Iskander

The National Interest website has an interesting article on Russia’s Iskander missile.  The article describes the missile,
 

Russia’s Iskander system, particularly the Iskander-M variant, is equipped with two solid-propellant single-stage guided missiles, model 9M723K1, each capable of carrying a warhead weighing 1,543 pounds. These warheads can include high-explosive fragmentation, cluster, or even nuclear payloads. With an operational range of 249 to 311 miles, the Iskander-M can strike targets deep …
 
The missile’s hypersonic terminal speed, reaching Mach 6 or 7, and quasi-ballistic trajectory, which involves evasive maneuvers during flight, make it exceptionally difficult to intercept. …  Russia has introduced radar decoys that deploy during the missile’s final approach, generating false signatures to confuse air defense systems like the US-supplied Patriot missile battery. Additionally, the missile’s ability to perform unpredictable maneuvers at high altitudes complicates interception algorithms, reducing the effectiveness of even defenses. The Iskander’s mobile launch platform, which can independently target and fire within seconds, adds to its survivability, as it is challenging to locate and neutralize before launch.[1]

Impessive, on paper, without a doubt but this is not an invincible weapon.
 

This has been especially evident in attacks on Kyiv where, despite Ukraine’s success in intercepting some missiles, the upgraded Iskander-M has caused significant damage.[1]

It would be interesting to know the circumstances of the successful intercepts and the overall success rates.
 
It is also noteworthy that the reported successes of the Iskander tend to be mainly centered around attacks on cities rather than military targets.  It is possible that the Iskander may be more of a terror weapon, similar to Germany’s V-1 rockets in WWII, than an effective combat weapon.
 
It is also worth noting that Ukraine possesses only fragments of a comprehensive air defense system and in only limited numbers.  It may be that the Iskander successes are more the result of a lack of air defenses than the effectiveness of the missile, itself.  On the other hand, perhaps not.  What is the success rate of the Iskander when attacking targets defended by active air defenses such as Patriot?  We just don’t know.
 
 
Discussion
 
Several thoughts occur:
 
Where’s our version of something like this?  Which one of our missiles has capabilities of similar to this?  I’m not aware that we have a missile approaching this type of performance.  We have a lot of different types of missiles so maybe I’m missing something? 
 
How do we effectively defend against this type of missile?  Are we testing our defenses against a representative threat surrogate?  I know we’re not because there is no realistic threat surrogate.  Since we’re not testing, how do we know how our defenses will perform?
 
It’s clear that the Iskander is not unstoppable.  How stoppable it is in the face of an actual defense is unknown but there is no reason to throw up our hands in defeat, as so many do at the mere mention of hypersonic missiles.
 
This emphasizes the importance of deep surveillance to try to target the launchers prior to launch.  We have plenty of deep strike options.  What we lack is survivable, deep surveillance assets that would be unaffected by anti-communications efforts (jamming, etc.)
 
Intimately tied to deep surveillance is deep strike with an emphasis on rapid response.  We have plenty of deep strike options but they need to be linked with the deep surveillance and targeting so that when a target is found, a weapon can be on its way in moments to destroy the target before it can launch or move.
 
It is also important to apply deep interdiction to prevent resupply of enemy missiles from occurring.  There’s a limit to how much damage an initial salvo of enemy missiles can do.  The challenge is to prevent follow on missiles from reaching launch points.  This requires deep strike interdiction on the order of hundreds of miles inside enemy territory.  This is the kind of task that a carrier group or a Marine amphibious raid behind enemy lines might address.
 
The challenges are twofold: 
 
1. Develop our own version of such a missile, including a ship launched variant.
2. Develop realistic defenses that are be mobile and can move with our forces.
 
 
 
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[1]National Interest website, “Russia’s Iskander Missiles Are Giving Ukraine a Massive Headache”, Brandon Weichert, 24-Jun-2025,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russias-iskander-missiles-are-giving-ukraine-a-massive-headache

Hypersonic Intercept … Well, Not Really

ComNavOps never ceases to be amazed at the deceptive spin (I’ll refrain from using the word fraud, in this case) put out by manufacturers, the Navy, and complicit ‘news’ sources.  As you know, the ability of defensive systems to intercept hypersonic attacking missiles is questionable.  Well here’s a headline from a Naval News website article that sounds like a piece of great news:
 
Aegis Combat System Demonstrates System’s Capability to Counter Hypersonic Threats[1]
 
A Burke class destroyer, USS Pinckney (DDG-91) conducted a successful intercept of a hypersonic missile.  Well, that certainly sounds like good news.  Aegis performed a successful intercept of a hypersonic missile.  Great!
 
However, as we read a bit further into the article, we note the following: 

The USS Pinckney (DDG 91) successfully completed Flight Test Other 40 (FTX-40), also known as Stellar Banshee, using Lockheed Martin’s Aegis Combat System to detect, track and perform an engagement against a live advanced hypersonic Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) target using a simulated SM-6 Block IAU.[1][emphasis added]

Wait, what now?  The intercept used a simulated SM-6 defensive missile????  So, in reality, all the destroyer’s Aegis system did was track the hypersonic target.  It didn’t engage.  No actual intercept occurred.
 
Well, that changes the tone of the article and essentially refutes the headline, doesn’t it?
 
So, what did the test actually accomplish?  I don’t know the test objectives but it certainly didn’t demonstrate a successful intercept.  At best, it demonstrated the ability to track a hypersonic target which we already knew we could do.  At worst, it was a purely theoretical, software exercise that proved nothing.
 
The main thing all of this demonstrates is the need for us to be very careful and diligent in our reading of articles.  Take nothing for granted.  Assume whatever you’re reading is deceptive and make sure you really understand what you’re reading.
 
Congratulations Lockheed and Navy.  You theoretically shot down a target drone with a theoretical missile.  Theoretically … good job.
 
Congratulations Naval News website.  You managed to parrot a Lockheed press release without adding any analysis or value whatsoever.  You’re a credit to news reporters everywhere.
 
 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Aegis Combat System Demonstrates System’s Capability to Counter Hypersonic Threats”, Carter Johnston, 25-Mar-2025, Lockheed Martin Press Release
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/03/u-s-navy-downs-maneuvering-hypersonic-missile-in-sm-6-block-iau-test/

Zumwalt Hypersonic Missile Perspective

As you know, the Zumwalt’s main weapon, the Advanced Gun System (AGS) was terminated some time ago in a major embarrassment for the Navy.  Now, seeking to recover some degree of usefulness for the class, the Navy has opted to convert the Zumwalt, itself, to a hypersonic missile shooter.  The conversion work has begun and the forward AGS gun has reportedly been removed.  Naval News website has a nice, short summary of the changes involved in the hypersonic missile conversion.[1]
 
The main change, of course, is the addition of four Multiple All-Up Round Canisters (MACs) housing three Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) missiles each, for a total of twelve hypersonic missiles.  Presumably, additional missiles could be added in the space currently occupied by the after AGS gun, however, no such plans have been announced.  Even if that were to occur, that would, presumably, only raise the total hypersonic missile count to 24 assuming there was sufficient room.
 
The question is, are 12 (or even 24) hypersonic missiles a worthwhile use for a cruiser size ship that cost around $14B+ (with costs continuing to rise!)?  The answer would seem to be an emphatic, no.
 
Of course, if the Zumwalt conversion is actually a testbed prototype limited to just the Zumwalt and just the forward missile cluster, then the effort might be worthwhile.  ComNavOps has long been in favor of prototyping and, let’s face it, there is no better use for the hugely expensive Zumwalts.
 
As an actual combat vessel, the Zumwalt with hypersonic missiles offers very little value.  Even if the missiles were unstoppable and 100% accurate and effective (Russian experience in Ukraine suggests hypersonic missiles can be stopped and are not all that effective), 12 (or 24) missiles simply don’t constitute a serious threat.
 
In the Navy’s mind, is the Zumwalt an actual combat vessel or just a testbed?  Time will tell.
 
 
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Related side note:  In a scenario eerily reminiscent of the Zumwalt, LCS, and Ford failures to develop non-existent equipment, the hypersonic missiles do not yet exist in an operational form and are being developed concurrently with the Zumwalt’s conversion.  Concurrency, as we know all too well, has not been a successful practice.

 
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[1]Naval News website, “US Navy Removes First 155mm AGS From USS Zumwalt At Ingalls Shipbuilding”, Carter Johnston, 14-May-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/05/us-navy-removes-first-155mm-ags-from-uss-zumwalt-at-ingalls-shipbuilding/

Hypersonic Missile Target Set

The Navy (and US military, in general) has latched on to hypersonic weapons and, as is typical of the Navy, with absolutely no supporting evidence or testing that demonstrates that hypersonic weapons will be effective enough to justify their cost and other negative impacts.  We touched on this in a previous post (see, “Conventional Hypersonic Prompt Strike Missile”).

  

Speaking of cost,

 

Based on internal Defense Department estimates on the number of weapons planned, that amounts to about $106 million per missile for the Army and $89.6 million for the Navy.[1]

 

One time use missiles that cost a hundred million dollars!  How can that possibly be justified?

 

Here’s a cost for integrating – not producing! – hypersonic missile components:

 

Lockheed Martin won $347 million to integrate at least eight of those glide bodies with guidance systems, rocket boosters, protective canisters, and so on, arming a battery of four Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) launchers.[2] [ed. = $43M each]

 

The 2021 GAO Annual Weapons Assessment report cites a program cost of $3.96B ($FY21) for a quantity of 11 missiles ($360M each) without specifying what’s included in the cost.

 

While there are no reliable unit cost figures for hypersonic weapons, yet, it is clear that they’re going to be very expensive.  The first reference, citing a cost of $90M per missile for the Navy, is the most authoritative estimate that I’ve been able to find.

 

Now, with that kind of staggering cost in mind, how do we justify hypersonic weapons?

 

Well, one way would be if the destructive effects were several levels beyond devastating - a near nuclear bomb level of destructive power from a single weapon.  However, the destructive effects are nowhere near that level.  They will either depend on kinetic energy alone or use a conventional warhead which limits the size of the explosive power to conventional levels although that would be added to whatever kinetic effects there are.

 

As we’ve repeatedly demonstrated via calculations, kinetic energy, alone, is rarely sufficient to produce a useful destructive force.  Kinetic energy is also a tricky phenomenon to effectively harness.  For example, the bullet through paper analogy that I’ve often cited renders kinetic energy unusable.  Even when a physically substantial target is hit, the kinetic energy is likely to be gradually released (on a relative time scale) as opposed to the instantaneous release from a conventional explosive.  The gradual release ‘dilutes’ the destructive effect of the kinetic energy release/conversion.

 

Here’s an illustrative example of the kinetic energy effects of a hypersonic weapon.  The data is all speculative as there are no publicly available specifications, that I’m aware of.

 

Mass of common glide body = 900 kg

Velocity = Mach 5 = 3800 mph = 1699 m/s

 

     k.e. = 0.5 * mass * (velocity)squared

     k.e. = 0.5 * 900 * (3800)squared

     k.e. = 6,498,000,000 J

 

By comparison, a kg of TNT releases 4,184,000 J.  Thus, the hypersonic weapon is equivalent to 1553 kg of TNT (3417 lb).  A Tomahawk missile has a 1000 lb conventional warhead so a hypersonic weapon would be equivalent to 3.4 Tomahawk missiles.  That’s substantial, to be sure, but it’s nothing approaching near nuclear bomb type of destruction.

 

Of course, if the warhead is heavier or lighter or the speed is greater or lesser, that would change the calculation.

 

The point is that while a weapon that is equivalent to 3.4 Tomahawk missiles is potent, it does not justify a hundred million dollar price tag when that hundred million dollars could buy 50 Tomahawk missiles.

 

We’ve discussed in previous posts that kinetic weapons (no explosive warhead) depend on the transfer/conversion of their kinetic energy into thermal energy and resulting shock/pressure effects.  In order for this to happen, the kinetic projectile must encounter sufficient resistance to quickly and efficiently transfer/convert the kinetic energy.  This is the bullet/paper problem: a bullet (lots of kinetic energy) fired at a piece of paper, will do very little damage, leaving only a bullet size hole as it passes through the paper and the paper will emerge virtually undamaged because the paper offers insufficient resistance to transfer/convert any of the bullet’s kinetic energy to the paper target.  Similarly, a hypersonic kinetic projectile that encounters a soft target like a ship will likely pass through, causing relatively little damage.  Conversely, a substantial, solid target such as a concrete bunker, fortification, or hardened aircraft shelter will offer sufficient resistance to facilitate the energy conversion and the target will be destroyed.

 

Closely related to this resistance problem is that a hypersonic missile will release/convert its kinetic energy slowly as opposed to a conventional explosive, such as a Tomahawk missile, which releases its energy instantaneously.  When you see videos of rail gun projectiles impacting targets, the targets are, invariably, steel blocks multiple feet in thickness and the projectile produces an impressive fireworks display.  However, how many real world targets consist of steel blocks a few feet thick?  A hypersonic body impacting a real world target, such as a building, is likely going to penetrate straight through the target, releasing/converting only a portion of its energy.  The remainder will be released/converted in the ground as the body continues to penetrate until it stops.  In fact, the body might well pass straight through the building, leaving only a small hole, and bury itself in the ground (the bullet through paper analogy).  What effect that underground release/conversion of energy would have on the above ground structure/target is unknown.  I’m not aware that anyone has done any realistic testing of hypersonic weapon destructive effects.  We desperately need realistic testing before we continue down the staggeringly expensive hypersonic weapons path.  It’s going to be very difficult to justify a hundred million dollar, one time use weapon.

 

A final consideration about target sets is that the hypersonic missile inventory will likely be quite small.

 

The [Pentagon] internal assessment, made available to Bloomberg News, shows an expected total of … 240 missiles for the Navy.[1]

 

Thus, we have to not only take into account the cost of a hypersonic missile but also the inventory level.  With very few missiles, we can’t waste them against anything but extremely high value targets.  We also can’t waste them against heavily defended targets.

 

Moving on, we’ve noted that hypersonics have a fairly limited target set.  With no guidance package, they can only be used against fixed targets.  In order to effectively release/convert their kinetic energy, the target has to be physically substantial.  Even a ship is likely to see a hypersonic weapon pass straight through (this phenomenon was seen often in WWII when large caliber, armor piercing shells would pass straight through a smaller target ship, causing very little damage.

 

What does all of the preceding tell us about the hypersonic weapon target set?  It tells us that valid targets must be: 

• Fixed targets since hypersonic weapons don’t have guidance packages
• Extremely high value targets to justify the cost
• Physically hard targets to trigger an effective degree of energy release/conversion
• Less defended so as not to waste expensive missiles

This excludes: 

• Area bombardment / suppression fire
• Mobile targets
• Physically soft targets such as trucks, tanks, artillery, aircraft, most buildings
• Heavily defended targets

Now, let’s consider how many real world targets fall into the valid target set?  The answer is … not many.  Examples might be a very large headquarters building, hardened aircraft hangars, underground bunkers, nuclear missile silos, and Chinese submarine pens built into mountains.  Even within this set, some of the potential targets are questionable.  For example, is it really cost-effective to destroy a hardened aircraft hangar with a hundred million dollar missile as opposed to a couple of Tomahawks?

 

The harsh reality is that the vast majority of targets are not valid hypersonic weapon targets.  These would include trucks, tanks, artillery, people, ships, aircraft, radars, and almost every worthwhile target one might find on a battlefield. 

 

Thus, hypersonics would seem to be more a one-shot, sniper type weapon for use against very high value, very constrained targets rather than a general warfare weapon.

 

 

 

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[1]Bloomberg website, “Hypersonic Sticker Shock: U.S. Weapons May Run $106 Million Each”, Anthony Capaccio, 12-Nov-2021,

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-12/hypersonic-sticker-shock-u-s-weapons-may-run-106-million-each

 

[2]Breaking Defense website, “Hypersonics: Army Awards $699M To Build First Missiles For A Combat Unit”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 30-Aug-2019,

https://breakingdefense.com/2019/08/hypersonics-army-awards-699m-to-build-first-missiles-for-a-combat-unit/

Zumwalt Hypersonic Update

The Navy has been working toward the installation of hypersonic weapons on the Zumwalt class by 2025.  The hypersonic missiles would be housed in, and launched from, modified Multiple All-up-round Canister (MAC) tubes similar to those installed in the Ohio class SSGN submarines. 

 

Initial reports varied but the plan seems to be to install two MAC tubes on one of the Zumwalts, offset to the sides, port and starboard.  The existing, idled Advanced Gun Systems (AGS) does not need to be removed according to CNO Gilday.[1]

 

Zumwalt has been operating as part of the Navy’s unmanned ship test squadron, Surface Development Squadron One (SURFDEVRON) which was established in May-2019.

  

 

MAC Tube

 

The modified MAC launch tubes will hold three hypersonic weapons.

 

The MAC tubes on the four SSGNs put seven Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) in the same space of a Trident-II D5 nuclear ballistic missile. The Navy will put three of the larger C-HGBs in the same space, USNI News understands.[1]

  

 

Common Hypersonic Glide Body

 

The hypersonic weapon is the Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB) which is being co-developed developed by the Army and Navy.  The missiles will be housed in a system similar to the Multiple All-up-round Canister (MAC) tubes that are installed on the Ohio class guided-missile submarines (SSGN).  The SSGN MAC tubes contain seven Tomahawk cruise missiles per tube.  Reports suggest that the Navy will convert the MAC tubes to house three hypersonic weapons.

 

The Common-Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB) is a weapon system that uses a booster rocket motor to accelerate to well-above hypersonic speeds, and then jettisons the expended rocket booster.

 

 

CONOPS

 

Here’s an interesting comment from CNO Gilday:

 

“Zumwalt gave us an opportunity to get [hypersonics] out faster and to be honest with you I need a solid mission for Zumwalt,” Gilday said.[1] [emphasis added]

 

I guess you should have developed a CONOPS before building the ship, admiral.  I guess you also should have R&D’ed the AGS before you committed to making it the main weapon of the ship.  The Zumwalt’s problems and current lack of mission are a purely self-inflicted wound … inflicted by stupidity.

 

Now, the question for the admiral is, have you learned your lesson about CONOPS or are you just stupidly plunging ahead with this hypersonics-on-Zumwalt idea without a CONOPS that tells you how you’ll use the Zumwalt-hypersonics, assuming it technically works?  I’m guessing you haven’t thought this through, at all.

 

For example,

 

-Zumwalt currently only has the capacity for 80 missiles.  Hypersonics take up more room so there will be even fewer (half as many??) regular missiles?  Is that a tactically useful amount?

 

-If you have to remove the existing Mk57 peripheral VLS and missiles to make room for hypersonics, how will the ship defend itself?  Will the ship require a permanent Burke escort (two ships to accomplish a one-ship mission)?

 

-In what scenario(s) will a ship with hypersonics be useful?  How will hypersonics fit in with the rest of the fleet’s missions?

 

-Does a ship with hypersonic missiles have a use in a carrier task force?

 

CONOPS, admiral, CONOPS!

 

CONOPS

 

CONOPS

 

 

 

 

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[1]USNI News website, “Navy Can Install Hypersonic Missiles Aboard Zumwalt Destroyers Without Removing Gun Mounts”, Sam LaGrone, 14-Mar-2022,

https://news.usni.org/2022/03/14/navy-will-install-hypersonic-missiles-aboard-zumwalt-destroyers-without-removing-gun-mounts

Hypersonic Conventional Prompt Strike Missile

The Navy is looking to deploy Mach 5+ hypersonic missiles (called Conventional Prompt Strike missiles, CPS) on the Virginia, Zumwalt, and Burke class ships.

 

Let’s see how the effort is coming along.

 

To briefly review, the missile is a joint development effort with the Army to produce hypersonic missiles with a common hypersonic glide body (CHGB), booster, and overall design.  Each service will then develop its own launchers and any warhead-specific capabilities it needs.  The Navy is taking the lead in developing the CHGB while the Army focuses on establishing an industrial production base.  The Navy’s version is called the Conventional Prompt Strike missile and the Army's version is the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (possibly referred to as ‘Dark Eagle’). Requested funding for hypersonic research in FY22 is an almost unbelievable $3.8B !  It would seem almost impossible to spend that amount of money in a year’s worth of research!  But, I digress …

 

As a reminder, there are two broad types of hypersonic weapons:

 

• Boost/Glide – These missiles are boosted to very high altitudes where the warhead separates and then glides, unpowered, to the target.
• Cruise – These are low level, ramjet/scramjet powered missiles.

 

Boost/glide hypersonic missiles, which are what we are discussing in this post, use a two-stage, solid fueled rocket motor to boost to hypersonic speeds at the edge of the Earth’s atmosphere, just short of space, where they glide along the atmosphere before dive/gliding at unpowered hypersonic speeds to the target.  The ‘warhead’ is non-explosive and relies on kinetic energy for its destructive effects.  Range is reported to be >1700 miles. [2]  The missile is reportedly around 3 ft wide and will not fit into standard Mk41/Mk57 VLS cells.  It is unknown if the hypersonic weapons currently being developed will have anti-ship capability or if it is just land attack.  Likely, it will initially just have land attack capability with a goal of later adding moving target (anti-ship) capability.

 

Concept For A Hypersonic Glide Body

As explained in a Popular Mechanics article,

 

CPS is a boost glide weapon system, using a rocket booster nearly 3 feet wide to propel the weapon into the upper reaches of Earth’s atmosphere. Instead of continuing into low-Earth orbit like a ballistic missile warhead, the glide body stops short of entering space, pitching its nose downward toward the target. The glide body then streaks down upon the target at hypersonic speeds, decreasing the amount of time the defender has to shoot it down. [1]

 

The missile's range is also secret, but the Union of Concerned Scientists estimates the May 2020 test weapon flew a total distance of 2,485 miles, while noting it was half the distance originally forecast for the weapon. [1]

 

The big question about CPS is how the Navy will fit the weapon on the Burke-class destroyers. The Burkes, largely considered the backbone of the surface fleet, are heavily armed, and there isn’t much room for new weapons. Each destroyer has between 90 and 96 vertical launch missile silos, but the silos are too small to fit a weapon nearly 3 feet in diameter. [1]

 

One possibility: Perhaps the Navy installs larger silos as it upgrades older Burkes. The lead ship, Arleigh Burke herself, was commissioned in 1991 and needs to be retired or refurbished by 2026. That said, it may not make financial sense to refurbish the new ships. [1]

 

The Navy also wants more silos in the fleet, and bigger hypersonic silos will come at a cost of smaller silos capable of carrying a broader array of both offensive and defensive weapons. Or, as Defense News writes, the Navy could instead develop a smaller version of CPS that can fit in the existing silos. [1]

 

 

Here’s a few aspects for further consideration:

 

Detection.  There are claims that hypersonic missiles will be difficult to detect.  It is not intuitively obvious why this would be.  In fact, given the altitude of their flight, the opposite would seem to be true with very long detection ranges possible.  Raytheon seems to believe missile detection is straightforward [3] although they are attempting to sell a radar system so, of course, they would make such a claim.

 

A CRS report offers the likely explanation for the seemingly contradictory claims by referencing radar line-of-sight.[4]  Hypersonic missiles are fairly easily detected with the detection range limited by the earth’s curvature (radar line-of-sight) and, of course, the power/capability of the radar itself (hence the Raytheon claim of enhanced detection range due to gallium based radars).  However, given the speed of the missile, even very long range detection still only provides a very short time period in which to take defensive measures.  So, it is not that hypersonic missiles are difficult to detect, it’s that their speed makes effective defense difficult regardless of detection range.

 

For example, a missile flying at 18 miles altitude (98,000 ft) has a maximum radar detection range of 434 miles [5] – plenty of range!  However, at Mach 5 the missile would cover that 434 miles in just 6.8 minutes which is not much time to conduct an effective defense.

 

 

Zumwalt and Mk57 VLS.  It appears that the first Navy application of hypersonic weapons will be on the Zumwalt class.  The hypersonic missile systems will be retrofitted to the space currently occupied by the defunct Advanced Gun Systems.  This will require the development of a new type of ?vertical? launch system referred to by the Navy as the Advanced Payload Module launcher (everything the Navy touches has to be ‘advanced’ and ‘modular’, doesn’t it?).

 

This touches on one of the long-standing mysteries about the Zumwalt - what was the point of the Mk57 Peripheral Launch VLS system?  The Mk 57 was touted as the VLS of the future with larger cells than the standard Mk41 but it appears to have been designed and procured with no suitably sized missiles in development or even contemplated and now we see that the hypersonic missiles won’t fit in the Mk57 cells, either.  Why did anyone think the Mk57 was a good idea?  The peripheral location is interesting and debatable but could have been achieved with standard Mk41 cells simply arranged differently. 

 

 

Burkes and Hypersonics.  Unlike the Zumwalts, the Burkes have no available, unused space in which to install large hypersonic magazines and launch systems.  Presumably, significant portions of the existing VLS cells would have to be removed to make room for new hypersonic launch systems.  This would mean reduced AAW (Standard and ESSM) and strike (Tomahawk) capacities although, presumably, the reduced Tomahawk capacities would be at least partially offset by the added hypersonic strike weapons.  Still, reducing the AAW capacity on a ship whose primary purpose is AAW seems like an undesirable situation. 

 

Installing even a minimally useful hypersonic capacity of, say, 30 missiles, would likely require the total removal of one of the two current Mk41 VLS clusters which would eliminate either 32 or 64 VLS cells depending on whether it was the forward or the aft cluster.  This strongly suggests that a purpose built hypersonic-capable ship would be a better option.  This might even be justification for the ever elusive, but never built, arsenal ship/barge.

 

 

Destructive Effect and Target Set.  We’ve discussed this in previous posts and comments.  Kinetic weapons (no explosive warhead) depend on the transfer/conversion of their kinetic energy into thermal energy and resulting shock/pressure effects.  In order for this to happen, the kinetic projectile must encounter sufficient resistance to quickly and efficiently transfer/convert the kinetic energy.  This is the bullet/paper problem: a bullet (lots of kinetic energy) fired at a piece of paper, will do very little damage, leaving only a bullet size hole as it passes through the paper and the paper will emerge virtually undamaged because the paper offers insufficient resistance to transfer/convert any of the bullet’s kinetic energy to the paper target.  Similarly, a hypersonic kinetic projectile that encounters a soft target like a ship will likely pass through, causing relatively little damage.  Conversely, a substantial, solid target such as a concrete bunker, fortification, or hardened aircraft shelter will offer sufficient resistance to facilitate the energy conversion and the target will be destroyed.

 

This suggests that the target set of hypersonic weapons will be limited to substantial, fixed structures.  Hypersonics would be useless against an army in the field since the combination of mobility (tanks, vehicles, men on foot, etc.) and softness would preclude effective hypersonic performance.

 

 

Infrared.  One aspect that I’ve not seen discussed is the heating of the glide body and how that relates to detection and defense.  A glide body will develop significant heat due to high speed friction with the atmosphere.  On the one hand, in addition to blinding the glide body’s sensors, if it had any, this should be easily detected at very long ranges which would seem to facilitate defensive efforts.  On the other hand, defensive missiles would suffer the same effect and be blinded in their attempt to intercept the hypersonic missile.[5]

 

 

Conclusion

 

It appears that we are spending nearly unbelievable sums of money on a weapon system with a very limited target set.  Hypersonics weapons seem to offer little advantage at the tactical and operational level although the ability to impact strategic concerns is, potentially, significant.  For example, hypersonic weapons offer the possibility to quickly and efficiently destroy an enemy’s port facilities, warehouses, airfields, key factories, and the like.  Of course, the converse is also true and an enemy can similarly impact our facilities.  This suggests that a revised approach to facility design and operations may be required.

 

Another implication of hypersonic weapons is that they are most useful when used against an enemy’s military infrastructure which, almost by definition, is located in the enemy’s mainland.  This means that, in order to be effective, combat must be expanded beyond proxy wars or distant battlefields and brought home to the enemy’s homeland.  Depending on the initial scope of a war, this might well be a major escalation in scope.  This implication holds true until such time as hypersonic weapons can be ‘down-scaled’ to the tactical level for use against small, mobile, fleeting targets.  Of course, we already have effective weapons for those targets so there may be no need for hypersonics at that level and certainly not for the cost required.

 

Given the incredible expenditures involved, I hope the military has carefully, realistically, and thoroughly gamed out the ‘CONOPS’ for hypersonic weapons so as to completely understand how and under what circumstances they would be used and what their effectiveness would be and, most importantly, how they would support our [non-existent] geopolitical and military strategies.  Unfortunately, given the Navy’s utter disdain for CONOPS, I’m not hopeful.

 

 

 

 

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[1]Popular Mechanics website, “All 69 Navy Destroyers Are Getting Hypersonic Missiles”, Kyle Mizokami, Oct 22, 2020,

https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a34440051/all-navy-destroyers-getting-hypersonic-missiles/#:~:text=The%20new%20missile%2C%20Conventional%20Prompt%20Strike%20%28CPS%29%2C%20is,glide%20body%20jointly%20developed%20with%20the%20U.S.%20Army.

 

[2]Naval News website, “Latest Details on Hypersonic Missile Integration Aboard Zumwalt-class Destroyers”, Peter Ong, 28-Oct-2021,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/10/latest-details-on-hypersonic-missile-integration-aboard-zumwalt-class-destroyers/

 

[3]Investor’s Business Daily, “Army's New Raytheon Radar To Detect One Of The Deadliest Emerging Threats”, Gillian Rich, 17-Oct-2019

https://www.investors.com/news/hypersonic-weapons-can-be-detected-raytheon-radar/#:~:text=Army%27s%20New%20Raytheon%20Radar%20To%20Detect%20One%20Of,video%20file%20cannot%20be%20played.%20%28Error%20Code%3A%20102630%29

 

[4]https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11623

 

[5]https://satelliteobservation.net/2018/11/15/detecting-hypersonics/