Amphibious Assault - Port Seizure

I’ve previously discussed amphibious assaults and stated that I consider the need for such assaults to be extremely unlikely under any foreseeable strategy.  Sure, there could be the odd small scale raid or diversionary feint but there just is no need for large scale assaults. 

However, the Marine Corps insists that such a capability is needed so let’s address what I consider the most likely amphibious assault scenario: a port seizure.  The Marines refuse to discuss it or even consider the possibility so we’ll do it for them. 

Short of a massive, multi-year buildup there is just no possibility of logistically sustaining a sizable invasion across a beach.  That only leaves the option of seizing an existing port to support the unloading of cargo ships at a rate sufficient to sustain a major invasion.  The astute historian will note that this is exactly what the objective of the WWII Normandy D-Day assault was.  Since all ports are associated with city structures and infrastructures, the roads leading to and from the port will prove every bit as critically important for quickly dispersing the unloaded supplies as the port itself.

Here are the main aspects of an amphibious port seizure and the more detailed points associated with them.

Initial Seizure

Port – The port, itself, must be seized, obviously.  The key is to seize it as quickly as possible, to minimize the time the defenders have to destroy the facilities such as cranes, piers, docks, ramps, and warehouses.  The best method of seizure is an initial airborne assault to quickly place infantry in and around the port to seize the facilities.  Simultaneous with the airborne assault must be an amphibious assault with heavier weapons, artillery, and armor to relieve the airborne troops and secure and defend the port.

Roads – Airborne troops should also be used to seize key roads leading in and out of the port so as to prevent immediate counterattack.  As with the port, additional amphibious troops will be required to relieve the airborne troops and secure and defend the roads.

Warships – It will be necessary to operate warships in the closed and congested waters of the harbor/port to provide cruise and ballistic missile defense, gun support, and counterbattery fire.  This is completely contrary to current Navy doctrine and will require new doctrine and tactics.

Mine clearance – It is hard to imagine that any modern port will not be heavily defended with mines.  Given that speed is the key to successful assaults, in general, and seizure of an, at least, semi-functioning port, mine clearance must be accomplished extremely rapidly to allow warships, supply ships, transports, and repair vessels access to the port.  For example, the WWII D-Day assault involved hundreds of minesweepers to achieve the necessary clearance in a combat-useful time frame.  Currently, we utterly lack the capability to perform this chore.

Holding/Defending

C-RAM (Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar) – Being a known, fixed location, a seized port will be subject to intense mortar and artillery fire.  Mobility, the mantra of modern militaries and the presumed solution to mortar and artillery fire, does not apply to seizing and holding a port.  Our forces will be static and fixed.  Uh, oh!  That’s an operational and doctrinal oversight!  C-RAM protection will be required. 

Missile Defense – Aegis warships will be required to establish a protective missile defense umbrella over the port.  This may be complicated by large buildings obscuring the radar view of the ships and may require an offboard, networked sensor.  However, we currently lack a communications and network system that is proven capable of functioning in the face of electronic and cyber countermeasures.

Road Defense – Roads are simultaneously the avenue for enemy counterattacks and the means of moving supplies out to the main invasion effort.  Defending the road system, especially early on, will be manpower (infantry) intensive and require large quantities of armor for mobile defense.

Repairs and Rebuilding

Barring some incredibly good luck, the enemy will likely destroy the port facilities to a very large degree.  We will need to rebuild most of the facilities.  We will need the ability to unload with only minimal port support while repairs are on-going.  We will need to rebuild under fire.  Who will do this?  How will they be protected?  What equipment is needed?  Are we trained to rebuild port facilities while under fire (hint:  we aren’t)?

Loading/Unloading Operations Under Fire

Since the port’s cranes will have likely been destroyed, we’ll need ships with their own large cranes as a stopgap unloading measure until we can rebuild facilities.  A dedicated crane ship or two would also come in very handy.  We’ll also need large numbers of fork lifts, trucks, etc. for quickly moving the unloaded supplies out and to the invasion force.  Initially, all of this will occur while under fire.  Are we prepared and trained to unload and disperse supplies while under fire?  Are we prepared to disperse supplies very quickly so as to avoid the buildup of large stockpiles (meaning very attractive targets)?

Dispersal

The key, and the entire point, to seizing and using a port is the ability to quickly disperse incoming, unloaded supplies out to the main invasion force.  The dispersal (meaning transport of supplies) will be complicated by the fact that there will only be one or two routes and those routes will be known to the enemy and, thus, subject to continual attack.  Are we prepared to fight our supply convoys through?  Do we have the necessary doctrine to secure roads, establish defended zones around the roads, and protect convoys?  Are we mentally prepared to inflict the degree of collateral damage on the surrounding areas that will be required to clear them of enemy forces?  Ironically, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mines, the bane of our Iraq/Afg efforts, will be a non-threat in this scenario since, presumably, we’ll kill anyone/anything even remotely approaching the transport roads – unless, you know, we try to fight a zero-casualty, zero-collateral damage type of war which would be incredibly stupid but is exactly what we’ve done in Iraq/Afg.

Summary

Other than for occasional small scale raids, over the beach assaults are neither feasible nor operationally warranted.  Port seizure, however, is mandatory.  There is simply no other way to logistically supply a modern, major assault force with the required volume and tonnage of supplies.  I believe that this is, or should be, the Marine’s core mission. 

It is obvious from the preceding discussion that port seizure requires a specific and specialized force with specialized equipment, doctrine, and tactics – almost none of which exists, today.  Being amphibious, the Marines are ideally situated to provide much of this capability although it would require a complete rethinking of their purpose and a complete rebuilding of their force structure. 

The issue of airborne troops, alone, is an interesting one.  Would these troops come from the Marines or from existing Army units?  Would the preferred airborne delivery be parachuting or helo insertion?  These are the kinds of questions that need to be explored in realistic exercises.  Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge, there has never been a port seizure exercise by the US military in recent decades.

If port seizure is as important as I believe it to be then we need to begin developing the force necessary to do it.  If one would argue that port seizure is not important then I need to hear how we’ll logistically support a major invasion force.

Israeli Combat Lessons - Follow Up

Well, that was interesting.  The comments on the preceding post (see, "Israeli Combat Lessons") on combat lessons from the Israeli-Hamas conflict confirmed exactly the problem I highlighted in the lesson about aerial suppression and collateral damage.  [By the way, I’m not going to refer to it generically as suppression any more.  I’m going to call it reduction, instead. - “Aerial reduction of enemy assets”-  Some of you focused on the strict definition of the word as it related to supporting fires and thereby got sidetracked.] 

Most commenters started their comments, observations, and arguments from the premise that collateral damage was inherently bad – I would go so far as to say they believed that it was inherently prohibited.  This also confirms another of the lessons, that we’ve forgotten what war is.

If this had been WWII, do you honestly believe that the US Army (the Israelis in this example) would have held back on area bombardment when faced with taking a city (Gaza, in this example) containing 9000 German (Hamas, in this example) artillery pieces and thousands of German soldiers?  Do you think the US would have attempted to enter the city without thorough preparatory area bombardment?  Of course not! 

Now, why is the answer “Of course not!”?  It’s because the US Army understood what war was.  It was ugly, vicious, and destructive and the best thing that could be done was to end it as quickly and decisively as possible.  Added to that was the implicit belief that, since lives had to be lost, it was far better that they be German lives, both military and civilian, than US lives.  That’s ugly but that’s what war really is.  Area reduction of enemy assets is just common sense.

We’ve gotten so used to fighting limited police actions that we’ve forgotten what real war is.  If we have to fight Iran, N. Korea, or China we’ll quickly be reminded what war is.

Given the absolutely overwhelming technological superiority and numbers, the Israelis suffered an unwarranted number of casualties.  They should have suffered next to none.  Frankly, I don’t know how the Israeli government can justify to the families of the dead soldiers that they placed more value on enemy lives than the lives of their own soldiers. 

If your country is faced with a threat, you destroy it utterly, totally, and completely.  You don’t engage in a limited operation that has to be repeated every few years with never-ending casualties on both sides, year after year.

This is not a political issue, it’s a doctrinal issue.  I have the same problems with the way the US conducted its actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The US was more concerned with preventing collateral damage than preventing US deaths. 

If we’re not willing to engage in real war then we should seriously be asking ourselves whether we should be engaged at all.  Our tendency to jump into one nation building, limited conflict after another is highly suspect.  We’re getting US soldiers killed for little or no gain. 

If we do opt to engage in a conflict with total commitment then area bombardment and the acceptance of collateral damage is quite logical.  Of course, I’m not advocating indiscriminate destruction for its own sake.  However, if there’s reason to believe that enemy assets are in an area then the area is a target.

Most of us have been conditioned by the limited actions of the last couple decades to believe that combat can somehow be clean and precise and that no one but the enemy soldier will be killed and no property will be damaged.  We need to remember what war is, remember how to wage it, and engage in it only infrequently and as a last resort.

Israeli Combat Lessons

The Israeli-Hamas conflict offers some combat lessons for the US Navy and Marines.

This is not a political blog so I’m not going to address the political aspects of the conflict.  Further, I’m working only from publicly available information, most of which is based on propaganda from each side.  Nevertheless, there are patterns to be seen and lessons to be learned.

Interestingly, the conflict can be viewed from the perspective of an amphibious assault.  Gaza is, essentially, a port city – exactly the kind of assault target the Marines are supposed to be prepared for.  The Hamas rocket attacks simulate, to a degree, A2/AD attacks on an invading fleet while Israel’s Iron Dome mimics a fleet AAW defense.  The Israeli army can be thought of as an amphibious assault force that has managed to land and is moving to seize its objective.  Here, then are some observations and lessons.

Aerial Suppression.  A few Zumwalts notwithstanding, the Navy has given up its shore bombardment capability in favor of aerial suppression of enemy capabilities.  Marine amphibious assault doctrine depends heavily on aerial suppression during the early stages of an assault.  We see, though, that the Israelis, despite having absolute aerial supremacy, were totally unable to prevent frequent and regular rocket attacks (some 3000 rockets launched over the course of a couple weeks).  This is the most one-sided application of aerial force against an enemy with next to no AAW capability one could imagine and yet it produced no discernible suppression of Hamas strike capability.  Will Navy aviation be able to suppress enemy capabilities during an assault?  This suggests that suppression will be extremely problematic. 

If aviation can’t accomplish the task, what can?  This offers an argument for greater naval gun support and leads to the next two lessons.

AAW.  The Israeli Iron Dome system has performed well at what it was designed to do.  My best guess is that the system has achieved about a 50%-75% success rate, Israeli claims of 90+% notwithstanding.  That success rate is tempered by the fact that the attacking weapons are unsophisticated rockets unsupported by any electronic countermeasures or AAW suppression to aid penetration.  While nowhere near an apples-to-apples comparison, this still offers lessons for the Navy’s Aegis system.  While Aegis is far more sophisticated than the Iron Dome system, so too is the threat (supersonic cruise and ballistic missiles).  The conclusion is that AAW systems can provide a degree of protection but that the degree will be far less than hoped for.  This has implications for the Navy’s doctrine of vast stand-off distances from land and the number and types of weapons that should constitute a ship’s layered defense.  There is no need for the Navy to cower far from land – stand in and fight and let Aegis do its job.  Along with that, the Navy needs to re-evaluate the number and types of short range and close in weapons it uses.  We need far more short range AAW and CIWS weapons in recognition of the number of leakers that will be encountered.

Precision Versus Area Attack.  In keeping with Israeli doctrine, strikes were as precisely focused as possible so as to minimize collateral damage.  While the specific targets were, undoubtedly, largely neutralized, the flip side of such precision targeting is that no benefits accompanied the strikes beyond the immediate destruction of the specified targets.  Rockets, launchers, personnel, weapons, and munitions mere feet away from the intended targets were left untouched and available for use.  In other words, any target that the Israelis did not specifically know about gained a large degree of immunity from attack due to the Israeli’s unwillingness to use area bombardment.  A doctrine of area bombardment would, undoubtedly, have resulted in a significant degree of destruction of unknown targets.  Again, I’m not discussing the political aspects of such a doctrine, merely the tactical considerations.  Area bombardment would, undoubtedly, have suppressed the rocket attacks.  The degree of that suppression is, of course, a matter of speculation.

It’s clear that if an attacker limits itself to only known targets, it will open itself to attack by all the unknown assets which will probably be quite substantial.  The US unwillingness to inflict collateral damage is quite literally akin to fighting handicapped.

Urban Combat.  Given the degree of technological superiority and prevalence of armored vehicles of various types, the Israelis have suffered a somewhat surprising number of casualties among their infantry.  Of course, not knowing what specific objectives the Israelis were pursuing and what tactics they were using, it is difficult to assess whether the number of casualties were acceptable or not.  Still, it is possible to make the general observation that urban combat is a messy and dangerous undertaking.  This is hardly a surprising finding as the Marine’s experience in Iraq has amply demonstrated.  Further, the presence of armor is no guarantee of safety or tactical success. 

I can offer no specific tactical lessons or suggestions but I can state that the Marines need to re-evaluate their approach to urban combat.  The rate of losses suffered by the US Marines in Iraq and the Israelis in Gaza are tactically unfounded.  Losses could be greatly reduced by a willingness to inflict greater collateral damage.  Further, I suggest that tactics need to be re-evaluated to better integrate infantry and armor in an urban setting.  The Marines tend to view urban combat as an infantry exercise and that view is just going to get soldiers killed unnecessarily. 

Finally, Marines need to recognize that urban combat is a unique environment.  As one small example, it may be that instead of tanks, a heavily armored and actively (think Israeli Trophy) protected vehicle equipped with a very short barreled cannon (for maneuverability in physically close quarters) capable of firing wide area munitions,  capable of extensive and sustained use of obscurants and debilitating agents, and capable of transporting and sheltering troops is needed.  Hey, I’m not a ground expert so this is just my own uniformed speculation.  I may be way off base.  The point is that the Marines are not currently equipped for effective urban combat nor do they possess the required doctrine for success in the urban environment.

Collateral Damage.  The Israelis have demonstrated an extreme unwillingness to inflict collateral damage even to the point of accepting additional casualties of their own.  While they have attacked schools and other targets that directly housed enemy weapons, a reluctance to inflict collateral damage has allowed Hamas to freely maneuver throughout the urban landscape and obtain shelter and respite as needed.  Historically, the US has largely shied away from attacking sensitive targets even if they contained enemy personnel and assets.  Unless the US is prepared to accept inordinate casualties, a re-evaluation of the collateral damage issue is called for.  Allowing an enemy safe refuge is tactically indefensible.

Nature of War.  Historically, the US has a tendency to try to fight with half-measures and more concern for public relations than sound tactics.  Israel is also doing that in Gaza.  War, in particular urban combat, is an ugly and vicious exercise.  The only good thing about war is ending it quickly and victoriously.  If that means area bombardment and infliction of collateral damage then the US needs to re-evaluate its doctrine.  Many will argue that the nature of our conflicts calls for more limited actions and “gentler” force to achieve nation building goals or something similar.  I would suggest that such limited conflicts have rarely succeeded long term and, indeed, often have unintended negative consequences.  It might be prudent for the US to give more thought to the wisdom of limited conflicts rather than just leaping into them too readily. 

ComNavOps’ personal philosophy is, “In it to win it, or don’t get in it.”

This is veering into the political realm so I’ll leave it at that. 

The point is that the US needs to remember what all out war is and what it entails.  We need to start equipping for high end war and revising or developing doctrine to deal with it.  War is ugly.  Trying to wage a limited, “gentle” war is only going to prolong the conflict and ultimately cause more deaths, both civilian and military.

In summary, the Israeli-Hamas conflict has many of the characteristics of an amphibious assault on a port city – just the type of thing the Marines and Navy claim to want to be able to do.  Even for the casual observer, divorced from any intimate knowledge of the objectives and tactics of either side, there are readily apparent lessons to be learned.  For a Marine Corps that hasn’t conducted an opposed assault for quite some time, this conflict offers an opportunity to observe the realities of urban combat and adjust their doctrine accordingly.