Naval Ballistic Missiles

Now that the US is officially withdrawing from the INF treaty, the Navy is free to develop short and medium range ballistic missiles.  While the INF treaty allowed naval ballistic missiles, the prevailing political climate and limited applicability and associated high costs precluded naval ballistic missile development.  Now, we're free to develop missiles that can be used by any/all the services, thereby taking advantage of commonality and economy of scale.

We already have a thousand mile cruise missile, the Tomahawk, however, it is old and bordering on obsolete.  The Tomahawk is subsonic, not maneuverable, non-stealthy, and carries no on-board electronic countermeasures or penetration aids.  Its effectiveness as a long range strike weapon is highly questionable against a peer defender.  Consider … would we have any great difficulty shooting down Tomahawks?  I don’t think so.

Setting aside the Tomahawk’s shortcomings, we need tactical ballistic missiles with ranges out to 3000 miles or so.  Just as the US is struggling to develop an effective defense against ballistic missiles, so too would any enemy struggle to stop a ballistic missile of ours.  The advantages of these missiles in both the land attack and anti-ship roles (assuming we can solve the targeting challenge) are obvious.

Many readers are terrified about using tactical ballistic missiles because the Chinese might ‘misunderstand’ their intent and respond with nuclear weapons.  Well, the Russians and Chinese, in particular, see no problem with the use of ballistic missiles and any potential ‘misunderstanding’ over their type and intention since they are fully committed to producing and using them.  Oddly, the same readers who are terrified about US ballistic missile use seem to have no concerns about Chinese ballistic missile use or our ability to discern their true nature.  Apparently, in their minds, the onus of risk is completely on the US.  That’s just ridiculous.  Turnabout is fair play so let’s develop our own.

I’ll leave the question of land based ballistic missiles to the Army other than noting that such missiles have two issues: range and vulnerability.  We have very few useful bases for ballistic missiles in the Pacific theatre (Guam being the notable one) and those we have are thousands of miles from China.  Further, the limited number of bases and the fixed or semi-fixed nature of any land based ballistic missiles makes them susceptible to first strike elimination.

This is a naval blog so let’s look at ship based ballistic missiles.  The obvious advantages of ship based ballistic missiles are:

Mobility/Survivability – Ship based ballistic missiles are more survivable simply due to the mobile nature of a ship.  Ship mounting would also ensure a survivable, retaliatory strike capability against a surprise, first strike attack whereas land sites are susceptible to first strike destruction.

Range – Ships can move closer to the target prior to launching, thereby reducing the range, if necessary. 

Stealth – In the case of submarine based ballistic missiles, the launching platform is about as stealthy as is possible.  Even for surface ships, the mobility of the ship confers a degree of stealth.

For surface ships, ballistic missiles are dependent on the Mk 57 VLS (the Zumwalt VLS system) being able to accommodate the desired missile or else a new launch system will have to be developed.  To refresh,

Mk 57 VLS Specifications
Missiles	4
Width (ft)	7.25
length (ft)	14.2
Height (ft)	26, 7.93
Weight (lb)	33,600
Max. canister width (in)	28
Max. canister length (in)	283
Max. encanistered weight (lb)	9,020

While the Mk57 VLS is not much larger than the standard Mk41 VLS, Raytheon claims that the big difference between the MK41 and MK57 is thrust capacity.  Raytheon product brochures claim the system can handle up to 45 percent greater rocket motor mass flow rate thereby allowing for much more powerful booster designs.  The Mk57 also allows for heavier canister weights:  9000 lbs vs. 6000 lbs for the Mk41.

Whether a missile with the desired performance characteristics can fit in a Mk 57 VLS is unknown.  If not, one has to seriously wonder what the rationale was behind the Mk 57 since no current or developing missile requires the extra capacity of the Mk 57.  But, I digress …

Back to naval ballistic missiles …

What specific ships would make good naval ballistic missile platforms?

Battleship - A modern battleship would make an excellent ballistic missile launch platform.  It would offer sufficient size for a significant loadout and excellent armored protection.

Submarine – A sub would obviously make an excellent ballistic missiles platform as demonstrated by the existing SSBN and SSGN vessels.

Arsenal Ship – This is another good possibility with the vessel being, essentially, a mobile ballistic missile barge.  Theoretically, the Zumwalt could be converted to a ballistic missile launch platform if a suitable missile could be designed that would fit the Mk 57 VLS.

As demonstrated by the concerns and the enormous effort the Navy, and military, in general, is putting into stopping enemy ballistic missiles, naval ballistic missiles would offer significant striking power on mobile, survivable platforms.  With treaty limitations no longer a concern, there is no reason not to develop tactical naval ballistic missiles and every reason to do so.

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(1)Navy Matters blog, “Mk57 VLS”, 18-Jul-2016,

https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2016/07/mk57-vls.html

Ballistic Missile Defense - Operator Error

The Navy has concluded that a recent failed anti-ballistic missile test of the Standard SM-3 Block IIa was due to an operator who inadvertently input an identification of the target as a “friendly”, thus causing the SM-3 to self-destruct before hitting the target.

“A U.S. Missile Defense Agency review of a failed ballistic missile intercept test showed that a mistaken input into the combat system by a sailor on the destroyer John Paul Jones caused the missile to self-destruct before reaching the target.

A tactical datalink controller, in charge of maintaining encrypted data exchanges between ships and aircraft, accidentally identified the incoming ballistic missile target as a friendly in the system, causing the SM-3 missile to self-destruct in flight …” (1)

We’re building a vast network of sensors and weapons as the foundation of the Third Offset Strategy – a strategy that will give us an unrivaled edge over our enemies and assure us of maintaining combat superiority.  At least, that’s what we’re being told.

And now, we see that a simple operator input error can entirely negate a ballistic missile intercept.  What if that had been an actual intercept instead of a test and the missile had been a nuclear missile aimed at a US base or city?  Do we really want to base our entire military “advantage” on a system so prone to inadvertent and haphazard failure?

All of us understand that software systems, and their inputs/outputs are subject to bugs and glitches under the best of conditions, let alone in the middle of war when electronic countermeasures will be blitzing the system, cyber/hack attacks will be constant, and the stress of combat will guarantee that input mistakes and output misinterpretations (remember Vincennes?) will happen with regularity.  Do we really want to bet our military future on such a strategy and such systems?

It’s interesting to note that the Russians and Chinese, while investing heavily in electronic and cyber warfare, are also producing massive increases in traditional, raw, brutal, explosive firepower.  They seem to understand that electronic and cyber warfare will be useful but that firepower still rules the battlefield.

Recall the Vietnam war.  Recall the air strikes by US planes.  For all the sophisticated surface to air missiles, radar warning receivers, countermeasures, and high performance aircraft with computer controlled navigation and weapon delivery systems, etc., our aircraft were still shot down, all too often, by old fashioned ZSU-23 barrage gunfire.

There’s a place for electronic and cyber warfare, without a doubt, but it’s as a complement to explosive firepower not a replacement for it and certainly not as the foundation of an entire military strategy.

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(1)Navy Times website, “Sailor error led to failed US Navy ballistic missile intercept test”, ”, David B. Larter, 24-Jul-2017,

https://www.navytimes.com/naval/2017/07/24/sailor-error-led-to-failed-us-navy-ballistic-missile-intercept-test/

Burke Flt III

The Burke Flt III was originally intended to be the Ticonderoga replacement and mainstay of both the AAW command vessel and the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) role.  As such it was intended to receive the new AMDR radar which could handle simultaneous BMD and AAW roles.  Unfortunately, it turned out that the optimum sized AMDR required more space, weight, and resources than the Burke could provide.  A new design ship was briefly considered but coming hot on the heels of the LCS fiasco, the Navy believed that the challenges in getting a new design approved and funded were too great. 

The Navy is now committed to fielding a down-sized AMDR which it acknowledges is too small to meet the desired performance criteria.  This is admission of an odd situation.  The Navy is, essentially, acknowledging that it is going to build a ship that is inadequate for the intended mission.

The other disturbing aspect of the Flt III is the growth margin.  The Navy is going to have to squeeze the AMDR and its attendant resources into an already overloaded hull.  The resultant ship will have no growth margins during a future in which the Navy anticipates lasers and rail guns reaching the fleet.  We’ll set aside whether that anticipation is realistic and simply consider what the Navy believes.  Why would you begin building the future backbone of the fleet with no significant growth margins for the developments you believe are coming in the relatively near term and which you know are going to require substantial weight, volume, and ship’s utilities, especially for the early versions?

Let’s take a quick look at some Flt III options that the Navy could pursue.

New Design – This would undoubtedly be the best approach from a purely technical point of view.  However, the Navy has been burned so badly on recent acquisitions that they are gun shy and devoid of credibility so they’ve opted to pass on this option.

Zumwalt – The Zumwalt has the size and power to fully field the AMDR and would be a good option, on paper.  However, there are significant questions about the seakeeping characteristics of ship and my guess is that the Navy felt that was too much risk.  The Navy did examine this option though how seriously, I’m not sure.

Lengthen – A lengthened Burke is a viable option and would provide at least some additional weight and space for the AMDR.  Whether it would provide the necessary superstructure mounting without raising the center of gravity unacceptably is unsure.  Again, the Navy supposedly examined this option and rejected it though I’ve never heard why.

Pure AAW – Another option would be to reconfigure the Flt III to be a pure AAW vessel - no guns, ASW, hangar, or anything else.  This would fill the AAW and AAW command requirements while freeing up space and weight.  Again, whether that would allow the full AMDR to be fit is unknown.

Distributed AAW – The AMDR doesn’t have to be mounted on the shooting platform.  Various proposals have been made to mount the AMDR on a ship dedicated to that purpose.  Such a ship would have the required space, weight, and power to support the radar and would be relatively cheap in that it would have no other functions or capabilities.

LPD-17 Variant – Proposals have been made to modify the LPD-17 to an AAW vessel.  Again, the ship would have the space, weight, and power to support the full AMDR.

The point is that when all the possibilities are considered, the Navy’s chosen path of shoehorning the AMDR into the existing Burke hull is arguably the worst option.  It’s just another in the seemingly endless string of poor decisions emanating from Navy leadership.

Burke Upgrades Cancelled

The Navy has cancelled planned ballistic missile defense (BMD) upgrades for five Burke class destroyers due to budget constraints (1).  The ships will not receive the Baseline 9 Aegis combat system upgrades.  The cuts in modernization funding will save around $500M over five years.

The cuts also impact the ship's networking and target data sharing capabilities.

"Additionally — without the Baseline 9 upgrade — the ships will not be wired into the Navy’s emerging Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA (pronounced: nifk-kah)) that would allow destroyers to download targeting information from assets outside of the range of their SPY-1D radars to attack air and BMD threats with the Raytheon Standard Missile 6 (SM-6)."

Well, that’s very unfortunate that we can’t afford those upgrades but as CNO Greenert said,

"When asked about the reductions following a House appropriations hearing on Thursday, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Jonathan Greenert told USNI News the cuts were a result of hard fiscal choices and reflected the service’s priorities."

Well, CNO Greenert is right.  When you have a limited budget, you have to make hard choices based on your priorities and …  wait … let me go back to that cost number …  $500M ?!! … to get 5 BMD and network capable Burkes? … $500M – isn’t that the cost of a single LCS?  So, CNO Greenert is telling us that the Navy’s priorities are that they would rather have an LCS than five BMD/network capable Burkes?  Does that make sense to you?!  I’ve said all along that Greenert is completely focused on low end and peacetime activities at the expense of warfighting and readiness and this just proves it.

I recently posted that, for reasons totally obscure to me, the Navy considers the LCS untouchable and this yet another example.  The Navy would rather pass on five BMD/network capable Burkes than give up one LCS. 

However, according to the article,

"Currently, the Navy’s number one priority is the $100 billion design and construction effort for a new nuclear ballistic missile submarine to replace the aging Ohio-class boomers (SSB)."

I'm not sure if the Navy's internal top priority really is the replacement SSBN.  As I’ve pointed out, the LCS looks to be the Navy’s top priority.  Still, it demonstrates the domino effect that occurs when a program, the SSBN replacement, in this case, is so expensive that it not only limits itself but cripples other programs.  The F-35, for example, is gutting the Marines and Air Force by forcing those services to cancel other badly needed programs to pay for the F-35.  Similarly, the SSBN has long been predicted to gut Navy shipbuilding, operating, and maintenance funding and now we're seeing the first concrete results.

We’ll continue to watch the SSBN funding play out but I predict that we’re going to see many more examples of early retirements, deferred maintenance, cancelled upgrades, and truncated shipbuilding to pay for the SSBN unless the Navy can get the funding shifted to a higher DoD level (of course, that just means that every service will have its budget cut a bit more to pay for the SSBN – there are no free lunches).  This is further evidence that the Navy’s 30 year shipbuilding plan is pure fantasy.  Many future ships will have to be cancelled to pay for the SSBN.

Seriously, how do you defend prioritizing the LCS over five Burke BMD/network upgrades?  Every time I think the Navy has hit rock bottom in decision making they dig a trench and lower the bar a bit more.

(1) USNI, "Navy Again Reduces Scope of Destroyer Modernization, 5 Ships Won’t Receive Any Ballistic Missile Defense Upgrades", Sam LaGrone, 3-Mar-2015,

http://news.usni.org/2015/03/03/navy-again-reduces-scope-of-destroyer-modernization-5-ships-wont-receive-any-ballistic-missile-defense-upgrades

Aegis Cruiser Replacement

As you all know by now, the Navy has announced that it will idle 11 Aegis cruisers.  These are the most powerful AAW vessels in the world.  The Navy says it only needs half the current number of Aegis cruisers given the budget constraints that currently exist.  OK, that’s fair.  But, if that’s the case, doesn’t that inexorably lead one to ask why we’re pursuing new Burke Flt III ships that are the intended replacements for the Aegis cruisers?  If we already have 11 extra of the most powerful AAW vessels in the world why do we need to build more?  Couldn’t we just skip the first 11 Burke Flt IIIs? 

Some will say that the Flt III’s BMD capability is what we need.  Think about that.  The Navy has already told us that Aegis ships can perform BMD and that many Aegis ships already possess that capability so what does the Flt III gain us?  The only real difference between the Tico/Burkes and the Flt III will be the AMDR radar.  As I understand it, the advantage of AMDR over Aegis/SPY is that it gives us the ability to perform AAW and BMD simultaneously which is something that Aegis/SPY can’t do.  OK, that’s fair.  But, does that alone justify scrapping (cause that’s what will ultimately happen to the 11 cruisers – once laid up, they’re never going to sea again) 11 of the most powerful cruisers in the world and spending billions for new ships? 

If BMD is that important and the AMDR is the key to that capability, then why are we skimping on the dimensions of the AMDR for the Flt III so that it’s not anywhere near as powerful as its statement of needs says it should be?  If BMD/AMDR is that critical shouldn’t we be building whatever size ship we need to gain the full advantage of the AMDR?

Alternatively, and most logically, given the very limited applicability of the BMD mission, wouldn’t it make more sense to develop a dedicated BMD sensor vessel and keep the Aegis/SPY ships as more general purpose combat ships?  I’m thinking, of course, of the proposal to base a BMD sensor suite on an LPD-17 derivative.  A handful of LPD(BMD) vessels to sail with carrier/amphib groups would take care of the BMD mission without requiring that we scrap 11 Aegis cruisers while simultaneously building Aegis cruiser replacements that only partially meet the stated need. 

I just don’t understand the Navy’s ongoing path of early retirements to fund ever-decreasing numbers of new construction vessels.  This is a classic death spiral in action.

BMD Performance

Actual performance data for AAW systems is hard to come by, as we've seen.  The May 2013 issue of Proceedings (p. 65) offers a bit of data for the Ballistic Missile Defense system.  Proceedings reports that Aegis/SM-3 have intercepted 22 of 27 (81%) missiles in test firings.

There are two ways to interpret this information.

We should be encouraged because both Aegis and SM-3 are still developing and and 81% success rate is outstanding and will only get better as the system matures.

We should be disappointed because these test firings are highly staged affairs with perfectly tweaked missiles and radar systems launched under absolutely ideal conditions against extremely simple targets in a non-ECM environment.  A failure rate of 19% doesn't bode well for actual combat situations against high performance ballistic missiles with on-board ECM.

Where does the truth lie?  Somewhere in between, undoubtedly.  Both perspectives are true although I lean far more towards the latter.  The Navy is famous for staging test firings which are ridiculously slanted towards success.  Nonetheless, the data offers a hint that China's carrier-killer missiles that so many people are so terrified of won't be quite the wonder weapons that they're made out to be.  Aegis/Standard is capable of some level of BMD success.

Although I've stated it many times, it bears repeating that China (and the US) have not solved the far-over-the-horizon targeting challenge.  That weakness combined with some level of BMD intercept capability suggests that ballistic missiles are no more than a low level threat for the time being - a threat to be respected, for sure, but not a game changer, yet.