Ambassador Class Missile Boat

The Ambassador Mk III class missile boat (sometimes referred to as Ambassador IV or Ezzat class) was a group of three (eventually, four) missile boats built by VT Halter Marine in the US, for Egypt.  The cost for the first three vessels was $1.05B ($ 2009) which gave a unit cost of $350M.[1]  A fourth vessel was added for a separate, incremental cost of $240M ($314M in $2022).[1]

 

Ambassador Mk III

The vessel is a stealthy design, around 210 ft long and 600 tons displacement.  Maximum speed is 41 kts and range is 2000 nm at 15 kts.  Crew is around 40.  It is heavily armed for its size, as listed below:

 

• 1x 76 mm gun
• 1x RAM
• 1x CIWS
• 8x Harpoon in two quad canister launchers
• 2x 7.62 MG

 

Ambassador Mk III

 

Before we go any further, let me just make the obvious statement and get it out of the way.  At ½ to 1/6 the size, the Ambassador class puts the LCS to shame in almost every respect except aviation.  It has more and better weapons (though if the Navy follows through on arming LCS with the Naval Strike Missile, that comparison would become a bit more even), higher speed, significantly lower cost, smaller crew, and is stealthier.  With that out of the way, let’s examine the Ambassador class in more detail.

 

The Ambassador class is a territorial waters missile boat and is, thus, defensive by nature.  As a territorial waters vessel, its limited range is not a problem as friendly ports will never be far away. 

 

With 8 anti-ship missiles per vessel, a squadron could muster a very strong anti-surface strike.

 

The class’ sensors are as good as can be hoped for^[a] in a vessel of this size and the anti-ship capability can be greatly enhanced by off-board sensors which, given the territorial waters regime, can be provided by land based helos, radar, over-the-horizon radar, aircraft, UAVs, etc.  With off-board sensor support, the Ambassadors could remain emission-silent (EMCON) and conduct strikes without ever radiating and being detected.

 

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^[a]Sensors include:

 

Thales MRR-3D NG G band air surveillance radar

Thales Scout (I/J band) surveillance radar;  low power, low probability of intercept radar

Thales STING-EO Mk2 fire control radar;  dual band radar plus electro-optical (EO) sensor

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The Ambassador Mk III is truly an impressive vessel for territorial waters operations but could an Ambassador provide any effective capability for the US fleet?  The answer is, clearly, yes, it could provide effective firepower but the real question is could the vessels be effectively supported in a US fleet role?  This is the problem that the LCS is facing. 

 

For better or worse, the US Navy operates on a forward deployed basis and the reality is that vessels with limited range are very difficult to support in an operationally relevant location.  We just don’t have many forward bases.  There are a few regions in the world where small vessels can operate and be supported but those are the exception.  The Middle East is the obvious example.  We have enough bases or support arrangements that Ambassador class vessels could effectively operate there, at least during peacetime.  In that region, they would make effective counters to Iranian naval assets since their weapons cover the spectrum from long range anti-ship missiles to close in weapons.  These vessels would be highly effective against Iranian UAVs, swarm boats, or corvette/frigates.

 

If this sounds suspiciously like the role the LCS was supposed to have filled, it is!  The only difference is that the Ambassador class works and the LCS doesn’t.

 

Ominously, however, the Navy has operated two other small vessel classes that could have been highly effective in the Middle East region and yet were not:  the Cyclone and MkVI patrol boat classes.  Both were well armed for their size and could have been effective as regional patrol boats but, due to timid policies and rules of engagement, were rendered toothless and ineffective and two vessels were captured by two nearly unarmed Iranian small boats with a grand total of three crew.

 

They could have, but were not allowed to, ride herd on Iranian small boats that terrorize and disrupt commercial and naval vessels. 

 

They could have, but were not allowed to, prevent Iranian mining of commercial ships. 

 

They could have, but were not allowed to, destroy Iranian UAVs that operated in an unsafe manner.

 

Given the demonstrated, historical refusal of the US government/Navy to take justified forceful action against a terrorist nation, or even exercise the inherent right of self defense against boarders, there would appear to be no precedent or justification for Ambassador class missile boats;  we simply would not utilize them in an effective manner.

 

In a war in the Middle East, the Ambassadors could operate as distant screening vessels, supported by other surveillance assets and air cover although, at that point, they would be somewhat redundant as we would have more than sufficient air power to accomplish the same things the Ambassadors could.

 

Similarly, the Ambassadors could be highly effective against Chinese Coast Guard vessels and fishing fleets that routinely trespass into other country’s territorial waters.  They could also be useful for providing on-site surveillance of illegal Chinese artificial islands.  Again, however, policy prohibits all this.

 

 

Conclusion

 

Without a doubt, the Ambassador class missile boats have potentially useful firepower which, combined with their small size and small cost, ought to make them effective patrol vessels during peacetime.  They could be very useful in the Middle East for controlling Iran or the South China Sea for countering China but only if we are willing to forcefully confront those countries when their behavior crosses the line.  Lacking that willpower and fortitude, the Ambassador class is of no use to the US Navy and would simply be yet another logistic support burden that provides no beneficial return - as is currently true of the entire Navy!

 

Outstanding vessel … no role in the US Navy.

 

 

 

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[1]Wikipedia, “Ambassador Mk III missile boat”, retrieved 9-Feb-2022,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambassador_MK_III_missile_boat

Missile Boat Battles – Latakia and Baltim

There is great debate among naval observers about what a future naval battle will look like and opinions range all over the map.  As always, let’s take a look at history to see if we can get a glimpse of the future.

 

The 1973 Yom Kippur War took place during October of that year between Israel and several Arab states, notably Egypt and Syria.  During the war, two missile boat battles occurred in the brief span between 7-Oct and 9-Oct.  These offer us the possibility of observing a modern naval battle (from the past!) and learning lessons applicable to today.

 

 

Battle of Latakia

 

The first of the two battles occurred on 7-Oct-1973 between  four Israeli Sa’ar 3 and one Sa’ar 4 missile boats and Syrian boats consisting of two Komar and one Osa missile boats plus a minesweeper and a torpedo boat.  The Israelis were armed with short range (12 miles) Gabriel anti-ship missiles and the Syrians were armed with the SS-N-2 Styx anti-ship missile which had twice the range (25 miles) of the Gabriel.(1)

 

The Israeli plan was to lure the Syrian missile boats out and engage them at the maximum range of their Styx missiles, which the Israelis hoped to defeat through the chaff and electronic countermeasures (ECM). (1)

 

On their approach to the operations area, the Israelis detected a Syrian torpedo boat by radar at 4 miles, visually identified it, and engaged with 76 mm gunfire to save a missile.  The gunfire from multiple Israeli boats, at ranges out to 10 miles, proved inefficient with many misses, though ultimately it was successful and sank the torpedo boat.

 

[Israeli commander] Barkai had to assume that the Syrian torpedo boat had reported the Israeli presence. He now abandoned the carefully rehearsed Israeli plan of an attack from the north and fighting at optimum distance in favor of an immediate descent on Latakia from the west. (2)

 

As the Israelis headed west, they detected a Syrian minesweeper at 15 miles and fired a Gabriel missile at extreme range which the minesweeper was able to outdistance, causing the missile to fall short.  Additional missiles were fired at closer range which damaged the vessel and a combination of missiles and gunfire sank the ship.(2)

 

Soon after, the Israelis detected the Syrian missile boats which fired first, at long range (45 km/28 miles), but the Israeli electronic countermeasures (chaff and jamming) prevented any hits.  Some Syrian boats attempted to fire missiles while docked in the port of Latakia but the missiles malfunctioned and two nearby merchant ships were hit by mistake.

 

As the Israelis closed the range and got their chance to launch missiles, an equipment malfunction prevented on Israeli boat from launching.

 

At this critical juncture, a short circuit on the Reshef prevented a missile launch. (2)

 

The Israeli missile salvos from the remaining vessels sank two Syrian missile boats immediately and the remaining boat, damaged, opted to run aground.  An Israeli boat engaged it with gunfire and destroyed it.

 

Osa I

The Israelis are reported to have used 9 Gabriel missiles which sank a minesweeper, one Komar, one Osa, and damaged another Osa.  Israeli 76 mm guns were used to sink a Syrian torpedo boat and the damaged Osa which had run aground.

Sa'ar 3

 

Summary – On paper, the Syrians had every advantage:  longer range missiles, first salvo, home waters, and land based support.  Despite this, the Syrian force was wiped out.  Israeli EW/ECM allowed their boats to pass through the Syrain engagement zone unharmed and reach their own engagement range.  The Israeli Gabriel missiles proved devastatingly effective while the Syrian Styx missiles were complete failures.

 

 

Battle of Baltim

 

The second battle took place just north of Baltim, in Egypt, on 8-9-Oct-1973, the day after the Latakia battle.  This one involved 6 Israeli Sa’ar missile boats (2x Sa’ar 4, 2x Sa’ar 3, 1x Sa’ar 2, 1x Sa’ar 1) and 4 Egyptian Osa class missile boats. 

 

The Israeli boats shelled coastal targets to try to draw out the Egyptian boats.  Initially, the Israelis detected targets to their west and pursued at high speed, however, after 30 minutes they realized that the targets were just false electronic ‘ghosts’.  Because of the high speed pursuit, several Israeli boats ran short of fuel and had to retire but enough were left to continue the mission.

 

Shortly after, 4 Osas were detected to the east, coming out of the port of Alexandria.  Unable to maintain contact, the Israelis fired chaff clouds, hoping to deceive the Egyptians into firing and this tactic succeeded.  The four Egyptian boats launched multiple missile salvos over the course of several minutes, many (all?) targeted on the Israeli chaff clouds.  After the last salvo, the Egyptians reversed course and headed back towards Alexandria.  The Israelis pursued for 25 minutes before reaching firing range.  Three of the Egyptian boats were hit by missiles, damaged, and further engaged with 76 mm gunfire.  The remaining Osa escaped when a pursuing Israeli boat suffered a malfunction and was unable to launch missiles.  At this point, the Israeli force withdrew.

 

 

Note:  Any attempt to study these battles is somewhat limited by the lack of information from the Syrian side.  Their objectives, intent, and actions are unknown or known only as reported through Israeli sources.  Nevertheless, the battle offers a good view of a modern naval missile battle.

 

 

 

So, as harbingers of modern naval combat, what lessons can we learn from these battles?

 

 

Targeting – As ComNavOps has repeatedly pointed out, missiles (no matter how fearsome, deadly, and long ranged) are useless without valid targeting.  The Egyptian misidentification of chaff clouds as actionable targets provided graphic demonstration of this phenomenon.  By launching at non-existent targets, the Egyptians forfeited any possibility of success.  They violated the axiom, ‘fire effectively, first’.  Firing at a misidentified, non-existent target is not firing effectively.  This also gives lie to the reliability of radar.  Targets will still be misidentified or missed no matter how modern and effective the radar is – or is claimed to be.  Recall the recent misadventure of the Burke destroyer launching several missiles against likely non-existent attacking missiles.

 

EW/ECM – Chaff and jamming allowed the Israeli boats, with shorter range missiles, to reach firing range safely.  ECM has, historically, proven highly effective at defending against missiles, far more so than active defensive weapons.  Hughes presents the data on this in his fleet tactics book.

 

Reliability in Combat – Systems will fail in combat as the Israelis encountered at least twice.  As long as Murphy roams the battlefield, this will be a guaranteed truth.  The fix for this, to the extent possible, is rigorous testing during peacetime, redundancy, and a ship and weapon system design that acknowledges such failure and allows for it with practices such as backups, local control, rapid repairability, and simplicity of design.

 

Manufacturer Claims versus Actual Performance – The much hyped Styx missile failed utterly while the relatively unknown Gabriel performed nearly flawlessly.  More generally, the Soviet Osas failed as a weapon system despite manufacturer claims.  With near 100% certainty, weapon systems will fail to live up to their claims and, generally, by a wide margin.  The antidote to this is rigorous, realistic testing during peacetime – a practice the US Navy abhors.

 

Mindset –The willingness to accept risks allowed the Israelis to close to effective engagement range.

 

Squadrons – The Israeli operation of small vessels as squadrons allowed for massing of weapons and resilience in combat when several boats ran low on fuel and had to retire leaving a still effective group behind.  It also allowed the Israeli commander to dispatch individual boats to perform side actions while still retaining a useful mass of force.

 

Missile Range – As noted in the post, the Syrian Styx missiles had twice the range of the Israeli Gabriel and yet were utterly ineffective.  This reinforces, with a hammer to the forehead, ComNavOps’ oft repeated warning that missile range is useless without valid targeting and a missile that can actually perform at least somewhat as advertised.  In fact, missile range is almost a minor attribute compared to other missile characteristics!  The obsession with missile range that so many naval observers have is based on a misdirected emphasis on a single attribute and the complete disregard for the missile’s other characteristics and the kill chain, in general.  For all practical purposes, the effective Styx missile range was zero.  This is also true of the hugely overhyped Chinese DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile whose effective range is also zero due to the complete absence of commensurate targeting capability.

 

Ship Range – Missile boats are strictly a short range, home waters asset and even under these conditions fuel became an issue and forced several Israeli boats to retire prematurely at Baltim.  Range is a priceless commodity and should not be ignored as has happened in modern US Navy ship designs.

 

Fog of War – Israeli boats at Baltim pursued electronic ghosts.  Egyptian boats targeted chaff clouds.  One Egyptian boat ran aground (whether intentionally or not is unknown – reports differ).  The carefully planned Israeli battle plan for Latakia was quickly abandoned after the initial engagement with the Syrian torpedo boat.  The fog of war is a constant of combat and all the modern sensors and electronics won’t change that reality.

 

Distributed Lethality – The Syrian torpedo boat at Latakia is a prime example of the folly of using distributed, isolated vessels which is what distributed lethality is.  This leads, inevitably, to defeat in detail, as happened to the torpedo boat.  Only in the most extremely positive set of circumstances can the concept have even a chance of succeeding and reality rarely provides the most extremely positive set of circumstances!

 

Detection – Syrian boats were detected by Israeli radar at horizon ranges or shorter.  It is noteworthy that the Syrian torpedo boat at Latakia was not detected until around 4 miles.  This should give pause to those who believe that radar is some kind of all-seeing, omniscient, miracle sensor.  The Syrian minesweeper at Latakia was detected by Israeli radar at 15 miles.  Syrian detection ranges of Israeli boats are unknown but, given the extreme ranges that they launched their missiles, they were presumably 20+ miles – with the caveat that the target identifications were suspect.

 

Soviet Weapon Performance – This was yet another in an almost endless string of Soviet weapon system failures.  Whether it was Soviet SAM performance in Vietnam, Styx missiles, or Soviet aircraft and tanks in Desert Storm, the simple fact is that Soviet weapons have failed spectacularly throughout post-WWII history.  This history should offer us some perspective as we contemplate whatever the latest claimed Russian wonder weapon is.  Soviet/Russian claims far exceed their actual performance.

 

Damage Control – Israeli boats twice suffered malfunctions that prevented missile launches, in one case allowing an Egyptian vessel to escape.  Battle damage, and simple breakdowns/malfunctions, will always occur and the ability to implement repairs on board, during a battle, is crucial.  US ship designs have forgotten this lesson by instituting minimal manning with no on-board repair capability and embracing overly complex systems that cannot be repaired on board.

 

  

 

 

 

Missile Comparison

 

Following is a brief comparison of the Gabriel and Styx missiles:

 

 

The Israeli Gabriel anti-ship missile used a joystick tracking system requiring that the operator keep it on target by radar. It had never been fired in actual combat. (1)

 

Meanwhile, the Soviet SS-N-2 Styx fire-and-forget (meaning that it does not require human tracing once fired) missile employed by the Syrians was combat-proven. (1)

 

 

 

 

	SS-N-2 Styx	Gabriel Mk1
Length, ft	19	11
Warhead, lb	1001	220
Range, miles	25	12
Speed, mach	0.95
Guidance	inertial guidance, active radar homing (fire and forget)	semi-active radar, joystick guidance

 

 

 

 

 

Conclusion

 

These missile boat battles offer many lessons but do they offer guidance for future battles?  The answer is yes but it all depends on the particulars.  Huh?  What I mean is that the individual lessons are manifestly informative and telling but their impact on future battles depends on how they are combined and what individual ship/weapon/sensor characteristics and battle plans/objectives one has.  For example, the seemingly simple question of whether to radiate or not is not an absolute. It depends on whether one has a defensive system that they believe can handle the enemy’s attack that will result from broadcasting one’s own position. 

 

Well, that’s not very satisfying for those hoping to read about how a future naval battle will play out.  Okay, I’ll offer my general conclusions which are, as I intimated, subject to modification depending on specific circumstances.

 

• Barring an anticipated mismatch in missile/defense capabilities such as the Israelis had, EMCON is mandatory until the missiles start flying.  This suggests a much greater role for passive sensors than the US Navy is currently committed to.
• Active missile defenses will be only marginally effective and electronic countermeasures will be far more important and effective.  Again, this is something that the US Navy is largely ignoring.
• Confusion will reign supreme and all the networks in the world won’t change that.
• Massing of ships equals flexibility, resilience, survivability, effective firepower, and victory.
• Battles will be won or lost during peacetime testing.
• Short range defenses will be the most valuable and yet are woefully lacking on US Navy ships.

 

 

From that you should be able to pretty well visualize what a future naval battle will look like.

 

 

 

Interesting thought:

 

The Israeli use of radar for target detection is interesting considering the flip side of radar use which is that it gives away the user’s position.  It is unknown whether the Syrians detected the Israeli radar emissions but, presumably, they did.  Given the Israeli intent to concede the first missile salvo to the Syrians, the use of radar and its revealing of the Israeli position was immaterial but if the electronic countermeasures hadn’t worked, the Israelis would have been decimated.  Alternatively, the Israelis could have opted to attempt a clandestine EMCON approach, similar to a WWII PT boat, and rely on visual detection but this would have run the risk of missing the Syrian targets.  The decision to use, or not use, radar is always a double sided coin of risk/benefit and is one of the major considerations in an anticipated naval battle.  To radiate or not?

 

 

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(1)Naval Post website, “Battle of Latakia: An operation changed the character of Naval Warfare”, Raymond McConoly, 11-May-2021

https://navalpost.com/battle-of-latakia/

 

(2)Weapons and Warfare website, posted 9-Jun-2018,

https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2018/06/09/battle-of-latakia/

Chinese Type 22 Missile Boat

Today we’re going to take a look at the Chinese Type 22, Houbei class missile boat.  It is a small, fast, stealthy assassin with massive firepower relative to its size.  The class has been built in large numbers (Wiki cites 83 boats currently built and active) which suggests that it will operate in squadrons, allowing it to mass its firepower.  Properly used, this is a formidable threat.

Let’s take a closer look.

Type 22 Missile Boat

Size - The vessel is a 140 ft long catamaran design with a 220 ton displacement and a crew of 12 (1).  For comparison, this puts it at around 1/3 the length of the LCS and a 1/16 the displacement.

Propulsion - Four waterjets give it a speed of 36 kts. 

Number - Wiki cites 83 boats currently built and active.

Range - Range is a potential issue with suggestions of a 300 mile range based on similar civilian craft. (1)

Sensors - Sensors are an issue but operating within the A2/AD zone may greatly mitigate sensor limitations.  It has a Type ESR-1 362 surface search radar plus a Fenis-ME electro-optical tracker and a Kolonika II low-light-level optical director and backup CIWS fire control director, on top of the bridge.  A mast-mounted Type 765 I-band navigation radar rounds out the sensor fit. 

Armament - It carries 8x C-802/803 anti-ship missiles with a range of 100-125 miles depending on variant, an AK-630 (30 mm) CIWS, and a small FLS-1 surface-to-air launcher for QW series missiles. (1)  The Type 22 has extensive communications and data link equipment which suggests the capability for off board control of the missiles.

As noted, this vessel is a combat vessel with firepower far out of proportion to its size.  Add to that, numbers and stealth and you have a vessel that will be hard to detect and can operate in squadrons for concentrated missile salvos – a formidable naval force, to be sure!

The number of vessels built, 83, is magnified by the small operating area that the boats will operate in.  Unlike a 300 ship US Navy which is spread over an entire world, the entire Type 22 fleet of 83 boats is concentrated in the relatively small East or South China Seas.  This has the effect of magnifying the vessels firepower because it automatically concentrates it.

This also suggests that the Chinese will use it as an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) asset to keep US naval forces out of the South and East China Seas.  This also suggests a defensive mindset as opposed to an open ocean, long range naval hunter vessel.  If true, this in turn suggests how the Chinese view the S/E China Seas – essentially, they act as a buffer zone or ‘moat’ around the mainland.  The Chinese are clearly working toward becoming a global naval/military force but this suggests that they are not there, yet, and that their current focus is defensive.

There is also some suggestion that the Type 22 has a shore bombardment role in support of amphibious operations in addition to the anti-ship role. (1)  If true, this would give the Chinese a small, stealthy, hard to hit fire support vessel – a capability that would be unmatched in the world.

It is difficult to talk about the Type 22 without comparing it to the American LCS.

The obvious conclusion is that this is one version of what the LCS could have been.  The LCS tried to be and do everything and failed to be or do anything.  Had the LCS concept been more focused, the Type 22 is one version of what might have been – a small, lethal, stealthy, fast, focused, anti-surface craft cheap enough to be acquired in large numbers and operate in massed squadrons.

The US Navy talks incessantly about distributed lethality.  Unfortunately, the LCS is a poor fit for the distributed lethality concept.  Further, many observers and some naval officers have talked about the LCS as a modern PT boat.  Again, this is utterly ridiculous, for reasons we’ve previously discussed.  The irony is that the Type 22 actually fills the role of a modern PT boat and distributed lethality asset quite well.  Again, this is a version of the LCS that could have been.

A Type 22 swarm attack against a US carrier group would be unstoppable although it is difficult to imagine how such a swarm would even get close enough to launch an attack.  ‘Swarm’ in this scenario is radically different than the Iranian type swarm.  In this case, it would amount to a long range missile swarm as opposed to a short range rocket attack.  That said, I don’t believe the Chinese view the Type 22 as a viable carrier attack asset although if the chance presented itself …

In summary, the Type 22 appears to be a defensive, A2/AD asset intended to prevent US naval entry into the S/E China Seas.  Its stealth, cheapness, and numbers make it the distributed lethality asset that the US Navy wants but has failed to develop.  This is the distributed threat that will ‘confuse and complicate’ our operational and tactical thinking just as we hoped that distributed lethality ships would confuse Chinese naval commanders.  The difference is that the Chinese actually have a suitable vessel for distributed lethality operations whereas we do not. 

The Type 22 is also a good representation of the Hughes concept of small, distributed naval forces – a concept that ComNavOps disagrees with, at least, for the US – and, again, ironically, it is the Chinese that have developed it.

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(1)https://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/1433

Undisputed and Unaccepted

There are certain enduring naval debates such as large carriers versus small carriers.  One of these debates is the value of small missile boats versus large multi-function vessels.  The leading proponent of the missile boat is Captain Wayne Hughes Jr., USN(Ret.).  He has literally written the book on the subject.

To summarize, his contention is that naval combat power is better distributed among many small vessels (the missile boat) than concentrated in fewer and larger vessels (Burkes, for example).  A mathematical model has been developed which factors in the various characteristics of naval warfare such as offensive power, defensive power, damage resistance, numbers of vessels, etc.  The model clearly shows that the single most valuable characteristic of a naval fleet is numbers.

It is a major irony that Capt. Hughes theories are simultaneously undisputed and unaccepted.  The model results are what they are.  There’s no disputing them.  What can be disputed, however, are the underlying assumptions that go into the model.  To repeat a saying as old as computers, “Garbage In, Garbage Out”.  If the data or assumptions are flawed then the results will also be flawed even if they are mathematically correct.



Chinese Houbei Missile Boat - Distributed Power



Is the Hughes model flawed?  I believe so.  For starters, the model is based on the assumption of fleet versus fleet.  It only loosely takes into account air power, for example.  Consider the contention of distributed power (small boats) versus centralized (Burkes).  While the salvo model reasonably models the surface versus surface action and associated factors, it does not really account for air power.  The lowly helo, or any other form of air power, would be essentially 100% effective against any number of missile boats since they have no AAW capability.  In contrast, a Burke would offer a significant defensive capability against air power.  So, the model suggests that missile boats are the preferred force structure but a consideration of air power suggests the opposite.

Or, consider the effect of scouting.  The model considers scouting but in a generic way.  As such, the model predicts the value of numbers and dispersion when evaluated against a generic scouting factor.  However, the model does not consider the impact of modern satellite systems, over-the-horizon radars, ESM dectection, and other scouting methods on the pre-combat scenario.  If the missile boats can be tracked before they ever get into the area of operations then they are just another drone target exercise for the defenders.

One of the central implications of Hughes’ model is that the enemy who faces a distributed fleet (missile boats) faces a dilemma – does the enemy radiate to find the distributed forces and thereby reveal his own location or does he remain silent and risk detection and destruction by the distributed force.  What is not considered is the third option which is to remain silent and let air, space, or subsurface assets do the detecting.

Another example…  The model does not really take into account the impact of an area AAW capable ship which can extend and provide its level of defense to the ships around it.  Further, CEC (cooperative engagement) effects are not accounted for.

One more …  Electronic warfare is not factored except in a generic way such as an improved defensive “rating”.  Things like deception and misdirection via decoys and false signals can have a huge impact on the conduct of a battle and yet are unaccounted for.  Small craft have little or no capabilities to wage this type of combat. 

Finally, the model deals only with the actual combat portion of the force structure issue.  It does not address seakeeping, range, endurance, support requirements, refueling, supply, or any other issues that strongly influence ship type selection.  The small missile boats are just “there” at the start of the battle in the model.  How they got there, or even whether they’re capable of getting there over vast distances and through heavy weather, is not addressed.  The combat model may suggest that small vessels are useful but the logistics and other issues may (or may not) preclude their use and this is not addressed.

Study of Hughes’ model quickly reveals that the model is very simplistic which is ideal for grasping basics or performing quick and dirty analyses, however, it falls well short of simulating actual combat involving the full range of combat assets and effects.  The model is equivalent to an introductory exposure to modeling and tactics.  It’s a good starting point for further, in-depth study but is not the end point.  To be fair, Hughes makes no claim that his model is a full featured simulation.  It is his supporters that have taken the model’s results and run with them beyond the model’s capabilities.

So, what is the takeaway form this discussion?  Hughes model is too simplistic to be an authoritative answer to any question of force structure.  Thus, the conclusion that distributed forces are the preferred force structure is a suspect conclusion.  The model offers suggestive conclusions that merit further investigation but far more factors need to be accounted for.  We have, therefore, a model which is undisputed but, because of the limitations, unaccepted and rightfully so.  A more distributed force structure may well be desirable but the model does not prove it.