7th Fleet and Deterrence

Despite having thoroughly discredited the notion of deterrence (see, “Forward Presence Deterrent EffectDisproved”), there is a faction of naval observers who continue to insist that deterrence is real and works despite the overwhelming evidence of China, Russia, Iran, and NKorea’s expansionism, terrorism, and general disregard for international laws, treaties, and norms which more than disproves the validity of deterrence.  In fact, many of these people believe that the only thing wrong with the Navy’s approach to deterrence – if there is anything wrong – is that we aren’t devoting enough ships to it.  If only we’d use even more ships our deterrence would be even more effective, they say.
 
Well, it’s time to take an analytical approach to the Navy and deterrence as regards our main enemy, China.  Is deterrence working?  What assets are we devoting to deterrence?  Do we need more? 
 
Is deterrence working?  -  Well, this one is easy to answer.  China has, for all practical purposes, annexed the entire South and East China Seas despite them being mainly international waters.  They’ve built illegal artificial islands and militarized them.  They’re continually encroaching on the territorial waters and air space of Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and other countries in the region.  They’ve made public claims about ownership of Japanese territories and most or all of the second island chain.  There are even reports stating that China has made claims on a third island chain which includes Hawaii and most of the Pacific.[2]
 
In addition to territorial expansion, China has also engaged in the seizure of US military assets and ignores the UNCLOS treaty to which it is a signatory (demonstrating that China’s word is worthless).
 
 
What assets are we devoting to deterrence?  -   The US Navy’s entire 7^th Fleet is devoted to deterring China.  As a reminder, 
 

It is headquartered at U.S. Fleet Activities Yokosuka, in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan. It is part of the United States Pacific Fleet. At present, it is the largest of the forward-deployed U.S. fleets, with 50 to 70 ships, 150 aircraft and 27,000 sailors and marines.[1]

Seventh Fleet includes a permanently forward deployed aircraft carrier, currently the USS George Washington, CVN-73.  Yokosuka, alone, typically includes a command ship, an aircraft carrier, Ticonderoga class cruisers, and a dozen or so Burke class destroyers.
 
In addition to the 7^th Fleet, numerous other carriers, ARG/MEUs, and aircraft regularly rotate into the 7^th Fleet’s control.
 
We are devoting an enormous number of ships, aircraft, and personnel to deterring China.
 
 
Do we need more?  - 
 
The facts are crystal clear.  If the 50 to 70 ships, 150 aircraft and 27,000 sailors and marines aren’t deterring China, no additional forces will suddenly, magically alter the situation.  Think about it, though, that’s a lot of ships, aircraft, and personnel.  Why isn’t China deterred?  Why aren’t they behaving very cautiously, in not cowering?  The answer is simple and painfully obvious:  China does not believe we’ll use our forces.  If your enemy does not believe you have the will to act, no amount of forces in the region will alter their thinking.  We could pack the entire US Navy into the South China Sea and it wouldn’t deter China for one second.  They believe, correctly, that we won’t use our force so any gathering of naval forces is a hollow, empty gesture.
 
The only force we’ve ever used in peacetime is against third rate countries and China does not see themselves as a third rate country.  In fact, history proves their view of things is correct.  China has seized US military aircraft and drones while they were in use, disrupted naval operations, successfully threatened and chased away US ships in international waters, established and militarized illegal islands while the US Navy stood back and watched, enforced illegal territorial water claims, violated the air space of Taiwan, etc.  All the while, the US Navy did nothing.  Ironically, the only substantive action the US Navy has taken, Freedom of Navigation exercises according to the conditions of UNCLOS Innocent Passage, has only reinforced the validity of China’s illegal territorial water claims!
 
No will to act means no deterrence and no amount of additional forces will change that.
 
 
 
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[1]Wikipedia, “United States Seventh Fleet”, retrieved 18-Aug-2025,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Seventh_Fleet
 
[2]The National Interest website, “China’s Next Territorial Claim: Hawaii and Almost the Entire Pacific Ocean?”, Harry J. Kazianis, 10-Sep-2016,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/chinas-next-territorial-claim-hawaii-almost-the-entire-17658

Lincoln Escorts

In a previous post noting the deployment of the Lincoln strike group (can you really call a carrier and three destroyers a strike group?), reader ‘BA 1959’ posted a comment asking where all our destroyers are since they certainly aren’t escorting our carriers.  This is an excellent question and it illustrates one of ConNavOps’ overarching themes which is that the Navy should be home based, training and maintaining, instead of on deployment or, worse, trapped in the useless phases of the interminable deployment cycle.
 
How come the Lincoln is deploying with just three escorts?  Well, partly it’s the fault of a hopelessly lost Navy leadership that either foolishly thinks carriers don’t need more escorts or believes that destroyers are better employed on worthless tasks like show-the-flag, pirate chasing, freedom of navigation exercises, forward presence, trading one-at-a-time shots with the Houthis and praying that a stray missile doesn’t get through, etc.
 
Think about it … if the Navy were home ported and engaged in continual training and maintenance, every ship that wasn’t in dry dock would have been available to surge as an escort for the Lincoln.  That, in a nutshell, is the justification for home basing the fleet.
 
 
Home Basing
 
Let’s consider the example of Pearl Harbor.  Many of you think the Pacific fleet has always been based in Pearl Harbor but that’s not the case.  Pearl Harbor did not become a functioning naval base until 1919 and, even then, did not have any permanently based ships.  Instead, the fleet was home based in San Pedro, California.
 
It wasn’t until 1940 that the Pacific fleet, under Admiral James Richardson, Commander in Chief US Fleet, was ordered (by President Roosevelt)  to make Pearl Harbor its home port.  Richardson was vehemently opposed.  When he queried Admiral Stark about why the fleet was being moved to Pearl Harbor, Stark replied, 

You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs (sic) going into the East Indies.[1]

Even then, the President and Admiral Stark, among many others, believed that forward presence would provide deterrence.  We know how that turned out.  The result was WWII in the Pacific and a disastrous defeat for the Navy.  Deterrence has never succeeded. 
 
Richardson believed the fleet could not begin hostilities from Pearl Harbor. 

Richardson wrote to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold Stark, cautioning him that should the fleet need to move west, “it can only start, properly prepared, from the West Coast where it can be docked, manned, stocked and stripped, and a suitable train assembled.”[1]

Richardson testified to Congress that, in his opinion, 

… the presence of the fleet in Hawaii might influence a civilian political government, but that Japan had a military government which knew that the fleet was undermanned, unprepared for war, and had no training or auxiliary ships without which it could not undertake active operations. I further stated that we were more likely to make the Japanese feel that we meant business if a train were assembled and the fleet returned to the Pacific coast, the complements filled, the ships docked, and fully supplied with ammunition, provisions, stores, and fuel, and then stripped for war operations.”[1]

What came of Richardson’s concerns?  

In January 1941, Roosevelt prematurely relieved Richardson of command and replaced him with Admiral Husband Kimmel.[1]

Richardson understood what Roosevelt and others did not:  that deterrence doesn’t work and that the fleet needs to be home ported where it can train, maintain, and prepare for war.  In fact, there is a very good case to be made that forward presence increases the likelihood of conflict rather than acting as a deterrent (see, “ForwardPresence – Deterrent or Provocation?”).
 
Our ship utilization priorities are badly misguided. We desperately need to return to a home basing concept and get the fleet back into shape in terms of maintenance and training, the product of which is readiness.  The Lincoln example is just the latest example that hammers home the wisdom of that approach.
 
 
 
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[1]The National WWII Museum website, “Solely a Bluff: Relocating the US Fleet to Pearl Harbor”, Kali Martin,
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/fdr-bluff-relocating-us-fleet-to-pearl-harbor

Case Study on the Failure of Deterrence in Ukraine

As we’ve seen, the United States attempted to deter Russia from invading Ukraine.  However, despite the combined military might of all of Europe plus the mammoth presence of the US forces based in Europe, Russia went ahead and invaded Ukraine.  Obviously, deterrence failed.  This failure offers us a chance to analyze the concept of deterrence and how deterrent efforts were applied and why they failed.  Let’s examine this case objectively.

 

Note:  This is a discussion of deterrence in the abstract.  None of this discussion should be viewed as a judgment or stance on the desirability of supporting Ukraine, or not.  That’s a separate issue.  The point is that the US made the attempt to deter Russia and it failed.  We can learn from that.

 

What deterrent actions did we attempt?

 

Deterrent Actions

 

Forward Presence.  Europe is the very definition of forward presence.  The number of troops, vehicles, aircraft, and ships surrounding Russia is almost uncountable and yet Russia was undeterred.  Why?

 

Proponents of forward presence – meaning overseas bases and forward deployed ships – claim that our forward presence is a deterrent.  This is the proffered justification for the endless, soul-sucking, maintenance-shredding, several month long deployments the Navy conducts.  We have forward presence all over the world.  In Europe, the US has something on the order of 60,000 troops and a couple of hundred aircraft.  In addition, the US has Army divisions based in the continental US that can deploy anywhere in the world in 24 hrs and Air Force aircraft that can strike anywhere in the world in 24 hrs.

 

It would be difficult to achieve a greater degree of forward presence than that which faces Russia and yet Russia was undeterred.  Why?

 

Clearly, forward presence, alone, is not a deterrent.

 

Sanctions.  The US threatened Russia with sanctions but publicly removed the most significant ones from consideration.  The remaining sanction options simply offered no significant pain to Putin.  Beyond that, Russia/Putin has never been impressed or influenced by sanctions so there was no reason to believe that watered down sanctions would accomplish anything … and they didn’t.  Putin clearly recognized US sanction threats for the hollow threats they were.

 

Aid.  The Russian invasion did not occur instantaneously, with no warning.  The military buildup took place over an extended period.  The US had the opportunity to supply Ukraine with sufficient weapons to possibly act as a deterrent but, ultimately, opted not to.  A RAND blog article cites US military aid to Ukraine in the amount of $2.5B since 2014.[1]  That averages out to around $310M/yr.  Aid was limited to lightweight arms and supporting equipment such as radios.[1]  Thus, the aid provided to Ukraine was insufficient in quantity or impact to provide a deterrent effect.

 

Information Warfare.  The USMC and the Navy, among other military and governmental organizations, have set up information warfare groups.[2,3]  The US’ attempt to conduct information warfare (whatever that might mean) was a total failure.  We failed to shape the narrative and failed to win the global perception battle.  We issued a steady stream of confusing and conflicting statements about ‘minor incursions’ and limited sanctions.  Our information warfare efforts (again, whatever that might mean) were an abject failure.

 

Willpower.  ComNavOps has repeatedly stated that presence, without the willingness to use that presence, is useless and this was an object lesson about the validity of that premise.  Of all the countries and forces amassed against Russia, none were willing to use their force.  That being the case, they may as well have disbanded and saved the cost of maintaining forces.  For the US’ part, the Biden administration made it crystal clear that they would not respond in any significant way to a Russian invasion.  This unwillingness to respond with forceful action is not just a Biden administration failing.  Under previous administrations, the Iranians seized our riverine boats and crews because they knew the US would not respond.  The Iranians shot down and seized our UAVs because they knew the US would not respond.  The Chinese seized our UUV because they knew the US would not respond.  And the list goes on endlessly.

 

It is likely not a coincidence that Russia chose the Obama administration as the time to annex Crimea and the Biden administration as the time to invade Ukraine rather than the Trump administration.  This has nothing to do with Democrat/Republican politics and everything to do with geopolitical willpower regardless of administration. 

 

All the deterrent actions in the world will not work if they are not backed up by the willingness to take forceful action, both militarily and non-kinetically.

 

 

Conclusion

 

A consideration of the above leads to the following inexorable conclusion:

 

There is no such thing as deterrence as a stand alone entity.  To have any hope, whatsoever, of an effective deterrent effect, the deterrent effort must be backed by ironclad willpower and the willingness – even eagerness – to use force.

 

This, then, leads to the obvious conclusion that the only truly effective deterrent is force and that really means that the enemy (the target of the attempted deterrence) must believe, deep in his psyche, that we will use force and will do so in a very painful manner.  That belief can only come from having witnessed or been the subject of such displays of force in the past.

 

Without the enemy’s absolute belief that we will use force, no other action or threat has the slightest deterrent effect.

 

Now, not all forceful deterrent effects need to be kinetic military actions - although that is the preferred action and the root of truly effective deterrence.  There are other actions that can be ‘forceful’.

 

Cyber Attacks.  We could have conducted massive cyber attacks on Russia during the build up phase.  After all, Russia is the source of most of the crippling ransomware attacks on the US so they’re long overdue for retaliation.  The Russian government is well aware of, and sanctions, the ransomware attacks.  Widespread cyber disruptions would have hindered Russian military actions, caused unrest among the population, and refocused Putin’s attention on domestic emergencies.

 

Trade Embargo.  We could have halted all trade with Russia and strong armed the rest of the West into co-operating.  The impact of that, alone, would likely have dissuaded Putin.

 

Economic War.  We could have frozen all Russian banking assets/monies, halted all economic transactions, and conducted a coordinated campaign to devalue the Russian currency. 

 

While these actions would, potentially, be effective to varying degrees, there is still no substitute for punishing, lethal, military action.

 

 

Relevance

 

This is a Navy blog so how does all of this relate to the US Navy?

 

• Forward deployments clearly provide no deterrent effect and are not only useless but are significantly counter-productive both in terms of trying to stabilize a region and in terms of negatively impacting our own combat readiness by increasing wear and tear on men and ships while deferring required maintenance.
• If we want to have any chance at providing a deterrent effect from forward deployment, we simply must begin applying force.  Our philosophy must change from appeasement to forceful confrontation and our rules of engagement must be modified to allow disproportionate, escaltory, pre-emptive and reactive force to be applied so as to instill bone-deep, painful lessons in enemies.  We must lose our fear of escalation and embrace it as our standard.  If someone shoots down our UAV, we need to destroy an entire airbase of theirs.  If someone captures our riverine boat, we need to destroy an entire naval base.  If someone points a rifle at us, we need to kill every enemy soldier in sight.  The bone-deep lesson is that you don’t screw with the US.  That, and that alone, will offer the possibility of effective deterrence in the future.
• We need to design and procure weapons and equipment that can be used in the ‘short of war’ region of the spectrum.  See, “Island Showdown”.

 

 

Implication

 

World events don’t happen in isolation.  China is taking careful note of what has transpired with the Ukraine situation.  Taiwan has to be watching the Ukraine events in sheer terror.  The US/West lack of response has given China the go-ahead to invade Taiwan with no fear of any significant response or repercussion.  Taiwan is as good as gone.

 

 

Note:  If you care to comment, be warned:  we are not going to discuss partisan politics and I will moderate such with a heavy hand.  If you care to comment, do so with data and logic, not emotions.

 

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[1]The RAND Blog, Charap and Boston, 21-Jan-2022,

https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/01/us-military-aid-to-ukraine-a-silver-bullet.html

 

[2]https://www.netc.navy.mil/Media-Center/News-Stories/News-Stories-Display/Article/2625363/navifor-commander-discusses-information-warfare-community-with-future-iw-leaders/

 

[3]https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2020/01/wheres-destruction.html

Commandant Berger on Deterrence

In a War on the Rocks website interview, Commandant Berger offered some thoughts on deterrence.  As you know, ComNavOps believes deterrence, in the form of forward deployment, is pure fantasy and a complete failure (how’s that forward presence and deterrence working out with Russia?) and we’ve proven it in repeated posts:

 

Here’s a partial list of deterrence posts:

 

“Forward Presence Deterrent Effect Disproved”

“Forward Presence – Deterrent or Provocation?”

“Not Deterred in the Least”

 

 

Now, here’s Commandant Berger’s thoughts on deterrence.[1]

 

Because from one argument, you could say that deterrence has worked. We’re not at war with China or Russia today, or Iran, so deterrence is working.[1]

 

I think that’s too simplistic a read, because if they’re advancing their objectives and ours are eroding, I would argue that deterrence is not working. It is working from a literal, “we’re not at hot war with them,” but it’s not working if their objectives are moving forward, and ours are moving backwards. I don’t think that’s winning at all.[1]

 

I disagree with Commandant Berger about, essentially, everything he’s done and is trying to do.  However, he’s not wrong about the failure of our attempts at deterrence.

 

Berger goes beyond that blindingly logical thought and poses some intriguing questions about deterrence.

 

What about deterrence by entanglement? What about deterrence by detection? What about all the different variations that we ought to think about? Those need to be debated. Those have to be discussed. Those have to be tried. What does deterrence by entanglement mean? What does deterrence by detection mean in practice? What does it mean, in the context, in other words, of not an open, hot conflict, but in gray zone every week, active campaigning … what’s going to work?[1]

 

Unfortunately, he didn’t go into any detail about these various levels and types of deterrence and how they could be implemented.  I’m inclined to believe that they are just variations on appeasement because it seems highly unlikely that we would back them up with force and, as we have demonstrated repeatedly, presence without action is pointless.  However, the questions alone are intriguing enough to warrant some thought.

 

Deterrence by entanglement?  What is that?  How would it work?  Could it be effective?

 

Deterrence by detection?  Again, what is that?  How would it work?  Could it be effective?

 

I’m intrigued.

 

Entanglement.  I have no idea what Berger thinks this means but I could imagine scenarios where we attempt to make an enemy’s actions so complex, so difficult, so consuming, that it creates a black hole for the enemy that sucks down resources and ties up their efforts to the point that they cannot disengage and their endeavor becomes net negative for them.  One could argue that this is exactly what happened to the US in Vietnam and the Global War on Terror.  Perhaps it happened to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, as well?  Is this deterrence?  Is it likely to succeed?

 

Detection.  Again, I have no idea what Berger thinks this means but I could imagine scenarios where the mere exposure of an enemy’s intent and actions might stop those actions.  For example, exposing the Chinese fishing fleet incursions in a major way – as opposed to the useless, sternly worded protests that we routinely do – might lead to cessation of the incursions.  This would likely have to involve a degree of force.  For example, a naval surface group riding to the ‘rescue’ of the Philippines in ‘repelling’ an incursion with full media coverage of the event and backed by a major military-conducted information campaign (the US military has stood up exactly this kind of media/information groups (roundly mocked by ComNavOps!) so here, perhaps, is a legitimate use for them?  Once relentlessly exposed on the world stage for the illegal, war-like act it is, China might drop the use of fishing fleet incursions.  Is this deterrence?  Is it likely to succeed?

 

As I said, I’m quite dubious about this but it is intriguing enough to warrant some serious thought.  Certainly, what we’re doing now isn’t working even a little bit so some alternative thinking is more than justified.

 

 

 

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[1]https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/general-berger-on-the-marine-corps-of-the-future/

Forward Presence Deterrent Effect Disproved

Long time readers know that ComNavOps believes that forward deployments (forward presence) provides no effective deterrence.  ComNavOps turns to history for proof.  There is no documented example of forward presence actually deterring an enemy from any action.  To be fair, this is trying to prove a negative which is not possible.  Approached from the other direction, there is a great deal of evidence that forward presence has NOT deterred our enemies.  Despite a significant Middle East presence by the US military, Iran continues to foment terror, attack shipping, disrupt shipping lanes, export weapons to terrorists, support terrorists, develop nuclear weapons, and harass US forces.  Despite significant US forces in South Korea, North Korea continues to develop ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, sink SKorean ships, and conduct special operations penetrations of SKorean territory.  Despite a massive US force presence in Europe, Russia continues to annex and invade countries, destabilize countries, violate international weapon control treaties, and harass US forces.  Despite significant US force presence in and around the Pacific and South/East China Sea, China continues to build illegal artificial islands, ignore international treaties, violate territorial waters of neighboring countries, engage in a massive military build up, make illegal territorial claims, seize US military assets, engage in massive cyber attacks, engage in massive intellectual property theft, and harass US forces.  Clearly, US forward presence has no deterrent effect.

While ComNavOps view is obviously correct, most military observers continue to cling to the misguided belief that forward presence equates to deterrence.

The Stimson Center (non-partisan US policy think tank) has now come out with an analysis showing that forward presence has little or no deterrent effect (2) – exactly as ComNavOps has long stated.  They analyzed 100 events since the end of the Cold War and found that the number of forces forward deployed in a trouble spot had no deterrent effect but that the movement of new forces into the region did.

As Breaking Defense website sums up,

The Stimson Center recently completed an analysis of more than 100 events since the end of the Cold War, when the US used the armed forces to coerce another country without resorting to actual war. For example: US leaders have sent aircraft carriers into the Persian Gulf to convince Iran to change its behavior, and held frequent military exercises with South Korea to demonstrate US resolve to the North. One key finding of the Stimson research is that, during a crisis, moving new forces into the region does significantly increase the chance that an adversary will back down. But the number of troops, aircraft, and ships already in the region prior to a crisis had no impact on the outcome.

The statistics show that permanent deployments are seen by our adversaries as part of the woodwork – factors that can be discounted when judging America’s seriousness. What caught the attention of the decision-makers the U.S. was trying to coerce was the demonstration of resolve when additional American forces are put at risk. Moreover, it was the fact of moving forces — not the types of forces moved –that mattered. (1)

For example, the Stimson analysis shows exactly what ComNavOps has noted about Russia’s behavior:

… the temporary deployment of US ground and land-based air forces to Eastern Europe in recent years seems to have put Russia’s threats to move beyond Ukraine on hold, at least temporarily, whereas the 30,000 troops based primarily in Germany did not seem to have been noticed. (1)

Stimson also noted that firepower trumps other forms of coercion.

Unlike other forms of escalation – such as economic sanctions, which may be interpreted as signs of weakness — adding firepower is what got the attention of potential adversaries. (1)

This finding simply reflects basic human behavior.  Our enemies are enemies because they are evil, corrupt, dictatorial bullies.  They are not rational human beings.  They function at an animal level of stimulus and response.  They display classic playground bully behavior that every school kid understands but which our government leaders on both sides of the aisle have forgotten.  Bullies respect and respond to physical pain which means firepower AND THE WILLINGNESS TO USE IT.  So, yes, economic sanctions and the like are seen as weakness, not strength.  Only the threat of physical harm is effective and that can only be effective if it is occasionally (or regularly!) applied.

To be fair, the article notes that forward deployments may serve purposes other than deterrence.

Permanent troop deployments overseas do serve many purposes. They seem to reassure allies about our security commitment, and that has value. (1)

An example of forward presence that serves a larger, positive purpose that is divorced from deterrence would be Guam.  Assuming we’re willing to seriously defend it - and there’s currently no evidence that we are – the base serves as a forward staging area rather than as a deterrent.  As a forward staging area it has value and is worth maintaining even though it clearly has no deterrent value.

Consider the Stimson findings in light of ComNavOps’ calls for ending deployments and removing our military from Europe, among other similar recommendations.  It is clear that our forward presence accomplishes nothing as far as deterrence is concerned.  We need to bring our forces home and spend our time training, maintaining, and executing missions.  Some of those missions may well be exactly the kind of rapid movements into a trouble spot that the Stimson analysis suggests actually produces positive results.

We also need to begin applying force on a more regular and consistent basis so that force movements are treated as threats to be taken seriously rather than just empty posturing.

Note:  The Stimson analysis is available as a book length treatise and I have not obtained it or read it.  I’ve only seen the Breaking Defense website article on it.  Thus, I’ve been unable to analyze the analysis.

_____________________________________

(1)Breaking Defense website, “Fast Deployments Deter Better Than Bases: Stimson ”, Barry Blechman, 7-Aug-2020,

https://breakingdefense.com/2020/08/fast-deployments-deter-better-than-bases-stimson/?_ga=2.29636351.1577885854.1596477103-1757035925.1542652267

(2)”Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy”, co-edited by Melanie Sisson, James Siebens, and Barry Blechman, ISBN 9780367459963, Published May 13, 2020 by Routledge

Forward Presence - Deterrent or Provocation?

One of the tenets of US naval policy is forward presence which, the Navy believes, has a deterrent effect on potential enemies.  ComNavOps has repeatedly stated that forward presence, at least as practiced today, has zero deterrent effect.  However, for the sake of this discussion, let’s set my misgivings aside, accept the Navy’s premise, and examine it a bit closer.

To repeat, the premise is that forward presence equals deterrence.

However, what if the reverse is actually true – that forward presence not only fails to provide deterrence but actively encourages war?  Huh?  Well that can’t be right.  I mean, sure, maybe forward presence is debatable as far as accomplishing deterrence but it surely can’t encourage war … can it?

Well, where is the first place we always turn for answers?  That’s right, history!  What does history tell us about forward presence?  Let’s look at some examples.

Pearl Harbor – The Pearl Harbor naval base was developed during the 1920’s and ‘30s and became the home of the US Pacific fleet in 1939 and beyond.  It was hoped that the forward presence of the Pacific Fleet would temper Japanese encroachments on China and the surrounding region.  Many US analysts believed that the Japanese, if they initiated hostilities, would strike the Dutch East Indies, Singapore or Indochina.  Instead, as we know, the Japanese took advantage of the concentration of US naval and air power to deal what they hoped was a crippling blow.

It seems almost certain that the Japanese viewed the concentration of vulnerable US military power as too good an opportunity to pass up.  Instead of acting as a deterrent, the Pearl Harbor forward base acted as a stimulus for the Japanese who believed that destroying that much of the US Pacific forces would ensure their successful occupation of the various South Pacific islands and facilities that were their ultimate objectives. 

We see, then, that far from deterring Japan, the forward base of Pearl Harbor encouraged and hastened the onset of war by presenting a target too good for Japan to pass up.

Admittedly, this is pure speculation, though well reasoned.  We have no documents or contemporaneous statements to the effect that Pearl Harbor’s concentration of military might encouraged the war.  On the other hand, we have no statements to the contrary and many documented writings and statements about the attractiveness of Pearl Harbor as a target so the conclusion that the forward base encouraged war is eminently logical.

Falklands – The Falkland Islands (and South Georgia) provided forward presence and served as a forward base of sorts for UK interests in the Antarctic  region and minor trade activities.  The islands were the subject of disputed territorial claims by the UK and Argentina.  Argentina, which was suffering from domestic unrest and economic troubles, seized on the opportunity to use the Falklands to deflect internal political criticism and create a rallying point for the population.  With the UK’s main military forces far away and having witnessed the UK initiate territorial transfer discussions, Argentina believed that the UK would not respond to a seizure of the islands.  As we know, the British did respond and the Falklands War resulted.

While not a forward base in the classic military sense, the islands were still a forward base for UK interests and presented a convenient and irresistible target for Argentina.  The British forward presence encouraged the conflict.

United States Colonies – The forward presence represented by the British colonies in America in the early to mid 1700’s were a trigger for numerous conflicts between the French and British, including the well known French and Indian War of 1754-1763.  Just a little later, the American Revolution resulted in the formation of the United States.  Clearly, the British forward presence, in the form of colonies and military forces, acted as a trigger for multiple conflicts.

Poland – Germany began WWII by invading Poland.  While Poland was not a forward base/presence in the strict definition of such, it did, by aligning itself with the UK (1939 Agreement of Mutual Assistance, for example), become a de facto UK forward base/presence for hostilities and operations against Germany.  While there were multiple reasons for Germany’s selection of Poland as the initial strike of WWII (Lebensraum, for example), did Poland’s forward location (adjacent to Germany) and vulnerability make it too good a target for Hitler’s Germany to pass up and thus encouraged the start of war?

To be fair, this example is a bit of a reach and may be a case of attempting a bit of tortured reasoning to support the premise.

Guam – Although a war has not yet occurred, the US forward base at Guam offers the Chinese the same type of overwhelmingly enticing target that Pearl Harbor offered the Japanese.  Elimination of Guam as a forward base would severely impair US military operations in a war and the Chinese obviously recognize this.  Will a strike on Guam prove to be a temptation to good to pass up for the Chinese and encourage them to initiate a war?

US Middle East and Pacific Fleets – While not forward bases in and of themselves (though they are forward based in the respective regions), it is clear that the forward presence of the US Middle East and Pacific Fleets is stimulating aggressive acts, some meeting the definition of acts of war, by Iran and China – acts that would not occur if not for the presence of US naval assets.  Thus, forward presence is encouraging aggressive, war-tending acts.

Spanish-American War of 1898 – The Spanish forward presence/base in Cuba ignited various United States economic, strategic, and humanitarian interests.  The sinking of the USS Maine provided the trigger that allowed the US to justify the initiation of war but it was a war that was stimulated by the Spanish forward presence and was likely to happen with or without the Maine incident.

It seems clear that forward presence has the inherent tendency to encourage conflict rather than deter it.  That makes the US geopolitical strategic policy linking forward presence and deterrence highly suspect.  Thus, the entire rationale for the US Navy’s global forward presence is founded on an untrue premise that forward presence equals deterrence when, in fact, history suggests the exact opposite effect. 

While forward presence has a clear antagonistic effect, it is important to recognize that forward presence also accomplishes beneficial objectives and that an accelerated movement to war may be a ‘good’ and necessary step to those ends.  While the reverse case, meaning no forward presence, might have prevented many conflicts it would also have allowed many undesirable situations to arise.  For example, without the forward base of Pearl Harbor, the Japanese would have been able to achieve their Indo-China goals and might have been able to prevail in any subsequent conflict.  Had the British refrained from establishing forward bases in colonial America, the territory might well have been completely occupied by the French.  If the US naval presence were absent from the Middle East and South/East China Seas, Iran and China would likely have established a militant and military presence (China has annexed the South China Sea even with our presence!).  And so on.

Thus, the mere fact that forward presence encourages conflict is not, in and of itself, reason to avoid it.  Instead, the use of forward presence should be entered into with careful forethought as to the repercussions and should be balanced against the desired gains and benefits.

One final thought is that forward presence, when combined with a policy of appeasement, which is how the US implements its forward presence, promotes all the negatives of aggressive behavior with none of the benefits.  It is the worst of both worlds.

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Comment note:  The examples offered have varying degrees of validity and none are absolute, clear cut, indisputable proof of the premise.  Any one example could be argued.  Further, the reverse of the premise which would be that forward presence prevents war and, if true, would disprove the post premise, is impossible to prove, absent statements from foreign leaders stating that they wanted to initiate war but were discouraged from doing so by the forward presence of their enemy and, of course, there are no such statements on record.  Thus, the way to read this post is to consider the totality of the examples and logic and consider the pattern described herein.  I am specifically NOT going to entertain individual arguments about the examples.  If you wish to comment, do so about the overall premise rather than individual examples.  Fair warning.

Finally, regarding forward presence and deterrence, someone is inevitably going to claim that our forward presence in, say, Europe, has resulted in no Soviet/Russian war and, therefore, must be true.  This is a case of correlation versus causation.  Just because there is a correlation (presence and no war) does not mean there is a causation.  One could just as logically argue that our implementation and use of fluoride in our water supply in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s correlates to no wars with the Soviets/Russia.  Therefore, fluoride must prevent wars as well as cavities!  Well, obviously fluoride doesn’t prevent wars – that’s correlation without causation.

Iranian Tanker Attack

By now, you’ve read about the two tankers, one Norwegian and one Japanese, supposedly attacked by Iranian forces in the Gulf of Oman on 13-Jun-2019.  The US believes the Iranians were responsible.  Publicly released evidence is sketchy but includes,

• Photos and video, provided by US Central Command, of Iranian boats removing an unexploded limpet mine from a tanker. (1)
• Unverified report of an Iranian vessel firing a surface-to-air missile at a US MQ-9 Reaper UAV a few hours before the tanker attacks. (1)
• The belief that no other actor in the region would have the motivation, skill, and resources to conduct such an attack. (2)

On a related note, the crew of the Japanese ship reported being attacked by a flying object but there has been no other such reports or verification. (2)

Also on a related note, you might recall that a month ago four oil tankers were damaged in an attack off the coast of the United Arab Emirates using what were likely limpet mines. (2)

The US appears satisfied with whatever evidence it has and is blaming the Iranians for the attacks.

"It is the assessment of the U.S. government that Iran is responsible for today's attacks in the Gulf of Oman," Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said. "These attacks are a threat to international peace and security, a blatant assault on the freedom of navigation, and an unacceptable escalation of tension by Iran." (1)

As I said, the publicly released evidence is sketchy although the video of the Iranian boat removing the limpet mine is fairly damning.  One would assume that the US has additional evidence that it prefers not to release so as to protect sources although that’s just speculation on my part. 

Photo From Surveillance Video Showing Iranian Boat Removing Limpet Mine From Tanker

Let’s set aside the question of absolute proof or not and, instead, examine the larger issue of maritime security and the US Navy’s role.

By their own claim, the US Navy’s mission is to ensure the freedom of the maritime global commons.  From the Navy website,

The mission of the Navy is to maintain, train and equip combat-ready Naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the seas. (3)

So, the Navy exists not just to protect US-flagged shipping but to deter aggression, apparently from any source and directed anywhere and at anyone and to maintain the ‘freedom of the seas’ which, again, suggests that the Navy is defending the maritime commons for ALL nations.  Thus, an attack on any country’s ship constitutes aggression, which is the Navy’s self-proclaimed mission to prevent, and a threat to the general freedom of the seas which, again, is the Navy’s job to prevent.  This then eliminates the idea that since the attacked ships weren’t US-flagged, the Navy can’t get involved.

We have, then, ample justification for naval action with the only question being, against whom?  Since we just read that the US Secretary of State is unequivocally assigning the blame to Iran, it follows that the Navy is duty bound to take action against Iran.

Now, suppose we don’t take action.  This would lead one to wonder why we bother with our much ballyhooed forward presence.  What’s the point of presence if we won’t take action when we believe we have clear evidence of aggression and a threat to the freedom of the seas?  The Navy justifies its ships, deployments, operating costs, etc. on the basis of forward presence and yet that forward presence is rarely, bordering on never, used.

We have seen a pattern of inaction in response to provocations, aggression, and threats.  For example, the Iranians illegally seized our boats and crews when they were lost, the Chinese have made outrageous territorial claims and attributed non-existent attributes to EEZ zones, the Russians have conducted multiple unsafe aerial and naval acts around our forces, the Chinese have ordered us out of ‘their’ South China Sea (ignoring the fact that it is international waters!), the Chinese have seized our unmanned underwater vehicles, the Iranians have interfered with our carrier aviation operations, and the list goes on and on – a buffet of aggression and threats to the freedom of the seas.  The only recent exception to this pattern of inaction on our part was the launching of some Tomahawks at purported radar sites in Yemen in response to a claimed attack on a Burke destroyer – an attack that public evidence strongly suggests never occurred.

So, I repeat, why are we wasting time, effort, and resources maintaining a forward presence when we clearly have no intention of using them?  Now, perhaps I’ll be surprised and wake up tomorrow to read about a retaliatory attack on Iran but I suspect not.  If we’re not going to use the Navy then bring the ships and crews home and let’s save unimaginable amounts of money.

The video of the Iranians removing the mine from the ship was taken by a US drone.  What better opportunity and justification could there be for action?  Instead, we did nothing.  The fleet is useless.  It’s accomplishing nothing.  Bring it home.

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(1)Business Insider website, “An Iranian boat reportedly fired a missile at a US drone right before the tanker attack”, Ryan Pickrell, 15-Jun-2019,

https://www.businessinsider.com/iranian-boat-took-shot-at-us-drone-before-tanker-attack-2019-6

(2)BBC News website, “Gulf of Oman tanker attacks: US says video shows Iran removing mine”, 14-Jun-2019, 

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48633016

(3)https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/swmag/Pages/Our-Navy%27s-Mission-How-the-surface-forces-fit-in.aspx

Why Battleships?

In a past post (see, "Why Not Battleships?") we reviewed the arguments against a modern battleship and were unable to find a compelling reason not to build them.  However, that does not necessarily mean that there are any compelling reasons to build them.  Let’s see if there are.  Here are some of the arguments for a battleship.

Presence – One of the Navy’s major justifications for its very existence is presence/deterrence.  Personally, I find that rationale to be completely unfounded and historically dubious but that’s a separate topic.  The Navy feels presence is a major justification and nothing says presence like a battleship.  Even critics would have to agree with this – they may not agree that it’s worth it but they can’t deny the sheer imposing presence of a battleship.  There is no better naval presence or deterrence than a battleship.

So, presence would seem to be a valid reason to build battleships.

Firepower – As we noted in the previous post, a battleship has more firepower, more sustained firepower, and more responsive firepower than a carrier – and the battleship’s firepower can’t be jammed, decoyed, shot down, or have a pilot captured.

Within its inherent range limitation, the firepower of the battleship, therefore, offers a viable alternative to a carrier group which frees up the carrier for its primary mission of air superiority and escort of Tomahawk shooters.

A battleship utterly dominates anything it can reach.

So, firepower would seem to be a valid reason to build battleships.

Flexibility – As noted in the preceding discussion of firepower, a battleship offers the ability to conduct significant strikes without requiring a carrier.  This flexibility would be operationally advantageous given the limited number of carriers in the fleet.

Further, the ability of a battleship to operate as the centerpiece of a powerful surface group gives the navy the flexibility to operate more surface groups than just the few carrier groups that are currently possible.

So, flexibility would seem to be a valid reason to build battleships.

Amphibious Assault – We’ve noted that the Navy/Marine amphibious assault doctrine completely negates any possibility of gun support.  Given the Marine’s already light combat structure, the absence of naval gun support effectively renders the entire concept of amphibious assault null and void.  The existence of battleship gun support completely changes that picture and makes amphibious assault conceptually possible again.  The ability to stand relatively near shore and provide gun support with near-immunity to land based rockets, artillery, and anti-ship missiles (via the small size of mobile anti-ship missiles and the presence of the Aegis umbrella) is a huge advantage in an assault.  

So, amphibious assault would seem to be a valid reason to build battleships.

Pressure – The Navy’s distributed lethality concept is predicated on the ability to apply much greater operational and tactical pressure on the enemy by forcing them to account for more threats.  Again, ComNavOps believes this is bilgewater but the Navy believes it.  That being the case, a battleship, alone (stupid) or in a group, would be the epitome of creating additional pressure on the enemy’s operational and tactical situation.  Unlike, say, an LCS with a few anti-ship missiles (if that comes to be), a battleship would be a major threat to both the enemy’s surface and land assets.  The enemy would have to devote significant resources to defending against a battleship group.

So, pressure would seem to be a valid reason to build battleships.

Range – The Iowa class battleships had a range of 15,000 nm at 15 kts, according to Wiki.  Short of nuclear propulsion, this is about as good as it gets.  This type of range is particularly applicable to the Pacific/China theatre and stands out in stark contrast to the LCS which has proven to be a disaster in its deployments to the Pacific.  Given the Navy’s limited bases and limited at-sea replenishment and refueling ships, a powerful ship with great range is mandatory.

So, range would seem to be a valid reason to build battleships.

We noted no compelling reasons not to build modern battleships and now we note several reasons to build them.  Operational and tactical flexibility combined with immense firepower are the main reasons for building modern battleships.  The increase in lethality and options that a battleship provides would be a tremendous advantage for any fleet.  The logic seems clear – battleships are a good idea and a modern battleship is long overdue.

USS Ronald Reagan and Force Z

Consider:  USS Ronald Reagan, CVN-76, is forward deployed and home ported in Yokosuka, Japan along with some escort ships as part of the troubled 7^th Fleet.  Yokosuka is just over 1000 miles from Shanghai, China – easy cruise or ballistic missile distance.

Consider:  Force Z was a British task force consisting of two battleships, HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, and four destroyers.  Leaving Singapore, the group was sent to sea where it was quickly spotted by Japanese submarines and aircraft and subjected to repeated attacks by land based aircraft.  Four attack waves of aircraft sank the two battleships on 10-Dec-1941 just a few days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  On paper, Force Z was a powerful group but it found itself operating in enemy territory, at the start of the war, without air cover.  It had no chance.

HMS Prince of Wales

HMS Repulse

So, what’s the link between the USS Ronald Reagan and Force Z?  Well, the parallels should be obvious.  When war with China starts, the Reagan will be forward deployed in enemy territory or, at least, within enemy reach, and if it attempts to move it will have limited air cover.  If Japan is part of the war, the Japanese Air Force will be too busy defending their homeland to provide aerial coverage for a carrier at sea.  If Japan is not part of the war, there will be no Japanese air cover at all.  Guam’s aircraft will be fully occupied (or destroyed!) defending their base and will be unable to provide air cover.

USS Ronald Reagan

No matter how you look at it, the Reagan will have limited air cover. 

Wait, what now?  Limited air cover?  It’s a carrier!  It has its own air cover.  Well, that’s technically true but for all practical purposes it’s nearly irrelevant.  You’ll recall that we’ve discussed the fact that carriers in war will operate in groups of 3-4 (4 being ComNavOps preferred number).  It will require 3-4 carriers operating together to mass sufficient air power to survive in combat.  A single carrier with, currently, only around 38 Hornets (another half dozen are required for tanking and unavailable for combat) is not exactly a powerful air force and would have a very hard time defending itself for very long against a sustained Chinese assault.  Those aircraft will be quickly attrited in combat or due to simple mechanical failings. 

The Reagan is forward deployed to Japan and would be faced with two unpalatable choices at the outset of war.

1. Stand and fight – and be sunk.
2. Run for safer waters around Guam or Pearl Harbor.

Running, the only real choice, would subject the carrier to repeated submarine, anti-ship cruise missile, and, possibly, anti-ship ballistic missiles.  The odds of successfully escaping are not great.

If running is the preferred, albeit poor, option, it leads to the question, why have the carrier based in Japan to begin with?

Is it for the carrier’s deterrent effect?  We’ve often discussed the concept of deterrence and concluded that there is no evidence that deterrence works.  In fact, the recent evidence is absolutely conclusive that deterrence does not work.  China, the obvious deterrence target of a Japan based carrier, has flouted international law and treaties, built illegal artificial islands and militarized them, used military intimidation against Vietnam and Philippines, seized the entire South China Sea, and begun laying the groundwork for seizing the second island chain.  If that’s deterrence at work, I’d hate to think about what China would have done without it!  Clearly, deterrence is not a valid reason to have a carrier forward based.

Is it for the carrier’s rapid response to a sudden outbreak of war?  As we just noted, there is nothing a single carrier can do in a peer war except go down fighting.  On a related note, if China opts to attack Japan at the outset of war, the addition of 38 Hornets to the total Japanese defensive effort isn’t going to make any big difference even assuming that the carrier isn’t sunk pierside in the opening shots.  Clearly, rapid response is not a good reason to have a carrier forward based.

So, why do we have a carrier forward based?  It makes no sense.

Now, just because a carrier is forward based in Japan doesn’t mean that it can’t be pulled out to safety in the run up to a war.  Peer wars simply don’t start with no warning.  However, if the plan is to pull the carrier out prior to a war and if deterrence isn’t effective then why is it there to begin with?