Landing Craft

Problem
 
Amphibious assaults?  A moot concept since we have no landing craft.
 
Wait, what?  Of course we have landing craft!  We have the LCAC, LCU, and LCM.  Well, yes, we have those craft but none of them are initial wave assault craft.  They’re follow on craft for sustainment after the assault site has been secured.
 
The only initial wave landing craft we have is the Marine’s AAV/ACV which is not really a landing craft in the traditional sense of a small boat that can delivery troops to the beach and return to the host ship to get more troops for subsequent waves.  The AAV/ACV is a one-way, amphibious, light armored personnel carrier (APC).
 
Let’s do the math.  An AAV/ACV can carry around 15 combat equipped troops and a MEU (we’ll discuss a MEU but this scales up to whatever size and, yes, we recognize that a MEU, on its own, is not capable of conducting an opposed landing) has around a dozen AAV/ACV so that represents a landing capacity of around 180 troops that can be delivered to the beach.  The remainder of the MEU’s 2200 troops have to find some other way to get ashore.  That’s an initial assault capacity of around 8% of the MEU.
 
A MEU has around 16 transport helos/MV-22s, each of which can carry 15-20 combat loaded troops but, again, these are not initial assault assets.  Helos are not survivable over a battlefield.  They’re follow on transports. 
 
Are 180 troops per MEU really enough to conduct an opposed landing?  Of course not!  Thus, we have a problem.
 
 
Solution
 
So, what’s the solution?  I’ve heard many people recommend foreign “landing craft” such as the CB90, Jehu (Finnish), Raptor (Russian), etc be used as landing craft.  Claimed benefits include a [very small] degree of stealth, speed, armament, and the ability to fit six or so craft in the well deck of an amphibious ship.
 

CB90

Jehu - Note the narrow, restricted exit ramp and imagine
fifteen or so combat laden troops trying to rapidly
debark, one at a time, under fire.

Analysis

 
Let’s take a closer, analytical look at this type of boat in the landing craft role.
 
Troop Capacity – This size boat claims to be able to carry 15-20 or so troops, likely less when the troops are combat equipped.  Let’s be generous and use a figure of 20.  For 6 boats, that’s 120 troops per assault wave.  Is that an assault or a school board meeting?  By comparison, a WWII attack transport carried around 24 landing craft, each of which could carry around 30 troops for a wave of 720 troops.
 
Cargo Capacity – None.  These types of craft have no cargo capacity.  That’s all there is to say about that.  The troops would land with whatever they can carry on their person.
 
Debarkation – One of the constant characteristics across these types of boats are the requirement for the troops to debark via narrow passageways, single file, slowly.  While some claim to have restricted, emergency egress, it is, again, an exceedingly slow and cumbersome process.  Under fire, these boats are death traps for the troops.  Arguably, the most important characteristic of an effective landing craft is the ability to rapidly discharge the troops while under fire.  The WWII Higgins boat allowed the troops to egress, line abreast, several at a time, simultaneously, across the bow ramp.  In an emergency, dozens of troops could simultaneously egress over the open sides.
 
Cost -  This type of craft costs several million dollars apiece, or more, which is way too expensive for a niche craft that is likely to suffer high rates of attrition and needs to be procured in large numbers.
 
 
Conclusion
 
It is patently clear that these types of craft are not suitable for amphibious assaults.  They are suited (and this may even be overly optimistic) for the kind of tiny raid operations or patrol duties they were designed for.  We need to stop looking for foreign landing craft because there are none that are suited for the purpose.  If we want a landing craft, we need to go back to the drawing board and design a dirt-simple, modern, Higgins boat and be done with it. 
 
Of course, such a landing craft would require a radically re-designed amphibious ship to make use of it … you know, something like a WWII Attack Transport (APA) but that’s a separate, though intimately related, topic.
 
Given that ComNavOps sees very little strategic need for future amphibious assaults and given that the Marines have publicly stated that they are out of the assault business, this entire discussion is probably moot but at least we now know what won’t work and can stop bringing up these types of boats.
 

SSC Connector Update

It’s been awhile since we last checked in on the Navy’s LCAC replacement program, the Ship to Shore Connector (SSC) in Nov 2018 (see, “SSC Update”).  That program should be about wrapped up by now, right?  Let’s check the status.

 

 

Status

 

The Navy/Marines are pursuing an acquisition program of Ship to Shore Connectors (SSC) which are nearly identical replacements for the Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC).  As a reminder, the Navy has 72 existing LCAC with a payload capacity of 60 tons.  The Navy plans to acquire 73 SSC with a payload capacity of 72 tons.

 

Ship to Shore Connector, SSC

Nearly Identical LCAC

 

As described in the previous update (link above), an interesting new feature is the ability of the SSC to disembark vehicles directly into the water instead of on land.  Presumably, this is aimed at offloading AAV/ACV vehicles into the sea as a means of bypassing the standoff range problem for amphibious ships.  The SSC would bring the vehicles to within a few miles of shore and drop them into the water to continue to shore on their own while the SSC retires to safety.  Unfortunately, this is yet another example of concurrency with this feature having been added part way through production and needing to be back fit to earlier production craft.

 

The SSC costs $79M each, based on the FY22 Navy SCN budget documents.[1]  After an initial flurry, the purchases are being funded at a rate of one or two per year (none in 2020 !) with a total of 25 having been funded, so far.  Acquisition began with the first contract awards in 2015 to Textron (New Orleans, LA).  Now, seven years later, the acquisition ought to be about done and the SSCs should be in the fleet and smoothly functioning.  Unbelievably, however, the second SSC (101) was only delivered to the Navy on 27-Aug-2020, five years after contract award.  Seriously?  Five years to build a small craft that is a near twin to the existing LCAC? 

 

Despite a hopeful start to what ought to be a simple follow on to the LCAC, the SSC program has been plagued by problems which have caused multiple, long delays.  GAO identifies the start of the program as May 2009.  Delays have pushed IOC back to the end of 2022 or beyond.  That’s 13 years and counting for a simple evolutionary development of the LCAC.  That’s pathetic.

 

 

Problems

 

The main problem with the SSC is the gearbox – what is it with gearboxes and the Navy? – which is undergoing its third round of design changes attempting to deal with premature wear.  This is yet another example of the folly and cost of concurrent development and production.  Once the gearbox problem is solved (it never was on the Freedom class LCS and now they’re all being retired !), the solution will have to be expensively retrofitted to the SSCs already produced.  I don’t know why the Navy can’t grasp the idea of testing first, then production.  But, I digress …

 

In 2019, GAO noted,

 

… testing of Craft 100 (the test and training prototype craft) continues to pose challenges, and electrical system stability and command, control, communications, computers and navigation integration challenges must be resolved … [2]

 

More recently, cracking propeller blades have become a problem and solutions will, again, have to be back fit to already produced craft.

 

The program is pursuing two concurrent solutions to address cracking found on 10 of the 12 tested propeller blades when the crafts were loaded with weight as they would be during an amphibious assault.[3]

 

Seriously … blade strength???  Isn’t this past technology that we mastered long ago?  We’ve been making propeller blades of all types since before WWI.  Is this an example of trying to cut every possible penny out of a program and then we wind up with understrength items that have to be re-developed and retrofitted and wind up costing ten times the amount of any potential savings?  Penny wise and pound foolish?  Grumman used to have the right philosophy about physical strength and ruggedness … they overbuilt which earned them the nickname ‘Grumman Iron Works’.  There are plenty of places we can cut costs but the actual product should not be one of them.  Moving on …

 

 

Rationale

 

Given the Marine’s numerous public statements that they are out of the amphibious assault business, one can’t help but ask the blindingly obvious question, ‘why are we buying amphibious assault landing craft (or, for that matter, new amphibious ships and ACVs)?’

 

Given that the Navy is building LHAs without well decks and LPDs with less well deck capacity than the ships they’re replacing, again, one can’t help but ask the blindingly obvious question, ‘why are we buying amphibious assault landing craft?’

 

Possibly as a partial recognition of that logical disconnect,

 

In a briefing to Navy senior leadership, the program stated that it is considering reducing the total number of craft from 72 to 50. It is also considering updating the cost baseline, which the program indicated will likely result in a breach of statutory unit cost thresholds.[3]

 

And, if we’re out of the assault business and just need occasional administrative unloadings from amphibious ships then why not procure LCUs for 1/5 the cost?  The latest Navy budget documents put the cost of the LCU at $17M each[1] which would be a huge savings over the $79M SSC cost.

 

Speaking of cost efficiency,

 

The program stated that Textron has indicated in the past that eight craft per year are necessary to achieve economies of scale … [2]

 

However, as noted, we’re only procuring one or two per year due to the various ongoing problems and delays.  Between the very low production rate and the responsibility to fix interminable problems, Textron has to be losing money badly on this program.

 

 

Summary

 

So, despite an initial promising start to the program, things have bogged down badly, problems have arisen that are proving difficult to solve, concurrency has reared its head, and the manufacturer is likely losing money.  This has become another long, drawn out development program like the F-35 and, like the F-35, it is now obsolete before it is even fielded.  The Marines have dropped out of the amphibious assault mission, leaving this a craft without a purpose.  As we consistently see, protracted development is the mortal enemy of relevance.

 

 

_________________________________

 

[1]Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Justification Book Volume 1 of 1, Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, May 2021, https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/SCN_Book.pdf

 

[2]Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, May 2019

 

[3]Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, Jun 2021

SSC Update

Despite what long time readers might think, ComNavOps loves to report good news.  The problem is there is so little of it to report!  Here, however, is some possible good news about the Navy’s Ship to Shore Connector (SSC) which is the LCAC replacement.

I have to stop at this point and offer the disclaimer that I’m pretty much dead set against the SSC/LCAC as a landing craft.  I greatly prefer LSTs and LCUs.  So, I find the entire SSC/LCAC program to be a waste of money and effort.  That said, the SSC program appears to be proceeding smoothly and - dare I say it? – wisely.

To refresh, the SSC is basically a rehash of the LCAC with maintenance and reliability improvements as well as various electronics upgrades.  Here’s a few basic specs on the SSC.

Troop Capacity    145

Weight Capacity    74 tons

Range              25 nm minimum

The program is planned to deliver 72 operational craft with a unit cost of around $50M each.  Delivery is scheduled to begin in 2018 with Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in 2020.

The manufacturer, Textron, began testing of the first SSC (they refer to it as LCAC 100) in April of 2018 in a New Orleans bayou in Louisiana.

One of the interesting capabilities is the ability to launch vehicles into the water rather than having to land to disembark. (3)  As we know, the Marine’s AAVs are limited to around 2-5 miles water transit before the embarked troops become too seasick to function.  Thus, the doctrine of standing 25-50+ miles offshore to conduct an amphibious assault is simply not viable.  One of the proposed solutions is to use another vessel to quickly transport the AAVs to with a few miles of the beach and drop them into the water for the final approach.  Thus, while the LCAC/SSC is doctrinally considered non-survivable and unsuited for initial assault waves, the SSC, if it can unload AAVs in stride, can provide a means to get the AAVs in range without exposing the SSC to  undue risk.  Of course, how valid the assumption is that a few miles offshore is far enough to maintain the survivability of the SSC is highly questionable in the age of rockets, artillery, and missiles!

Scott Allen, Textron’s vice president for marine systems, noted that while the individual upgraded components were all technically mature, the challenge was in integrating them.  Integration is an often overlooked challenge that has tripped up many a program.  Good to see that Textron is aware of the challenge and addressing it up front. 

Just as an interesting tidbit, Allen noted that the SSC has 66 individual compartments!  Who would have guessed that in a small craft like that?  He further noted that the compartments present their own challenge in terms of running cables and piping since every penetration has to be made watertight.

According to the Navy, the SSC is the first major program to be designed in-house by the Navy in quite some time. (2)  I don’t know to what degree that refers.  Was it just the requirements or was it nuts and bolts construction drawings or something in between?  The contractors that bid on the construction were, apparently, allowed to choose their own components so the design was not, presumably, at the construction drawing level of detail.  It sounds like the design was just a requirements level design which is not exactly designing in-house in the sense that most of us would think.  Still, it appears to be a step in the right direction.

Here’s the main shining beacon of wisdom in the program – it has no concurrency!

Allen said testing on LCAC 100 had shown “no show-stoppers” in terms of finding deficiencies or changes that need to be inserted into the production line, but he did note that “all of the learning that we got from 100 is rolled back into 101 – so where you discover things and it takes some time to work through it, we’re able to actually already have that baked in when 101 comes off the line at the end of this month. It will save us a lot of time in testing going forward.” (1)

Wow!  Unlike every other Navy acquisition program, the SSC appears to be building an initial craft, testing it, and rolling the findings back into the construction of the next craft – you know, just like any intelligent person would do.  It’s a sad commentary on the state of affairs in the Navy that doing something in a logical manner would warrant praise but that’s what it’s come to.  I’d love to know who insisted on this simple and correct approach.  Was it the Navy or the manufacturer?  If it was the Navy, why only on this program? 

In any event, this is programmatically outstanding.  Now, I just wish they’d apply this common sense to a truly useful landing craft like a modern LST/LCU and, maybe, a modern LCVP.

____________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “First Ship-to-Shore Connector Begins On-Water Testing in New Orleans”, Megan Eckstein, April 17, 2018,

https://news.usni.org/2018/04/17/32985

(2)Naval Sea Systems Command website,

http://www.navsea.navy.mil/Home/Team-Ships/PEO-Ships/Ship-to-Shore-Connector-SSC/

(3)https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship-to-Shore_Connector

Attack Transport APA

We recently discussed the value of our big deck, amphibious aviation ships and concluded that they did not offer sufficient value to justify their cost.  One of the alternative suggestions was to transfer the aviation capability to the fleet’s regular aircraft carriers and relocate the amphibious ground combat element to dedicated transport vessels similar to the WWII Attack Transports (APA).  Let’s consider the APA in a bit more detail.

The WWII APA, as typified by the Haskell class, was designed to carry 1500 troops and their combat equipment.  The ships carried around two dozen landing craft of various types.  The Haskell APA was 455 ft long and had a displacement of 6900 t (light) and 14,000 t (loaded).  Contrast this to the current Wasp LHD class at 843 ft long and 40,000 t displacement and carrying 1700 troops.  The Wasp is nearly twice as long and three times the displacement with around the same troop transport capacity.

                 Haskell     Wasp

Length, ft           455      843

Displacement, t   14,000   40,000

Troops              1500     1700

Haskell Class APA

The APA contains several inherent design advantages compared to our current LXX amphibious ships.

• Number of Landing Craft – The APA carried a couple dozen landing craft, the most common of which was the LCVP which carried around 36 troops and had a speed of around 12 kts.  Contrast this with the current AAV which carries around 20 troops and has a speed of around 7 kts.  The LCVP was reusable whereas the AAV is single use but can function as a poor armored personnel carrier on land.  Also contrast the number of landing craft with the 0-3 LCACs that current amphibious ships carry.  A couple of the new America class LHAs don’t even have a well deck and cannot transport and land any equipment that can’t be loaded onto a helo.  The number of landing craft on the APA and their reusability made the APA less vulnerable to the effects of landing craft attrition.  To be fair, the number of landing craft is less an issue of the type of ship and more one of the type of landing craft although the APA’s use of over-the-side landing craft as opposed to the LXX well decks offers certain advantages in terms of numbers.  To be even more fair, if the modern AAVs are considered landing craft then the numbers are more even but there’s no getting around the fact that the AAVs are one use craft as opposed to the LCVPs.

• Defensive Armament – An APA contained purely defensive anti-air armament (some classes had a 5” gun which was used for anti-air but could provide anti-surface in an emergency).  In a modern context this would equate to simple, self-contained, short range anti-air weapons like CIWS and SeaRAM.  No sophisticated sensor suite would be needed since the weapons contain their own radars.  Contrast this with the sensor suite on an LXX which consists of 2D, 3D, surface search, and air traffic control radars which drives up costs.

• Cost – APAs were basically commercial cargo ships.  Their austere fit kept the cost down which allowed large numbers of ships to be built.  In WWII, 388 APAs were built – we’re struggling to maintain a 30-ship amphibious fleet.  The low cost and large numbers greatly mitigated the impact of a sunken ship.  As we’ve discussed, the sensor suite, fairly extensive weapons suite, and aviation capability drastically drives up the cost of modern LXX amphibious ships.

• Commercial Design – APAs were basically commercial cargo ships.  As such it would be possible and quite reasonable to build them for commercial use with conversion in mind and convert them to transports when needed.  Thus, they would serve a useful commercial purpose for the 99% time when we aren’t conducting major amphibious assaults but still be available when needed.

• Ship To Shore – APAs had the ability to land their entire troop and equipment/cargo load using their organic landing craft.  LXXs are somewhat limited.  In an aviation assault mode, the LXX cannot land most of the Marine’s heavier and most useful equipment.  The lead ships of the America class have no well deck and are limited to only aviation landings which means they can’t land any heavier, useful equipment.

  

So, what does all this tell us?

It tells us that the current big deck LXX amphibious ships are an evolutionary mistake.  They began as an attempt to incorporate aviation, in the form of helos, into amphibious assaults but the concept was carried too far and resulted in hugely expensive ships that have very little use outside their narrow task set of amphibious assault.  The ships are also not very efficient at their main task of actually landing the ground element and their equipment.

We need to give serious consideration to eliminating the big deck LXX amphibious ships, dispersing the aviation element to regular carriers, and using modern APAs to transport and land the ground element.  Along with that, we need to design a reusable landing craft whose only function is ship to shore transport, rather than try to be an all-in-one high speed landing craft / armored personnel carrier / fire support / light tank / whatever else, miracle vehicle.  We keep trying to re-travel the failed EFV path instead of emulating the venerable, cheap, Higgins boat.

The LXX ships are yet another attempt by the Navy to make every ship a single-handed war winner.  Today’s amphibious ships are a combination of fixed wing aircraft carrier, helo carrier, troop transport, cargo vessel, assault ship with, now, rumblings of offensive anti-surface and area anti-air capabilities.  The result is ships that are too expensive to afford in sufficient quantity and too expensive to risk conducting the very task they were designed for – assaults!  You can’t conduct an assault from 25-50+ nm offshore.  We need to return to simple, basic, modified cargo ships as APAs.