China is building warships faster than we can keep track of them with dozens of new ships every year. How is the US Navy doing, by comparison? Let's take a look at the Navy's most recent 30-year shipbuilding plan and, more importantly, the five year portion of that plan (everything beyond five years is just made up guesses).
New Construction
According to the Navy’s most recent 2025 30 Year
shipbuilding plan [1], over the next five years the Navy plans to build 33 combat ships (average 6.6 per year) which break down as follows:
Carriers CVN 0
Burke DDG 10
Constellation FFG 7
Virginia SSN 9
San Antonio LPD 3
Columbia SSBN 4
In comparison, China went from around 190 to 250 (+60) in the four years 2020-2023
inclusive for an average of 15 new ships
per year which is twice the build rate of the US.
In addition, the Navy plans to build 24 assorted auxiliaries
and logistics vessels.
Retirements
Balanced against the build plans, the Navy plans to
decommission 64 ships as indicated below and broken down by year.
2025 19
2026 17
2027 12
2028 7
2029 9
2025 CG 4, SSN 3, LCS 2, LSD 1, other 9
2026 CVN 1, CG 3, LCS 1, SSN 3, SSGN 2, LSD 2, other 5
2027 CG 2, SSN 1, SSBN 1, other 8
2028 DDG 2, SSN 1, SSGN 2, SSBN 1, LSD 1
2029 DDG 3, SSN 1, LSD 1, LHD 1, other 3
Total retirements by type:
CVN 1
CG 9
DDG 5
SSN 9
SSGN 4
SSBN 2
LCS 3
LSD 5
LHD 1
other 25
Discussion
We see, then, that in the five year plan (beyond five years
is just pure made up guesses), the Navy is planning to retire 39 combat ships
and 25 auxiliaries while building 33 combat ships and 24 auxiliaries for a net
decrease of 6 combat ships and 1 auxiliary … while we’re supposedly gearing up
for a near term war with China. What’s
wrong with this picture?
Other notable findings:
The MCM capability is of major concern. The entire current MCM force of Avenger class
ships and MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters will be retired with only a half dozen
or so Independence variant LCS-MCM to take over mine countermeasures for the
entire world. Worse, the LCS MCM module
is not yet functional and is entirely ineffective. For all practical purposes, we no longer have
any mine countermeasure capability.
The SSGN is far and away our most stealthy and effective
land attack naval asset and will be retired without direct replacement. The Virginia class, even with the VPM, simply
cannot equal the SSGN in effectiveness and operational usefulness.
The lack of a Burke/Tico replacement is a major
weakness. We’ll be losing VLS (strike
and AAW) capacity from the fleet while replacing them, numerically, with small,
unmanned vessels with a fraction of the VLS.
The Burke Flt III is obsolete even before the first joins the fleet and
is emphatically not the solution to future naval warfare due to the lack of
stealth, armor, firepower, weight/stability margins, combat resilience, effective
damage control, and a sub-optimal radar system.
_______________________________
Burke DDG 10
Constellation FFG 7
Virginia SSN 9
San Antonio LPD 3
Columbia SSBN 4
2026 17
2027 12
2028 7
2029 9
2026 CVN 1, CG 3, LCS 1, SSN 3, SSGN 2, LSD 2, other 5
2027 CG 2, SSN 1, SSBN 1, other 8
2028 DDG 2, SSN 1, SSGN 2, SSBN 1, LSD 1
2029 DDG 3, SSN 1, LSD 1, LHD 1, other 3
CG 9
DDG 5
SSN 9
SSGN 4
SSBN 2
LCS 3
LSD 5
LHD 1
other 25
- The entire MCM force will be retired
- All SSGNs will be retired
- Nimitz class retirements will begin
- Burke class retirements will begin
- No new carriers are scheduled in the period
- No Burke/Tico replacement is planned
We can't conduct large amphibious operations unless air and naval superiority is established. If that will be a problem, we need more combatants and fewer amphibs.
ReplyDeleteG2mil
"we need more combatants"
DeleteTo expand on that, we need the RIGHT KIND OF COMBATANTS. A hundred more Burkes won't help us at all. Amphibious assaults require firepower in unimagninably massive quantities. There's no way around it - that means 8"-16" naval guns among other types of firepower.
It also means that the assault force needs the RIGHT KIND of firepower, for example, heavy mortars, amphibious tanks, heavy APCs, combat engineering vehicles, self-propelled howitzers and anti-air vehicles, etc.
I don't want more combatants, I want better combatants!
Having said all that, I don't foresee the need for large scale amphibious assaults in any reasonably anticipatable scenario.
My solution to the mine warfare problem is to dedicate at least two new LPDs to minewarfare as motherships. They can carry something like eight Mark VI size boats in their well deck. So buy similar size fiberglass boats with sensors and remote UUVs and send them out searching. If destroyed by a mine, oh well, it was just a boat. And tell the Marines to hand over a few new CH-53Ks to the Navy that can operate from LPDs too!
ReplyDeleteG2mil
"motherships"
DeleteI'm all for that but the real need is not motherships but EFFECTIVE mine detection and removal capabilities and equipment. The entire trend towards one-at-a-time mine hunting and neutralization is utterly ineffective when it is obvious that we will face minefields consisting of thousands to tens or hundreds of thousands of mines. Clearing one-at-a-time is pointless and useless. We need EFFECTIVE, large scale, large area, sweeping capabilities which I see no evidence that we have. So, until we have a PROVEN effective sweep system, the motherships are not that useful.
Further, if we do come up with an effective sweep system, it has to be able to cover a wide area and fairly quickly. I'm not sure that can be done by the tiny, unmanned boats the Navy is acquiring. I suspect they just can't meet the area/speed towing requirements. I think we'll wind up needing modern versions of Avengers. But, this is something that needs to be realistically tested and exercised and we seem to have no desire to do that.
The other issue is smart moving mines that have been around for decades. One can sweep an area only to have mines move into it. Even simple floating mines present this problem. I don't know if anyone has shore-based rocket mines, but the idea is simple. An enemy can fire rockets to drop mines anywhere they want, like in an area that was just "cleared."
DeleteG2mil
"smart moving mines that have been around for decades. One can sweep an area only to have mines move into it."
DeleteSomething to be aware of, for sure, but I don't see this as a major tactical problem. In combat, the ships/craft that want to move through a minefield would do so IMMEDIATELY on the heels of sweeping, as in, minutes behind. Consider ... you want to sweep a passage through a navigational chokepoint. The ships are piled up and waiting. You sweep and then the ships move through immediately while you, presumably, still have the element of surprise for whatever it is you want to do. Or, consider the sweeping of assault approach lanes as was done at Normandy across the English Channel. You sweep and the assault forces follow in your wake, essentially, exactly to deny the enemy the opportunity to re-mine.
"An enemy can fire rockets to drop mines anywhere they want, like in an area that was just "cleared."
If you're close enough to an enemy for them to do that, you should be hammering them with hundreds of thousands of pounds of high explosive from large caliber naval guns. We too often think of things in isolation. We need to think in the broader sense. For example, sweeping landing lanes for landing craft isn't done in isolation. It would be done as hundreds of thousands of pounds of high explosive suppressive fire was being applied specifically to force the enemy to keep their heads down. Give them no chance to fire on landing craft or launch mines into the landing lanes. If we haven't got the capability to apply massive suppressive fire (which we currently do not) then we shouldn't be attempting an assault. This is exactly what you wisely pointed out in your first comment about air and naval superiority being a prerequisite for an amphibious assault.
Does the technology exist for rapid large scale, area sweeping of naval minefields? I understand that modern naval mines can rest on the seabed almost indefinitely and be programmed to detonate under the hull of a passing ship or submarine according to its specific acoustic signal or magnetic field or something. Being made presumably of plastic and designed to blend in with the natural features of the local seabed environment these mines would surely be very difficult to detect and sweep.
DeleteIs the solution to use massive quantities of HE to clear a pathway through or is there something out there more sophisticated than that?
"Does the technology exist for rapid large scale, area sweeping of naval minefields?"
DeleteShort answer ... no one knows and anyone who might claim to know, isn't saying. Personally, my investigations lead me to believe that the capability does not exist.
The best solution I've come across, so far, is the signal modulating sweep. It can change the sweep signal output characteristics to mimic a trigger signal for smart mines. The challenge is knowing what type mine(s) you're sweeping so that you can select the proper signal characteristics. I guess that's where espionage and clandestine acquisition of an enemy's mines comes in. Even so, some mines can be programmed to ignore the first xx number of times it sees a trigger and simply wait. No amount of sweeping can defeat that until the wait period is over.
We desperately need to conduct large scale, realistic tests against actual mines (the warhead can be removed or inactivated for exercise purposes) and find out what works and what doesn't. I suspect such a test would present us with an unwelcome reality but who knows?
I've described this before but imagine what would happen if an enemy mined a few of our harbors. The convulsions the Navy would go through trying to get its half dozen LCS-MCM assets in place would be mind-boggling. Meanwhile, a few mines in a few places in the Pacific would paralyze the entire fleet while the few LCS-MCM were trying to clear our harbors.
This is very concerning. I would imagine that these mines could be manufactured in any reasonably well equipped workshop by a competent team of technicians and deployed by hand off the stern of a merchant vessel.
DeleteIf the mines had a delay function we wouldn’t even know who planted them and when; Russia, Iran, North Korea, the Houthis, someone else, who’s to say?
A single ‘successful’ strike would send insurance rates through the roof and cause massive disruption to our trade.
I hope someone is looking into this as a matter of urgency.
I think a short term solution is to halt ALL planned decomms. Except the LCS- those should all be eliminated, freeing up sailors and maintenance funds.
ReplyDeleteCG retirements HAVE to be halted, and all active, as well as those recently retired need a proper overhaul (not the fake sham program like the Navy already pulled on Congress)
I don't know what the reason for the SSGN retirements are ( reactor life? number of dives left in the hull? or just a general Navy dislike for "legacy" platforms?), but they should be put in some kind of active reserve status, to conserve their remaining life, ready to use when actually needed. The Nimitz, and next in line CVN should undergo whatever is needed to extend their life, short of a refueling, and shouldn't undergo deployments, in order to conserve her life.
Now is the time to end wasteful deployments (as CNO has long suggested), and conserve the older, irreplaceable assets we have!!
-jjabatie (unable to log in, hence 'anon'...)
Agree wholeheartedly with you, if DoD thinks China war is on the horizon, maybe next 5 years, decommissioning any SSN, SSGN and CVN makes zero sense, we should be able to put them in some kind of warm storage with a skeleton crew where they could be reactivated.
DeleteCan't find it now but the numbers released by DoD of how many S2A missiles have been fired at Houti drones, UAVs and ASMs by DDGs is seriously even more concerning than the build number of ships in the coming years, if a bunch of "amateurs" require that many missiles, how many do we need to fight the CHINESE NAVY and AF!?!? 10x? 20x? 50x?!?!?
ReplyDelete"if a bunch of "amateurs" require that many missiles"
DeleteThey don't require that many missiles! We're using that many missiles (however many that is) ONLY because we refuse to take decisive action and ELIMINATE the threat. Instead, we make an occasional pro forma attack on some irrelevant target and then allow the Houthis to keep lobbing missiles at us.
The same would apply to the Chinese navy. If we allow them to attack us at will, then, yes, we'll go through a LOT of defensive missiles. On the other hand, if we attack them in port, at sea, or wherever we find them, then we'll use a lot of OFFENSIVE missiles but not many defensive. Sink all their ships and we won't have to worry about missile usage. Of course, I'm grossly simplifying to make a point: you don't sit back and play continuous defense, you go on the offensive and eliminate the threat.
Vice Adm. McLane revealed Tuesday that USN had fired 20 ESSMs, 120 SM-2s, 80 SM-6s, an unknown number of SM-3s, maybe half a dozen?, plus 160 rounds of 5" shells, not mentioned was the Phalanx which has been used and no mention of the RAM missile, not many of the Burke's are fitted with RAM as yet which is replacing the Phalanx, in the 15 month campaign against Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.
Deletehttps://www.twz.com/news-features/navy-just-disclosed-how-many-of-each-of-its-surface-to-air-missiles-it-fired-during-red-sea-fight
"USN had fired"
DeleteDid you notice that the total fired weapons, including each individual 5" shell, is 380 while the claimed number of targets engaged is "more than 400 Houthi aerial drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles"? That means that every munition the Navy fired destroyed a target and many destroyed more than one target! That's phenomenal. That's incredible. That's unbelievable. No, seriously, it's unbelievable as in, I don't believe it. Not even a little bit.
So, one of the two numbers, the munitions fired or the incoming attacks, is wrong and wrong by a lot.
Assuming these numbers aren't just totally fictitious, all it says is that we're on the wrong side of the cost curve ... big time.