Bykov Corvette and Warship Design

We’ve extensively discussed the flawed designs of modern ships as regards firepower and survivability.  Here’s a bit of data from actual combat involving the Russian Bykov (Project 22160) class corvette which, on paper, was nearly the dream design of a modern small ship:  small, fast, cruise missile armed, helo equipped, unmanned capabilities, complementary diesels and gas turbines, and flexible modular capabilities to accommodate any imaginable mission.  Truly, the epitome of modern naval design.  The reality of combat, however, revealed the flaws in the design sufficient to curtail further production of the class.  From a Google-translated TASS article,
 

"The series of patrol ships of project 22160 will not be continued and will end with the delivery of the last corvette of the series to the Black Sea Fleet next year," the agency's interlocutor said, noting that the customer intends to abandon an additional six units of project 22160 due to the discrepancy between their tactical and technical qualities and combat operating conditions.

He explained that military sailors are not quite satisfied with the characteristics and equipment of corvettes tested in the course of their combat use - insufficient seaworthiness, light armor and vulnerability of power plants, as well as weak anti-aircraft weapons.[1][emphasis added]

Bykov Class Corvette - the epitome of modern design
and a failure in combat

 
This illustrates ComNavOps’ claim that modern ship designs do not incorporate the reality of combat.  We (meaning the US and the world) are designing to a hypothetical standard that is focused on business cases, extended cruise comforts, and peacetime tasks instead of actual naval combat.  We’ve abandoned firepower, lethality, and survivability.
 
This also illustrates the phenomenon of follow-the-leader in warship design.  One of the common counter arguments to many of ComNavOps’ tenets about warship design is to point out that every other country is doing it (whatever it is that’s under discussion), therefore, it must be right.  The reality is that follow-the-leader doesn’t ensure correctness, it only ensures uniformity of thought.  Everyone wanted battleships immediately prior to WWII but everyone was wrong, as the rise of carriers demonstrated.  Everyone now wants lightly built ships with extensive crew comforts, minimal manning, and maximum flexibility.  As the Russians are now finding out, everyone is wrong about modern WARship design.  We’ve already seen that modern warships are not built to fight and survive (see, “SingleHits”).
 
Follow-the-leader is not the right way to design a warship.  What’s needed is a solid understanding of the realities of naval combat leading to an effective Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  We need to stop playing follow-the-leader about unmanned assets, lightweight naval guns, minimal manning, no armor, modularity, etc.  These are incorrect, dead end failures in the evolution of WARship design.
 
We mastered the principles of WARship design in WWII and we need to return to them.  For the stupid among you, I’m not calling for a return to actual WWII equipment (though in many cases that might be superior to what we have now!).  I’m calling for a return to the principles of WARship design that we mastered in WWII.  The principles are timeless and proven successful.  We foolishly abandoned those principles and now desperately need to return to them.
 
The Bykov failed in combat and yet it represented the epitome of modern naval design.  Does anyone think the Burke or Constellation will fare better?
 
 
 
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[1]TASS website, “The Russian Navy will refuse an additional series of six patrol ships of project 22160”, 14-Jun-2022,
https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/14908939

Hughes Great Battle

Wayne Hughes is one of the foremost proponents of small vessel naval forces and has spoken and written extensively about it.  Before I go any further, let me commend Capt. Hughes for his willingness to formulate, publicize, and discuss a point of view.  It takes courage to put one’s opinions into the public realm where they are open to criticism.  Whether I agree or disagree with Hughes’ theories, I respect him for holding and publicizing his thoughts.
 
In Hughes’ book, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, he presents his theories and then, in conclusion, offers a naval combat scenario to illustrate their application [1, p.321].  I’d like to examine his combat scenario as a means of describing the limits and constraints of his theories.  There are many naval observers and commentators who ascribe to his theories so this exercise is well worth the effort.
 
In brief, the combat scenario involves a conflict between Greece and Turkey with the US stuck in between, using naval force to, ironically, keep the peace by attacking docked Turkish amphibious transport ships.  The US attack force consists of several small missile boats that are transported undetected, by a mothership, to a location near the proposed battle and then dispersed, again undetected, to their launch points where they will attack docked Turkish troop transports thereby preventing a widespread Turkish amphibious assault on several Greek islands.
 
Interestingly, Hughes does not conclude his naval battle scenario.  Instead, he ends his narrative at the moment of engagement.  His purpose was setting the stage for the battle to demonstrate the value of his small combatants.  Whether the outcome is successful or not is irrelevant for what he is trying to accomplish and whether he successfully demonstrates the value of his theories is up to the reader. 
 
In order to make an assessment of Hughes’ scenario and the principles he applies, it is necessary to clearly understand the conditions he sets for the scenario.  As with any wargame, the input conditions determine the result (garbage in, garbage out) and this combat scenario has a number of constraints built into it, to the point of rendering the scenario nearly irrelevant.  I’ve long maintained that Hughes’ theories and conclusions are of very limited value and applicability and his battle scenario clearly illustrates this.  Following are some of the conditions Hughes sets for his scenario.  Judge for yourself the validity and usefulness of the overall scenario in light of the constraints imposed on the scenario. 
 

• The scenario is tailor made to fit his theories.  In other words, Hughes’ theories are not applied to the scenario;  the scenario is applied to his theories.  That’s backwards and unrealistic!  There’s nothing wrong, per se, with doing that but the reader needs to recognize what was done and be very wary of extrapolating the success – or lack thereof – of a very specific scenario to other, perhaps more likely scenarios such as open ocean combat or combined arms (aviation) naval combat.
  
  
• The scenario forbids attacks on the enemy homeland, land bases and airfields, land sensors, etc.  In other words, a foolish way to conduct a war.  Of course, historically, we generally do limit ourselves in combat to the point of harming ourselves so this may not be a totally ridiculous constraint!
  
  
• Electronic warfare (EW) is ignored and networks are assumed to be flawless and unimpeded with the US having perfect communications, command, and control.
  
  
• Land based strikes by enemy aircraft against naval targets are not included.
  
  
• US Air Force and Army assistance is ignored so no friendly air strikes, reconnaissance, intel, tanker, or EW support.
  
  
• Carrier air strikes on ships are ruled out due to fear of a hypothesized 200 enemy fighters.
   
  
• It is assumed that no Greek or Turkish surveillance will detect the US small combat vessels.
  
  
• Complete US satellite coverage is assumed.

  
You can draw your own conclusion but my assessment is that Hughes constructed a scenario that perfectly fits his theories so as to illustrate and extoll them.  As such, my conclusion regarding his theories is that their ‘window’ of applicability is so small and so unlikely as to render them nearly irrelevant.  For example, the US small missile boats, the heart of Hughes’ envisioned fleet structure concept, are almost magically transported to the perfect placement on the naval battlefield with no possibility of detection by the enemy.  He also ignores the issue of fuel and logistical support for the small combatants.  A single enemy helicopter would wreak havoc on the small, defenseless missile boats but enemy air activity was excluded since its presence would turn a nice, neat scenario into a disaster for the US and Hughes.
 
As I was reading the description of the scenario, I was struck by the thought that there was a far easier and far more assured, alternate battle plan available.  Hughes hypothesized a single US carrier with four Aegis escorts.  He limited their involvement to some minor scouting but he could, instead, have assigned the four Aegis escorts to deal with the enemy air forces while the carrier’s aircraft swiftly dispatched the nearly defenseless Turkish amphibious and naval forces.  That, however, would not have served the purpose of illustrating his theories or, rather, would have pointed out a preferred alternative to his theories.
 
Hughes’ theories of small combatants have numerous flaws but the book serves as an excellent Navy 101 or primer on naval combat.  It is a starting point for the study of naval combat, not an endpoint.  As a starting point, it is well worth reading and studying.  Simply identifying the flaws in Hughes’ concept is an invaluable education in itself.
 
For those of you who opt to read his book or writings, the biggest overall flaw is that his theories all begin with his favored small combatants already in position, perfectly poised for the salvoes that are the basis of his theories.  He neglects the logistics, basing, detection, lack of anti-air defense, EW, etc. that are all crucial to, and precede, any successful naval engagement.  As you read his writings, keep that in mind and recognize the weaknesses.  It will help you assess the validity – or lack thereof - of his theories.
 
 
 
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[1]”Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat”, 2nd Ed., Wayne P. Hughes Jr., Naval Institute Press, 2000, ISBN 1-55750-392-3, p.321.