MEKO A-200 Frigate Cost

Just a quick note ... For those of you who continue to believe that foreign shipbuilders can build naval vessels faster and cheaper than US builders, here’s a data point.  The newly specified MEKO A-200 frigates for the German navy will reportedly cost $1.9B(USD) each for four ships and you can bet your soul that cost will increase as work actually commences.  We’re looking at a $2 - $2.5B frigate!  Yikes!

"Existing Design With Only Minor Modification" Trap

More and more, the Western naval ship acquisition world is reverting to ‘existing designs with only minor modifications’ instead of new ship designs.  This is due to fear rather than combat requirements: fear of runaway costs, fear of schedule delays, fear of bad publicity and criticism, fear of innovation, etc.  Fear.  The Western naval world is acquiring ships as a reaction to fear of their own ineptitude. 
 
Instead of honestly and objectively assessing the reasons for acquisition failures and fixing the problems, Western navies have opted for the perceived path of safety over that of combat effectiveness.
 
The latest victim is Germany which has cancelled its F126 frigate acquisition program. 
 

The German Ministry of Defense has decided to discontinue the construction of six F126-class frigates …[1]
 
According to the BMVg, Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding (DSNS), the company initially contracted as the prime contractor, was unable to meet the agreed-upon time and budget constraints.[1]

The program began around 2015, depending on what one considers the starting point, and the first production contract was issued in 2020.  Lead ship delivery had been delayed until 2032 and costs were ballooning.
 
Burned by the failure and afraid of a repeat, Germany has opted to proceed with an existing design, the MEKO A-200 frigate.
 

Instead of planning a new ship, the decision was made to use a readily available, off-the-shelf vessel with only minor modifications.[1]

On a side note, this is yet another bit of evidence that the widespread belief among American naval observers that other countries can produce quality ships, on time, on or under budget, and cheaper than US shipbuilders is false.  But, I digress …
 
So, what is the problem with using an existing design with only minor modifications?
 
There are multiple problems:
 
The “minor modifications” never happens.  The existing design gets heavily modified, commonality disappears, and the costs balloon while the schedule slips.  The US Constellation program was a prime example of this.
 
Far more serious, though, is the trap that existing designs present.  If one never builds new designs, how do ships ever get better?  At some point, you have to move to a new design in order to incorporate new technology.  There’s a reason we’re not still building sailing ships.  Yes, you can upgrade individual pieces of equipment (though limited by ship’s utilities capacity, internal volume, weight margins, etc.) but you can’t improve or change the basic ship.  No amount of equipment upgrades could turn a Burke into a Visby-level stealth ship.  If you want a Visby-level stealth warship – and you do! – it’s got to be a new design.
 
Given the several year (or decade+)  build time for a modern naval vessel, even if the parent design was adequate when the program began, it will be obsolete by the time it enters service.  Of course, existing designs are not adequate.  Consider the MEKO A-200 that Germany now intends to acquire.  The original MEKO 200 design dates back to 1987 and even the MEKO A-200 dates back to 2001, making it already a 25 year old design which will be 30+ years old by the time the ships enter service.  Is a 30+ yr old design really what you want for your most modern, front line surface warship?
 
Take a look at the MEKO A-200.  It’s not particularly stealthy which is the major survival requirement for the modern battlefield.  Its electrical capacity for the perpetually ‘just around the corner’ lasers and rail guns is inadequate.  And so on.
 
Consider the US National Security Cutter (NSC) which is to be the basis for the next iteration of the Navy’s attempt at procuring a frigate.  The design dates back to the late 1990’s and is not even built to combat standards.  Assuming the project isn’t cancelled, the Navy is going to accept frigates whose base design is going to be around 40 years old by the time they enter service!  The NSC meets none of the requirements for success on the modern naval battlefield and yet the Navy has turned to them out of desperation and fear – fear of yet another ship acquisition fiasco.  We’re not designing for combat;  we’re designing for programmatic and career safety and public relations.
 
We cannot successfully build new designs until we objectively and honestly figure out why we keep failing.  Just to save Western navies decades of study, I’ll tell you why we keep failing:
 

• CONOPS, CONOPS, CONOPS
• Change Orders

 
There you have it, Western navies.  I’ve done your job for you.  Now, go build a new ship that actually belongs on the modern battlefield.
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Germany is cancelling the F126 frigate project and procuring eight MEKO frigates”, Staff, 24-Jun-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/06/germany-is-cancelling-the-f126-frigate-project-and-procuring-eight-meko-frigates/

NSC Frigate Commonality

Do you remember the main selling point of the Constellation, as originally stated?  It was to use an existing (parent) ship design with absolutely minimal modifications so that commonality would be high, thereby keeping costs low and schedules short.  Instead, the Navy heaped on so many changes that commonality dropped from 85% to 15% at the time of cancellation.  We saw what happened to cost and schedule, as a result.
 
For the National Security Cutter (NSC) frigate, the Navy’s main goal is to get AMERICAN hulls in the water as quickly as possible without worrying about lethality or combat effectiveness.  Setting aside the absurdity of the lack of lethality and combat effectiveness, the only way hulls can hit the water quickly and cheaply is to maintain maximum commonality with the parent NSC design.  Of course, the greater the commonality, the less the firepower and lethality … but, I digress.
 
Unfortunately, we’ve already seen many changes to the parent design.  The forward superstructure is being modified, stern platforms added, weapons changed, electronic warfare added, sensors added, presumably a new combat software system, etc. and those are only the changes we know about and only the external, visible changes.  Each of the listed changes requires modifications to the internal structure, ducting, cabling, bulkheads, layout, runs, utilities, etc.  Changes have a cascading effect far beyond the main change.  Further, the NSC is not built to Navy standards so, presumably, like the Constellation, the Navy will make significant internal structural changes for increased survivability just as was done to Constellation.  My slightly educated guess is that the commonality is already down to around 50% and it’s only going to get worse as the design progresses.  The Navy will continue to make changes.  They can’t help themselves.  It’s who they are and what they do.
 
Affordable and fast production?  I think cheap has already left town and quick is buying a bus ticket out as we speak. 

New Swedish Frigate

ComNavOps has long considered the Swedish Visby class corvette as the gold standard of modern, total stealth warship design (not perfect ... just the best out there).  That makes the conceptual design for the next Swedish frigate, a larger vessel than the Visby, seemingly obvious:  simply upsize the Visby and add a few more weapons.  However, that seems not to be the case.  The candidates for the next Swedish frigate appear to be the existing (parent??) designs listed below:
 

• Saab/Babcock - Arrowhead 120 (variant of the Arrowhead 140)
• Naval Group (France) - FDI frigate
• Navantia (Spain) - Alfa 4000 light frigate

 
As a quick reminder, Visby is 238 ft and 840 tons.  For comparison, the Arrowhead 120 is 406 ft and 4,650 tons.
 
None of the candidates exhibit anything approaching the maximum stealth and total signature reduction the modern naval battlefield requires and all would seem to be a significant step back from the Visby in that regard.  Honestly, the parallels between this and the US Navy’s failed Constellation program which attempted to build a “new”, 20+ year old, already obsolete frigate from a parent design, are eerie.
 
Sweden is looking to acquire four frigates from one of the companies listed above.  The contract for four ships is estimated to be between $4.5B -$6.7B(USD) which would be $1.1B - $1.7B(USD) per ship and, of course, no estimate ever comes in on budget so the real cost would likely be pushing $2B or more which seems excessive for relatively simple, dated frigates.
 
I assumed Sweden would simply scale up the Visby design for frigtes/destroyers.  That would be eminently logical and, indeed, that was the original idea for the Visby Generation 2 design.
 

Initially in 2021, FMV [Swedish Defence Materiel Administration] awarded Saab Kockums a contract for the product definition phase of the Visby Generation 2 corvettes, a new class based on the existing Visby-class stealth vessels … [1]
 
However, the program was canceled in 2023 amid Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and Sweden’s push toward NATO membership (finalized in 2024), leading to Saab teaming up with Babcock for a new, larger design.[1]

Somehow, in moving from the world’s stealthiest corvette to a “new” dated frigate, Sweden lost sight of what’s important for survival and combat-effectiveness on the modern naval battlefield.  Did some US admirals join the Swedish navy?
 

Arrowhead 120

I fully support the idea of a larger ship than the Visby but why go for a less capable and less survivable one?  Surely, the Visby could be scaled up from a corvette to a frigate without violating any “laws” of shipbuilding.
 
I guess it’s not just the US Navy that engages in perplexing behavior.
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense website, “Saab, Babcock bank on Arrowhead 120 design for Sweden’s next frigate”, Jonas Olsson, 13-Feb-2026,
https://breakingdefense.com/2026/02/saab-babcock-bank-on-arrowhead-120-design-for-swedens-next-frigate/

Where’s the Lethality?

Having failed so many times, the Navy’s primary shipbuilding criteria is no longer lethality (if it ever was in modern times) but the [incorrectly] perceived need to get hulls – any hulls – in the water as quickly as possible to stop the criticisms and fend off Congressional anger.  As Naval News website notes about the new frigate program,
 

… speed [of production] is now the primary factor driving the program.[1]

Speed of production.  Not firepower, not stealth, not lethality, not operational usefulness or anything else one might think would be of importance … just the speed with which hulls can be put in the water.  Why not just buy combat canoes?  We can get them in the water quickly.
 
The new Frigate’s armament will consist of a 57mm main cannon and a RAM launcher with 21 Rolling Airframe Missiles.  A payload space will be constructed (so much for no changes to the parent design!) at the stern of the ship capable of carrying 16 Naval Strike Missiles, 48 Hellfires, or other containerized weapons or modules.[1]
 
50-65 ships will be built …  So, we’re committing to a large production run before the first design is even finalized.  Does sound identical to the LCS?
 
The horrifying concern is that this level of armament relegates this vessel to the level of a patrol boat (and not a particularly impressive one at that!) and yet it will make up something like a third of our combat fleet.  Absorb that for a moment.  A third of the combat fleet will be patrol boats.  Add in the Navy’s desire for all manner of unmanned vessels and we’re looking at half or more of the fleet being nearly devoid of serious combat capability. 
 
Sure, the Navy will talk about future upgrades but when has that ever actually happened?  Ask the LCS how those future module upgrades that we were promised are coming along.
 
If I were China, I’d bankroll this program for the United States just to ensure we field a fleet of non-lethal ships!
 
 
____________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “New U.S Navy Frigate: FF(X) Program Specs Revealed”, Ethan Gossrow, 16-Jan-2026,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/01/new-u-s-navy-frigate-ffx-program-specs-revealed/

NSC Frigate Delusions

The degree of delusion and fantasy associated with this NSC frigate concept is already stunning and does not bode well for the program.  Let’s check out a few of the notable delusions and fantasies.
 
What is most important about the new frigate design?  We all know it is lethality in support of a focused Concept of Operations (CONOPS), presumably ASW-centric.  However, is that the most important thing about the NSC frigate in the Navy’s view?  Well, here’s their take on it.
 

The new frigate design will focus on American designs and American yards, [Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle] Caudle said.
 
“Other countries will always prioritize their own fleets, not us, ships that depend on foreign industry,” he said. “That’s why this is an American design backed by American workers, American suppliers and an established logistics and maintenance network. So wherever the ship sails, when the American flag goes into port, it does so with American industry firmly behind it.”[1][emphasis added]

Wow!  Caudle’s last two sentences use the word, “American”, five times.  Apparently, as far as he’s concerned, the NSC frigate’s main and most important characteristic is not firepower, focused mission, CONOPS, cost, or anything else.  The most important characteristic is that it’s “American”!  Got burned by the foreign FREMM design, did ya there Adm. Caudle?  Not gonna make that mistake again, are ya, huh?  Everything about this is gonna be “American”, by God!  Nope, no overreaction, there!  Lurching from one extreme to another is definitely the way to go! 
 
Just out of curiosity, if this American approach doesn’t work out and we’ve already tried, and ruled out, foreign designs, what does that leave for the next attempt?  An extra-planetary Martian design?  But, I digress …
 
So, what is the guiding philosophy for the construction of this NSC-frigate?
 

… Jason Potter, who is performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition (RDA), said the service would base the new frigate on an existing design with minimal design changes.[1]

Wait a minute … Isn’t that word for word the guiding principal behind the Constellation’s parent design concept?  Yeah, and we saw how that worked out.  What’s the likelihood that the Navy learns a lesson and leaves the design alone and doesn’t make a host of changes?  This is pure delusion!
 
Where does an NSC-frigate fit into the Navy’s force structure?
 

“The design [with] little adaptation will meet the CNO’s requirements for a small surface combatant,” [Caudle] said. “The current [battle force] requirement is 73, of which we’re meeting less than a third.[1]

Whoa, there admiral.  You think we have around two dozen small surface combatants now?  Are you counting the LCS as a small surface combatant?  The operative word is combatant and the LCS has no useful combat capabilities so you’re deluding yourself.  If you have a requirement for 73 small surface combatants, you’re short 73.
 
What’s the situation on manning for this ship?
 

The design will have accommodations for about 140 sailors.[1]

Have we finally admitted that the LCS idea of a crew of six highly cross-trained sailors plus a parrot cross-trained as a dog isn’t sufficient?  As a point of reference, the Zumwalt is over 600 ft long and 16,000 tons with a crew of 147.  Now, we’re going to build a frigate that’s 400 ft long and 4,600 tons with a crew of 140??!  One of those two ships is incorrectly manned.  Can you figure out which one it is, admiral?
 
What will the NSC-frigate do for us?
 

… this platform would help take the load off of our destroyers so they could focus on some of the higher-end missions,” a second senior official told USNI News.[1]

There it is again.  The ever-present, mythical “free up ships for higher end missions” justification.  Of course, no one has yet come up with an example of what a higher end mission is that the Burkes would be freed up for.  But, I digress …
 
Well, there may be some problems already visible with this NSC-frigate concept but I am, at least, comforted by SecNav’s strongly implied assurance that change orders will come only over his dead body, as documented in the previous post.  Ominously, though, there’s this,
 

One of the few changes the Navy intends to make to the NSC design is to construct a platform above the open boat deck for containerized mission packages …[1]

A platform to hold containerized packages on the order of 40,000 lbs!  That’s a hefty platform! 
 
So, it’s not even a formal program yet and, despite SecNav’s proclamation, we’re already making changes – changes that will affect the ship’s designed weight margins, weight allowances, stability, total weight, sea keeping and handling, etc.  Inevitably, those changes will require other changes in propulsion, ballasting, fore/aft freeboard, internal structure, etc.  There’s no such thing as an isolated change in ship design.
 
Well, at least the change is to enable a modular mission package approach.  That worked so well on the LCS that even I can’t argue against it.  Modular is clearly the way to go. … right?
 

Those containers could do a host of missions. That’s a core element of the future force design.[1]

That is some Class A delusion, there!
 
Well, at least the entire modular modification will be the only change, right?
 

Based on the FREMM design in service with the French and Italian navies, the Constellation class design required modifications to meet U.S. Navy survivability standards.[1]

Uh … say, there SecNav … are you aware that the NSC design does NOT fully meet Navy standards?  So, either we build a sub-standard vessel for Navy service or we make more changes to the Constellation NSC-frigate to meet Navy standards. 
 
Will the NSC-frigate be armed similar to the Constellation?
 

The initial FF(X) hull will be largely unmodified from the systems found on the NSC, officials told USNI News.[1]

The NSC’s entire weapons fit is 1x 57 mm gun and a CIWS.  That’s it.  That’s all.  If the NSC-frigate is going to be “largely unmodified from the systems found on the NSC”, that will be one extremely lightly armed ship, bordering on unarmed.  If we add VLS, torpedoes, anti-ship missile racks, RAM/SeaRAM, etc., that will necessitate extensive … um … what are those called when you change the design? … oh, yeah … change orders.  You know, the things SecNav implied would not happen and that he would have to personally approve.  I’m guessing he’s going to be doing a LOT of approving despite his little sound bite.  Added weapons will require internal structural changes, expanded magazines, ammo hoists, modified power and utility runs, etc.  Hmm … weight, weight margins, stability …
 
Fortunately, industry sees no problems.
 

… Chris Kastner, HII’s president and CEO, said in a statement. “Speed matters, and the NSC ship design is stable and producible and will lead to predictable schedules.[1]

I guess Mr. Kastner is unaware of all the changes the Navy is already planning to make to the NSC.  Can you say, “goodbye cost, goodbye schedule”?
 
Well, there you have it – a broad assortment of fantasy and delusion before the program has even gotten off the ground.  I can’t foresee any problems, whatsoever.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “SECNAV: New Frigate will be Based on National Security Cutter, First FF(X) to be Built at Ingalls”, Sam LaGrone, 19-Dec-2025,
https://news.usni.org/2025/12/19/secnav-new-frigate-will-be-based-on-national-security-cutter-first-ffx-to-be-built-at-ingalls

NSC Patrol Boat

I applauded the Navy’s decision to terminate the Constellation program and still do.  I also, initially, viewed the decision to build a NSC-frigate as a poor choice but one that had some slight potential to produce a useful vessel if certain constraints and discipline could be applied such as a rigorous CONOPS and an obsessive fixation on a single mission, presumably ASW.. 
 
Sadly, the program is already doomed. The vessel will, apparently, have almost no weapons or useful sensors and no mission focus, whatsoever.
 
The initial NSC “frigate” will have 1x 57mm gun and 1x RAM mount.[1]  That’s it for weapons.  Nothing else.  That’s not a frigate.  That’s barely even a patrol boat and is hideously oversized, overpriced, and overmanned for that level of firepower.
 
The initial NSC “frigate” will NOT have a 5” gun, VLS, anti-ship missiles, strike missiles, ASW sonar, towed array, anti-submarine torpedoes, or CIWS.[2]  What it doesn’t have is far more impressive than what it does have.
 
Looking at the equipment list (or lack thereof) one can’t help but wonder, in stunned disbelief, what the purpose of the ship is?  What is the mission?  It barely qualifies as a patrol boat.  What is the Navy going to do with it?
 
It sounds like we’re just going to be building Coast Guard cutters and not even good ones.
 
I know the Navy is incapable of learning lessons but after decades of hitting themselves in the head with a hammer wouldn’t you think they’d at least stop just to make the pain go away?  I guess not.  They’ve just picked up a new hammer and immediately started whacking themselves in the head again. 
 
Enjoy the pain, Navy!  What a bunch of morons.  Good work, SecDef, SecNav, and CNO!

 
 
_______________________________

  
[1]The War Zone website, “Navy’s New Frigate Will Not Have A Vertical Launch System For Missiles”, Joseph Trevithick & Howard Altman, 22-Dec-2025,
https://www.twz.com/sea/navys-new-frigate-will-not-have-vertical-launch-systems-for-missiles
 
[2]USNI News website, “SECNAV: New Frigate will be Based on National Security Cutter, First FF(X) to be Built at Ingalls”, Sam LaGrone, 19-Dec-2025,
https://news.usni.org/2025/12/19/secnav-new-frigate-will-be-based-on-national-security-cutter-first-ffx-to-be-built-at-ingalls

USS Constellation Update

The Navy’s new frigate, the USS Constellation, is now expected to deliver 3 years late, or more (spoiler alert!  It will be more!).  What’s going wrong?  Let’s get an update.
 
 
Design
 
The Constellation contract was awarded in April 2020 which means the design work began more than 5 years ago and is still nowhere near complete.  That’s astounding.  Over 5 years to generate a design and it still isn’t complete.
 

… the U.S. Navy had to significantly modify the design to meet U.S. survivability and growth margin standards.
 
Speaking at the Naval Institute’s Defense Forum Washington event, Fincantieri Marinette Marine CEO Mark Vandroff said the Navy and the shipyard underestimated the complexity of altering the design.[2]

The entire point of the so-called parent design approach was exactly to avoid significant design changes and yet the Navy ignored that philosophy and instituted extensive changes.
 
Concurrency and Schedule
 
As we’ve seen with every acquisition program in recent years, concurrency (simultaneous design and construction) always causes cost and schedule havoc.  Despite this repeated, soul-deep lesson, the Navy opted for concurrency, yet again, beginning construction with only partial design plans.  Predictably (well … predictable by everyone except the Navy), this has caused schedule problems among other issues, with the ship now scheduled to deliver more than three years late.
 

The Navy’s decision to commence construction before completing the design has led to significant schedule slippages.[1]

Cost
 
As always, the Navy’s cost estimates have proven fraudulently underestimated.
 

Initially, the estimated cost for the first ship was around $1.28 billion, with subsequent ships expected to cost approximately $1.05 billion each. However, these estimates have proven to be overly optimistic. The actual costs have increased significantly, with some estimates suggesting that the final cost per ship could be as high as $1.6 billion. This 40% increase in costs has raised concerns about the program’s affordability and sustainability.[1]

Actually, those costs aren’t even true.  The Congressional Research Service Feb 2021 report notes,
 

The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission estimated that subsequent ships in the class will cost roughly $940 million each in then-year dollars.[emphasis added][2]

Weight
 

The weight of the ships has increased by over 10% from the initial estimates. This weight growth is attributed to design decisions and the challenges of adapting a foreign design to meet U.S. Navy requirements.[1]

Unfortunately, the Navy is now looking at reducing or eliminating other capabilities in order to compensate for the weight increase.  It is almost certain that the range and speed requirements will be downgraded among other detrimental changes.
 
Workforce
 

The shipyard is reportedly a “few hundred” workers short, which has contributed to delays in the construction schedule.[1]

Come on, now.  It’s not as if the builder didn’t know how many workers they had when the bid the project.  If they’re short of workers now, they certainly knew they were short of workers when they bid.  This is, again, fraud on the part of the builder and willful complicity on the part of the Navy who also knew the builder’s workforce compared to the project requirements.
 
Risks
 

The Navy has yet to demonstrate the full capabilities of the propulsion and machinery control systems … [1]
 
The Navy is considering additional land-based testing to mitigate these risks and ensure the reliability of the systems before the ships are deployed.[1]

When have we ever seen ‘risks’ not become problems?  The point of land based testing is to find problems and solutions before beginning construction.
 
Second Yard
 
Given the inability of Fincantieri to meet the contracted schedule, the Navy has begun looking at a second source shipyard.  Possibilities include:
 

… specifically mentioned Austal USA, Bollinger, HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works as potential second yards.[2]

 
Conclusion
 
The Navy’s absolute refusal to design and build a ship the proper way (complete the design and then begin construction) is, after so many demonstrated failures using this approach, a near criminal act of fraud and negligence perpetrated against the American taxpayer.
 
As we all knew, with 100% certainty, concurrency has, once again, caused schedule slippage and cost overruns.
 
The Constellation class is now in the process of having its requirements downgraded to compensate for weight increases.  So much for the supposed benefits of a parent design.  The Navy never had any intention of building the parent design.  That was just a ploy to evade additional Congressional oversight.
 
It bears noting that the yard’s manpower shortages are not exactly a new problem that suddenly reared its head.  Both the yard and the Navy knew they couldn’t build the ship in the required time frame with the workforce they had.  Essentially, the yard and the Navy conspired to hide the inability to meet the contract.
 
Worse than all the listed problems is the fact that even if there were no problems, it would only produce an obsolete design unsuited for modern combat.
 
There is no other way to describe this program than as a massive fraud and failure. 
 
 
 
____________________________

[1]1945 website, “The U.S. Navy’s New Constellation-Class Frigate Is In Big Trouble”, Isaac Seitz, 25-Feb-2025,
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/02/the-u-s-navys-new-constellation-class-frigate-is-in-big-trouble/
 
[2]USNI News website, “Navy: Constellation Frigate Design Will be Ready in May, Second Yard Could Come in FY 2027”, Mallory Shelbourne & Sam LaGrone, 13-Dec-2024,
https://news.usni.org/2024/12/13/navy-constellation-frigate-design-will-be-ready-in-may-second-yard-could-come-in-fy-2027

Constellation – Type 054B Comparison

The United States and China are both in the process of building a new class of frigate.  The US is building the Constellation class frigate and China is building the Type 054B which is an evolutionary advance on the Type 054A.  China has built/building 50 Type 054A and an unknown number of Type 054B for a total of, perhaps, 70 some Type 054 frigates.  In contrast, the US plans to build 20 Constellation class ships.
 
Let’s take a look at the cursory specs and see how they compare.
 

Type 054B Launch

As the specs demonstrate, the Constellation is just a bit inferior in several respects with the only advantage being a greater number of anti-ship missiles.  The Chinese frigate has better stealth, a more powerful gun, ASW torpedoes, and an extra close in weapon.  Based just on these specs, the Type 054B is the superior vessel.  That’s a disappointing commentary on ship design and the underlying combat-mentality that went into each country’s design.
 
The US had an opportunity to produce a modern, state of the art, optimized frigate and instead opted for an obsolete base design some 20 years old.  As with the Burke Flt XXIV, or whatever they’re up to now, the Navy has opted for the illusion of a safe design instead of a modern combat capable and survivable design.  China, on the other hand, has opted for a state of the art modern frigate.

Constellation Fraud

The Navy assured us that the Constellation class frigate would be a zero risk, on-time, on-cost, romp through the park to build since it was, essentially, a copy of an existing Fincantieri FREMM design.  There would be only minor, inconsequential changes – the color of the paint, perhaps, or an extra bulkhead or two for greater compartmentalization – that would have no impact on the design or production of the ship.
 
Of course, when the concept drawings were released, it turned out that the ship had been heavily modified and actually bore little resemblance to the parent FREMM design.  The Navy had lied to Congress and the public by presenting the frigate as a minor variation of an existing design when, in reality, it was a nearly brand new design with little in common with the so-called parent.  I won’t bother reciting the litany of changes from the parent design as those are readily available on line.
 
So, how’s all that working out?
 
USNI News website reports that the ship construction and delivery is going to be delayed at least a year.[1]  Construction began in Aug 2022 and the Navy is now hoping for delivery in 2027.  Far more likely is a 2028-9 delivery.  That’s a five to seven year delivery for what the Navy claims is a minor tweak of an existing design!
 
This babbling, incoherent, pointless statement from Andy Bosak (deputy manager for the frigate program) tells you everything you need to know about the state of the program.  The Navy has no idea what’s happening, no idea how to fix it, and no idea when the ship will be delivered. 

We are doing our analysis, as the Navy does, of doing deep dives of causes and effects and various different levers of which we can pull within that shipyard,” he added. “And we need to, as a program, work with our leadership, kind of figure out what we want to do. And from that, we will make that assessment as to what the actual schedule impact is of where we are. And that effort is ongoing.[1]

The builder, Fincantieri, blames much of the delay on labor shortages, welders, in particular.  No doubt this is a factor but I suspect there are other, far more impactful problems.  For example, 

… Fincantieri … wrestled with Americanizing the FREMM design for two and half years before it hit the 80 percent design completion and could begin fabrication on Constellation in 2022.  The modification of the design altered almost every drawing of the FREMM and required review from NAVSEA … [1]

The labor situation was well known before Fincantieri submitted a bid and the before the Navy awarded them a contract so that should have already been factored into the schedule.  What wasn’t factored in was the extent to which the Navy would modify the design.  The modifications sent ripple waves of disruption spreading throughout the program, culminating in the major schedule slippage we learn about now.  Undoubtedly, the schedule will slip even further.  We’re likely looking at closer to a two year schedule delay for a ship that was supposedly a knock off of an existing design.
 
The Navy knew all this and understood what deviating from the parent design would mean. 

"[The Navy] and the shipbuilder agreed that design maturity was probably the single biggest factor we could do to reduce the risk of production,” former program executive officer for unmanned and small combatants Rear Adm. Casey Moton said in August of 2022.[1]

So, knowing full well what a modified (immature) design would do to the production schedule, the Navy went ahead and completely redesigned the ship anyway.  Not only is the Navy complicit in the current problems, they are the proximate cause of the problems!
 
Here’s yet another example of the ‘minor, insignificant’ changes the Navy made: 

… testing at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock found that the modified design did not meet service standards for operating in heavy seas, necessitating design changes that ate into the schedule margin … [1]
 
“We were already into the functional and detail design when that report came from Carderock – something of a surprise because the parent design didn’t really have that,” Vandroff (Mark Vandroff, Fincantieri Marinette Marine’s chief executive officer) said.[1]

That was a surprise to you, Mr. Vandroff?  Seriously?  You completely changed the design to the point that it is a brand new, never before produced design and were surprised to find that created new problems?  You’re not an engineer, I’m assuming?
 

 
Conclusion
 
This program has been nothing but fraud and deception piled on fraud and deception from the very beginning and now it’s coming home to roost.  The Navy tried to hide a completely new ship inside the shadow – and lies – of an existing ship and now they’re acting surprised that the fraud is impacting the production schedule.
 
We need to also keep cost in mind.  Schedule slippages of this magnitude don’t come free.  The cost is going to skyrocket and the Navy will, again, act surprised and attempt to blame the builder.
 
By the way, do you recall that the Navy claimed that the follow on ships (2-20) would cost less than $800M?  Yeah, they said that.  Here’s the quote from RAdm. John Neagley:
 
“The follow-on objective cost for FFG(X) is $800 million. We think we can get below that.”[2]
 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), on the other hand, estimated an average cost of $1.2B per ship.[3]
 
As it turns out, the actual budgeted costs are around $1.1B-$1.2B, and that’s before the inevitable cost overruns, costs associated with schedule slippages, deferred completion costs for incomplete delivery, etc.  The true cost will be somewhere in the $1.5B+ range.
 

 
 
______________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “First Constellation Frigate Delayed At Least a Year, Schedule Assessment ‘Ongoing’”, Mallory Shelbourne and Sam LaGrone, 11-Jan-2024,
https://news.usni.org/2024/01/11/first-constellation-frigate-delayed-at-least-a-year-schedule-assessment-ongoing#:~:text=The%20service%20has%20briefed%20Congress%20that%20the%20future,legislative%20source%20confirmed%20to%20USNI%20News%20this%20week.
 
[2]Breaking Defense website, “Navy Says It Can Buy Frigate For Under $800M: Acquisition Reform Testbed”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 12-Jan-2018,
https://breakingdefense.com/2018/01/navy-says-it-can-buy-frigate-for-under-800m-acquisition-reform-testbed/
 
[3]CBO website, “The Cost of the Navy’s New Frigate”, Oct-2020,
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56675

Constellation Land Based Engineering Test Facility

The Constellation frigate program is building a land based engineering test facility in Philadephia which will duplicate the ship’s power plant.  What a great idea!  The Navy deserves credit for this after the Freedom variant powertrain combining gear debacle, right?.  However, we can’t give the Navy any credit because they didn’t want the test facility.  It was mandated by Congress in the 2021 defense budget.[1, 3]
 
Well, regardless of who the credit goes to, it’s still a great idea.  The program can put the ship’s power plant through its paces and work out any problems before the ship is built.  Only … in true Navy fashion, the test facility will not be ready before the first ship is delivered and subsequent ships have been started.
 

The site should be ready around the time the first frigate is delivered and will continue to operate until the ship is ready for deployment.[1]

Uh … isn’t this backwards?  Shouldn’t the test facility be up and running long before the ship construction begins?
 

… the LBTS [land based test site] focuses on hardware, as a laboratory of different configurations to settle on a final propulsion system.[2]

Again, shouldn’t that testing to determine a final propulsion system be completed before the ship construction begins, not after the ship is delivered – at which point it is too late to matter?
 
Well, what’s the big deal?  The Constellation is, basically, the existing FREMM frigate so the propulsion system is already well proven.  Honestly, the land facility is a Congressionally mandated formality that isn’t really needed for an existing, proven propulsion system, right?
 
Unfortunately, the Navy did a bit of fraud bait and switch.  The Constellation is based only loosely and to a minor extent on the existing FREMM.
 

The propulsion system for the Constellation is a new configuration for the U.S. Navy, with a combined diesel-electric and gas turbine system. The CODLAG propulsion system takes a General Electric LM-2500+G4 and combines it with two MTU diesel engines to power the ship via an electric drive system.[2]

This is not what Congress intended.
 

In accordance with the Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, the Navy must finish the LBES site for the frigate before the lead ship in the class delivers in 2026. The site must include shipboard equipment for systems ranging from the main reduction gear and the main propulsion system, to the power control modules.[2]

Cognizant of the LCS debacle, Congress intended for the land site to be up and running before the ship was built, not after.  Congress wanted to eliminate the problems before the ship was built.
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense, “Navy Says Constellation Hull Change Won’t Affect Internal Design”, Justin Katz, 4-Aug-2021,
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/08/navy-says-constellation-hull-change-wont-affect-internal-design/
 
[2]USNI News website, “Frigate Land-Based Engineering Site Taking Shape in the Philadelphia Navy Yard”, Mallory Shelbourne, 20-Jun-2023,
https://news.usni.org/2023/06/20/frigate-land-based-engineering-site-taking-shape-in-the-philadelphia-navy-yard
 
[3]From Congressional Research Service, “Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate
Program: Background and Issues for Congress”, 27-Mar-2023, p.8 : 
Section 125 of the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6395/P.L. 116-283 of
January 1, 2021) requires the Navy to commence, prior to the delivery of the first FFG-62, a landbased test program for the FFG-62 engineering plant (i.e., its propulsion system and related machinery). The provision specifies how the test program is to be conducted and requires the Navy to complete the test program not later than the date on which the first FFG-62 is scheduled to be available for tasking by operational military commanders.

Destroyer Escort Development

Destroyer Escorts (DE), or Frigates (FF/FFG), as they’re now known, have an interesting developmental history that illustrates many of the problems we’re dealing with today.

 

The modern DE, as we know it, came to be in WWII.  There are earlier possible predecessors but, for our purposes, we’ll say WWII was the starting point, as typified by the Buckley class.  The type continued to evolve throughout the war and the immediate post-war, eventually developing into missile and helicopter versions, changing names from destroyer escort to frigate and leading, ultimately, to the current Constellation class frigate.

 

In its early guise, the outstanding characteristics of the DE were:

 

Focus on anti-submarine warfare (ASW)

Cheap cost and large numbers

Use as convoy escorts for which the main threat was submarines

 

As post-war development took place, the ships grew steadily larger and eventually lost their ASW focus, becoming more multi-function (not a good thing!), expensive, and less numerous.

 

Consider the steady increase in size, as shown in the table below and the scaled silhouette drawings.

 

 

Destroyer Escort Size Growth
Class	Length, ft
Buckley	306
Dealey	314
Garcia	414
Knox	438
Perry	453
Constellation	496

 

 

 

 

 

Let’s take a look at several representative destroyer escort classes.

 

Buckley – This is the classic destroyer escort of WWII.  Weapons included 3x 3” guns, Hedgehog, 200x depth charges, 2x stern depth charge rails, 3x 21” torpedoes and assorted 40 mm and 20 mm anti-aircraft guns.  Sensors included Type 128D or Type 144 sonar in retractable dome.  The noteworthy aspect of this class was its ASW focus which set the pattern for subsequent DE classes.  This was a focused, efficient, cheap vessel whose cost allowed procurement in large numbers with around 150 being built.  The class had a clear primary purpose and contained nothing that did not directly contribute to that purpose.  The ship was as small as it could be, consistent with its function.

 

In this class, we see all the characteristics of an excellent ship:  small as possible, heavily armed, single function, cheap, simple and easy to build, and numerous.

 

Dealey – This was the first post-WWII DE.  Weapons included 4x 3” guns in two twin mounts, RUR-4 Weapon Alpha anti-submarine rocket launcher, 2x ASW triple torpedo launchers, 2x K-gun depth charge launchers, and 1x stern depth charge rails.  Sensors included the SQS-4 low frequency sonar.  USS Willis, DE-1027, operated a variable depth sonar from the stern.  The class was later modified for DASH operations.  The class was still focused on ASW but one can already see the beginnings of a decrease in ASW weaponry with smaller, lighter torpedoes and fewer depth charges and rails/launchers

 

Garcia – These ships typified the major jump in size that occurred due, primarily, to the incorporation of an aviation component (flight deck, helo, hangar).  Weapons included 2× 5 in guns, 1× 8-tube ASROC Mk16 launcher (16 missiles), 2× triple lightweight torpedo tubes, and 2× MK 37 stern mounted fixed torpedo tubes which were later removed.  Sensors included the SQS-26 bow sonar.  The ship operated the SeaSprite helo. 

 

This class is an example of the beginnings of a fascination with technology over firepower and combat effectiveness as evidenced by an emphasis on aviation as the primary ASW tool rather than up close, volume oriented ASW firepower (depth charges and the like). 

 

The use of 5” guns illustrates additional loss of focus and the movement away from a single, primary function towards a multi-function philosophy.

 

Knox – This class further emphasizes the movement away from a strict focus on ASW and towards a broader, ocean escort role.  Weapons include 1× 5 in gun, 1× Mk16 8–cell ASROC launcher, and 2× triple lightweight torpedo tubes.  Again, the on-board ASW weapons have been decreased in favor of the helo.  Sensors included the SQS-26 bow sonar and SQR-18 towed array.  The ship operated the SeaSprite helo. 

 

Perry – This is where the destroyer escort concept really went off the rails as the focus shifted to ocean escort and anti-air although ASW was still a mission.  However, the Perry’s SQS-56 sonar was considered only marginally capable although the SQR-19 towed array was useful.  This class also saw the near abandonment of ship-based ASW in favor of helo-based ASW with the ship acting as a helo-host rather than an active ASW combatant.

 

Constellation – This class doesn’t even pretend to be ASW-focused.  The ship lacks even a VL-ASROC.  It is a mini-Burke, pure and simple, trying to be all things and being good at none.  This is a class without a mission other than to be a cheaper Burke and not be a failure (see, “Constellation Class Frigate - Success or Just Not Failure?”).

 

 

From the brief history and description of the DE classes, we clearly see that the initial primary characteristics of a destroyer escort,

 

• Focus on anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
• Cheap cost and large numbers
• Use as convoy escorts for which the main threat was submarines

 

were altered, over time, to,

 

• Unfocused, multi-mission
• Expensive and few in number (only 20 Constellations are planned)
• No clear mission or CONOPS

 

 

Focus

 

The WWII DE was supremely focused on one task and one task alone.  It was sized and equipped for that one task and nothing else.  This resulted in the minimum possible construction cost/time and, hence, the maximum number of ships.  We’ve lost that over the years.  Today’s destroyer escorts – which we now call frigates – are multi-focused (multi-functional) which has drastically driven up size and cost, diluted ASW weapons, and drastically decreased the number of ships we can afford.

 

 

Helo-centric ASW

 

We need to address one of the DE trends and that is the adoption of helos as replacements for shipboard ASW.  When they’re in the air and over a contact, helos are quite effective and useful.  The problem is that helos are only sporadically available.  Helos are good for around two 3-hour missions per day.  Even with two helos per ship (an optimistic number) that provides only 12 hours of airborne coverage per day and even that will be sporadic in the sense that in combat there will be many false contacts that will have to be pursued.  Thus, the helo won’t be flying around searching broad areas, as so many people envision.  Instead, they’ll be tied to one contact location for an extended period, trying to prove/disprove a suspected contact.  That’s point coverage, not broad area searching.  Thus, by making helos the focus of our ASW effort, we’ve effectively reduced our coverage area.

 

 

Cost/Numbers

 

Destroyer escorts have, historically, been effective not because they were individually supremely effective ASW machines but because they were ubiquitous.  They were effective due to numbers!  Their presence forced submarines to alter course, miss intercepts, and abort attacks.  As the type has grown in size, complexity, and cost, the numbers have been reduced to the point that their main mode of effectiveness, a ubiquitous presence, is no longer viable.  Our entire supposed ASW force will now consist of 20 Constellations.  That’s not even remotely enough to be effective.  The Navy can claim that Burkes are ASW-capable but they’re not.  They don’t train for it and no sane commander is going to risk a $2B-$3B ship playing tag with a submarine.

 

 

Summary

 

By foolishly trying to make every ship a multi-function, do-everything, single-handed war-winning, mega-machine, we’ve lost all the positive attributes of the type.  We’ve taken a ship that was exquisitely optimized for its role and morphed it into a ship that has no defined role (or, maybe, every role!). 

 

Consider the Constellation.  We clearly do not have a CONOPS for the class other than ‘do everything’ which is another way of saying ‘do nothing well’.

 

The DE development history also clearly shows the relationship between size/cost and numbers.  We’ve gone from 150 Buckleys, at 306 ft long, to 20 Constellations, at 496 ft long.  Size equals reduced numbers.  It can’t be stated any plainer than that.  A 496 ft long frigate is an abomination and makes a mockery of the type’s traditional role while simultaneously reducing, nearly to the point of extinction, the numbers of ASW ships in the fleet.

Read and Analyze

Lately, the blog has been getting a number of commenters repeating claims from various sources that, upon analysis, turn out to be highly suspect.

 

This blog rarely reports news.  Instead, it analyzes news.  This analysis takes the form of intelligent questioning of the news, asking whether what has been reported actually makes sense and agrees with other bits of data.  Far too often, the naval news of the day fails to withstand the scrutiny of intelligent analysis.  Manufacturer’s claims, Navy claims, and naval observer/analyst claims are almost invariably overstated or just flat out wrong.  Blog readers/commenters are, likewise, encouraged to read with analytical and questioning intelligence rather than just accepting what they read out in the wild – it’s safe on this blog to accept what you read but everywhere else …

 

Let’s hammer this home with a very recent example.

 

From a Naval News website article comes this breathless report of ‘Sea Breaker’, a new cruise missile from Rafael that will revolutionize warfare (that’s what, the five thousandth reported ‘revolutionary’ weapon development just this year?).  After citing an endless list of amazing capabilities, the article closes with this statement about the missile:

 

… ensuring a high probability of mission success, with a 250 lb. penetration, blast and fragmentation warhead, making a single hit effective enough to neutralize a frigate-sized ship. (1)

 

Wow!  One hit neutralizes a frigate size ship.  That’s tremendous.   …  …  Or is it?  Is a 250 lb warhead really enough to ‘neutralize’ (whatever that means) a frigate size ship?  Let’s briefly step through the analytical examination.

 

What do we know?

 

Well, it’s a given that the manufacturer didn’t actually shoot any missiles at a frigate so there’s no actual data.  That alone casts doubt on the claim.

 

Since there is no actual data, what about historical evidence that could shed light on the claim?  What about the Perry class frigate, the USS Stark, that was hit by not one but two Exocet missiles on 17-May of 1987.  Let’s look up the Exocet missile warhead size …    Hmmm …    Wiki gives an Exocet missile warhead size of 364 lbs which is 114 lb greater than the Sea Breaker.  Reports suggest that the first Exocet did not explode but did deposit several hundred lbs of burning fuel (very short missile travel time) causing fires at 3500 degF.(2)  The second missile did explode and also contributed burning fuel.

 

Having read the book, ‘Missile Inbound’ (see, the post “Missile Inbound” for a review of the book), which tells the story of the attack and the subsequent damage control efforts, we know that the ship was ‘neutralized’ to a degree, depending on the definition of ‘neutralized’.  Fires were extinguished within 20 hrs and the ship arrived in Bahrain the day after the attack. 

 

So, we can now ask ourselves, does it seem likely that a single 250 lb warhead can ‘neutralize’ a frigate given the example of the Stark surviving two significantly larger missiles plus well over a thousand lbs of burning fuel?  Or, is the manufacturer’s claim overstated?

USS Stark Damage

 

I’m not going to offer an opinion since the purpose of the post is to illustrate the analytical process and encourage readers to do the same in their own reading.  The point is that we have to stop accepting claims at face value and start analyzing them intelligently.

 

 

 

_____________________________________

 

(1)Naval News website, “Rafael Unveils A New Long Range Guided Missile System, ‘Sea Breaker’”, Martin Manaranche, 30-Jun-2021,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/06/rafael-unveils-a-new-long-range-guided-missile-system-sea-breaker/

 

(2)https://news.usni.org/2017/05/17/the-attack-uss-stark-at-30