It’s Not About One Versus One

Far too often (all the time?) commenters and analysts focus on one-on-one assessments of the weapon systems they are arguing for or against.  The US has more carriers than China.  A Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile can’t be stopped.  This missile has a ten mile greater range than that missile.  This weapon can penetrate that tank’s armor.  And so on.  That’s fine but it completely ignores the big picture.  Where does the weapon system fit into the larger military scheme?  Can it be produced in quantity?  Can it be serviced in the field?  Is it reliable?  And so on.
 
How many times have you heard the argument that if this weapon can beat that ship/plane/tank then that ship/plane/tank is obsolete and useless?
 
One-on-one, the WWII German Tiger tank was nearly unbeatable but that’s not how the war was fought.  Tiger tanks and US Sherman tanks didn’t line up, one against one, in a series of jousts.  The Tiger tank was difficult to produce, lacked numbers, was hard to maintain, hard to repair, and suffered from critical fuel shortages due to Allied attacks on Germany’s raw materials, factories, refineries, etc.  The war against the Tiger tank was fought in many ‘domains’ not just one-on-one.
 
We, as observers and analysts, need to stop the one-on-one thinking that dominates our discussions and begin recognizing and considering the many other factors that make up the larger military picture.
 
Let’s take a look at a current example involving Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian fuel capacity which is impacting the general Russian military effort.
 

Ukraine has intensified its campaign of drone strikes on Russian oil infrastructure, hitting refineries in recent weeks and deepening fuel shortages across the country.[1]
 
About 40% of Ukraine's long-range strike missions this year have focused on refineries, while others have hit storage and pumping facilities. [1]
 
Independent estimates suggest up to 20% of Russia's refining capacity has been disabled, cutting more than 1 million barrels a day of output, mostly gasoline. Refineries that have been hit repeatedly have sustained lasting damage, especially to cracking units that are difficult to replace under Western sanctions. [1]
 
The impact has been felt nationwide. Motorists face fuel shortages, long lines, and record prices. Wholesale gasoline prices have jumped 54% since January, prompting authorities to suspend exports and impose rationing in some regions. [1]

We see, then, that the Russian military effort can be impacted not just by one-on-one weapon contests but by many other factors such as fuel supply – a lesson straight out of WWII (and every other conflict in history!).  No longer can we, as analysts, talk about one-on-one assessments without considering the larger picture and all the other factors that impact and determine a weapon system’s actual usefulness and effectiveness.
 
___________________________
 
On a bit of side note, albeit closely related, here’s a bit of information about Ukraine’s drone effort.
 

The FP-1 long-range "kamikaze" drone, introduced in May, now accounts for about 60% of strikes inside Russia. Produced at an estimated 100 units a day, it carries a 60- to 120-kilogram warhead with a range of up to 1,600 kilometers.
 
Despite a price of about $55,000, it is said to feature advanced guidance software that maintains accuracy under electronic jamming. [1]

This highlights so many lessons we’ve discussed in past posts.  For example, not every weapon has to be bleeding edge, light years ahead technology.  Had the US tried to produce this drone, it would have been 10x the size, 1000x the cost, and been partially ready in a decade or two.  In the non-US procurement world, simple and just plain effective will almost always be sufficient.  Low cost, easy to mass produce, reasonably useful characteristics … this is what effective weapons procurement should look like.
 
 
 
________________________________

 
[1]Newsmax website, “Russia Faces Gasoline Crisis as Ukrainian Drones Strike”, Sandy Fitzgerald, 5-Sep-2025,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/russia-ukraine-war/2025/09/05/id/1225208/

Kirov Class Cruiser Begins Trials

It is reported that the Kirov class cruiser, Admiral Nakhimov (formerly Kalinin in the Soviet navy), has put to sea for trials after decades of modernization (can it really be called modernization if it takes decades?).  The ship last sailed in 1997 and has been undergoing repairs and modernization since 1999 with many stops and starts.
 
Details are sketchy but Naval News reports the following upgraded systems.
 

The vessel reportedly has over 176 vertical launch cells, capable of firing a wide array of anti-ship and air defense missiles. The cruiser reportedly has 10 universal shipborne firing systems (USFS), each capable of housing 8 missiles. This results in 80 launch cells reserved for launching Russia’s most modern missiles such as the subsonic Kalibr cruise missile, the supersonic Oniks anti-ship missile, and the hypersonic Tsirkon cruise missiles. In order to make room for these launch cells, the 20 angled Granit anti-ship missiles were removed.
 
An additional 96 launch cells are reserved for surface-to-air missiles to be used for air defense. It is unclear what missiles are installed on the cruiser with some reports stating that the cruiser operates the S-300Fort-M air defense systems with other sources stating that the S-400 air defense system is installed. Additional air defense systems for close to medium range engagement include six Pantsir-M air defense systems as well as a number of AK-630 close-in weapon systems.  The vessel is reportedly also equipped with the Paket-NK and Otvet anti-submarine and torpedo weapon systems.
 
The 130mm AK-130 dual purpose naval gun has been replaced by a modern 130mm AK-192M naval gun.[1]

Nakhimov heading out for trials

That makes for a large, powerful, expensive to operate ship which leads to the obvious question:  what’s its purpose?
 
The Russian navy is, for all practical purposes, a coastal defense force not an open ocean, globe spanning force.  For one thing, Russia has very limited overseas territories or commitments that would require the presence of a naval force, hence the emphasis on coastal or near coastal forces.  Thus, overseas naval operations would not seem to be a legitimate purpose.
 
Cost is another major factor.  Manning and operating a major warship like this is a very expensive proposition and Russia simply lacks the financial resources to comfortably do so which, again, leads one to question what the purpose of the ship is.
 
The key question, of course, is what combat purpose would this ship serve?  The original Kirovs were intended as anti-carrier strike assets with their twenty SS-N-19 (P-700) Granit supersonic missiles with 1600 lb warheads.  Today, a single Kirov would be no threat to a carrier group and, indeed, if the report is to be believed, the SS-N-19 missiles have been removed.
 
Of course, the ship can launch land attack missiles but against who?  Considering Russia’s likely enemies list, land attack missiles could be launched much more easily and cheaper from land sites or aircraft.
 
The Russian navy, today, consists primarily of frigates, corvettes, and various patrol vessels with a few surviving Soviet era destroyers.  In other words, it is a coastal defense force. 
 
The Russian navy has also demonstrated in the Ukraine war that they lack the equipment, doctrine, and training to survivably and effectively operate in contested waters so it’s hard to imagine they would risk their symbol of national pride in a naval battle that didn’t involve an existential threat.  That makes the Nakhimov a very limited use asset.
 
One obvious purpose, and perhaps the only real purpose, is international prestige and public relations.  Russia/Putin seems very big on trying to generate international prestige (a losing battle but Putin keeps trying) and there’s no denying that a large cruiser does generate a certain amount of attention if not any actual respect.  Of course, knowledgeable naval observers are not impressed by a ship with no naval purpose (hey, we have plenty of those!) but for Russia/Putin this would seem to be a valid purpose, perhaps the only real purpose.
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]Naval News, “RFS Admiral Nakhimov commences sea and factory trials”, Frederik Van Lokeren, 21-Aug-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/08/rfs-admiral-nakhimov-commences-sea-and-factory-trials/

Iskander

The National Interest website has an interesting article on Russia’s Iskander missile.  The article describes the missile,
 

Russia’s Iskander system, particularly the Iskander-M variant, is equipped with two solid-propellant single-stage guided missiles, model 9M723K1, each capable of carrying a warhead weighing 1,543 pounds. These warheads can include high-explosive fragmentation, cluster, or even nuclear payloads. With an operational range of 249 to 311 miles, the Iskander-M can strike targets deep …
 
The missile’s hypersonic terminal speed, reaching Mach 6 or 7, and quasi-ballistic trajectory, which involves evasive maneuvers during flight, make it exceptionally difficult to intercept. …  Russia has introduced radar decoys that deploy during the missile’s final approach, generating false signatures to confuse air defense systems like the US-supplied Patriot missile battery. Additionally, the missile’s ability to perform unpredictable maneuvers at high altitudes complicates interception algorithms, reducing the effectiveness of even defenses. The Iskander’s mobile launch platform, which can independently target and fire within seconds, adds to its survivability, as it is challenging to locate and neutralize before launch.[1]

Impessive, on paper, without a doubt but this is not an invincible weapon.
 

This has been especially evident in attacks on Kyiv where, despite Ukraine’s success in intercepting some missiles, the upgraded Iskander-M has caused significant damage.[1]

It would be interesting to know the circumstances of the successful intercepts and the overall success rates.
 
It is also noteworthy that the reported successes of the Iskander tend to be mainly centered around attacks on cities rather than military targets.  It is possible that the Iskander may be more of a terror weapon, similar to Germany’s V-1 rockets in WWII, than an effective combat weapon.
 
It is also worth noting that Ukraine possesses only fragments of a comprehensive air defense system and in only limited numbers.  It may be that the Iskander successes are more the result of a lack of air defenses than the effectiveness of the missile, itself.  On the other hand, perhaps not.  What is the success rate of the Iskander when attacking targets defended by active air defenses such as Patriot?  We just don’t know.
 
 
Discussion
 
Several thoughts occur:
 
Where’s our version of something like this?  Which one of our missiles has capabilities of similar to this?  I’m not aware that we have a missile approaching this type of performance.  We have a lot of different types of missiles so maybe I’m missing something? 
 
How do we effectively defend against this type of missile?  Are we testing our defenses against a representative threat surrogate?  I know we’re not because there is no realistic threat surrogate.  Since we’re not testing, how do we know how our defenses will perform?
 
It’s clear that the Iskander is not unstoppable.  How stoppable it is in the face of an actual defense is unknown but there is no reason to throw up our hands in defeat, as so many do at the mere mention of hypersonic missiles.
 
This emphasizes the importance of deep surveillance to try to target the launchers prior to launch.  We have plenty of deep strike options.  What we lack is survivable, deep surveillance assets that would be unaffected by anti-communications efforts (jamming, etc.)
 
Intimately tied to deep surveillance is deep strike with an emphasis on rapid response.  We have plenty of deep strike options but they need to be linked with the deep surveillance and targeting so that when a target is found, a weapon can be on its way in moments to destroy the target before it can launch or move.
 
It is also important to apply deep interdiction to prevent resupply of enemy missiles from occurring.  There’s a limit to how much damage an initial salvo of enemy missiles can do.  The challenge is to prevent follow on missiles from reaching launch points.  This requires deep strike interdiction on the order of hundreds of miles inside enemy territory.  This is the kind of task that a carrier group or a Marine amphibious raid behind enemy lines might address.
 
The challenges are twofold: 
 
1. Develop our own version of such a missile, including a ship launched variant.
2. Develop realistic defenses that are be mobile and can move with our forces.
 
 
 
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[1]National Interest website, “Russia’s Iskander Missiles Are Giving Ukraine a Massive Headache”, Brandon Weichert, 24-Jun-2025,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russias-iskander-missiles-are-giving-ukraine-a-massive-headache

No More Russian Subs in the Med

It is being reported that the last Russian submarine has left the Mediterranean due to the loss of the Tartus naval base in Syria.  This is a good thing, in case anyone is confused.  You may recall that we recently discussed the idea of the US seizing Syria or, in some other fashion, denying the base to Russia.  This is pretty compelling evidence as to the desirability such actions.

Bye, bye!

Cable Cutting – Act of War

You may or may not have heard of the most recent cable cutting incident involving a cable connecting Finland and Estonia in the Gulf of Finland, off the Baltic Sea.  A Russian tanker is believed to have been responsible for the act, as described in a Redstate website article.[1]
 

Finnish commandos boarded and seized an oil tanker Thursday that is believed to have temporarily disabled the Estlink-2 power line connecting Finland and Estonia. The vessel in question, the Cook Islands-registered Eagle S,  was traveling from St. Petersburg to Port Said, Egypt. The Eagle S is thought to be part of Russia's "shadow fleet" that smuggles Russian crude oil to market.[1]

The proof of sabotage is pretty convincing as shown in the photo below which tracks the ship’s path as it crosses back and forth over the cable.
 

Track of Russian ship showing back and forth
movement over cable

This was a deliberate act of sabotage against the infrastructure of Finland and the world at large, arguably an act of war, and it was not a one time accident. 
 

This is the fourth time power or telecom cables crossing the Baltic have been damaged by deliberate actions. In October 2023, a Chinese container ship damaged a gas pipeline and two telecom cables between Finland and Estonia by dragging an anchor across them … In November 2024, a Chinese ship disabled a 745-mile cable linking Germany and Finland and a 135-mile cable linking Lithuania and the Swedish island of Gotland, again by dragging an anchor across them.[1]

In each case, the Chinese have refused to cooperate in any investigation.  Russia and China are at war with us, and the West, only we refuse to pull out heads out of the sand and see it.  As a result, we’re losing the war.
 
I like that, in this case, Finland finally took some moderately decisive action by quickly boarding the ship.
 
This also refutes the legion of Chicken Littles out there who are terrified that sneezing in the direction of Russia or China will bring nuclear escalation down upon us.  Finland seized the offending vessel and, shockingly, did not immediately get attacked with nuclear weapons.
 

The Finnish customs service said it had seized the vessel's cargo.[1]

What is the lesson in all this?  As the article’s author opines,
 

The obvious collaboration of Russian-controlled and Chinese-registered vessels to damage the telecom and power grid running beneath the Baltic Sea threatens NATO and the EU. NATO must take this hybrid war being waged underwater seriously and develop equally serious strategies for combatting it. What can't be tolerated is China stepping in to block investigations and legal actions by affected countries.[1]

We are at war but it’s a one-sided war.  We refuse to engage.  That must change.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Redstate website, “Finland Boards Russian 'Shadow Fleet' Tanker in Connection With Damage of Undersea Electric Cables”, streiff, 26-Dec-2024,
https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/12/26/finland-boards-russian-shadow-fleet-tanker-in-connection-with-damage-of-undersea-electric-cables-n2183645

Russian Naval Base in Syria

The Russians have long cultivated a relationship with Syria for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the access to a Mediterranean naval base. 

Before this week, Moscow in part projected power in Syria and beyond through two military installations: Hemeimeem air base near Latakia and Tartus naval base on the Mediterranean.[1]

With the overthrow of Assad, the Russians have been ejected (or elected to leave to avoid combat and losses) from Syria and the Tartus naval base. 

Open source intelligence photos indicate that Russian military ships have departed from Tartus naval base …[1] 

The loss of a Mediterranean naval base greatly complicates Russia’s attempts to exert influence in the region and cedes dominance in the region to the West.
 
Given that there is no coherent ruling government in Syria, at the moment, Russia faces difficult choices:
 

• Abandon the Syrian base
• Fight to conquer and hold the base
• Pull back and hope that they can work out a future diplomatic arrangement that would allow them to use the base again with whatever force eventually seizes power

 
None of the choices are particularly palatable or easy.
 
Similarly, the US faces choices although it does not need the base for its own use:
 

• Do nothing which could result in Russia regaining the base one way or another
• Hope to work out an eventual political arrangement that would deny Russia the use of the base
• Eliminate the base as a functional facility thereby denying it to Russia

 
The last option, eliminating the base, would require the US to destroy the facilities to deny them to Russia.  There is precedent for this.  Israel has already launched heavy attacks that have destroyed Syria’s naval assets, air force, and chemical weapons, among other targets so that those assets cannot be used against Israel in the future.
 
Since Syria no longer exists as a coherent country with a functioning, recognized government, attacks on potential threats are not a legal obstacle.  Right now, Syria is open, unclaimed territory controlled by various factions.  The US has the opportunity to act boldly, if it wishes.
 
Now, just for fun, let’s stir the pot a bit and rattle the timid …
 
An extremely bold move would be for the US to actually seize and occupy Syria, thereby obtaining a large foothold of sovereign US territory in the Middle East, surrounding Lebanon, hugely bolstering Israel and, potentially, securing actual stability in the region.  Of course, the drawbacks are many and far from insignificant.  Such an act would require a completely different approach to dealing with the various factions (an absolute smashing imposition of discipline and peace via military might), a zero tolerance policy towards terrorism, and a domineering approach to foreign relations with neighbors.  Before you go off the deep end attempting to rebut this, consider that the most stable regimes in the region have done exactly this.  Modified to exclude conquest of neighbors, this approach could work.  The US becomes the biggest warlord and rules by might – the way of the Middle East.
 
Anyway, back to the main premise of the post, crisis, unrest, and turbulence creates opportunity for the bold.  We have an opportunity to reduce Russian influence and, possibly, improve the Middle East.  Do we have the boldness to do it?
 
Once upon a time, we acquired our entire country through various bold acts. Do we still have the courage and boldness to seize the future?
 
 
 
__________________________

 
[1]Breaking Defense website, “Russian bases and Hezbollah weapons: Key questions follow fall of Syrian regime”, Agnes Helou, 12-Dec-2024,
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/12/russian-bases-and-hezbollah-weapons-key-questions-follow-fall-of-syrian-regime/

What’s a Navy To Do?

In the Ukraine-Russia war, the Russian navy has been rendered nearly irrelevant through a combination of factors, not the least of which is their sheer incompetence which has allowed Ukraine to dominate the seas.  However, there is another, larger factor at play, here, and that is that the Russian navy has no useful role ... or at least none that they’re capable of executing.
 
Consider the traditional roles of a navy in a war and how they relate to Russia.
 
Blockade/Interdict Shipping – There is no shipping moving to or from Ukraine with the exception of the so-called ‘grain corridor’ which operates under an agreement between Russia and Ukraine.
 
Destroy the Enemy’s Navy – Ukraine has no navy.
 
Conduct Land Strikes – The Russian navy has almost no land strike capability.  Early in the conflict, Russia did attempt some small degree of land strike during the attempt to seize Snake Island, however, Russia did not follow that up with any serious attempt to seize and hold the island.
 
Amphibious Assaults – Aside from the short lived attempt to seize Snake Island, the Russians have not attempted any amphibious assault because they largely control all the land that borders the sea.  The one exception is the 70-some mile strip of land centered around Odesa.  This would seem to be a candidate for assault except that Russia lacks both the amphibious transport and sufficient available land forces for such an attempt.
 
Logistics – Russia’s logistics are largely satisfied by overland supply routes.  Some degree of maritime resupply has been conducted via the ‘backdoor’ of Crimea.
 
Aerial Supremacy – Carrier based air power is capable of establishing localized aerial supremacy and supporting land operations.  Of course, the Russians possess no carriers so this is a moot consideration.
 
 
Discussion
 
Consideration of the above naval roles makes it obvious that there is little significant role for the Russian navy or, at least, little significant role that the Russian naval force structure is capable of successfully executing.
 
The inescapable conclusion is that Russia built an incorrect naval force structure.  The Russian navy lacks land strike, anti-air , amphibious assault capability, broad area maritime surveillance, and effective small boat / USV defensive capability.
 
Putin didn’t wake up one morning and suddenly say, “Let’s invade Ukraine today”.  The Russian navy knew this was coming for quite some time, dating back at least to the 2014 Crimea annexation and, obviously, that didn’t happen spontaneously.  It had to be in the planning stage for years.  So, the Russian navy had ten to twenty years advance notice and yet they failed to plan for the war with Ukraine or, if they did attempt to tailor the navy to the planned war, they badly failed to anticipate the form of the war.
 
The Ukraine conflict has demonstrated that the Russian ship designs have been found incapable of conducting effective surveillance or self-defense.  Indeed, various Russian ships have been pulled out of the war zone and production of some classes has been halted as the Russian navy has come to recognize that their ships are inappropriately designed and fitted.
 
 
Conclusion/Warning

Considering all of the above, it’s apparent that the Russian hasn’t been defeated as much as they simply have no relevant, vital role.  The proof of this is the fact that, having ‘defeated’ the Russian navy, Ukraine is in no better position, overall.  This is a land war, pure and simple.  Lacking a role, the navy has, wisely, pulled back to a relatively safe distance to preserve their forces.
 
What this tells us is that you had better know your enemy and your own strategy against that enemy as you build your force structure.  Failure to do so will guarantee that you have an inappropriate and ineffective naval force.  We need to keep this lesson firmly in mind as we build toward the inevitable war with China.  Currently, we have substituted technology for strategy and, as a result, have produced ships with no useful purpose in a China war (Zumwalt, LCS, AFSB, MLP, every amphibious ship, etc.).

Prepare to Fight the Last War

There’s an old saying that generals always prepare to fight the last war.  Nowhere is this truer than the Ukraine-Russia war.  The US (and, to be fair, the entire world) is preparing to fight the Ukraine conflict for the next war. 
 
We noted the success Ukraine has had using unmanned surface drones against the Russian navy and so we are dutifully pushing ahead with unmanned vessels just as quickly as we can while ignoring the unique factors that make the Ukraine conflict a true one-of-a-kind example.
 
We noted the inability of manned aircraft to exert decisive effect and so we’ve begun revising our air doctrine and tactics to reflect this while ignoring the unique factors that make the Ukraine conflict a true one-of-a-kind example.
 
We noted the impact of small UAVs in attacking individual soldiers and vehicles so we’ve enthusiastically embraced all manner of small drones while ignoring the unique factors that make the Ukraine conflict a true one-of-a-kind example.
 
We noted the marked lack of success by tanks and their high rates of attrition and so we’ve eliminated the entire Marine Corps tank component and begun moving away from tanks and toward light vehicles while ignoring the unique factors that make the Ukraine conflict a true one-of-a-kind example.
 
 
There can be no dispute.  When we enter into a duplicate of the Ukraine conflict we will be more than ready.  On the other hand, when we take on China we’ll be lost, floundering, and wondering why we aren’t better prepared.  It’s because we’re preparing to fight the Ukraine war, not China.

Preparing To Fight The Last War

In August of 2023, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced a program to produce thousands of drones. 

… Department of Defense (DoD) Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks announced the Replicator initiative, … fielding attritable autonomous systems in multiple thousands across multiple domains.[1]

So, having seen what they believe to be the war-changing impact of drones in the Ukraine-Russia conflict, the DoD is preparing to fight China using the methodology of the Ukraine-Russia war.  This, despite all the warnings and signs that the Ukraine-Russia war is highly unique and not applicable to future wars, in general, and a war with China, in particular.  I’ve extensively covered the reasons why this war has little bearing on, or lessons for, a China war so I won’t bother re-listing them.  Suffice it to say that there are few operational or tactical lessons to be had from this.  It would be like a professional boxer trying to draw lessons from a schoolyard fight between a couple of ten year old children.
 
I’ve also extensively covered the extremely limited suitability of most drones for combat operations.
 
Despite all that, it appears that we’re going to go ahead and base our war with China on the actions of a couple of militaries notable only for their stunning degree of ineptitude.
 
This is the very definition of preparing to fight the last war – one that has no relevance to a war with China.  
 
 
 
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[1]Defense Innovation Unit, “Implementing the Department of Defense Replicator Initiative to Accelerate All-Domain Attritable Autonomous Systems To Warfighters at Speed and Scale”, 30-Nov-2023,
https://www.diu.mil/latest/implementing-the-department-of-defense-replicator-initiative-to-accelerate

Surface Drone Detection

We’ve discussed the combat utility of unmanned surface suicide drones (see, “Surface Drone Swarm”).  One of the conclusions was that drones are easily spotted and defeated, assuming any degree of competence and preparedness by the defender.  Here’s some real world data about drone detection from the recent Ukraine attack on the Russian patrol boat.
 
Just prior to the attack, a Russian merchant ship, the Ella, reported sighting four drones which, presumably, were the ones that wound up attacking the patrol boat.
 

Significantly the crew reported that they could only see the drones when they came within 2 nautical miles (2.3 miles / 3.7 km) of the ship. Their radar could only extend the detection range to 3 nautical miles (3.5 miles / 5.5 km).[1]

 
Assuming that ‘see’ means visual observation, this demonstrates that drones are easily detected even using simple visual means.  It is unlikely that a merchant ship would have sophisticated EO/IR sensors so ‘see’ likely means a man with binoculars.
 
Similarly, ‘radar’ undoubtedly means a basic navigation radar rather than a high powered, optimized, military grade radar.
 
Thus, if a simple merchant ship could spot and track drones at 2-3 nm, a warship should be able to, at least, do that and, likely, a good deal more.  An alert defender would have more than enough time to destroy drones given a 2-3 nm ‘head start’.  Of course, this assumes that the defender has appropriate weapons which neither the Russians nor the US Navy has to any great extent.
 
This incident also suggests that the ‘swarm’ was just four drones.  Destroying four drones with detection and engagement beginning 3+ nm out should be an easy task.  The Navy needs to begin working out the tactics and weapons required to do this.  As a reminder, we’re operating within easy reach of land off Yemen so we’d better be prepared.
 

 
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[1]Naval News website, “Vital Russian Supply Lines In Black Sea Cut By Ukrainian Drones”, H I Sutton, 10-Mar-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/03/vital-russian-supply-lines-in-black-sea-cut-by-ukrainian-drones/

Abrams Tanks Being Sent To Russia

 
Once in a great while, I take a peek at a non-naval issue and today is such a case.
 
The US has sent 30 some M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine and reports suggest they’ll be committed to some kind of spring offensive when the ground dries enough to support heavy armored vehicles.  That raises the probability that Russia will eventually capture an Abrams tank.  Yes, I know that some of the more sensitive gear has been stripped out of the tanks for just that reason but what about the general characteristics of the tanks, especially the armor.  We’d be giving Russia the opportunity to study the tanks’s armor scheme, material composition, strengths, and vulnerabilities as well as other general characteristics and capabilities.  And, of course, anything Russia gets or learns will make its way to China, one way or another.  Is this wise?

Surface Drone Swarm

Russia just lost another landing ship to a Ukrainian drone swarm.[1]  The mind simply boggles at the degree of ineptitude being exhibited by the Russians.  Let’s use this incident to examine the use of surface drone swarms.
 
Let’s start by looking at the drones Ukraine is using and see how deadly they really are.
 
 
Magura V5
 
The commonly reported Ukrainian drone craft is the Magura V5.  There have been different versions produced so the specs vary, depending on the source and the referenced variant.  The drone is a relatively small craft (5.5 m long) with a low silhouette which would make them difficult to spot visually, however, at speed they leave a very visible wake.  Their shape is not notably radar stealthy although they are smooth and relatively free of protrusions so they may be somewhat radar stealthy.  Propulsion is said to be an electric motor or hybrid (gas-electric?) of some sort.  Presumably, the craft are readily visible in the infrared and should be easily detectable at the horizon, some 12 miles distant or so, depending on the height of the EO/IR sensor.  Range is variously reported to be 250-500 miles.  Control is via optical sensor and satellite (Starlink?) communication.  Drone weight is 1000 kg (2200 lb) with a payload variously reported as 300-400 lbs explosive.  Cruising speed is 20 mph with a terminal burst speed about twice that.
 

Magura V5 Drone

Magura V5 Drone

Acoustically, an electric motor running at high speed and a craft sailing at high speed should generate significant noise and be readily detectable at 10-25 miles, using passive sonar.  I would imagine the sound would be similar to that of a torpedo at speed.
 
I would assume that, like all weapons with a range, the reported range is much greater than the effective operational range.  Thus, the operational range is likely 50-100 miles but that’s just informed speculation on my part.  It does, however, greatly impact the overall effectiveness of the drone since it impacts the launch distance from the target.
 
This is a surface running torpedo, for all intents and purposes.  Like a torpedo, it can be deadly if not treated appropriately.  Unlike a torpedo which can be decoyed but cannot be destroyed, these drones are easily destroyed with appropriate weapons.
 
Now, let’s look at the Russian landing ship.
 
 
Ropuch Amphibious Ship
 
The Ropucha class landing ship is a medium size (369 ft long, 4080 tons displacement), lightly armed LST with either 2x 57mm dual guns (Ropucha I) or 1x 76mm gun and 2x AK-630 30mm CIWS (Ropucha II).  Either way, that’s not a lot of armament!
 
The ship has multiple fire control, search, and navigation radars.  I assume it has EO/IR sensors but that’s speculation.
 
Crew size is around 90.
 
 
Now, let’s consider some of the relevant operational factors.
 
 
Operational Factors
 
Launch Site.  The drone can be launched from shore or from a host vessel.  Either way, the drones must be close enough to the target to be within the range of the drone.  It’s not as if the drone can be safely launched from a thousand miles away.  One would think that a host vessel, meaning, potentially, any unidentified vessel within 500 miles, would be easily spotted and sunk before it could launch the drones.
 
Alternatively, if launched from shore, the launch operation would require trucks and handling equipment given the overall drone weight of a ton or more.  This is not something that one tucks into a backpack.  It’s a fairly major operation to transport, handle, and launch the craft.  One would think that surveillance of the likely launch areas and access roads would be effective in spotting and preventing launches.
 
Detection.  As noted, there are multiple modes of detection including visual, infrared, acoustic, and radar.  A semi-alert defender should have no trouble detecting the drones at a distance.  The use of swarms of multiple drones further increases the chance of detection.
 
Satellites.  Satellites (reportedly Starlink) are, apparently, being used to control the drones.  I assume Russia is attempting to disrupt the satellite communications although given the demonstrated degree of incompetence, this may not be true.  Satellite vulnerabilities include physical destruction in space, local signal disruption, cyber attacks at various points of the satellite system (ground control, master communications, local receivers, etc.).  If Starlink involvement is confirmed, Russia would be within their rights to conduct physical sabotage of Starlink facilities even in the US.
 
If Russia is attempting any of these actions, they appear to be having little or no success.
 
Targeting.  Targeting information is likely being gathered via satellites and UAVs, probably from Ukrainian-allied countries like the US.  Again, if confirmed, Russia could conduct attacks on the targeting assets with minimal risk of escalation.  The last several years have demonstrated that the US is highly unlikely to respond beyond speeches and warnings that are never acted on.
 
Lethality.  The drones reportedly carry around three hundred pounds of explosive which is a reasonably substantial amount of explosive.  However, it should be noted that the explosive is a non-penetrating effect as compared to a shell, bomb, or missile.  This lessons the extent of damage relative to the nominal weight of explosive since a significant amount of the explosive force is directed away from the ship.  A similar phenomenon occurred in the attack on the USS Cole.
 
Proximity.  The Ukrainian drones benefit greatly from the unique geography of this situation.  The operating area is a fairly small, constrained area as opposed to the open ocean that the US Navy would operate in during a war with China.  Of course, if the Navy opted to do something stupid, like operate near land with inadequately armed and sensored ships, as the Russians are doing, then the result could well be similar.
 
Damage Control.  The Russians appear to have had very little success in applying damage control to ships that have been struck.  Obviously, hard data on this is difficult to come by.
 
 
 
Analysis
 
To sum up the preceding, the drones are potentially damaging with a few hundred pounds of explosive but they are also small, highly vulnerable to destruction, and easily detected.  So, why are they having some success? 
 
Note:  We hear about the successes but we do not hear about the failures, if any, and I assume there are many.  For example, it could be that only one in a hundred drones succeed.  While that wouldn’t change the overall end result, it would certainly change the assessment of the efficiency of the drones.
 
There is simply no getting around the staggering degree of Russian ineptitude.  They are sending ill-equipped ships, unescorted, into known dangerous waters with, apparently, no aviation surveillance support such as helos or UAVs.  A handful of small, simple escorts with suitable sensors and weapons would end the drone threat.  Even submarines ought to be able to provide detection of drones, interdiction of host ships, if any (most hints suggest shore launches), and covert surveillance of possible shore launch sites..  Russia supposedly has seven Kilo class subs in the Black Sea and their sonars should be able to detect drones and provide early warning.
 
The operational stupidity is compounded by the lack of long range interdiction of the launch points and ships/trucks that are used to transport and launch the drones.  Russia should have air, land, and sea patrols dedicated to finding and destroying the transport/launch vehicles or ships.
 
If we consider the kill chain concept, there are several links in the chain where the Russians could take effective action to disrupt the chain (production facilities, storage facilities, transport, launch event, local detection, and local destruction).  Bafflingly, the Russians seem to be unwilling or unable to break the chain at any of those points.
 
In the hints we get from videos, the Russians appear unable to kill many (any?) drones with the weapons they do have.  This speaks volumes about the overhyped claims of Russian weapon performance (as we’ve seen throughout history and covering ALL Russian weapon systems) and/or the woeful state of Russian training.
 
Compounding all this is the Russian’s unwillingness to seek out and destroy targeting platforms.  The Russians could, simply, declare suitably large exclusion zones and then destroy any foreign (US) aircraft in the area.  Similar actions could be taken against satellite surveillance if, indeed, that is a source of targeting information.
 
As with all other aspects of this war, Russia is conducting the drone defense operations in the most inept manner imaginable. 
 
The Ukraine success is due almost exclusively to Russian ineptitude rather than any inherent capabilities of the drones which, as we’ve discussed, are not particularly formidable on paper.
 
 
Conclusion
 
So many naval observers want to jump on the drone bandwagon because of Ukraine’s handful of successful attacks but is this enthusiasm justified? 
 
An objective analysis suggests that drones are not a threat to an alert, suitably equipped defender who counters the threat with intelligent operations, doctrine and tactics.  The ineptitude of the Russians cannot be ignored and, therefore, trying to derive universal lessons from this is an exercise in futility if not downright misleading.
 
Like any threat, if one fails to treat the threat with the respect it deserves, it can be lethal.  The US needs to be aware of drone threats and train and equip to counter them but they are not, inherently, a serious threat.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Redstate website, “Russia Loses Large Landing Ship to Ukrainian Drone Swarm”, streiff, 14-Feb-2024,
https://redstate.com/streiff/2024/02/14/russia-loses-large-landing-ship-to-ukrainian-drone-swarm-n2170101

Russian SAM Systems

Ukrainian aircraft appear to have attacked and sunk a Russian Ropucha class landing ship docked at the Crimean port of Feodosia.[1]  The strike weapon was speculated to be either a Storm Shadow or SCALP-EG cruise missile.[1]  The incident seems to be confirmed by Russia.
 
It should be noted that the ship was docked and was, apparently, functioning as a warehouse for Iranian supplied Shahed drones.[1]  Thus, the ship was not operating as a warship at sea.  Of course, a landing ship is not a warship, to begin with, and the Ropucha class has no viable and effective anti-air sensors or defenses.  The attack was tantamount to striking a fixed, land based building.  Thus, this is not telling us something about naval warfare despite what many observers will attempt to say.
 
The noteworthy part of this incident is the fact that the Ukrainian aircraft appear to have flown some 170-250 miles through Russian controlled air and ground space, depending on where they took off from and what route they flew.  This brings into question the effectiveness of Russian anti-air SAM systems especially since Ukraine is not flying modern, stealth aircraft.
 
Prior to the Russian invasion, most observers seemed to credit Russian SAM systems with near miraculous capabilities bordering on invincibility.  Reality seems to have revealed that, like all previous Russian SAM systems, the current systems are vastly overrated.  To be fair, it is unknown what SAM systems are in place … if any.
 
Regardless, there are only two possibilities:
 
1. Russia had no SAM systems operating between Feodosia and Ukraine which would reveal operational stupidity of an almost unimaginable level, or,
 
2. Russian SAM systems are vastly overrated, as we said.
 
The incident also raises, yet again, the issue of port defenses.  Russian has had several ships hit while docked.  It is, again, unimaginable that ports in a war zone would not be heavily and effectively defended.  The degree of ineptitude and unpreparedness of the Russian military is staggering.
 
For the US, the issue of port/base defense is the key takeaway from this.  We don’t even pretend to make any serious attempt at port/base defense (looking at you Guam).  We haven’t had to fight to defend a port/base since … I don’t know when … maybe Guadalcanal?  Remember, base defense includes not only SAM systems but hardening, dispersal, decoys (both electronic and visible), layered sensors, redundancy, and repair capabilities.
 
Guam has addressed only ballistic missile defense and then, only to a small degree.  To the best of anyone’s knowledge, there is no layered cruise missile or anti-submarine defense or any of the other items we just listed.  Hardening?  What’s that?
 
The US military is drawing lots of incorrect, invalid conclusions from the Ukraine-Russia conflict and ignoring the few potentially valid ones.  We need to start thinking and acting as if we’re at war with China … because we are.  We’re being graced with a non-kinetic phase of the war that we should be using for serious preparations but we’re wasting it.  When the shooting starts, we’ll quickly realize what we should have been doing all this time.
 
 
 
 
___________________________________

 
[1]Redstate website, “Massive Fireball Marks the End of A Russian Ship After Ukrainian Missile Attack”, streiff, 26-Dec-2023,
https://redstate.com/streiff/2023/12/26/massive-fireball-marks-the-end-of-a-russian-ship-after-ukrainian-missile-attack-n2167974

False Lessons and Fighting the Last War

Despite my constant warnings against - and cautions about - drawing conclusions from the Ukraine-Russia war, governments and militaries around the world – the US prominent among them – are leaping to conclusions without considering the context of those conclusions.  The context, of course, is that this is an incredibly unique war that is unlikely to resemble any future conflict, most especially the one we care most about which is war with China.
 
Consider the lessons/conclusions that are being cited.  I’m not going to bother citing references as this is an assembly of many articles, statements, and reports from many sources.  What follows are commonly claimed conclusions and lessons.
 
 
Asymmetric warfare can beat a conventional military.
 
Asymmetric warfare can most certainly beat a conventional military if that military opts to be stupid.  The US fell victim to exactly that in Vietnam by restricting attacks on critical military targets, allowing North Vietnam safe havens, allowing free and unhindered resupply from the Soviet Union, etc.  Failing to learn any lessons, we repeated many of those same mistakes in Afghanistan with the same result.  However, if a conventional military fights smart (or merely competently), asymmetric tactics will be nothing more than a minor annoyance.  Conventional militaries can cut off supplies, out-mass, and overwhelm any asymmetric force with relatively little effort. 
 
 
Surface drones have rendered conventional naval operations and ships obsolete.
 
This is flatly false.  We just did a post on the extremely limited effectiveness of Ukraine surface drones against the Russian navy (see, “Ukraine-RussiaNaval War”) and yet so many observers have proclaimed the era of conventional navies to be finished due to drones.
 

Aerial drones have rendered conventional tanks, artillery, and troops merely targets waiting to be destroyed.
 
While aerial drones certainly appear to have been instrumental in targeting for artillery and have, to some degree, been able to directly destroy vehicles and infantry, it is erroneous in the extreme to draw any conclusions from this.  The utter lack of tactics, joint support, and operational expertise being displayed in the employment of vehicles and infantry accounts for the success of drones rather than any inherent effectiveness or lethality of the drones themselves. 
 
Add to this the apparent total lack of any mobile anti-air defenses tailored to anti-UAV combat and the explanation for drone success is clear;  it’s ineptitude.
 
 
The era of the tank is over.
 
There has been a rush to pronounce the demise of the tank when, in reality, there’s nothing wrong with tanks.  There is, however, everything wrong with how both sides are using their tanks.  The level of operational and tactical stupidity on both sides is stunning.  Tanks are being expended in individual, slow moving operations with no coordinated, joint support.  The proper use of tanks is in fast moving, massed operations overwhelmingly supported by infantry, aviation, and artillery.  The entire world learned how to do this in WWII but now seem to have forgotten every lesson learned.
 

Anti-air defenses have totally negated aircraft operations.
 
Once again, it is the complete lack of coordinated air/ground operations that have rendered aircraft only marginally useful.  Aircraft need support from electronic warfare (EW) aircraft, SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) aircraft, AEW (Airborne Early Warning and battle control) aircraft, and ground forces in order to be survivable and effective.  None of that has been on display in this conflict.
 

UAVs have replaced manned aircraft in military effectiveness.
 
UAVs have filled in the gap created by ineptitude in the use of manned aircraft and shortages of manned aircraft.  I would speculate that there is also a cost consideration component.  I suspect Russia is carefully husbanding its supply of aircraft due to their cost.  If so, perhaps there is a valuable lesson, here, about risk avoidance associated with overly expensive assets (looking at you Ford, Burke, B-2/21).
 
 
Summary
 
Every one of these supposed lessons is wrong in the sense that they are so severely limited in application as to be useless in terms of predicting the future of warfare and developing equipment, strategies, and operations for that future.  Despite the evident wrongness of these conclusions, military professionals, both uniformed and civilian, have leapt to embrace them and are guiding their militaries down false paths. 
 
One of the worst offenders is the US Marines who have latched on to examples that they feel support their isolated, missile-shooting concept.  One can somewhat forgive civilian military observers but professional, uniformed Marines should know better.
 
Another problem with leaping to these conclusions and lessons is that none of them are being tested in exercises representative of the conditions in which we intend to apply them, namely, a peer war with China.  There’s nothing wrong with thinking one of these conclusions is valid (well, yes there is since it shows you’re an idiot) as long as you’re willing to thoroughly test the conclusion under the conditions you anticipate fighting and are willing to accept the results that will, invariably prove them to be wrong.
 
We are literally watching a live fire tutorial on how not to conduct a war by both sides.  Why we would leap to draw conclusions and lessons from that is a baffling mystery.

Ukraine-Russia Naval War

So many people want to read miraculous changes in the future of naval warfare into Ukraine’s success with surface drones and anti-ship missiles.  Is this the case?  Is the future of naval warfare being rewritten as we speak?  Or, are false conclusions being drawn and propagated?  Let’s examine the situation and see what conclusions we can draw.
 
We’re going to focus on the Ukrainian attacks against the Russian fleet but it should be noted that, in terms of a Ukraine-Russia naval war, the Ukraine navy, such as it was, was completely eliminated at the opening of the war.  Thus, the war has not been as one-sided as media portrays it.
 
Following are some factors, characteristics, and considerations of the naval war.
 
Russian Ineptitude.  It cannot even be questioned that Russia has been stunningly inept in their operations, putting vessels in dangerous situations, and failing to protect their harbors or ships with any degree of competence.  The Moskva, for example, assuming it was actually sunk by Ukrainian actions, appeared from photos to have its air defense radars in fore/aft standby positions rather than actively scanning.
 
It is also clear that Russia did not grasp the magnitude of the threat until somewhat recently and did not, therefore, have proper and effective defensive weapons or tactics.  This is also a condemnation of modern warship design with its lack of short range defensive weapons.
 
 
Geography.  The Ukraine-Russia conflict is somewhat unique in that the naval incidents are taking place in a relatively very small, constrained area.  This geography permits Ukraine the fantastic good fortune of not having to search very far for targets and not having to transport their weapons very far.  Contrast this with the prospect of a naval war between China and the US which would be spread across unimaginable distances extending at least a thousand miles beyond the first island chain and, quite likely, encompassing far away areas of conflict in Africa, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, and elsewhere.  Short range drone surface vessels would be nearly useless across those kind of distances.
 
The unique geography also allows Ukraine to wage the naval war without actually having any ships!  The constrained area of conflict allows Ukraine to stage and launch weapons from nearby land sites.  Again, in a China-US war, this would rarely, if ever, be the case for either side although the Marines seem to think they’ll dominate the Chinese navy from a few hidden bases.  I won’t bother ridiculing that wishful, fantasy notion any further. 
 
In an open ocean naval war, lacking land based drone launch points, some type of drone transport ship would be required to closely approach the target and no one is going to allow an enemy (or unidentified) ship to approach without being sunk.  Thus, ship launched surface drones seem an impossibility.
 
 
Effectiveness.  The Ukraine surface drones get a lot of frenzied hype in the general press but how effective have they actually been?  While solid information is difficult to come by, it appears that only one major ship, the guided missile cruiser Moskva, has been sunk along with, possibly, a couple small patrol boats.
 
As best I can determine, here is the list of sunk or damaged Russian ships:
 

The obvious conclusion is that for all the attacks and effort by Ukraine, very little actual damage has been done.  The one notable success, the sinking of the Moskva, is actually not a confirmed attack by Ukraine.  I’ve read theories that the sinking was the result of a drone surface vessel, anti-ship missiles, or a shipboard mishap on the Russian’s part.
 
The remaining couple of sinkings were minor tugs or patrol boats with the remainder of attacks producing unknown degrees of damage.  In terms of overall damage to the Russian fleet and resulting impact on the conduct of the war, the Ukraine efforts have been nearly insignificant.  Compare these meager results to the hundreds/thousands of vessels sunk in WWII.
 
It is also noteworthy that most of the Russian ships sunk or damaged were unarmed and defenseless which, again, speaks to Russian operational failures in putting defenseless vessels in harm’s way.
 
The Russians clearly either do not grasp the concept of defensive escorts or are unable to execute the concept properly and effectively.
 
A final question regarding effectiveness is what the success rate has been?  How many hits have been achieved compared to the number of attempts?  The media generally only reports a successful hit on a Russian ship.  We have no idea how many attacks have been unsuccessful.  Of course, given the minuscule cost of drones or small anti-ship missiles, if one can occasionally sink a major warship, the number of unsuccessful attacks is almost irrelevant.  Still, it would be informative to know the success rate.
 
 
Conclusion
 
One obvious conclusion is that the naval war is not really a naval war, at all.  It’s more closely akin to a navy versus land war with the Russian navy operating near and against the land and Ukraine trying to repel or neutralize the Russian maritime forces.  In essence, it’s the age old ‘ship fighting a fort’ scenario!  Russia is attacking Fort Ukraine from the sea.  That bit of near semantics aside …
 
Due to geographical considerations, if nothing else, it is impossible to imagine a Ukraine style drone war being even slightly successful in a China-US war.  Given a largely open ocean campaign, neither side would have recourse to land launched drones.  Anti-ship missiles are, of course, another story but that takes us to targeting which is an undeniable and, thus far, unsolved problem for both sides.
 
It is also difficult to imagine that either the US or China would be as inept as the Russians have been.  US naval doctrine heavily emphasizes layered defenses and escorts.
 
In short, it is difficult to imagine that the Ukraine-Russia naval war heralds any earth-shaking change in the future of naval warfare.
 
 
 
______________________________

 
[1]USNI News website, “A Brief Summary of the Battle of the Black Sea”, Heather Mongilio, 15-Nov-2023,
https://news.usni.org/2023/11/15/a-brief-summary-of-the-battle-of-the-black-sea

Bykov Corvette and Warship Design

We’ve extensively discussed the flawed designs of modern ships as regards firepower and survivability.  Here’s a bit of data from actual combat involving the Russian Bykov (Project 22160) class corvette which, on paper, was nearly the dream design of a modern small ship:  small, fast, cruise missile armed, helo equipped, unmanned capabilities, complementary diesels and gas turbines, and flexible modular capabilities to accommodate any imaginable mission.  Truly, the epitome of modern naval design.  The reality of combat, however, revealed the flaws in the design sufficient to curtail further production of the class.  From a Google-translated TASS article,
 

"The series of patrol ships of project 22160 will not be continued and will end with the delivery of the last corvette of the series to the Black Sea Fleet next year," the agency's interlocutor said, noting that the customer intends to abandon an additional six units of project 22160 due to the discrepancy between their tactical and technical qualities and combat operating conditions.

He explained that military sailors are not quite satisfied with the characteristics and equipment of corvettes tested in the course of their combat use - insufficient seaworthiness, light armor and vulnerability of power plants, as well as weak anti-aircraft weapons.[1][emphasis added]

Bykov Class Corvette - the epitome of modern design
and a failure in combat

 
This illustrates ComNavOps’ claim that modern ship designs do not incorporate the reality of combat.  We (meaning the US and the world) are designing to a hypothetical standard that is focused on business cases, extended cruise comforts, and peacetime tasks instead of actual naval combat.  We’ve abandoned firepower, lethality, and survivability.
 
This also illustrates the phenomenon of follow-the-leader in warship design.  One of the common counter arguments to many of ComNavOps’ tenets about warship design is to point out that every other country is doing it (whatever it is that’s under discussion), therefore, it must be right.  The reality is that follow-the-leader doesn’t ensure correctness, it only ensures uniformity of thought.  Everyone wanted battleships immediately prior to WWII but everyone was wrong, as the rise of carriers demonstrated.  Everyone now wants lightly built ships with extensive crew comforts, minimal manning, and maximum flexibility.  As the Russians are now finding out, everyone is wrong about modern WARship design.  We’ve already seen that modern warships are not built to fight and survive (see, “SingleHits”).
 
Follow-the-leader is not the right way to design a warship.  What’s needed is a solid understanding of the realities of naval combat leading to an effective Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  We need to stop playing follow-the-leader about unmanned assets, lightweight naval guns, minimal manning, no armor, modularity, etc.  These are incorrect, dead end failures in the evolution of WARship design.
 
We mastered the principles of WARship design in WWII and we need to return to them.  For the stupid among you, I’m not calling for a return to actual WWII equipment (though in many cases that might be superior to what we have now!).  I’m calling for a return to the principles of WARship design that we mastered in WWII.  The principles are timeless and proven successful.  We foolishly abandoned those principles and now desperately need to return to them.
 
The Bykov failed in combat and yet it represented the epitome of modern naval design.  Does anyone think the Burke or Constellation will fare better?
 
 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]TASS website, “The Russian Navy will refuse an additional series of six patrol ships of project 22160”, 14-Jun-2022,
https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/14908939

Ukraine-Russia Naval War

As I keep saying, we can’t draw any conclusions from the Ukraine-Russia war  …  and yet military observers continue to try to do so.  The latest batch of supposed lessons involves a burst of ‘naval war’ analyses following recent claims of a successful suicide attack by a Ukrainian unmanned surface vessel against a Russian Ropucha I LST landing ship.[1]
 
Previous reports claimed successful attacks on 29-Oct-2022 by USVs (and possibly UAVs) against a Russian Admiral Grigorovich class frigate and a mine countermeasure (MCM) ship.  It is also possible that the sinking of the missile cruiser Moskva was due to a USV as the apparent damage would be consistent with a waterline explosion caused by a USV.  There is also the 24-Mar-2022 sinking of a Russian Alligator class amphibious landing ship while docked in Berdyansk (see, “Port Seizure Example”).  The method of attack was never identified and a USV strike would fit the facts as well or better than artillery or missile strikes.
 
In addition to the successful attacks, there have been multiple reports of failed attacks.
 
From this, observers have concluded that the Ukraine-Russia naval war – to the extent there actually is one – is an asymmetric conflict between Ukrainian unmanned assets and conventional Russian ships.  Observers believe that the Ukrainians have demonstrated that the future of naval warfare involves small, unmanned assets and that large ships are no longer viable.  This is utterly incorrect but that’s not really the point of this post.
 
While we cannot draw any definitive conclusions from the Ukraine-Russia conflict, we can discuss certain aspects that have become apparent. 
 
 
Lethality/Effectiveness – One of the common misunderstandings is that unmanned assets are incredibly effective.  That is false or, at best, only semi-true. 
 
The actual sink rate for Ukrainian USVs against Russian ships is zero, as far as I know (excepting the possibility that Moskva and Alligator were sunk by a USV).  A few ships have, apparently, been damaged with the extent of damage unknown.
 
So, while the reported attacks have caused damage they have not been fatal (unless the Moskva or Alligator was a USV attack).  Thus, a single drone strike appears insufficient to sink a ship.  This is analogous to missile attacks which are not, generally, instantly fatal from a single hit.
 
The apparent effectiveness of the USVs (they have hit multiple ships) seems equally due to the appalling lack of awareness and tactical ineptitude of the Russians as to whatever effectiveness the Ukrainian USVs might have.  The Russians seem oblivious to, or incapable of, detecting USVs and seem to lack any organized defensive effort.
 
 
USV Detection
 
Why have Russian sensors failed to detect the USVs in time for effective countermeasures?  We claim to be able to detect periscopes at hundreds of miles.  This may reinforce one of ComNavOps recurring themes that all manufacturer’s/Navy claims are vastly overblown.  Unless one believes that Russian sensors are vastly inferior to those of the US, it would seem that sensors cannot reliably detect even speedboat size objects on the water.  Of course, it may well be that Russian sensors are vastly inferior or that Russian operators are insufficiently trained to use their sensors effectively.
 
 
Proximity – The attacks all seem to have occurred in port or very close to land which is understandable given the short legs and limited seaworthiness of an unmanned speedboat.  There are reports of some USVs attacking the Crimea bridge from a significant distance.  Of course, since we have no confirmed USV launch points, it’s impossible to say what the various attack distances were.  Regardless, relative to open ocean distances in, say, the Pacific theater, the attacks are limited to near land.  This suggests that USV speedboat type attacks are not a threat to ships operating in the open ocean.
 
 
Defense
 
There have been reports of successful defenses by the Russians against the USV drones.  This suggests that individual USVs are easily defeated – not surprising since they have no defensive weapons, whatsoever.  Reports also suggest that the drones have been used in bunches – a ‘swarm’ of sorts – which would increase the chances of one/some getting through the defenses.  Bear in mind that the defense has to be 100% effective whereas the USVs, due to their cheapness - only need an occasional success to be effective.
 
This suggests that effective defenses must be numerous, lethal, and rapidly responsive.  Small missiles, guided rockets, or CIWS-type weapons would be appropriate.  It also suggests that the defensive weapons ought to be harbor-based, controlled, and operated by a central harbor defense rather than depending on the individual ships to provide their own defense.  In other words, once a ship enters a port, the defense should be the responsibility of the port forces instead of the ship.  Ships come and go from a port but the port’s defenses ought to be consistent and on-going.  This provides continuity and consistency of defense regardless of the comings and goings of individual ships.  Sensors and weapons ought to be sited at the various approaches to the port and ought to be layered with multiple sensing and engagement zones.
 
 
Conclusion
 
There is no escaping the fact that the Russians appear utterly incapable or inept (or both) of detecting and defending against USVs.  They seem to lack any tactical doctrine for defense.  Given that, it is worse than pointless to draw conclusions.  This conflict seems almost totally inapplicable to a China-US war.  There is no more reason to believe that the naval aspects of this war offer valid lessons than do the ground combat aspects.
 
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]The War Zone, ”Ukrainian Drone Boat Scores Direct Hit On Russian Warship”, Thomas Newdick, 4-Aug-2023,
https://news.yahoo.com/ukrainian-drone-boat-scores-direct-093744246.html