With
decades of assured United States
Fairly
recently, in fact, there were calls for removal of short range air defense
(SHORAD) from the Marines.
“In the quest to transform into the
Joint force of the future, many have advocated the removal of Short Range
“In August 2006, the USMC
recommended the termination of the CLAWS [Complementary Low-Altitude Weapon
System] program as part of cuts to spending on air defence capabilities.” (2)
Even
Congress is aware of the air defense shortcomings.
“[House Armed Services] Committee
Chairman Rep. Michael Turner, R-Ohio, asked what the Marines Corps is doing
about its air defense vulnerability: “We are aware that the Marine ground units
are almost wholly without an effective organic air defense system.” (5)
Very
recently, there has been some renewed interest from the Marines as the
realization that we can no longer count on uncontested aerial supremacy sinks
in. Low end UAVs over the battlefield
have also spurred some renewed interest.
Let’s take a closer look at the Marine’s anti-air situation.
Current Capabilities
It is
difficult to find current information on Marine Corps air defense capabilities
but that appears to be, in large measure, because there aren’t many
capabilities. If I've missed an active capability, let me know in the comments. That said, it seems that there are
only two dedicated air defense units:
- 2nd Low Altitude Air Defense
Battalion (2nd LAAD)
- 3rd Low Altitude Air Defense
Battalion (3rd LAAD)
2nd Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion (2nd LAAD) is an
air defense unit that is part of Marine Air Control Group 28 (MACG-28)
and the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing (2nd MAW), II
MEF, and is currently based at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point.
The Battalion is composed of one Headquarters and Support Battery and two Firing
Batteries (Alpha and Bravo).
II MEF
- 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing (2nd
MAW)
- Marine Air Control Group 28 (MACG-28)
- 2nd Low Altitude Air Defense
Battalion (2nd LAAD)
3rd Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion (3rd LAAD) is an
air defense unit that is part of Marine Air Control Group 38 (MACG-38)
and the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (3rd MAW) , I
MEF, and is currently based at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California.
I MEF
- 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (3rd
MAW)
- Marine Air Control Group 38 (MACG-38)
- 3rd Low Altitude Air Defense
Battalion (3rd LAAD)
III
MEF appears not to have a dedicated LAAD but uses detachments from other
groups.
III MEF
- 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st
MAW)
- Marine Air Control Group 18 (MACG-18)
- Low Altitude Air Defense Detachments
Even the
LAADs are limited in capability. They
appear to operate only three weapons: Stinger missiles, 7.62 mm MG, and 0.50
cal MG (9) and only the Stinger is a credible, if short ranged, anti-air weapon. The weapons can be operated singly or mounted
on an HMMWV which is then optimistically referred to as an Advanced
Man-Portable Air Defense System (A-MANPADS). The addition of a single channel radio, a GPS,
and a laptop apparently makes the HMMWV a “system”.
The LAAD
is, essentially, a gunner with a Stinger on his shoulder.
Currently,
there are no active armored mobile air defense vehicles in the Marines and no
effective ability to engage cruise missiles.
The
Marine’s entire air defense consists of Stinger missiles. The Marines are going to take on Chinese
artillery, rockets, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, aircraft, helos, and
UAVs with just Stinger missiles. Yes, we
fight jointly and the Marines will hope (desperately, frantically hope!) for
support from the Navy and Air Force but, in a peer war, those forces will be
fully engaged with their own concerns and anti-air support for the Marines will
be sporadic and ineffectual, at best.
Reference Note: FIM-92 Stinger - man portable,
surface-to-air, shoulder fired, supersonic missile designed to counter
high-speed, low-level ground attack aircraft. It is capable of all aspect
engagement. The current BLOCK I version is capable of destroying fixed and
rotary wing aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles. Stinger missiles are five
feet long and weigh thirty five pounds fully armed. Range is around 4 miles.
 |
| LAAD - Stinger Surface to Air Missile |
Historical Context
How did we
get to this point? Obviously, the lack
of threats, until recently, influenced procurement and organizational decisions
in a negative way. The war on terror has
had a serious deleterious impact on military preparedness and force structure
and we are only just beginning to climb out of the hole we’ve created – in
fact, we’re only just beginning to even recognize that we’ve created a hole and
stepped fully into it! The military lost
sight of its main responsibility, peer warfare, in its zeal to use the war on terror
to increase budgets.
Beyond the
war on terror and lack of immediate threats, one of the relatively recent air
defense concepts that heavily influenced procurement decisions was Sea Shield
(part of the transformational plan along with Sea Base and Sea Strike). Sea Shield was envisioned to provide an air
defense umbrella over the entire forward battlespace and littoral areas.
“Sea Shield extends precise and
persistent naval defensive capabilities deep overland to protect joint forces
and allies ashore.” (7)
Sea Shield
was envisioned to utilize ship (Aegis), sea base, and aerial (Hawkeye,
primarily, at the time) radars to establish comprehensive radar coverage and,
thus, defensive capability. Implicit in
this assumption was that the US
A further problem
is that “fixed” radars cannot provide comprehensive coverage against low level
threats and this has long been recognized.
From a 2004 USMC paper,
“Radar horizon and terrain shadowing
will also degrade these sensors because they are not designed to move with the
maneuver forces. Consequently, maneuver forces will require an organic air
defense capability for local protection from immediate, pop up, low-level air
threats. This organic air defense capability is the Stinger missile system.”
(1)
Curvature
of the Earth further limits the coverage.
Even elevation of the radar sensor cannot completely compensate for the
various limits. As one example,
“225’ high Sea Based sensors will
not be able to detect targets below 5,539 feet at a range of 110nm.” (1)
And this
assumes no significant topographical rises like hills or mountains.
We see,
then, that various short-sighted decisions, flawed beliefs, and loss of focus
led to the current situation. It is
obvious that ground forces need a mobile, local air defense capability. This need has been further emphasized by the
recent boom in low altitude UAV operations and capabilities.
The irony
is that as the air threats to ground forces have grown, the Marine’s air
defenses have declined.
Near Future Developments
Ground
Based Air Defense Future Weapon System (GBADFWS) – is currently being developed as a
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) mounted system. The system uses Stinger missiles and an electronic
warfare capability. Future plans include
a laser variant. (3)
TPS-80 G/ATOR (Ground / Air Task Oriented Radar) – offers counterfire
targeting and general situational awareness but, while air-sensing capable, is
not currently linked to any anti-air weapon.
It is a short to medium range, air-cooled, phased array radar that is
intended to replace five current radar systems and augment the AN/TPS-59
long-range radar. A total of 45-57 G/ATOR systems are planned for procurement,
depending on what source one reads. The
system is claimed to be capable of detecting low observable targets.
The
system consists of three major assemblies: (4)
- Trailer mounted and towed
radar; towed by Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR)
- Communications module mounted
on a JLTV or equivalent
- Power module mounted on a
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR)
G/ATOR
is being developed and delivered in three blocks. (4)
- Block 1 develops the basic
hardware and provides Air Defense/Surveillance Radar (AD/SR) capability.
It replaces the AN/UPS-3, AN/MPQ-62, and AN/TPS-63 radar systems.
- Block 2 adds a ground
counterbattery/counter-fire mission capability and replaces the AN/TPQ-46
radar system.
- Block 3 was a series of
enhancements, including Identification Friend or Foe Mode 5/S, that are
instead being incorporated into other blocks. The term Block 3 is no
longer used.
- Block 4 replaces the AN/TPS-73
radar system for air traffic control capability, which will be a future
development effort.
 |
| G/ATOR Radar |
Status Summary
For the
moment, the Marines are focused on short range AAW.
“Walsh [Marine Lt. Gen. Robert
Walsh, deputy commandant for combat development and integration] said that the
Marine Corps has been focused on countering threats from unmanned aerial
systems -- a preferred weapon of extremists in the Middle East -- but is now starting to shift
focus to longer-range threats such as aircraft and cruise missiles.” (3)
This is
symptomatic of the Corps’ focus on very low end combat where UAVs are, indeed,
a significant concern. When high level
combat comes, however, the Corps will quickly learn that ballistic and cruise
missiles, MLRS-type rocket barrages, and artillery barrages will be far more
lethal and concerning than the presence of UAVs, though, admittedly, UAVs can
lead to other types of attacks if allowed to collect targeting data.
The longest
range anti-air weapon the Corps has is the Stinger missile and it is mounted on
unprotected, glorified jeeps. In combat,
those vehicles will be non-survivable.
The Corps lacks any type of armored, mobile, anti-air vehicle.
The Corps
is not only shedding armor and artillery but, lacking any type of counter-rocket/artillery/missile
(C-RAM) weapon, is extremely vulnerable to enemy artillery.
With all
these needs and gaps, how do the Marines expect to conduct successful assaults
against peer opponents?
Needs
As noted, the
range of threats encompasses much more than just UAVs and includes,
- Anti-rocket
- Anti-artillery
- Anti-helo
- Anti-cruise missile
- Anti-ballistic missile
- Anti-UAV
- Anti-naval shell (artillery?)
The Marines
are aggressively pursuing down-sized, down-armored, down-firepowered units that
are predicated on battlefield mobility using aviation and light “jeeps”. This kind of unprotected, non-survivable
force depends all the more on highly effective anti-air protection.
Consider
just the artillery issue. Our light
infantry forces will be decimated in a fight against an enemy with artillery
unless we can employ extensive and effective C-RAM. Thus, the movement towards mobile, light,
unprotected infantry ought to have triggered a concomitant development of a
mobile, C-RAM vehicle and yet, illogically, it hasn’t.
Cruise and
ballistic missiles have become a major threat.
The Navy will attempt to provide protection via the Aegis system but, as
the Marines move inland, the coverage umbrella will get progressively more
porous especially against low flying cruise missiles. The Marine’s very mobility works against them
as far as anti-air protection and, thus, demands a mobile, organic, anti-air
system.
The Marine
Corps is becoming a light infantry force despite claims of being a middle
weight force and with little armor, no armored personnel carrier, no infantry
fighting vehicles, and a heavy dependence on highly vulnerable “jeeps”, the infantry
forces desperately need survivable (armored), organic, mobile anti-air
protection.
Reference Note - Recent Terminated
Systems
MIM-23
Hawk – medium range surface to air missile; semi-active radar homing; range
45-50 km; speed Mach 2.4; depending on
version, a typical system consisted of a triple missile, towed launcher with
associated radars and 36 reloads; terminated in 2002 in favor of Stinger
systems
CLAWS
(Complementary Low-Altitude Weapon System) – surface launched AMRAAM, fire and
forget, surface to air missile; 4-5 missile launcher mounted on HMMWV;
successfully demonstrated in 2005-6 and terminated in May 2006
LAV-AD
– retired (8); combines a
high-rate-of-fire 25 mm Gatling gun and short-range, infrared Stinger
fire-and-forget missile (16 total, 8 ready); primary sensor is FLIR optical
tracking although a Thales TRS 2630P radar capability is also being developed; the
last of 17 systems was delivered in January 1999 (6); provides air defence for
the light armored vehicle battalion, with a secondary ground defense role; vehicles are assigned to the light armored
reconnaissance battalions
 |
| LAV-AD |
The
Marines had credible anti-air systems but, unwisely, terminated them for
various reasons, none good.
________________________________________
(1)DTIC, United
States Marine Corps,School of Advanced Warfighting, Marine Corps University,
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, “The Loss of USMC Man Portable Air
Defense Capability”, Major Stephen G. Conroy, 2004,
(3)Military.com
website, “Marines Developing JLTV Air-Defense System Armed with Laser Weapon”,
Matthew Cox, 21-Mar-2018 ,
(4)DOT&E
FY 2017 Annual Report, Jan 2018
(5)Marine
Times website, “Marines add Stinger missiles, lasers to vehicles to make up for
lagging air defense”, Todd South, 23-Apr-2018 ,
(6)Army
Technology website,
(7)Dept. of
the Navy, “Naval Transformation Roadmap, Power and Access…From the Sea, Sea
Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing”, 2003?
(8)g2mil
website, “Vital Amtrack Variants”, Carlton Meyer, 2017
(9)Marines
website, “Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Gunner’s Handbook”, MCRP 3-25.10A,
2011,
