Currently, two of the three LCS supposedly based in the
Middle East have been moved (evacuated?) to Singapore.[1] The whereabouts of the third is unknown. Why aren’t they in the Middle East, perhaps
ensuring the safe passage of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz? Isn’t this kind of mission exactly what they
were designed for? As you recall, the
original LCS concept was that they would boldly enter littoral (hence, the ship’s
name) waters and neutralize mines, subs, surface, and land threats so that
larger, more expensive ships could operate in the area with less risk.
So, why aren’t they there?
Well, we all know the answer. The
originally envisioned modules were just flights of fantasy and never
materialized. But, what if the original
modules had become available as fully functioning equipment? Would such LCSes be useful in the Middle East
today?
Let’s briefly recall the intended functionality of the original
modules.
MCM – The LCS was intended to stop well outside a minefield
and use remote, unmanned assets to clear the area of mines.
ASuW - This
was, perhaps, the key to the entire LCS concept. The NLOS (not to be confused with the current
Spike NLOS missile) system of loitering, smart, networked munitions would
address all threats out to a range of 20+ miles. By removing all visible threats, it would
allow fellow LCSes to deal with mines and submarines.
ASW – The LCS was intended to basically stop and throw out
an ASW barrier of remote vehicles that would track down and destroy enemy
submarines while the LCS remained safely out of reach.
Thus, a mixed group of LCS would enter an area and the ASuW
equipped vessels would eliminate all visible land and surface threats while ASW
and MCM equipped vessels eliminated the subsurface threats. Such a group in the strait, today, would
eliminate all missile, rocket, artillery, and speed boat threats to shipping
across the width of the strait and twenty miles inland. UAVs would provide continuous surveillance
with NLOS munitions on-call, moments away.
Hidden enemy launchers would be destroyed moments after they emerged
from hiding. The MCM-LCS would search
for the rumored, but not yet confirmed, mines.
Highly effective, indeed!
Of course, the LCS modules were never realized (that’s why
it’s called fantasy!) and the LCS proved useless as demonstrated by the Navy’s
removal of the ships from the very mission they were designed for. The concept was okay but it was dependent on
non-existent technology coupled with unbelievably inept execution.
Since we don’t have fantasy modules but the conceptual need
still exists, what do we have that could do the job? Well, there’s always air power that could,
for enormous cost and effort, provide the continuous surveillance and quick
response strike that’s needed to deal with emergent threats. We have Burkes with their single 5” gun that
could provide persistent, on-call, fire support if some other asset can provide
targeting. We could land Army/Marines in
various locations to search and destroy or provide counterbattery fire.using
G/ATOR or similar systems.
We have the theoretical capability for ships to do
counterbattery fire since the radars are fully capable, lacking only the
software to do so. Why hasn’t the Navy
ever bothered to implement counterbattery capability? Because it doesn’t put big, new, shiny hulls
in the water which is how large budget slices are ensured.
The original LCS concept was valid and the need was
legitimate but the actual design was based on non-existent technology and
wishful thinking. We didn’t need the
LCS. The need could have been met with
existing assets by implementing counterbattery capability on Burkes, adding
much more small UAV capability to ships, and incorporating air power and land
forces. The cost would have been minimal
– free compared to what the LCS program has cost us.
That we didn’t take the approach of using existing assets
simply highlights the Navy’s focus on budget over mission accomplishment. The LCS gained the Navy large budget share as
opposed to simple software modifications or buying some more small UAVs.
Until we stop viewing the Navy as a business organization
trying to turn a profit (budget slice) and start viewing it as a tool for
mission accomplishment, nothing will improve.
Where are the LCSes?
The past Navy CNOs need to be brought out of retirement and forced to
take responsibility for their dereliction of duty.
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