Some of the recent posts have engendered discussion about
strike aircraft with people offering opinions about multi-role versus single,
one-seat versus two, adapting existing aircraft versus purpose built, and so
on. In essence, everyone is endeavoring
to answer the question, what kind of strike aircraft do we need? Lost in this discussion is the most
fundamental question: why do we need a
strike aircraft? No one has addressed
this and yet no discussion about strike aircraft can begin until this question
is answered. The universal reaction of
commenters is that of course we need strike aircraft. It goes without saying. It’s a requirement because it’s always been a
requirement and always will be. Battleships
strike aircraft will always be needed.
What I just described is a paradigm – a mode of thinking that has become so ingrained that it’s not even possible to consider an alternative (see, “Knee Jerks and Paradigms”). Most people are locked into the paradigm of strike aircraft and are incapable of considering any alternative. Thus, asking the fundamental question of why we need strike aircraft, let alone answering it, is not even a possibility because the paradigm, itself, is the answer: we need strike aircraft because we’ve always needed strike aircraft.
ComNavOps, in solitary contrast, has opined the we don’t need a strike aircraft, at least not as we think of it today. I’ve brought this up in multiple posts and comments but it’s time to focus in and address the question of why we need strike aircraft … or *gasp!* not.
As always, let’s start with history.
Historically, strike (meaning, generically, the ability to reach out and touch someone with lethal effects) has been notable for two characteristics:
Limited Range – Prior to the advent of the aircraft, naval strike was performed by ships carrying large caliber guns. Range was limited to a maximum of twenty miles or so and this rendered many land targets inaccessible and, therefore, immune. The rise of aircraft changed that by providing immense range, on a relative basis.
There is a subset to the range discussion and that is the aircraft weapon’s release range. While the aircraft may be able to fly hundreds of miles, thus greatly extending the host vessel’s strike range, the aircraft still has to approach the target fairly closely to reach weapons release range. Stand off missiles have somewhat increased the release range but, at the same time, defending surface to air missile (SAM) ranges have hugely increased which results in the aircraft still often having to enter the defender’s engagement zone.
Nearly Non-Existent Accuracy – Prior to the advent of the aircraft, naval gunfire was wildly inaccurate and required many, many rounds to achieve a single hit. Even the development of aircraft did not change the fundamental inaccuracy of strike. Aircraft bombing was wildly inaccurate, requiring many bombs, torpedoes, or bullets to achieve a hit. Dozens and dozens of aircraft, concentrated in a single, massive strike, were required to offer even a slight chance of hitting a target, whether on land or at sea.
In more modern times, precision guided weapons have offered a partial solution to the accuracy issue. I say, ‘partial’, because the accuracy of precision guided weapons is overstated (consider the glowing accuracy claims in Desert Storm versus the substantially less impressive post-conflict documented results) and the performance of precision guided weapons in the face of peer defenses and electronic warfare has yet to be established but is absolutely going to be far less than we’ve grown used to while attacking terrorists and third world countries. Still, precision guidance offers a significant improvement over dumb bombs.
We see, then, that the advent of the aircraft seemingly solved the first characteristic of limited range and, with the dawning of precision guided munitions, has somewhat solved the accuracy issue. However, defenses have not been static, either. As aircraft have increased strike range, defenses have increased defensive ranges. As aircraft and precision guided weapons have increased accuracy, defenses have decreased accuracy by forcing greater standoff distances, employed sophisticated electronic warfare measures, deployed highly effective point defenses, constructed hardened shelters, and employed obscurants and decoys (chaff, flares, etc.), among other measures. That leaves us with aircraft still having to penetrate robust defenses, face significant attrition, and struggle to achieve accuracy without excessive losses … not an ideal situation. That’s asking a lot of aircraft, especially non- or marginally stealthy aircraft. The F-18 Hornet, for example, has few of the characteristics (range, speed, stealth, armor, redundant systems, dedicated air-to-ground sensors, etc.) necessary to have a reasonable chance to penetrate a peer defended target, destroy it, and survive to return home.
So, where does this leave us as regards the question of why we need strike aircraft?
It leaves us with the realization that aircraft are not ideally suited to the task, even stealthy aircraft. Considering the kinds of A2/AD zones an attacker will face, the range of modern SAM systems, the effectiveness of point defenses, the development of modern electronic warfare and decoys, the steadily decreasing value of stealth, and the existence of highly effective defending air forces, the odds on successful strikes by aircraft are poor.
Well, poor odds do not alleviate the need for strike. We still have to destroy the enemy’s assets. Does that mean we just have to do the best we can and accept the likely high attrition rates from aircraft strikes – kind of an aerial Charge of the Light Brigade? If so, then that’s our answer, right there. Yes, we need aircraft strikes and our job is to maximize the effectiveness and minimize the losses, as best we can. Of course … if there was another option … an alternative … some other way to strike …
Fortunately, there is another option … an alternative. Cruise missiles!
Cruise missiles have almost all the characteristics for an effective strike asset and few of the limitations of aircraft.
Cruise missiles have,
- Great range
- Potentially supersonic speed
- Potentially excellent maneuverability, especially terminal approach maneuvering
- Large payloads,
- Low cost
- No pilot risk
Consider … for the cost of a single $100M strike aircraft carrying, say, two JSOW AGM-154C 500 lb warhead bombs, we could procure 33x $3M Tomahawk type cruise missiles with 1000 lb warheads. That’s 33,000 lbs of explosive cruise missiles versus 1000 lb of JSOW explosive. It makes no sense, whatsoever, to use an aircraft when cruise missiles are available. Thus, there is no role for strike aircraft.
Cruise missiles can do everything a manned strike aircraft can except return home and their small cost renders that exception irrelevant.
Consider … a carrier strike group, even with four carriers as ComNavOps calls for, can muster a maximum of around 80 aircraft for a strike and even that’s more wishful thinking than reality (see, “Carrier Strike”). With two major strike weapons per aircraft, that’s a total of 160 strike weapons. By comparison, a single SSGN carries 154 cruise missiles. There is no role for strike aircraft.
Conclusion
It is clear that strike aircraft have no role in modern strike against a defended target. Cruise missiles can do everything a strike aircraft can, and more, with few of the drawbacks and none of the risk. This makes the role of the carrier and air wing that of escort for the true strike assets (Burkes, SSGNs, and Air Force bombers) and localized air superiority.
So, the question of why we need a strike aircraft has been answered: we don’t !
Now, instead of discussing what type of strike aircraft we need we can move on to discussing what type of long range air superiority fighter we need for our carriers.
Note: The only role for strike aircraft is in very low threat scenarios like striking terrorists or unresisting third world countries. The aircraft for such a role are Tucano/Skyraider types flying off a WWII Yorktown type carrier.
I'd take a modern strike aircraft over a bunch of Tomahawks any time, given that we're talking about a borderline obsolete missile the Chinese likely won't have much trouble shooting down.
ReplyDeleteNow, the key point here is survivability: I think it's possible to develop a modern strike aircraft with significant superior survivability against a peer when compared to cruise missiles.
Should that not be doable, of course, things would be different.
When such a survivable aircraft with 1000 mile strike range has been developed, I'll revisit the topic. Until then, the conclusion stands.
DeleteFirst thing we need to do is dramatically improve the quality of our cruise missiles. We don't have anything supersonic, let alone hypersonic, and we don't have any sort of SRBM/IRBM. Those are things we need to develop, but this is one area where the Navy has always dragged its feet. And I don't know why.
DeleteAnd yes, we do need a survivable strike aircraft with a 1000-mile combat radius. Then there will be a viable strike mission for carrier air. If we could operate carriers outside the range of China's A2/AD umbrella, and from there launch aircraft that could strike targets--land or ship--around the first island chain, that would be useful.
Obviously there could be a carrier strike mission against a non-peer opponent, such as a rogue nation of a terrorist group, and until such time a China and/or Russia achieve something close to blue-water naval parity with the USA, that kind of proxy war is the kind of engagement I expect we will see more of them. But fight them to win, not like we do now.
"launch aircraft that could strike targets--land or ship--around the first island chain, that would be useful."
DeleteHow would that be better, cheaper, more effective than cruise missiles which don't require a carrier group and don't risk pilot's lives?
You're trapped in a paradigm.
The carriers already need to be there to provide air superiority and cover for any surface units to operate under. That is clearly to be their primary mission. The are not the primary (SSGN) or secondary (VPM) or even tertiary (surface ships) strike platform. But the more ways you have to skin a cat, the more likely you are to get it skinned--particularly in wartime when nothing works the way it is supposed to work. If the primary, secondary, and tertiary strike assets succeed in disabling China's (or Russia's) A2/AD, then strike aircraft could help to deliver the crushing blow. And if we build them right they should be an effective anti-ship weapon as well. Plus, you can call an airplane back; that's harder with a missile. I'm not arguing that aircraft strike be a primary mission, but I don't think it should be ignored and abandoned either. The more ways we have to kill bad guys and break their toys, the better.
DeleteRight now we have a serous need to upgrade the size and quality of our missile inventory. I am not sure how many Tomahawks could get through against a Chinese--or Russian--air defense system, but I suspect it's not optimum. The Navy has never really gotten behind the cruise missile concept, for whatever reason. Given what we could be looking at from China or Russia, we had better take far more seriously both the strike capability missiles provide and the ways to defend against them.
"But the more ways you have to skin a cat, the more likely you are to get it skinned"
DeleteUnfortunately, every strike aircraft bought and placed on a carrier eliminates a fighter from the carrier either due to physical constraints (taking up deck space - not currently an issue with our shrunken air wings but potentially an issue in a war assuming we beef up the wings) or due to budget redirection and/or opportunity cost. Every strike aircraft is one less fighter we can afford and one less manufacturing 'slot' less for fighters which, even you acknowledge, are the main function of the carrier.
Just as there's nothing wrong with a secondary function for an aircraft or ship AS LONG AS IT DOESN'T DETRACT FROM THE PRIMARY FUNCTION, so too is carrying strike aircraft on a carrier AS LONG AS THEIR PROCUREMENT AND PLACEMENT DON'T DETRACT FROM THE CARRIER'S MAIN ROLE. I've just demonstrated that procuring and placing strike aircraft WOULD detract from the carrier's main purpose so, no, strike aircraft have no place on a carrier.
"succeed in disabling China's (or Russia's) A2/AD, then strike aircraft could help to deliver the crushing blow."
If we've succeeded in disabling the enemies defenses then we don't need a handful of strike aircraft. We can just lob missiles (or naval gunfire!) all day long. Using strike aircraft at the point is just making up a mission for them.
"we have a serous need to upgrade the size and quality of our missile inventory."
No question there!
Lots of interesting comments to this topic. But IMO these two previous posts sum it up.
Delete- Naval strike aircraft would be nice to have.
- What opportunity cost is willing to be paid for having naval strike aircraft.
I see a navalized F-22, or equivalent, as being the highest priority the navy has, but the cost for that would be enormous. How much would procuring a strike aircraft get in the way of it?
Lutefisk
Would extended-range battleship rounds help the naval strike mission? They can't be decoyed, can't be shot down as easily as missiles/aircraft can, and without guidance they can still be accurate and more cheaply-massed than cruise missiles can be.
ReplyDeleteG2mil (who sometimes comments on here) mentioned possible extended-range ramjet rounds for 16-inch guns at the following link:
https://www.g2mil.com/battleships.htm
There is not existing or envisioned battleship shell that can meet the strike requirement of ranges of hundreds of miles on out to a thousand miles.
DeleteThat said, for short range strikes of dozens of miles, I'm all for large caliber naval guns.
I would also point out that all extended range naval shells use sabot mechanisms to achieve the range and that trades explosive power for range. Thus, the 'battleship' shell that can travel a hundred miles is NOT a battleship 16" shell. It's a sub-shell of some type with significantly less explosive power. One has to question how useful such a shell is relative to the effort expended to deliver it (meaning, the cost of the battleship).
The section about G2mil's ramjet-powered battleship rounds don't mention anything about reducing the caliber of the 16-inch rounds themselves, but admittedly that section is somewhat bare of details of what exactly would go into those rounds.
DeleteStill, even without range-extension technology, quite a lot of cities and their associated infrastructure are already within battleship gun range, as the video below attests to. You might want to spend some time watching this particular section:
https://youtu.be/YasYnqRHkXk?t=317
Iran, as a coastal nation, might be a prime target for "gunboat diplomacy" had the Iowa-class battleships been reactivated and stayed so till the present day, for it has happened before. Captain Larry Seaquist of USS Iowa said the following during the Iran-Iraq War:
"When we would sail the Iowa down the Strait of Hormuz during the Iran-Iraq War, all southern Iran would go quiet."
In any case, if saboted battleship gun rounds can achieve equivalent-or-better explosive and armour-piercing performance than a Tomahawk missile can muster within a given range, why not use those rounds? They'd certainly be cheaper than Tomahawk missiles to start.
As I've said, I'm all for battleships!
DeleteSo am I. Say, would you be interested in making a post going into detail about why you chose the "Battleship Surface Group" composition you did? I can see what you have in mind for one of those on your fleet composition page, but not why you made those choices.
DeleteAlso, where would you send one or more of those BSGs? Would they always be accompanied by one of your Carrier Groups, or could those BSGs go it alone?
"why you chose the "Battleship Surface Group" composition you did?"
Delete"where would you send one or more of those BSGs?"
"could those BSGs go it alone?"
All three questions have, essentially, the same answer. When peer war comes, we'll have precious few carriers available for LOTS of missions. Battleship groups address that lack of carriers by handling some of the slightly lesser missions that we feel may not require massive carrier aviation support or that can be done with whatever Air Force aviation support is available. With that in mind, you can then understand the group composition where the escorts handle the AAW and ASW but don't need the massive numbers of escorts because they'll be handling slightly less demanding missions.
That also answers the 'where would I send them' question. They'd operate around the near periphery of the major operations but not in the middles of the major operations (unless part of a carrier group).
From the preceding, it becomes obvious that, yes, the BB groups would operate alone in the sense of not normally with carriers.
"As for the "invincibility of cruise missiles"
ReplyDeleteI've deleted the comment that went with this quote as it was 100% factually incorrect. I will not allow incorrect statements on the blog. Feel free to research the topic, get your facts correct, and then re-comment, if you wish.
Thanks for doing that. The part about Syria using chlorine gas is what bothered me the most.
DeletePlease don't delete me, bro . . .
If 2/3rds of US cruise missiles were shoot down, I think US military would have a hard time hiding that fact and would be scrambling to buy a new replacement....don't think that would be an acceptable loss rate....
DeleteWe're not going to discuss incorrect facts. I'll be deleting any further comments from anyone about made up facts.
Delete"This is the same argument that was made against guns on aircraft in the 1950s -- "we can't think of a use right now so there must not be one"
ReplyDeleteNo, this is not the same situation. What I'm saying - and you completely missed - is that there is a better solution to strike that obviates the need for strike aircraft.
You might want to re-read the post while contemplating your obvious paradigm adherence.
@Mazryonh I remember something about an 80s era project that used 11in SABOTs out of an 16in gun that offered significant range increases.
ReplyDeleteSee my earlier reply on the matter.
DeleteSomewhat agree, I think we should develop a better strike fighter TO COMPLIMENT cruise missile strikes. Also think we need to consider a replacement to the Tomahawk, its slow and vulnerable, to use an analogy, its like a old 4 gen fighter versus a brand new 5th generation fighter, still has a role but we need something better. Tomahawk could be used for second day of war not knock down the door first day. We could use some more entrants in the field to provide more choices and better prices for sure.
ReplyDeleteWonder though if cruise missiles become the primary strike force, should we continue with just DDGs and SSGNs (really wish we could build new ones!) OR should we refurbish Zummies with more VLS tubed (short term solution) OR develop a new dedicated CG for strike only, not stick another ship with AEGIS but focused on strike? If CM becomes the focus of the fleet offense, I think we need some new class of ship to accommodate this and train the fleet to operate differently....my 2 cents.
"I think we should develop a better strike fighter TO COMPLIMENT cruise missile strikes."
DeleteWhy? I laid out an entire rationale why not. You've offered nothing to rebut it other than you 'think' we should have strike aircraft. Now, back it up with some logic and make your case!
Cruise missiles make poor decision makers. Until we invent Skynet, cruise missiles are only effective against stationary, pre-planned structures, non-mobile facilities, and other similar locations.
ReplyDeleteCruise missiles can't conduct battlefield interdictions. They can't conduct close air support. They can't conduct SEAD/DEAD on mobile air defenses. They can't conduct aerial minelaying. They can't conduct electronic warfare.
Until we have missiles that can make decisions beyond "Fly to spot X and explode," we're going to need a human decision maker overhead.
"Consider … for the cost of a single $100M strike aircraft carrying, say, two JSOW AGM-154C 500 lb warhead bombs"
I would think that we'd be procuring the plane for more than just a single JSOW attack.
Anyways, I feel that this discussion is more academic than practical. Technology has advanced far enough that there's no real limitation in integrating air-to-ground capability into aircraft that already have AESA, IRSTs, datalinks, etc, such as how the F-22 is used as a bomb truck these days.
"cruise missiles are only effective against stationary, pre-planned structures, non-mobile facilities, and other similar locations."
DeleteIncorrect. We now have the capability for loitering missiles that can evaluate and cooperatively assign targets as well as track and attack moving targets (the Tomahawk anti-ship version, for example).
"SEAD … electronic warfare"
Those capabilities are only needed to support strike aircraft. No strike aircraft, no need for those capabilities.
"aerial minelaying"
This is not a viable capability against a peer defender. No minelaying aircraft (the B-1 bomber) is capable of survivably penetrating hundreds or thousands of miles of enemy defenses to lay mines where they would be effective.
"We now have the capability for loitering missiles that can evaluate and cooperatively assign targets"
DeleteLoitering munitions aren't cruise missiles. The characteristics of having loitering weapons are (for now) incompatible with long-ranged, ship-launched cruise missiles, especially in terms of warhead size, loiter time, and situational awareness capability.
"as well as track and attack moving targets (the Tomahawk anti-ship version, for example).
The TASM was retired in the 90's because it turns out that having a 1000nm missile that can't discern between an enemy warship and a neutral civilian ship is a recipe for diplomatic disaster.
The US Navy is only now contemplating putting anti-ship capability back in, but only if they can add in datalinks and other safeguards to ensure that the weapon doesn't hit civilians.
I'm not convinced that the Navy's current plans for the Tomahawk are viable in a real-world combat situation. The fundamental problem of 1000nm shots with subsonic missiles hasn't changed: ships can and will move, often on unpredictable courses. The longer the range, the more likely that it is that the enemy will no longer be where you think he is going to be.
"Those capabilities are only needed to support strike aircraft. No strike aircraft, no need for those capabilities."
I don't agree. As I described before, there are many missions in which a manned strike aircraft will be necessary. SEAD and EW will still be needed to handle mobile SAMs (of which nearly all SAMs are these days).
"This is not a viable capability against a peer defender."
Oddly enough, while this one is currently performed by manned aircraft, I think that this mission might be better suited for cruise missiles in the long run due to the risks you've identified.
For now, however, there is no cruise missile capable of performing the mission. This means manned aircraft with upgraded aerial mines, like the Quickstrike-ER.
"The characteristics of having loitering weapons are (for now) incompatible with long-ranged, ship-launched cruise missiles,"
DeleteNonsense. Tomahawks already have loitering capability. From a Pop Mechanics review article on Tomahawks,
"Block III added GPS, ... as well as a loitering capability."
Even more capability,
"Block IV Tomahawks added more features, including the ability to be re-routed to new targets in mid-flight. Block IV missiles also feature a camera and datalink, allowing a missile to send imagery back to friendly forces. If a Tomahawk discovers its target already struck or civilians are crowding the target area, the missile can be re-routed to destroy something else."
"The TASM was retired in the 90's because it turns out that having a 1000nm missile that can't discern between an enemy warship and a neutral civilian ship is a recipe for diplomatic disaster."
The Block Va adds moving target, anti-ship capability, imaging and comms to allow command guidance, and penetration aids.
"SEAD and EW will still be needed to handle mobile SAMs"
Are you reading what you're writing? SEAD is only needed if you're sending manned strike aircraft. What mission requires SEAD other than manned strike?
You need to update your knowledge about cruise missiles and then update your thinking to account for that updated knowledge! Most of your statements were factually incorrect.
"Tomahawks already have loitering capability."
DeleteWrong kind of loitering. The kind used by Tomahawks is to allow the controllers to reprogram the missile to conduct strikes against alternate fixed targets. Same with the retargeting/camera capability on the Block IV and V where they can retask a missile to hit a secondary target and then perform BDA with the follow-on missile.
Cool stuff. Until they put a camera pod underneath the missile that can survey the battlefield to find enemy vehicles or other targets that isn't a building *AND* the capability to make decisions itself, the Tomahawk is basically just a glorified SLAM/SLAM-ER (which had this capability nearly 30 years ago).
It might be helpful to think of this in terms of strategic strike versus tactical strike. Cruise missiles excel in the former, and they're awful at doing the latter.
"The Block Va adds moving target, anti-ship capability, imaging and comms to allow command guidance, and penetration aids."
I know. I said as much in my comment above that you read, too. I also said that I'm skeptical that it'll be useful in a peer conflict. For all of the datalinks in the world, the geometry of multi-hundred mile-long naval engagements doesn't favor a subsonic cruise missile engagement of being successful.
"Are you reading what you're writing? SEAD is only needed if you're sending manned strike aircraft. What mission requires SEAD other than manned strike?"
No need to be hostile. As I described above:
* Battlefield air interdiction
* Close air support
* Aerial Minelaying
* DEAD
As you noted, SEAD and EW are typically missions that support manned strikes. However, the above missions aren't going anywhere anytime soon. That means that SEAD and EW aren't going away anytime soon.
"Wrong kind of loitering."
DeleteSays who? I find that perfectly useful loitering!
I would also point out that a manned aircraft cannot loiter over a peer defended target. That's just a duck in a shooting gallery! You're quibbling over some kind of 'loitering' definition that only you have while ignoring the main issue that the cruise missile can do the mission better than a manned aircraft which has no hope of doing whatever kind of loitering you envision. As any strike pilot would tell you, it's one pass and haul ass!
I've overwhelmingly demonstrated that there is no need for manned strike.
The Tomahawk's loitering orbit has a diameter in the tens of miles and takes forever to complete a circle thanks to it's stubby wings and anemic engine. It's not what you'd want to support troops with CAS or to search and destroy moving ground targets.
DeleteThat means it makes a LOT of difference in terms of loitering capability. Compare the Tomahawk to the ALARM or the Delilah. The ALARM used a parachute and stayed nose-down, so there is no orbit in which the weapon is pointed away from the battle. The Delilah could use one of several sensors to surveil a battlefield and mark/engage targets.
The Tomahawk is used to attack pre-planned coordinates, not moving ground targets: The controller plugs in precise LAT/LON (or grid, or whatever they use), Tomahawk flies to that position and blows up. If the controller wants a new position, it uploads a new LAT/LON and the Tomahawk flies to a new coordinate and blows up.
A peer enemy's mobile ground forces are likely not going to cooperate by standing still for eight hours while the Tomahawk strike is on its way!
"I would also point out that a manned aircraft cannot loiter over a peer defended target. "
As you said, one pass and haul ass. Why would I want to loiter above a target defended by a peer threat?
"You're quibbling over some kind of 'loitering' definition that only you have while ignoring the main issue that the cruise missile can do the mission better than a manned aircraft which has no hope of doing whatever kind of loitering you envision."
Well, you brought it up. Having an orbit diameter the size of Kansas doesn't help much when you have troops in contact. Tomahawks also lack the situational awareness you'd want in a loitering munition as their cameras are basically soda straws looking straight ahead. Until they put down- and side-facing cameras on the Tomahawk, it's not going to work.
Compare the Tomahawk with the Delilah missile, which is specifically designed as a loitering munition to be used on mobile targets on the battlefield:
* It has EO/IR/ARM sensors as needed depending on the target environment
* MITL capability to control and direct the weapon as needed
* Reattack capability
* Smaller warhead for tactical targets
* Smaller overhead orbits owing to to its smaller size
The Delilah is not a perfect weapon, however, as it doesn't have radar and it requires a human to decide on which targets to attack.
"Compare the Tomahawk to the ALARM or the Delilah."
DeleteWhy? What are you arguing about? Is it that the Tomahawk is not the world's most advanced cruise missile? It's not! That doesn't change the conclusion that strike aircraft are not viable.
"ALARM or the Delilah"
You're making my conclusion even stronger! Thanks.
"A peer enemy's mobile ground forces are likely not going to cooperate by standing still for eight hours while the Tomahawk strike is on its way!"
But it will for a manned aircraft strike?????
"CAS"
CAS is an army issue not a Navy issue. We're talking about carrier strike aircraft.
"loitering munition"
I cannot understand why you think this is an issue since manned aircraft cannot loiter at all. Cruise missiles can, with varying degrees of capability. If, for some reason, we think that a loitering cruise missile is critical, we can build one. We cannot build a survivable loitering manned aircraft.
It's really unclear to me what, exactly, you're arguing for or against. Your comment provides further evidence of the superiority of cruise missiles over manned aircraft so, thanks for that. Beyond that, you seem to want to argue that Tomahawk is not the world's most advanced cruise missile despite the fact that no one claimed it is. Again, quite puzzled! Take a moment and think about what you're arguing for or against before you comment again.
"Why? What are you arguing about?"
DeleteLoitering orbits. You raised the Tomahawk as an example of a loitering weapon when, for the purposes of this discussion, it really isn't. If you had raised the Delilah, then you'd have a point on a useful loitering tactical strike missile.
"That doesn't change the conclusion that strike aircraft are not viable."
The the technology does not yet exist for cruise missiles to perform all of the missions that strike aircraft currently perform.
"You're making my conclusion even stronger! Thanks."
Well, no, I'm not. As I described, current loitering munitions are extremely limited. The Tomahawk is probably the worst kind of cruise missile to attack mobile targets for all of the reasons I've spelled out above. The alternatives aren't much better, and the best missile (Delilah) still requires manual engagement by a human.
"CAS is an army issue not a Navy issue. We're talking about carrier strike aircraft."
You may not *like* the CAS mission, but it's still performed. Until the Marine Corps is formally dissolved (which ain't happening anytime soon), naval aviation-including big wing carriers- will have to support Marines on the ground.
"It's really unclear to me what, exactly, you're arguing for or against."
That's likely due to the scattered way that you've replied to my comments, which has caused us to move down three or four tangents. Allow me to summarize my position:
Cruise missiles *cannot* perform specific missions that are currently performed by strike aircraft. There is no missile in the world that can do any of the missions (which I will list below). I've described the limitations of modern cruise missiles, and why they are not useful toward completing those missions. Some of them try real hard, but the technology still isn't there. Until and unless we invent an AI capable of being completely autonomous in its target selection criteria, we won't have a system that can replace strike aircraft.
Cruise missiles excel in one and only one mission set: attacking pre-planned, non-moving targets at long range. If the ground target is moving, or if it is a target of opportunity, or if you have troops in contact, then a cruise missile is almost certainly the worst kind of weapon. Anti-ship cruise missiles better as long as they have relatively shorter ranges, but will face problems regarding accuracy over long flight distances. They also run the risk of significant collateral damage if they hit something they shouldn't. I'm open to changing my mind about long-range anti-ship cruise missiles after we have reports on their effectiveness at not sinking cruise liners in war.
The missions that cruise missiles currently cannot perform that require strike aircraft:
Battlefield air interdiction
Close air support
SEAD / DEAD
Electronic Warfare
Aerial minelaying
And as I noted in a previous reply, the minelaying mission is well-suited to transition to cruise missiles as the target water area is unlikely to move or be hidden. However, there is no missile currently in service that can do the minelaying mission.
"current loitering munitions are extremely limited."
DeleteHow is that even relevant? Manned aircraft can't survivably loiter over a target so it isn't an argument for strike aircraft. Again, I'm lost what you're arguing for or against.
"naval aviation-including big wing carriers- will have to support Marines on the ground."
No. In any peer war, carriers will be providing interdiction well away from any ground combat. Amphibious ships with F-35Bs may supply ground support but that's a completely different topic and is a Marine concern not a carrier aircraft issue.
"Battlefield air interdiction
DeleteClose air support
SEAD / DEAD
Electronic Warfare
Aerial minelaying"
You've left out the main mission which is the subject of the post and that is strike. You've left it off your list because cruise missiles are better suited, as demonstrated in the post.
So, on to the secondary missions that you've listed.
Battlefield air interdiction - I'm not sure exactly what you think that is but a cruise missile can strike any target that an aircraft can. Cruise missiles have imaging capability and can select target types from their image libraries.
Close air support - This is not a Navy strike aircraft mission, as I've explained. It's a Marine mission and an Air Force mission.
SEAD / DEAD - This is not needed for cruise missiles.
Electronic Warfare - This is not needed for cruise missiles.
Aerial minelaying - This is the only mission you've listed that a cruise missile can't perform but no manned aircraft can perform it to any degree of useful effectiveness, either. The B-1 is the only aircraft that can perform the mission to a useful degree and it's not survivable in the mission.
Again, you've made my case for me so, thanks!
"You've left out the main mission which is the subject of the post and that is strike. You've left it off your list because cruise missiles are better suited, as demonstrated in the post."
DeleteWhere did I leave it off? I have noted previously that cruise missiles are well-suited to attacking pre-planned, stationary targets. I must have said that a half-dozen times by now.
In any event, since when has the word "strike" been used to exclusively describe deep penetration attacks against fixed targets? The word is a shorthand of "airstrike" which means all kinds of air-to-ground attacks. Even looking through your past blog posts, I haven't seen the term redefined.
"Close air support - This is not a Navy strike aircraft mission, as I've explained. It's a Marine mission and an Air Force mission."
Then why did you call it an "Army issue" previously?
In any event, this isn't even correct. CAS is very much a US Navy mission as the Navy provides CAS to US ground forces, especially the Marine Corps. I get it that some in the Navy don't like the CAS mission as they feel it's a distraction, but the need is still there, and thus the Navy has the mission. To perform the mission, the Navy has used strike aircraft (previously known as "attack" aircraft).
"So, on to the secondary missions that you've listed."
These aren't secondary missions. They're the primary mission for strike aircraft on "Day Two" of a war ("Day One" being attacks against fixed and any mobile targets that can be caught out in the open).
I'm excluding anti-ship missions from this discussion as that's a wider topic I don't have time to get into.
"I'm not sure exactly what you think that is but a cruise missile can strike any target that an aircraft can. Cruise missiles have imaging capability and can select target types from their image libraries."
This is, quite frankly, a laughable assertion. Cruise missiles will be awful at BAI, and I challenge you to show me a cruise missile that can autonomously spot, identify, and engage mobile military targets in all weather conditions and without hitting civilian targets at a rate better than humans can.
The closest missile I know of is the Delilah, and I've described its shortcomings previously.
However, like I've said, I want to know if this kind of missile exists.
Furthermore, cruise missile imaging libraries are used for terminal guidance, specifically to make sure that the missile is in the right place when attacking a fixed target. When cruise missiles can roam the battlespace at will, autonomously picking out military convoys amidst a highway traffic jam, then we'll be in a new age of artificial intelligence. When that happens, I suspect we won't need manned military aircraft at all.
I also suggest you read up on BAI, as it seems that you're unfamilair with the concept:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_interdiction
As for the rest, I've beaten it to death in this discussion.
Anwyays, I hope that I've made my point. Even though I haven't convinced you, I hope your readers will recognize the discussion that we've been having.
Always a pleasure to discuss with you!
I was waiting for, and expected this post!!! I think the conclusion, and the premise that carriers are protection for the true "shooters" is correct. We do need a modern, fast, and reasonably priced replacement for the Tomahawk though, as well as a hard look at SSGNs and the need for (more of) them now and in the future.
ReplyDelete@Jjabatie. Yes, agree, its more than just replacing a shooter really, I think the way you operate and what ships you need would be changed too. Carriers would need lots more long range fighters, need more SSGNs and I think you need a dedicated strike CG or DG. Training would change too.
Delete"By comparison, a single SSGN carries 154 cruise missiles. There is no role for strike aircraft."
ReplyDeleteExcept, when an SSGN has fired all it's missiles and returning to base, carrier-based strike aircraft can continue the fight. At the same time, carrier-based strike aircraft can deliver other types of weapons, such as sea mines and antiship missiles.
"Except, when an SSGN has fired all it's missiles and returning to base, carrier-based strike aircraft can continue the fight."
DeleteYes, no, and it's irrelevant. Yes, those few aircraft that survive and can be repaired in time could conduct a 2nd strike until the carrier's magazine runs out or the number of viable aircraft drops below the necessary level to conduct a viable strike.
No, carriers don't operate that way. They don't stand and fight. They approach, strike once, and flee due to the need to avoid counterattacks, the need to refuel their escorts, and the need to replace their decimated air wings.
It's irrelevant because another SSGN takes the place of the original, if warranted, unless we only have one SSGN in the entire fleet.
You are clearly 'all in' on the strike aircraft paradigm!
As you well know, the Navy plans to retire Ohio and Florida in 2026 and Michigan and Georgia can't be too far behind. And, their replacements, the Virginia Block Vs carry only 40 rounds and the first one probably won't be in service for another 7-8 years.
DeleteAnd, as you know, losing the SSGN's puts extra stain on the surface fleet to fire Tomahawks at the enemy.
Yes, I am 'all in' on the strike aircraft paradigm because there is is need for carrier-based strike aircraft.
"Yes, I am 'all in' on the strike aircraft paradigm because there is is need for carrier-based strike aircraft."
DeleteWhat need? Cruise missiles can do everything - and generally more - that a manned aircraft can do so why do we need manned aircraft? What can a manned aircraft do that a cruise missile can't?
You're just repeating yourself that you want manned strike aircraft but you're not saying why.
The SSGN retirements without replacement are unwise but we already have hugely more VLS cells (both surface ship and submarine) than we have cruise missiles so, in a sense, their retirement is irrelevant although, eventually, it will come back to haunt us.
Come on, you've made two comments now and have yet to offer a single reason why we need manned strike aircraft. Give me something!
Not every target needs to be hit with a sledgehammer. Sometimes, a ballpeen hammer does the trick. And, sometimes, your sledgehammer isn't even available.
DeleteLike I said earlier, strike aircraft can deliver a wide variety of munitions, including sea mines, antiship missiles, and guided bombs. They, in general, carry the type of sensors needed identify land and surface targets. And, their effects can be scaled to match the target.
When we invaded Panama in 1989, two Nighthawk each dropped a 2,000 lb GBU-27 near Panamanian forces to “stun and disorient” them, but not to kill them. Not that it is always goes according to plan, but strike aircraft provide for some flexibility to attack an enemy.
As for those VLS cells, those cells are shared with a lot of other weapons. And, it wasn't that long ago, that you expressed great concern about the coming reduction in the number of VLS cells in the fleet.
"strike aircraft can deliver a wide variety of munitions, including sea mines, antiship missiles, and guided bombs."
DeleteA cruise missile IS a guided bomb! Cruise missiles have anti-ship capability! That only leaves mines and those are not really a viable Navy aircraft strike mission and submarines are a far better means of deploying mines. So, again, no justification for strike aircraft.
"They, in general, carry the type of sensors needed identify land and surface targets."
Cruise missiles have multiple sensors to identify land and surface targets including the claimed ability to target specific parts of a ship (I'm dubious but that's the claim).
" their effects can be scaled to match the target."
So can a cruise missile. You'll recall that in Desert Storm, we used Tomahawks with non-lethal warheads to disperse conductive filaments to disable Iraqi power plants. Cruise missiles can use unitary warheads or cluster munitions - again, tailoring the load to the situation.
Seriously, you're just throwing out general platitudes about aircraft, not specific strike mission rationale and those platitudes apply even more to missiles than the aircraft! Not surprising that you're having a hard time coming up with a rational for strike aircraft, really, SINCE THERE ISN'T ANY!
"Nighthawk each dropped a 2,000 lb GBU-27 near Panamanian forces to “stun and disorient” them"
If we're going to attack defenseless targets in peacetime with non-lethal effects, I've called for Tucano/Skyraider type aircraft. I would also point out that Nighthawks are Air Force aircraft not Navy and so their use is immaterial.
"you expressed great concern about the coming reduction in the number of VLS cells in the fleet."
Because the number is going to drop by many thousands!
If the number of VLS cells "is going to drop by many thousands" how many Tomahawks will the Navy be able to actively deploy?
DeleteI doubt the Navy is willing to give up many cells allocated for SMs and ESSMs.
"how many Tomahawks will the Navy be able to actively deploy?" That's a concern especially with the Navy decision to drop the SSGNs without replacement, although that won't matter in the short term.
DeleteThe more important aspect of the SSGN is that it's the only truly stealthy cruise missile launch platform.
The larger question is how many cruise missiles can the US produce in time of war. Disturbingly, the answer appears to be, not many.
Given we're going to lose the 4 SSGNs and all of the Ticos by 2030, I think the larger question is how many cruise missiles the Navy can we fire in the first days of the next war.
DeleteWhat would you say about sea strike?
ReplyDeleteWould you not want an aircraft to find enemy ships at distance and attack those with anti-ship missiles?
Or would the plan be to use some extended sensor to detect, but I would think you argued against that idea.
On land I would agree, for low tier warfare other aircraft are better and for close support, other a/c are much better.
"Would you not want an aircraft to find enemy ships at distance and attack those with anti-ship missiles?"
DeleteYou're conflating two different missions. Finding is a different mission than striking. I have no problem with using aircraft (my choice is UAVs not manned aircraft) to find targets. Once found, rather than take the time and suffer the losses with a manned strike by aircraft, the obvious and preferred solution is to attack with cruise missiles from a much greater distance. Currently, we have the LRASM with a claimed range of 300+ miles and the Tomahawk anti-ship missile with a thousand mile range. With those capabilities, why would you any commander even contemplate a manned strike?
This is a little bit analogous to using infantry to find targets and then deciding between attacking with infantry or attacking with artillery. Of course you choose artillery! More lethal, able to mass large quantities, and no risk to our own personnel.
"Or would the plan be to use some extended sensor to detect, but I would think you argued against that idea."
I've stated that our current plans to use large UAVs, P-8, Triton, helos, and the like are not survivable or effective. Instead, I've called for extensive use of small, cheap, expendable UAVs.
I am puzzled now : are you saying that cruise missile can operate in a peer war ? Aren't they relying too much on GPS signals which are very likely to be disrupted ?
ReplyDeleteD614-D623
Of course they can operate in a peer war. How well, is the question. For the last several years, the military has been moving away from GPS-only guidance in favor of multi-mode guidance. They've also been 'hardening' the GPS system although the effectiveness of that is unknown.
DeleteFor example, from a Wiki entry about the LRASM,
" LRASM is expected to be capable of conducting autonomous targeting, relying on on-board targeting systems to independently acquire the target without the presence of prior, precision intelligence, or supporting services like Global Positioning Satellite navigation and data-links."
EFOGMs will dominate future wars, but the USA has none, and wants none.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.g2mil.com/efogm.htm
How does this relate to cruise missiles replacing carrier strike aircraft?
DeleteEFOGMs are far better for close air support than strike aircraft, and don't cost $2 million each like Tomahawks. They can't be jammed by anything since they are wire guided.
DeleteWatch this South Korean system in action.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PTUxjGxIfzU
Anti-boat, anti-ship, anti-helicopter, anti-tank ect. Imagine AAVs plodding ashore against an enemy with these.
Okay, there is potential for these as tactical weapons, but they are not even remotely in the class of strike weapons like cruise missiles, SRBM and IRBMs.
DeleteYes, but the title of this post is "Why Do We Need A Strike Aircraft?" Strike aircraft are mostly used for tactical attacks, not strategic targets.
Delete"EFOGMs"
DeleteThat's a short range, army issue not a carrier strike concern.
A lot of the comments for strike aircraft seem to be putting the cart before the horse. If you're attacking land based targets (interdiction) then you're exploiting previously established sea control (unless you have admirals with a death wish).
ReplyDeleteEstablishing sea control and exploiting it has a different set of ideal weapons load out.
For establishing sea control I would want to use missiles as my primary strike weapon for all the reasons in the main post. The aircraft used should primarily be fighters/ interceptors and antisubmarine A/C.
Exploitation of sea control is where attack A/C starts to shine. It provides local observation and decision making with firepower at a distance. Missiles can provide cheaper one shot use. But if you're bombing regularly then A/C is cheaper.
You have to be able to adapt your force depending on what you're doing.
"Exploitation of sea control is where attack A/C starts to shine. It provides local observation and decision making with firepower at a distance."
DeleteAs do cruise missiles. Cruise missiles have various cameras and sensors for bomb damage assessment and target identification and allocation and the missiles can loiter to await target assignments depending on the types and numbers of targets seen.
But you need a justification for 100,000 ton aircraft carriers. But then, what do I know. I served on destroyers
ReplyDeleteWell, the justification for carriers is the escort and air superiority role. The carriers and their fighters will be what protects the Tomahawk shooters long enough to conduct their strikes and protects Air Force bombers and establishes air superiority for other operations.
DeleteGiven our total lack of air bases near China, there is plenty of justification for carriers. Now, mega carriers like the Ford class? - no. We need to return to Forrestal type carriers.
Any conflict between the USA and a potential peer competitor is going to be resolved by space, air, then sea warfare, and possibly by certain cyber-attacks against infrastructure. None of this is the specialty of ‘strike aircraft’, and even USAF bombers primary weapon will not be JDAMs, but very long-range standoff air-to-ground cruise missiles, and hopefully not the strategic kind. Discussions advocating, strike aircraft, aerial interdiction, MRLS strikes, and worse CAS are hugely unproductive.
ReplyDeleteFor Fun:
Imagine yourself in the shoes of Winston Churchill overseeing a war strategy meeting early in the war. Your only means of doing real damage to the German economy and war machine is by aerial attack. The Chief of Bomber campaign presents you with a plan for 1,000 aircraft raids that will deliver tens of thousands of tons of incendiary bombs to literally burn the heart out of the enemies major industrial aeras. Then someone jumps in with the idea that instead of using your fighters to actually destroy the Luftwaffe, you should instead arm large numbers with bombs to hit the pitifully few targets in range. Moreover, they suggest that you order your factories to re-design your best fighters into fighter bombers; even though you have not reduced the German fighter numbers.
GAB
Major distinguish a cruise missile to other missiles use rocket engines is it uses jet engine. Jet engine enables a cruise missile flies long distance of its size. It only needs to carry fuel without oxidant (use oxygen in air). There is a problem of it -- too slow in comparison with rocket propelled missiles. Except China's DF-100 (first showed in Oct 2019 parade), all cruise missile are sub-sonic. To achieve high speed, it needs to use ramjet and even scramjet. Despite tons of money been spent, despite many boastful announcements, still, no useable ramjet/scramjet from the defense industry is good enough for cruise missiles.
ReplyDeleteWhile US cruise missiles can hit fixed target with very high precision, there are still issues to target moving objects (tank, etc.). It relies on reconnaissance in enemy's territory, for instance, radar detection, etc. This part requires manned aircraft (maybe drone in future). Strike aircrafts have no problem to attack moving targets on land and over sea.
Today, strike aircrafts no longer need to fly over to drop bombs. They drop guided bombs some distances away. Actually, fly over bombing is very danger today. Why Air Force gives up B-1B but keep old B-52? largely because fly over bomb becomes impossible. If you have to launch missiles (include Tomahawk) far away, B-52 is good enough. A-10, despites its past fame, becomes less and less usable as it needs to fly close and low to use its famous machine gun.
Finally, depend on with whom you fight. A big problem for Navy is it still believe that it can fight all over the world. Time has changed, yes Virginia, harsh reality is you canNOT.
Whatever we are going to use for strike needs considerable improvement. We don't have a supersonic, let alone hypersonic, missile. China and Russia apparently have both. There are tradeoffs. Flying supersonic with any range requires flying at high altitude, where they are detectable longer, whereas subsonic missiles can be sea skimmers and more difficult to detect. We don't have a short-range or intermediate-range ballistic missile. China and Russia have both. We need some of each. We are just woefully behind the power curve on this.
ReplyDeleteWe need a stealthy strike aircraft with a 1000-mile combat radius. If we have that, then carrier aircraft strike becomes a viable mission, although not primary (SSGN) of secondary (VPM) or tertiary (surface ships), all those platforms wit better missiles.
Trident with conventional warhead = very much a hypersonic platform.
Delete"Flying supersonic with any range requires flying at high altitude"
DeleteSupersonic is only important during the terminal approach and there are missiles that cruise subsonic and then do a supersonic, low altitude sprint during the final approach.
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DeleteI agree with CNOps that CV aircraft's 1st, 2nd, and 3rd job is to provide air cover to the fleet, including a strong fixed wing interceptor capability with supporting Electronic Attack and AEW aircraft, and a secondary Fixed/Rotary ASW and ISR role.
Chip is a proponent of a carrier-based strike aircraft, which could theoretically bring a capability that Fighting Irish noted that surface ships lack - depth of magazine. Replying to Irish, CNOps rightly noted these detract from CV Missions 1/2/3 and would suffer from attrition unless launching large long-range standoff missiles, in either case forcing the CV to need to resupply in the same time frame as a fleet focusing on cruise missiles for strike.
SSGNs also solve the depth of magazine issue, and all of us agree we need to get more of them as we also acquire VPMs. GAB glibly noted the SSBNs can be used for more than deterrence, and I'll add that they're not configured with conventional weapons but the tunable-yield warheads with the "super fuse" are an attractive first strike asset for everything from SCS island bases to Hainan, Beijing, and their hardened missile forces. If we really wanted to do a Big Strike, we'd use Tridents.
That said, in an all-out conventional or nuclear strike scenario CV air and the CVBG overall has more to do than keep itself safe as it escorts its VLS platforms into range. With a readiness rate of 33% the Air Force brings a hefty chunk of our standoff-range strike capability with B-52s (~475 AGM-158), B1s (~428), B-2s (~80), and possibly F-15Es with one (72) to three (~216) missiles in addition to drop tanks and MALD decoys (500 mi range!). A nominal 4-CV group with 1/3 of our fleet and surface ships with a respectable 50% tomahawk VLS loadout brings 20 DDG (960 t-hawk), 7 CG (427), 2 SSGN (308), and 10 VPM SSN (120). The numbers are just a thought experiment, but here's some analysis..
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DeleteOne assumption above is that 33% of listed aircraft can be routinely sortied for an alpha strike in the western pacific region. This would require a notable but realistic surge in assets to the region during a war to achieve at any rate. To perform this alpha strike repeatedly at a high tempo would also require investments in regular aircraft maintenance as well as a surge in support activity at Guam and other regional air bases... not to mention investments in air base hardening and missile inventories. In this hypothetical alternative history, the US government and military leadership have taken these things seriously over the past decades and billions of dollars that was thought wasted in acquisition programs, counterterrorism operations, asset liquidations, security assistance programs, and government accounting hiccups were all secretly funneled into underground missile factories and aircraft production/maintenance facilities, filling out our current inventory and easing the ramp-up in wartime production when the time comes.
So, in that fantasy... the fleet brings 1815 Tomahawks and the Air Force brings 1055 equivalents such as the AGM-86 or a hypothetical air-launched LRASM-ER. Until we build more SSGNs or wake up the Boomers, the fleet's strike power depends largely upon the loadout of the DDG/CGs and the numbers used are a reasonable upper limit of what our current fleet could achieve with a limitless tomahawk supply in Guam.
The Fleet can round-trip from Guam to the eastern side of the first island chain in 6-9 days (approx, East CS vs South CS). That's a good turnaround time for the aircraft alpha strike as well, so in a "protected Guam" scenario the Fleet delivers slightly more striking power than the Air Force, but still would work in conjunction with them to minimize the need for land-based air escort and additional tanking.
The situation becomes more complicated if we don't or can't protect Guam. The Fleet round-trip becomes almost a month at 15 kts average (accounting for combat operations), while the bombers can alpha strike four times in that period - we'll call it 3 on account of the additional tanking required though I suspect we could keep up with the tanking. In an "abandoned Guam" scenario the Air force can deliver 3x1055 missiles (3165) in the month it takes the Fleet to deliver ~1800.
In the "abandoned Guam" scenario the Fleet's strike power is still very considerable, but for sustained strategic strike operations the fleet would be tasked with escorting the Air Force strike and reserving its strike assets for self defense, remaining on station to enable maximum-tempo air strike operations with minimal land-based air escorts. Offloading in-theatre air superiority to the fleet allows the air base to maximize the operational tempo of the tankers, bombers, and associated support crews, and this becomes preferable to rapid-turnaround strike missions for the fleet when the nearest safe harbor is >3000 mi from the combat area.
If we had spent the billions we spent on the Fords, the Zumwalts, and the LCSs on development of better cruise and ballistic missiles, anti-missile systems, ASW frigates, dedicated MCM platforms, and a 1000-mile combat radius attack aircraft, we'd be way better equipped to defend ourselves and prosecute a peer war than we are today.
ReplyDeleteThis post needs a +1 vote: here it is!
DeleteGAB
Thank you.
DeleteUnderline problem is that they could not image but they could not develop desired weapons. In recent years, we keep hearing failure of new weapons - laser, railgun, hypersonic missiles, scramjet, ... etc. Worse, China got some done so base on Physics and engineering, they are achievable. Quality of US defense R&D seems lower and lower.
DeleteHonest question... Are you ex-USN or with naval experience in general? I am *not* looking for a fight or to criticize or anything. I'm just curious.
ReplyDeleteAs for myself.. I have not served in any branch but I have relatives who have and who endure my questions. Past 40 years I've inhaled as much military history and technology that I can. I won't claim to be any kind of expert but I know a little about a lot.
A few thoughts on Tomahawk land attack missiles
ReplyDeleteTomahawk is long past its sell by date against a peer enemy, why I say this is because the Brits back in 1945 had a kill rate 80% + of the 400 mph German V1 missile, 76 years later don't think much of a stretch to expect Chinese A2/AD will have capability of ~95% kill rate of a 550 mph Tomahawk.
If Navy launched an attack with 1,000 Tomahawks eg targeting the large Shanghai shipyards, maybe ~50 get through and as relying on INS and GPS for accuracy but don't hold out high hopes of success in targeting as unlikely GPS will be operational (either the current GPS satellites will be space debris or its signal will be jammed or spoofed, that's the reason why the USAF jams the GPS signal over a wide area when conducting its annual Red Flag exercises and the Army exercise Project Convergence 2021 will be following and jamming GPS). Assuming 50 missiles get through, 50,000 lbs / 25 tons warheads on target area, perhaps 50% effective, will have minimal effect, think right in saying 1944 was the peak year for German armaments output despite American and Brit bombing.
Second question is how many Tomahawk in stockpile, understand older variants pre Block IV being retired/scrapped, left with Block IV and Vs, so think too few to have any meaningful impact if only ~5% get through, 2.5% effective on target. That might be ok if fitted with nuclear warheads! (Block IV to be updated to incorporate the new encrypted M-Code GPS signal which presuming will minimize spoofing but not jamming).
The Army had the Pershing II nuclear TBM with same range and warhead weight as Tomahawk but it was approx twice the size of a Tomahawk and too large for the Mk41 VLS cell, do wonder if the Navy could have developed a TBM to fit the Mk41 to replace Tomahawk with new gen energetic propellants and so much smaller rocket motor than Pershing II.
Navy has chosen jump TBMs and go with the large and unproven long range, ~2,000 mile?, hypersonic CPS land attack missile, looking like it will be expensive missile, have seen no estimates of a ROM cost released as yet, reported Congress committee flinched when given numbers and cut back Navy funding in FY2021 NDAA. The other massive downside to the CPS is it requires a new large and expensive VLS cell, variant of the Trident missile tube, the ~$500 million Virginia Payload Module is 84' long with only four VLS /tubes and each VLS/tube can only fit 3 CPS missiles, 12 missiles in total, repeat only 12 missiles in total so think very high probability CPS will only be deployed in penny packet numbers due to limited funding from Congress. In the fantasy world the Navy operates in last month they asked industry for proposals install the CPS in the three Zumwalts.
@Nick: Yes: every weapon system is vulnerable/subject to destruction as individual systems, but coordinated mass strikes are a different matter. Add in surprise, feints to misdirect, EW, etc. and even aging systems are useful.
DeleteThe UK knew where V-1s came from and where they were headed. I think Tomahawk's will get through based on the impact of those factors and how important the target is. How many US installations are ready for a similar attack?
Delete"If Navy launched an attack with 1,000 Tomahawks eg targeting the large Shanghai shipyards, maybe ~50 get through"
DeleteOf course, that assumes that the defenders have 950 defensive missiles within range and that each missile has a 100% kill rate. If the kill rate were only, say, 50% then the defender would have to have 1900 defensive missiles in range. Does that seem likely?
The historic defensive missile kill rate is on the order of 1%-25%.
We tend to fixate on individual weapons versus individual weapons and lose sight of the bigger picture.
Don't think China with high growth rate and with it's expected GNP to exceed US by 2026 will have any problems in resourcing the necessary A2/AD tech and assets to counter mass attacks from any direction against the limited capabilities/numbers the 1980's era Tomahawk. It's not as if Navy has that many thousands of Tomahawks in store, think FY2021 buy / upgrade is approx 150.
Delete"Don't think China … will have any problems in resourcing the necessary A2/AD tech and assets to counter mass attacks from any direction"
DeleteThis is more of the isolation type thinking. Yes, if China decided that the only military priority they had was to build massive base defenses then, sure, they could do that. However, the reality is that they also want to fund and resource a massive army, tanks, artillery, ships, carriers, aircraft, ballistic missiles, submarines, and the list goes on almost endlessly. Somewhere in that list is base defenses. So, in the real world, they'll allocate some degree of funding and resources for base defense but it won't be anything even remotely approaching the kind of exclusive effort you're suggesting.
Conversely, the Navy has enough cruise missiles for a few massive attacks and that's it because, like China, we have many, many other priorities as well.
So, switching from the individual Tomahawk against the individual SAM picture to the bigger picture, we see that the US could mount a handful of strong attacks and then some lesser efforts while China can mount moderate defenses at their important bases and lesser defenses at the rest.
Remember, also, that the attacker always has the advantage in terms of concentration of firepower. China has to defend every target and we, as the attacker, only have to attack one target at a time. Properly sized, the attacker will always win. However, after a handful of attacks, the US Navy would be out of missiles and out of the attack business unless we can immensely increase wartime missile production.
Of course, the reverse of all this is also true as we consider China attacking our bases. However, in that case, we only have a couple of bases in the region so that allows greater concentration of defense but also greater concentration of attack!
ComNavOps as mentioned previously the historic kill rate was 80% plus, no missiles were involved, understand mainly just old fashioned AA guns with proximity fused shells were good enough.
Delete"as mentioned previously the historic kill rate was 80%"
Delete??????????? Where did you get that?
"Second question is how many Tomahawk in stockpile"
DeleteAccording to Pentagon's rule, US needs to keep 4,000 cruise missiles in stockpile. This is why every time, US fires large number of Tomahawk, MM stock price rises.
Interesting post and associated comments.
ReplyDeleteAs usual, well done CNO you are a master of teeing up a topic, properly validating your position and then defending it.
Four things for consideration that I did not see either in the original statement or the comments were; Strike/Fighter, Power Projection, Presence and Rules of Engagement.
Strike/Fighters: There are no longer dedicated Fighters on a CVN, you have aircraft that are capable of both missions depending on how they are configured and loaded. Makes a big difference as to space on the flight deck, number of squadrons, manning, flexibility etc … Much more effective and economical that say two F-14 and two A-6 squadrons dedicated to separate missions. F/A-18s carry this designation, and although a F-35 does not, it is still very capable in both arenas. Point to be made is, with Fighter capability comes Strike capability. Removing the strike capability and only have Air-to-Air Fighters on board removes tremendous fire power and frankly, there is not enough “Fighter” only missions to justify.
Presence: Presence is part of a strategy to send a very deliberate message and an aircraft carrier without organic Strike capability dilutes the power and associated deterrent of a CVN. Yes, other ships in the CVN BG have Strike ability, but knowing that 4th and 5th generation aircraft with kinetic strike capability stand at ready on the carrier deck sends is a strong message of a rapid reaction force on call.
Power Projection: As defined by Wikipedia, Power projection (or force projection) is a term used in military and political science to refer to the capacity of a state to deploy and sustain forces outside its territory. This ability is a crucial element of a state's power in international relations. Strike aircraft flying from a CVN is one of the strongest ways to display this in a non-kinetic way. Pure Fighters may look ominous, but without kinetic strike capability, not as effective.
Rules of Engagement: Short of a full blown shooting war, and even then there are still rules, ROE is generally very restrictive and “eyes on” or visual confirmation is required. Yes, there are other sensors to do this, but the act of launching a cruise missile in a sensitive environment to ID before engaging is problematic. Adversary will see the act as “they just fired a cruise missile”. On the other hand, a Strike aircraft are well suited to evaluate the situation and then react or not react iaw ROE; much less of a chance for an international incident.
My argument is not perfect but will venture to say that yours is not either; not as simple as a cruise missile can engage the same target set. CVNs are the epitome of carrying a big stick and have more reactionary and sustained capability than a SSGN.
In summary, International politics and diplomacy is complicated, not binary, cruise missiles generally are binary; launch and go kill something. Strike aircraft make adversaries think twice about their actions or potential actions, and I believe it is the presence and power projection displayed with Strike aircraft that reinforce this.
Strike Aircraft are part of an overall strategy, removing them removes larger elements of power project and presence that influence and deter our adversaries. The threat of cruise missiles also does this, but it’s a package of potential kinetic force displayed in multiple ways that makes it effective.
Nice comment. Wrong, of course, but nice. Time to defend. To wit,
DeleteStrikefighters - I've thoroughly and exhaustively documented the fallacy of strikefighters that try to combine two roles. They're supreme at neither. In a peer war, you're either supreme or you're dead. 'Nuff said.
Presence - This is a highly suspect concept that events over the last couple decades have proven is invalid. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, NKorea's development of ballistic missiles, Iran's development of nuclear weapons and export of terrorism, China's annexation of the E/S China Seas, Russia's annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine, among many other examples, prove the fallacy of 'presence' as a deterrent.
Power Projection - The same arguments apply as with 'presence'. This is an invalid concept. Even if one chose to believe the concept, we have a global Air Force and Army that can project power ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD in a matter of hours. In contrast, we generally have only one or two carriers deployed at any give moment and they can 'project power' over a miniscule portion of the globe. Beyond that, terrorists don't care whether there's a carrier several hundred miles away with aircraft on deck. They don't even know!
Rules of Engagement - This is an issue only during peacetime and, therefore, is irrelevant to this discussion which is about wartime strike. That aside, the requirement for 'eyes on' is easily (and better!) filled by UAVs since we don't risk losing a pilot (the Gary Powers scenario).
"removing them removes larger elements of power project and presence that influence and deter our adversaries."
Given that our 'presence' and 'power projection' have utterly failed to deter anyone or anything over the last two decades, removing strike aircraft from a carrier has no negative consequence, whatsoever.
"Removing the strike capability and only have Air-to-Air Fighters on board removes tremendous fire power"
It removes little firepower compared to cruise missiles and GREATLY ENHANCES AIR SUPERIORITY FIREPOWER if replaced with pure fighters.
Nice comment … unfortunately, wrong!
Appreciate your comments and you are more skilled than I at retort, but I do have a few comments for you to consider.
ReplyDeleteStrike-fighters do not need to be supreme … Our inventory today, with its ability to project power, kinetically or non-kinetically, in a self-escort role is tremendous and meets the need. If you wanted to load an F/A-18 one way or another, pure fighter or strike, you can and they are outstanding at the task at hand. Hybrid, pure fighter or pure strike (or tanker), I would launch in a Hornet any day with supreme confidence in airplane and capabilities. From firsthand experience, agree to disagree here.
Presence: Yes Iraq did invade Kuwait, but … First, there was no presence in the region at the time and … Once presence did arrive, USS Independence came from the Philippines, further advance stopped. Chalk-up one for presence, with power projection. Not a shot in anger was fired by USS Independence, but the advance stopped, and allowed forces to mobilize to push back and regain ground.
Power Projection is the collection of forces to include Strike Aircraft from a CVN, part of the big picture, not a nice to have. Remove it and your Global Strike lessens, calculated risk if you want to take it.
Rules of Engagement, you are incorrect. Rules of engagement do not only apply to peacetime operations; they are always present but flex depending on the AOR and conflict. It is never anything goes; ask any JAG/Military Lawyer.
You make good points but are bias toward a binary answer. Power projection and presence, albeit “fluffy” at times, do play a role and do affect those decisions of our adversary. Does every rogue terrorist contemplate where the CVNs are today, of course not, but near-peers do and pay attention. May not seem like they do or get reported in the open press; guaranteed that acts of aggression have been thwarted because of the Strike Fighter capability of a CVN.
Pleasure to joust with you, you stimulate and foster productive thought, I do not disagree with you, just offer an opinion to help shape yours.
" I would launch in a Hornet any day with supreme confidence in airplane and capabilities."
DeleteTo help you understand my reasoning, I wouldn't hesitate to fly a Hornet to attack terrorists or Iraq in Desert Storm or some such. But - and this is the big but - I wouldn't want any part of flying a Hornet into the teeth of a peer (Chinese) defended target. To do that, I'd want the most optimum pure attack aircraft possible; one with stealth, terrain following, speed, maneuverability, internal air-to-ground sensors, internal weapons, great range, and all the other things that make a truly supreme strike aircraft and most of which the Hornet lacks. Going up against a peer defense with a Hornet is a good way to wind up with one less landing than launch in your log book.
For the run of the mill pickup truck plinking and peacetime terrorist bombing, sure, any aircraft will do. For peer defenses, only one will do and the Hornet isn't it. A cruise missile, on the other hand, does everything a Hornet does, most of it better, and risks no pilots.
"further advance stopped."
There is absolutely no evidence that presence stopped anything. Do not confuse correlation with causation. We could just as legitimately say that President Bush sneezed and the advance stopped. You may find the presence idea appealing but it is totally unverified.
As far as the specific claim that the Independence deterred further advances, the actual facts suggest otherwise. Iraq accused Kuwait of stealing oil, made demands, and when they weren't met, launched an invasion of Kuwait on 2-Aug-1990. The invasion concluded on 4-Aug-1990 with Iraq seizing all their objectives and looting the national bank. Independence did not arrive until 5-Aug-1990, a day after Iraq operations halted. There is every indication that Iraq had no plans for further advances and achieved everything they wanted.
You suggest that countries keep track of carrier locations and are deterred by them. If so, Iraq would have known that Independence was in the region and available within a few days and yet Iraw launched the invasion of Kuwait anyway. Iraq was not deterred.
"acts of aggression have been thwarted because of the Strike Fighter capability of a CVN."
Again, there is not a single documented instance of this. There are, however, many examples where presence did not deter enemy actions. For example, the NKorean seizure of the Pueblo while US aircraft and the USS Enterprise were within strike range demonstrates that NKorea was not deterred from committing an act of war against the US - a proven failure of deterrence.
To be fair, proving that deterrence worked in some specific scenario is nearly impossible, however, the reverse - proving deterrence failed - is easy and commonplace. I've already listed several of the more noteworthy examples.
So, again, you may find deterrence and presence and power projection appealing but there is no evidence for its validity and lots of evidence of its failure.
"You make good points but are bias toward a binary answer. "
Yes, the binary choices are, 1. right and 2. wrong. I naturally gravitate towards 'right'. 'Fluffy' is what people claim when they lack the will to make the 'right' choice and wish to justify their failure to do so.
"ROE"
You seem to be assuming that the only options for a restrictive ROE are a cruise missile or a manned strike aircraft. For such a situation, the preferred choice would be a UAV. It risks no one and is, by far, the least threatening option among cruise missiles, strike aircraft, and UAVs. A UAV would provide all the eyeball monitoring required and with almost zero threat. So, by your own argument, a strike aircraft is a poor choice!
All good points and aside from living through much of it, have no additional info found in the open press to provide more explanation; you are a tough cookie CNO. Fluffy is one word, but perhaps shades of gray; not black and white is a better explanation. Like you say, easy to refute but sometimes hard to substantiate. As for me, Roberto Duran best said it, "No Mas".
ReplyDeleteFair enough! Whether I agree with it or not, a well written/presented differing opinion enhances the value of the blog by providing alternative views. That's what the preceding discussion was and, as such, I value it. Readers can consider and decide for themselves. Good stuff!
DeleteWhile I agree that future of the strike role will be reserved for cruise missiles (and drones, although the distinction between the two is blurring more and more and will continue to do so), thereby relegating the carriers to a support role, you are not taking your own logic to its ultimate conclusion, ie you are stuck in a paradigm of your own.
ReplyDeleteSomeone hinted at it in one of the earlier comments, and it has been the topic of earlier posts: why is the USN still stuck with the Tomahawk and why has so little effort been put into developing, new, better, faster and much longer ranged weapons?
The answer is simple and goes to the heart of your own paradigm. Not only are naval strike fighters (as a major power projection force against (near-)peers) going the way of the dodo; by that same logic, so is the entire USN surface fleet.
Like or not (given that this is a naval blog the overwhelming reaction be on the 'not'), when (and NOT if) cruise missiles have ranges in the many thousands of miles, there will be little need for very large, extremely expensive floating bulls-eyes, aka the large combatants of the surface fleet.
Look at China for example, Bejing is only about 3500 miles from the Alaskan mainland and 2500 miles from Guam. For a fraction of the cost of the navy's ships you can install vastly larger quantities of long range cruise missiles there than the USN ships could ever carry. And you can disperse them negating one of the big problems of using 'floaters' to carry them, if they go down, they take down everything on them all at once. One hit can cost you a significant fraction of your force.
It's not going to happen tomorrow or the next five years, but continuing with surface ships as main sources for power projection in (near) peer warfare, be it strike aircraft or cruise missiles, is a dead end. It already is fiscally.
The navy isn't the only one suffering from this paradigm problem btw. So too does the air force with their ridiculous focus on 'deep penetration heavy bombers', like the B2 and B21. Like the surface vessels of the navy, they're too expensive to risk and don't do a better job than (very) long range stand-off weapons (such as cruise missiles) launched from the ground or by by cheap bombers who can stay well out of the range of any air defences. (And yes, you can park them in Alaska and Guam and anywhere else you have bases, further negating the future viability of the navy in its current form).
There will be a future role for naval vessels, but it will no longer be in the form of the dominant branch it now is. It will also be almost entirely defensively oriented, not offensively.
I know that few if any of you will agree with me on this, which is why I have so far refrained from stating what to me is blatantly obvious. But now that we're addressing naval paradigms, I figure i might give it a go. So let's go all the way and address the elephant in the room.
The whole point of a navy was (historically) that you needed ships to carry firepower to where it was needed due to the distances involved (which included aircraft carriers btw, which are just a variation of the same old principle). But when smart cruise missiles have ranges in the thousands of miles, you no longer need to carry that firepower to where it's needed. It'll fly there itself (while possibly hitching a ride on a land based bomber first). In that case, you don't need ships to carry them any more either, do you?
This is why the navy has refrained from developing the kind of cruise missiles others already have or are developing. They are nails in the coffin of the navy itself.
Please pay close attention to what I am NOT saying. I'm not saying the navy will disappear. I'm not saying there won't be any role for the navy any more. But what will be left will be very different from what they have been doing (or trying to do) so far, and much smaller in scope.
R.
"you are not taking your own logic to its ultimate conclusion, ie you are stuck in a paradigm of your own."
DeleteThis is an outstanding comment. I disagree with much of it but it is an excellent, thought provoking comment. Exactly what I like! Well done.
To specifics:
You overlook several functions that cannot be replaced by missiles:
Convoys - supplies must always get through even if it's nothing more than replacement cruise/ballistic missiles and sea transport is still the only efficient, viable means to transport large quantities of cargo.
Convoy Escort - if you're going to have convoys you need to provide submarine and AAW protection for the convoy.
Mobile Cruise and Ballistic Missile Protection - bases such as Guam; Guam, as a fixed target, can be overwhelmed whereas an AAW ship is mobile and difficult to target and thus can provide persistent, survivable protection.
Submarines - subs remain the only truly stealthy attack asset.
ASW - Since the enemy will have subs, we need ASW.
Shore Area Bombardment - I still see a need for land attack by large caliber naval guns to support ground combat operations. Cruise/ballistic missiles are far too expensive for area bombardment and are subject to decoys, electronic countermeasures, and SAMs, among other defenses. Naval shells are immune to all defenses. Obviously, given the range limitations, this is somewhat of a niche capability and would depend on the particulars of whatever war crops up.
The Seat of Purpose is on the Land - This age old truism is still true and always will be. To that end, true and total victory requires ground combat and those forces and their supplies can only be transported by ship which, again requires transports, cargo ships, and escorts, including, most especially, carriers due to our utter lack of air bases in the Pacific region.
Mining - mines remain one of the most powerful naval weapons and only ships/subs can lay the required numbers of mines. Again, only ships can provide the required degree of mine countermeasures.
"you can disperse them negating one of the big problems of using 'floaters' to carry them, if they go down, they take down everything on them all at once."
I think you miss a key point here. Land bases of missile are fixed and known and can be readily destroyed by the enemy's missiles. In fact, you even suggest that LARGER quantities of missiles be sited at these bases so you'd lose even large quantities of your inventory. In contrast, a constantly moving ship is much harder to find, track, and destroy especially at the ranges that the ships could maintain with these new extremely long range missiles you postulate.
I can go on listing reasons/uses for a future navy but this suffices for initial discussions.
I'd like to see you address these issues, not as an argument but as a discussion. How can these needs that I've outlined be met in your non or reduced Navy concept, if they even can?
Again, really great comment! Well done. I look forward to hearing your thoughts.
R. definitely overstated their claim, even with the major caveat that the Navy would still exist. CNOps pointed out a dozen good reasons to have surface ships that look largely like current ones do, but none of those reasons were "strategic strike". If R's premise about the changing cruise missile paradigm were true, cruise missiles (incl. SSGNs) would replace all other strategic strike assets except perhaps ballistic missiles. Even if you needed bombers and cruisers and carriers, it would be for their tactical capabilities and using them to launch strategic cruise missiles from in-theatre that could be launched from out of theatre just detracts from their tactical capabilities.
DeleteHowever, that's just not where we are, it's not where we'll be any time soon, and it might not even be where we're going. Cruise missiles are a platform that suffers from the same laws of physics, engineering, and economics that prevented the US's decades-long fighter program from producing an airframe with outstanding payload, range, and speed as well as minimal size and cost. We're not going to make jet engines more than a few % more efficient or discover a new jet fuel with higher energy density; if we want longer range missiles they need more fuel and proportionately larger engines, which costs more. This relationship looks a lot like the "rocket equation" - although jet engines are somewhat more forgiving than closed cycle rockets - and the solution is similar to that used in rockets; staging. Instead of making a massive (expensive) rocket (cruise missile) that takes a tiny payload all the way to orbit (CONUS to China), the economical approach is to make a smaller (cheaper) upper stage (cruise missile) propelled by a lower stage (Ship/Aircraft). Staging is economical for rockets even when they're sub-orbital and their stages are discarded, and orbital rockets have many stages. Cruise missiles give the most economical payload delivery when they have just enough range to keep the launching platform safe, but the real cost spike comes somewhere from 1000-2000 miles. As CNOps noted, even at those ranges (vs intercontinental) a stealthy and mobile ship (or bomber) is unlikely to be detected by dragnet satellite ISR or radar, so there's more pressure for us to develop and rapidly acquire a modernized TLAM and VL-LRASM with ~1000 mi ranges than to develop a longer range, larger, more expensive cruise missile.
"You overlook several functions that cannot be replaced by missiles"
DeleteExactly.
"Submarines - subs remain the only truly stealthy attack asset."
If all we are going to prepare for is to attack China, there is an argument that all we need are SSBNs and SSGNs, and a lot more of them. That's why in my proposed fleet which I have shared on here before, I have more SSGNs (20) and more VPMs (30) than I have seen from anyone else. The tradeoff is that in order to get sufficient numbers without blowing the roof off the budget, I have also proposed 30 smaller and cheaper ASW/surface-attack SSNs (French Barracuda as a paradigm) and 30 AIP SSKs for choke point and port defense duties, to free the SSNs up for other jobs.
But in any scenario, including a peer war with China and/or Russia, there are many other needs for a Navy, and SSBNs/SSGNs are essentially useless for any of them.
Part One
DeleteAs I was afraid would happen, most of the comments and rebuttals are either addressing issues I did not state, are ignoring that we are talking about (near) FUTURE capabilities and not current ones, or are cherry picking from my arguments.
"You overlook several functions that cannot be replaced by missiles"
I did not.
I explicitly stated that the role of the SURFACE fleet as a MAJOR source of POWER PROJECTION in (NEAR) PEER warfare is coming to an end.
All highlighted parts matter. It is and has been the dominant role of the USN and it is exactly that role (and not all others) that is coming to an end. That is why they are so desperately scrambling to find a new way to remain as relevant as they are now and not lose most of their budget.
I also explicitly stated that the new role would be primarily defensive. Most of the functions you claim I overlooked are defensive in nature (convoy escort, ASW, dealing with mines, off shore protection of land bases. Those are exactly the kinds of defensive tasks the navy ought to be focusing on but isn't (as you know very well).
The offensive functions you claim I overlook are either not conducted by the surface fleet or are suicidal against (near) peers (like shore bombardment).
"I think you miss a key point here. Land bases of missile are fixed and known and can be readily destroyed by the enemy's missiles."
I'm sorry to say so, but again, I am not, it's you who is overlooking an important issue (two really).
If you properly disperse them it will take a lot of enemy missiles (which would also need the range to get there) to take them out. How many? Well, with mobile land launchers in hardened shelters, and both passive and active air defences it will take two or more missiles to take out a single one on the land. Given proper defensive measures it's a losing proposition for the attacker.
And that assumes they can get at all of them before they are launched in return. The incoming missiles will be spotted before they arrive and a response launch is highly likely. In other words, in such a scenario, the attacking launch is almost entirely wasted (the targets are no longer there). That is the conundrum the attacker is faced with if he tries to take out the enemy's land based launchers. He runs the serious risk of wasting a huge number of his own long range missiles for no return.
We can all come up with hypothetical scenarios in which one side or the other is overwhelmed. But you cannot simply assume that the other side will have sufficient numbers to overwhelm your land based missiles. That is engaging in wishful thinking to satisfy your own desire for the navy to maintain its relevancy.
Which brings me to the first thing you are overlooking, opportunity costs.
(See part two)
Part Two
DeleteWithout the massive costs of the current surface fleet, all those funds become available for other, far more effective, purposes. Let's use a simple comparison.
A carrier battle group can carry what, between a 150 and 200 land attack cruise missiles? Let's say we can fit 200 very long range cruise missiles in their tubes.
Instead of wasting money on the B21 we design and build a B52 analogue that can carry eight of the air launched versions of these very long range cruise missiles. You'll only need 25 of those very cheap (it doesn't need stealth for example) bombers to launch the same number of missiles as the CBG.
And those aircraft are far more flexible, can cover far more terrain and can return to base and reload in a fraction of the time it would take the CBG. And they are not the fat juicy target that any single large surface combatant is.
The costs of those 25 planes is obviously only a fraction of the cost of a CBG. That leaves you plenty of funds to spend on other stuff to deal with other missions.
(And please note, you can use these bombers and their very long range stand-off munitions against targets just about anywhere in the world)
The second thing you are overlooking is that you are making the assumption that the sea still is and will remain a place you can hide surface ships in. It isn't and it won't be, but that's a whole new discussion.
Again, I ask, WHEN these long ranges missiles are a reality in the near future, what could possibly justify the ridiculous amounts spend on the navy's surface fleet given that other military assets will be able to do the same job (or a better one) for a fraction of the cost, taking into account all the opportunity costs you incur if you keep wasting it on all these large surface combatants?
Finally, I repeat that I'm talking about the US surface fleet. The role of the submarine fleet is far from over. On the contrary, I believe that the decision to reduce the number of submarines with cruise missiles as one of the dumbest decisions of the USN.
R.
"As I was afraid would happen,"
Delete"I explicitly stated that the role of the SURFACE fleet as a MAJOR source of POWER PROJECTION in (NEAR) PEER warfare is coming to an end."
Ah … you had multiple, conflicting statements but you wound up pretty much stating that there would be no need for a surface fleet. Here's your statements:
"Not only are naval strike fighters (as a major power projection force against (near-)peers) going the way of the dodo; by that same logic, so is the entire USN surface fleet.
Like or not (given that this is a naval blog the overwhelming reaction be on the 'not'), when (and NOT if) cruise missiles have ranges in the many thousands of miles, there will be little need for very large, extremely expensive floating bulls-eyes, aka the large combatants of the surface fleet."
That certainly sounds to me like you see no need for a surface fleet. Perhaps that's not what you meant but, if so, that didn't come across. Hence, my response about the various roles of a navy that missiles can't fill.
The upshot is that you appear to agree with the premise of the post and then went a step further based on currently non-existent missile technology. If/when we develop an intercontinental cruise missile, I'll gladly re-evaluate.
"or are cherry picking from my arguments."
DeleteWelcome to my world, by the way!
This sounds alot like the Air Force vs Navy /Bombers vs Carriers argument of over a half century ago!!! But I have to ask, if carriers and the surface fleet are approaching obselesence, why are many navies trying to replicate ours now?? China seems to be current king of long range missile ownership, yet they are chasing large carriers and a large surface fleet at breakneck speed!! Britain has just built two carriers, smaller yet appropriate for their strategic/tactical needs and budget. France is currently doing design work on a large deck carrier. While doubtful to ever be reality, Russia has aspirations of a new large deck carrier. Japan is evolving their navy towards a more offensive naval aviation-centric force. The list continues...
DeletePoint being, battles fought at sea are to influence land events. While the Corps is shying away from major seaborne assaults, the reality is this: Bombers and missiles cant take and/or hold ground. And while CVBGs can't exactly either, they CAN occupy ocean space, and make continued enemy occupation of lamd areas very costly or even impossible. They can support and defend land actions, and do it for long periods of time if necessary. That loiter/repeated attack role cant be done by long range planes/missiles alone. Its very much the NGFS vs air strike scenario, but on a larger scale... (And as of yet, the conclusions havent changed, in spite of how they've been largely ignored)
When we look at the land based long range missile scenario, it actually makes the case for the surface fleet...!!! It was represented as almost an ICBM scenario where someone would launch theirs when an incoming raid was detected. But if that attack was from an offshore fleet, whose location is unknown, then what do all those nice dispersed missiles get shot at?? And thinking that the missile base would only be attacked by a surface fleet is disingenious. We dont fight like that. Combined arms assaults include the AF, and itd be in waves. The "trade our missile for your missile" just isnt realistic. Never mind that any large action would see a multi-CV group with a LOT more escorts and a significantly larger offensive weapons inventory. If bombers and missiles are the obvious future, than in many respects you could also argue that armies and troops are also obsolete. But again, thats not the case, as they are the ones that will ultimately settle a conflict. So while yes, the environment is changing, and warfare is continuing to evolve, until the day that the vast oceans will 100% no longer be able to hide ships, and their defensive capabilities are useless, surface fleets and even carrier aviation will be invaluable tools...
DeleteComNavOps:
DeleteSorry, I tried to make very clear I wasn't talking about the entire surface fleet (hence the last paragraph) but that one poorly formulated sentence slipped by. Which btw is interesting to observe, I did also state several times that I was talking about LARGE surface combatants in a specific role as becoming obsolete, not all of them, but it appears you subconsciously zeroed in on the one time I didn't specify that.
Jjabatie:
As to China's naval build, first they do not have much of a naval history themselves and are mostly copying what others do, trying to learn from others and trying to avoid their mistakes. At least, that's what it looks like to me.
Secondly, my earlier comments are about the future of naval warfare, not the present. The Chinese are building fleet for specific present needs.
Thirdly, they are already doing what ComNavOps talks about in this post. Their 'cruisers' (type 55s) and destroyers, combined with air delivered ASMs and land attack missiles are their power projectors. They are not building fleet carriers (like the ones the US has). They are building just a handful of medium sized carriers whose main task is air defence, not power projection.
Fourth, the Chinese have a specific goal in mind with their construction, regaining control of the parts of China they see as having been stolen from them, most notably Taiwan. They are not so much engaged in hypothetical future scenarios but in establishing such a local dominance now that the reunification can be established with as little cost and fighting as possible.
Fifth, from a Chinese perspective all these vessels serve a defensive purpose primarily. We look at the reunification of the two Chinas as an attack of one country on another, while they (and to be honest, with some justification) see it as the conclusion of a civil war that has dragged on far too long. They want to be able to properly defend ALL of China (including Taiwan) from potential adversaries in the near future.
And finally, if they decide to jump of a bridge, the smart move is not to do the same.
As to your second post, no fleet remains undetected. Period. Not any more. Whether before or after they launch, the odds of them being detected at some point of their mission approaches 100%. Which will likely result in their demise as their defensive measures are finite and are far easier to overwhelm than those on land.
And you are ignoring the cost aspect and opportunity costs. You'll be spending tens of billions of dollars on a fleet launching a relatively small number of missiles (one CBG IS equal to 25 cheap bombers for example).
Part of the difference in cost between your insanely expensive fleet and those 25 bombers is what will be spend on making it hard for that fleet to approach undetected and impossible for it to get away intact.
In the end the question is: does the amount of damage that the (surviving, 'cause air defence) missiles launched by your fleet cause, justify the cost of such a fleet?
You turn it into a question of whether or not such a fleet could, in theory, conduct such a mission. But that's not what this is about. It is about whether or not it is the best way to spend a finite amount of defence dollars to achieve certain goals. It isn't, not any more.
If you are honest in your scenario, than you'd have to include that even if successful, your fleet only managed to destroy a fraction of the enemy's 'throw weight' and that while your fleet was trying to get home, fighting for its life and taking massive casualties, the remaining enemy missiles were successfully destroying the fleet bases, depots, repair facilities and other targets in your fleet's home country. Because with all the money they spend on their fleet, they didn't have enough left to buy proper air defences for their bases. Opportunity costs matter.
R.
R., okay, so if I understand you correctly, you're referring to ONLY the missile launching portion of the fleet while retaining ships of various types for the remaining, largely defensive functions. Correct me if I'm still misinterpreting what you've written.
DeleteAssuming I've got it correct, I have no real problem with your premise other than the actual technology required to produce intercontinental cruise missiles. If/when that time comes, I'll certainly re-evaluate my position.
Again, though I said it once, I feel it's well worth repeating, you wrote an excellent comment!
"continuing with surface ships as main sources for power projection in (near) peer warfare, be it strike aircraft or cruise missiles, is a dead end. It already is fiscally."
DeleteThe fiscal aspect of this comment is spot on and I've addressed this many times. We are firmly ensconced in a death spiral of increasing costs and decreasing numbers. We are pricing ourselves out of the naval business. For reasons that elude me, too many people, including our uniformed Navy leadership, either don't understand this, don't recognize it, or willfully ignore it.
It is refreshing to see someone clearly recognize the fiscal path we're on.
"R., okay, so if I understand you correctly, you're referring to ONLY the missile launching portion of the fleet while retaining ships of various types for the remaining, largely defensive functions. Correct me if I'm still misinterpreting what you've written."
DeleteThat is correct, with the addendum that it also includes the power projection function by strike aircraft. And any sort of significant amphibious operations against (near) peers is also out of the question.
The size and complexity of vessels now deployed by the USN (and as a result, also their cost) are a result of continuing to hold on to the illusion that the navy can continue to successfully perform these functions.
I'll freely admit that I lack the naval expertise to specify in detail the kind of alternative navy you'd need if they were to stop focusing on that (to the detriment of may other tasks I might add). Nevertheless, it seems obvious that scaling down the size of the vessels across the board is inevitable. As is increasing the role of land based naval air assets.
R.
Regarding the fiscal angle:
DeleteI just saw this:
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/39992/watch-a-saudi-f-15-fighter-swoop-in-low-to-blast-a-houthi-rebel-drone-out-of-the-sky
It's a great metaphor for what the US Navy is doing.
While shooting down the Houthi drone may look like a victory for the Saudi's, it is not. As the article correctly adds at the end, the cost of the missile used to shoot down this glorified DIY drone is either around $450,000 (for a sidewinder) or around $1,000,000 (for an AMRAAM).
The drone will at most have cost a few thousand dollars, and probably at the low end of that. We're talking not one but two to three orders of magnitude difference in costs.
From where I'm sitting, the navy s doing the same thing. They use vastly overpriced assets to accomplish missions for which the effects if expressed in a monetary value is but a fraction of their own costs.
That's how you lose wars.
R.
"I just saw this:"
DeleteSomething's not right about the story. The drone is flying low, relative to jet fighter operating altitudes, and yet the missile approaches from almost directly underneath. I don't know what missiles the Saudis use or what the in-flight behavior of the missiles is but this looked more like a ground launched missile. That doesn't necessarily alter the fundamental cost issue but it does make me question the video.
Anon: Your reasoning is interesting and relevant but I have a couple of questions if you don't mind.
DeleteFirst you seem to assume that US missile batteries will be able to operate from Alaska or some other mainland location and at the same time being able to defend itself from incoming missiles. Why wouldn't the adversary be able to defend their installations in the same way, rendering our attack on them as useless as their attack on us?
Also there is the matter of scale. Germany received in the vicinity of 1 000 000 000 kg of explosives through bombs in WW2. Converted to Tomahawks that is well over 2 million missiles. At a cost of 3 musd a piece that is around 6 trillion dollars worth of missiles that can be shot down by cheaper short range missiles. And China is a lot larger than Germany...
The third question I have relates to the amphibious assault question. Both you and CNO have suggested that large scale amphibious assaults are out of the question. While you may be right, where does that leave us? There's a number of islands of strategic importance scattered around the pacific of varying sizes and should an enemy take one of these by surprise we would be forced to just let it be without any amphibious assault capability.
Again, I believe your analysis to be largely correct but I am not entirely satisfied with the solutions.
/IED
"Why wouldn't the adversary be able to defend their installations in the same way, rendering our attack on them as useless as their attack on us?"
DeleteAs I mentioned before, attacking an enemy's land based launch capability would be a losing proposition for the attacker. That does apply both ways.
And the answer is very simple. You don't use them to attack the enemy's launchers. You use them as they are supposed to be used, against the fixed infrastructure that supports military operations; bases, depots, shipyards, headquarters, production facilities, etc. You target the infrastructure that enables the other country to wage war, and not as much their actual military assets. It may sound counter-intuitive but they are not actually that important, not compared to the infrastructure that not only supports them, but without which they cannot conduct effective operations.
Modern warfare is moving further and further away from direct conflict between what is traditionally seen as part of the military. Not everybody recognizes that though.
Wars are not fought between armies and navies. Armies and navies fight battles while countries fight wars. It is a very important distinction. Just look for example at how the US, since WW2, has this distinct tendency to win battles yet lose wars. You need to target the other country's ability to wage war and not the opposing army or navy's ability to fight battles. Again, it's a crucial distinction. There is overlap. Some of the ability to fight battles can and will likely be used to defend critical infrastructure and hence might become relevant targets.
And yes, it does mean that the opposing side will likely get in some initial blows of their own. Losses are inevitable, including to part of your own infrastructure. And that does include strikes against the US mainland. Future (near) peer wars will NOT spare the continental US.
The country who's least able to absorb damage to its critical infrastructure will lose the war, even if their navy wins a couple of battles in the meantime.
"And China is a lot larger than Germany..."
Very fair point. And I too question whether the US would be capable at all to defeat China with purely conventional military means. At this moment my answer would be "no, they can't". They can win battles against China that way, but IMO not a war (see the distinction above).
"should an enemy take one of these by surprise we would be forced to just let it be without any amphibious assault capability."
Correct. If you are talking about islands in range of Chinese air and missile cover, then there is nothing you can do about it that's not near suicidal so why bother?
The days of complete US Pacific hegemony are over. They still control most of it, but not all of it any more. Which means that the suicidal nature of amphibious operations also applies to the enemy if they were to contemplate conducting these (too) far away from their own bases and cover.
Any such operation should be suicidal. If not, then the defenders dropped the ball, badly.
The question you should ask yourself here is 'how many losses, in equipment and men, am I willing to lose in order to conduct a successful amphibious operation?" With the obvious follow up questions being: "what are the required conditions to limit these losses to what I find acceptable?" and "When and where would/could this situation actually occur?" and "Are the potential benefits of paying to have this capability sufficient to warrant all the costs (including opportunity costs) involved?"
Retaining some degree of amphibious capability might be warranted, provided there are areas where you can use them safely, which, almost by definition, precluded their use in areas that are strategically important to the enemy, hence means they'll be of little use in (near) peer warfare.
R
My understanding is that China is building at least two large deck carriers, and intend on more. That tells us a few things.
ReplyDeleteFirst, they have a healthy fear/ respect for ours, and wisely intend to use them to keep us even further away.
Second, they dont believe in their long range missiles as the cure for our surface fleet, otherwise they wouldnt bother with building their own large deck CVBGs.
Third, whether inexperienced or not, the PLAN isnt going to invest in hugely expensive assets that they veiw as obsolete or ineffective, so they must feel that naval aviation has a future. If they actually had somthing that trumps the US surface fleet, they wouldnt copy it.
I think the idea that our surface force cant move undetected, and that it cant defend itself is mostly just wrong. Thinking that replacing a CV with 25 bombers is absurd. Sure the cost is high for a CVBG (and i dont disagree that the price were paying for things is absolutely out of hand, but that a whole other subject) but you gain offensive and defensive depth, mobility, and loiter time that the cheap bomber fleet CANT provide. And again, when ground needs to be taken, (which is how wars are won) how do they get there, who supports the effort, who ensures the flank/rear (the sea) is protected, who escorts the logistics train?? Bombers, no matter how cheap, and how many you have, cant do that. They have their own vulnerabilities as well. Their basing is much more observable, their approaches and timing can be much more predictable than a fleet at sea, etc... There is a place and use for bombers, as well as the surface fleet. Operating together as combined arms is how its done. Focusing on just the cost and perceived vulnerabilities is disingenious. Regardless of the pricetag, some things (surface fleet) need to be on hand to be a successful maritime power, and other navies emulation of ours isnt an accident or a case of everyone being wrong...
There's no point debating you on this as you persist in ignoring opportunity costs, make false claims about what I stated, and making up fantasy scenarios to satisfy your preconceived notions. And you call me disingenuous??????
DeleteR.
Agreed. There is no point, when using buzzwords with no basis like "opportunity cost", thinking that land based air/missiles have rendered the surface fleet untenable, and mixing now/then arguments to give your position merit, while ignoring all the strengths a surface fleet gives you, all all the limitations and weaknesses of shore based air...
DeleteAs I said, things I never claimed. And if you think "opportunity costs" are but a buzzword, you are indeed not worthy of the time and effort. Dream on.
DeleteR.
All right, that's enough of the personal stuff by everyone. Debate the ideas, not the person and try to discuss more than debate.
DeleteIf anyone thinks an idea is flawed then analyze it with data and logic, not insults. Alternatively, we all sometimes arrive at a point where we simply can't change someone's opinion and that's the time to drop it. This may be that point.
"China is building at least two large deck carriers, and intend on more. That tells us a few things."
DeleteIt may tell us something or it may not. You've listed what you think it tells us and that's fine and you may be correct. On the other hand - and this is one of my overarching themes - it may not be telling us anything or, at least, nothing useful.
Consider … at one time, every country in the world that could afford it was building battleships even as carriers were beginning their rise. So, what would that have told us? That battleships had intrinsic value? Or, that battleships had a lot of inertia, paradigm, and tradition without actual value (or not the same value they once had)?
China may have other reasons for pursuing carriers such as a completely different set of objectives than us. For example, they may see value in carriers for use in securing the first island chain from lesser countries and territories. We have no similar goal so we can't learn anything from their pursuit of carriers other than that they have different objectives. They may see no value in our carriers - at least not as we see and use them.
The point is that I'd be cautious about assigning the 'value' to China's carriers that we assign to ours.
This is similar to the 'everyone else has frigates so they must be a good thing and we should get some, too' school of thought … which is completely wrong, as I've demonstrated. Again, just because everyone else is doing it doesn't make it a good or wise thing or anything that we can learn from. It might … but it might not. Caution!
Everyone else has lots of little missile boats so they must be good, right? No … that makes them right for everyone else because they have different needs. It doesn't make it right for us, necessarily.
Way too long winded. I'll stop!
Youre right of course. Ill try to add more "I think"s to be clear that its my opinion not fact!!
DeleteMy veiw of Chinas carrier program is that it has very different uses than ours. While ours are mostly veiwed as offensive platforms, I see theirs as strategically defensive, being used to expand their defense and detection further out beyond the islands. While it could set the stage for somthing Midway-esque (and we would need it to), operating at the edge of shore coverage makes that a tough proposition, although it will be a long time if ever, before we lose a numerical CV advantage. The true danger to us might be their expanded detection bubble that they will have, where their long range missiles could be brought into play. I think the world has a CV momentum, but since China has none, that much thought was put into it before embarking on a costly program to build them, including a "vs US CONOP". Of course, on the flip side, no country is invulnerable to making idiotic decisions (as our recent procurements make painfully clear) so they could be just building to "keep up with the Joneses", with no clue what to do with them. Time will tell!!
Many have confused between invade weak nations/regional powers vs fight another super power.
ReplyDeleteWith Russian help, even Syria could shot down some US Tomahawk during previous raids. Cruise missiles work well on raid weak to regional powers but not super powers.
Strike aircrafts can fly close to weak enemies lack of sophiscate SAM but have to attack BVR on regional powers but with another superpower, there are ways too many variables.
For a superpower like US, we need both. Strike aircrafts can launch missiles BVR, attack enemy radars, ... etc. Cruise missiles (except China's DF-100, usually fly subsonicly) can do jobs suit for them.