Air Force Follows Navy Playbook for A-10

You probably know that the Air Force has attempted to kill the A-10 Warthog, the best close air support aircraft ever built, for many years now but has been repeatedly thwarted by Congress.
 
The Navy faced a similar situation with the Ticonderoga class cruisers.  They attempted to early retire them, multiple times, only to be thwarted by Congress.  The Navy’s solution was to agree to a blatantly bogus “modernization” program which, in reality, was a way to remove funding for the cruisers while they literally rotted pier side until the Navy could claim that they could no longer be economically upgraded.
 
Like the Navy, the Air Force has, yet again, been prevented by Congress from retiring the A-10 but, ignoring the intent of Congress, has settled on the tactic of simply no longer funding the operation, maintenance, and support of the A-10.  As Redstate website reports,
 

… by the end of this year, the A-10 will be without depot support, without a training pipeline, without weapons-school instruction, and without operational-test capacity.[1]

With no funding for support, the aircraft  will rapidly fall into unflyable status.  The Air Force will have, technically, kept the A-10 but will have achieved practical retirement.
 
Congress should fire every Air Force general and withhold all Air Force funding until A-10 support is restored.
 
The military seems to feel it is above the will of Congress.  It is past time for Congress to re-exert its authority.
 
 
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[1]Redstate website, “Act Now: Fund A-10 Warthog or Lose Combat Power Forever”,  Ward Clark, 24-Jun-2026,
https://redstate.com/wardclark/2026/06/24/act-now-fund-a-10-warthog-or-lose-combat-power-forever-n2203670

ASROC or Helicopters?

Helicopters are generally recognized as the best ASW platform above the surface; another submarine being the best ASW platform below the surface, of course.  Unfortunately, this leads to the widespread mindset that every ship must have helos embarked for ASW.
 
The problem with the concept of helos on every ship is that the aviation element of a ship is shockingly expensive.  A helo needs a flight deck (something on the order of 80ft x 50ft), hangar (another 80ft x 50 ft), dedicated weapon magazines, fuel storage, maintenance shops and parts storage, pilot and maintainer berthing (and food, water, etc.).  The extra 160ft x 50ft of ship size means more power is needed to move the ship which means bigger engines which requires more ship size which …  You get the idea.

Another problem is that helos are only sporadically available, being notorious for needing maintenance at inconvenient times.
 
Sure, there’s a penalty to be paid for putting helos on every ship but, really, what’s the alternative since we need ASW?  Well, one alternative is ASROC (anti-submarine rocket).  ASROC began back when submarines still had to get fairly close to their target in order to attack.  Today, submarines can attack with torpedoes or missiles from far beyond ASROC range (vertical launch ASROC has a range of around 12 nm). What’s needed is a much longer range ASROC, perhaps on the order of a hundred miles.  Given that we have thousand mile cruise missiles I can’t see any problem with developing a hundred mile ASROC. 
 
In the past, ASROC used arm launchers, box launchers, and common VLS cells.  The flexibility in launch mechanism means that some kind of suitable launcher can be placed on any ship tasked with ASW.
 

A long range ASROC would offer a viable alternative to the incredibly expensive helicopter on every ship.  Note that this does not mean we don’t need ASW helicopters.  We do!  We just don’t need them on every ASW ship.  Helicopters should be reserved for true destroyers (of which there are none in the world), ASW carriers, and, perhaps, a specialized convoy escort frigate.  They should not be on corvettes, general purpose frigates, and cruisers (meaning Burke/Zumwalt “destroyers”).  Want to build a cheaper Burke?  Eliminate the helicopter!

Statistics Will Say Whatever You Want Them To Say

Here is a cost estimate for the war in Iran, as reported by Reuters and provided by the Pentagon.
 

The ​United States' war in Iran has cost $29 ‌billion so far, a senior Pentagon official said on Tuesday, an increase of $4 billion from an estimate provided ​late last month.[1]

I have serious doubts about that figure
 
How can there be any doubt or discrepancy, you ask?  Don’t you just add up the costs?  Well, it depends what you consider to be costs.  For example, it’s incredibly expensive to operate an aircraft carrier so the cost of operating one in this conflict must be significant, right?  Well, no.  That aircraft carrier was going to be operating whether it was involved in the Iran conflict or just on routine deployment.  Those costs would be the same.  Whether in a war or not, you still have to pay for the crew, food, expendables, escort ships, and so on.  That carrier costs nothing extra to operate in war versus peace. 
 
The only true costs of war are the direct, extra costs such as the additional munitions that would not otherwise have been expended.  Thus, the war cost of the carrier is only the extra munitions, fuel, and the like that would not have otherwise been used.  That’s a pretty small figure compared to $29B !
 
I can go through endless other examples but you get the idea.  The cost of the war is only the direct, extra cost.  We have to pay for all the personnel, aircraft, ships, fuel, food, etc. that we would have if there were no war.
 
So, what did the Pentagon include in their cost estimate?  Only the Pentagon knows and they aren’t saying.  As Reuters acknowledges,
 

It is unclear how the Pentagon arrived at the $29 billion figure.[1]

You can say anything you want with statistics by manipulating what you include and exclude.  Here’s a hint that the Pentagon’s estimate may include more than the direct costs.
 

Jules Hurst, ‌who ‌is performing the duties of the comptroller, told ‌lawmakers that the cost included updated repair and replacement ‌of equipment and operational costs.[1]

Repairs and replacement due to battle damage is a legitimate war cost but routine repairs and replacements that would have happened anyway, are not.  Similarly, operational costs are not a direct cost unless they are over and above routine costs.  Even munition expenditures cost zero.  Those munitions have already been paid for.  They cost nothing.  Their replacements will cost something but there has been near zero direct replacement of any of the expended munitions, as yet, since replacement takes months or years.  As Congress begins to allocate munitions replacement funding and the Pentagon begins placing production contracts, then the legitimate war costs will begin to accumulate.  And, yes, I understand including anticipated replacement costs in a war cost estimate.  That’s reasonable, if not accurate.
 
I’m certain – with no concrete evidence – that the Pentagon has loaded every cost they can think of into the cost estimate.  Why?  Because the Pentagon is not in the business of fighting wars;  they’re in the business of securing funding from Congress and a large war cost estimate is a great way to get Congress to provide additional funding.  It’s as simple as that. 
 
The Pentagon wants more money.  You don’t get more money by telling Congress the war is well within your existing budget.  You get money by lying exaggerating falsifying creative accounting to pressure Congress into giving you more money. 
 
Every cost estimate I’ve ever seen from the Pentagon has been highly, and artificially, skewed, up or down, to serve the purposes of an agenda.
 
What has this war cost?  I have no idea but I’m sure it’s not what the Pentagon says.
 
 
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[1]Reuters website, “US war in Iran has cost $29 billion so far, Pentagon says”, Staff, 12-May-2026,
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-war-iran-has-cost-29-billion-pentagon-says-2026-05-12/

Jump Over Justification

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued a report on the Navy’s unmanned systems acquisition efforts and they list various challenges the Navy faces in expanding the unmanned fleet.  For example,
 

• Inconsistent leadership and priorities impeded RAS [ed. robotic and autonomous systems] investments
• Domain- and platform-centric approaches impeded progress of RAS

 
That’s nice, however, the report entirely ignores the fundamental question, why do we even need unmanned assets?  Instead, they jump over the “why” and proceed immediately to address the “how”.  The Navy, and those who report on the Navy, has done this repeatedly and always to their detriment, if not regret.  Can you say “LCS”?  Can you say “Zumwalt”?  Can you … well, you get the idea.  I don’t need to cite the nearly endless list of acquisitions that ignored the why (the CONOPS, in other words) and focused on the how.
 
The report simply accepts the official Navy spiel about unmanned.
 

Recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East prove that robotic and autonomous systems(RAS) are disrupting naval warfare and challenging traditional naval superiority. To provide more adaptable, distributed operations, the Navy intends to shift away from its World War II-era operating model, which was based on closely knit battle groups comprised of several traditional platforms, such as planes, ships, and submarines. [1]

Consider that statement.  Ukraine proves nothing about naval warfare except that a sufficiently inept navy can be injured by drones.  The Middle East proves nothing about naval warfare because there hasn’t been any naval drone warfare.
 
The statement then unquestioningly accepts the Navy’s idea that unmanned assets will somehow, in some unproven, magical manner be successful.  There has been absolutely no relevant, real world experience to justify drones and no exercises that do so.
 

According to Navy strategic documents, a hybrid fleet is necessary to enable this shift and would incorporate smaller, more numerous, and distributed capabilities—including RAS capabilities—as a complement to larger, more individually powerful, traditional capabilities.[1]

So, a hybrid fleet is “necessary”?  Based on what?  Not based on the real world and not based on exercises so … what?
 
I’ll repeat what I’ve said many times:  I have yet to see a viable CONOPS (the why) for unmanned assets.  The people reporting on the Navy need to question the Navy’s proclamations, not blindly accept them.  GAO needs to examine the why before they examine the how … and so do we.
 
 
 
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[1] Government Accountability Office, “GAO Report to Congress on the Navy’s Robotic Autonomous Systems”, 16-Jun-2026, GAO-26-109014,
https://news.usni.org/2026/06/16/gao-report-to-congress-on-the-navys-robotic-autonomous-systems

Where Are The Troops?

This is not a land combat blog but, sometimes, I’ve just gotta dip my toe into that world. 
 
We’ve repeatedly seen the US get attacked (with very little success) in the Strait of Hormuz by a drone or a speedboat and then we retaliate by striking combat related facilities.  The blindingly obvious question is why aren’t we striking these targets before they can be used against us since, clearly, we know where they are?  What kind of idiot commander allows known enemy combat facilities to exist during a war?
 
Now, here’s the land combat portion.  Why haven’t we put a brigade ashore to sweep, say, a 5-10 mile deep swath along the length of the strait?  As best I can tell, that would eliminate every remaining speedboat and most of the relevant combat facilities (weapons warehoused, radars, command and control facilities, troop housing/hideouts, etc.
 
Oh, but what if Iranian troops confront us?  Oh no!  What will we do?  Well, how about we thank them for revealing themselves and gathering together in one place so that we can more easily and efficiently kill them?
 
A sweep would remove most of the remaining ability of Iran to harass shipping in the strait.
 
Are we so afraid of casualties that we won’t risk soldiers?  If so, then this war isn’t very important.  If it is important, then ground troops are justified.  This would be a training exercise for a WWII battalion.  
 
We started the war with a good approach but it’s devolved into a decidedly half-assed affair the last couple of weeks.

US Helo Crew Rescued By Drone!

An Apache helicopter crashed in the water off the coast of Oman and the military is telling us that the 2-man crew was rescued by an unmanned boat, a 24 ft Corsair.  That’s astounding!  An unmanned boat rescued downed aircrew who had been adrift for two hours.  Here’s the headline.[1]
 

In First, 2 US Apache Pilots Rescued by Drone Boat

 
The promise of unmanned is finally being fulfilled!
 
We have no details, only sensationalistic headlines but, presumably, the boat located the aircrew on its own, plotted a course, found the crew, lifted the crew into the boat, applied emergency first aid as needed, and returned the crew to safety.
 
Of course, unless the boat had capabilities I’ve never heard of, it didn’t locate the crew, lift the crew into the boat, or apply emergency first aid because unmanned boats can’t do any of that.  Don’t get me wrong.  Pulling up near the crew so that they could climb aboard, unaided, see to their own first aid (were there any emergency supplies on the boat?  I doubt it), and be transported out of the area is very helpful if no manned asset was available but to call this a rescue by an unmanned boat is akin to saying that a sling on a helicopter rescued a swimmer in the water.  The sling didn’t do anything.  It was just a tool.
 
My larger question is, given that we’re in a high intensity war in the area, shouldn’t we have manned assets blanketing the area, including dedicated search and rescue units?  For example, an SH-60 type helo traveling 170 mph could travel the length of the strait in a half hour or so, depending on the start and end point and could reach any specific point in less time than that, flying a straight line.  Was there no manned ship, boat, or helo anywhere in the strait?  To rescue downed aircrew, we pull out all the stops.  All the stops meant no manned assets?  We’re not talking about covering the entire Pacific Ocean.  The area around the strait is pretty small.  The Navy’s presence in the area seems abnormally sparse which may explain why we seem incapable of escorting ships through the strait.  Is this a war we’re serious about or not?  The Navy doesn’t seem all that serious about it and this is just one more example.
 
 
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[1]Newsmax website, “In First, 2 US Apache Pilots Rescued by Drone Boat”, 9-Jun-2026,
https://www.newsmax.com/us/drone-boat-rescue-us-pilots/2026/06/09/id/1259057/

Lessons From Truk

How often have we seen comments stating that our carriers are hopelessly outmatched against China because a carrier has only around forty combat aircraft (160 in a 4-carrier group) and China has thousands of aircraft?  As good naval analysts always do, let’s turn to history to see what lessons we can learn that might be applicable.  A salient example is the US Navy’s WWII attack on Japan’s Truk island bases on 17–18 Feb-1944.
 
Truk was the major Japanese base in the South Pacific and was referred to as the "Japanese Pearl Harbor" and "the Gibraltar of the Pacific”.  It was believed to be heavily defended, fortified, and nearly impregnable with five airfields and a seaplane base and large numbers of warships.
 
It was feared that an attack on Truk would be quite costly and might well not succeed.  Despite this, an attack was ordered (Operation Hailstone) and conducted by three carrier task forces consisting of 5 fleet carriers  (Enterprise, Yorktown, Essex, Intrepid, and Bunker Hill) and 4 light carriers (Belleau Wood, Cabot, Monterey, and Cowpens) along with seven battleships, including Iowa and New Jersey, and many cruisers and destroyers.
 
The US carriers employed their usual run in under cover of night and pre-dawn launches to begin the attacks and achieved total surprise.  The result was a completely lop-sided victory for the US and Truk was never again a significant threat.
 
As it turned out, the Japanese had already begun withdrawing major naval units from Truk prior to the attack but that does not lesson the courage and skill of the attackers.
 
What can we learn from this?
 
Surprise – Surprise has forever been a major contributor to success on the battlefield and there is no better instrument for achieving surprise on the naval battlefield than a carrier group (submariners might argue that!).  In WWII, carriers conducted high speed run ins to their target under cover of night.  Today, darkness offers less cover but the tactic is still valid.  A carrier at sea is generally “invisible” and can show up anywhere at any time.  An enemy’s superiority can be decisively overcome if surprise can be achieved.  The art and task of the military planner is to arrange matters so as to achieve surprise.
 
Localized Superiority – It doesn’t matter how many assets the enemy has in its total inventory.  What matters is how many are instantaneously available at the point and moment of attack – a concept that seems to elude many of today’s naval observers.  The Japanese had superior numbers of aircraft when the initial US fighter sweep arrived but the Japanese aircraft were largely caught on the ground (see, Surprise, above) thus enabling the US to establish and maintain local, effective superiority.  As long as the attacking force doesn’t hang around too long, local superiority can be achieved and maintained for the duration of an operation.  Thus, the oft claimed superiority of numbers of Chinese aircraft in their total inventory is meaningless.  What matters is how many they can put into the air at the moment of attack.  Even having superior numbers locally is meaningless if surprise is achieved and the aircraft are caught on the ground.
 
Firepower – In addition to the hundreds of attacking aircraft, the US utilized large caliber naval guns on its battleships and cruisers to bombard bases and facilities on the islands and sink several fleeing ships, thus effectively supplementing the carrier aircraft.  As devastating as the air attacks were, nothing compares to large caliber naval gunfire for effective, sustained, unstoppable (with air superiority established!) destruction.  This is a lesson the Navy has completely forgotten.  We have no surface firepower and will one day rue the absence.  Large caliber naval guns are a devastating weapon and it is the responsibility of the naval planner to recognize that and work to bring that firepower into play, as appropriate.
 
Another aspect of firepower is numbers of delivery platforms.  The attack on Truk succeeded due to the immense numbers of carrier aircraft involved (500 aircraft).  An aircraft can only deliver a very limited amount of firepower and has no ability to sustain that delivery without returning to its base/carrier to rearm which means aerial firepower can only be applied sporadically.  This limitation was overcome at Truk (and throughout the war) by applying huge numbers of aircraft.  Each individual aircraft carried an almost insignificant amount of firepower but numbers compensated.  Our carrier air wings, today, consist of only around thirty actual combat aircraft (subtracting out combat aircraft relegated to tanker duty because we idiotically gave up our tankers without replacement).  We’ve forgotten that quantity matters when it comes to delivering firepower.
 
Courage – Last but not least, Truk teaches us the importance of courage.  At the time, there was a great deal of trepidation about an attack on Truk but we went ahead anyway.  Today, we have far too many Chicken Littles who see nothing but doom and gloom and are unwilling to take the slightest risk. 
 
Who Dares, Wins
Fortune Favors the Bold
 
These are the mottos and philosophies we should be living by, not
 
What Will the Chinese Think?
We Can’t Risk Escalation
 
Look at all the people, including within the military, who are terrified by the mere thought of engaging Iran, a third rate military, at best, certain that we cannot win.
 
 
 
As with any battle throughout history, there are important lessons to be learned and, as with every battle throughout history, the Navy is deaf, dumb, and blind to the lessons history is screaming at us.