I’m Blind … Or Lying

The Navy is attempting to retire large numbers of ships in a misguided effort to increase funding for unmanned vessels and other nonsensical items.  In particular, the Navy has been trying for many years to retire the Aegis cruisers, the world’s most capable and powerful warships.  After being repeatedly rebuffed by Congress, the Navy settled on the ploy of allowing the ships to sit pier side and, literally, rust away and then claim that it would cost too much to upgrade them.  Now, the Navy is going a step further and outright lying to Congress.  CNO Gilday had this to say to the House Armed Services Committee about the Aegis cruiser retirement requests:

 

 “The older SPY radars can’t see the threat. If they can’t see it, they can’t shoot it down.”[1]

 

So, according to the admiral, Aegis/SPY-1 ‘can’t see the threat’.  Really?  Aegis originated the motto,

 

‘If it flies, it dies’.

 

Was that a lie? 

 

The threats haven’t changed all that much since Aegis/SPY was first introduced.  The threat was missiles back then and today the threat is … ah … missiles.  Yes, stealth has come along but that affects all radars not just Aegis/SPY radars.

 

Ah … here’s a thought … don’t the Burkes use the same SPY-1 radar, albeit a slightly different version (-D versus –A/B).  Is the version difference so great that Burkes are front line warships capable of seeing every threat and yet Ticonderogas are blind barges, unfit for even harbor patrol?  Or, is Gilday lying to get what he wants which is to retire the cruisers?

 

 

 

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[1]Breaking Defense website, “Decommissioned ship funds would go towards buying missiles, Navy says”, Aaron Mehta, 11-May-2022,

https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/decommissioned-ship-funds-would-go-towards-buying-missiles-navy-says/

Ticonderoga Replacement

This post is a result of a suggestion from reader ‘Lonfo’ in the recent November open post and I thank him for the idea.

 

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As best I can tell, it appears that around half the Ticonderoga fleet is sitting, rotting, pier side – retired and scrapped in all but name and the Navy has proposed officially retiring 7 Ticonderogas in 2022 with the remainder of the class being retired as quickly after that as the Navy thinks they can get Congress to allow.

 

While the reasonable supposition would be that the Ticonderogas would be replaced by a new cruiser class, the Navy has suggested that a Ticonderoga replacement may be a family of vessels (and UAVs or manned aircraft?) rather than a single ship.  It’s also possible that there may never be a true replacement and that the less capable Burke Flt III may be the semi-replacement. 

 

Beyond vague, speculative articles on the Internet, there’s no real information about a Ticonderoga replacement so let’s speculate using the Navy’s single, vague statement about a family of platforms, the known push by the Navy towards smaller, unmanned vessels, and the Navy’s general desire to move towards unmanned or minimally manned vessels and see where that takes us regarding a Ticonderoga replacement.

Ticonderoga Class Cruiser

 

The key is to recognize the Navy’s driving forces for ship design:

 

Minimal Manning – This not only means manned with a minimal crew but also unmanned.  In other words, the Navy wants to operate platforms with as few people as possible with the Holy Grail being entirely unmanned platforms and an unmanned navy.

 

Cost – The Navy continually attempts to design and build ‘cheap’ ships and continually fails spectacularly.  Despite the constant failure, they still keep trying to achieve ‘cheap’.

 

Numbers – The Navy has a myopic focus on hull numbers – AS LONG AS THEY’RE NEW HULLS – and don’t really care whether those hulls offer any useful combat capability – witness the LCS and Zumwalt.  In an apparent contradiction, the Navy has no interest in maintaining and upgrading older hulls so as to increase numbers – only new hulls matter in the Navy’s eyes.

 

Technology – The Navy is obsessed with new, cutting edge technology which, to them, means artificial intelligence, networking, data, and centralized command and control.  It is vital to note that firepower is not among the valued technology elements.

 

 

So, having considered the driving forces for Navy ship design, what kind of cruiser replacement design does that lead us to?

 

The obvious conclusion is that the Navy will do exactly as they have stated and replace the Ticonderoga class with a family of unmanned or minimally manned vessels.  That being the case, what would a family of cruiser replacements be?

 

To answer that, we have to recognize the functions that the Navy wants a cruiser to perform: 

• AAW
• BMD
• Strike
• ASW

 

With that in mind, what are the ‘breakdowns’ of a cruiser’s functions that could be distributed to a family of platforms?

 

Weapons – This would be a floating VLS barge, in essence;  a missile magazine.

 

Sensors – This would be a dedicated radar platform.  Given the need for endurance on the order of weeks and 24/7 persistence, this has to be a ship.  In concept, the vessel would be a blockhouse with 3-4 radar faces spaced around the structure.  As such, it could be quite small.  The Burke’s radar arrays are contained within an approximate 60 ft square superstructure.  This would lead to a very small vessel even allowing for engine space and other requirements.

 

Command – This would be a small vessel whose purpose is to communicate with, and control, the various components of the cruiser ‘family’.  Thus, this would be a network ship with command functions.

 

Aviation – Aviation facilities, meaning flight deck, hangar, workshops, magazines, etc., are extremely inefficient in the sense that the same function(s) are repeated for every helo-capable ship.  The more logical and cheaper approach would be to condense several aviation facilities into a single ship … a helo/UAV carrier.  This does not have to be, and should not be, a giant amphibious ship like the current LHAs and the like.  Instead, this should be a moderate size vessel whose only function is aviation and would carry around six or so helos and a dozen small to medium size UAVs.

 

We should note that the Navy has already begun the process of producing a large displacement unmanned surface vessel that will essentially be a missile barge – an unmanned mini-arsenal ship.  Several ships are already budgeted.  In addition, the Navy has also begun the process of producing a smaller displacement, unmanned, sensor (ISR) vessel.

 

There you have it.  We can envision four separate unmanned or lightly manned vessels that would make up the family of a cruiser function.  Of course, none of the individual components would be as capable as the function contained within the parent Ticonderoga cruiser.  I really hope someone is gaming this out in a realistic fashion because this is a path that will be difficult to come back from.

 

Initial Ticonderoga Retirement

I get tired of hearing people call for ship designs with 40-50 year service lives and designed in upgradability.  Aside from being an extremely questionable concept, the reality is that the Navy almost always retires perfectly good ships far earlier than their service life limit calls for.  The only exception is carriers and that, only to an extent. 

 

For example, the Ticonderoga class cruisers were designed with a 35 year service life and yet the first five ships of the class were retired barely halfway through their designed lifespan.  The actual service lives are shown in the table below.

 

 

 

Ship	Years at Retirement
CG-47, Ticonderoga	21
CG-48, Yorktown	20
CG-49, Vincennes	20
CG-50, Valley Forge	18
CG-51, Gates	18

 

 

Why were these ships retired?  The Navy has offered numerous explanations with most centering around the ineffectiveness of the twin arm missile launchers and the prohibitive cost to upgrade the ships to VLS.  We’ve already demonstrated the fallacy of the claim that arm launchers are substantially inferior … they’re not (see, “VLS versus Arm Launchers”)!  They’re just as good and, in some circumstances, better than VLS!

 

At the very least, the twin arm launcher Ticonderogas were, and still are, the equal or superior to any other ship in the world.  Does it make sense to have thrown them away?  Even if one believes that VLS is superior, the difference in performance is minimal and nowhere near enough to justify early retirement of five world class ships.

USS Ticonderoga

 

For the sake of further discussion, let’s accept the Navy explanation at face value.  This perfectly illustrates the folly and the degree of self-deception in designing a ship to have a long service life and undergo modernization – it just doesn’t happen!  When the time comes to modernize, the Navy always claims that the ship under consideration is too expensive and obsolete to modernize.  This was true for the Spruance, the Los Angeles, the Perry, the Tarawa, the Ticonceroga, and other classes.  If we know, with near 100% certainty that the ship won’t be upgraded and modernized and will, in fact, be retired early, why do people persist in trying to argue for long design service lives?  Clearly, the rationale - that modernization will occur - is false.

 

ComNavOps has argued for building ships with a 20 year life span.  In this example, two of the five ships didn’t even make it that far!  I guess I need to reduce my goal!

 

Had the Ticonderoga class been designed for a 20 year life, maintenance costs would have been far cheaper since maintenance costs go up with time.  In addition, the mythical modernization would have actually occurred because brand new ships would have been built at the 20 year mark.  New ships … cheaper to operate … it’s a Navy dream come true!

 

Let’s stop deluding ourselves and acknowledge that designing long service lives is pointless, useless, more expensive, and results in a fleet of older, less capable ships.  It is obvious that the Navy has no interest in properly maintaining ships to achieve their full service life and even less interest in performing mid-life modernizations.  The Navy attempted to retire the entire remaining Ticonderoga class early and proposed foregoing the mid-life RCOH for a couple of carriers.  In each case, Congress has slapped the Navy down and yet the Navy keeps trying to early retire its ships.  The Navy uses long service lives as a ‘bait and switch’ tactic to obtain funding from Congress. 

 

Having acknowledged that (admitting a problem is half the battle!), we can then begin a rational force structure design process based on 20-year ship lives and continual, timely modernization (new ships).  The result will be a younger fleet with lower construction costs and significantly lower maintenance and operating costs, as well as a more robust shipbuilding industry thanks to building twice as many ships.

Large Unmanned Surface Vessel Rationale

Why is the Navy pushing so hard for the Large Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV)?  That’s always been a bit of a mystery to me.  I know the Navy has an obsession with minimal manning due to personnel costs but, even so, the push for unmanned ships was puzzling.  Well, Defense News website has made the reasons clear to me and I’d like to share the reasons and my analysis with you.  There are two main reasons: 

• Manning
• VLS Cells

 

Let’s look closer at each reason.

 

Manning – Reduced manning expense has long been the Holy Grail of Navy leadership in an utterly misguided attempt to reduce operating costs and, ultimately, shift that budget money to new ship construction.  The ironic aspect of this drive is that it’s completely unnecessary and the problem, itself, has been deceitfully, almost fraudulently, presented.  The Navy would have us believe that the main portion of a ship’s operating cost is manning and that it is unaffordable.  As we’ve demonstrated, this is pure nonsense (see, “The Manning Myth”) and yet it drives the Navy towards unmanned vessels despite no Concept of Operations, no analysis of alternatives, no fleet exercises to prove the validity of the concept, and no public wargaming to support the concept.

 

 

VLS Cells – While not officially stated in this way, the Navy is, quite literally, replacing 22 Ticonderogas containing 122 VLS cells each with 20 Constellation frigates containing 16-32 VLS cells each in the near future.  Yes, a cruiser (large surface combatant) is supposedly coming sometime down the road but that will be many years from now, if ever, and it has already been described by Navy spokesmen as, potentially, a family of assets rather than an actual, single cruiser size ship so that suggests even more small, unmanned vessels as the Ticonderoga replacement.  In any event, we’ll soon be retiring Ticonderogas, Burkes, and SSGNs and the only replacement surface warship program currently active is the Constellation class frigate.  So, soak that in:  the Constellation frigate is the replacement for the Ticonderoga.  Let’s say it again because I know some of you are going to have a hard time accepting it so here it is again:

 

The Constellation frigate is the replacement for the Ticonderoga.

 

Don’t believe me?  Here’s what former Navy destroyer captain and noted naval analyst Bryan McGrath had to say,

 

… on the horizon there is a situation where we’ll be trading guided missile submarines, cruisers and destroyers for Constellation-class frigates. (1)

 

 

Let’s do the math.  We have 22 Ticonderogas with 122 VLS cells retiring for a total loss of 2,684 cells.  We have 20 replacement frigates with - let’s be generous and use the higher number – 32 VLS cells for a total replacement of 640 cells.  That’s a net loss of 2,044 VLS cells from the fleet.

 

It gets stunningly worse when one factors in the imminent retirement of the Burkes and SSGNs.  By the early 2030’s, the Navy will have retired 22 Ticonderogas, 21 Burkes, 4 SSGNs for a total loss of around 5,500 VLS cells and the only replacement on the books is the Constellation class frigate.(1)

 

What is the Navy’s solution to this looming, gaping VLS cell shortage?  Why, it’s the LUSV which the Navy envisions as being, essentially, a missile barge.

 

The LUSV is supposed to be the Navy’s answer to a troubling problem: How does the service quickly and cheaply field hundreds of new missile tubes to make up for dozens of large-capacity ships due to retire over the coming years? (1)

 

The idea of the LUSV is that unmanned vessels will be cheap enough to be procured in large enough quantities to fill that 2,044 VLS cell gap.  The problem, however, is that the LUSV will not only be replacing VLS cells, it will be replacing the associated sensors, targeting, and fire control systems that are also on the Ticonderogas and Burkes and are necessary for the missiles to function.  The desperate hope is that the Navy’s fantasy-based regional network of sensors can take the place of the retiring Ticonderoga’s sensors and fire control systems and support the unmanned vessels.  However, if the enemy can disrupt our data sharing networks (a distinct possibility, as we’ve discussed many times), the LUSV VLS cells will be useless as they will lack any form of organic sensing, targeting, or fire control.

 

We see, then, that the LUSV missile barge is the salvation that the Navy is grasping at to overcome sustained and stunningly bad force structure planning over the last two decades. 

 

Unfortunately, the Navy’s problems are not limited to the technical aspects of the LUSV.  The Navy also has to contend with a very suspicious Congress.  Congress is most definitely not on board with the Navy’s plan.  After multiple stunning acquisition disasters (LCS, Zumwalt, Ford, and others), Congress has lost faith in the Navy’s integrity and ability to execute an acquisition program.  Regarding the LUSV,

 

… Congress is not convinced the Navy did the proper analysis prior to launching into a technically risky, 2,000-ton robot ship.

 

Before going any further, the Navy must conduct a full study examining alternative approaches for fielding missiles downrange.

 

The LUSV has become a flashpoint for a larger problem: After two decades of high-profile problems with programs such as the littoral combat ship and the Ford-class carrier, Congress’s faith in the Navy to make significant technical leaps without close supervision has all but evaporated …  Furthermore, it is unclear that, even if the Navy managed to make the LUSV related technologies work, it would be the right answer for the missile tube problem. (1)

 

Demonstrating that doubt, Congress slashed funding for the LUSV and placed severe constraints on the program, such as prohibiting the addition of VLS cells to any unmanned ship design.  Congress has also taken note of the Navy’s habitual failure to examine alternatives and has mandated that the Navy conduct a yearlong analysis of alternatives, as noted in the quote above.

 

In the 2021 appropriations and policy bills, lawmakers eviscerated funding for the Navy’s Large Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV) development program and laid in stringent requirements for the Navy to work out nearly every component of the new vessel before moving forward with an acquisition program. In all, lawmakers slashed more than $370 million from the $464 million the Pentagon requested. (1)

 

ComNavOps is not alone in questioning the operating concept (CONOPS) for unmanned vessels.

 

… sources both inside and outside the service, as well as analysts who spoke on the record, agreed the Navy has not come up with a convincing concept of operations for the ship. (1)

 

Summary

 

So, we now understand the rationale behind the Navy’s bizarre and obsessive push towards unmanned vessels despite all their attendant flaws, lack of validity, and high programmatic risk.  It cannot be stressed enough that the VLS cell shortfall is not a problem that suddenly manifested itself overnight, without warning.  The problem is a force structure issue and has been obvious for close to two decades.  The Navy clearly knew the retirement schedules and what that would mean for VLS cell counts.  This is a scathing indictment of Navy leadership over the last two decades.

 

The LUSV is a very high risk program.  Setting aside any ship-specific technical issues, the heart of the concept is the assumption of a 100% reliable, uninterruptible, unshakeable, real time data, sensor, and fire control network.  It is this that the Navy should be focused on, not the unmanned ships.  Until this fantasy network can be proven to work and work in the face of all manner of jamming, disruption, cyber attacks, spoofing, etc. there is no point pursuing LUSV missile barges.  Without the network, the missile barges will be just barges.

 

 

 

 

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(1)Defense News website, “Unclear on unmanned: The US Navy’s plans for robot ships are on the rocks”, Part 1, David B. Larter, 10-Jan-2020,

https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/surface-navy-association/2021/01/10/unclear-on-unmanned-the-us-navys-plans-for-robot-ships-are-on-the-rocks/

Chinese Type 055 Update

China’s Type 055 destroyer (cruiser, actually) is intended to be a functional equivalent to the US Ticonderoga class Aegis cruiser.  The 055 just made its international debut at a Chinese naval parade. (1)

From China Defense Blog, a second Type 055 was launched in April 2018 and a third and fourth were launched in July 2018. (1)  Two others are known to be under construction.  That’s five Aegis-equivalent ships in a very short period while China continues to build other destroyers, frigates, and corvettes, as well.

What is the US building?  More outdated Burkes.  There are seven Burkes scheduled for commissioning over the next five years.  That’s an average of just more than one per year.  China is building surface warships at two or three times the rate we are.

Let’s take a look at the profile view of the Type 055.

Type 055 Class (Credit Ref 2)

The profile emphasizes not only the stealth shaping of the ship but also a low and greatly reduced superstructure – something ComNavOps heartily approves of in ship design.  In addition to the lower radar signature, the smaller superstructure provides less of a target and makes for a smaller visual signature.  Recall how our Gato fleet submarines in WWII underwent drastic sail reductions to reduce their visual signatures? 

Now, compare the 055 profile to a Ticonderoga class Aegis cruiser profile.

Ticonderoga Class

Note the gigantic, blocky superstructure.  There’s nothing stealthy about that!  To be fair, the Type 055 is a brand new design and the Ticonderoga design dates back to the late 1970’s, long before stealth was a design consideration.  The Ticonderoga superstructure also makes for a very unstable, top heavy ship.

How about we do a quick visual comparison of the 055 to our newest surface warship, the Burke class?

Burke Class

We see that the Burke has some degree of stealth shaping but it pales in comparison to the Type 055.  Note the Burke’s large superstructure and great deal of exposed equipment, all of which detracts from the ship’s stealth.  Again, the Burke design dates back to the early 1980’s when stealth was in its infancy, so this is somewhat understandable.  However, that begs the question, why are we still building them?

There’s nothing terribly profound about this post – just a quick update and scan of the Type 055.

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(1)China Defense Blog, “China debuts most powerful destroyer in celebrations”, 25-Apr-2019,

http://china-defense.blogspot.com/2019/04/china-debuts-most-powerful-destroyer-in.html

(2)China Defense Blog, “DDG 101”, 25-Apr-2019,

http://china-defense.blogspot.com/2019/04/ddg-101.html

Ticonderoga Class Modernization

As you know, the Navy has been attempting to early retire the Ticonderoga class cruisers for several years now.  They’ve put forth various plans and Congress has repeatedly slapped them down.  That hasn’t stopped the Navy from scheming to achieve the desired retirements.  It’s only made the Navy more creative and devious about how they go about it. 

After the last attempt at hidden retirements, Congress forced the Navy to adopt the ‘2/4/6’ plan which called for 2 cruisers per year to enter a ‘modernization’ program, 4 years to complete the modernization, and a maximum of 6 cruisers in modernization at one time.

It’s important to understand that this program results in a permanent reduction in the number of cruisers by 6 since the modernized cruisers will re-enter the fleet only as one-for-one replacements for retiring cruisers.  Thus, the Navy got what they wanted, at least partially.

So, what’s the current status of the ‘modernization’ program?  Surprisingly, it’s very difficult to get information.

Here’s the list of cruisers inducted into the modernization program, thus far:

2015 

USS Cowpens (CG-63)

USS Gettysburg (CG- 64)

2016  

USS Vicksburg (CG- 69)

USS Chosin (CG- 65)

2017  

USS Anzio (CG-68)

USS Cape St. George (CG- 71)

Now, in 2019, it’s been 4 years and the first two cruisers should be coming out of modernization.  According to Navy Recognition website, the Gettysburg is being prepared to re-enter the fleet in March 2020 under a $150M contract with BAE Systems in Norfolk.  Gettysburg will be replacing the Bunker Hill (CG-52), scheduled to retire in 2020.

Starting in January 2019, the Gettysburg will undergo extensive repair and upgrade work that will return the ship to full capability after nearly four years of inactive status under the Navy’s cruiser modernization program. (1)

The key point, here, is that the cruiser has NOT been undergoing continuous modernization since entering the modernization program in 2105, as you might reasonably suppose.  Instead, it has been sitting idle in inactive status.  Most people do not realize this aspect of the ‘modernization’ program.  The program is really a way for the Navy to idle cruisers for several years and then bring them back when another cruiser is retired – thus, an effective permanent decrease in the cruiser fleet size.

USS Gettysburg Sitting Inactive While Undergoing "Modernization"

One might also note that the 4 year limit is being violated by some months.

It is also unclear exactly what is being modernized.  The Navy claims the usual mishmash of vague improvement lists such as,

… installation of a new Aegis combat system, new communications suite and the Consolidated Afloat Network Enterprise Systems (CANES); and renovate the crew’s living spaces aboard the 27-year-old ship. (1)

It’s unclear, though, just how much improvement in combat capability will occur.  For example, the ‘new Aegis combat system’ is, as best I can determine, just a software upgrade and could have been done, pierside, at any time without a 4 year ‘modernization’ program.  Crew living space improvements have nothing to do with combat capability.  CANES appears to be a consolidation of existing networks – nice, but not a direct combat enhancement.

It’s also interesting to note the cost of the modernization.  At $150M, this is not a very extensive modernization by today’s cost standards. 

Given the limited scope of the modernization and the moderate cost, one can’t help but ask, ‘why did it require 4 years?’.  Well, as you now see, it didn’t.  The first three years were spent in inactive, idle status.  The actual work only requires a year and that’s probably stretching things out a bit.  The real purpose of the program was to idle as many cruisers as Congress would allow for as long as Congress would allow.  We’re trying to grow the fleet to 355 ships or so and yet we’re idling the most capable cruisers in the world.  Hmm …

Here’s the retirement schedule (3):

2020 

USS Mobile Bay (CG-53)

USS Bunker Hill (CG- 52)

2021  

USS Antietam (CG- 54)

USS Leyte Gulf (CG- 55)

2022  

USS San Jacinto (CG-56)

USS Lake Champlain (CG- 57)

2024

USS Philippine Sea (CG-58)

USS Princeton (CG-59)

2025

USS Normandy (CG-60)

USS Monterey (CG-61)

2026

USS Chancellorsville (CG-62)

Just recently, the Navy has, apparently, indicated its intention to cancel the cruiser modernization program:

The FY 2020 budget request also notes the Navy’s intention to cancel a planned cruiser modernization and life-extension program – which the service has asked to do previously and Congress would not agree to. (2)

What the Navy intends to do at that point is unknown.  We’ll have to wait and see Congress’ reaction to the Navy’s new plan but it’s unlikely to be positive.

In summary, the ‘modernization’ program was clearly a fraud intended to idle cruisers and, in that regard, the Navy has partially succeeded in bypassing Congress’ intent.  Where the program goes from here remains to be seen.




Update Jan-2020:  BAE Systems has been awarded a $175M contract to modernize USS Vicksburg's gas turbine propulsion system, restore crew habitability spaces, and support the installation of a new Aegis combat system, communication suite and CANES (Consolidated Afloat Network Enterprise System). Work is expected to be completed in July 2021.  Again, this violates the 2-4-6 Congressional mandate by several months to a year.  Vicksburg has been sitting idle since 2016 rather than undergoing modernization as the Navy claimed.  This was, clearly, a means for the Navy to idle cruisers rather than actually modernize them.  The described modernization contains very little in the way of direct combat capability improvements.

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(1)Navy Recognition website, “BAE Systems to Modernize U.S. Navy Tico-class Cruiser USS Gettysburg“, 27-Aug-2018,

http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2018/august-2018-navy-naval-defense-news/6458-bae-systems-to-modernize-u-s-navy-tico-class-cruiser-uss-gettysburg.html

(2)USNI News website, “Large Surface Combatant Program Delayed Amid Pivot Towards Unmanned, Other Emerging Tech”, Megan Eckstein, 13-Mar-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/03/13/large-surface-combatant-program-delayed-amid-pivot-towards-unmanned-other-emerging-tech

(3)Defense News website, “The US Navy will start losing its largest surface combatants in 2020”, David B. Larter, 8-Oct-2017,

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2017/10/09/the-us-navy-will-start-losing-its-largest-surface-combatants-in-2020/

Aegis Cruiser Retirement Schedule

As you know, the Navy has tried for several years to eliminate the Ticonderoga class Aegis cruisers before their service life is even up.  The reason for this is a baffling mystery other than the Navy’s constant fixation on new hulls, no matter how useless (looking at you, LCS).

Congress has, thus far, thwarted the Navy’s efforts which has led the Navy to concoct a scheme of de facto retirements whereby Aegis cruisers are placed into “modernization” for multiple years and will only be brought back into the fleet on a one-for-one replacement for decommissioned cruisers.

Here is the retirement schedule for the Aegis cruisers and their service length at that point. (1)

Year      Ship                           Service Yrs

2020  Mobile Bay         33

2020  Bunker Hill        34

2021  Antietam           34

2021  Leyte Gulf         34

2022  San Jacinto        34

2022  Lake Champlain     34

2024  Philippine Sea     35

2024  Princeton          35

2025  Normandy           36

2025  Monterey           35

2026  Chancellorsville   37

You’ll note that the service life retirement ages do not agree with the recent ship service life extensions that have the Ticonderogas serving 42-52 years!  I guess we’ll ignore that little inconsistency since the service life extensions were nothing but wishful thinking anyway.

This accounts for 11 of the 22 Aegis cruisers.  The remainder will have undergone the “modernization” and displace the ships listed above.  Presumably, after 2026 the “modernized” cruisers will be retired in short order.  This is not at all what Congress intended.  Once again, the Navy has found a way around Congressional intent and direction.

The Navy is continuing to push to put around half the class into a reduced operating status but Congress’ earlier resistance and distrust continues.  Recall Congress’ earlier feelings,

Lawmakers made clear in hearings last year that they didn’t trust Navy leadership to bring the ships back into the fleet once they were taken out of service, particularly in bulk quantities. (2)

For the time being, the 2/4/6 plan remains in effect

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(1)Defense News website, “The US Navy will start losing its largest surface combatants in 2020”, David B. Larter, 8-Oct-2017,

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2017/10/09/the-us-navy-will-start-losing-its-largest-surface-combatants-in-2020/

(2)USNI News website, “FY 2017 Budget: Navy Wants to Modernize Last 7 Cruisers Instead of Following 2/4/6 Directive from Congress”, Megan Eckstein, 9-Feb-2016,

https://news.usni.org/2016/02/09/fy-2017-budget-navy-wants-to-modernize-last-7-cruisers-instead-of-following-246-directive-from-congress

Still Trying To Retire Cruisers

The Navy is at it again.  You’ll  recall that the Navy attempted to retire 11 of the 22 ship Aegis cruiser force under the guise of “idling” them while slowly modernizing them and then eventually bringing them back into the fleet as one-for-one replacements for retiring cruisers.  [See, “Idled Cruisers” and “Idled Cruisers – Update”]  Of course, ComNavOps pointed out that if you remove half the cruiser fleet and then bring them back on a one-for-one replacement basis you will have effectively retired 11 of the 22 cruisers since, in one fell swoop, the cruiser force would be reduced from 22 to 11 and never rise above that number again.

Of course, that was the best case plan.  More realistically, the “idled” cruisers would never sail again.  Can you really see the Navy following through, several years from now, on modernizing ships that are even older at that point?  Of course not!  Once idled, these ships are done.  The operating costs disappear, crews vanish, money is saved, and new construction is assured.

Why, you ask, would the Navy conceivably want to early retire the most powerful warships in the world, some with BMD capability already, all with potential BMD capability, and all with many years of service life left?  The answer is two-fold:

1. As we just discussed, saving money for new construction.
2. Eliminating a potential and very viable alternative to the Burke Flt III which, if exercised, would threaten new Burke Flt III construction funding.  This was the same tactic used when the Spruance class was literally sunk to prevent competition between the Spruance/NTU and the, then, new Aegis system.  The Navy also did the same thing by neutering and retiring the Perrys to avoid competition with the LCS.

In any event, Congress didn’t believe the Navy’s “modernization” plan any more than ComNavOps did and they legislated that the Navy continue to operate the cruisers.  Then, when the Navy continued to try to back-door Congress, passed the 2/4/6 law which limited the Navy to 2 “idles” per year, mandated that the modernizations be completed in 4 years, and only allowed a maximum of 6 cruiser to be “idled” at a time.

So much for the history of this.

Undeterred, the Navy is once again attempting to retire 11 cruisers (1) in one stroke.  This time, recognizing Congress’ distrust, the Navy has offered (is insisting, actually) to have Congress write legislation mandating the return of the modernized cruisers to the fleet.  That way, the Navy claims, they can’t renege on the plan and retire the cruisers.

How dumb does the Navy think we are?  This is just a rehash of the original attempt whereby half the cruiser force would be idled for an extended period and then returned to the fleet on a one-for-one basis to replace retiring cruisers.  It still results in 11 cruisers being dropped from the force, permanently.  The article also makes it crystal clear that the Navy recognizes and publicly acknowledges that Congress does not trust them.  As I’ve said, the Navy has squandered whatever good will they ever had with Congress.  Now, though, they’re in the process of squandering their intellectual credibility.

At a time when the Navy is claiming to want to build the fleet up to 300+ ships, claiming that BMD is one of, if not the top, priorities, and is supposedly preparing for a Pacific Pivot and potential confrontation with China, how can the Navy possibly retire 11 of the most powerful warships on earth and replace them, numerically, with LCSs?  Honestly, if China could slip an agent into the Secretary of the Navy’s job with instructions to weaken the US fleet, they couldn’t do it better than this.

This latest attempt demonstrates, yet again, the Navy’s blatant disregard for Congressional wishes and highlights the absolute insanity that is now passing for leadership in the Navy.

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USNI, “WEST: Navy Wants Congressional Mandate Preventing Decommissioning Modernized Cruisers”, Megan Eckstein, February 18, 2016,

http://news.usni.org/2016/02/18/west-navy-wants-congressional-mandate-preventing-decommissioning-modernized-cruisers

Navy Again Trying To Retire Aegis Cruisers

ComNavOps is highly critical of Navy leadership but one thing I have to give them credit for is their sheer refusal to accept legislative direction.  Now, when I say that I give them credit, it’s akin to giving a bank robber credit for pulling off a successful robbery – it’s against the law but they showed determination in flouting the law.  Similarly, the Navy doesn’t even blink at Congressional mandates and things as silly as actual laws.

You’ll recall that the Navy previously tried to early retire several Ticonderoga class Aegis cruisers and Congress slapped them down.  Undeterred, the Navy then opted for the completely transparent ploy of “idling” the cruisers for “upgrades”.  Eleven cruisers were to be “modernized” for several years and then would re-enter the fleet.  No one, Congress included, bought that fairy tale.  Instead, Congress imposed a 2/4/6 rule whereby the Navy could only idle 2 cruisers per year, the modernization had to be completed in 4 years, and there could be no more than 6 cruisers undergoing modernization at one time.

Now, the Navy wants to retire modernize 7 additional cruisers for a total of 9.  The cruisers would be idled for an unspecified period of time and be brought back into the fleet only on a one for one basis to replace retiring cruisers (1). 

Aside from ignoring Congress’ legislative directive, that would have the effect of early retiring 9 cruisers since they would only return to the fleet as replacements for future cruiser retirements.  Of course, that assumes you believe the Navy would actually bring them back.  Can you seriously see the Navy bringing back ships that, at that future point, would be ten or fifteen years older?  Of course not!  The Navy will argue that the ships are outdated and should just be left idled.  This is nothing but another transparent early retirement ploy designed to bypass Congress’ law and intent.

It doesn’t matter whether you believe early retirements for the cruisers is a good idea or bad.  The point is that the military is run by the civilian government.  That’s what makes our country unique.  The Navy’s willful disregard for civilian authority is breathtaking.  This is just one more reason Navy leadership needs a wholesale housecleaning.  Fire them all.

(1)http://news.usni.org/2016/02/09/fy-2017-budget-navy-wants-to-modernize-last-7-cruisers-instead-of-following-246-directive-from-congress

Alternate Ticonderoga Roles

The Navy has tried repeatedly to early retire the Ticonderoga class Aegis cruisers, the most capable warships on the planet.  Setting aside the lunacy of that intent, let’s assume that the Navy succeeds in its quest – ultimately, they always do.  Is there a secondary role that “retired” Ticos could serve in?

Well, here’s a few fun speculations about secondary roles.  Note that for most or all of these roles, the non-specified functions and capabilities would be removed and the crew size proportionally reduced.  Thus, the Aegis system, sonar, helos, etc. would likely be removed.  If desired, some simple sheet metal structural work could slant some of the superstructure that remains to add a degree of stealth.  The degree obtainable might or might not justify the effort and cost.

AAW Barge – The Ticos could simply be filled with AAW missiles, have all other functions stripped out, be minimally manned, and provide an AAW missile inventory for other shooters.

Amphibious Assault Gun Ship – Removing the VLS cells would allow room for additional guns and magazines.  It ought to be possible to raise the ship’s gun total to around five 5” guns.  That would represent a vast improvement over what we have now in the way of gun support.  Helos would be replaced by a sizable short range UAV complement for gunfire spotting and surveillance.

Surveillance UAV Carrier – If the flight deck were expanded and the helos deleted, the ship could make an excellent UAV carrier for conducting surveillance.  The ship already has fairly extensive command, control, intel, and surveillance capabilities.  It would be easy to blend in UAV operations.

Arsenal Ship – The VLS cells could be dedicated to cruise missiles.  In fact, the guns could be removed and additional cells added. 

Whether any of these options would make the perfect platform for the described role is not the issue.  The issue is that the Navy is trying desperately to early retire the ships and these concepts represent possible ways to extract more useful life from the class.  Do you have any ideas of your own?

A2/AD Combat

The May issue of Proceedings has an interesting article about using an Arsenal Ship as a means of breaching an A2/AD zone (1).  The author’s contention is that an Arsenal Ship represents a survivable concentration of firepower which is necessary to breach an A2/AD zone.  One of the author’s underlying premises is the need to,

“… provide a precise, persistent, and continuous volume of fire directed at the enemy’s command-and-control (C2), communications nodes, and long- and mid-range weapon systems.”

This is a reasonable requirement and ties in with other, related philosophies such as the best defense is a good offense (attack the launch sites and weapons rather than defend against the launched weapons), attack the supporting bases, etc.  The key in any of these related concepts is the need for very long range, survivable weapons or, conversely, the means to deliver shorter range weapons in a survivable manner.

Setting aside actual strategies and operational plans, let’s look a bit closer at the Navy’s ability to deliver weapons through or across a sizable A2/AD zone (a thousand miles or so).

Currently, the Tomahawk missile is the only Navy weapon with sufficient range for A2/AD penetration.

The Navy surface force has the ability to launch Tomahawk missiles with thousand mile range from surface ships.  Burke and Ticonderoga class vessels can carry around 100 vertical launch missiles (VLS cells).  That’s potentially a lot of strike power.  Given the Navy’s current practice of three Burke/Tico escorts per carrier strike group, that equates to 300 missiles.  However, the Navy’s top priority will always be defense of the carrier so the escort ships will be heavily weighted towards AAW missiles rather than strike.  For sake of discussion, let’s speculate that an escort ship would contain 80% AAW and 20% strike.  That means that the 300 missiles carried by the escorts would be 240 AAW and 60 strike.  While not an insignificant amount, 60 missiles from an entire carrier group is not much of an impact against the entire mainland “target” of an enemy with a sizable A2/AD zone (oh come on, we’re talking about China, right?).  Attacking China with 60 missiles won’t make much of a dent in their defenses.

Surface ship strikes are also problematic in that they carry a higher degree of risk to the launching vessel and the launch locations are reasonably predictable.

The subsurface force also has Tomahawk launch capability.  Virginia class SSNs carry 12 or 40 Tomahawk vertical launch missiles, depending on version.  In addition, the legacy SSGNs carry 154 Tomahawks and the later Los Angeles class SSNs carry 12.

Submarine launched missiles offer the greatest degree of stealth.  Subs are very difficult to detect even after having announced their presence via the “flaming data point” of launch.  Unless the sub launches in the close vicinity of ASW forces, by the time appropriate forces can arrive at the launch location the sub will be sufficiently far away to make detection an enormous challenge.  Of course, the first island chain geography dictates somewhat predictable points of entry into the area and offers the possibility of sub traps and enemy SOSUS-like detection arrays.  Still, subs are a very survivable means of delivering volumes of missiles.

The drawback to both surface and sub launched missiles is that, once expended, the ships must return to port to reload.  Thus, a sizable pulse of firepower could be generated but a high volume sustained attack scenario would be extremely challenging or impossible.

Of course, we fight jointly and the Air Force can offer long range, deep penetrating strike capabilities on a regular and frequent basis though at great risk and attrition will likely render such a contribution ineffective in fairly short order.  A force of 19 or 20 B-2 bombers simply cannot operate for long.  Combat attrition combined with simple mechanical failure would render the force too small to be operationally effective in a fairly short period.  The 100 B-1 bombers offer a more robust capability numerically but their ability to conduct and survive deep penetration A2/AD missions is questionable.

We see then that the Navy’s ability to apply large volume firepower across a sizable A2/AD zone is marginal.  This leads to several conclusions.  The most obvious conclusion is that the Navy needs more, and preferably longer ranged, missiles.  In addition, the Navy needs to examine its strategy and operational planning for A2/AD combat.  If we can’t effectively generate much more than a single pulse of firepower then we need to ensure that we have plans to take maximum advantage of that pulse.  Finally, we need to closely examine the potential for complementary actions between the Air Force and Navy.  We’ve covered this in previous posts.  It may be that the best use of the carrier strike group is to establish corridors of local aerial superiority for the Air Force bombers to use.  This, in turn, dictates the development of a certain type of naval fighter – one not exemplified by the F-35, unfortunately.

Returning to the article, the author advocates the development and use of the Arsenal Ship as a means of increasing the long range firepower of the Navy.  That's certainly an option and I leave it to the reader to check out the article and evaluate the author's proposal.

In summary, it is clear that we currently lack the required weapons and platforms to counter a sizable and effective A2/AD zone and operate within it.  The Navy needs to look much closer at how to attack an A2/AD zone, develop operational plans, acquire more and longer ranged weapons, and begin developing and training the required tactics (multi-carrier strike groups, for instance).

(1)USNI Proceedings, “Breaking the Anti-Access Wall”, Capt. Sam Tangredi, USN(Ret.), May 2015