It’s Not About One Versus One

Far too often (all the time?) commenters and analysts focus on one-on-one assessments of the weapon systems they are arguing for or against.  The US has more carriers than China.  A Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile can’t be stopped.  This missile has a ten mile greater range than that missile.  This weapon can penetrate that tank’s armor.  And so on.  That’s fine but it completely ignores the big picture.  Where does the weapon system fit into the larger military scheme?  Can it be produced in quantity?  Can it be serviced in the field?  Is it reliable?  And so on.
 
How many times have you heard the argument that if this weapon can beat that ship/plane/tank then that ship/plane/tank is obsolete and useless?
 
One-on-one, the WWII German Tiger tank was nearly unbeatable but that’s not how the war was fought.  Tiger tanks and US Sherman tanks didn’t line up, one against one, in a series of jousts.  The Tiger tank was difficult to produce, lacked numbers, was hard to maintain, hard to repair, and suffered from critical fuel shortages due to Allied attacks on Germany’s raw materials, factories, refineries, etc.  The war against the Tiger tank was fought in many ‘domains’ not just one-on-one.
 
We, as observers and analysts, need to stop the one-on-one thinking that dominates our discussions and begin recognizing and considering the many other factors that make up the larger military picture.
 
Let’s take a look at a current example involving Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian fuel capacity which is impacting the general Russian military effort.
 

Ukraine has intensified its campaign of drone strikes on Russian oil infrastructure, hitting refineries in recent weeks and deepening fuel shortages across the country.[1]
 
About 40% of Ukraine's long-range strike missions this year have focused on refineries, while others have hit storage and pumping facilities. [1]
 
Independent estimates suggest up to 20% of Russia's refining capacity has been disabled, cutting more than 1 million barrels a day of output, mostly gasoline. Refineries that have been hit repeatedly have sustained lasting damage, especially to cracking units that are difficult to replace under Western sanctions. [1]
 
The impact has been felt nationwide. Motorists face fuel shortages, long lines, and record prices. Wholesale gasoline prices have jumped 54% since January, prompting authorities to suspend exports and impose rationing in some regions. [1]

We see, then, that the Russian military effort can be impacted not just by one-on-one weapon contests but by many other factors such as fuel supply – a lesson straight out of WWII (and every other conflict in history!).  No longer can we, as analysts, talk about one-on-one assessments without considering the larger picture and all the other factors that impact and determine a weapon system’s actual usefulness and effectiveness.
 
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On a bit of side note, albeit closely related, here’s a bit of information about Ukraine’s drone effort.
 

The FP-1 long-range "kamikaze" drone, introduced in May, now accounts for about 60% of strikes inside Russia. Produced at an estimated 100 units a day, it carries a 60- to 120-kilogram warhead with a range of up to 1,600 kilometers.
 
Despite a price of about $55,000, it is said to feature advanced guidance software that maintains accuracy under electronic jamming. [1]

This highlights so many lessons we’ve discussed in past posts.  For example, not every weapon has to be bleeding edge, light years ahead technology.  Had the US tried to produce this drone, it would have been 10x the size, 1000x the cost, and been partially ready in a decade or two.  In the non-US procurement world, simple and just plain effective will almost always be sufficient.  Low cost, easy to mass produce, reasonably useful characteristics … this is what effective weapons procurement should look like.
 
 
 
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[1]Newsmax website, “Russia Faces Gasoline Crisis as Ukrainian Drones Strike”, Sandy Fitzgerald, 5-Sep-2025,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/russia-ukraine-war/2025/09/05/id/1225208/

Strategic Petroleum Reserve

The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is a reserve inventory of crude oil intended for use in the event of war or extreme emergencies.  Oil is stored in 62 salt caverns at four sites along the Gulf of Mexico and holds a total of 714 million barrels of crude oil.  In the event of war, the reserve could be used not only for direct military oil needs but also to supply defense industries.  To give an idea of the practical impact of the SPR, as of Jan 2022, the SPR represented around 1450 days of total U.S. petroleum net imports at the usage rates at that time.[1]
 
As an emergency supply, the importance of maintaining the supply at full capacity is self-evident.  Unfortunately, President Biden drew down the storage levels for political gain in violation of the intent of the reserve.  From Wikipedia,
 

On March 31, 2022, President Joe Biden announced that his administration would release 1 million barrels of oil per day from the reserve for the next 180 days …   The 2022 release became the largest ever SPR sale and lowered the SPR to its lowest levels in 40 years.  …  The Biden administration continued to release reserves in 2023, selling off 45% of the SPR by September 2023.[2]

Again from Wikipedia,
 

As of March 7, 2025, the inventory was 395.3 million barrels … [ed. 55% of capacity]).[2]

The SPR is a military safety net in the event of war and should not be manipulated for political purposes.  Even using it to mitigate occasional gasoline shortages, as other Presidents have done in the past, is wrong.
 
The Trump administration is refilling the reserve at the maximum rate the facilities can accept which is around 3 million barrels per month.  At that rate, it will take quite a while to completely refill the reserve – I calculate 120 months.  If correct, this is staggeringly slow and emphasizes why the reserve should never be tapped for anything other than a war or major disaster.
 
Redstate website has an interesting article on the status of the SPR.[3]  Energy Secretary Chris Wright said,
 

We are refilling the Reserve now and we will continue to refill the Reserve the whole time I'm in office.[3]

Discussing Biden’s actions, Wright noted,
 

You know, that was just such an irreponsible action to drain that reserve so quickly for electoral reasons, and in fact it was drained so fast, it did some damage to the facilities. So right now we can only fill two of the four major salt caverns that we have. So, we're doing repair work on the other two, we're slowly filling the other two … [3]

So, not only was the Biden action irresponsible, it apparently caused structural damage of some sort.  Even when the damage is repaired, given the apparent refill rate, we will be years refilling Biden’s drawdowns.
 
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Note:  For anyone who might be tempted to argue that the President can draw from the SPR for non-emergency reasons because it’s been done before, here is the relevant law governing drawdowns from the SPR.  Nothing in the law allows the President to draw from the SPR just because gas prices have increased a bit before an election.
 
 
42 U.S. Code § 6234 - Strategic Petroleum Reserve

(f)(1)The drawdown and distribution of petroleum products from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is authorized only under section 6241 of this title, and drawdown and distribution of petroleum products for purposes other than those described in section 6241 of this title shall be prohibited.
 
42 U.S. Code § 6241 - Drawdown and sale of petroleum products
 
(1)Drawdown and sale of petroleum products from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve may not be made unless the President has found drawdown and sale are required by a severe energy supply interruption or by obligations of the United States under the international energy program.
 
(2)For purposes of this section, in addition to the circumstances set forth in section 6202(8) of this title, a severe energy supply interruption shall be deemed to exist if the President determines that—
 
(A)an emergency situation exists and there is a significant reduction in supply which is of significant scope and duration;
 
(B)a severe increase in the price of petroleum products has resulted from such emergency situation; and
 
(C)such price increase is likely to cause a major adverse impact on the national economy.
 
 

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[1]https://www.energy.gov/ceser/spr-quick-facts
 
[2]Wikipedia, “Strategic Petroleum Reserve (United_States)”,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Petroleum_Reserve_(United_States)
 
[3]Redstate website, “Energy Secretary Chris Wright on Strategic Petroleum Reserve: 'We're Filling It Right Now'”, Ward Clark, 28-Apr-2025,
https://redstate.com/wardclark/2025/04/28/energy-secretary-chris-wright-on-strategic-petroleum-reserve-were-filling-it-right-now-n2188445