Wednesday, March 10, 2021

Initial Ticonderoga Retirement

I get tired of hearing people call for ship designs with 40-50 year service lives and designed in upgradability.  Aside from being an extremely questionable concept, the reality is that the Navy almost always retires perfectly good ships far earlier than their service life limit calls for.  The only exception is carriers and that, only to an extent. 

 

For example, the Ticonderoga class cruisers were designed with a 35 year service life and yet the first five ships of the class were retired barely halfway through their designed lifespan.  The actual service lives are shown in the table below.

 

 

 

Ship

Years at Retirement

CG-47, Ticonderoga

21

CG-48, Yorktown

20

CG-49, Vincennes

20

CG-50, Valley Forge

18

CG-51, Gates

18

 

 

Why were these ships retired?  The Navy has offered numerous explanations with most centering around the ineffectiveness of the twin arm missile launchers and the prohibitive cost to upgrade the ships to VLS.  We’ve already demonstrated the fallacy of the claim that arm launchers are substantially inferior … they’re not (see, “VLS versus Arm Launchers”)!  They’re just as good and, in some circumstances, better than VLS!

 

At the very least, the twin arm launcher Ticonderogas were, and still are, the equal or superior to any other ship in the world.  Does it make sense to have thrown them away?  Even if one believes that VLS is superior, the difference in performance is minimal and nowhere near enough to justify early retirement of five world class ships.


USS Ticonderoga

 

For the sake of further discussion, let’s accept the Navy explanation at face value.  This perfectly illustrates the folly and the degree of self-deception in designing a ship to have a long service life and undergo modernization – it just doesn’t happen!  When the time comes to modernize, the Navy always claims that the ship under consideration is too expensive and obsolete to modernize.  This was true for the Spruance, the Los Angeles, the Perry, the Tarawa, the Ticonceroga, and other classes.  If we know, with near 100% certainty that the ship won’t be upgraded and modernized and will, in fact, be retired early, why do people persist in trying to argue for long design service lives?  Clearly, the rationale - that modernization will occur - is false.

 

ComNavOps has argued for building ships with a 20 year life span.  In this example, two of the five ships didn’t even make it that far!  I guess I need to reduce my goal!

 

Had the Ticonderoga class been designed for a 20 year life, maintenance costs would have been far cheaper since maintenance costs go up with time.  In addition, the mythical modernization would have actually occurred because brand new ships would have been built at the 20 year mark.  New ships … cheaper to operate … it’s a Navy dream come true!

 

Let’s stop deluding ourselves and acknowledge that designing long service lives is pointless, useless, more expensive, and results in a fleet of older, less capable ships.  It is obvious that the Navy has no interest in properly maintaining ships to achieve their full service life and even less interest in performing mid-life modernizations.  The Navy attempted to retire the entire remaining Ticonderoga class early and proposed foregoing the mid-life RCOH for a couple of carriers.  In each case, Congress has slapped the Navy down and yet the Navy keeps trying to early retire its ships.  The Navy uses long service lives as a ‘bait and switch’ tactic to obtain funding from Congress. 

 

Having acknowledged that (admitting a problem is half the battle!), we can then begin a rational force structure design process based on 20-year ship lives and continual, timely modernization (new ships).  The result will be a younger fleet with lower construction costs and significantly lower maintenance and operating costs, as well as a more robust shipbuilding industry thanks to building twice as many ships.


125 comments:

  1. "They’re just as good and, in some circumstances, better than VLS!"

    Something missing on your your thread about VLS vs arm launchers : wouldn't it be possible to armor the top closure VLS launchers, which obviously isnt for the Mark 26 ?

    D614-D623


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    1. "armor the top closure VLS launchers"

      I don't know. It would make the hatches very heavy and very difficult to open. Maybe too heavy? I just don't know.

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  2. You said it yourself -- ships are retired SOLELY to justify NEW SPENDING and NEW CONTRACTS. It DOESN'T MATTER if the new ships are worse than what is being retired. Relative to "upgradability", you've seen on your site many times where you, or someone else, says that they don't like the Fincantieri FFG(X) because "it is NOT big enough to upgrade" or "it can't accept large amounts of extra weight in the future" when they actually mean "it was not invented here".

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    1. "someone else, says that they don't like the Fincantieri FFG(X) because 'it is NOT big enough to upgrade' or 'it can't accept large amounts of extra weight in the future'"

      By putting AEGIS on it, we added a lot of high weight. This brings me to a question that has concerned me for a long time. We seem to like a lot of high weight--superstructure, etc.--in our ship designs. Maybe we could look at distributing a bunch of weight lower in the ship.

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    2. Look at the Japanese Maya vs Burke. Radar higher up. CEC higher up, their SEWIP higher up. Rear VLS higher up. Helo deck and hangar higher up. They remembered steel is cheap. Same capability, bigger ship. About the same building times and cost vs a Flight IIA.

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    3. @ CDR Chip - Thought most of the top weight was in the SPY-6 radar with its heavier new gen TRMs panel antenna arrays, Constellation has only three small panel arrays, nine modules (24 TRMs each) 2'x2' each, 108 sq ft in total whereas Burke Flt III has four 37 modules per panel, total 592 sq ft. Constellation SPY-6 only 18% size/weight of Burke Flt III SPY-6 and yet its 75% size of a Burke Flt III.

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    4. "By putting AEGIS on it, we added a lot of high weight."

      You keep talking about Aegis and weight on the Constellation. The radar unit is the SPY-6 (Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar, EASR) which is made of Radar Module Assemblies (RMA). Each RMA is 2'x2'x2'. The frigate capabilities graphic lists the radar as '3x3x3 fixed face EASR' which I interpret to mean three 3-RMA x 3-RMA arrays. That would make each array 6'x6'. I don't know the weight but it seems quite small. By comparison, the Burke Flt III would, ideally have a 24' square array, or so (I don't recall the exact size) so the Constellation is quite a bit smaller. I'm not seeing any great weight issue. What is your concern? Are you confusing the SPY-6 with the SPY-1?

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    5. I think the Norwegians use the 8' SPY-1 high up. Keep in mind that behind those RMAs is a whole lot of cooling capacity. If you look at the rotating array which is the size of 1 of the EASR fixed panels, its really big compared to a TRS-3/4D, Sea Giraffe, SPQ-9B etc. Trying to swap to that rotator on a small ship like LCS, OPC, or NSC would take some work. Its easy for LPD and LHA where it is planned to go.

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    6. My understanding of the scalable/building block SPY-6 radar made up of 2'x2'x2' RMAs each with 24 GaN transmit/receive modules, my assumption is that each RMA is an individual radar that that can work individually or in combination as required for range and discrimination

      AN/SPY-6(V)1 for Burke Flt III, with four flat panel antennas, each panel contains 37 RMAs, radar module assembly, total 148 RMAs, 592 sq ft arrays, Raytheon claims it has 100x the sensitivity of the SPY-1

      AN/SPY-6(V)2 /EASR for the large amphibs, upgrades for Nimitz class, a singe rotating flat panel array with 9 RMAs, 36 sq ft

      AN/SPY-6(V)3: for CVN-79+ and Constellation, using same flat panel as the (V)2 but three fixed panels, 27 RMAs, 108 sq ft, Raytheon claims same sensitivity as SPY-1

      AN/SPY-6(V)4 proposed as an upgrade Burke Flt IIA replacing SPY-1, with four fixed panels with 24 RMAs each, total 96 RMAs, 384 sq ft.

      PB FY2021 Navy Justification, Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy shows costs as Burke Flight III - SPY-6 (V)1 $169.2 million, Amphib SPY-6(V)2 - $35.0 million and Constellation SPY-6(V)3 $59.2 million

      Navy stated that radar sensitivity scales as a cube of the size of the radar aperture, and while improvements can be made to the T/R modules said this is a linear not cubic relationship.

      Naval News "NAVSEA replied to the question on if the Zumwalts will receive new SPY radars and sensors [replacing the newish SPY-3] : “The Navy is exploring several alternatives to sustain air and surface search capability aboard the Zumwalt-class ships but no decision has been made at this time.”

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  3. Starting to warm up to 20 year and retire warships. I figure if you start from scratch with that in mind, you probably would design, produce and operate a somewhat different warship.

    ROLLS ROYCE a fews ago did an internal study with only some details released about impact on jet engines with high oil prices/high kerosene prices, it made some noise inside aerospace industry as what seemed like for ever fixed design and production wasn't TRUE! At elevated prices, you would start to design, produce and maintain engines differently. My guess is if USN would start from scratch with this idea of only 20 years and chuck it, my bet is you would come up with a different warship.

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    1. " start from scratch with this idea of only 20 years"

      For starters, you wouldn't design in extra space for future upgrades and additions. That would save money and make the ship slightly smaller.

      You wouldn't over-spec engines and generators for future electrical needs. You'd just design for the immediate needs. That would save a chunk of money.

      You might not need to design access to some equipment, like tanks, because you wouldn't need to replace them in the 20 yr time frame.

      And so on.

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  4. Navy has presented DDG(X), also known as the Future Large Surface Combatant program, to Congress:

    https://news.usni.org/2021/02/16/report-to-congress-on-ddgx

    It is still in early stage. Nevertheless, we know it is a large surface combat ship which is likely to replace retiring Ticonderoga. Navy has not finalize detailed spec. of DDG(X) but there are many guesses in media.

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  5. Cant agree with this enough!!! As an added perk, 20yr old ships could be mothballed, and be much more current, viable assets worthy of being reactivated. The Reserve Fleet is somthing that needs to become a credible option again...

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  6. While a battle ship is designed, room for upgrade frequently haunt designers. If you leave large amount of displacement for future upgrade, people would say that you are not fully explored its potential and waste of XXX.

    Twin arm missile launchers are much slower than VLS in firing large number of missiles due to re-loading times. While face saturated air and missile attacks, you need to fire lots of missiles in short time still no guarantee your ship is safe -- if enemy can simply dump more missiles (old Soviet Union thought). Of course, if enemy's missiles are more capable than your intercept system, then, you deserve ... Yes, technology matters.

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    1. "Twin arm missile launchers are much slower than VLS"

      Incorrect. Read the linked post regarding that topic.

      "you need to fire lots of missiles in short time "

      No, you need to launch missiles that can be EFFECTIVELY controlled and utilized. There is a reason the Navy uses shoot-shoot-look type sequences rather than just shooting everything at once. You need to familiarize yourself with engagement scenarios and methodology. Review the archives for lots of information on the topic.

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    2. As I read, Soviet Union's saturate attack aimed on US ships which cannot fire missiles fast enough. I need to clarify that I didn't mean to shoot 96 missiles out in one go. Even an enemy won't fire 100 missiles in one go. However, as 10 missiles come in a short period, twin arm cannot handle as loading is too slow. Ironically, VLS was first developed by Soviet Union.

      Today, not just US, other nations' modern ships also equip VLS. China's type 055 has cell size larger than US MK41 and can perform both hot (US style) and cold (Soviet style) launch. S. Korea, Japan, Israel, ... all use VLS in their new surface combat ships.

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    3. Again, I encourage you to study engagement methods to gain a better understanding. Please make use of the archives!

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  7. ComNavOps, I think you nailed the problem. The Navy states up front that a ship will last some unreasonably long time in order to get budgetary approval, and then cuts that time short in order to get budgetary approval for its replacement. Some admirals need to be fired for dishonesty. They should have their feet held to the fire to make ships last as long as they proposed when asking for money to build them (except the LCSs, they could be SINKEXed tomorrow).

    The problem I see with 20-year lives is this. Fleet size is a direct result of a) shipbuilding budget, b) cost per ship, and c) ship life. Shipbuilding budget divided by cost per ship equals number of ships per year. Number of ships per year times ship life equals number of ships that can be in the fleet. The math is very unforgiving. The shorter the lives, the smaller the Navy, unless we can change one of the other two variables.

    The current Navy 355-ship plan has been priced out by CBO at $2.8B/ship. That means that the current Navy shipbuilding budget of $20-22B/year builds 7.5 ships a year, and a 20-year ship life yields a 150-ship Navy. I think that is scarily close to happening.

    Say you want a 400-ship Navy. To maintain that size with 20-year lives requires building 20 new ships per year (400/20). At current Navy shipbuilding budget levels, that means that either a) your average warship would have to cost $1-1.1B, or b) you would need to convince congress to spend a lot more on ship construction. $1 billion per ship is well less than the average cost of the Burkes, not to mention way, way less than the average cost of CVNs, SSBNs, SSGNs, SSNs, and LHAs/LHDs. You could build a fleet of LCSs for that (and they may not last even 20 years), but what good would that do you? Or you could build a few CVNs, a few SSBNs, a few SSGNs, a few SSNs, and a bunch of war canoes, but what good would that do you? I know you believe that we can get ships built cheaper, and I agree we should, but how much cheaper?

    If you constrain ship life to 20 years, how do you propose to build a reasonable fleet within the constraints imposed by congressional budgeting, or alternatively how do you propose to change congress's mind to give you a lot more money? Looking at it another way, 20 years of $20-22B/year is, say, $420B. How many ships, and of what type, can you fit under a $420B cost ceiling, given that CBO says the proposed 355-ship fleet will cost more than twice that ($865B)? Using CBO numbers, 12 Fords would be $156B, 12 Columbias would be $90B, and 29 Virginia VPMs would be $90B. At that point you have 53 ships and you have $84B left. How do you make that work? If you build Nimitzes instead of Fords, you save $48B, leaving $132B, but what does 53 ships and $132B get you?

    If we assume congress isn’t going to give us more to spend, then the only variables we have to work with are cost/ship and service life. If we use a high/low approach to 1) build some carriers (mix of Nimitzes and conventional CVs, can't be Fords) and some SSBNs/SSGNs/SSNs, 2) flesh out the numbers with cheaper surface escorts and amphibious ships and true littoral combatants, 3) get the average cost/ship down to $1.5B in so doing, and 4) enforce 30-year lives, then we can build 14 ships/year and support a 420-ship navy (21/1.5 x 30). You can play around with those numbers any way you like, but short of a complete political upheaval in congress, I think that’s about as close to a “sweet spot” as we are going to be able to get.

    To be clear, I agree with you on the problem. I just don’t know how you put together a fleet that can take on China or Russia with the money congress is going to give you to spend. The real fear I have is that the early disposition problem is going to destroy what’s left of our Navy in about 20 years.

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    1. "If you constrain ship life to 20 years, how do you propose to build a reasonable fleet"

      You already know my answer. We need to stop building giant, do-everything ships and start building smaller, single function ships. There's your math. Hugely cheaper ships built far more often. As the frequency and number of new ships increases, overhead will be spread across many more ships thereby lowering costs/ship (more math … I love it!) and spreading the work around to more shipyards which increases opportunity, strengthens the shipbuilding industry, and promotes competition (more math, more savings!).

      With a fleet that is constantly newer, maintenance and operating costs decrease (math, math, math! more savings!).

      I can keep going, describing how this works but I've laid it out before and it's elementary logic. Trying to waffle a 30 year lifespan is just the worst of both worlds - it's not long enough to be meaningful and yet it imposes additional construction, maintenance, and operating costs.

      The Navy has already tried twice - that I know of - to early retire another carrier and we only have 9 air wings, as it is, so, in effect, we only have 9 carriers. What good is the carrier's 45-50 year design life when the Navy is trying desperately to dump them?

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    2. I think a new life-cycle program would have to phase in. And along with it, new designs for large and small combatants that move away from being multi-mission, in order to bring costs down and numbers up. Things would get worse before getting better, and we'd probably end up adding nearly a decade of use to the Constellations before the new plan hit full stride. We'd also have to reinstitute SLEPS for the early Burkes to keep em around even longer... So while the shorter planned lifecycle is good, itd be painful for a while...

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    3. "You already know my answer. We need to stop building giant, do-everything ships and start building smaller, single function ships."

      Agree, and that's the low part of my high/low mix. But we can't build SSBNs or SSGNs or even SSNs or the cheapest carriers for anything approaching $1B apiece, and when you get through with them, you've basically burned through the money that congress will let you spend, with nothing left over for anything like the number of those smaller, cheaper, single-purpose ships.

      You joke about my spreadsheets, but I've run a bunch of different scenarios with them, and about the lowest number I can get the average ship cost down to, while maintaining some semblance of a balanced fleet, is $1.5B. With a $21B budget, that builds 14 ships/year. With a 20-year average ship life that builds a 280-ship Navy.

      With a 30-year average ship life, the number goes up to 420. Now, we can have some 20-year ships in that mix as long as we have some longer-life ships as well. Keeping carriers longer really helps the numbers because they will always be among the most expensive.

      But $20-22B/year for 20 years works out to $420B. I looked at fitting total costs under that ceiling in the post above. Another way to look at it is by ship type, with number of type times cost/ship equals total cost, divided by service life equals cost/year, as follows:

      Carriers (Nimitz) 12x$9B=$108B/50 years=$2.2B/year
      SSBNs (Columbias) 12x$7.5B=$90B/30 years=$3B/year
      SSNs (Ohios) 10x$5B=$50B/30 years=$1.7B/year
      SSNs (Virginias) 60x$3B=180B/30years=$6B/year

      That's $12.9B/year for 94 ships. That leaves $8.1B/year for, say, 256 ships to build a 350-ship fleet. If those all have 20-year lives, that's $162B for 256 ships, or $633MM/ship. I don't think we can do that. I think we'd do well to build the rest of the fleet for $1B/ship, even if we only build to a 20-year life standard. That would be 162 more ships, or a 256-ship fleet, which I don't think can get the job done.

      I know your answer, and I agree in concept. It's just that when you put actual numbers on it, it's hard to make it work. You could cut the number of carriers, or build some of them conventional, or cut the number of boomers or SSGNs or Virginias, but all of those moves would knock big holes in peer war capability somewhere.

      I can't make it work. I can get cost/ship down to about $1.5B, which gives us 14 ships/year. 280 with 20-year average lives, 420 with 30-year average lives, 560 with 40-year average lives, but that's as far as I can go. Maybe you can do better. More power to you if you can.

      I'd like to see it work. My first ship after commissioning was a 25-year-old destroyer that had been FRAMed, and it was hurting. But it was designed just to get us through WWII, and not to serve much longer, and maintenance over the years had not been stellar, so I don't think it is a valid example of the best that we can do.

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    4. "I can't make it work. I can get cost/ship down to about $1.5B, which gives us 14 ships/year. 280 with 20-year average lives, 420 with 30-year average lives, 560 with 40-year average lives, but that's as far as I can go. Maybe you can do better. More power to you if you can."

      As I see it, yeah, you can theorically get above 400, even 500 BUT do you believe half of those ships are worth anything in combat??? I think I would prefer 280 ships/20 years old to having 560 ships/40 years old. You get numbers but what shape are they in, full of rust, old electronics, crew quality, training, etc?!?

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    5. "As I see it, yeah, you can theoretically get above 400, even 500 BUT do you believe half of those ships are worth anything in combat?"

      Before I answer, I have a return question. Are the 20-year ships that you can build with what you have left over after building the high-value units worth anything in combat, even brand new, or are they just war canoes?

      To answer your question, if you design them well enough, and more importantly if you maintain them well enough, maybe. The Air Force is still flying B-52s that are pushing 60. And the Russians have a number of ships that date back to the Soviet era, and those were not well maintained. I realize that those are not entirely apples to apples comparison, but if you have a ship physically present somewhere, an enemy has to deal with it somehow. As the Russians say, quantity has a quality all its own. I don't think you can send a 40-year-old ship into the South China Sea in a peer conflict with China. But other than maybe a SSGN, I don't think you can send a brand-new ship there, either.

      One thing I am building into my model is a much, much more vigorous and rigorous and frequent maintenance cycle, and that's going to cost a bunch of money, too. I don't have enough data to run the numbers there, but I do know that it will require more shipyard capability than we have now. The maintenance requirement could drive my cost model over the ceiling. Obviously, if my maintenance cost at the 20-year point is equal to or greater than new construction cost, I’m no better off cost-wise than with a 20-year ship. Maybe it could be sold to congress as a way to stimulate the domestic shipbuilding and repair industry.

      The answer may very well be that congress needs to spend more money to give us the fleet we need. That's the one variable I have tried not to play with. But the math is pretty straightforward and unforgiving. To have 400 ships with 20-year lives and current funding, the average ship has to cost $1B, and we can't come close to that with our current requirement for high-end ships. It’s like the old riddle where you have to drive two miles, if you drive the first mile at 30 mph, how fast do you have to drive the second? If you use up all your money building the few high-value units that you need, you can’t build competent ships to screen and escort them.

      One ship class that I omitted from my model above would be:
      10 LHAs/LHDs at $3.8B=$38B/20 years=$1.9B/year.

      Add them and you are now talking about $14.8B/year for 104 ships, leaving $6.2B/year. To get to around 300 you need 200 more ships, with 20-year lives that's 10/year, at $620MM each. To get to 400 would be 15/year at $413MM each.

      The lesson there may well be that we can't have LHAs/LHDs as amphibs, nor can we afford San Antonios at $2B each. The amphib fleet needs to average out somewhere in the $600-800MM range or lower. I'm fine with that.

      I do think the Navy needs to be told, in no uncertain terms, that if they want more than 150-200 ships, they can't go decommissioning Ticonderogas at 20 years. Period. You've got to make your high-value units last longer.

      Again, you can't design a fleet around cost, and that’s not what I’m doing. It has to be based on strategy, tactics, and CONOPS. But you can't ignore cost either, and the cost models are not kind or forgiving. I’m not saying that any particular length of ship life is ideal. All I’m saying is that if you have to have 20-year lives, you’re either going to have a 150-200 ship Navy or you’re going to have a lot of war canoes.

      Play with the numbers yourself. Cost it out and see what you can build for $20-22B per year. Either you get more money from congress or you shrink the fleet or you make them last longer. I’ve been playing with this for a couple of years (hence ComNavOps’s “spreadsheet” comment) and I can’t make the numbers work any other way.

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    6. CNO Chip - What you are missing from your spreadsheet is the major savings from maintenance with younger ships, figures show in last decade of 35 year life maintenance costs increase by 30%, last time looked commercial ships scrapped at average age of ~23 years.

      So suggest you take SCN budget and Navy maintenance budget and rework your figures and should add in a factor for the newer ship tech that allows commercial ships much lower maintainance.

      PS INSURV Inspections Found Lower Material Readiness on Surface Ships, Subs - March 3

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    7. "What you are missing from your spreadsheet is the major savings from maintenance with younger ships"

      I've already stated that I'm looking at a maintenance-heavy model, and that maintenance costs of doing so might eat us up. All I'm trying to do is point out the tradeoffs. Shorter lives must mean either cheaper (and presumably less capable) ships or fewer ships. The numbers don't work differently.

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    8. "about the lowest number I can get the average ship cost down to,"

      The problem you have with trying to balance your spreadsheet (and no, I'm not making fun of it, it's a useful tool for visualizing the concept) is that you're combining reality and ideal and not in the right way. Huh???

      What I mean is, you're postulating an ideal fleet composition (your own concept) but then you're using reality pricing to implement it. Guess what? That won't work! Of course your spreadsheet won't give you the numbers you need.

      You've stuck your toe into the waters of idealism but pulled it out to price the ideal concept. If you're going to discuss ideals, go all the way! For example, there is no way a carrier should cost $15B. That's a joke, so don't use it. In fact, a Nimitz at $8B is absurd. I did a post on carrier costs. A Nimitz shouldn't cost more than around $5B (get rid of all the 'comfort' spaces and equipment, all the gender accommodations, all the Internet access, etc., spread the overhead, use more shipyards/competition, etc.) and a conventional powered, 'smaller' carrier shouldn't cost more than $2B.

      In other words, if you're going to discuss ideal, go all the way and include ideal costs. Trying to mix ideal and real is pointless.

      I've laid out in various posts how we can move from current reality to ideal by building single function ships on 20 yr cycles which requires more shipyards which means more competition, less maintenance and operating costs, and so on. Your spreadsheet isn't capturing any of this. Go back and rework the spreadsheet to include ideal costs and infrastructure (shipbuilding when we have more yards, more competition, less overhead, etc.).

      Another benefit of 20 yr cycles is NO CHANGE ORDERS DURING CONSTRUCTION. That alone will save billions and allow shipyards to bid lower prices since they won't have to factor in disruptions and subsequent cancellations as the costs run away. I've posted on how to build a better ship and it includes contract structure.

      All of my changes, while ideal, are readily doable and require NO legislative changes, just a different philosophy by the Navy and that could be implemented with a memo from the SecNav or CNO.

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    9. "Shorter lives must mean either cheaper (and presumably less capable) ships or fewer ships."

      You're not getting it … not at all. The ships resulting from a 20 yr cycle will be both cheaper AND MORE CAPABLE, not less. By more capable, I mean that they will be smaller and focused on a single primary function. That focus makes them MORE CAPABLE. An ASW Corvette will be MORE CAPABLE at ASW than a Burke and for a tiny, tiny fraction of the price.

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    10. We could do better on Carrier cost, but there is no reason to think we can do much better. Keeping spreadsheets on all this starts to pay off over time. Below is in 2020 dollars (2 numbers on the QE as I don't really trust their lower numbers. I alsso have a 10.2B estimate for the CTOL version of the QE.):
      LHA 3,873.50
      DDG-1000 4,425.21
      RCOH 5,629.43
      QE Class Revised 5,669.35
      French CVN 6,005.00
      Chinese Carrier 7,260.27
      QE Class 8,794.62
      Columbia 9,326.06
      CVN-81 12,450.70

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    11. "You already know my answer. We need to stop building giant, do-everything ships and start building smaller, single function ships."

      That will require a large number of ships, which will then require a large number of sailors to man them. The USN doesn't have enough sailors to man the ships it already has- hence going all-in on unmanned ships requiring new (and likely unreliable) technology to function, like lemmings.

      Even then, is there any guarantee the right ship will be at the right place at the right time? With aerial and satellite reconnaissance, a cunning opponent can see what kind of "single function ships" are coming his way, and deploy weapons those ships are unequipped to handle, e.g., air attacks against an antisubmarine ship, submarines against an air defense ship. The obvious counter to that (deploying the "single function ships" in complementary flotillas) is one the USN seems reluctant to use, likely due to cost- lone ships keep getting sent on "freedom of navigation" ops.

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    12. I'm assuming from your comment that you're new to the blog so welcome! Check the archives. We've addressed manning and proven that the Navy has a large excess of personnel assigned to shore positions. We can easily man whatever number of ships we want. As one example, simply eliminating half the admirals and their staffs would free up thousands of sailors. And so on.

      "a cunning opponent can see what kind of "single function ships" are coming his way,"

      You need to come up to speed on how navies fight in war. Ships do not sail around by themselves. They sail in groups with all the types of ships they need. No enemy is going to find a single function ship by itself.

      Again, welcome and please make use of the archives!

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    13. “The ships resulting from a 20 yr cycle will be both cheaper AND MORE CAPABLE, not less. By more capable, I mean that they will be smaller and focused on a single primary function.”

      I’m with you as far as a single-purpose ASW frigate. But now you need another ship to take care of AAW (and if that’s AEGIS it won’t be cheap) and presumably another ship to take care of surface threats. In your thread on Burke Cost Breakdown, you determined that the biggest single part of the cost (44%) was basic hull and superstructure construction. So at the end of the day, by the time you build additional hulls, and have to do it again in 20 years, I’m not sure how much you save.

      If it truly saves money in the long run, then it makes sense. I'm just not sure how much it saves.

      Delete
    14. "But now you need another ship to take care of AAW "

      We've covered this. Imagine a Ticonderoga with no flight deck, no hangar, no helo magazines, no sonar, no guns, no Tomahawks (so fewer VLS cells), etc. That would be a significantly smaller ship, wouldn't it? Now, consider the secondary effects that accompany those deletions: smaller crew, smaller galley, fewer berthing spaces, fewer heads, less laundry, less food storage, less water storage, etc. That significantly smaller AAW ship gets even smaller. Then there's the tertiary effect of smaller engines since the ship is smaller and smaller fuel tanks. The ship gets smaller still.

      As we noted, hull - the single biggest expense - has been reduced significantly. I'm going to hazard a guess that a Tico could be reduced in size by half. I know you don't believe that but look at a profile drawing and note how much of the ship is just flight deck and hangar, for starters. Subtract all the other stuff and you can see where a half size Tico is reasonable.

      So, now we're at half the cost, conceptually, or less (done right, around a third of the cost - it's just a powered AAW barge)! So, we can build two (or more) AAW ships (20 yrs apart) for the cost of a single full Tico that wasn't going to make its full service life anyway and we can operate and maintain those two ships for significantly less than the aging full Tico. More savings!

      Also, the second AAW, built after 20 yrs, will be significantly more capable than the original, full Tico that we know the Navy wouldn't upgrade because it will be 20 yrs newer and incorporate whatever improvements were made over those 20 yrs.

      Seriously, if you can't picture this then put into a spreadsheet and do the analysis. This really is a no brainer.

      Delete
    15. "I know you don't believe that..."

      No, you don't know that, because it's not true. I'm agnostic about it, I neither believe nor disbelieve it.

      Delete
    16. If we can truly build a 20-year ship for half the cost of a 40-year ship, then it's clearly the way to go.

      Delete
    17. The problem I see is not in building a 20-year single-purpose ship cheaper than a 40-year multi-purpose (or single-purpose) ship.

      If the issue is just building a 400-ship Navy for $20-22B a year, and you use 20 year lives, you average ship could cost would be $1B. Building a 20 year ship for $1B doesn't seem all that daunting.

      The problem is like the old classic riddle, you have to drive two miles, if you drive the first mile at 30 mph, how fast do you have to drive the second mile to average 60 mph? The answer is that you can't do it.

      By the time we get through building the carriers, SSBNs, SSGNs, and SSNs that we need (not to mention along with the LHAs/LHDs and LPDs that the Navy wants) you have something like 116 ships for $15B/year. Based on recent shipbuilding budgets in the $20-22B/year range, that leaves roughy $6B/year to build roughly 300 ships. With 20 year lives, that's 15/year that we have to build, and with $6B to spend, that's $400MM/ship. Maybe you can build your single-purpose ASW frigate for that, but I don't see any way to build an AAW ship for that, particularly if it is going to have AEGIS.

      In order to have a reasonably sized fleet (~400), we need either to 1) build fewer carriers, SSBNs, SSGNs, and/or SSNs, 2) find a way to stretch lives out longer, or 3) talk congress into a lot more money.

      You seem to think there is great potential just to build everything cheaper. But I don't think there's any way to build a CVN for $5B or a CV for $2B, and recent experience in our Navy and others suggests that a Nimitz CVN comes in at more like $9B and a smaller CV at more like $6B. When you buy the big ticket items we need, that really squeezes it for everything else.

      Delete
    18. Okay, now that you've acknowledged the wisdom of 20 yr ship lives, we talk about actual execution. The first point to cover is that not every ship should be 20 yr. Carriers, as the prime example, are fine for 40-50+ yr lives. ????? Why would I say that after having so vigorously argued for 20 yr lives? Because, carriers don't change in 20 yrs or 50+ yrs. Consider the Forrestal. If we had kept applying rigorous maintenance and a handful of electronics upgrades, it would still be as useful and efficient today as it was brand new. The carrier function and technology don't change so there's no need to scrap it after 20 yrs. Also, it's a huge investment to scrap after 20 yrs. Battleships would be the other example. SSBNs might be another. All the rest … 20 and out! So, that helps with part of the implementation challenges.

      As far as costs, we have got to stop gold plating. The example of the dual band radar on the Ford which the project manager has now admitted was a billion dollar mistake perfectly illustrates this. In combat, a carrier will NEVER radiate so why give it anything more than a local Sea Sparrow or ESSM fire control radar? And so on.

      Another example is excess manning and comforts. I've discussed this before. NO MORE DEPLOYMENTS - just maintenance, intense training, and occasional missions. That means we can eliminate all the crew comforts, lounges, TV, Internet, cafes, exercise rooms, barber shops, ship's store, spacious berthing, dual gender duplication of facilities (if women want to serve they'll use the same facilities and if they're not comfortable with that, don't join the Navy - that's true equality), and so on. If we eliminate all those non-combat spaces and functions, we can significantly reduce the crew size which, in turn, significantly reduces the number of cooks, galley size, berthing, food storage, and on and on which makes for a smaller, cheaper build.

      All of this is linked and all of it must be done to achieve the proper fleet size and cost.

      Delete
    19. "if you drive the first mile at 30 mph, how fast do you have to drive the second mile to average 60 mph?"

      I'm not sure what riddle you're referring to. The answer is 90 mph.

      Delete
    20. He left off the time requirement in the riddle. The original riddle calls for 2 minutes to complete both mile laps. Since you took 30mph to drive the first mile, essentially that is 2 minutes so there is no way to average 60mph because you don't get to drive the 2nd mile.

      Delete
    21. "With 20 year lives, that's 15/year that we have to build, and with $6B to spend, that's $400MM/ship."

      I'm just doing a thought exercise here, using the Burke as a substitute in this model. For one, the ship is a proven design with mostly proven technologies. For two, I know this sounds a little bit crazy but basing on the description of a very stripped down AAW design, I believe that the costs/materials to Burke would be roughly equivalent to two separate AAW and ASW design. Could we achieve somewhere around $1 billions for two single-function designs? I think so. Now I know it sounds like we are missing $200 millions somewhere but simply scrapping the Zumwalt and halting/scraping the LCS program would save enough to get this plan going. We will find new savings as we go!!!

      Plus some of these 20-years ships may clock even 25s or 30s years if we service it well and keep it in port like CNO proposed.

      "Maybe you can build your single-purpose ASW frigate for that, but I don't see any way to build an AAW ship for that, particularly if it is going to have AEGIS."

      It seems like the main issue that is prohibiting this concept is the lack of shipyards. I suspect that in a real life scenario, you will have to accept a stagnation (or even reductions) for the first few years and use the savings to fund more shipyards. If even just one more shipyard happen, we can see significant cost reductions thanks to competitions.

      "(not to mention along with the LHAs/LHDs and LPDs that the Navy wants)" What's the official situation on this? I thought the Marines seem to leave out the LPD in their concept and the Navy seems not exactly enthusiastic. These ships sometime pop up on the news once a while with nothing worthwhile to report. At this point, the Marines might just be keeping the LHA/LHD to fill MATF for traditional mission.

      Delete
    22. "He left off the time requirement in the riddle."

      Ah!

      Delete
    23. "I suspect that in a real life scenario, you will have to accept a stagnation "

      The ideal plan depends on a lot of ideal changes. Those changes would not - could not - occur instantaneously. They would gradually come to be. The way to start is to pick a single, lower end vessel and design a new 20-yr class and then send it out to industry in packets of, say, five and spread it around various shipyards so as to encourage new shipyards, expanded shipyards, and improved shipyards. Everyone gets a steady supply of work and, therefore, has reason to invest in their facilities and improve/expand. Along with this, we begin intensive maintenance which creates more demand for shipyards which means more reason to expand/improve. And, slowly, the shipbuilding industry begins to grow and the pieces of the ideal puzzle begin to come together.

      Delete
    24. "if you drive the first mile at 30 mph, how fast do you have to drive the second mile to average 60 mph?"
      "I'm not sure what riddle you're referring to. The answer is 90 mph."

      Nope. To average 60mph for two miles, you have to cover the entire distance in 2 minutes. If you drive the first mile at 30mph, you have used up the entire two minutes and you are only halfway there.

      The analogy is that the number and cost of carriers, SSBNs, SSGNs, SSNs, and frankly LHAs/LHDs, basically uses up too much of your money for you to be able to build viable smaller and cheaper ships.

      Delete
    25. "Nope. To average 60mph for two miles, you have to cover the entire distance in 2 minutes. If you drive the first mile at 30mph, you have used up the entire two minutes and you are only halfway there."

      Ah, you left out the time requirement! Here's your exact, original statement:

      "The problem is like the old classic riddle, you have to drive two miles, if you drive the first mile at 30 mph, how fast do you have to drive the second mile to average 60 mph? The answer is that you can't do it."

      It's that clarity of writing issue again - or just an oops!

      Delete
    26. “A Nimitz shouldn't cost more than around $5B (get rid of all the 'comfort' spaces and equipment, all the gender accommodations, all the Internet access, etc., spread the overhead, use more shipyards/competition, etc.) and a conventional powered, 'smaller' carrier shouldn't cost more than $2B.”

      This is where I think you are being absurdly unrealistic. There is no credible case to support either of those numbers. I think a Nimitz for $9B and/or a Kitty Hawk for $6B should be doable, based on numbers from other at least somewhat similar ships, like those that AndyM posted above, but I’ve gotten a lot of flak from some knowledgeable people here and elsewhere for suggesting even those costs, not to mention $4B/ship less. You may truly believe those numbers are doable. I don’t.

      Also you take a really dim view of habitability and while I agree that we may have gone too far in some areas (a 5,000-sailor carrier without a urinal is absurd), the reality is that particularly in an all-volunteer force the Navy is competing for personnel in a marketplace where WWII-level accommodations are going to be viewed very unfavorably by the potential labor pool. We frankly need a lot of that habitability to attract the people we need to make the ships work. And I don’t think we could get down to your numbers if we ditched all of it.

      I am totally in agreement on the competition issue, perhaps even more so with aircraft, where one terrible consequence of the one-size-fits-all F-35 is that it basically destroys competition in the military aviation industry. We could do some things like the RN did with Queen Elizabeth—break it into parts to get as many yards as possible involved, although theirs was for a different reason. We definitely need ways to get more and smaller yards involved. I’ve also thought about European designs with the idea that somebody like Naval Group might be willing to invest in restoring a US shipyard to build something like a production run of 30 Barracudas (sort of like Fincantieri with Marinette, but I see the FREMM filling more of a GP role and thus don’t like what the Navy has done to the FREMM design to get AEGIS onboard).

      Delete
    27. "NO CHANGE ORDERS DURING CONSTRUCTION."

      Absolutely, but you don't have to go with 20-year lives to get that. You just mandate it. Or at least put very severe restrictions on it.

      Delete
    28. "NO MORE DEPLOYMENTS."

      Here is the problem there. If the Navy's only responsibility was to execute a war against a peer enemy, maybe so. But the Navy has considerable peacetime duties protecting worldwide sea lanes of communication. And that requires deployments. I do think we have far too many stupid deployments just because some area commander asks for something that he doesn't really need, and we would do well to get rid of those. But some deployments are necessary to fulfill the missions.

      Delete
    29. Block buys and a faster build rate can help with change order reduction. Some change orders are literally the result of the world moving on because we build the same thing for too long.

      Delete
    30. "This is where I think you are being absurdly unrealistic. There is no credible case to support either of those numbers."

      This is the truly sad part of this discussion. You (and most others) have lived so long with the absurdly broken shipbuilding process and resultant prices that you've come to think they're normal. Nothing could be further from the truth. The absurd factors are legion and range from total lack of competition for carriers to concentrated overhead due to infrequent builds to the legendary thousand dollar toilet seats phenomenon to non-combat functions being built into ships. All of that adds up to $9B-$15B carriers … but it doesn't have to. We accept it as normal, now, when it's actually an abomination of acquisition.

      Delete
    31. "And that requires deployments."

      There is zero evidence that deployments accomplish deterrence or anything else. In fact, if you recall, I presented a post documenting a report that demonstrated that deployments and forward presence accomplished nothing. I've also done a post presenting a pretty compelling case that forward presence actually increases the chance of conflict.

      Again, you've bought into the deployment model just because it's all you've known in your lifetime. Examine history and see if you can find any example of deployments that have accomplished anything. They're vanishingly rare.

      In addition to accomplishing nothing, we know the harm that deployments do in terms of wear on ships, deferred maintenance, stress on crews, driving up costs of ships which have to be built like cruise ships, etc. So, with all the known problems and no evidence of benefits, why do you believe deployments are mandatory? It's illogical.

      Delete
    32. "Ah, you left out the time requirement! Here's your exact, original statement:
      "The problem is like the old classic riddle, you have to drive two miles, if you drive the first mile at 30 mph, how fast do you have to drive the second mile to average 60 mph? The answer is that you can't do it."
      It's that clarity of writing issue again - or just an oops!"

      No, I expect you to figure out the time requirement. That's the key to solving the problem. I expect you to figure out that to drive two miles at an average speed of 60 miles an hour requires you to cover the distance in two minutes.

      Delete
    33. "No, I expect you to figure out the time requirement."

      Uh huh … riiiight.

      Delete
    34. That's why it's a brain teaser. If I tell you the time, I give the answer away.

      Delete
    35. Nothing about the problem implied time. You just forgot to include that.

      Delete
  8. I look at it as if they are running away from commercial standards for service life they are going to waste money. If the fast ferry biz cycles out the old every 25 years so shoud we. Larger steel hulls with props or azipods, do as the Romans so to speak. Its why I like life of the ship reactors on nukes. Aside from that though, pick nukes as propulsion with caution until they allow maintenance at other commercial yards or fix the navy yard maintenance issues.

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  9. "This perfectly illustrates the folly and the degree of self-deception in designing a ship to have a long service life and undergo modernization – it just doesn’t happen!"

    Well, it doesn't happen because the Navy is playing games, but otherwise a 40 year ship life would work just fine.

    Throwing away 20 year old ships seems really wasteful to me.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. " otherwise a 40 year ship life would work just fine."

      No. It results in:

      -higher maintenance costs
      -higher operating costs
      -higher construction costs
      -older average fleet age
      -less modern fleet
      -less active industrial base
      -less competition in shipbuilding resulting in higher costs

      This is not a system that would 'work just fine'. It's not even really debatable.

      Delete
    2. "This perfectly illustrates the folly and the degree of self-deception in designing a ship to have a long service life and undergo modernization – it just doesn’t happen!"

      But could we make it happen. Suppose congress told the Navy, "At the very least, the twin arm launcher Ticonderogas were, and still are, the equal or superior to any other ship in the world. Therefore, you are not retiring them early. Period."

      Delete
    3. In theory, sure. If we had a Congress of patriotic, dedicated, selfless, subservient … I'm sorry, I can't go on because I'm laughing too hard to type.

      Delete
    4. And I'm laughing too hard to reply, except that I think you've found a real problem there.

      Delete
    5. I'm mocking Congress but, of late, they are doing their jobs to at least a small degree. They've stopped the AF from getting rid of the A-10 and stopped the Navy from retiring two carriers early and the entire Ticonderoga class. In addition, they've stepped in and demanded proof from the navy that unmanned ships work before they'll fund them and allow VLS to be installed. They've also cut funding for LCS modules pending proof that the modules work (spoiler … they don't!). So, well done to Congress for at least that amount of good oversight. I'd like to see them do so much more but it's better than nothing which is what they've done for decades.

      Delete
  10. Not all Navy ships are retired early. The Burkes are still going strong. DDG 51 is 30 years old this year. I haven't seen any plans to retire it early. All of the Flt I's and IIs are older than 20 years at this point.

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    1. However whether they will be upgraded at all is open to question.
      How many different Aegis builds are currently in service?
      https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/03/17/cost-of-upgrading-the-arleigh-burke-destroyers-may-not-be-worth-it-navy-says/

      Delete
    2. " whether they will be upgraded at all is open to question."

      I don't think it's much of a question. The Navy has already cancelled upgrade plans for some of the Burkes.

      The Navy also cancelled service life extension plans for the Burkes in Mar 2020.

      The Navy cancelled plans to upgrade 34 Burkes to hybrid electric drives in Mar 2018.

      The Navy cancelled plans to upgrade 5 Flt IIa Burkes to ballistic missile defense capability in Mar 2015.

      And the list goes on. You're seeing the pattern? Every upgrade plan that's been floated has been cancelled. I think upgrades for the Burkes are extremely unlikely and, if any occur, they will be limited in scope and numbers. With the Navy's push to unmanned and their publicly stated goal to replace 'some' of the Burkes with unmanned vessels, the Navy is not going to upgrade and is likely to begin early retirements to free up funding for new unmanned vessels.

      Delete
  11. Maybe we are making this "too hard". The "upgrade" issue really went back to WWII where pre-war US warships that survived hostile attack continually needed AA upgrades to protect themselves from ever-increasing Japanese air attacks. This resulted in "high top weight" for new sensors and "increasing crew sizes and weight" to staff increasing quantities of AA guns and ammunition, that caused these kinds of issues. Through the modern miracles of "minimal staffing", lack of ship armor, and inadequate defensive and offensive weaponry, and lack of time to train the crews due to extended deployments, our ships will NEVER SURVIVE an encounter with the enemy (or an anchored civilian tanker, or a plainly marked shoal, or moving civilian ships, or a fire at the dock, for that matter), so "upgrades" will never be necessary. All of our future warship builds will be "new".

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  12. Unfortunately the short lifespan was the only concept the LCS succeeded at. The LCS was argued to have a short lifespan as you are advocating. This was further compromised by so-called civilian ship standards by which was actually meant shoddy design work.

    This does bring back up an earlier post you did on what to do with the Ticos other than upgrading or retiring them. A lot of good ideas were floated that would be enable them to remain useful even if the SPY/AEGIS system weren't modernized.
    Indeed since the lack of VLS was their justification for scrapping the earlier ones, shoulding the existence of VLS on the remaining ones justify keeping them? The Navy is all enamored of this silly Distributed firepower nonsense so why not keep a 120 cell ship active or even on reserves status just to provide more tubes? Who knows these could be the successors to the Four Stack Destroyers which were made into all kinds of other vessels during WW2.

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  13. What is clearly both dishonest and stupid is claiming a 40-year life and adding all this upgrade capacity in order to get the ship built, and then getting rid of the ship at 20 years, particularly when the reason for getting rid of it is to make room for something as useless as the LCSs.

    Jonnie Z makes an interesting point. How much of the shoddiness of the LCSs was because they were contemplated as short-lived ships.

    I don't have any magic beans. I'm just trying to figure out what we would need to win a peer war, and try to figure out how to afford it.

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    Replies
    1. I really think LCS is the result of the process and we might end up in the same boat if there isn't a more active interest in the engineering of the ships.

      Delete
    2. "How much of the shoddiness of the LCSs was because they were contemplated as short-lived ships."

      None, I don't think. The various LCS shortcuts (and there were many!) were due to the initial attempt to keep the cost at $200M (later $220M). This resulted in omitting galvanic corrosion protection, bridge wings, reduced flight deck structural supports, and so on. It was all about building to a cost figure when, as we've stated so often, a ship should be built to combat requirements with cost a distant secondary concern.

      Delete
    3. "... [T]hen getting rid of the ship at 20 years, particularly when the reason for getting rid of it is to make room for something as useless as the LCSs."

      It's heartbreaking how commonplace such shortsighted behavior is in the US. Imagine burning down your own house for insurance money with which to buy a new house. What if the insurance policy doesn't pay out (i.e., if Congress won't approve funds for your new shipbuilding contract)? What if your new house turns out to be a poorly constructed deathtrap (i.e., the new ships don't work)?

      Delete
  14. ". . . the reality is that the Navy almost always retires perfectly good ships far earlier than their service life limit calls for."

    The Navy has retired many ships before they reached their service life called for, but early retirement seems to be the exception and not the rule. Of the first 11 Ticos slated to be retired between 2022 and 2026, 9 will have served 30 years or more. Of the 22 remaining, 12 already have 30 years of service and 4 more will reach that mark this year. And, if the Burke Flight I ships are retired later this decade, most of them will have served 30+ years.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Actually, several of the remaining Ticos have been idled which is, for all practical purposes, retired.

      Also, I've listed several entire classes that were retired early so I'd say it's the rule, not the exception. The Navy attempted to early retire the entire Tico class and two carriers so, again, I'd say it's the rule not the exception.

      The Burkes may be the only class that is not retired early and that will almost certainly change when the Navy gets permission to start procuring unmanned LUSVs and MUSVs and starts looking for ways to pay for them.

      Delete
    2. While early retirement is clearly somthing the Navy is doing/attempting, are the Ticos an example of the poor/ignored/deferred maintenance catching up with them?? Have they been abused and overused til they need to be retired because now ownership costs are skyrocketing?? Is there evidence of that?? Or is it a matter of just wanting to dump them to free up dollars for shiny new toys??

      Delete
  15. Type 055 destroyer is almost a perfect replacement for Ticonderoga. Problem is that it is a Chinese ship. China built 8 in a short time. First launched in June 2017 and the 8th in August 2020. Two have fully commissioned to its navy.

    Like DDG-1000, 055 integrates all radars into one mast(not like Ticonderoga has many antennas exposed). It has dual band ASEA (S and X) which DDG-1000 planned but failed to implement. Its displacement is ~12,000 to 13,000 tons with a speed of 30 knots. It has 112 VLS and each VLS is larger than US' which means it can carry larger missiles. Its VLS can perform both hot and cold fires. It carries two helicopters (size like SH-60). Other armaments include: 130 mm gun, type 1130 CIWS (fire speed far faster than US'), HQ-10 (function like US' Sea Ram), two torpedo tubes, towed array sonars, etc.

    As I read, DDG(X) aims a ship like type 055 destroyer. However, hope the defense industry can act fast than keep talking, bargaining, and delay.

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    1. Given the Navy's habitual delays and cancellations, the tightening of budgets, and the intense desire for unmanned vessels the likelihood of the DDG(X) reaching fruition is poor.

      Delete
    2. Funny thing... Today we look at the Chinese and are seemingly amazed... 8 ships put in service in 3 yrs!!! But not that relatively long ago, as far as ship class procurement goes, we were doing the same and more!! We built 30+ Spruances and Kidd variants in roughly 5 years!!! And, we did it in the same time period that saw a new, unproven design supercarrier class just starting out...

      Delete
    3. One year we landed 8 Spruance, while building the LHAs 1 a year at the same yard. Its all bush league numbers now.

      Delete
  16. “a ship should be built to combat requirements with cost a distant secondary concern.”

    Yes, ComNavOps, but you can’t ignore cost. We’ve got two major constraints—money and time. The variables that you have to play with are cost/ship and ship life.

    Here’s the problem. You have the fleet you determine that you need. You have the money that congress is willing to give you. You have to figure out how to get as close to that fleet as you possibly can with that money. Say you determine that you need 450 ships and congress is willing to give you $22B/year (both of which I think are fairly reasonable approximations of current reality). If you go with 20 year lives, that means you have to build 22.5 ships/year (450/20) to maintain that fleet, and that means that your average ship needs to come in somewhere under $1B. More ships or shorter lives mean your cost/ship has to go down, fewer ships or longer lives mean your cost/ship can go up.

    What complicates the problem is that you have a minimum number of high-value, high-priced (although fortunately generally long-lived) units that you absolutely have to have. Carriers, SSBNs, SSGNs, SSNs, and any large surface combatants or big-deck amphibs. If you’re not careful, you spend all of your money building them, and end up with something like 125-150 ships and no more money.

    You have to plot a path between cost and requirements that gets you the most bang for the available bucks.

    Your fleet structure ideas have influenced my thinking a lot, so let’s look at where we sort of agree. We both want 4-carrier CTFs made up of 2 CVNs and 2 CVs, and we both appear to want 6 such CTFs, therefore 12 CVNs (you have 15) and 12 CVs. We are pretty much committed to 12 SSBNs. We both want SSGNs based on the Ohios, you want 10, I want 20 as my primary strike platform. We both want 60 SSNs, you want non-VPM Virginias, I want half VPM Virginias as my secondary strike platforms and half as smaller and cheaper ASW specialists based on something like French Barracuda. We both want battleships and ASW helo carriers (you 6 of each, me 8 of each, though our CONOPS for them appear to differ a bit). We both want about 200 surface escorts. Although our amphibious forces are configured very differently, it would appear that we would both spend about $40B total on amphibs. One place where we differ is that I have incorporated some of CAPT Wayne Hughes’s NNFM ideas into a littoral force (corvettes, missile patrol boats, SSKs, mine countermeasures ships) that would operate around coastal and choke point areas. You did not include auxiliaries in your proposed fleet, but we would probably have similar numbers there. I have 76, which may not be enough, but in any event they are cheap.

    In their analysis of the Navy’s 2019 shipbuilding plan, CBO came up with the following lives for the indicated ship types: Carriers, 50 years; SSBN/SSGN, 42 years; SSNs, 33-43 years; Large surface combatants, 35-45 years; Small surface combatants/MCM ships, 25-30 years; Amphibious ships, 40 years; Auxiliaries, 30-45 years. Plugging those lives into my proposed fleet and cost produces a 600-ship fleet with a construction cost of $25B/year and an average ship life of 35 years. The difference in numbers from your 398 is basically my 120 littoral ships and 76 auxiliary ships.

    Achieving those numbers will obviously require a more robust maintenance program than currently exists. I would propose that a 40-year ship spend year 10, years 20-21, and year 31 out of commission for major maintenance. For headcount, I have proposed pulling 11,000 personnel out of admin/overhead slots and putting them in maintenance activities, and similarly pulling 22,000 personnel out of admin/overhead slots and into the fleet. And I have proposed doubling the size of the reserves for backups. Making these moves should also allow moving sufficient funds from admin/overhead to cover the increase in construction, operation, and maintenance costs.

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    1. "You have the fleet you determine that you need. You have the money that congress is willing to give you. You have to figure out how to get as close to that fleet as you possibly can with that money."

      NO! You're falling prey to looking at fleet design as an accounting game and it's not - or it shouldn't be. The military is an existential requirement. That being the case, you determine what you need (truly need, not would like to have to provide jobs for Congressional constituents) to do the military's job and THAT IS YOUR FLEET DESIGN. It is then the job of Congress to provide that amount of funding, whatever that amount is - BECAUSE IT'S AN EXISTENTIAL REQUIREMENT.

      You've come to believe that our broken fleet design process is normal and that our funding philosophy - where budget determines the fleet rather than the other way around - is normal. Again, it's the farthest thing from normal.

      Budget does not drive the military, the military drives the budget. We're doing it backward. The budget tail is wagging the military needs dog.

      Once you grasp how broken and backward our process is, you can begin to see the problems and how to correct them.

      All of your spreadsheet manipulations are based on a broken, backward system.

      Delete
    2. "Yes, ComNavOps, but you can’t ignore cost. We’ve got two major constraints—money and time. The variables that you have to play with are cost/ship and ship life."

      I don't think he is actually ignoring it but rather de-emphasize the actual calculations that need to happen. It is fact that we don't get the actual full disclosed costs for any shipbuilding projects but a public + slightly reduced for PR purposes + extra unaccounted costs + diverted funding for pet projects. This makes estimates like CBO a good indicator to talk and discuss but realistically, we could do much to reduce the overhead on the items if CNO or you are in charge.

      The important emphasis here is the idea/concept that you stands behind. (Like a Force Message :) ) And to be fair to his concept, if the Navy could engage in accounting games to hide the true costs, there is nothing to say CNO can't do the same. The more important factor is if it has merit (and I think it does) and the will to do so!

      "And I have proposed doubling the size of the reserves for backups"

      If you could achieve a 400 active ship force in this day and age, would you still need a reverse fleet? It dwarfs anything that the Chinese Navy and Russian Navy puts out in the foreseeable future. In the event of a war, we just need to slowly build up like we always had.

      The case for a reserve fleet has often been that your industrial base may not be as robust and capable as you need it to be to surge("Thriving" is the word that one could use to describe it). Achieving the goal that you proposed requires at least a capable shipbuilding industry, making it useful to have but redundant.

      Delete






    3. "The military is an existential requirement. That being the case, you determine what you need (truly need, not would like to have to provide jobs for Congressional constituents) to do the military's job and THAT IS YOUR FLEET DESIGN. It is then the job of Congress to provide that amount of funding, whatever that amount is - BECAUSE IT'S AN EXISTENTIAL REQUIREMENT."

      You can't get your way 100% of the time no matter what. You have to do some tradeoffs. You can make it work, you just can't afford major screw-ups like the Fords or Zumwalts of LCSs.

      "You've come to believe that our broken fleet design process is normal and that our funding philosophy - where budget determines the fleet rather than the other way around - is normal. Again, it's the farthest thing from normal."

      Not at all. But you cannot ignore budget or you'll build half the fleet you need and run out of money. You can't build Fords and Zumwalts and LCSs and LHAs/LHDs, because you'll exhaust the funds available and end up with 150 ships.

      At some point you have to pay attention to cost. I'd love to have 80 carriers and 85 SSBNs and 90 SSGNs. But that would clearly break the bank. So you have to think about opportunity cost. Would I rather have a Ford or a Nimitz with $5B worth of escorts or airplanes or a conventional CV?

      Delete
    4. Look, you've come up with a proposed fleet design, presumably unconstrained by cost, and as discussed a few posts above I've come up with one considering cost as a constraint, that ends up being very similar--you have more CVNs and AAW destroyers, I have more battleships and more SSGNs and our amphibious and littoral concepts are different. Either one is cheaper and better than what the Navy is proposing.

      Delete
    5. I am firmly in the spreadsheets help camp. Take his spreadsheet,my spreadsheet ship and now we have 2 things to build from. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1cpiJJH2CS--H5I-q-1Ny0B9SvID0hVBl_spDouLWfGU/edit?usp=sharing

      Delete
  17. "Budget does not drive the military, the military drives the budget. We're doing it backward. The budget tail is wagging the military needs dog."

    I would argue that the problem is exactly the opposite. The Navy is getting mesmerized by shiny new objects, with no concept of cost discipline. You don't end up with Fords or Zumwalts or LCSs if there is proper cost discipline. You don't end up with the Navy saying, "Oh, yes, we can build a 355-ship fleet for $21B/year," only to have CBO say, "No, it would be $29B/year." Every dollar that the Navy spends is a dollar that doesn't get spent on something else, and somebody needs to be asking the question, "Is this the best thing to spend that dollar on?" Obviously, nobody is.

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    1. "I would argue that the problem is exactly the opposite. The Navy is getting mesmerized by shiny new objects, with no concept of cost discipline."

      The LCS was a pure exercise in building to cost and it utterly failed to produce a combat-useful ship even setting aside all its other associated failings. Almost by definition, building to cost cannot produce a combat-useful asset. You design to combat-requirements AND THEN YOU WORRY ABOUT COST. You seem to be trying to defend a badly broken system. Is that really the position you want?

      Delete
    2. "I would argue that the problem is exactly the opposite."

      Dead wrong. Our system currently sets a budget and then the Navy requests ships and things to fit within that budget. That's back asswards. The Navy should define what is need to ensure our national survival (existential combat requirements) and then present a cogent case for it to Congress and the people. It's then Congress' responsibility to figure out how to fund that, whatever it is.

      Cost discipline is vitally important as a SECONDARY concern. For example, NOT designing in cruise ship comforts or proposing ships not based on a solid CONOPS.

      It does no good for a nation to save on its military budget and wind up with a military that can't win - which is where we're heading. Good for us … we'll be the richest conquered nation the world has ever seen because we designed to a budget instead of to existential combat requirements.

      Now, none of this excuses stupidity. Supposed professional warriors who come up with LCS, Zumwalt, Ford, F-35, dropping tanks, etc. are just stupid and should be fired. That has nothing to do with budget. It's just an issue of allowing stupid, incompetent people to run the military. The military is an existential requirement and, as such, cannot afford to have stupid, incompetent people running it. Congress needs to act and fire those people.

      Delete
    3. "You design to combat-requirements AND THEN YOU WORRY ABOUT COST. You seem to be trying to defend a badly broken system. Is that really the position you want?"

      On the next thread, I posted how I derived my proposed fleet strictly from combat requirements. My only point is that you can't ignore cost. You seem to be saying that combat needs are primary and cost is secondary. I'm fine with that, as long as you realize that cost constraints are real.

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    4. "cost constraints are real."

      No, they're not. An existential requirement is non-negotiable. It costs what it costs and you have no choice but to pay it or be conquered. There's no point maintaining a budget while you're being conquered!

      You determine your existential military requirements AND THEN YOU BUILD A BUDGET AROUND THAT - not the other way around, as you're trying to do.

      Simplistically and illustratively, you determine what ship you need to survive as a country and then you figure out how to pay for it. You don't set the price first and then see what you can build for that amount. You set the requirement first and adjust your budget to meet it. Cost enters the equation as a secondary concern by ensuring that you ONLY spec what's absolutely required (no crew lounge, no TV, no barbershop, no ship's store, no duplicate berthing facilities to accommodate women, no dual band radar, etc.).

      Delete
  18. You can say to your family "your desire drive spending" only while you have unlimited money. Military also needs to live within means which the nation can afford. Those who call others to sacrifice but ask cut their own taxes deserve to be &^%$#@!

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  19. I'm not aware of any other observer of naval matters who believes tat we could come anywhere close to building a Nimitz for $5B or a Forrestal for $2B. When I propose a Nimitz for $9B or a Kitty Hawk (basically an upgraded Forrestal with a better deck and elevator layout) for $6B on other discussion boards, I catch a lot of grief for it.

    ComNavOps, I respect your opinions greatly, but this time I just cannot go there.

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    1. "I'm not aware of any other observer of naval matters who believes tat we could come anywhere close to building a Nimitz for $5B"

      Of course not. They're all firmly mired in the current abomination of a procurement system so why would they have any different view? You now have the advantage of having been enlightened and can see what they can't.

      Consider: The USS Forrestal was ordered in 1951 for $217M which is $2.1B today. If we could build a supercarrier then for $217M/$2.1B, why do you think we can't do it again, today, especially since we now have the advantages of computer controlled manufacturing processes, robotic construction, computer aided design, lift technology, and so on? It ought to be MUCH cheaper to build a ship today than in 1951.

      Again, you've come to believe that our broken system is normal. It's not!

      Delete
    2. Well, the price of anything is the price at which somebody is willing to sell it and somebody else is willing to buy it. For the price of a Forrestal to be $2.1B, somebody has to be willing to make and sell one for that price. And so far, nobody is. And if we offered to pay that much for one, I am pretty sure we would not get any takers.

      You can make all sorts of arguments that the price should be $2B, but until somebody is willing to make and sell you one for that price, that's not the price.

      So instead of taking a 1951 price and applying a simple inflation rate, why is there nobody willing to sell one for tat price? $217MM in 1951 growing to $2B in 2021 is an inflation rate of about 3% per year; growing to $6B is an inflation rate of about 5% per year.

      RAND studied why navy ship cost increases (1) and found that rates have varied between 7% and 11% since 1965, basically 9.2% for guided missile destroyers (only class they examined). They found that rate was attributable to 4 main factors--equipment 2%, labor 2%, complexity 2%, and standards and requirements 2%. The first two are basic economy differences, the last two can be attributed to procurement and other systems.

      (1)https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9182.html

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    3. " And if we offered to pay that much for one, I am pretty sure we would not get any takers."

      Because there is no competition. The one or two qualified shipbuilders know that they have a monopoly and can simply say no and wait until the govt caves and agrees to the price. On the other hand, if we implemented all the changes I've outlined, we'd eventually develop competition and drive down prices. It certainly wouldn't happen overnight but it would happen. I'd gladly look at using foreign shipbuilders for the hull (not classified weapons and electronics) to provide additional competition.

      "applying a simple inflation rate"

      There are two broad categories of military related inflation:

      1. The same inflation that the overall economy experiences. This is valid and, for the most part, unchangeable.

      2. Cost increases totally unrelated to 'real inflation'. These include consolidation of industry resulting in monopolies that lead to increased prices, over-spec'ing of materials leading to unnecessary costs (thousand dollar toilet), unnecessary requirements (EMALS, AAG, Dual Band Radar, etc.), fewer builds which causes concentrated overhead, etc. These are self-inflicted 'inflation', are not real, and can be modified and eliminated. That we choose not to eliminate them is a conscious choice on our part to pay costs over and above real inflation. This is pure stupidity and incompetence on the part of Navy leadership.

      Using your own cited RAND study, if you eliminate the last two factors you've cut the apparent inflation back to the real inflation and, presto!, you CAN build the Forrestal for $2.1B.

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    4. "Because there is no competition. The one or two qualified shipbuilders know that they have a monopoly and can simply say no and wait until the govt caves and agrees to the price. On the other hand, if we implemented all the changes I've outlined, we'd eventually develop competition and drive down prices. It certainly wouldn't happen overnight but it would happen. I'd gladly look at using foreign shipbuilders for the hull (not classified weapons and electronics) to provide additional competition."

      And again, we are moving closer to common ground. The only ships that I'm aware of that have been built for something like the kinds of costs you are advocating are the Danish Ivor Huitfeldts, that were assembled from blocks built in Estonia and Lithuania, used an existing hull design, and recycled a lot of equipment from older ships.

      I think you are spot on about the need for more shipyards to foster competition. When only one shipyard can build nuclear carriers, a nuclear carrier is going to cost whatever they want it to cost. One thought I have is that there are a lot of smaller yards the may not be able to build a sip but could have the capability to perform major maintenance. That might be a way to enhance maintenance and at the same time get them going. They might also be able to build smaller ships, and that is part of my thinking in building some of Wayne Hughes's true littoral ships. Another thought is that they could provide a significant OPFOR for more realistic training. Another thoughtI have in looking at foreign designs is that one way to revitalize our shipyards could be to get companies like Naval Group and Damen and even Navantia (although I would watch them closely) to invest in US yards to build their design. Naval group is building something like a half dozen Barracudas. If we promised them a production run of 30 if they built a US yard, then the numbers would work for them to do something like they are doing with the Brazilians. One other place we agree is no change orders--once the keel is laid then you don't change anything, with possible exceptions to correct major safety risks discovered during production.

      "These are self-inflicted 'inflation', are not real, and can be modified and eliminated. That we choose not to eliminate them is a conscious choice on our part to pay costs over and above real inflation. This is pure stupidity and incompetence on the part of Navy leadership."

      I would add a bunch of dishonesty to go with stupidity and incompetence.

      "Using your own cited RAND study, if you eliminate the last two factors you've cut the apparent inflation back to the real inflation and, presto!, you CAN build the Forrestal for $2.1B."

      If you dive deeper into the RAND study the first two factors I listed account for 4% and the last two account for another 4%. Interestingly, the way compounding works, your $2B number for a Forrestal represents a little over 3% inflation over time and the $6B number represents a little under 5%. So 4% (plus minor amounts attributable to other factors) should leave you somewhere in the middle.

      I think we probably be should doing everything we can to drive competition up and costs down. But I think we have to be realistic about where we are today. One other quibble. I'm an old Ranger sailor, loved that ship, but I have to admit that the Kitty Hawks have better elevator placement than the Forrestals, so that would be my preferred CV design. I don't think we can get a Forrestal for $2B, but if we could get a Kitty for $4B I would be ecstatic.

      Delete
    5. "When only one shipyard can build nuclear carriers,"

      As I've demonstrated in posts, there is little ultimate difference between nuclear and conventional power. That being the case, if conventional powered carriers would allow us to open other yards to carrier construction, then that might a valid reason to go conventional.

      "a lot of smaller yards the may not be able to build a sip but could have the capability to perform major maintenance."

      Quite right. That then leads to those yards gaining experience on larger ships and eventually becoming qualified to build them.

      "Kitty Hawk"

      Interestingly, the Kitty Hawk Vets website (https://www.kittyhawkvets.com/ship-awards) lists the construction cost for the ship as $265M in 1961 which is $2.3B today. They didn't list a source.

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    6. "Interestingly, the Kitty Hawk Vets website (https://www.kittyhawkvets.com/ship-awards) lists the construction cost for the ship as $265M in 1961 which is $2.3B today. They didn't list a source."

      Actually what that says is that we got more efficient about building carriers. 3.3% inflation (the rate that gets you from $217MM to $2B today) applied to the Forrestal cost would get you to about $301MM for the Kitty, notwithstanding cost of improvements in the Kitty Hawk design. Of course, that improved efficiency is what we got by building 4 carriers in 10 years.

      The secret to getting improvement in costs--of ships or aircraft--is competition among manufacturers.

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    7. Kitty Hawk's cost of $265m in 1961, compared to $12.8b in 2019 for a Ford, suggests an inflation rate of 6.9%.

      H.W. Bush's cost of $6.2b in 2009, compared to Ford, suggests an inflation rate of 6.8%. Close.

      Kitty Hawk's cost compared to H.W. Bush's also suggests a 6.8% inflation rate.

      Delete
  20. "If we know, with near 100% certainty that the ship won’t be upgraded and modernized and will, in fact, be retired early, why do people persist in trying to argue for long design service lives? Clearly, the rationale - that modernization will occur - is false."

    And we have found one point of common ground. Tis is the crux of the problem. The Navy knows that if they admitted that, their whole shipbuilding plan would blow up in Congress because of cost. So they lie to get ships built, and then lie again to get rid of them early. The basic problem is dishonesty among the naval leadership.

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    1. "the rationale - that modernization will occur - is false."

      And we have found one point of common ground."

      The only logical conclusion from this is to stop building ships with 35-50 year design service lives and switch to 20 yr lives (or less, depending on specific ship type) for all the reasons I've listed as well as to recognize reality.

      So, now that you're firmly in the 20 yr ship life camp, what does that do to your fleet structure/size calculations?

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  21. "So, now that you're firmly in the 20 yr ship life camp, what does that do to your fleet structure/size calculations?"

    I'm not firmly in the 20-year life camp. I'd say we have common ground about the problems, but not necessarily about the solutions. We are going to keep building some ships with inherently longer lives (mostly bigger ships, like carriers), and that will drive the average fleet life up. What to do with the rest is still an open question to me.

    What I need to see is hard data (more than the guesses we have on here) about what it would cost to do maintenance properly--say, to implement my 40-year model of years 1-9 in service, year 10 out of commission for major maintenance, years 11-19 in service, years 20-21 for super major maintenance (could be almost a rebuild) then 22-30 in service, 31 major maintenance, and 32-40 (or whenever) in service. The compare that to the cost of building twice as many ships to cover the same 40 year period.

    Unlike the way you have characterized my comments, I think the first thing we have to do is to figure out what we need, and then figure out the most cost-effective way to get that. I still think we need 24 carriers, 8 BBs, 8 ASW helo carriers, 200 escorts, 60 amphibs, 92 SSBN/SSGN/SSN, 120 littoral combatants, 12 ABM/BMD ships, and 76 auxiliaries. Exclude the littoral ships and auxiliaries, which you don't include in your proposed fleet, and that's 404 for me versus your 398. So somewhere around 400 is where we need to end up for the apples to apples ships. Cost comes in to figure out the best way to get them. If we can build a 40-year ship with a midlife rebuild that makes it basically good as new (more than the WWII cans got with FRAM) for less than two 20-year ships, then that's the way to go. I haven't seen any data that tells me the answer to that.

    I do agree that major problems include the failure of the Navy to perform proper maintenance, the flat dishonesty of Navy leaders about ship lives, construction, and costs, and the dwindling number of US shipyards capable of building naval ships.

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    1. "40-year ship with a midlife rebuild that makes it basically good as new"

      You can't. This is one of the major problems with long service lives. Consider the Perrys. They were designed in the early 1970's and built from 1977-1989 and so would have served from 2017-2029 with a 40 year life. During that time span, think about all the technology changes that took place that simply could not be incorporated regardless of how many upgrades occurred or could not be affordably upgraded. The obvious, major one is stealth. The Perrys are the complete opposite of a stealthy ship. No upgrade could add stealth. So, you'd have been stuck with a decidedly non-optimum, non-combat effective ship until 2029, all because you wanted a 40 yr ship and couldn't upgrade the most important combat development of that time period.

      Now, consider other technology developments during that time period: Aegis, fire control, VLS, advanced computers, and so on. Likely, none of those could have been affordably added/upgraded because they would have involved major structural modifications which, almost by definition are too expensive to justify on an old ship. Even something seemingly simply like adding new computers would likely have been prohibitive because it would have involved running all new cables throughout the ship which, as you well know, is a major undertaking inside a closed, limited access ship which has to maintain watertight integrity. Yes, it can physically be done but not at a cost anyone would care to pay.

      And so on.

      Technology changes too fast over 40 years and much of it just can't be retrofitted at all or, if it can, not for a cost anyone would pay.

      The very concept of a 40 yr life is fundamentally flawed because significantly upgrading old ships is fundamentally flawed. There's a reason why the Navy consistently refuses to upgrade ships.

      There are times when a certain, limited upgrade is a good idea but those are relatively few and best done in the first 10 yrs, not after 20+ years.

      I know you're enamored of this 40 yr, upgrade concept but a calm, objective analysis shows that it's an inherently flawed idea. I've presented all the reasons why. You just need to let the acceptance fill you with joy and peace!

      Delete
    2. "There's a reason why the Navy consistently refuses to upgrade ships."

      Yes, because Navy leadership is fundamentally dishonest.

      You like to use the Perrys as an example. Are the LCSs better than the Perrys would be today in any material respect? They're faster--when their engines work--but otherwise anything? What if we spent as much to upgrade and renew each Perry as we spent to build each LCS?

      I'm not enamored of any particular ship life. If I'm enamored of anything, it's having the fleet we need to do what navies are supposed to do--win wars--and building it in the most cost effective way possible. If you can demonstrate with factual evidence that 20-year lives are the best way to do that, then I'll come aboard. But I'm not going to jump onboard what seems to me to be counterintuitive proposition without hard evidence.

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    3. "You like to use the Perrys as an example."

      Okay, if you want to ignore that data point, consider the Burkes. Arguably (and not really), the number one attribute of a modern, high end, combat naval vessel is stealth. The current standard is the Visby. By comparison, the Burke is only marginally stealthy and that's being generous. How do you upgrade the Burke's stealth to bring it up to current standards and give it a chance to succeed on the modern battlefield? You can't! It's not possible to change the ship's stealth signature to any significant extent. That being the case, what's the point of having 40 yr Burkes if, after 20 yrs, they can no longer be effectively upgraded and can no longer survivably participate in modern combat? Even the Chinese Type 055 is, by comparison, far more stealthy. By insisting on 40 yr Burkes, you handed the Chinese a decisive advantage.

      "But I'm not going to jump onboard what seems to me to be counterintuitive proposition without hard evidence."

      I've given you logic, examples, qualitative cost information, comparative examples, lists of benefits to short ship lives, and more. What else do you want?

      Be objective!

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    4. "Yes, because Navy leadership is fundamentally dishonest."

      That's true but irrelevant to this discussion. The Navy is correct that significant upgrades generally don't make sense and when they do significant upgrades, such as for carriers, the cost is astronomical.

      Yes, the Navy plays bait and switch with Congress about 40 yr life spans but their fundamental objection to upgrade worth is not wrong. As I said, there are, most certainly, times and places where limited upgrades are a very good idea but the notion of wholesale upgrades at mid-life are unaffordable and without value, as I've demonstrated through examples.

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    5. "By comparison, the Burke is only marginally stealthy and that's being generous. How do you upgrade the Burke's stealth to bring it up to current standards and give it a chance to succeed on the modern battlefield? You can't! It's not possible to change the ship's stealth signature to any significant extent."

      So why are we still building Burkes?

      Delete
    6. "I've given you logic, examples, qualitative cost information, comparative examples, lists of benefits to short ship lives, and more. What else do you want?
      Be objective!"

      But you haven't actually put numbers on it. You've derided my spreadsheet, but that's the ultimate objectivity. Numbers are objective. So what does your spreadsheet look like?

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    7. "So why are we still building Burkes?"

      The list of reasons is long:

      incompetence
      stupidity
      fear of failure
      history of failure
      absence of in-house design capability
      refusal by the Navy to recognize the threat of China
      no imagination
      and so on ...

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    8. "But you haven't actually put numbers on it. "

      There are two cases (the two options): 40+ yr life and 20 yr life.

      Numbers exist for the 40 yr life case and you have them readily available. They include the current runaway costs of ships, the shrinking fleet, the exploding maintenance and operating costs of old ships, reams of upgrade costs (noting that, other than carriers, none of the upgrades are of the magnitude you're calling for).

      There are no numbers for the 20 yr case because we haven't done that since WWII and earlier. I can make up numbers but you won't be convinced by that and you can make up your own numbers just as well. Lacking actual numbers, the overwhelming evidence that I've presented is what you have available to make an assessment based on.

      Jack Welch (of GE fame) said that anyone can make the right decisions with all the data. Real leaders are those who can make the right decision in the absence of complete data. You have far more than enough evidence to make the right decision. Don't be a Navy leader, refusing to make a decision and dithering while waiting for complete data. Be a real leader. You have all you need.

      I would also remind you that many of the benefits of 20 yr ship lives go far beyond the immediate ship construction costs that you're so focused on. Reinvigorating the shipbuilding industry, for example, would be a massive benefit that would lead to even lower ship costs and more competition as well as strengthening our future war production capacity but how do you put a number on that?

      As I said, you have all the evidence you need. You just need the will to make a decision without 100% data. Be a real leader!

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    9. "But you haven't actually put numbers on it."

      I've repeatedly discussed eliminating crew comforts - which requires eliminating deployments in favor of home port training, maintenance, and missions - and you've expressed doubt about the magnitude of the potential savings. Well, just as a fascinating point of interest, following is a list of such non-combat, non-essential comforts that were part of the USS Kitty Hawk (https://www.kittyhawkvets.com/ship-awards):


      Closed Circuit Television: Six channels
      Average Soda Consumption Daily: 5,040 cans
      Public Works Force: 300 personnel
      Number of ATMs: Four (Navy-specific)
      Chaplains: Three
      Ship's Retail Stores: Two
      Dentists: Five
      Barber Shops: Two
      Exercise Facilities: Five
      Lawyers: Two
      Post Office: One
      Pounds of Mail Processed Daily: 2,500 pounds

      This list is, by no means, comprehensive. These were just a partial list of some interesting features. Consider the number of compartments even this partial list requires and the number of sailors working to support these non-combat, non-essential functions and you can see where significant savings begin to accrue by eliminating them. If we eliminate deployments, all those functions can be home port based instead of aboard ship.

      I'm sure a comprehensive list would be 2x-10x larger!

      Interesting, huh? It shows how much we've moved from designing WARships to designing cruise ships.

      Delete
    10. "I've repeatedly discussed eliminating crew comforts - which requires eliminating deployments in favor of home port training, maintenance, and missions - and you've expressed doubt about the magnitude of the potential savings."

      Compared to ship costs in the billions, or even millions, I doubt those would have a material impact, even 2x-10x those. Besides, the Navy is in a battle for personnel with both other branches and the civilian world, and you do away with all those things and your recruiting and retention are going to pay a price.

      As far as no deployments, that won't really work now because we have taken on so many treaty and other commitments. Arguably we need to get rid of some, but we need somebody else to pick them up first.

      Delete
    11. "we have taken on so many treaty and other commitments."

      I'm unaware of any treaty or other commitment that requires nearly year long deployments.

      Delete
  22. "Had the Ticonderoga class been designed for a 20 year life, maintenance costs would have been far cheaper since maintenance costs go up with time."

    I'm not too sure about this. It seems to me that if they had only been designed and built to last 20 years, we would have gone for less rugged equipment the would have broken down earlier and more often in the first 20 years. Obviously there would have been fewer breakdowns in years 21-40, but that's because there would have been no more ships to break down then.

    Loking back at my fleet thoughts,
    24 carriers - probably 50-year life because of size and cost
    8 battleships - probably 45-50 year lives
    8 ASW helo carriers - probably 45-50 year lives
    60 amphibs - probably 40 year lives because not technologically complex, LSTs maybe shorter because of wear and tear on hulls from beaching, NGFS frigate maybe shorter
    92 submarines - probably longer than 20 because of cost, probably in 35-year range because of wear and tear on hulls
    120 littoral - probably 20
    200 escorts - this is really the only place it matters much; I'm looking at 20 cruisers, 40 AAW destroyers, 60 GP escorts, and 80 ASW frigates; query whether I do better building 40-year cruisers for $3.5B, AAW destroyers for $1.8B, GP escorts for $1B, and ASW frigates for $500MM, or 20-year ships for half that?

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    1. "It seems to me that if they had only been designed and built to last 20 years, we would have gone for less rugged equipment the would have broken down earlier"

      Now you're just making stuff up. A 20 yr ship's equipment would be spec'ed for 20 yrs.

      Come on. Be a little bit fair and objective!

      Delete
    2. Perhaps the term is shorter service life rather than less rugged equipment. At least, I think what he is getting at.

      Delete
    3. "A 20 yr ship's equipment would be spec'ed for 20 yrs."

      Exactly. And in many cases, spec for 20 years would be less rugged than spec for 40 years.

      Delete
    4. If it lasts 20 yrs, that's all it needs.

      Delete
  23. We seem to have common ground about several things.

    We seem to agree that what the Navy is doing is stupid and incompetent and dishonest.
    We seem to agree generally on the size of the fleet needed, although differ in some details.
    We seem to agree that some major units like carriers will necessarily have longer lives.

    I guess what I'd like to understand from you is to which ships exactly would you apply the 20-year-life standard, and how many would you want, and how much would you spend on them. Going back to my spreadsheets, if I cut costs to the bone and go with 20-year lives for a significant portion of the fleet, then construction cost/year very quickly blows up into the $30-40B range, and I just don't think congress is going to go there. So I'm trying to fit the fleet I think we need into what I think we can sell congress, and I can't get there with 20-year lives. You have put forth a proposed fleet. How much do you expect to spend for each of the ships, and which ones do expect to be your 20-year ships? I'm a numbers guy, so if I could see some numbers that worked then I might come aboard.

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    1. "which ships exactly would you apply the 20-year-life standard,"

      Every ship but carriers. I'm on the fence about BBs - I'd have to analyze that with a naval ship designer but I'm leaning towards 20 yrs.

      I would also point out that I have almost no need for an amphibious fleet so there's an immense savings there.

      "$30-40B range, and I just don't think congress is going to go there."

      'Going there' is not an option, it's an existential requirement. It is the Navy's job to present the case to Congress that that amount of ships and budget is required if we are to secure our survival as a nation. It is Congress' job to juggle the national budget and provide the required funding. Now, Congress has to believe the Navy and, currently, the Navy has depleted any trust they ever had with Congress by repeatedly lying to them so that's a problem. A good start to regaining the trust would be to demonstrate that the Navy is ONLY proposing things that are ACTUALLY vital to our national security. So, for example, the Navy should start by firing 2/3 of all the Admirals (the rest are not vital to national security), immediately retiring all the LCS, terminating the Ford program, terminating the unmanned vessel program, not accepting incomplete ships, and … well, you know the litany. Do all that and then you can begin to build some trust which will lead to convincing Congress that you really need whatever budget you're saying is required. Also, the degree of cost savings by doing all those things WILL PAY FOR THE INCREASED CONSTRUCTION BUDGET!!!!!!!!!!! You recall the somewhat recent exercise we went through in a post about saving money and we all found many tens of billions of dollars of savings. There's plenty of money available IF WE SPEND IT WISELY.

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    2. “Every ship but carriers. I'm on the fence about BBs - I'd have to analyze that with a naval ship designer but I'm leaning towards 20 yrs.”

      If you actually run the numbers, I think you’ll find that’s harder than maybe you believe. It was when I ran the numbers. See, I didn’t start from the numbers as you alleged. I started from requirements, and then tried to figure out how to make it work. We need X ships, if we can get them for $Y and make them last Z years, then we can make the budget work. Start with X and then solve for Y and Z.

      “I would also point out that I have almost no need for an amphibious fleet so there's an immense savings there.”

      I think you are focused almost single-mindedly on peer war with China, which I think is unlikely ever to happen. That doesn’t mean we don’t prepare for it, because the way to keep it from happening is to be so well prepared that China would never want to go there. I don’t foresee an amphibious assault on the Chinese mainland, but that doesn’t mean we don’t need an amphibious capability. The scenario I think we need to prepare for is the old “two and a half war” standard, where can fight peer wars on two fronts—China in Asia and Russia in Europe—and also deal with a rogue nation or terror threat. And an amphibious capability could be very useful in dealing with that rogue/terror threat. What I expect as long as China doesn’t believe that they can beat us head-to-head is a series of proxy wars. So we need to keep China thinking that they can’t beat us head-to-head while winning the proxy wars. I also see a couple of amphib needs in a war with China. One, contests along the first island chain, and two, port seizure along the series of ports China is building in south Asia and Africa. Also, if you don’t spend $4B apiece on LHAs and $2B apiece on LPDs, amphibs are cheap. My whole proposed amphib force prices out at $40B, about half the cost of what the Navy is proposing, or about $1B/year. That’s not breaking any banks.

      “So, for example, the Navy should start by firing 2/3 of all the Admirals …, immediately retiring all the LCS, terminating the Ford program, terminating the unmanned vessel program, not accepting incomplete ships, and … . Do all that and then you can begin to build some trust which will lead to convincing Congress that you really need whatever budget you're saying is required. Also, the degree of cost savings by doing all those things WILL PAY FOR THE INCREASED CONSTRUCTION BUDGET!!!!!!!!!!!”

      Agree 100% with every one of those steps, except that, again, if you run the numbers I don’t think it will pay for the increases you need, particularly when you add training and maintenance and aircraft and weapons needs. But doing those things would be an appropriate opening salvo to convince congress you were serious. I think your approach has merit in an unconstrained-cost environment. But short of a shooting war with China and/or Russia (by which time it will be too late) I don’t think we are going to get that.

      From playing with the numbers, I think you could get it down to a number that you could sell to congress if you went with a high/low mix and staggered target lives—carriers, 50 years; BBs, cruisers, amphibs, and auxiliaries, 40 years; destroyers, frigates, and submarines, 30 years; littoral and small combatants, 20 years. Doing that gets the average life down to about 30 years and cost/year down to $28.7B, about where CBO has priced out the 355-ship plan. Maybe one approach would be to start with some true littoral and small combatants, get smaller shipyards back in the game, and stimulate some competition. Using what I think are reasonable costs for your proposed fleet, with 20-year lives comes out to $36B/year ($33.8B if you really can build $5B Nimitzes and $2B Forrestals), excluding auxiliaries.

      I’m with you absolutely until I run the numbers, but then I just can’t make the dog hunt.

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    3. "I’m with you absolutely until I run the numbers, but then I just can’t make the dog hunt."

      The final - AND ONLY - consideration is that if the navy is an existential requirement, YOU HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO PAY WHATEVER THE BILL IS. ALL ELSE IS SECONDARY. You pay the military bill and then, and only then, do you worry about budgets for whatever else you want as a country.

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    4. "if you run the numbers I don’t think it will pay for the increases you need"

      I would remind you of all the personnel we've noted that are shore based and the vast majority of those are likely unnecessary. HUGE savings to be had, as you, yourself, have noted. Any reasonable person could easily streamline the Navy and find billions upon billions of excess money without ever having to start making tough decisions. Just low hanging fruit.

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    5. "The final - AND ONLY - consideration is that if the navy is an existential requirement, YOU HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO PAY WHATEVER THE BILL IS. ALL ELSE IS SECONDARY. You pay the military bill and then, and only then, do you worry about budgets for whatever else you want as a country."

      I like your point. I just don't think it is realistic in this political climate to expect to be able to do that. But if we don't do exactly that, then we need to get as close as we can.

      "I would remind you of all the personnel we've noted that are shore based and the vast majority of those are likely unnecessary. HUGE savings to be had, as you, yourself, have noted. Any reasonable person could easily streamline the Navy and find billions upon billions of excess money without ever having to start making tough decisions. Just low hanging fruit."

      No disagreement there either. I've talked about two studies that provide indicators of how much:
      1) The CBO force structure study that shows 40% of Navy/Marine Corps active personnel in admin/overhead positions. That suggests, to me at least, that we could cut admin/overhead headcount by 50% and add 22,000 sailors to the fleet and 11,000 to fleet support (maintenance and training), and double the reserves to have more headcount for surge.
      2) The McKinsey "tooth to tail study" which says that USA defense expenditures are 16% for combat, 7% for combat support, and 77% for admin/overhead. That suggests, again to me at least, that we could increase DoD-wide combat and combat support expenditures by 25% each, and cut admin/overhead expenditures by 25%, and reduce the defense budget by 100,000, or about 15%.

      Either one of those suggests that the money and personnel to do what is needed are already there, it's just a matter of reprioritizing in favor of warfighting instead of paper-shuffling.

      I don't think we can go straight there from here, but I do think we need to head in that direction.

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    6. "I don't think we can go straight there from here"

      Of course not! On the ship construction front, a good start would be to abandon the Ford design and revert to a Nimitz or Forrestal design with all non-combat, non-essential crew comforts deleted. That's not going to instantly produce a $2B carrier but it's a step towards responsible, combat-based design and shipbuilding fiscal sanity instead of the lunatic path we're on.

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    8. I think the Kitty is a superior design to the Forrestal, although I still love my first ship, Ranger. The port elevator is really in the wrong place on the Forrestals, so you can't use it during flight ops, and the flight deck is about 30 feet wider on the Kittys, so handling aircraft is easier. And I think you create a recruiting and retention problem with deleting all crew comforts, most of which add very little to the cost of the ship. But abandoning the Fords and reverting to a Nimitz/Kitty mix is an excellent idea.

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