Tuesday, January 21, 2025

Destroyer Modernization

ComNavOps loves to report good news out of the Navy but seldom has the opportunity.  Here is a possible positive development regarding modernization of Burke Flt IIA destroyers.
 
A handful of ships have been designated for modernization under the Navy’s Destroyer Modernization 2.0 program.  Upgrades involve installation of :
 
  • SEWIP Block III SLQ-32(V)7
  • SPY-6 V4 air and missile defense radar
  • Baseline 10 Aegis Weapon System.
  • 350t high efficiency super capability chiller that provides the extra cooling needed when adding both the SLQ and SPY array to the legacy hulls
 
The initial set of destroyers chosen for modernization are:
 
  • USS Pinckney (DDG-91)
  • USS James E. Williams (DDG-95)
  • USS Chung Hoon (DDG-93)
  • USS Halsey (DDG-97)
 
These ships will receive upgrades incrementally rather than in a single availability.  The intent is for these ships to act as lessons learned prior to implementing fleet wide upgrades beginning in 2029.
 
In the first modernization period, destroyers will receive the AN/SLQ-32(V)7 SEWIP Block III. According to Moore, these vessels will serve in the fleet “for some time” before returning for a second depot modernization period to receive a modified AN/SPY-6 air and missile defense radar.[1]

The Navy has also announced that USS Sterett (DDG-104) will be the first ship to receive the entire upgrade set in a single availability sometime in the next five years.
 
The Navy’s explanation for the modernization effort is,
 
“The bottom line here, the real takeaway that I want you to take here, is that we are bridging the gap between our legacy destroyers and the Flight III by delivering decisive combat power to the Flight IIA DDGs,” said Moore [DDG 2.0 modernization program manager Capt. Tim Moore].
 
The $17 billion modernization program aims to bring the fleet’s Flight IIA destroyers up to “Flight III-like capabilities” … [1]

Somewhat puzzlingly, the Navy has also identified some ships to receive only fragmentary upgrades.
 
… the Navy has also identified USS Kidd (DDG-100) to be the first of a “handful of ships” to receive only a SEWIP Block III upgrade and no SPY-6 back fit.[1]

Why the Navy wouldn’t fully upgrade these ships is unknown.  It is also unknown whether they would be included in the eventual fleet wide upgrade effort.
 
It is good that ships are being modernized rather than retired early, as the Navy is so often prone to do.  The question, now, is whether the Navy will follow through on this plan.  One of the concerns is the extended time period for this modernization.  Given that the main effort will not begin until 2029, will it still be a modernization?  In other words, will current equipment still constitute a modernization four-plus years from now?  One can easily envision the Navy, some four to ten years from now, telling Congress that the modernization is no longer adequate and the ships are too worn out to be financially worth upgrading and, therefore, they want new ships, instead.  Why do I think this?  Because that’s exactly what they’ve done in the past, repeatedly.
 
Despite the obvious dangers and doubts, I’ll view this as good news until the Navy proves otherwise.  Now, if they’d just drop the idiotic unmanned vessel nonsense and focus on firepower, I’d have some real positive news to write about!
 
 
______________________________
 
[1]USNI News website, “Navy Identifies First Destroyer to Receive Full Set of DDG MOD 2.0 Upgrades”, Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, 16-Jan-2025,
https://news.usni.org/2025/01/16/navy-identifies-first-destroyer-to-receive-full-set-of-ddg-mod-2-0-upgrades

34 comments:

  1. Big questi.on in my mind is the radar availability. The Dutch plans on modernising their Zeven Provincien frigates fell through because of delays in the delivery of the APAR Blk 2 radar, which will only be delivered in 2028, which makes it unfeasible to refit the first two ships, since they'll be end of life by the time the refit is comoleted.

    This might reflect teething issues with the delivery of Flight III. We webt from building two DDGs a year to now being years behind achedule on all our shipbuilding. Covid has definitely benefited China.

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  2. Reflecting on one of your previous post, these are # 9.000 tons platforms. If you keep only sensors and remove all weapons what would be the weight / size of an equivalent unmanned vessel ? And how many crews are currently needed on a DDG51 for the operation and maintenance of said sensors ? Of course these unmanned vessels could be specialised for anti aircraft / missiles warfare vs. submarine warfare vs. sea warfare.
    Actually an unmanned platform which would be purely weapons and no sensors seems to be easier to develop, and possibly more useful given the difficulties of reloading VLS at sea.

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    1. I see value in the added tubes on a nearby ship dependent on a destroyers sensors and combat system. I find it hard to believe that an unmanned ship will be able to operate for weeks or months at sea. So many parts and systems to break, malfuntion, or just stop working and no one to fix it.

      Delete
  3. A picture of the USS Pinkney shows the ship is now very wide at the top, with sponsons housing the new electronics. I read that the ballasts were increased, but I wonder how the ship will handle rapid turns in heavy seas. I wonder also how all this electronic is protected against spalls eg. when a phalanx destroys a missile close to the ship.

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    1. As has been discussed many times on the blog, the Burkes are now an obsolete design as well as being max'ed in weight and stability margins. We desperately need a new design but the Navy is so scared after so many failed designs, they're sticking with the Burkes regardless of how poor a choice they are.

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    2. I struggle to see why this is so hard!! We need a design that's bigger, to allow for more power/cooling, and hopefully, the CG(X) sized radar. But, since we're doing evolutionary, not revolutionary, we should be using existing tech, including SPY6, right??. Nothing that isnt slated to be used on the FltIII... so whats the holdup?? Is the Navy still secretly trying for somthing transformational?? I sure hope not!!

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    3. Is it crazy to use the basic design of the DDG-1000 ship? Hull, power, etc. Adding the larger AN/SPY-6 radar and other upgraded technology and rework the forward end of the ship without the useless gun systems (adding more missiles) and modifying the superstructure as required?

      Is the hull design and power system otherwise bad or has it been essentially all tested and known?

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    4. The first question to ask and answer is why are we doing this in the first place? What kind of ship are we trying to produce? We've already got around 80 Burkes at around $3M apiece. Do we really need more ships we won't risk in combat and can't afford to lose?

      Setting that aside, the Zumwalts cost $8M+ each and were never actually completed. Is that an affordable and risk-able ship? Is it wise to build more super expensive ships?

      I've previously demonstrated that we can build a pure AAW vessel that would be half the size of a Burke and half the cost. Wouldn't that make more sense? Risk-able and affordable.

      The Zumwalt hull has some significant sailing limitations due to its hull shape. It is not the best hull type to emulate.

      Delete
    5. "I've previously demonstrated that we can build a pure AAW vessel that would be half the size of a Burke and half the cost."

      Really? I'm skeptical. You could save some room by making it single-role. But my understanding is that the trend was to go bigger for area air-defense. The SPY-6 was already compromised because they couldn't fit the size of antenna array they wanted. It was supposed to be bigger in order ot increase detection ranges for stealth aircraft and ballistic missiles.

      And going with a truly single-role ship means it can't travel without escorts for ASW, if nothing else.

      Delete
    6. "Really? I'm skeptical."

      Avail yourself of the archives and educate yourself.

      "You could save some room by making it single-role."

      At the risk of repeating previous posts, I would point out that a pure AAW vessel has no need of helos and the flight deck and hangar combination constitutes somewhere around a third of the ship's length. Removing just those would result in significant size reduction before we even begin to discuss radars or anything else!

      "the trend was to go bigger for area air-defense."

      No, the trend was to get bigger to accommodate all manner of non-essential equipment and functions.

      "And going with a truly single-role ship means it can't travel without escorts for ASW, if nothing else."

      We're talking about combat, right? Do you seriously think any ship is going to travel alone during a war. Ships always travel in task forces so not only is this not a problem, it's everything proper and right!

      You need to give this some serious rethinking.

      Delete
    7. "We're talking about combat, right? Do you seriously think any ship is going to travel alone during a war. Ships always travel in task forces so not only is this not a problem, it's everything proper and right!"

      Not necessarilly, Prince of Wales and Repulse did just fine in WWII without all extras around them.

      Delete
    8. Ha ha ha!

      I think that was supposed to be a joke in reference to below sunk by the Imperial Japanese:

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinking_of_Prince_of_Wales_and_Repulse

      https://www.historyskills.com/classroom/year-10/sinking-of-prince-of-wales-and-repulse/

      https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/the-repulse-and-prince-of-wales-battleships-how-they-sunk/

      On a more serious note maybe the U.S. Navy does not upgrade all the destroyers because we are also exporting the Aegis system like to Japan below thus our capabilities may be maxed out (maybe we should be letting Japan license build the Aegis systems themselves to free up capabilities)

      From below:

      Lockheed Martin successfully delivered the first AN/SPY-7(V)1 radar antenna for the Aegis System Equipped Vessel (ASEV) to the Japan Ministry of Defense.

      The delivery was made through Mitsubishi Corporation under a Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) arrangement after rigorous acceptance testing.

      https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/01/lockheed-martin-delivers-first-asev-an-spy-7v1-radar-antenna-to-japan/

      Lockheed Martin has been awarded a significant contract modification worth $92.7 million for its AEGIS Combat System, which will support Japan, South Korea, and Australia.

      https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2025/01/22/lockheed-secures-aegis-upgrade-for-japan-korea-australia/

      So maybe we should be transferring the Aegis technology whole to South Korea, Japan, and Australia to have them built the systems themselves to free up our own capabilities for our own ships... well maybe not Australia as they seem to be corrupt as show below but I would think Japan at least should be competent to build the Aegis systems themselves and free up U.S. capabilities. For those wondering, I am referring to below and I think the quote from the link below is most illustrative and I see nothing done I could find since then so I would suggest Japan at least should start making Aegis themselves maybe license production and technology transfer like with the F-2 (F-2 is the Japanese version of our F-16):

      DCNS is now known as the Naval Group. It was previously DCN. Since 1997, DCNS has been involved in 5 major corruption scandals. Three of these events were known before the company was selected to design Australia’s submarines and two have come to notice since it was selected. Four of the incidents involve the supply of submarines or frigates to Taiwan, Pakistan, Malaysia and Brazil and the loss of information pertaining to the submarines the company is building in India. DCNS has denied any wrongdoing, but too many incidents have occurred to be ignored, and further information should be sought by the Australian Government about them and appropriate anti-corruption measures applied. But have they?

      https://www.malkaraconsulting.com/articles/2018/4/22/australias-submarine-program-a-failure-in-anti-corruption-due-diligence


      https://michaelwest.com.au/collins-class-national-security-debacle-on-top-of-aukus/

      And on Japan buying the Aegis below:

      https://www.naval-technology.com/news/us-clears-150m-sale-to-japan-for-aegis-combat-systems-patch/

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  4. Honestly i think we need a new CG rather than DDG. I know the distinctions have blurred, but I think its appropriate to call it that for the task, and simplicity. The CG can be the AAW focused ship, with the higher vls cell count, big power/radar and can fulfill the AAW Commander function that the Ticos usually have. Itd be attached to the CVN (or other high value group centerpiece) at the hip. The DDGs can then be more strike focused in their loadout, yet still picket/AAW capable. Until the new CG hits the fleet, we could go back to building cheaper IIA Burkes, (or even non-helo FltI if possible) and maybe
    forego the SPY6 upgrades to older ships. New SEWIP, and additional CIWS systems are the only upgrades needed, since they're refocused on strike.

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  5. "We're talking about combat, right? Do you seriously think any ship is going to travel alone during a war. Ships always travel in task forces so not only is this not a problem, it's everything proper and right!"

    Except, ships (singly or in small numbers) often operate ahead of a task force (e.g., radar picket, etc.) or detached from a task force to perform other duties.

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    1. "Except, ships (singly or in small numbers) often operate ahead of a task force"

      No, almost never and certainly not capital ships which is what a Burke or AAW-Burke would be. The example you cite of a radar picket was the lowest, smallest, cheapest ships we had AND THEY OPERATED UNDER CARRIER AIR COVER and with other pickets so they were not alone.

      You need to brush up on naval operations.

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    2. Perhaps this is why the Constellations have an AAW-grade radar? That would theoretically allow them to slot in to a battlegroup as radar pickets, feeding sensor picture to Burkes acting as shppters (until their inevitable destructuon anyhow).

      Delete
    3. "Perhaps this is why the Constellations have an AAW-grade radar?"

      Not likely. No one would use $1B+ ships as sacrificial radar pickets. The Navy designed the Constellation as a mini-Burke, hence the radar and Standards. This makes no sense but that's the Navy.

      I'm not sure the concept of a radar picket even makes sense today given the speed of modern anti-ship missiles.

      Delete
  6. If I understand correctly, in a previous post you demonstrated that any AAW ship would difficulties shooting more than 4-6 missiles against sea-skimming missiles if it was only relying on its own radar (limited by horizon curvature). Thus the need for carrier borne AEW. What would be the outcome for a carrier group with 4-6 AAW escorts against a massive missile attack (> 100 combining ballistic, hypersonic, sea-skimming) plus torpedoes ?

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    1. Well the F-35 is supposed to be able to shoot down missiles as show by Israel below:

      https://www.twz.com/israeli-f-35-shoots-down-cruise-missile

      Against the massive missile attack you mentioned, if the commander is wise and use his assets correctly a modern carrier group could survive although damaged assuming that the number includes decoys and potentially duds as well as misses as they can not ALL be live warheads can they? So our targeting systems should be able to tell the difference and thus sparing the decoys to harmless hit our ships. Also, as with Israel, I think we should have below or similar to defend against torpedoes if we do not already:



      TORBUSTER – a key component in RAFAEL’s SHADE™ Torpedo Defense Suite – is a 4th generation, state-of-the-art countermeasure for all types of acoustic homing torpedoes. Combining both soft- and hard-kill capabilities, it is effective in shallow and deep waters for long- and short-range attacks. Launched externally, it propels itself to a safe distance from the submarine or surface vessel and attracts the incoming torpedo, detonating its warhead at the Closest Point of Approach (CPA). TORBUSTER actions end torpedo attacks after the first one.

      https://www.rafael.co.il/system/torbuster/


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    2. If I remember correctly CNO once mentioned from one of the comments from the link below. Ah! Here it is:

      ComNavOpsAugust 5, 2024 at 10:12 AM

      Of course, basic sensors and weapons stations are always manned, most assuredly during war. Thus, the ship can defend itself. Other functions, such as damage control might not be manned but this immediate defensive reaction is intact.

      This is also why combat software has a full auto option. Aegis has such an option and, when enabled, can run the engagement by itself. Similarly, CIWS has a full auto mode.

      https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2024/08/train-like-you-fight.html

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    3. I published too quickly after I found what I was looking for, sorry about that anyway assume the AWACS detected the missile attack actually such large attack should be detected ways off from IR signature alone so anyway the carrier group will be dead or badly damaged depending on how accurate the missiles and torpedoes hit. I assume from what is mentioned it is an attack from an Type 055 destroyer below as it carries:

      112 GJB 5860-2006 VLS cells[8]

      HHQ-9 long range surface-to-air missiles[8]
      YJ-18A anti-ship missiles[8]
      YJ-21 anti-ship ballistic missiles[15]
      CJ-10 land-attack cruise missile[8]
      Anti-submarine missiles[8]

      2 × sets[16] of 324mm torpedo tubes[14]

      Yu-7 torpedoes

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_055_destroyer

      Of course CNO suggested 4 carriers per group from link below to do a successful strike so if the Navy follows CNO's suggestions in addition to below the attack may destroy or badly damage a carrier or two but it may still be effective as the carriers are escorting the missile shooters so with the missiles targeting the carriers and hopefully not the missile shooters the carriers have served their role as decoys although a very expensive decoy and there is no mention of after damage assessment so out attack may have no way of knowing if they have succeeded or failed and so may just assumed they succeeded whether or not they did another plus for our side if true as the group could act as a surprise attack force if it survies. Below is what I am referring to:

      My goodness! Our strike is going to need more aircraft than a single carrier even has! For F-18’s alone, we’ll need 3.4 carrier’s worth and that assumes that we have a dedicated unmanned tanker. If not, we need 168 F-18s which is 3.8 carriers worth.

      https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2018/11/carrier-strike.html





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    4. "What would be the outcome"

      It all depends on a hundred different factors. What are you really asking?

      Delete
  7. In the Iranian October '24 attack on Israel with approx. 180 ballistic missiles (including the Fattah-1 a terminally maneuvering ballistic missile) and fair to say Israel is defended by the most sophisticated anti-ballistic defense system with its Arrow 2 and 3 missiles, plus a dozen SM-3 Block 1B? fired from two Burkes, the Israeli military said only most were intercepted (75%?) as Iranian ballistic missiles did hit central and southern Israel.

    You can imagine China having the capability of launching a similar number of more sophisticated various types of missiles in a single dedicated attack on a CBG, what are the implications if the new destroyer is not dedicated to AAW.

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  8. Does the basic hull design need to be reinvented for each new class of ship, or is it acceptable to use an existing hull design with more armor and internal volume than any existing destroyer?

    As the older Burkes, Ticonderogas, and LCS are retired, we could repurpose their engines and combat systems for new build North Carolina class battleship hulls. We have an existing example that someone with a 3D laser scanner can go visit in dry dock to gather accurate data on the as-built ship, which can then be adapted to mount all the weapons from our retiring Ticonderogas and LCS.

    4 LM2500s paired with more efficient modern propellers would allow us to retain 28 knot speed, they're at least twice as fuel efficient as WWII era boilers at full output, and no worse at normal cruising speeds. North Carolina's fuel bunkers are roughly equal to 2/3rds of a Ticonderoga's full load displacement, which means fewer UNREP events. We're removing at least 4,250 tons of top weight by replacing the main battery with VLS cells, the pair of 5 inch guns, and the rest of the armaments. That should make them much more stable.

    If the superstructure from the Burke or Ticonderoga ships is still serviceable, then we cut those right off the deck of the retiring ships and weld them to the deck of the new ships. No wheels need to be reinvented to get functional superstructures, either.

    If more money is available, there's space for more VLS cells and weapons. If each ship was equipped with 512 Mk41 cells loaded to capacity, that's 3,008t below the main deck. There's also plenty of space for additional crew members during a war. If the systems they normally have installed are equivalent to a Ticonderoga, then there's no reason why a substantially larger crew should be required in peacetime.

    It's ugly, but expedient- a minimal cost survivability upgrade. We're paying for a larger hull with more space, but nothing else. Buying more steel is much cheaper than recruiting and training new sailors. Someone else can figure out what to refit them with later, using all the time and money not spent reinventing the cruiser. Adding a little more top weight with newer SPY-6 radars will have no significant effect on stability.

    kbd512

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    1. "new build North Carolina class battleship hulls."

      I'm not completely following your intent. You seem to be suggesting building a battleship arsenal ship using repurposed equipment to defray costs?

      "use an existing hull design"

      A NC class BB would need to have a complete redesign of its armor/structural scheme for modern combat. I've posted on this. We could not simply dust off the old blueprints and build it.

      "repurpose their engines and combat systems"

      In theory, yes. In practice, no. If the existing equipment had been faithfully maintained throughout its life, yes, we could repurpose much of it. The reality is that the Navy is criminally negligent regarding maintenance and any existing equipment on a retiring ship has been badly neglected and is unusable.

      Interestingly, some foreign ship builders do repurpose retiring ship's equipment. How successfully they do that, I don't know.

      "If the superstructure from the Burke or Ticonderoga ships is still serviceable"

      The Tico superstructures, being aluminum, are riddled with cracks and have probably exceeded their useful structural life in addition to the fact that aluminum is NOT an acceptable structural material for a warship.

      The Burke superstructures are no longer state of the art stealthy and would not be suitable for future combat. They are also not armored which would not fit with the concept of a battleship arsenal ship.

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    2. CNO,

      Rationalization for more than adequate hull volume:
      My intent was to avoid the snowball effect related to low mass and volume growth margins. A larger hull doesn't need to be as highly optimized as it would otherwise have to be when constrained by a much smaller hull volume.

      I read an article writen by an officer assigned to the SPY-6 integration project for the Flight III Arleigh Burkes. They spent a lot of time trying to rearrange the new equipment to maintain stability, so as not to further compromise survivability, and that involved a lot of iterative design and virtual testing. SPY-6 required far more effort than a simple electronics swap, despite reducing total weight and space claim. The large and heavy waveguides were gone, the computers were far lighter and occupied far less internal volume, but the arrays themselves were much heavier, increasing top weight and reducing stability. An entirely new electric generation and cooling plant had to be developed / tested / integrated to power and cool the new electronics due to the hull constraints. They ended up redesigning the superstructure, strengthening the hull, thickening or moving some structural members supporting the hull and superstructure, and/or using stronger steel, moving multiple pieces of unrelated equipment to restore stability, and rerouting wiring and plumbing.

      That's the kind of project we can avoid by starting with a much larger hull. As requirements change over time, we're not re-engineering multiple structural parts and subsystems of the ship, initiating power and cooling equipment development projects to avoid weight / fuel burn rate / stability penalties, or other similarly expensive and time consuming design efforts. It's not a license to partake in sloppy engineering practices, but can provide better margins for unanticipated mass growth or redistribution, space claim, and prevent design rework stemming from a highly constrained hull volume and mass allocation tolerances. When one hears "reduced weight and space claim", one doesn't think, "now we need a significant redesign of the hull and superstructure".

      Increasing total displacement by 5,000t may alleviate the top weight issue caused by the heavier SPY-6 arrays, but after we spent all that time and money improving the sensors and effectively redesigning significant portions of the ship, are we not going to capitalize on our sensor reach advantage with more and/or larger weapons? That's not very sensible, so we add more VLS cells. Now we're right back to needing a larger hull or undertaking significant engineering projects to shoehorn everything into a smaller hull. Alternatively, we're making significant compromises.

      A hull similar in size to a NC also has enough fuel to steam at typical carrier battlegroup cruising speeds without requiring a weekly fuel replenishment. The historical NCs allocated about 14,000t to the hull, 11,000t to armor, 5,000t to equipment and machinery, 7,000t to weapons, and 7,000t to fuel. I'm not suggesting that we build an exact replica of a NC, but in order for this purpose-built air warfare ship to keep pace with a carrier cruising at 20 knots, over any significant period of time, requires more fuel than any 10,000t to 15,000t destroyer / cruiser hull can allocate. If we're expecting the primary escort ships in a carrier battlegroup to remain on station with the carrier they're protecting, then their fuel load resembles the total displacement of an Arleigh Burke. There's only so much we can do to increase fuel burn efficiency, and then physics dictates the size of ship required to maintain a certain speed over a given period of time.

      kbd512

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    3. "As requirements change over time"

      You're operating from a flawed premise that it's a good thing to keep a ship design (or the physical ship) for 40+ years (the Burke was designed in 1985!). That's folly. Ships have traditionally been designed for a 10-20 year lifespan. It's only recently that we've gone to 35-40+ year designs and even that's based on the theory, now proven false, that upgrades will occur and we, therefore, need to allow space/weight for future upgrades.

      If we design for 10-20 years, we don't need to build in massive space/weight margins - we'll just build a new design/ship when changes are needed.

      "I read an article writen by an officer assigned to the SPY-6 integration project for the Flight III Arleigh Burkes. They spent a lot of time ..."

      They spent a lot of time because they were trying to do something idiotic instead of doing the intelligent thing and designing a new ship for the role and the equipment.

      "after we spent all that time and money improving the sensors"

      You're a long time reader so you know we've disproven the concept of far distant AAW intercepts. Modern missiles are, within range of the target, sea skimmers and can only be detected at the horizon, absent a carrier aircraft screen and, if you have carrier aircraft, they do the distant intercept not the ship's missiles.

      "A hull similar in size to a NC"

      You're ignoring the downsides to a NC sized hull:

      1. It's a HUGE target and no amount of stealth can compensate for that immense size.

      2. It's frighteningly expensive. The much smaller Zumwalts cost $8B each and that was without the second phase of outfitting! I shudder to think what a BB-AAW would cost. The immense cost dictates that only a very few ships can be built. You recall that during WWII, with money not really an object, we only ever had ten fast battleships out of a 6000-ship fleet! For AAW escorts, as you're proposing, we'd want around 4-8 per carrier for a total of 40-80 or so.

      3. It takes forever to build a BB size ship. You recall that during WWII we didn't start and complete a single battleship even though cost was not really an issue? BB size ships consume precious building ways and drydocks for years on end, impacting the ability to build the more useful corvettes, destroyers, cruisers, etc.

      We could build several reduced-Burke-AAW ships for each BB-AAW you're suggesting and do it in a much shorter time frame. I see a place for true battleships but not for BB-AAW ships.

      Delete
    4. CNO,

      Operating Premises:
      Absent a radical shift in thinking, our Navy will continue to operate its ships for 30 to 50 years. Is that wise? Probably not.

      AAW Inteceptions:
      A good number of the proposed 512 cells will be loaded with shorter range / lower cost missiles intended to engage sea-skimming or pop-targets like drones at closer ranges, since sea-skimming cruise missiles still represent the bulk of the air defense threat against our ships.

      Hull Cost vs Equipment Cost:
      Using total cost for equivalent capability, larger ships don't cost substantially more to build, nor take substantially longer to build. The Zumwalt and Ford class were so expensive and took so long to complete because they were science experiments that didn't use proven propulsion, sensors, and equipment. I'm talking about building a specialist AAW ship the size of a small battleship with existing tech, then equipping it with enough armor, fuel, and VLS cells so that the limited number of surface combatants we do manage to build and deploy per calendar year is less of an issue as it relates to immediate availability of weapons to defend against large numbers of anti-ship missiles.

      If 4 of these ships were included per carrier battlegroup, then we'd need 16 (128 cells/ship) AAW-Burkes to 21 (96 cells/ship) Burkes to provide the same number of defensive weapons to each battlegroup. Let's use that $8B cost figure for each BB-AAW. If we built 16 AAW-Burkes instead, those would also cost $32B, and take longer to build, because at some point we'd have to wait for dry dock space to build that many more of them, or build more dry docks. Between 1988 and 2025, our actual build rate for the Arleigh Burke class stands at 2.27 ships per year. Maybe we could build more, and faster, but we haven't. BB-AAW adds VLS cells to our battlegroup at a 5:1 ratio against Burkes or 4:1 against AAW-Burkes.

      Spruance hull ships can't steam for more than a week without fuel replenishment, so quadrupling the number of AAW-Burkes implies at least 1 more tanker per battlegroup, and oil tankers are every bit as big as a battleship. Tankers average 1.5 years between keel laying and commissioning, so that's an advantage. It's not about the quantity of fuel, it's the frequency of replenishment required. BB-AAW ships can steam for more than a month without fuel replenishment.

      WWII Battleship Hull Construction Timelines:
      About 3 years and 9 months elapsed between our declaration of war and singing of the peace treaty with Japan. Keel laying to commissioning date alignment with the start and end dates of the war aside, 12 new battleships were laid down and 10 commissioned between 1937 and 1944, with keel laying to commissioning taking 2.5 to 3 years. 17 of the 26 Essex class aircraft carrier hulls laid down were ultimately put to sea before the war ended, their hull tonnages were similar to Treaty Era battleships and they were equipped with battleship propulsion systems.

      AAW-Optimized Arleigh Burke:
      The 4,000t Perry class frigates were laid and commissioned in about 2 years, little different than the 9,800t Burkes, which implies that hull size doesn't dramatically affect completion timeline. 128 VLS cells for each AAW-Burke implies 4 AAW-Burkes per BB-AAW, doubling available dry dock slips and workforce to build more Burkes. You'd also need 1,200 sailors vs perhaps 600 sailors for each BB-AAW ship. BAE's 950ft long / 160ft wide floating dry dock in California can lift 55,000 tons.

      kbd512

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  9. It would be nice to see a modular warship program akin to the German MEKO concept. Plug and play modular hull module's (engineering, weapons, ect.) that can be mass produced and assembled to create various class size and mission focused ships. Not unlike the Navy is doing now with the Virginia payload modules.

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    1. There's nothing wrong with the MEKO concept but it can't be used to create different function vessels. For example, an ASW ship needs exquisite quieting measures that have to go into the ship from the first rivet to the last. You can't achieve that via modules.

      Modules only work when they're inconsequential or very similar. A MEKO weapons pit, for example, can take different types of weapons because they're all essentially the same thing: weapons. You couldn't successfully drop a MCM module into a weapon pit and produce an optimized MCM vessel. And so on.

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    2. You can get a certain measure of common functions into a hull but that means building in a baseline level of capability that is overkill for the low end. Consider the Italian PPA frigates: the PPA Light configuration, where it's only got the foredeck gun and aft point defense 76mm Sovraponte, is systems-wise adequete for the OPV mission. It has, however, spaces for the hull sonar and towed array sonar of the Light+ and Full configurations, as well as quieting measures that are reasonable for an ASW frigate and overkill for an OPV. *shrug*

      That said Italian friends have told me that this is really the MN wanting more surface combatants than the Parliament is willing to fund, which is why the Light ships are using the same combat software as the Full configuration ships, and have multiple spaces built in for canister ASCMs to be installed, turning them from large patrol ships into ASuW frigates.

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    3. "but that means building in a baseline level of capability that is overkill for the low end."

      Setting aside the still remaining issue of lack of optimization, it is the overkill for the lesser ships that makes the entire modular concept a financial poor decision. I've said it before and I'll continue saying it, modular only works if the modules are identical in function or if they're non-combat.

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  10. After reading all the discussions, I don't know why China's 052D and 055 come to my mind.
    Is our military industry corrupt?
    How come China can build these ships for less than half or even 1/4 of the price? And much faster?

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    1. You're either new to the blog, in which case you need to come up to speed on the archives, posts, and comments or you're not grasping and retaining key concepts. China's shipbuilding costs are HEAVILY subsidized by the government which obscures the true cost. Every time I've dug into foreign shipbuilding costs and accounted for all the subsidies, accounting gimmicks, repurposed equipment, and other techniques used to create seemingly cheaper costs, they wind up being more or less the same. For example, many countries claim to be able to produce cheaper warships but a major part of that is that they build to significantly lower survivability standards than the US. And so on.

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