UK’s Commercial Mine Countermeasures Ship

The UK’s Royal Navy just commissioned a former commercial offshore support vessel (OSV) into the fleet as HMS Stirling Castle, a mine countermeasures (MCM) mothership. 

The ship – previously named MV Island Crown – was acquired from the commercial market for £39.8 million at the start of 2023 to provide a UK host platform for autonomous MCM payloads … [1]

So, for the sum of around $51M(US), the Royal Navy acquired a mine countermeasures ship.  Of course, there had to have been additional expenses in converting it from its commercial role to a naval MCM ship although one cannot imagine the scope of work or the cost would be too significant since the roles are not all that different.  Compare that cost to the cost of a new, purpose built MCM ship and the Royal Navy likely saved something on the order of $300M.

 

HMS Stirling Castle

The salient question, though, is how well suited is the vessel for its new role?  The ship’s duties are described as:

 

Stirling Castle…will now take her place on front-line duties, carrying high-tech equipment, including autonomous surface and underwater vehicles, for specialist mine hunting operations, primarily in UK waters.[1]

This is not a terribly demanding role and consists primarily of launching and recovering unmanned MCM assets, not too dissimilar from its previous role of loading and unloading supplies.  Is the ship exquisitely optimized for the role?  Of course not but is it adequate?  Almost certainly … and for a substantial savings.

 

This is exactly the kind of pragmatic, responsible action that the US Navy should be engaged in.  At the moment, we have no viable MCM ships.  The LCS remains a joke both in terms of its non-existent capabilities and inadequate numbers.  Wouldn’t some US Navy $50M MCM motherships look pretty good about now?

 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “UK Royal Navy commissions HMS Stirling Castle as first MHC mother ship”, Richard Scott, 25-Jul-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/07/uk-royal-navy-commissions-hms-stirling-castle-as-first-mhc-mother-ship/

Perception Is Reality

An anonymous reader (please, people, include a username at the end your comments so I can offer proper credit!) offered an interesting thought regarding lessons that could be learned from the Royal Navy (RN).  He observed,
 

… once naval forces stop generating usefulness and relevance to the countries [sic] population.... you soon stop having a navy big enough to matter..[1]

I understand this to mean that he believes that a citizenry will direct their resources (taxes and popular opinion) to those endeavors and organizations that it sees the greatest benefit from.  This is not terribly surprising, it’s just basic human nature and quite reasonable.  In this specific case, the population of the UK sees value in ‘things’ other than the RN or, at least, the RN ranks fairly low on the priority list in the minds of the citizens.
 
Most of the readers of this blog, almost by definition, would see a great value in a navy for their country, whatever country that is.  You wouldn’t be reading the blog if you didn’t, right?  So, how is it that the citizenry of the UK sees so little value in the RN?  Does the Royal Navy really offer no value to the people?
 
There are two factors at play, here.
 
1. True value
2. Perceived value
 
Among other purposes, a navy, any navy, ensures the security of its country’s shipping, provides persistent surveillance, presence, and confrontation against unfriendly encroachments, and stands as a ready force against enemy attack.  This ensures unhindered trade and enhanced economic fortune for the population.  This is the true value.
 
How could any population not see that as valuable and gladly provide resources for the establishment and maintenance of a naval force?
 
Well, that brings us to the perceived value.  There’s an old saying:  perception is reality.  That means that whatever someone believes to be real is what’s real to them.  If you believe that your navy isn’t doing anything worthwhile then that’s your reality regardless of the true reality.
 
Where does perception come from, if not from reality?  How is someone’s perception formed?  Well, it comes from many sources: one’s own experiences, media news sources (you can instantly see, here, the danger posed by a biased media that presents an altered reality as true reality, but, I digress), social networks, etc.  If those various sources are not constantly presenting and explaining the true value of a navy then the perception quickly becomes that the navy has no value.
 
I can’t address the UK situation specifically but I can note that the US Navy makes almost no effort to talk to the citizenry and present its accomplishments and value in terms that the average person can understand and relate to.  Instead, the Navy resorts to blocking the media, circling the wagons, hiding behind bogus classification labels, misleading Congress and, generally, looking down at the general population. 
 
The Navy’s actions off Yemen involving missile attacks and defense should be made into near-movie type adventures to be presented to the public.  The exploits of our fearless sailors, fighting off relentless missile attacks so that Americans can get their oil and goods should be the stuff of growing legend.  It almost doesn’t matter how precisely true the accounts are.  That’s not the point.  The point is to present the Navy’s value to the public.
 
Once upon a time, moviegoers were routinely treated to newsreel highlights of our armed forces.  We need to bring back the updated version of that on TV, streaming channels, social media, podcasts, influencers, etc.  We need to continuously show the public the value of the Navy.  If we do that, the Navy won’t have to beg Congress for ships, the people will do it for them.  If we do that, the recruiting problem will solve itself.
 
On the other hand, if we persist in hiding information, the people will have no idea what the value of the Navy is and the people’s attention and resources will be directed elsewhere … which is exactly what’s been happening for years, now.
 
On a related note, if the US is providing the security for global shipping, then what true value does the RN offer?  Why should the UK citizenry pay for a navy when the US is providing their security for free?  One could see this as a powerful argument for the US to stop providing global security which would, in turn force other countries to increase their naval forces to fill the gap and result in an increase in their true (and perceived?) value.  Thus, one could make the argument, it is in the UK’s best interest for the US to stop providing international shipping security.  Interesting perspective, huh?
 
 
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[1]https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2024/12/open-post.html?showComment=1735387686167#c4809056757800113041

Shaft Misalignment

The Royal Navy’s carrier, Prince of Wales (QE class), was sidelined with a propulsion casualty one day into a 2022 attempted voyage to the US and has been undergoing repairs ever since.  The problem, estimated to cost $31M to fix, was caused by a miniscule misalignment of the propeller shaft. 

The investigation into the cause of the starboard [propeller] shaft fault found that there was an installation error. More specifically, Wallace added that based on “initial reports” the shaft was misaligned by as much as 0.8mm to 1mm.[1]

The reason this caught my eye was the apparent sensitivity of the shaft to very, very small misalignment.  One can’t help but wonder what would happen if the ship were subjected to vibrations, shock, and whipsawing from an explosion in combat.  Would the shaft hold up or would it inevitably wind up misaligned by 0.8 mm or more and be rendered unfit?
 
The US Navy encountered something similar when the Aegis cruise, Port Royal, gently drifted aground off Hawaii and suffered unrecoverable misalignment of its radar arrays.
 
Militaries should not be producing machinery that is so sensitive that it cannot withstand typical combat shocks.
 
We discussed pod propulsion (see “PodPropulsion”) in a previous post and noted that it potentially offered many benefits.  I’m certainly no expert on pods but it would seem that a pod would bypass all shaft alignment issues.
 
I like the idea of pod propulsion from a combat damage resilience perspective, separate from whatever its propulsion performance is.  A pod, even if it’s rendered unrepairable, can be simply unbolted from the outside of the stern and a replacement put in place.  There is no need to open the ship up, as there is a for a damaged or misaligned shaft.
 

Pods - No more shafts?

Again, I’m not a propulsion pod expert, by any means, and I’m sure that pods have their own unique problems but they seem well worth investigating.
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “Millimeters cost millions: UK still to decide who ‘should cough up’ for $31M aircraft carrier repair bill”, Tim Martin, 17-May-2023,
https://breakingdefense.com/2023/05/millimeters-cost-millions-uk-still-to-decide-who-should-cough-up-for-31m-aircraft-carrier-repair-bill/

Battle of Jutland Lessons

ComNavOps enjoys examining historical naval battles for lessons applicable to us, today.  One such battle is Jutland in WWI.  Jutland has been analyzed to death by a multitude of writers and historians and many of the lessons are obvious and repetitive.  Rather than repeat what’s already been thoroughly covered, I’d like to focus on just a couple lessons that may be less obvious.

 

To ever so briefly review, the WWI Battle of Jutland occurred between the Royal Navy Grand Fleet (Jellicoe) and the German Navy High Seas Fleet (Scheer).  As noted, the battle has been thoroughly described by many sources.  I won’t attempt to describe the battle other than as necessary to support the various points.  You can research the details of the battle for yourself, if you’re interested.

 

The Germans planned to break Britain’s blockade by enticing a portion of the Grand Fleet out, trapping it, and destroying it.  As it happened, both sides wound up luring sections of each other’s fleet into traps, generally unintentionally.  Thus, both sides wound up trying to execute the same plan!

 

In the end, the Royal Navy lost  

• 3 battlecruisers
• 3 armored cruisers
• 8 destroyers

 The German’s lost 

• 1 battlecruiser
• 1 pre-dreadnought battleship
• 4 light cruisers

 

Many other ships on both sides were damaged.

 

Following is a discussion of a few lessons that deserve special attention.

 

 

Submarines – The Germans attempted to lure the Royal Navy forces across a picket line of submarines.  However, poor timing, bad weather, and poor communications prevented the submarines from achieving much success.  In addition, British ASW efforts forced some subs out of their intended operating areas.

 

The obvious lesson is that submarines are very difficult (impossible) to communicate with and control in close combat and their limited sensor ranges make ad hoc independent operations by the submarines very difficult.  While some modern observers believe that submarines will instantly spot, identify, and target anything that moves, the reality is that submarines are still not able to be part of a ‘team’ combat effort.  Communication difficulties make friendly fire incidents highly likely or, best case, they paralyze the submarine due to uncertainty.

 

So many naval observers want to include submarines in naval battles but, in order to be effective, submarines must be deployed to areas with no friendly activity, leaving them free to maneuver and to assume that any contact is an enemy and that they can act accordingly.  Combat coordination between subs and surface ships is simply not feasible.

 

 

Confusion – This requires special attention because it is a constant of combat that the US seems to be ignoring.  Examples of confusion include,

 

• Both sides had a plan (very similar plans, as it happened) and both side’s plans fell apart immediately. 
• Beatty’s battlecruisers passed by the unprepared German submarine picket/trap line and showed up near the German ships long before the Germans expected them
• The German submarines were not ready when the operation began.  German submarines reported British ship courses incorrectly (they reported a leg of a zig-zag rather than the base course).
• The British 5^th Battle Squadron battlecruisers failed to receive course change instructions and, having not operated with Beatty’s ships before, did not know to maintain formation on the flagship and the overall formation was seriously disrupted.
• Groups from both sides appeared seemingly out of nowhere.
• The German commander, Scheer, had no idea the British Grand Fleet was even at sea until they appeared in front of him.
• The German fleet was sighted several times by Jellicoe’s screen while disengaging and escaping but the sighting reports were not received by the British.

 

The only clear winner was Murphy.  Confusion rules the battlefield.  All our vaunted and hyped networking won’t change that reality one iota when combat and Murphy come calling.

 

The terrain of the naval battlefield is confusion.  It’s what you hide in and it’s how you conceal yourself.

 

As has been said so many times, no plan survives contact with the enemy which emphasizes the importance of sound doctrine

 

 

Survivability – Survivability is paramount in battle.  So many British ships blew up so quickly.  If you can’t survive, you can’t contribute; you’re a waste of resources.  The US Navy has intentionally adopted unarmored, non-survivable warships – some of them designed to be abandoned after the first hit!

 

Related note:  You must exercise under realistic conditions (overheated steering gear jammed because no one stressed the gear during exercises).

 

HMS Queen Mary Exploding

Communications – German radio signals alerted the British that a major operation was happening and the British sailed before the Germans were ready.  It is a timeless lesson that communications are never as secure as believed.  Even today, our low probability of intercept, line of sight, encrypted, whatever communications are not nearly as secure as we’d like to believe.  The enemy doesn’t need to break our codes to discern our intentions.  Signals analysis (frequency of transmissions, locations of transmission sources, increase in comm traffic from HQ’s, departure from normal communications, etc.) will clearly tell at least the general concept of what’s about to happen and alert the enemy.  I’ve talked to current comms people and, while they won’t divulge any details, they assure me that communications are nowhere near as secure as believed.

 

An important aspect to note is our current habit of constant micromanaging which requires every level to continuously communicate with the levels one step above and below.  This verbal diarrhea cannot be concealed.  The sheer quantity assures that the enemy will detect it.  We must break ourselves of this habit and start practicing total communications silence.

 

The failure to train realistically and establish standardized doctrine resulted in communications issues even between ships of the same side.  For example, from Wikipedia,

 

… the battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron – which were too far behind to read his [Beatty’s] flags – found themselves passing the battlecruisers on an opposing course and heading directly toward the approaching main body of the High Seas Fleet.[1]

 

And, another example, a British ship-launched seaplane spotted German forces but was unable to relay the information to back to the ship.

 

 

Distances - Too many people today seem to think that ships will sail a hundred feet apart in combat.  On this blog, we’ve discussed the reality that a carrier group, for example, will be spread over a circular area 25-50 miles in radius.  Ships in combat will be miles apart, not a hundred feet.  At Jutland,

 

Beatty's ships were divided into three columns, with the two battlecruiser squadrons leading in parallel lines 3 mi (2.6 nmi; 4.8 km) apart. The 5th Battle Squadron was stationed 5 mi (4.3 nmi; 8.0 km) to the north-west … [1]

 

And this was before the advent of missiles with their much longer ranges.

 

 

 

Summary

 

As I said, this post touched on just a few lessons that bear added attention.  History is screaming lessons at us but our arrogance – and incompetence – prevents us from hearing them.

 

We have got to start preparing for high end naval combat – not the fantasy type of combat where everything we do works and nothing the enemy does works but real, confused, chaotic, up close, combat.  We’ve got to train for the kinds of things we think will never happen:  night combat, gun range combat, total chaos, loss of command and control, unanticipated enemy forces, and so on.

 

We need to start training without concern for stressing or damaging equipment.  We need to let our pilots apply maximum g’s and if the airframe can’t stand it then we need new, stronger airframes.  We need to maneuver our ships to the edge of their envelopes and if equipment fails we need better equipment.  While we can’t ignore safety, it can’t limit our training, either.  Accidents and deaths will happen and we have to accept that.  Our priority is not keeping everyone alive and healthy;  it’s preparing for high end combat where anything less than 100% preparedness is a guarantee of defeat and mass deaths.

 

We have got to either test our completely unfounded notion of secure communications and data transfer under realistic conditions and prove that it works or give it up as unworkable and learn to fight without constant communications.

 

We must start intentionally incorporating total confusion into our exercises.  Let’s, unannounced, ‘kill’ commanding officers and see what happens.  Let’s give intentionally incorrect orders and see who can adapt and overcome.  Let’s start providing intentionally false contact reports and see what happens.  And so on.  We must embrace confusion and chaos and learn to fight with them as our constant companions.  We must get familiar with them so that they no longer frighten or upset us.

 

We need the Van Riper’s of the world to humiliate us in realistic exercises and then thank them for doing so while we correct the identified problems.

 

 

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[1]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Jutland

BALTOPS Amusement

More and more, I’m reading stories that are so pathetic that they become truly funny and entertaining.  Here’s another such example involving a British frigate during a BALTOPS exercise.

The story’s title was, “British frigate tested with ‘drone assaults and torpedo attacks”.  Okay, that sounded intriguing.  Throwing drones that simulate attacking missiles and ?submarine? torpedo attacks against a frigate to test it is exactly the kind of thing we should be doing.  I eagerly jumped into reading the article to see the details.  Well, here’s the relevant portion of the article,

The upper deck gunners tested their marksmanship with machine-guns and Miniguns (ship-mounted Gatling guns) and the 30mm Automatic Small Calibre Gun (ASCG) against dummy surface targets before ‘air attacks’ as Banshee drones – 9ft long, 8ft wingspan, moving at about 120mph – were deployed against Kent. Also put to the test were the flight team as maintainers prepared and loaded a dummy Sting Ray for the Merlin helicopter, which promptly headed off on a sortie with the torpedo at the ready.” (1)

In stunned disbelief, I had to reread the passage a couple of times to be sure I was understanding it correctly.

The drone attacks were from Meggitt Banshee drones which are 9 ft long, non-stealthy, and have a speed of around 120 mph.  That’s half the speed of a WWII aircraft!  For comparison, Wiki lists the top speed of a WWI Sopwith Camel as 113 mph.  So, what modern, attacking, weapon system is that simulating?  The only thing it remotely simulates is a very low end, commercial grade quad-copter or UAV.

Banshee Drone - Top speed is more than twice that of the boat it's riding in!

The torpedo attack?  It wasn’t an attack, it was a practice loading of a dummy torpedo onto a helicopter.

What was the Royal Navy assessment of these pathetically meager efforts?  The Royal Navy claimed the exercises,

… tested the crew of HMS Kent to the limit. (1)

A WWI-ish drone and loading a practice torpedo is a test to the limit????

Seriously, I did get a good laugh out of this article.  It’s hilarious what passes for a major exercise today.  The crew of the Kent must be exhausted after being ‘put to the test’ and ‘tested to the limit’.  I hope they get a commendation and some well deserved time off to recover.

________________________________

(1)UK Defence Journal, “British frigate tested with ‘drone assaults and torpedo attacks”, Tom Dunlop, 15-Jun-2020,

https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/british-frigate-tested-with-drone-assaults-and-torpedo-attacks/

Type 26 Global Combat Ship

Here in the US there is a strong tendency to view everything foreign as superior to everything native.  Foreign weapon systems often take on a near-magical degree of fame.  For example, the 30 mm  Millenium gun is seen as vastly superior to the Phalanx CIWS, despite no actual supporting data that I’m aware of.

Another example of this is the reverence with which the non-existent UK Type 26 Global Combat Ship is held.  Let’s take a look and see if the respect is deserved.

For starters, the ship is not yet built so it makes comparisons a bit difficult but we’ll do the best we can.  The non-existence of the ship probably also explains why it is held in such high regard – everything sounds good on paper!  The F-35 sounded good.  The LCS sounded good.  The Ford sounded good.  And so on.

Anyway …

Here’s a brief summary of the ship’s characteristics and how they compare to the US Burke class DDG.  Recognize, though, that the Type 26 is not intended to be a functional equivalent to a Burke.  This comparison is just to give readers a point of reference that is familiar.

                 Type 26                Burke

Cost              $1.6B(USD)(1)         $1.8B

Length            492 ft                590 ft
Displacement      6900 t                9200 t
Speed             26+ kts               30+ kts
Range             7000 nm @ ? kts       4400 nm @ 20 kts
Gun               1x 5”                 1x 5”
AAW Missiles      48 VLS                96 VLS, any mix
Strike Missiles   24 VLS                above, any mix
Radar             Type 997 Artisan 3D   SPY-1D
Sonar             Towed Array and Bow   Towed Array and Bow
Aviation          1x Merlin/2x Wildcat  2x MH-60R

The Type 26 is described as a multi-mission, “global combat” ship with an emphasis on anti-submarine warfare (ASW).  The ship is claimed to have an acoustically quiet hull, whatever that means.  One would hope that it means that the ship’s machinery is rafted and acoustically isolated from the hull, among other quieting measures.

Type 26

The ship’s anti-air weaponry consists of vertically launched Common Anti-Air Modular Missiles (CAMM), also known as Sea Ceptor.  Sea Ceptor has an advertised range of around 15 miles.  Guidance is via mid-course datalink and terminal active radar homing.  The missile is credited with a limited anti-surface capability against small craft.

The ship’s ASW fit is credible but not outstanding.  The inability to operate two large ASW helos is a drawback as is the lack of on board ASW lightweight anti-submarine torpedoes and a quick reaction Hedgehog/RBU type weapon.  On paper, the Type 26 ASW capability appears to be on par with the Burke or even a bit below since the Burke can operate two large ASW helos.

In summary, allowing for the inevitable cost increases, the Type 26 will equal or exceed the cost of a Burke and have around half the capabilities.  There is nothing that stands out about the Type 26 to warrant any special attention.  It appears to be a capable albeit overpriced ship.




________________________________

(1)Royal Navy news website,

https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2017/july/02/170702-deal-for-t26-frigates,
article cites £3.7B(UK) contract for first three ships which equates to $1.6B(USD) assuming a 1:1.3 conversion rate to USD;  already this represents an increase over the $1.3B cost cited in 2016 (2)

(2)Defence Committee hearing, 20-Jul-2016,

http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/defence-committee/naval-procurement-type-26-and-type-45/oral/35261.html,
assumes a 1:1.3 conversion rate to USD

The Interoperability Myth

Lately, the Navy and Marines have been making a point of conducting cross-training operations with other navies in order to demonstrate and develop interoperability.  This begs the question, to what purpose?  Does anyone really believe that the US will cross-operate with another country’s military in a real war?

It’s never happened to any significant degree and it never will.  Interoperability cross-training is a pointless, useless, waste of time.

The first problem is that, short of a world war, it is highly unlikely that another country is going to join us in a conflict.  Is Spain really going to militarily join us in a strike?  They rarely have and I see no reason why they will in the future.  Is France going to commit their military to a joint military conflict?  France has denied us simple overflight permissions in anti-terrorism strikes.  There’s no way they’ll join us in actual combat operations.  Turkey, a NATO ally, has denied us basing and operations (3).  They’re not going to join us in combat operations.  Japan is slowly ejecting us from their land and is constrained by legal limits on military action.  The UK has joined us but their military is dwindling fast.

The next problem is practical and involves logistics.  Are we really going to send MV-22’s to fly from a Royal Navy carrier – a carrier that lacks the spare parts, trained maintenance techs, maintenance manuals, and diagnostic equipment required to actually operate the aircraft?  I would hope not.

Another problem is public relations.  Is the Navy going to allow Marines to conduct an assault from a Royal Navy ship when we have a fleet of 30+ big deck amphibious ships sitting around that need all the justifications they can get?  Of course not.  How bad would that make the Navy look in front of Congress?

Combat effectiveness is also an issue.  A recent example is the deployment of US Marines onto a Royal Navy amphibious ship.

“A total of 150 US and British Marines and up to three Osprey aircraft will be deployed on HMS Ocean.” (4)

What purpose does that serve?  Three MV-22s and 150 troops are not an effective combat force.

How many combat operations have we screwed up on our own?  Remember President Carter’s ill-fated hostage rescue attempt in 1980?  And we want to layer on the added confusion of trying to operate from, and with, a foreign navy?  That’s insane. 

Common sense also rears its ugly head.  An occasional cross-training of a very few units/troops is not going to provide across the board competence by either the US or whatever foreign country, in operating with the other.  If the time were to come to cross-operate for real, the very, very few units/troops who had actually trained for it would have been long since dispersed, retired, or unavailable.  Why would we possibly try to operate aircraft, under combat conditions, on someone else’s carrier when we have all the deck space we need to operate the aircraft from our own ships?

Consider a recent cross-training exercise,

“The Corps will test capabilities for the first time in November during the large NATO exercise Trident Juncture, Cooling [Brig. Gen. Norm Cooling, deputy commander of Marine Forces Europe-Africa] said, putting Marines aboard the Ocean for two weeks and working on the Spanish amphibious ship Juan Carlos I for several days and then the Ocean for two weeks.” (5)

How does a week or two of cross-training build any permanent and useful capability or skills?  We can’t even build competence in basic ship handling when we sail our ships full time!

Cross-training makes for good public relations opportunities and photo ops, I guess.  Consider this example - MV-22’s operated from the HMS Illustrious in 2007 and 2013.

“Lieutenant Commander Nigel Terry, deputy head of HMS Illustrious’ Flight Department was also on board when the Osprey visited in 2007.

He said: "Opportunities like this present an invaluable opportunity to continue to grow our ability to work together with other nations. This is absolutely essential in modern naval operations.

"It allows us to grow our understanding of our different procedures as well as providing valuable training for our deck crews.” (1)

This Royal Navy spokesman is either delusional or just engaged in public relations spinning.  How does the Royal Navy briefly operating an aircraft they’ll never have help the RN?  For the reasons I’ve already enumerated, the US is never going to operate MV-22’s from an RN vessel.  This is absolutely pointless.

I suppose there’s some small benefit on a person-to-person level in getting to know foreign sailors but that doesn’t begin to justify the effort and expenditure of the exercise.  If we want people to conduct group hugs we can schedule port visits when a ship happens to be in the area.

Here’s an example of how/why our goals so seldom mesh with another country’s.  Consider the criteria of use for some of Italy’s new ships.

“Previously, the Italian Defense Ministry said that the new warships [frigates] would be used only for humanitarian operations.

In 2015, the Defense Ministry and Fincantieri shipyard signed a contract to build an amphibious assault ship equipped with a helicopter deck.

According to the ministry, the ship would be used for humanitarian operations, including to aid in the evacuation of refugees. This is why the ship was dubbed a "humanitarian aircraft carrier." In addition, recently laid down patrol ships were also planned for humanitarian missions.” (2)

A country building “humanitarian aircraft carriers” isn’t going to conduct military operations with us.

There may well be countries that fight beside us in future conflicts.  The Royal Navy, for example, will always stand with us but they will fight beside us, separately, not mixed in with us.  With that in mind, there is value in exercising communications and command/control procedures but that’s not the kind of cross-training this post is talking about.

Why are we cross-training when we haven’t mastered our own procedures, operations, and tactics?  If we get to a point where we have totally mastered all of our own “stuff” and we’re sitting around bored, looking for something to pass time, then sure, let’s go cross-train.  Until then, let’s stop wasting time.

_______________________________

(1)Royal Navy website, 20-Sep-2013, retrieved 19-May-2017,

http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2013/september/20/130920-osprey-lands-on-illustrious

(2)Sputnik website, “Italy to Respond to Russia’s Presence in the Mediterranean With Naval Reform”, 29-Nov-2016,

https://sputniknews.com/military/201611291047958629-italy-naval-modernization/

(3)Los Angeles Times website, “US Seeks Overflights in Turkey”, Esther Schrader and Richard Boudreaux, 12-Mar-2003

http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/12/world/fg-mili12

(4)Sunday Express website, “Hundreds of US Marines to be deployed on British warship amid Russia threat”, Nick Gutteridge, 16-Jun-2015,

https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/584779/US-Marines-deployed-British-Royal-Navy-warship-Russia-threat-Eastern-Europe

(5)Stars and Stripes website, “With fewer ships at their disposal, Marines turn to allies”, Steven Beardsley, 16-Jul-2015,

https://www.stripes.com/news/europe/with-fewer-ships-at-their-disposal-marines-turn-to-allies-1.358252

Technology Or Firepower?

Western militaries are caught up in a technology craze:  networks, unmanned, remote, cyber, open architecture, data sharing, software, integration. 

The belief, I guess, is that floods of data, data sharing, networking, etc. will allow us to know where every enemy asset is and then we can use the wonders of our distributed, light, mobile, flexible, adaptable forces to destroy the enemy. 

Of course, all the Aegis radar, navigational radars, EO/IR sensors, satellite monitoring, aerial surveillance, and “big picture” data sharing in the fleet hasn’t prevented us from completely losing track of where giant, slow moving cargo/tanker ships are and colliding with them or running aground so one can’t help but question the very foundation of the entire technology push. 

Unfortunately, the UK’s Royal Navy is now getting in on the technology craze, as described by First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff Adm. Sir Philip Jones and reported by USNI News website (1).  Here are some snippets from the First Sea Lord’s vision.

“autonomous systems operating in squads”

“artificial intelligence-assisted decision making”

“autonomy”

“robotics”

“3D printing”

“novel weaponry”

“power of data” 

“cyber”

“ultra-modern communications”

“information exploitation”

“lightweight deployable IT system”

“vertical lift unmanned air system “

“open architectures”

“augmented reality”

“…bandwidth acceleration technology, which slashed the time for chest x-rays to pass through a handheld SATCOM terminal from half an hour to under five minutes.”

“drones that dissolve on demand”

“algae electric propulsion systems”

What do all those technologies have in common?  With the possible exception of the vague, buzzword-ish “novel weaponry”, whatever that might mean, none go “BOOM”.  None produce a bigger explosion.  None make the RN more lethal.  None increase the combat resilience of the RN.  None allow the RN to take more hits and keep fighting.  None increase the number of ships, aircraft, or personnel in the fleet.

They’re mostly technology for the sake of technology.

And all depend on the enemy cooperating by allowing us to send and receive data and to network systems without hindrance.  Think about it.  We’re putting all our eggs in the data basket.  A basket which is easily upset by enemy electronic warfare, cyber warfare, jamming, etc.  Would you buy a rifle that only works if the enemy doesn’t jam it?  Of course not!  And yet, that’s exactly what we’re doing with the whole data and networking movement.

Meanwhile, China and Russia are steadily producing bigger, heavier, better armed and armored tanks, more artillery, more cruise and ballistic missiles, bigger mortars, and better cluster munitions. 

Consider a few more detailed statements from the First Sea Lord.

“…integration of all weapon systems, engineering sensors and off-board logistics in the future, we have specified that the new Type 31e general purpose frigate should be designed with open architecture from the outset.”

Open architecture sounds appealing, doesn’t it?  It allows us to easily upgrade, incorporate third party and commercial software, and make it so that many, many people and companies can support our efforts.  Of course, all that openness also means that the systems are vulnerable to hacking and cyber attack!  Recall the U.S. software attack on Iran’s centrifuges?

Here’s another interesting statement from the First Sea Lord.

“We proved, for example, that a drug smuggler is no longer a bobbing needle in an oceanic haystack but has an identifiable algorithmic fingerprint. In the engineering world, we can predict, and therefore prevent, component failures.”

It’s a dubious leap from finding a drug smuggler to predicting and preventing component failures.  A relevant example is the U.S. LCS which has mammoth amounts of automated monitoring of its machinery intended to predict component failures, minimize maintenance down times, reduce the number of people needed for maintenance, and save untold amounts of maintenance money.  Of course, the reality is that the maintenance aspect of the LCS has been an abysmal failure.  Every LCS has suffered major engineering breakdowns, most ships having suffered multiple failures – all unforeseen, maintenance down times have almost exceeded operation times, and maintenance personnel requirements and maintenance costs have far exceeded expectations.  Of course, perhaps the RN will be the organization to make this all work.

Another good example is the state of the art (I use that phrase laughingly) ALIS comprehensive and predictive maintenance software that runs the F-35.  Far from streamlining maintenance, reducing costs, and predicting component failures, the F-35’s ALIS program has been an abject failure with aircraft unable to get off the ground without substantial workarounds to the software interlocks.  Aircraft have caught fire with no prediction whatsoever!  Of course, perhaps the RN will be the organization to make this all work.

The First Sea Lord goes on.

“As modern warfare becomes ever faster, and ever more data driven, our greatest asset will be the ability to cut through the deluge of information to think and act decisively.”

No, your greatest asset will be large enough munitions inventories to keep fighting for more than a week (recall the 2011 Libyan affair when the European militaries ran out of certain munitions after just a few weeks – and that was hardly an all out war!) and sufficient numbers of aircraft, ships, and tanks to absorb the inevitable attrition losses and cover the necessary territory and missions.

“…technologies that senior officers hope will keep the RN “at the forefront of capability in the decades to come”.

What’s the point of being at the forefront of irrelevant technology if you haven’t got the firepower and numbers to actually win a war of attrition which is what a war with Russia, China, NKorea, or Iran will be.  We may not want a war of attrition but those countries will most certainly make it so.  Remember, the enemy gets a vote and when it comes to attrition, if the enemy is willing to engage in attrition warfare you won’t have much choice but to follow.  A human wave attack doesn’t care about your data sharing.

Now, how does the First Sea Lord propose paying for all these irrelevant technological advances? 

“This requires big decisions with far reaching consequences. Are we, for instance, prepared to remove existing platforms from service in order to create the financial and manpower headroom to introduce new systems …”

His solution is to drop existing platforms and further decrease numbers in an already numerically challenged military!  Let me repeat – the enemy is not going to give you a choice about attrition warfare.  In fact, given the steadily decreasing size of Western militaries, our potential enemies may well see attrition warfare as a major advantage for them. 

Decreasing numbers to pay for highly questionable technologies that do little or nothing to increase firepower and lethality is foolish.

Now, I’ve been focused on the Royal Navy and the First Sea Lord’s comments but this post is really about the U.S. Navy which is doing all these same things.  The First Sea Lord’s comments simply provided a handy platform to work from.

The technology path we’re on is insane.  We’re ceding firepower and numbers to the enemy in the desperate hope that data will make up for it. 

Let’s be objective.  Recon is incredibly important to a military and plays a huge role in who wins and data is a form of recon.  I’m not arguing against data.  I’m arguing against abandoning the pursuit of firepower in favor of data.  Data should complement firepower not replace it.  Let me repeat – because it’s vitally important – the US Navy, for all its myriad sensors, Aegis radar, electro-optical sensors, infrared sensors, satellite imagery, aerial surveillance, drones, data sharing, and networks, couldn’t see giant, slow moving, cargo/tanker ships as they collided with our warships and couldn’t keep track of their own locations to prevent running aground – and this happened during peacetime with absolutely no electronic countermeasures or stealth on the part of the commercial vessels.  Come a peer war, do we really think we’ll be able to track stealthy ships and aircraft that are intentionally “hiding” and using electronic countermeasures, cyber attacks, hacking, jamming, decoys, etc.?  Well, despite all evidence to the contrary, this is exactly what we’re betting our future military capability on.

Someday, after a monumental military disaster, people will look back and wonder why no one saw it coming.  Well, they did.  This is the warning!

___________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “DSEI: First Sea Lord Jones Plots High-Tech Future for U.K. Royal Navy”, Jon Rosamond, 12-Sep-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/09/12/dsei-first-sea-lord-jones-plots-high-tech-future-u-k-royal-navy

Queen Elizabeth Class - All In Or Half-Hearted?

Beaking Defense website has an article about the UK committing to operating two carriers with F-35B air wings (1).  That’s good news for the Royal Navy and yet I see limitations and weaknesses being baked into the concept as well some disturbing trends being played out just as they have in the US Navy.

Ministry of Defense officials are saying that the UK is committed to operating two carriers regardless of the results of an ongoing defense review.  That strikes me as a bit optimistic but, not knowing the UK political situation, I’ll accept the statement at face value.

One of the trends in the US Navy is minimal manning.  The concept is that automation will allow reduced crews thereby saving on personnel costs.  The flip side of that is that significant maintenance must be performed by shore side personnel.  Thus, the manning isn’t really decreased but rather a portion of it is transferred from sea to shore.  Again, the concept is that the shore contingent will be able to service multiple ships at an overall decrease in manning.  That sounds good on paper but, thus far, the US Navy has not been able to make it work.  LCS shore side personnel have had to be far more numerous than planned and there has been no significant reduction in manning and, quite probably, an increase depending on how one counts the personnel.

Worse than simple overall personnel numbers is the issue of actual maintenance.  The US Navy has been dabbling in minimal manning for at least a couple of decades now and has amassed considerable practical experience with the concept.  The clear finding has been that minimal manning has proven very detrimental to the material condition of the ships involved.  Minor problems have been allowed to grow into major ones and ships have been early retired due to their poor condition – much of that condition directly attributable to the lack of manpower.

It now appears that the UK is going down the same path.

“To save costs, the Queen Elizabeth class has a fewer sailors for its size than older ships, she [Penny Mordaunt, Minister of State for Armed Forces] said, but it requires ‘additional shore support’ to compensate.”

I hope that the UK looks seriously at the USN experience before fully committing to minimal manning. 

Moving on, the Queen Elizabeth class will carry F-35B air wings.

“Each QE-class ship can accommodate 40 aircraft of various types, but not all of those are going to be fighters. … The maximum capacity for F-35s is reportedly 36 aircraft but during routine operations, each carrier might have only a dozen F-35Bs on board.”

The key part of the statement above is the suggestion that the carriers would operate with only a dozen F-35s during routine operations.  If true, this would be a major mistake.

How can a navy learn to operate an air wing under maximum combat conditions if all their operational and training time is spent operating an air wing that is a third the size?  There are just too many differences between a 30-40 aircraft wing operating at maximum capacity versus a 12 aircraft wing operating under leisurely peacetime conditions.

How will the carrier learn the deck “dance” of handling and placement of 30-40 aircraft under constantly changing conditions from only operating 12?

How will the carrier learn the art of juggling launches and recoveries under maximum sortie rates with only 12?

How will the carrier learn the task of munitions handling, refueling, and maintenance of 30-40 aircraft with only 12?

In short, a carrier does not seamlessly transition from 12 aircraft operated at a leisurely pace to 30-40 aircraft operating a maximum sortie rate without constant practice.  The USN devotes months of training workups to its carriers and air wings prior to each deployment and that’s with operating a full air wing routinely.  The art of maximum carrier operations is not something that can be picked up on the fly in a week.

This brings us back around to manning levels.  The reduced manning of the QE class presumably is what’s required to operate the dozen F-35s.  When the carrier surges to a maximum 30-40 aircraft it will need many additional personnel.  Where will these extra personnel come from?  How will they be trained if they aren’t routinely operating with the carriers?  Learning on the fly on a carrier is a recipe for disaster.

Reduced operations is a bad idea all around.  Remember the adage, fight like you train, train like you fight?  Routinely operating 12 aircraft when you intend to fight with 30-40 violates a very wise adage.

Royal Navy, are you operating two carriers because you just like the idea of being able to say you have the carriers or are you operating two carriers because you want to be able to place two fully loaded carriers into high end combat at a moment’s notice?

Lastly, here’s an interesting comment about philosophy.

“What’s more, Britain has prioritized warfighting over low-intensity operations, accepting a smaller fleet as the price of more capable vessels …”

If true, that’s a very wise philosophy and one which, sadly, the USN is abandoning with its emphasis on the toothless LCS, JHSV, smaller air wings, submarine and fighter shortfalls, etc.  Note, though, RN, the contradiction between the stated philosophy of emphasis on warfighting with the reduction in operations of the carriers from max size air wings (30-40 aircraft) to a dozen aircraft for routine operations.  Are you really committed to warfighting or not?  Will you be fully trained and ready, or not?  You certainly won’t have a full air wing at a moment’s notice.

That’s an interesting question, too.  How long will it take to get all those extra F-35s out to the ship?  Are they all going to be parked on a tarmac ready to launch?  Not likely.  Will the extra pilots be sitting around fully trained (and carrier qualified!!) just waiting to launch?  Will the extra maintenance crews be sitting around, ready?  Will the extra spares and maintenance/testing equipment already be on the carrier or will they also have to be assembled and transported to the carrier? 

Those who might suggest that the a dozen aircraft are just fine for routine operations and that the rest of the aircraft can be instantly surged are just not seeing reality.  The F-35 is not a WWI powered kite that can be piloted by someone with a few hours training and maintained by any mechanic with a pipe wrench.  Surging F-35s may take weeks or months and a carrier caught in a moment’s notice conflict will be severely limited in its capabilities.

It pains me to see the Royal Navy preparing to go down some of the same paths that the USN has already shown to be mistakes.  I hope the RN very carefully thinks through their carrier operating plans.

(1)Breaking Defense, “UK Commits To 2 Carriers, Fully Crewed; F-35B Numbers TBD”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. September 04, 2015,

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/09/uk-commits-to-2-carriers-fully-crewed-f-35b-numbers-tbd/