Showing posts with label Mines. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mines. Show all posts

Friday, August 28, 2020

Navy Retires Three Avenger Mine Countermeasure Ships

Without even much debate, the biggest threat to the Navy is mines.  To counter that threat, the Navy has only a handful of Avenger class mine countermeasure (MCM) ships and some long past retirement age MH-53E helicopters (see, “MH-53E and MineCountermeasures”). 


Avenger Class MCM


As we all know, the Navy’s vision was for the LCS to replace both the Avengers and the MH-53E Sea Dragon helos and that plan has failed spectacularly.  There are currently no MCM-capable LCS ships and the MCM module is still years away from functional deployment, if ever.  Further, the module swapping concept that would have allowed for surges of MCM LCSes has also been abandoned in favor of two 4-ship squadrons of dedicated MCM-LCS, one on each coast (actually, only 3 of the 4 ships in each squadron are deployable with the fourth being a training ship).  Given that colossal failure, you’d think the Navy would be caring for the Avengers as if they precious, newborn babies, right?  So, what is the Navy doing?  They’ve retired three Avengers (1): 

  • USS Champion
  • USS Scout
  • USS Ardent

We’re down, now, to 8 Avengers and probably around 12 flyable MH-53E helos.  That’s our entire, global mine countermeasures force. 

Note that the helo fleet became operational in 1986 is now around 35 years old and the Avengers are around 30 years old.  Both are long past retirement age and both are substantially unsafe to operate.

We’re headed right down to ZERO mine countermeasure assets.




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Friday, July 26, 2019

Mining Hainan

Given the near complete absence of mine countermeasure assets in the US Navy, the nightmare scenario in a war is an enemy that uses a few submarines to lay a handful of mines in mainland American ports and then has only to sit back and watch the Navy convulse in an effort to race back from the war front to clear and protect our ports.  Our entire MCM fleet - all 6-8 LCS (and the few Avengers and HM-53E helos that we might not have yet retired) – would have to be brought back from any overseas missions to conduct port clearance.  Even then, we’d only be able to clear and maintain a maximum of 8 ports even using the minimal, and inadequate, tasking of one LCS per port.  Unfortunately, the US has many dozens of ports.  While this mammoth convulsion was on-going, our commercial shipping would be brought to an abrupt standstill.  A clever enemy – and no one is accusing Russia or China of not being clever! – would be able to institute a total blockade of the entire United States via a handful of submarine laid mines.  How’s that for a return on investment in low cost mines and a few subs?

Such a move would have the added benefit, for the Chinese, of depriving the US fleet of its overseas MCM capability which means the fleet would be unable to go anywhere that mines were even suspected – which would be almost everywhere!  Thus, in one stroke, the Chinese could paralyze both our commercial shipping and our naval actions.

So, clearly a bad news scenario for us.

Fortunately, we are frantically working to build lots of additional dedicated minesweepers and new MCM helos.  Oh wait … we’re actually not doing that at all.  We’ll set aside the staggering stupidity of our non-existent MCM plan and force and press on to a related aspect .

Having recognized the catastrophic nature of this scenario, why can’t this scenario be turned around?  Why can’t we use our subs to lay a few strategically placed mines in and around the Chinese Hainan base/port, for example?  Why can’t we mine the various chokepoints around the South China Sea through which Chinese merchant shipping must pass?  Why can’t we mine the Taiwan strait?  And so on.

Theoretically, there is no reason why we can’t turn the scenario around.  Of course, the reality is that we no longer have the capability or weapons to achieve such a scenario.  Our mines are nearly obsolete and our subs almost never practice mine laying (see, "Offensive Mine Warfare - Operational Usage").

The attractiveness of being able to apply against our enemies the same mine warfare that we dread encountering is so blindingly obvious that one can’t help but be stunned by our near total neglect of offensive mine warfare.  What little mine awareness we have is directed towards the ill-suited and ill-conceived LCS MCM module.  We need to remember and regain our offensive mine warfare mindset and capability.

Wednesday, July 24, 2019

Wonsan Amphibious Assault And Mine Lessons

The US Navy has had two major post-WWII lessons handed to it regarding the link between amphibious assault and mines.  You may, already, be asking yourself, ‘Why two lessons?  Shouldn’t one major lesson suffice?’ .  For anyone but the US Navy, yes, a single major lesson should suffice.  But, I digress …

The two lessons were the Wonsan, Korea assault in 1950 and the aborted amphibious assault during the Desert Storm conflict (see, "Marine Corps in Desert Storm - The Great Diversion").  Let’s take a closer look at Wonsan.

The Navy Historical Center website very nicely summarizes the Wonsan operational rationale.

The great success of the Inchon Invasion led General MacArthur to order a second amphibious assault, targeting Wonsan on North Korea's east coast. After landing there, Tenth Corps could advance inland, link up with the Eighth Army moving north from Seoul and hasten the destruction of the North Korean army. Wonsan would also provide UN forces with another logistics support seaport, one closer to the battlefronts than Pusan and with greater handling capacity than tide-encumbered Inchon.

Wonsan's greatest value, though, was unintended: it gave the U.S. Navy a painfully valuable reminder of the fruits of neglecting mine countermeasures, that unglamorous side of maritime power that, when it is needed, is needed very badly. As Admiral Forrest Sherman, the Chief of Naval Operations at the time, remarked "when you can't go where you want to, when you want to, you haven't got command of the sea". This experience provoked one of the greatest minesweeper building programs in the Navy's history, one that produced hundreds of ships to serve not only under the U.S. flag, but under those of many allied nations. (1)


The Soviet Union had supplied North Korea with thousands of mines and technical advisors to help them plan and lay the mines using sampans operating at night.  The mines included 1904 era Russian contact mines and new magnetic influence mines sensitive enough to be triggered by a wooden minesweeper’s engines. (3)

Operation Wonsan was the clearance of mines from the Wonsan harbor and surrounding area in preparation for the amphibious assault.  The operation began on 10-Oct-1950, ten days before the assault was to begin.  The minesweeping and clearance operation was conducted under accurate artillery fire from the North Koreans.  On 12-Oct-1950, mines sank two US minesweepers, the USS Pledge (AM-277) and the USS Pirate (AM-275).  A Republic of Korea minesweeper, YMS-516, was blown up and sunk by a magnetic mine while conducting a clearance check sweep on 18-Oct-1950. (2)

SKorean Minesweeper Blown Up By A Mine


The landing force of some 30,000 Marines and soldiers arrived off Wonsan to begin the assault on 20-Oct-2019 but the mines had not yet been cleared and the assault force was forced to wait two weeks at sea while the mine clearance operation continued.

The minefields caused a 250-ship amphibious task force with 50,000 Marines and soldiers aboard to ‘yo-yo’ up and down Korea’s East coast for two weeks as NAVFE waited for Wonsan harbor to be cleared. (3)

Rear Admiral (RADM) Allan E. ‘Hoke’ Smith, TF Advance Force 95 at Wonsan was forced to message Washington,

“We have lost control of the seas to a nation without a Navy, using pre-World War I weapons, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ.” (3)

In the larger Korean conflict, five destroyers were severely damaged by mines and seven minesweepers were sunk. (3)

The incident offers some valuable lessons still immensely relevant today.

Clearance Under Fire – The mine clearance effort was greatly hampered by the North Korea artillery fire directed against the minesweepers.  We have totally ignored this aspect of MCM today.  We have too few MCM assets to allow for any combat losses.  We have no doctrine for protecting the MCM assets since our amphibious assault doctrine has the Navy standing 25-50+ miles offshore.  The LCS COBRA shoreline UAV is envisioned to function by slowly flowing back and forth, up and down the shoreline.  The life expectancy of the UAV will likely be measured in minutes.  We’re designing capabilities with no thought, whatsoever, to enemy resistance.

Sampans as Minelayers – This raised the question of how to counter what appear to be civilian craft?  Do we sink everything that floats and not worry about whether it was engaged in a military action or not?  Do we attempt to board every boat – while under fire?!  Do we allow the enemy a free ‘haven’ for mine laying?  This sounds ridiculous but the US has a long history of exactly that – allowing the enemy various types of free havens!  We have given this zero doctrinal attention.

Clearance Rate – I’ve talked about this repeatedly.  We simply do not have the right technology, the right number of assets, and the right mentality to conduct mine clearance in an operationally useful time frame.  This, alone, all but rules out amphibious assaults as a viable operation!

Technology Disparity versus Effectiveness – The US maintains a wide technological disparity over most potential enemies and yet we see time and again the stunning success of very low tech mines.  One can’t help but wonder if we’re pursuing the wrong end of the technology trail?  For starters, we need to acknowledge the incredible effectiveness of low tech mines instead of all but ignoring them as we have done for decades.  Next, we should be looking at simpler, more basic methods of mine clearance.  For example, instead of using exquisite technology to identify every mine, get its serial number, count the rivets on it, and neutralize them one by one, perhaps we should be looking at a method of indiscriminate destruction of every  object that even remotely looks like a mine – area destruction instead of precision destruction.  An example of such an approach would be to flood an area with a true swarm of small, suicidal underwater vehicles that just blow up everything they ‘see’ and don’t worry about what it was.  This is just one back-of-the-napkin idea.  I’m sure MCM professionals could come up with other ideas.

History is screaming lessons at us and the Navy is walking around with their hands over their ears.  We need to study history, learn the lessons, and change our ways.  Amphibious assault cannot occur in the presence of mines and we have no effective mine clearance capability.  The Marines, in particular, need to be pounding on this problem since amphibious assaults are their claimed reason for existence.





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(1)Navy Historical Center website, “The Wonsan Operation, October 1950 --
Overview and Selected Images”, retrieved 21-Jul-2019,
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/OnlineLibrary/photos/events/kowar/50-unof/wonsan.htm



Monday, December 17, 2018

LCS MCM - What's The Point?


As we all know, the LCS is, by design and intent, utterly useless without a module.  Of course, the first LCS was commissioned in 2008 and here we are, a decade later, still waiting for any useful modules.  Now, USNI News website reports that the Navy is developing an unmanned surface vessel (Common Unmanned Surface Vessel – CUSV) as the prime ‘carrier’ for the various planned mine countermeasure equipment packages (mine hunting, mine sweeping, mine neutralization).  This is actually somewhat old news – not sure why it’s being reported as new other than the Navy’s constant attempt to spin news.

As a bit of memory refresh, the ASW (anti-submarine warfare) and MCM modules are running neck and neck in terms of the most module program starts, stops, start-overs, revamps, and slipped schedule dates.  The MCM module was originally planned to be a combination of helo-towed equipment and the unmanned underwater (UUV) remote multi-mission vehicle (RMMV).  Unfortunately/unbelievably, no one bothered to see if the helo could actually safely tow the required equipment and, as it turned out, it couldn’t.  Plus, the RMMV was a failure.  So, it was back to the drawing board.  After a few years of floundering around, the latest plan is to use the CUSV to tow sonars and influence sweep gear.

The really interesting point to this is the time frame.  As the article reports,


NAVSEA is set to compete for the MCM USV with an acquisition program that could start as early as 2020. (1)


So, the CUSV acquisition program won’t start until 2020 (or later – everything LCS related seems to slip its schedule!).  Integration and testing will take several more years.  Let’s be generous and say that the MCM module will be ready in 2025.  By then, the first LCS will be 17 years old and staring at retirement (the Navy hasn’t kept any ship class for its full service life in recent times).  More likely, the testing will slip further.

Okay, all of this highlights the abject stupidity and incompetence of the Navy but that’s hardly news at this point, is it?  Is this just another beat up on the LCS and the Navy post?  No, it’s not.  There’s a larger point here.

For sake of continued discussion, let’s assume that the LCS MCM module works perfectly and is fully deployed by 2025.  The question then becomes, so what?

As a reminder, the LCS fleet has been reorganized into two squadrons, one on each coast of the US, and each squadron will consist of four 4-ship divisions with one division each for training so there will be one division of ASW, one of ASuW, and one MCM in each squadron. (2)  Thus, there will be a grand total of 8 MCM-configured LCS ships in the entire US Navy.

The Navy’s entire MCM fleet will be 8 ships.

That bears repeating.

The Navy’s entire MCM fleet will be 8 ships.

Those 8 ships will be replacing the previous 12 Osprey class and 14 Avenger class mine countermeasure ships.  In addition, the Navy’s entire helo-based mine countermeasures inventory, 30 MH-53E Sea Dragons, are old and barely flightworthy and will retire very soon and without replacement.  Thus, the 8 LCS MCM ships will be replacing the Ospreys, Avengers, and MH-53E’s.  So, 8 LCS will replace 26 ships and 30 helos.  Does that sound rational to you?  Do you really believe that 8 LCS are equivalent to 26 ships and 30 helos?

Let’s recall a few salient points related to mine warfare and mine countermeasures. 
  • In WWII, the Normandy (D-Day) invasion used over 250 minesweepers to clear the sea lanes and approaches in a combat-useful time frame.
  • China’s inventory of mines is in the tens or hundreds of thousands.
  • Iran’s inventory of mines is in the tens of thousands.
  • N Korea’s inventory of mines is in the tens or hundreds of thousands.
  • A single LCS can clear a couple of mines per hour.

Ponder the interrelated ramifications of those five related points.

Considering the concept of combat-useful time frames, the size of the mine inventories our enemies have, and the clearance rate of the LCS-MCM, it becomes immediately apparent that we have a mammoth mismatch between needs and capabilities which is only going to get worse as the LCS becomes the only MCM asset in the fleet.

The mine clearing capacity of the entire LCS “fleet” is absolutely dwarfed by the enemy inventories and combat time frame requirements.  There is almost no difference between having the LCS-MCM fleet and not having it at all.  We have atrophied to the point that we may as well have no MCM capability since even with the LCS-MCM fleet we essentially won’t have any for any relevant use.

The conclusion is inescapable.  We need to abandon both the LCS and the LCS MCM concept (modular, remote, unmanned vehicles locating and removing single mines at a time) as an effective mine countermeasures asset and move on to an entirely new concept.  What that concept is, I don’t have a solid idea about.  Certainly, though, it needs to include high speed, high volume mine removal – sweeping – combined with individual mine removal, as needed.  Whether this can be done with small, unmanned craft towing influence sweeps or whether we need dedicated small vessels, as in WWII, is something for the experts in the field to determine.

Oddly, the Navy’s LCS MCM module development has been almost exclusively focused on one-at-a-time mine removal which is useless in a combat scenario.  I’m completely baffled by the thinking behind the effort.  What is needed, as I stated, is high volume, high speed clearance.  From day one of LCS MCM module development, we should have been focused on combat clearance (sweeping), not leisurely one-at-a-time clearance.

We also need to hugely increase our MCM asset numbers.  Mine clearance in a combat-useful time frame requires numbers of assets … large numbers of assets (250 minesweepers at Normandy!). 

We need to produce an immediate replacement for the MH-53 which currently forms the backbone of our MCM effort.

The Navy bet ‘all in’ on the LCS for MCM and crapped out.  We have, essentially, nothing left.  We need to invest heavily and quickly in a multi-faceted and robust MCM force.  As it stands, our vaunted amphibious assault capability can be stopped in its tracks by any country with a handful of mines.  Further, a system of mines laid in the gaps between the various islands of the first island chain can effectively close the E/S China Seas to the US Navy and don’t think that thought hasn’t occurred to China.



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Related thought:  Given China’s willingness (eagerness?) to flaunt international treaties, laws, and norms in constructing artificial islands and expanding their territorial claims, it’s only a matter of time until China decides that the negative political repercussions of laying mines between the first island chain waters and truly closing the E/S China Seas to the US is worth it.  We would have no means of conducting large scale clearance operations and would have no choice but to fully concede the E/S China Seas.

Another related thought:  In a war, if China places just a few mines in just a few US harbors, stand back and watch the US Navy convulse in an effort to protect and clear all our harbors with just 8 LCS – leaving none for forward combat operations!


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(1)USNI News website, “Navy Developing New Mine Countermeasures USV for Littoral Combat Ships”, Sam LaGrone, 17-Oct-2018,

(2)USNI News website, “Littoral Combat Ship Program Vastly Different a Year Into Major Organizational, Operational Overhaul”, Megan Eckstein, 6-Sep-2017,

Wednesday, December 13, 2017

Marine Corps in Desert Storm - The Great Diversion

In the 1991 Desert Storm campaign, the Marines threatened, but did not conduct, an amphibious assault.  Their efforts created a diversion that tied up large numbers of Iraqi troops (60,000 – 80,000 depending on the source) defending against an assault that never materialized.  This reduced the numbers that the Coalition faced during the actual ground assault.  Most people believe that the diversion was a brilliant example of the value of amphibious forces.  To some extent, that’s true, however, in this case, the diversion was never a serious, viable threat due to the presence of mines.

“At the inception of Operation Desert Storm, it was unlikely that amphibious operations would take place, because of the minefields that lay along the Kuwaiti and Iraqi coast, and the threat posed by Iraqi antiship-missile capabilities.” (1)

Coalition planners did, indeed, consider the possibility of an amphibious assault with the goal of seizing the port at Ash Shuaybah, on the Kuwaiti coast.  However, when the Tripoli (LPH-10) and the Princeton (CG-59) struck mines on 18 February 1991, any thought of an actual assault was abandoned.  The U.S. and Coalition lacked the capacity to clear mines in a combat assault scenario.

“The force planners estimated any assault would need ten days of concentrated mine clearance to clear a path and three to five days of naval gunfire support to clear Iraqi beach defences. Air strikes and naval gunfire would also have to be used while the mines that were within range of Iraqi artillery were cleared. Before then, the amphibious force would have to stay over 70 miles from the coast.” (2)

Ten days to clear a path for an amphibious assault – and this did not include clearance of the more widespread minefields that prevented the amphibious ships from even reaching the area – as Tripoli and Princeton found out.

Had Saddam Hussein realized this, and he should have, he could have dismissed the amphibious possibility as the non-existent threat that it was.  However, no one ever accused Hussein of being a strategic or operational genius and he treated the non-existent threat as real.  Of course, in the end, it made no difference either way.

The salient point from this is that the presence of mines completely removed the realistic possibility of amphibious assault from the operational table.  Not only has nothing changed today but our mine countermeasures (MCM) capability has atrophied even further.  We have no realistic possibility of conducting amphibious assaults or port seizures when mines are present.  Given the vast inventories of mines possessed by all our likely enemies, those enemies are effectively immune from amphibious assault. 

The Marines and Navy can talk all they want about amphibious assault but until they begin to acquire the basic, non-glamorous capabilities like MCM, naval fire support, C-RAM, functional first wave connectors, etc., amphibious assault will remain just talk.



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(1)United States Naval Institute Proceedings magazine, “Marine Amphibious Force Operations in the Persian Gulf War”, 2nd Lt. Michael Russ, USMC, July 1997, Vol 123/7

(2)History of War website,

Wednesday, November 29, 2017

Torpedo and Mine Damage History - Part 2

In Part 1, we examined some of the historical examples of the effects of underwater explosions from mines and torpedoes on ships.  We found, as we did with our scholarly examination, that the myth about torpedoes breaking the back of ships is just that – a myth, at least for ships the size of large destroyers and above.  Further, we found that even significant structural damage – significant in the sense of threatening to sink the vessel – was rare to non-existent.  The next obvious question is, why?  Where does this torpedo damage resistance come from?  What is it about the structure of a ship that provides such resistance?

The answer is both obvious and largely unknown and unrealized, at least outside naval architect circles and possibly even within.  The answer is keels.  Note that the answer is in the plural – keels.  Few people realize that ships have multiple “keels”.  Now note the enclosure of the word in quotes, indicating that the word is not to be used literally.  Huh?  What are we talking about?

Ships have multiple “keels” (I’ll now stop putting the word in quotes, for ease of typing), most of which are unintended as such but are nevertheless present.

Consider …  A keel, without getting too technical, is the bottommost, main structural longitudinal member of the ship.  It runs the length of the ship and provides the backbone upon which all the other structural elements attach, either directly or indirectly.  For this reason, the torpedo bubble crowd believed that if the keel (the ship’s “back”, like the spine of a human) were broken the ship would automatically sink.

What few people realize is that there are other longitudinal structural members in a ship that act as keels. 

Armor belts on the side of a ship are complete, solid structures that run a significant length of the ship and are intimately attached to the ship’s structure.  Thus, they constitute two additional keels.

Armored (or even simply thick) decks also run the length of the ship and act as longitudinal structural members or keels.  There can be one or more, depending on the number of armored decks the ship has.

Some ships have longitudinal bulkheads which also act as keels.

Each of these keels has the strength to hold the ship together by itself.  Thus, even in the unlikely event of the failure of one keel, the others are sufficient to protect the ship from breaking in two and sinking.

Noted naval historian Robert Lundgren discussed this phenomenon in a NavWeapons website forum topic (1).  Here are some of his comments.

“A ship with a fully developed side protective system is not subject to the type of break-up a lesser vessel is due to under-keel explosions. No capital ship ever in history ever broke in half due to an under-keel explosion even when it was a nuclear explosion.”

“In a battleship, the ship has what they call a soft keel. Any longitude bulkhead that makes up over 50% of her length becomes a strength member of the hull girder. In an Iowa as an example, her four bulkhead system on each side gives her eight additional strength members and her third bulkhead is her armor belt which is extremely difficult to place into sheer. The side protection system is so strong it can support the weight of the ship even if the flat keel is destroyed. Each layer of the side protective system acts as an additional keel so in an Iowa she has 8 side keels and her flat keel and she actually has three upper strength decks with the second deck being an armored deck which is also difficult to bend. In the roughly 2 seconds an under-keel explosion has to work on the hull the side hinges that form on lesser ships never form on a battleship or even a fleet aircraft carrier. Therefore, the upper strength deck or decks are never placed in stress. What does occur is the under-bottom is either holed or crushed in and depending on the damage will depend on the amount of flooding just like a side hit by a torpedo. The ship will whip just like Tirpitz did but not break up.”

“The 4,000 lb warheads under Tirpitz were roughly equal to 4 x MK 48 torpedoes or a 1,500 lb warhead detonating 50 feet under her keel. All underwater explosions work the same. So if a MK 48 1,500 lb warhead gives X amount of force at 50 feet this can equal a 4,000 lb warhead at 100 feet and the 28 kiloton nuclear warhead may be the same at 2000 feet and so on. So the distance and the amount of ocean on top of the explosion is important. Even Arkansas did not break up at Bikini. She basically was flipped over and landed upside down on an empty sea bed as all the water had been blown out of the lagoon.  Her hull was crushed when all that water came back down. Her sides held her together while she was in mid-air and her armor is cracked in one place near her bow but she is intact.”


There you have it.  There’s the explanation (well, one of them) for the resistance of ships to underwater explosions.  Additional resistance is also imparted by the numerous other shorter, smaller structural elements, all of which function to spread the stress load throughout the entire ship’s structure rather than having it concentrate in one spot.  The spreading or dissipation of the stress helps to prevent structural breakage at the point of impact.  We’re wandering into structural engineering, now, and that’s well beyond the scope of a simple post so we’ll leave it at that.  Suffice it to say that ships have a greater inherent resistance to underwater explosions than most people realize.

This is not to say that underhull explosions are not powerful and damaging – they are and for smaller, lighter built ships they may well prove fatal.  But, as we proved in our examination of the torpedo myth, and in our examination of historical data, they are not the instant death that the torpedo myth crowd believes. 

This concludes our examination of the torpedo myth and puts it to rest, once and for all.



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(1)NavWeaps website forum, Topic: “Threat: Torpedoes That Go Under The Keels” 31-Mar-2014, username: rlundgren,


Monday, November 27, 2017

Torpedo and Mine Damage History - Part 1

We previously examined torpedoes and their lethality and debunked the “broken back over a bubble of air” myth by examining available experimental data and applying simple logic (see, "Torpedo Lethality Myth").  However, it’s always worth looking at actual operational experience so let’s look at some historical examples of ships subjected to large underwater explosions due to mines and torpedoes and see what we can learn. 

This is the first of a two part post.  In this part, we’ll look at the historical data.  In the second part, we’ll examine an explanation for the historical data.

I’ve tried to pick a cross section of ship types, sizes, eras, and nationalities while working under the constraint of known data.  Many ships suffered mine/torpedo damage but the damage was too poorly documented to analyze.  The following examples are presented in no particular order.



Tirpitz

Tirpitz is one of the most documented and relevant examples.  According to Wiki, X-Craft midget submarines laid four 2 tonne mines on the sea bed under the bottom of the target.

“first exploded abreast of turret Caesar”

“second detonated 45 to 55 m (148 to 180 ft) off the port bow”

“A fuel oil tank was ruptured, shell plating was torn, a large indentation was formed in the bottom of the ship, and bulkheads in the double bottom buckled. Some 1,430 t (1,410 long tons) of water flooded the ship in fuel tanks and void spaces in the double bottom of the port side, which caused a list of one to two degrees, which was balanced by counter-flooding on the starboard side. “

The mines were massive explosions and caused extensive damage but no threat of sinking and no significant permanent structural damage.  In fact, the damage was repaired over the course of a few months.  These mines probably represented a worst case under-the-hull explosion of the type we’re interested in.

In a later attack, RAF Lancaster bombers attacked with 6-short-ton Tallboy bombs with 5200 lb Torpex D1 explosive.  A single hit on the ship's bow penetrated the ship, passed through the keel and exploded on the bottom of the fjord.  A thousand tons of water flooded the bow and caused a serious increase in trim forward but the ship did not sink.

Along with many bomb hits distributed over several aerial attacks which eventually sank the ship, Tirpitz absorbed three massive underwater explosions of the type we’re concerned with.  In fact, the explosions were probably much more powerful than a torpedo and yet they failed to inflict significant structural damage.

Prince of Wales / Repulse

PoW
-          torpedo hit on outer port propeller shaft exit causing extensive flooding and an 11 degree list to port
-          torpedo hit starboard bow
-          torpedo hit starboard alongside B turret
-          torpedo hit starboard alongside Y turret

Repulse
-          Four or more torpedo hits

Note that Repulse lacked anti-torpedo blisters and modern internal compartmentation.


Yamato

The Japanese battleship Yamato was subjected to multiple waves of attack.

First wave:

-          torpedo hit port side, forward which caused little damage
-          two torpedo hits port side near engine and boiler rooms
-          probably torpedo hit near auxiliary steering

Hits cause an initial list which was corrected with counterflooding.  Top speed was only slightly affected.

Second wave:

-          three or four torpedoes hit port side and one to starboard

This attack caused additional listing but did not put the ship at risk of sinking.

Third wave:

-          Three torpedo hits port side concentrated along the engineering spaces
-          Torpedo hit starboard

At this point, the ship began to sink.  In addition to the numerous torpedo hits, many bomb hits caused additional damage.


Musashi

Musashi was a Yamato class battleship that was sunk on 24-Oct-1944.  The ship suffered numerous bomb hits and the following torpedo hits.

-          1 torpedo starboard amidships which caused some flooding
-          3 torpedoes port side
-          4 torpedoes, three of which hit the forward bow
-          3 torpedoes starboard bow
-          11 torpedoes various locations

The ship sank intact.


Belgrano (Brooklyn class light cruiser)

The Argentinean cruiser was a 44 year old pre-WWII ship, poorly maintained, served by an ill-trained crew, and sailing with all watertight doors open when it was hit by three British 21” torpedoes.  The first exploded just forward of the armor belt and damaged the bow but did not threaten the ship’s stability.  The second hit just aft of the armor belt and opened a large hole which caused severe flooding.  Reports suggest that the third torpedo hit but it is uncertain whether it exploded.

None of the torpedoes broke the ship’s back and the first didn’t even hazard the ship.  The second caused flooding beyond the ill-trained crew’s ability to handle and led to the ship sinking.  It is likely that a well maintained ship, sailing at combat readiness (watertight doors closed), and with a trained crew would have been able to contain the damage and save the ship.


Bismarck

Prior to the action that directly resulted in the sinking of the Bismarck, the ship had suffered shellfire damage though the damage appeared to have no direct impact on the ship’s survivability.

On the evening of 24-May-1941, Bismarck suffered a single torpedo hit which caused only superficial damage to her armored belt.  Other reports suggest several torpedoes hit but did no significant damage. (1)

On the evening of 26-May a torpedo struck Bismarck’s port side and jammed her rudder.

On 27-May, British battleships and cruisers eventually wrecked Bismarck’s upper decks with the Bismarck absorbing as many as 500 shell hits. (1)  Torpedoes were launched by the British ships but the number of hits, if any, are unknown.  Two possible hits were reported. (2) 

Dorsetshire fired two 21 inch torpedoes and both hit the starboard side with no appreciable effect observed.  Another torpedo struck the port side, again with no visible effect.

Bismarck settled deeper into the sea and eventually capsized and sank.

In all, Bismarck suffered at least 5 confirmed torpedo hits and possibly 7 or more.  Other than to contribute to the cumulative flooding, the torpedoes caused no catastrophic structural damage.


HMS Belfast (light cruiser)

The cruiser Belfast struck a magnetic mine in November of 1939.  The ship suffered moderate damage and was repaired and returned to service.  Belfast was 613 ft long and around 11,000 tons displacement.

Photos of the ship in drydock suggest that the mine exploded under the hull, slightly offset to one side.  The explosion caused little direct damage to the hull, leaving a small hole, but did cause shock damage and warping of decks and structural members.  The keel was bent upwards by three inches.

The ship was, apparently, in no danger of sinking at any time.

This was a nearly classic example of the torpedo/mine exploding under directly under the hull and should have been a perfect example of the “broken back due to  suspension of the ship over a bubble” if the phenomenon were true.



Lexington (CV-2)

Two torpedoes hit the carrier on the port side but the ship was able to continue flight operations until a series of massive gasoline-sparked explosions occurred which eventually led to the ship being abandoned.  A US destroyer was ordered to sink the carrier and fired five torpedoes at which point the carrier settled into the sea on an even keel.


Princeton (CG-59)

During Desert Storm, Princeton suffered two bottom-moored influence mine explosions, one under the port rudder and the other under the starboard bow.  The explosions caused superstructure cracks and hull deformations along with various piping damage, shaft damage, and rudder damage but the ship’s weapons were back on line in 15 minutes.  The ship was able to leave the minefield under her own power.

Again, this was a near perfect example of the “explosion under the hull” and yet they did not break the ship’s back nor threaten the ship’s survival.  Further, this is a case of an explosion occurring under a modern, weakly built (as compared to a WWII ship of similar size) hull and yet still did not sink the ship.


Tripoli (LPH-10)

During Desert Storm, Tripoli suffered a mine explosion from a sub-surface moored mine which caused a 16x25 ft hole in the hull below the waterline.  The ship continued operations after damage control measures.

Again, this is a near perfect example of the underwater explosion effect and the results were negligible as regards ship survivability or even mission effectiveness.

Tripoli Mine Damage


Samuel B. Roberts (Perry class FFG)

A mine explosion blew a 15 ft hole in the ship and broke the keel triggering flooding and fires on multiple decks.  The mine is believed to have exploded in contact with the ship’s hull.  The explosion occurred on the port side at the forward end of the hangar.  Despite the near fatal damage, the ship was able to maneuver using thrusters at 5 kts and her combat systems and weapons remained operational.  The ship was saved, repaired, and returned to service.  Repairs took 6 months and cost $89M.

This explosion took place a bit to the side as opposed to directly under the ship and came as close to sinking the ship as any of the examples.  This is also the smallest ship in the examples and a modern, weakly built ship.  Despite this, the explosion did not break the ship in two.


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The observation that leaps out from an examination of the historical data is that no large ship has ever had its back broken by a mine or torpedo in the popular “suspended over a bubble of air” scenario.  Yes, a sufficiently large number of mines/torpedoes can cause enough cumulative damage (usually cumulative flooding) to eventually sink a large ship but none has ever been broken and sunk with a single mine/torpedo shot which is the commonly cited claim by the “torpedoes are invincible” crowd.  In fact, not only has no large ship ever been sunk by a single torpedo/mine hit but most have absorbed at least several such hits prior to sinking along with, in most cases, many aerial bombs which contributed to the sinkings.

It is also notable and, frankly, a bit surprising, that even smaller ships have been able to absorb surprising amounts of underwater explosion damage.  The 450 ft long, 4200 ton displacement Samuel B. Roberts was an example of such.

It must be noted that WWII torpedoes were not designed as under-the-keel weapons.  Most WWII torpedo hits impacted the side of the target’s hull somewhere in the lower half of the underwater hull depending on the depth setting of the torpedo and the draft of the target’s hull.  As such, these are not direct representatives of a perfectly placed under-the-keel explosion but they are informative data points, nonetheless.

There is also a school of thought that WWII weapons were not as powerful as today’s.  This is nonsense, as least as far as torpedoes and mines are concerned.  Supersonic, heavyweight anti-ship missiles are another issue but that’s a topic for another time.  Mines haven’t appreciably changed in terms of their explosive power.  Yes, fusing mechanisms have gotten more sophisticated but the raw explosive firepower has not.  The same holds true for torpedoes.  For example, the standard US torpedo of WWII was the Mk14 with a warhead weight of 643 lb.  The current standard US torpedo, the Mk48 has a 650 lb warhead.  They’re identical.

We previously disproved the commonly held belief that torpedoes kill by suspending a ship over a bubble of air and breaking its back.  The empirical evidence in this post further proves that the belief is a myth.  In fact, the empirical evidence suggests that ships can absorb far more underwater explosive effects than anticipated and that even destroyer and frigate size ships are capable of absorbing tremendous damage without structurally collapsing and sinking.

This post should not be read as a claim that torpedoes are insignificant - far from it.  They are powerful and damaging.  The smaller the ship, the more damage an underwater explosion will inflict – no great surprise – and, for smaller ships, such damage may well be fatal.  Still, all ships seem to show a surprising inherent resistance to underwater explosions. 

In part 2 of this post, we’ll examine one of the main, but generally unrecognized, factors behind this resistance to underwater explosions.



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Wednesday, November 1, 2017

The Stupid Is Growing!

We’ve discussed the utter stupidity of the Navy’s distributed lethality concept.  We’ve pointed out the idiocy behind risking high value amphibious or logistic support vessels in an attempt to mount 4 or 8 Harpoons and somehow “complicate” the enemy’s tactical situation.  We’ve pointed out that none of those ships have access to the long range targeting that distributed lethality would require.

Despite the obvious stupidity of distributed lethality, the Navy has decided to double down on “distributed” and is now proposing distributed mine countermeasures (MCM). (1)  Having recognized that their all-in bet on the LCS as the future of MCM has turned into a dismal failure, the Navy now proposes a piecemeal distribution of MCM components across the fleet. 

“…the Navy now wants at least some mine-hunting gear on a vessels ranging from modified oil tankers to catamarans to aircraft carriers.” (1)

It’s a grand vision, isn’t it?  A task force encounters a minefield and barely even hesitates as every ship unleashes remote MCM drones that clear the field in short order and the task force sails on, hardly even delayed.  Another enemy stratagem foiled!

Breaking Defense website at least sees part of the problem with this concept.

“The new plan could finally infuse mine warfare into the mainstream of the Navy — or diffuse responsibility to crews that see it as an unwelcome distraction from their ships’ main mission.” (1)

They’ve got it right.  A Burke, carrier, or other ship has a main purpose and many other side functions that already occupy all their time.  Adding yet another responsibility to an already overloaded crew is pointless – they won’t be any good at it.  Once a year (at best!) the ship will run through a quick, scripted MCM exercise to check off a training box and then promptly store the equipment out of the way and forget about it and the skills required to be competent at MCM.  Despite what the Navy would have us believe about the magical capabilities of remote, autonomous MCM UUVs, mine detection and identification still require a great deal of expertise from the human operators.  Do you think a Burke captain is going to spend his precious training time practicing MCM or AAW?  That’s right, when the time comes for real, the crew won’t even remember how to spell MCM let alone be able to competently execute it.

Do we really want to take a carrier or Burke or high-demand logistics ship away from their main mission and park it next to a minefield for weeks on end?

Do we really want to risk multi-billion dollar ships near a minefield?

Do we really want to tie high value warships to a fixed location for weeks on end, offering the enemy a perfect target that they can pick off at their leisure?

Breaking Defense website sums up the problem.

“Navy culture makes it all too easy for surface commanders to ignore mine warfare unless that is their vessel’s only mission. And hunting mines is a slow, laborious task that requires a ship to stay in one small area until it’s done.” (2)

As retired Navy commander Bryan Clark puts it,

“…adding MCM to the task list of ships that are already unable to stay proficient and certified in their current mission areas is not a good idea.” (2)

Our crews are overworked and unable to master basic seamanship and now we want to add another task to the list of things they’re not competent to do?

I give the Navy the tiniest bit of credit for recognizing that the LCS MCM concept has failed.  However, instead of doing the obvious and building a fleet of dedicated MCM vessels, ranging from small Avenger replacements to large MCM motherships, along with squadrons of MCM helos, the Navy has chosen the stupid option, as they always do.


Our Next Minesweeper!

By the way, does any of this sound vaguely familiar?  It should.  We built six Burkes that had organic MCM capability in the form of the WLD-1 Remote Minehunting System (RMS) which was to be housed and launched from a pocket built into the side of the Burke’s hangar.  That program failed and was cancelled – now we want to do it again and think it will work.  Does anyone recall the definition of insanity?

Burke With Minehunting Modification


Distributed lethality.  Distributed MCM.  I’m waiting for someone to come up with distributed aircraft carriers with every ship carrying one aircraft. 



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(1)Breaking Defense website, “Every Ship A Minesweeper? Navy Looks Beyond LCS”, Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., 30-Oct-2017,

(2)Breaking Defense website, “Worries Surface On New Navy Mine Warfare Plan”, Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., 31-Oct-2017,