in part to poor reliability. … Navy testers recommended that IRST continue to be introduced to the fleet, despite their findings.[1]

????  It’s not operationally effective or suitable so let’s send it to the Fleet???  I don’t even know how to comment on the level of stupidity demonstrated by this.
 
 
MQ-25 Unmanned Tanker - Attempting to explain significant cost estimation errors,
 

Program officials stated that due to the fixed-price nature of the development contract, they did not previously have access to data showing the actual cost of building the aircraft.[1]

Wait … the Navy entered into a contract without actual cost data?  If you were writing a farcical comedy, you couldn’t make this stuff up.
 
 
ORCA Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV) - Attempting to explain software delays, the Navy stated,
 

… the Navy has reported that it did not have any licenses for data rights or visibility into the ORCA software and was reliant on the contractor to make changes to the software.[1]

This has been a recurring problem that we’ve highlighted and some people still refuse to believe it.  The Navy, far too often, does not have access to product data or software rights.
 
 
Columbia SSBN -  Columbia is falling behind schedule.
 

SSBN 826, the lead ship, is at least 18 months behind its contracted delivery date as of July 2025.[1]

Virginia SSN – The Navy keeps assuring us that the submarine shortfall will be mitigated by producing 2-3 subs per year.  However,
 

The [Virginia] construction rate has generally stabilized, with shipbuilders working at a one-per-year pace as of June 2025—half the rate of the Navy’s two per year goal.[1]
 
While the Navy received delivery of two Block IV submarines in 2025, both were over 3 years late.[1]
 
The projected delivery dates for the first 10 Block V submarines continue to worsen, slipping by an average of almost 3 years since original contract award.[1]

 
 
Conclusion
 
The level of stupidity and the demonstrated lack of responsibility and integrity evidenced by these findings is mind-numbing.  Where is SecDef Hegseth?  Does he not read these reports?  He should be firing people by the truckload.  He is every bit as culpable as every other moron associated with these programs.

 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Government Accountability Office, "Weapon Systems Annual Assessment", Jul 2026, p.144

Flower Class Corvette

The Flower class corvette was the epitome of a single purpose vessel (to be fair, most ships were in WWII).  It was designed and built to provide coastal convoy escort, specifically, anti-U-boat protection although it later proved adaptable to open ocean convoy escort thanks to its impressive range for its size.  While not designed or intended to hunt and kill U-boats, the class nevertheless managed to sink some fifty U-boats. 
 
 
Design Concept
 
It’s important to understand the ship’s intended role.  It was a convoy ASW escort.  Its responsibility was to deliver convoy ships not sink U-boats.  In other words, was designed to ensure that convoy ships arrived safely.  It was not designed to go hunt and kill U-boats.  The designers recognized that a mission kill, meaning forcing a U-boat to break off an attack, was just as good as a kill in that it delivered convoy ships safely to port.  Thus, the designers, wisely, didn’t try to load every known ASW weapon and sensor onto the ship.  That would have increased the size, cost, and complexity of the ship resulting in far fewer vessels being built which would have defeated the purpose of the class.  It is vitally important to recognize this concept:  greater individual ship capability would have negatively impacted the overarching goal of getting convoys safely to port.  We have completely lost sight of this balance between mission intent and individual ship design.  By insisting on building uber-capable Burkes (to the dubious extent that they still are) we’ve been forced to give up building true destroyers, frigates, and corvettes thus hurting our overall naval capability.
 

 
Another vital consideration for the designers was that trying to fit the ultimate, top-of-the-line ASW gear on every ship would have resulted in ASW equipment shortages for every other ship class.  In a time of war, resources (meaning weapons and sensors) are limited.  Maximum ASW fits for Flower class ships would have been a case of robbing Peter to pay Paul.  We have completely lost sight of this concept today.  By only building high end Burkes we have ensured that we will be unable to outfit any other ship type (of which we have none!) in a time of war.
 
 
Design Specifics
 

• ASW fit sufficient for its task but no more than that which contributed to its affordability
• Buildable at small shipyards
• Affordable in large numbers (394 ships built)
• Good range at 3,500 nm at its cruising speed of 12 kts;  compare to a Burke with a range of 4,400 nm at its cruising speed of 20 kts
• Commercial machinery operable by reserve and merchant sailors
• Sufficient speed (16 kts) for its purpose
• Built to the minimum requirements not the maximum

 
What would a modern Flower class ship look like?  In other words, what would a modern, low end, affordable in numbers, minimally capable ASW corvette look like without advanced radars, high speed, helo hangar/flight deck, dozens of VLS, etc. look like?  Well, here’s a few characteristics:
 

• Moderate stealth shaping (no exotic coatings)
• 1x 76 mm Super Rapid STRALES/DART
• 2x Mk32 Triple Torpedo Launchers
• 2x RBU
• VDS
• Hull mounted, small, multi-frequency sonar
• SQR-20 Multi-function towed array
• Acoustic isolation
• Low end radar
• 18 kt top speed
• 5,000 nm range
• 1x CIWS/SeaRAM/RAM

 
Discussion
 
The Flower class was built not to kill submarines (though they managed to kill some fifty U-boats!) but to accomplish a mission which was the safe delivery of merchant ships to port and it filled that purpose admirably.  Given the mission, the designers recognized that a mission kill was just as good as an actual kill and cost a lot less money thus allowing the class to be built in large numbers across numerous yards.  The large numbers of vessels contributed to the mission success.  Mere presence achieved mission kills since submarines will go far out their way to avoid detection and this occurs whether the surface ship even knows the submarine is present or not.  In other words, presence equals mission kill which makes simple presence (numbers) a weapon in itself!  We need to re-learn those design lessons and re-embrace the low end, single purpose ship suitably updated and adapted to modern warfare.