The Navy – and most naval observers/commentators – are
obsessed with modernization. If
something isn’t the absolute latest and greatest technology then these people
believe it’s automatically obsolete and must be replaced (the Navy’s view) or
modernized (everyone else’s view). In
fact, ships are intentionally designed to be modernized part way through their
service lives. More to the point, ships
are sold to Congress as ‘good value’ because they can be periodically upgraded
and modernized and serve a full service life over three or four decades because
modernization will keep the ship up to date and supremely effective.
Of course, the constantly repeated reality is that
modernization almost never occurs and the vast majority of ships are retired
early.
Let’s take a closer look at the very concept of modernization.
We all assume we know what modernization is, right? Sure, it’s the process of replacing older
technology with newer, more effective ones.
What could be more simple and what could be more desirable? I mean, it’s a no-brainer to modernize, right? Who would not want a better radar? Who would not want a faster computer? And, of course those better, faster items
mean a more effective ship, right? Come
on, this is obvious to the point of silliness
… … … or
is it?
When considering modernization, the point – the main point
and the only relevant point – is whether the item under consideration can
effectively do its job? If it can, it
doesn’t need to be modernized. The fact
that somewhere in the world there might be a piece of equipment that can do the
job slightly better is irrelevant.
Effective is good enough.
Remember that saying, ‘perfect is the enemy of good (enough)’? That’s essentially what we’re talking about
here. Modernization is the enemy of
effective!
For example, the fact that the Ticonderoga’s radar can only
identify a target and provide a fire control solution as opposed to the latest
radar that can produce a 3D, holographic, full color image of the target is
irrelevant. The task is to find and
destroy. Everything else is just icing
on the cake and, almost invariably, more expensive and unnecessary icing at
that! If the Ticonderoga’s radar can see
the target and provide a fire control solution, that’s all that’s needed. Anything more than that is just expensive
waste that adds no value.
Modernization is only needed when the item under
consideration is no longer effective.
Consider the WWII standard M1 carbine. It’s been replaced by the current M4 (I don’t
follow land combat matters so maybe the M4 has already been replaced? Doesn’t matter) but is the M4 actually more
effective than the M1? I strongly
suspect not. Since 99% of all rifle
rounds sent downrange are just sprayed in the general direction of the target,
some slight gain in claimed accuracy at a thousand yards, or whatever, is
irrelevant. The M1 can spray rounds just
as well as the M4. Now, perhaps the M4
has other characteristics that make it more desirable like lower weight (nope,
it’s heavier), or cheaper (nope!), or better reliability (doubt it), or easier
maintenance (pretty sure not), or whatever, but those are peripheral
characteristics and do not make the M4 more effective. Hey, as I said, I’m not a land combat guy and
I’m not going to entertain a rile comparison discussion. I’m illustrating a point.
To repeat, combat effectiveness is the only reason
for modernization. Note that there’s a huge
difference between something that must be modernized because it can no
longer do the job effectively and something that someone would like to
modernize because there’s a slightly newer and slightly more effective version
somewhere in the world.
The US military has an obsession with technology to the
overall detriment of our military power and effectiveness. Consider the example of the Ford/Nimitz. The Nimitz design is perfectly capable and
effective, as is. The Ford, despite all
the upgrades/modernizations, offers zero additional combat effectiveness over
the Nimitz and it does so at twice the price tag. The Ford was modernization for the sake of
modernization not for the sake of enhanced combat effectiveness.
Returning to the Ticonderoga example, it offers yet another
lesson in the Navy’s version of modernization.
Why is the Ticonderoga modernization effort racking up higher than
expected costs? According to Adm.
Galinis (Vice Adm. Bill Galinis, commander of Naval Sea Systems Command),
“Number
one is the amount of change that we have pushed into the availability, driven
principally by, in some cases, the condition of the [hull, mechanical and
electrical] plant, the hull in particular. So a lot more structural work than
initially anticipated as we got into tanks
in some cases that had not been opened for quite some time. Some
additional work on the underwater hull portion, including the running gear – and
again, in some cases, these ships had
not been docked for an extended period of time … (1) [emphasis added]
Do you see the glaring fallacy in his statement? He basically just indicted Navy leadership
over the last couple of decades! The
problem isn’t modernization, it’s routine maintenance. He notes that tanks ‘had not been opened for quite
some time’ and ‘ships had not been
docked for an extended period of time’.
Hey, admiral, that’s called routine maintenance and it should have been
performed … well … routinely! If the
tanks were being maintained routinely as the ship’s service plan specifies,
there would be no problems with the tanks and you could move on to actual
modernization items, if any. If you,
Adm. Galinis, and the rest of Navy leadership had done your jobs, there
wouldn’t be any problems. Every former
CNO should be brought back to active service and court-martialed for
dereliction of duty.
As demonstrated by the Ticonderoga example, most Navy modernization
isn’t actually modernization, it’s an attempt to catch up on long deferred,
routine maintenance. What actual required
modernization is being done to the Ticonderogas? I’ve heard of almost none.
On a related note regarding the Ticonderogas, specifically,
the Navy’s so-called modernization program for the Ticonderogas (1) was never
intended to modernize the ships. It was
just a ploy to get around Congress’ refusal to allow the Navy to retire the
ships. Now, CNO Gilday is claiming the
Ticonderogas MUST be retired because they’re too expensive to modernize. Well, they
never needed to be modernized, in the first place! Sure, you could swap out a newer computer, if
you want but the basic ‘find and destroy’ function worked as effectively as
ever.
We see, then, that modernization is the huckster salesman’s
fraudulent claim that allows the Navy to sell oversized, overpriced ships to
Congress. Modernization almost never
happens and most of what is purported to be modernization is actually just
routine maintenance, most of which has been deferred far beyond acceptable
limits. Modernization is a myth and,
since it almost never happens and ships are almost always retired early,
doesn’t this pretty much demand that the intelligent navy design ships for a
limited 20 year service life or less?
________________________________
(1)USNI News website, “Navy ‘Struggling’ to Modernize Aging
Cruiser Fleet As Tight Budgets Push Pentagon to Shed Legacy Platforms”, Megan
Eckstein, 5-Apr-2021,
https://news.usni.org/2021/04/05/navy-struggling-to-modernize-aging-cruiser-fleet-as-tight-budgets-push-pentagon-to-shed-legacy-platforms
