Network Lessons for Future Warfare

The Navy (and, to be fair, the entire military) has gone all-in on networking as the basis of our future combat capability.  We’re attempting to create vast regional (or worldwide!) networks of distributed sensors and weapons all tied together in a completely interchangeable, any-to-any linkage.  The Navy claims this will deliver omniscient awareness that will place us inside the enemy’s decision/action loop (OODA, for those of you who recall Col. Boyd’s work) and allow us to wreak havoc and destruction against a hapless, helpless, confused enemy.  While we aren’t at the end point with fully functioning network systems, yet, we do have more than enough existing pieces to get an accurate assessment of the viability of the concept.
 
To ever so briefly review, ComNavOps has mocked the concept as being utterly unrealistic and pure fantasy.
 
To ever so briefly review, history and real world events have mocked the concept as being utterly unrealistic with example after example of the failure of networks, sensors, and weapons.
 
Now, we have yet another real world example of the failure of networking and distributed sensing to examine.  You recall the recent friendly fire shootdown by the Navy of a F-18F Super Hornet on 22-Dec-2024 by the USS Gettysburg (CG-64)?  Reader ‘G2mil’ brought an interview to my attention that examines the incident and offers insight into the networking and sensor failures that led to the shootdown.[1]  The interview is available on YouTube and features retired Navy Capt. Kevin Eyer, a former Aegis cruiser captain, discussing the friendly fire incident with retired former Navy Commander and F-14 RIO, Ward Carroll.
 
Caution:  The interviewee, Capt. Eyer is not on active duty and made no claim to have inside authoritative information.  He did, however, imply that he has access to unofficial, inside information.  The Navy has not yet issued a formal report.  You can make your own assessment of the credibility of the Captain’s information.
 
 
Continuing …  I’ve extracted salient points from the interview and summarized them below.
 

• The IFF interrogation of the aircraft initially succeeded and the aircraft was identified as friendly.  However, the Gettysburg was in the act of recovering a helo of its own and during the recovery had to shut down all emissions.  Upon re-establishing sensor coverage, the aircraft was again queried but this time the IFF failed and the aircraft was not tagged as friendly.
• An electronic warfare (EW) operator identified the aircraft’s emissions as friendly and designated the aircraft as such.  However, the designation failed to register in the system due to a software bug that has been known since 2023.
• The EW operator followed up with a verbal designation of ‘friendly’ on the CIC communication net but, in the din, confusion, and stress of the CIC environment, the verbal statement failed to register with the TAO or anyone who might have intervened.  Verbal communications in stress situations always fail.
• The area wide Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) network did correctly have the aircraft identified as friendly however the Gettysburg’s CEC was either down or failed to register the designation from the network.  Networks always fail.

 
 
Here’s a couple of interesting, related notes:
 

• USS Gettysburg ‘failed’ its pre-deployment workups with the ship and crew’s performance being notably short of meeting standards.  Despite this, the ship was allowed to proceed on deployment due to a lack of potential replacement ships.  You’ll recall that we’ve talked about the widespread use of waivers that inevitably lead to tragedy and are at the heart of nearly every incident.  We’ve also noted the Navy’s refusal to hold anyone or anything to established standards.  This ship should never have been allowed to deploy.  The entire point of pre-deployment workups is to certify that the ship/crew are proficient enough to deploy.  Gettysburg was not but deployed anyway.
• NavSea knew about the software bugs but pushed the Aegis software out into the fleet anyway.  This is literally criminal negligence and, in the civilian world, is the basis for criminal and civil trials and lawsuits all the time. 
  

 
 
Discussion
 
As with almost every incident, it was due to a number of supposedly unlikely factors all occurring together.  However, upon examination we see that some of the factors were well known and, thus, the incident was less of a freak confluence of unlikely factors and more of a known problem waiting to happen.  It was just a matter of time.
 
In this incident, we see that despite multiple ships and aircraft tracking the F-18, area wide networks sharing their data, an aircraft that was talking and squawking its identification, and the most advanced surveillance and fire control software in the world, we still managed to lose situational awareness and shoot down a friendly aircraft.  If we can’t keep track of a friendly aircraft with IFF flying a known safe flight path and with no enemy cyber or electronic hindrance, what hope does a regional (or worldwide!) network have in combat?
 
With these repeated demonstrations of ineffectiveness and unreliability, why are we basing our entire future warfare plans on this kind of network/software approach?  This network/data/software approach to warfare requires perfect performance to even begin to be useful in combat and when does perfection ever occur in combat?
 
We shoot down our own aircraft, collide with hulking merchant ships, are unable to verify attacks on us (USS Mason affair), and yet we choose to ignore those real world experiences in favor of fantasy level imaginings of future warfare.  How stupid are we?  The answer is … admiralty stupid!
 
 
 
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[1]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bo34Zwbte6c

I’m Blind … Or Lying

The Navy is attempting to retire large numbers of ships in a misguided effort to increase funding for unmanned vessels and other nonsensical items.  In particular, the Navy has been trying for many years to retire the Aegis cruisers, the world’s most capable and powerful warships.  After being repeatedly rebuffed by Congress, the Navy settled on the ploy of allowing the ships to sit pier side and, literally, rust away and then claim that it would cost too much to upgrade them.  Now, the Navy is going a step further and outright lying to Congress.  CNO Gilday had this to say to the House Armed Services Committee about the Aegis cruiser retirement requests:

 

 “The older SPY radars can’t see the threat. If they can’t see it, they can’t shoot it down.”[1]

 

So, according to the admiral, Aegis/SPY-1 ‘can’t see the threat’.  Really?  Aegis originated the motto,

 

‘If it flies, it dies’.

 

Was that a lie? 

 

The threats haven’t changed all that much since Aegis/SPY was first introduced.  The threat was missiles back then and today the threat is … ah … missiles.  Yes, stealth has come along but that affects all radars not just Aegis/SPY radars.

 

Ah … here’s a thought … don’t the Burkes use the same SPY-1 radar, albeit a slightly different version (-D versus –A/B).  Is the version difference so great that Burkes are front line warships capable of seeing every threat and yet Ticonderogas are blind barges, unfit for even harbor patrol?  Or, is Gilday lying to get what he wants which is to retire the cruisers?

 

 

 

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[1]Breaking Defense website, “Decommissioned ship funds would go towards buying missiles, Navy says”, Aaron Mehta, 11-May-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/decommissioned-ship-funds-would-go-towards-buying-missiles-navy-says/

Chinese Type 055 Update

China’s Type 055 destroyer (cruiser, actually) is intended to be a functional equivalent to the US Ticonderoga class Aegis cruiser.  The 055 just made its international debut at a Chinese naval parade. (1)

From China Defense Blog, a second Type 055 was launched in April 2018 and a third and fourth were launched in July 2018. (1)  Two others are known to be under construction.  That’s five Aegis-equivalent ships in a very short period while China continues to build other destroyers, frigates, and corvettes, as well.

What is the US building?  More outdated Burkes.  There are seven Burkes scheduled for commissioning over the next five years.  That’s an average of just more than one per year.  China is building surface warships at two or three times the rate we are.

Let’s take a look at the profile view of the Type 055.

Type 055 Class (Credit Ref 2)

The profile emphasizes not only the stealth shaping of the ship but also a low and greatly reduced superstructure – something ComNavOps heartily approves of in ship design.  In addition to the lower radar signature, the smaller superstructure provides less of a target and makes for a smaller visual signature.  Recall how our Gato fleet submarines in WWII underwent drastic sail reductions to reduce their visual signatures? 

Now, compare the 055 profile to a Ticonderoga class Aegis cruiser profile.

Ticonderoga Class

Note the gigantic, blocky superstructure.  There’s nothing stealthy about that!  To be fair, the Type 055 is a brand new design and the Ticonderoga design dates back to the late 1970’s, long before stealth was a design consideration.  The Ticonderoga superstructure also makes for a very unstable, top heavy ship.

How about we do a quick visual comparison of the 055 to our newest surface warship, the Burke class?

Burke Class

We see that the Burke has some degree of stealth shaping but it pales in comparison to the Type 055.  Note the Burke’s large superstructure and great deal of exposed equipment, all of which detracts from the ship’s stealth.  Again, the Burke design dates back to the early 1980’s when stealth was in its infancy, so this is somewhat understandable.  However, that begs the question, why are we still building them?

There’s nothing terribly profound about this post – just a quick update and scan of the Type 055.

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(1)China Defense Blog, “China debuts most powerful destroyer in celebrations”, 25-Apr-2019,

http://china-defense.blogspot.com/2019/04/china-debuts-most-powerful-destroyer-in.html

(2)China Defense Blog, “DDG 101”, 25-Apr-2019,

http://china-defense.blogspot.com/2019/04/ddg-101.html

Ticonderoga Class Modernization

As you know, the Navy has been attempting to early retire the Ticonderoga class cruisers for several years now.  They’ve put forth various plans and Congress has repeatedly slapped them down.  That hasn’t stopped the Navy from scheming to achieve the desired retirements.  It’s only made the Navy more creative and devious about how they go about it. 

After the last attempt at hidden retirements, Congress forced the Navy to adopt the ‘2/4/6’ plan which called for 2 cruisers per year to enter a ‘modernization’ program, 4 years to complete the modernization, and a maximum of 6 cruisers in modernization at one time.

It’s important to understand that this program results in a permanent reduction in the number of cruisers by 6 since the modernized cruisers will re-enter the fleet only as one-for-one replacements for retiring cruisers.  Thus, the Navy got what they wanted, at least partially.

So, what’s the current status of the ‘modernization’ program?  Surprisingly, it’s very difficult to get information.

Here’s the list of cruisers inducted into the modernization program, thus far:

2015 

USS Cowpens (CG-63)

USS Gettysburg (CG- 64)

2016  

USS Vicksburg (CG- 69)

USS Chosin (CG- 65)

2017  

USS Anzio (CG-68)

USS Cape St. George (CG- 71)

Now, in 2019, it’s been 4 years and the first two cruisers should be coming out of modernization.  According to Navy Recognition website, the Gettysburg is being prepared to re-enter the fleet in March 2020 under a $150M contract with BAE Systems in Norfolk.  Gettysburg will be replacing the Bunker Hill (CG-52), scheduled to retire in 2020.

Starting in January 2019, the Gettysburg will undergo extensive repair and upgrade work that will return the ship to full capability after nearly four years of inactive status under the Navy’s cruiser modernization program. (1)

The key point, here, is that the cruiser has NOT been undergoing continuous modernization since entering the modernization program in 2105, as you might reasonably suppose.  Instead, it has been sitting idle in inactive status.  Most people do not realize this aspect of the ‘modernization’ program.  The program is really a way for the Navy to idle cruisers for several years and then bring them back when another cruiser is retired – thus, an effective permanent decrease in the cruiser fleet size.

USS Gettysburg Sitting Inactive While Undergoing "Modernization"

One might also note that the 4 year limit is being violated by some months.

It is also unclear exactly what is being modernized.  The Navy claims the usual mishmash of vague improvement lists such as,

… installation of a new Aegis combat system, new communications suite and the Consolidated Afloat Network Enterprise Systems (CANES); and renovate the crew’s living spaces aboard the 27-year-old ship. (1)

It’s unclear, though, just how much improvement in combat capability will occur.  For example, the ‘new Aegis combat system’ is, as best I can determine, just a software upgrade and could have been done, pierside, at any time without a 4 year ‘modernization’ program.  Crew living space improvements have nothing to do with combat capability.  CANES appears to be a consolidation of existing networks – nice, but not a direct combat enhancement.

It’s also interesting to note the cost of the modernization.  At $150M, this is not a very extensive modernization by today’s cost standards. 

Given the limited scope of the modernization and the moderate cost, one can’t help but ask, ‘why did it require 4 years?’.  Well, as you now see, it didn’t.  The first three years were spent in inactive, idle status.  The actual work only requires a year and that’s probably stretching things out a bit.  The real purpose of the program was to idle as many cruisers as Congress would allow for as long as Congress would allow.  We’re trying to grow the fleet to 355 ships or so and yet we’re idling the most capable cruisers in the world.  Hmm …

Here’s the retirement schedule (3):

2020 

USS Mobile Bay (CG-53)

USS Bunker Hill (CG- 52)

2021  

USS Antietam (CG- 54)

USS Leyte Gulf (CG- 55)

2022  

USS San Jacinto (CG-56)

USS Lake Champlain (CG- 57)

2024

USS Philippine Sea (CG-58)

USS Princeton (CG-59)

2025

USS Normandy (CG-60)

USS Monterey (CG-61)

2026

USS Chancellorsville (CG-62)

Just recently, the Navy has, apparently, indicated its intention to cancel the cruiser modernization program:

The FY 2020 budget request also notes the Navy’s intention to cancel a planned cruiser modernization and life-extension program – which the service has asked to do previously and Congress would not agree to. (2)

What the Navy intends to do at that point is unknown.  We’ll have to wait and see Congress’ reaction to the Navy’s new plan but it’s unlikely to be positive.

In summary, the ‘modernization’ program was clearly a fraud intended to idle cruisers and, in that regard, the Navy has partially succeeded in bypassing Congress’ intent.  Where the program goes from here remains to be seen.




Update Jan-2020:  BAE Systems has been awarded a $175M contract to modernize USS Vicksburg's gas turbine propulsion system, restore crew habitability spaces, and support the installation of a new Aegis combat system, communication suite and CANES (Consolidated Afloat Network Enterprise System). Work is expected to be completed in July 2021.  Again, this violates the 2-4-6 Congressional mandate by several months to a year.  Vicksburg has been sitting idle since 2016 rather than undergoing modernization as the Navy claimed.  This was, clearly, a means for the Navy to idle cruisers rather than actually modernize them.  The described modernization contains very little in the way of direct combat capability improvements.

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(1)Navy Recognition website, “BAE Systems to Modernize U.S. Navy Tico-class Cruiser USS Gettysburg“, 27-Aug-2018,

http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2018/august-2018-navy-naval-defense-news/6458-bae-systems-to-modernize-u-s-navy-tico-class-cruiser-uss-gettysburg.html

(2)USNI News website, “Large Surface Combatant Program Delayed Amid Pivot Towards Unmanned, Other Emerging Tech”, Megan Eckstein, 13-Mar-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/03/13/large-surface-combatant-program-delayed-amid-pivot-towards-unmanned-other-emerging-tech

(3)Defense News website, “The US Navy will start losing its largest surface combatants in 2020”, David B. Larter, 8-Oct-2017,

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2017/10/09/the-us-navy-will-start-losing-its-largest-surface-combatants-in-2020/

Aegis Cruiser Gets Lucky

You’ve probably already read that a South Korean fishing boat collided with the Aegis cruiser Lake Champlain.  Apparently, damage was minimal to both vessels. 

“Guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Champlain (CG-57) and a South Korean fishing vessel collided in international waters east of the Korean Peninsula, the Navy said in a statement this morning. That fishing vessel lacked functioning radio or GPS and did not heed audio warnings, a defense official told USNI News.” (1)

How can a Navy Captain allow an unidentified and non-responsive boat to get close enough to collide?  Did we learn nothing from the Cole attack?  Do we not recall that North Korean forces have torpedoed a South Korean ship?  Have we forgotten that North Korean small boats and mini-subs have been found in South Korean waters?  While there may have been no overt reason to believe this was a suicide/attack attempt, there was also no reason to believe that it wasn’t given North Korea’s history and erratic and unpredictable behavior.  In fact, blowing up a US cruiser would have been something quite appealing to North Korea.

I repeat, how did a Navy Captain allow an unidentified and non-responsive boat to get close enough to collide?  That’s a huge risk of a multi-billion dollar ship.  That’s gross incompetence.  The Captain should be relieved and court-martialed. 

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(1)USNI News website, “UPDATED: Cruiser Lake Champlain Collides With South Korean Fishing Vessel That Lacked Radio, GPS”, Megan Eckstein, 9-May-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/05/09/cruiser

Aegis Test Ship

This idea has come up repeatedly.  The Navy’s main AAW weapon system, Aegis, is completely untested under any realistic conditions.  Further, the system’s combat resiliency is unknown.

Regarding function, the Aegis system has never been tested against the very threat it was designed to handle, saturation missile attacks.  We have no idea what its capabilities are and yet we’re betting the protection of our fleet on it.  We need to know how the system will actually function in combat.

Regarding resiliency, you’ll recall that when the Port Royal gently nosed aground at one or two knots, and rocked gently for a day or so until it could be freed, it left the system out of alignment and possibly inoperative, depending on what report you care to believe.  I think the fact that the Port Royal was the Navy’s first choice for early retirement of the Aegis cruisers is quite telling – this despite the Port Royal being the newest Aegis cruiser and fitted with the much valued ballistic missile defense modifications (BMD).

This does not bode well for the Aegis system’s combat resiliency.  If an entire Aegis system could be incapacitated by gently rocking for a while, what will happen when an anti-ship missile hits and whipsaws the entire ship?  We need to know.  Are Aegis ships one-hit mission kills or can they stay in the fight?

So what can we do about this?  How can we get answers?

As we’ve documented, the Navy has tried multiple times and in multiple ways to early retire the Aegis cruiser class.  Congress has rebuffed the Navy.  Even so, the Navy has managed to de facto retire six cruisers under the so-called modernization plan.  Be that as it may, if the Navy is so eager to retire a cruiser, why not let them?  Let’s retire a cruiser, automate it for remote control, put it out in the middle of the ocean, launch a saturation attack against it while it defends in full auto mode, and see what happens.  That will tell us how it functions in combat and whether it can take damage and keep fighting.

USS Paul F Foster - Self Defense Test Ship

It would cost next to nothing to automate the ship.  We’re not talking about artificial intelligence – just basic helm controls to position the ship.  Remember, the Aegis system, itself, already has a full auto mode – set it, leave the ship, and watch what happens.  We’d want to add in some extensive recording equipment to monitior the results.  We’re talking, what, a few million dollars?  That’s round off error in the Navy’s accounting ledgers. 

Aegis Cruiser - Aegis Test Ship Needed

Lest anyone believe the idea is not feasible, recall that the Navy maintains exactly such a remote controlled weapons test ship, the USS Paul F. Foster, a Spruance class destroyer converted to act as the Navy’s Self Defense Test Ship.  Given that the bulk of the Navy’s surface fleet carries the Aegis AAW system, it is long past time for a dedicated Aegis self defense test ship.

Idled Cruiser Update

The Navy has been trying for several years, now, to early retire the Ticonderoga class Aegis cruisers.  Presumably, the reason is to eliminate any potential competition with the Flt III Burkes that might threaten their funding.  Ironically, the Spruance class destroyers were retired and sunk to eliminate them as competition with the Ticonderogas!  The wheel turns full circle, I guess.

In any event, here are the specifics on the initial idlings via Defense News website.  Here are the ships that have been idled and the year they were idled or are scheduled to be idled.

Cowpens        2015

Gettysburg      2015

Chosin            2016

Vicksburg        2016

As you recall, the Navy tried to block retire 11 of the 22 cruisers and Congress blocked that plan.  The Navy then came up with the fiction of “modernization”, which was simply an unofficial retirement, and Congress blocked that.  Ultimately, the Navy swore to Congress that they really would modernize the ships and return them to service and Congress responded by implementing a 2-4-6 law which limits the “modernizations” to two ships per year with completion mandated in four years and a maximum of six ships in “modernization” at a time.  So, four of the allowable six are now idled and, presumably, two more will follow suit in 2017.

Here’s the catch that the Navy, intentionally, hasn’t advertised.  When the ships come out of modernization they will replace retiring cruisers.  Thus, the four (next year, six) ships represent a net permanent decrease of four (next year, six) cruisers from the force.

It’s inconceivable to me that in the midst of declining fleet numbers and a stated desire for a 300+ ship navy, that we would early retire the most powerful surface warships in the world.

The crews of the ships are being disbanded.

“Once NAVSEA takes control, the ship will slim down from a 325-person crew led by a captain to a 45-person crew led by a lieutenant commander.” (1)

The Aegis cruiser fleet, once 22 ships, is now 18 ships and will drop to 16 next year, never to return.  China must simply be giddy with delight.  A Chinese secret agent inserted into the upper ranks of Navy leadership couldn’t do as much damage to the US fleet as we’re doing to ourselves.

(1)Defense News, “The Navy keeps sidelining its best surface ships. Here's why”, David Larter, Navy Times, March 25, 2016

http://www.defensenews.com/story/military/2016/03/24/chosin-home-port-shift-san-diego-hawaii-cruiser-modernization/82215912/

Still Trying To Retire Cruisers

The Navy is at it again.  You’ll  recall that the Navy attempted to retire 11 of the 22 ship Aegis cruiser force under the guise of “idling” them while slowly modernizing them and then eventually bringing them back into the fleet as one-for-one replacements for retiring cruisers.  [See, “Idled Cruisers” and “Idled Cruisers – Update”]  Of course, ComNavOps pointed out that if you remove half the cruiser fleet and then bring them back on a one-for-one replacement basis you will have effectively retired 11 of the 22 cruisers since, in one fell swoop, the cruiser force would be reduced from 22 to 11 and never rise above that number again.

Of course, that was the best case plan.  More realistically, the “idled” cruisers would never sail again.  Can you really see the Navy following through, several years from now, on modernizing ships that are even older at that point?  Of course not!  Once idled, these ships are done.  The operating costs disappear, crews vanish, money is saved, and new construction is assured.

Why, you ask, would the Navy conceivably want to early retire the most powerful warships in the world, some with BMD capability already, all with potential BMD capability, and all with many years of service life left?  The answer is two-fold:

1. As we just discussed, saving money for new construction.
2. Eliminating a potential and very viable alternative to the Burke Flt III which, if exercised, would threaten new Burke Flt III construction funding.  This was the same tactic used when the Spruance class was literally sunk to prevent competition between the Spruance/NTU and the, then, new Aegis system.  The Navy also did the same thing by neutering and retiring the Perrys to avoid competition with the LCS.

In any event, Congress didn’t believe the Navy’s “modernization” plan any more than ComNavOps did and they legislated that the Navy continue to operate the cruisers.  Then, when the Navy continued to try to back-door Congress, passed the 2/4/6 law which limited the Navy to 2 “idles” per year, mandated that the modernizations be completed in 4 years, and only allowed a maximum of 6 cruiser to be “idled” at a time.

So much for the history of this.

Undeterred, the Navy is once again attempting to retire 11 cruisers (1) in one stroke.  This time, recognizing Congress’ distrust, the Navy has offered (is insisting, actually) to have Congress write legislation mandating the return of the modernized cruisers to the fleet.  That way, the Navy claims, they can’t renege on the plan and retire the cruisers.

How dumb does the Navy think we are?  This is just a rehash of the original attempt whereby half the cruiser force would be idled for an extended period and then returned to the fleet on a one-for-one basis to replace retiring cruisers.  It still results in 11 cruisers being dropped from the force, permanently.  The article also makes it crystal clear that the Navy recognizes and publicly acknowledges that Congress does not trust them.  As I’ve said, the Navy has squandered whatever good will they ever had with Congress.  Now, though, they’re in the process of squandering their intellectual credibility.

At a time when the Navy is claiming to want to build the fleet up to 300+ ships, claiming that BMD is one of, if not the top, priorities, and is supposedly preparing for a Pacific Pivot and potential confrontation with China, how can the Navy possibly retire 11 of the most powerful warships on earth and replace them, numerically, with LCSs?  Honestly, if China could slip an agent into the Secretary of the Navy’s job with instructions to weaken the US fleet, they couldn’t do it better than this.

This latest attempt demonstrates, yet again, the Navy’s blatant disregard for Congressional wishes and highlights the absolute insanity that is now passing for leadership in the Navy.

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USNI, “WEST: Navy Wants Congressional Mandate Preventing Decommissioning Modernized Cruisers”, Megan Eckstein, February 18, 2016,

http://news.usni.org/2016/02/18/west-navy-wants-congressional-mandate-preventing-decommissioning-modernized-cruisers

Navy Again Trying To Retire Aegis Cruisers

ComNavOps is highly critical of Navy leadership but one thing I have to give them credit for is their sheer refusal to accept legislative direction.  Now, when I say that I give them credit, it’s akin to giving a bank robber credit for pulling off a successful robbery – it’s against the law but they showed determination in flouting the law.  Similarly, the Navy doesn’t even blink at Congressional mandates and things as silly as actual laws.

You’ll recall that the Navy previously tried to early retire several Ticonderoga class Aegis cruisers and Congress slapped them down.  Undeterred, the Navy then opted for the completely transparent ploy of “idling” the cruisers for “upgrades”.  Eleven cruisers were to be “modernized” for several years and then would re-enter the fleet.  No one, Congress included, bought that fairy tale.  Instead, Congress imposed a 2/4/6 rule whereby the Navy could only idle 2 cruisers per year, the modernization had to be completed in 4 years, and there could be no more than 6 cruisers undergoing modernization at one time.

Now, the Navy wants to retire modernize 7 additional cruisers for a total of 9.  The cruisers would be idled for an unspecified period of time and be brought back into the fleet only on a one for one basis to replace retiring cruisers (1). 

Aside from ignoring Congress’ legislative directive, that would have the effect of early retiring 9 cruisers since they would only return to the fleet as replacements for future cruiser retirements.  Of course, that assumes you believe the Navy would actually bring them back.  Can you seriously see the Navy bringing back ships that, at that future point, would be ten or fifteen years older?  Of course not!  The Navy will argue that the ships are outdated and should just be left idled.  This is nothing but another transparent early retirement ploy designed to bypass Congress’ law and intent.

It doesn’t matter whether you believe early retirements for the cruisers is a good idea or bad.  The point is that the military is run by the civilian government.  That’s what makes our country unique.  The Navy’s willful disregard for civilian authority is breathtaking.  This is just one more reason Navy leadership needs a wholesale housecleaning.  Fire them all.

(1)http://news.usni.org/2016/02/09/fy-2017-budget-navy-wants-to-modernize-last-7-cruisers-instead-of-following-246-directive-from-congress

Aegis Overhaul

Here’s an interesting tidbit about Aegis cruiser maintenance and upgrades.

BAE Systems Norfolk Ship Repair, Norfolk, Virginia, is being awarded a $38.6M modification to a previously awarded contract (N00024-11-C-4403) for USS Leyte Gulf (CG-55) fiscal 2015 extended docking selected restricted availability (ED-SRA).  Work is expected to be completed by February 2016.

Remember that the Navy told us it would take 4 years to modernize an Aegis cruiser which is why they had to take 11 cruisers out of service?  Well, here’s a significant maintenance and upgrade for an Aegis cruiser that is only going to cost $38.6M and be completed in less than seven months (it doesn’t say when the start date is).

To be fair, I don’t know what the complete scope of work is for either this availability or the Navy’s proposed four year modernization.

The other interesting aspect to this is that we often discuss modernization upgrades as a possible alternative to new construction.  For example, what if the Perry’s had been upgraded instead of retired in favor of new LCSs?  During these discussions, people often fling costs around with little or no supporting data – the costs, predictably, being either outrageously high or low as needed to support the position being argued. 

I’d like to gather some supporting costs for those types of discussions.  Of course, an Aegis cruiser ED-SRA is not an exact match for anything other than what it is.  It is not, to use the previous example, an exact match for, and estimate of, the cost to modernize a Perry.  Still, this is a pretty extensive piece of work on a pretty sophisticated ship and should, therefore, offer some insight into modernization costs.  The next time someone argues for modernization and claims a cost of $10M, I’ll have data that suggests that’s not a realistic figure.  Similarly, the next time someone argues against modernization and claims a cost of $750M, I’ll have data that suggests that’s not a realistic figure.

I’ll gather a few of these data points over time and across a range of upgrades and maintenance and see what kind of cost numbers are realistic.  I’ll share them with you as I come across them.

Aegis Modernization

USNI News website reports that the Aegis cruiser Chancellorsville received the first Aegis Baseline 9 modernization upgrade (1).  Apparently, the work occurred in an approximate six month period during the latter half of 2012.  The ship, you’ll recall, was involved in the drone crash during subsequent system testing.

The interesting part of this is that the Navy has claimed to Congress that it needs to put the Aegis cruisers through a four year modernization program in order to upgrade them.  Instead, we see that the major portion of the upgrade, the Aegis Baseline 9, can be performed in six months or less.  To be fair, the Navy undoubtedly had other modernization action items in mind for the four year upgrade but, come on, four years worth of other “stuff”???  Again, to be fair, the Navy has never released a comprehensive list of planned modernization items - I seriously doubt that such a list even exists since the Navy has no intention of ever modernizing the ships.  Further, the astute among you may be wondering how the Navy can perform a mid-life nuclear refueling and comprehensive overhaul of a carrier in less time than a cruiser modernization.  This simply reinforces the suspicion (certainty) that the Navy’s cruiser modernization plan was a thinly veiled attempt to retire the ships prematurely.

(1)USNI News, “Modernized Cruiser Chancellorsville Leaving for New Homeport in Japan”, Megan Eckstein, 28-May-2015

http://news.usni.org/2015/05/28/modernized-cruiser-chancellorsville-leaving-for-new-homeport-in-japan