San Antonio Class Mast and Stealth

The San Antonio class (LPD-17) ship design included the use of a composite enclosure around the mast.  The Advanced Enclosed Mast/Sensor (AEM/S) was intended to reduce the ship’s radar signature while allowing the ship’s own outgoing and returning radar waves to pass through the enclosure unimpeded.  Thus, the enclosure was designed to be selective about which signal frequencies it reflected or passed.  The selectivity would, theoretically, enhance the ship’s sensor performance by filtering out false and spurious signals.  Additional claimed benefits included reduced sensor and mast maintenance, longer sensor life, easier sensor maintenance, and greater sensor reliability.

USS San Antonio, LPD-17 - Note enclosed masts

 

The AEM/S consists of a faceted radome that provides a cleaner exterior profile, with internal platforms on which antennas and sensors are mounted. The radome material is designed so that the antennas can transmit and receive through the material. The base of the mast is constructed from fiber reinforced composite skins encasing end-grain balsa core. The upper (radome) section consists of structural foam and fiberglass.[2]

 

The AEM/S System mast [a 93-foot-high hexagonal structure 35 feet in diameter ] is constructed of a multi-layer, frequency-selective composite material designed to allow passage of own-ship sensor frequencies with very low loss while reflecting other frequencies. The mast’s shape is designed to provide a smooth silhouette to reduce radar cross section. Signature and electro-magnetic design requirements are based on criteria associated with sensor and antenna performance, electro-magnetic interference, lighting protection electromagnetic shielding, and electrical bonding and grounding.[1]

 

The AEM/S System mast is an enclosed structure that protects radars and communication antennas from weather exposure and provides access for repairs, thus greatly reducing maintenance costs and risk of failure. The top half is divided into two radome-like compartments; the upper compartment houses the Mk 23 Target Acquisition System (TAS) antenna and the lower encloses the AN/SPS-40 air search antenna. Structural design requirements for strength and stiffness meet Fleet requirements for vibration, shock, and fatigue.[1]

 

The lower half of the AEM/S system serves to hold up the top half. The case of the lower half is balsa. An electromagnetic (EM) shield compartment that uses reflecting metallic shielding is included in a portion of the lower half of the mast to meet design requirements. The top half contains a tailored sandwich composite material made up of a foam core, with frequency selective material, as well as structural laminate skins.[4]

 

The AEM/S was initially prototyped on the USS Radford and many of the AEM/S public descriptions apply to the prototype rather than the LPD-17.  Regardless, the structures are essentially identical.

 

The AEM/S System is fabricated with an advanced composite hybrid frequency selective surface (FSS), designed to allow passage of own-ship sensor frequencies while reflecting other frequencies.

 

The upper half of the AEM/S System is designed to allow passage of own-ship sensor frequencies with very low loss while reflecting other frequencies. It is divided into two radome-like compartments; the upper compartment houses the MK 23 TAS antenna, and the lower encloses the SPS-40 air search radar antenna.[3]

 

The AEM/S has a pretty impressive list of claimed benefits, bordering on magical.  Has it delivered on the claimed benefits?  Unfortunately, there is no actual data that I’m aware of so we’re reduced to informed speculation to answer the question.

 

There have been persistent, though unconfirmed, reports of the enclosure negatively impacting own-ship sensor performance.

 

The most telling piece of circumstantial evidence is the fact that the Navy has opted not to continue using the enclosure on the next flight of LPD-17s.  Beginning with USS Fort Lauderdale, LPD-28, the mast enclosure has been discontinued.  In addition, the new Constellation class frigate will not have an enclosed mast.

 

If all the claimed benefits had actually materialized, it would have been a no-brainer to continue using the mast enclosure.  The fact that no new ships/classes have been spec’ed with the enclosure offers pretty compelling evidence that the enclosure has not been the success that was hoped and that the benefits, if any, have been insufficient to justify its continued use.

 

LPD-17 Mast Prototype on USS Radford

 

 

USS Fort Lauderdale - Note the conventional, open mast

 

Consider the logic of the reflectivity/transmission characteristics.  The claim is that the enclosure reflects incoming enemy radar waves while allowing the ship’s own outgoing and return sensor signals to pass unimpeded.  Does it seem plausible that this can actually occur?  The enemy, like us, uses a multitude of radar and sensor frequencies, often the same ones we do, so how can an enclosure reflect enemy radar waves while allowing the exact same frequency waves of the ship’s sensors to pass unimpeded?  Logic would suggest it can’t. 

 

If the enemy only used one frequency and we used a different one than, yes, it might be possible to construct such a selective enclosure.  However, in these days of multi-frequency and/or frequency hopping radars, trying to design a selective friendly/unfriendly enclosure would seem impossible.  Indeed, the persistent reports suggest that the enclosure is not performing as claimed and that, in particular, the ship’s own signals are being impeded.

 

It would appear that the AEM/S is a failure which raises the question, why didn’t the prototyping on the Radford reveal the problems and prevent the enclosure from being used on the LPD-17 class?  I suspect this may have been a case of unrealistic testing that was designed not to find faults but to validate a decision already made.

 

 

 

__________________________________

 

[1]https://man.fas.org/dod-101/sys/ship/lpd-17.htm

 

[2]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Enclosed_Mast/Sensor

 

[3]https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/aems.htm

 

[4]https://cimsec.org/22119-2/

LPD-25 Delivery Deficiencies

The San Antonio (LPD-17) amphibious assault ship class has been in production since the lead ship began construction in 2000.  Now, 21 years later, the bugs ought to have been long ago worked out and the manufacturer, Huntington Ingalls (HII) ought to be delivering polished, problem-free ships on a regular basis, right?  Well, here’s what an Oct 2020 Defense News website article noted from a GAO report about LPD-25, commissioned in 2014:

 

For example, the GAO found that 25 of the 58 systems required to be certified for deployment on LPD-25 were incomplete at the time of the ship’s delivery, and 14 were still incomplete when the ship was transferred to the fleet. Multiple systems were found deficient while the ship was in the fleet, including an advanced electronics system that “controls nearly all systems and equipment on the ship,” the GAO found.

 

“The system has experienced widespread performance failures and the Navy has been unable to repair the ship efficiently, including during the post-delivery period and after the ship was provided to the fleet,” the report found. “As a result, the Navy is in the process of looking at incorporating a new system.” (1)

 

 

I don’t know what the ‘advanced electronics system that “controls nearly all systems and equipment on the ship” ‘ is but it must be big and it must be important. 

 

That the Navy has been unable to repair the system is worrying and is yet another example of the trend of modern systems becoming too complex to operate and maintain and too complex to achieve their anticipated performance.  We’ve seen this with the fleet-wide degradation of Aegis.  Despite this trend, the Navy is continuing to pursue ever more complex systems in violation of both the K.I.S.S. principle and the common sense requirement that combat systems be as rugged, robust, and repairable as possible.

 

Equally worrisome is that the Navy is ‘looking at incorporating a new system’.  The Navy appears to be giving up on what is clearly a very important system.  This, too, is becoming a trend.  For example, the F-35 ALIS software system has been a debacle of sufficient magnitude that the military has given up on it and is trying to replace it.  Note that I am not arguing against giving up on failed systems but it is troubling that so many systems are advancing so far, only to be abandoned.  We need to identify failed systems much earlier in their development cycle instead of allowing them to become part of what should be mature production systems.  

 

LPD-25, San Antonio Class

The LPD-25’s problems are not isolated to one unfortunate ship of the class.  The INSURV inspection for USS Portland, LPD-27, noted,

 

On LPD-27, the Portland, the ship scored lower than any of the previous four ships over the past five years, with deficiencies in main engines, aviation, small boat handling, anchoring, generators and air search radar systems, the report found. (1)

 

Of course, the Navy doesn’t see any problems.  As Adm. Moore enthusiastically described it, the Portland is an amazing success.

 

Portland is the 11th San Antonio class Amphibious Transport Dock ship to be presented to the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) for acceptance. Acceptance Trials are conducted with INSURV and are intended to demonstrate a ship's readiness for delivery through a series of dock-side and underway tests and evaluations.

"The USS Portland is a well-designed ship that is going to increase our Navy and Marine Corps warfighting capability for years to come," said Vice Adm. Thomas Moore, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command. "The material condition of the ship is fantastic, and the success she had during acceptance trials is a true testament to the men and women that built her." (2)

There you have it.  According to the Adm. Moore, LPD-27 is ‘fantastic’ and an unmitigated success.  It would appear that INSURV/NAVSEA didn’t get the memo from Adm. Moore about just how fantastic the Portland is.

 

Despite endless years of incomplete and damaged ships being delivered to the Navy, the Navy continues to accept these ships and does not require warranties from the shipbuilders.  Why even bother with issuing contracts since the shipbuilders have no intention of meeting the contract requirements and the Navy has no intention of holding them to the contract requirements?  We could save a lot of money by just dropping the charade and simply accepting whatever non-functional crap industry wants to deliver.  It’s what we do now, anyway, but we spend a lot of money negotiating contracts neither side has any intention of fulfilling so let’s stop pretending.

 

 

 

_____________________________________

 

(1)Defense News website, “US Navy inspections of Ingalls-built ships uncovered significant problems, report shows”, David Larter, Oct‎ ‎8‎, ‎2020

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/10/08/us-navy-inspections-of-ingalls-built-ships-uncovered-significant-problems-report-shows/

 

(2)http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/186111/future-uss-portland-%28lpd-27%29-completes-acceptance-trials.html

LSD-41/49 Class and LX(R)

The Navy has designated the LPD-17 as the basis for the LX(R) (now designated LPD-17 Flt II) which is intended to replace the LSD-41/49 class amphibious ships.  The San Antonio LPD-17 class began with the LPD-17 and has continued through LPD-27 with LPD-28 and -29 being designated transition vessels to the LPD-17 Flt II which begins with LPD-30.  The Navy intends to build 13 of the ships.

LX(R) / LPD-17 Flt II

As a reminder, the LSD-41 (Landing Ship, Dock) Whidbey Island class, built in the 1980’s, was designed specifically to transport and launch LCAC vessels and has a capacity of four LCACs which is the most of any amphibious ship.(1)   It can also provide docking and repair services for LCACs and for conventional landing craft.(1)

In 1987 the Navy began construction on LSD-49 Harpers Ferry class which reduced LCAC capacity to two while increasing cargo capacity.(1)

Here’s a few basic specifications for the LSD-41/49 class. (1)  Note the LCAC capacities.

LSD-41/49 Specifications
	LSD-41	LSD-49
Length, ft	609	609
Beam, ft	84	84
Displacement, tons	16000	17000
LCAC Capacity	4	2

LSD-41 Whidbey Island Class

There are several questionable aspects to the LPD-17 Flt II program that warrant a bit of discussion.

Well Deck Size.  The LX(R) is intended as the replacement for the LSD-41/49 class.  The problem is that the LX(R) has a significantly smaller well deck than the LSD-41 class and can only carry 2 LCACs.  Here are the well deck dimensions for recent classes of amphibious ships (see, “Wither The Well Deck”).  Note the generally decreasing well deck sizes.

Amphibious Ship Well Deck Size
Whidbey Island LSD-41	440’ x 50’
Harpers Ferry LSD-49	220’ x 50’
Tarawa LHA-1	268’ x 78’
Wasp LHD-1	267’ x 50’
America LHA-6	none
San Antonio LPD-17	170’ x 50’

The decreased well deck and LCAC capacity represents a significant decrease in ship to shore amphibious capability which seems incongruent with the LSD/LPD’s main function of amphibious assault.  One can’t help but wonder what the Navy sees as the main function of the new LPD-17 Flt II since it clearly isn’t amphibious assault.

Cost.  Navy’s cost target for the LPD-17 Flt II is $1.8B (FY2019$) for the lead vessel, LPD-30, and $1.5B (FY2019$) for the follow on ships (2), however, LPD-31 is now estimated to cost a bit over $2.0B (5) so, as always, the Navy’s cost estimates are significantly understated.

Huntington Ingalls announced a sole-source $1.5B fixed price incentive contract for the lead ship, LPD-30, in Mar 2019.  As usual, this is only a partial cost and does not include advanced procurement funds already expended, Government Furnished Equipment, or post-delivery construction which is an ever-increasing portion and is intended to get around cost caps and make acquisitions seem cheaper than they are.  The true cost is likely $2B+.  Indeed, the Navy’s budget request documents show a cost of $1.7B without GFE or post-construction costs. (4)

As usual, the Navy is not pursuing responsible contracting practices and is doing everything it can to obscure costs.  From the CRS report,

The Navy plans to award sole-source contracts to Huntington Ingalls—the only shipbuilder of Flight I ships—for Flight II construction. Further, the program did not request a separate independent cost estimate for Flight II prior to awarding the LPD 30 detail design and construction contract. At the same time, the Navy identified no plans to establish a cost baseline specific to Flight II. Without this baseline, the Navy would report full LPD 17 program costs—rather than Flight II specific costs—constraining visibility into Flight II. (4, p.14)

Design Basis.  The Navy’s driving force for the ship design was the cost target rather than functionality or combat effectiveness.  As we have repeatedly stated, cost is a secondary consideration for warship design and cannot be the primary design factor.  No good ship was ever designed with cost as the primary design criteria.

From 1Q 2013 to 1Q 2014, the Navy claims to have conducted an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) with three alternatives considered:

• modified (reduced capability/reduced-cost) LPD-17
• brand new designs
• foreign design

Given the Navy’s documented half-hearted or non-existent AOAs for other ships, one can’t help but wonder about the rigor and validity of this AOA.  The LCS, Ford, Zumwalt, Burke Flt III, and new frigate never got rigorous AOAs.  They were either never performed or they were conducted for show with the outcome having been pre-determined.  Indeed, the selection of the modified LPD-17 strongly suggests that this was yet another example of a pre-determined AOA conducted purely for show.

Following are LX(R) design features compared to the San Antonia Class (3):

• half the medical spaces
• smaller hangar for stowing two MV-22 tilt rotor aircraft
• no composite masts
• two main propulsion diesel engines instead of four
• two spots for Landing Craft Air Cushion hovercraft or one Landing Craft Utility boat
• reduced troop capacity from 800 to 500
• reduced vehicle storage space
• enhanced command and control facilities

Competition.  According to the Congressional Research Service, as recently as May 2017, the Navy had publicly stated that a competition would be held between HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding of Pascagoula, MS, the builder of LPD-17 Flight I ships, and General Dynamics’ National Steel and Shipbuilding (GD/NASSCO) of San Diego, CA.  However, on April 6, 2018, the Navy announced that it would sole-source the design and construction of LPD-30 to HII.  Again, this suggests that the previously announced ‘competition’ was for show and that the builder had been pre-determined from the start.

CONOPS.  One of the major justifications for the LX(R) is the “requirement” to operate independently.  Of course, this is idiotic but that’s the Navy’s story and they’re sticking to it.  Under this concept, the 3-ship Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG/MEU) will routinely disaggregate and operate as independent ships, widely separated geographically.  This, the Navy/Marines claim, will increase flexibility and responsiveness.

The reality is that disaggregated ARGs have even less capability than the mathematical 1/3 capability that splitting them up into three parts would suggest.  For example, the LPD, when operating independently, carries less than a third of a MEU and almost none of the aviation assets.  Similarly, the larger LHA-6 America class, when operating independently, cannot land heavy equipment as they have no well deck.

The Marines state that a MEU is the smallest full-function combat unit.  Subsets of a MEU are, by the Marine’s own definition, incapable of effective combat.  So, what does the Navy/Marines want to do?  Why, split the MEU up and send the pieces off to distant points where they cannot act as a complete unit nor support each other!  Stupid on a shingle!

Commandant’s Vision.  All of the preceding was background for the real point of this post and that is to consider how the LPD-17 Flt II jibes with the Marine Commandant’s recent statements and documents which call for a movement away from the 38 amphibious ship and 2 MEB lift requirements.

It is worth noting at the outset that the LPD-17 Flt II was conceived long before the current Commandant took office.  Thus, it may be that the Flt II doesn’t fit his plans for the Corps, at all !

Commandant Berger has unilaterally and arbitrarily set the Corps on a radically different path, assuming he follows through on his early statements.  To be fair, there are, as yet, few details so much is speculation, at this point.  That said, Berger has been pretty clear that the Marines will move towards small, dispersed units using forward bases.  The question, then, becomes how does the Flt II fit into and support this concept, if at all?

On the one hand, the Flt II, with traditional well decks and LCACs may be considered a relic of the old way thinking which involved massed combat power and amphibious assaults and, thus, of little value in a small unit, dispersed, forward based type of force structure.  On the other hand, a Flt II, being significantly smaller than the large deck LHA/LHDs, might be quite useful in moving around and supporting small units.  Then again, the Flt II has very limited aviation capability which is a cornerstone of the forward base concept and the Marine’s recent push to become aviation-centric.  As I noted, without details about Berger’s plans, it is very difficult to pass judgment about the value of the Flt II in the new Marine concept.

If we take the Commandant at face value and assume that the Flt II is of limited value, it calls into question the reason for the entire Flt II program.  Should we immediately halt the program and move in a different direction?  Berger has suggested that the Marines will look to smaller, cheaper, more numerous vessels such as the JHSV or the Light Amphibious Warship (see, “Light Amphibious Warship Update”) for transport.  If that’s the case, we can build a lot of JHSVs for the cost of one Flt II and we should halt the Flt II program immediately.  At the very least, a pause in the LPD-17 program is warranted until the Commandant decides what ships he wants for his Navy.

_____________________________________

(1)Navy website,

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=1000&ct=4

(2)Congressional Research Service, “Navy LPD-17 Flight II (LX[R]) Amphibious Ship Program: Background and Issues for Congress”, R43543, Ronald O’Rourke, 3-Jul-2018,

https://www.defensedaily.com/wp-content/uploads/post_attachment/202101.pdf

(3)Wikipedia, “LX(R)-Class Amphibious Warfare Ship”, retrieved 10-Oct-2019,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LX(R)-class_amphibious_warfare_ship

(4)Congressional Research Service, “Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for Congress”, 10-Oct-2019

(5)Congressional Research Service, “Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for Congress”, 22-Jul-2020

LX(R)

Let’s take a closer look at the LX(R), the replacement for the LSD-41/49 class.  To refresh our memories, here are some specs on the LX(R) and LSD-41.

Whidbey Island LSD-41       LX(R) (San Antonio LPD-17)

Length:                       610 ft                                      684 ft

Displacement:           16,360 t                                  24,900 t

Speed:                       22 kts                                      22 kts

Draft:                          21 ft                                         23 ft

Connectors:               4 LCAC or 21 LCM-6            2 LCAC or 1 LCU

Troops:                       400-500                                 700-800

Hangar:                      none                                      1 large helo or 2 smaller helos

Flight Deck:               2 landing spots                      2 landing spots

Well Deck:                 440 ft                                      170 ft

Cost:                          $339M(1981)                         $2.0B (2012)

Navy cost estimates for the LX(R) are on the order of $1.5B per ship.  Of course, we know that Navy cost estimates are uniformly, grossly underestimated so the actual cost will probably be on the order of $2.5B as we previously noted (see, “The Definition of Insanity”).  LX(R) contract issuance is scheduled for 2020 with delivery following in 2026.

The choice of the LPD-17 to be the basis of the LX(R) is odd on multiple levels.  The purpose of the LX(R) is to perform amphibious assault and yet the LX(R) will have a well deck half the size of the LSD-41 that it’s replacing.

The LPD-17 was one of the worst construction programs in the Navy’s history and that’s saying something.  The ships suffered from extensive manufacturing defects and quality control issues, were delivered unfinished, and continue to suffer from construction related problems.  This seems to make the LPD-17 an odd choice to base another class of ship on.

An interesting note is that the LX(R) will abandon the enclosed mast of the LPD-17 in favor of a conventional mast according to artist’s concept drawings.  Presumably, this is an attempt at cost savings although the Navy encountered interference problems with the enclosed mast and considered dropping it during the LPD-17 production run.

For a ship seemingly ill-suited to its purpose, why was the LPD-17 chosen as the basis?

The LSD did not have the ability to effectively operate independent of its ARG.  This is, apparently, the main justification for using the LPD-17 base seaframe.  The LPD’s aviation and command and control capabilities allow it to operate independently, according to the Navy.  One can debate the independence trend but this appears to be the rationale.

Of course, there’s also the ever-present poltics/jobs issues that can dictate directions in acquisition programs that otherwise make no sense.  Is that a major factor in this choice?  You can make your own decision on that.

Thus, the LX(R) has two general uses:  as part of an Amphibious Ready Group and operating independently.  Let’s look a bit closer at both those roles.

As part of an ARG, the LX(R) takes the place of an LSD.  Unfortunately, it costs the MEU/ARG two LCACS.  On the plus side, it potentially brings a couple of extra helos to the ARG, depending on the helo type.  It can also carry a few hundred more Marines although the benefit of that is questionable since aggregate ARG troop carrying capacity was not previously limited.  The major impact, therefore is the loss of two LCACs.

In independent operations, the LX(R) can carry 700 troops.  That’s kind of an odd amount for operations – more than a Company, less than a Battalion.  Presumably, the MEU’s tanks and artillery would be evenly distributed if the ARG’s ships were disbursed.  That would give the LX(R) one or two tanks and one or two artillery pieces.  Again, that’s an odd amount.  It’s not how tanks and artillery are organized or trained.  Alternatively, they might not get any tanks or artillery.  In either case, the embarked Marines would constitute a very lightly armed force.  The danger is that, eventually, they’ll get dropped into a situation they’re not equipped to handle and find themselves in over their heads with no help to call on due to acting independently.  In fact, the entire concept of independent operations is questionable but that’s a topic for another day.

Also noteworthy is the significantly larger cargo capacity of the LX(R) over the LSD-41 which would be beneficial in supplying the sustainment phase of any operation, no matter how small.

The LX(R) also further cements the Marine’s movement away from amphibious assault and towards vertical assault as evidenced by amphibious ships with no or smaller well decks, an emphasis on the MV-22, and the decades long lack of interest in a substantially upgraded replacement for the obsolete and doctrinally ill-suited AAV.

It’s evident, then, both from what the Navy has stated and a logical assessment of the evidence, that the LX(R) is intended to be an independent operator and the LPD-17 base sea frame was chosen for this reason.  Whether that rationale is wise is another topic.

USS Arlington Upgrade

Kris Osborn at DoD Buzz website has an article about current upgrades to the USS Arlington, LPD-24 (1).  The main item discussed was modifications to the ship’s computing/data network, the Shipboard Wide Area Network (SWAN).  Briefly, the SWAN routes all data through a common network rather than having separate networks for each major function.  Claimed benefits include fewer physical servers, fewer physical server cabinets (down to four, according to the article), and the use of virtual servers which enhance flexibility.  The benefits are real.  The question is whether they constitute a battle ready system. 

One of the main characteristics of a battle ready system is redundancy.  If one element of a system is damaged, identical, redundant elements can take over the lost function. 



Cost Efficient or Battle Ready?



Another characteristic of a battle ready system is separation.  Critical elements need to be physically separated from each other so that a single hit can’t take out too many elements of the system.  The obvious connection to the previous paragraph is that the redundant elements should be physically separated by as large a distance as reasonably possible.

Unfortunately, this is about as far as my analysis can go.  The article did not specify whether the remaining servers were redundant or to what degree, if any, the server cabinets were separated.  The flip side to having a highly centralized, cost efficient server architecture is that a single hit can incapacitate every ship system that uses the network – essentially, the entire ship! – unless the principles of redundancy and separation have been observed.  Given the Navy’s oft demonstrated tendency to apply business and cost efficiency principles over battle readiness, my fear is that this is another example of a cost efficiency improvement resulting in a degradation of battle readiness.  I hope I’m wrong.

(1) http://www.dodbuzz.com/2014/07/03/navy-overhauls-amphips-electronics-ahead-of-deployment/

DOT&E - LPD-17

The San Antonio, LPD-17, class amphibious ship has had a troubled and challenging history, to say the least.  The DOT&E 2013 annual report sheds light on the current status of the class.

The class consists of 11 ships, 9 of which are completed and 2 building.  The lead ship was completed in 2003.  At this point the class should be fully operational and working out any final bugs in the design.  The DOT&E report, however, paints a different picture.

The Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) revealed numerous, serious deficiencies that led DOT&E to evaluate the class as

“… not operationally effective, not operationally suitable, and not survivable in a hostile environment.”

The ship’s combat system, the Ship Self Defense System (SSDS), was found to have major problems which have yet to be corrected.  In fairness, the SSDS is problematic on all ship classes that it is installed on although the LPD-17 class seems particularly affected.

Reliability issues across many different systems continue to plague the class.

The enclosed mast which proved troublesome early on and almost led to the deletion of the feature in the earlier ships continues to be a problem.

Improvements and fixes that the Navy claims to have made have not been validated in follow-on testing (FOT&E).

DOT&E lists many other problems and you can read the report if have an interest in the details.  The salient point is that, now, ten years after the lead ship was completed, the class is still not deemed survivable in combat.  There’s just no excuse for this.  As has been repeatedly pointed out, the Navy is so focused on new construction that existing ships, however new, just don’t get the attention they need.  This is how you build a hollow Navy.

Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS)

Here’s a little-known system that is critical to Navy ship survivability and yet is struggling to achieve effective and reliable operation – the Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS).  SSDS is intended to be the self-defense weapons control system for all carriers, amphibious ships, and LCS.  The system comprises software and networking which links existing, legacy sensors to existing and new weapons.  Supported weapons include, notably, Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) and Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM).  In concept, any sensor or any weapon can be added to the system through software modifications.

In their 2011 Annual Report, DOT&E stated the following.

“… the ability to effectively complete the self-defense mission against the types of threats for which the overall system was designed has not been successfully demonstrated. In addition, reliability problems further degrade the ships’ ability to complete this mission.”

 

ESSM - Part of a Troubled System



Several ship classes including the LPD-17 and CVN-68 carriers have been evaluated as unable to meet their self-defense requirements.  This doesn’t mean that the system is totally inoperable, only that aspects of the threat spectrum can’t be reliably countered, as yet.  For instance, the report describes the CVN-68 problems,

“The CVN-68 ship class combat system has several problems that keep it from successfully completing the ship self-defense mission. Specific problems include deficiencies in weapon employment timelines, sensor coverage, system track management, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) SeaSparrow Missile System performance, as well as deficiencies with the recommended engagement tactics provided for use against multiple ASCM threat classes.”

 

One of the common and continued problems is that the physical placement of some of the legacy sensors has proven to be sub-optimal, leading to detection difficulties in some scenarios. 

One of the major issues identified in the report is a lack of realistic threat surrogates which will allow meaningful testing.  This is a several year, standing criticism/recommendation to the Navy from DOT&E.  We’ve covered this general issue in multiple posts.  I find it disturbing that year after year the Navy somehow finds the funds to build new ships but makes little or no attempt to field realistically performing threat drones so as to test and develop the self-defense systems that will keep the new ships afloat.  The Navy’s internal priority is new construction at the expense of maintenance, training, testing, and so on.  Navy leadership has their priorities completely ass-backwards and they desperately need to wake up as Adm. Harvey urged in his farewell note to the fleet.

DOT&E issued a classified report to Congress on the SSDS program in March of 2011 describing details of the problems.

This is one of those posts about which I have no meaningful analysis beyond the Navy’s scrambled priorities.  Consider this simply interesting information that is worth keeping an eye on because it is the backbone of so many ships.

Concurrency - Building Without a Design!

The Navy has its share of problems.  Some, such as budget limitations, are imposed from the outside and are largely outside the Navy’s control.  Others are self-inflicted such as maintenance, manning, and training.

One of worst self-inflicted problems is that of concurrency.  This is a relatively new problem and is the practice of trying to build a ship or aircraft while also designing it at the same time.  For most of us, this is an instant head-scratcher which simply defies understanding.  Almost instinctively, we know that you must have a finished design prior to building.  Otherwise, how do you know what to build?  The short answer is that you don’t.  What happens is that you wind up having to rebuild sections of the ship/plane as the design changes.

For anyone who’s unsure what I’m describing, consider the example of building a car without a design.  You’re pretty sure there’s some basic things you need so you figure to get a leg up by starting the construction.  Unfortunately, part way through you decide that you want to place the engine in the rear instead of the front so you have to tear out the rear seats, re-design the back end to support the engine, reroute the various gas and electrical lines and then re-install the removed seats somewhere else.  In essence, you’ll wind up building the car two or three times over.  An expensive proposition, right?

Well,  that’s exactly what the Navy has been doing with the LCS, JSF (F-35), LPD-17, DDG-1000, and so forth.  The results of this approach have been nothing short of disastrous.



Anybody Know Where This Piece Goes?



The LCS has tripled in price with most of that increase due to the changing design.  Indeed, the changes still continue.  Here are some comments from the CRS April 2012 report on the LCS,

“The Navy started construction of LCS 1 and 2 without a stable design and has had to incorporate design and production changes into follow-on seaframes. When the LCS 1 and 2 construction contracts were awarded, the basic and functional design of each seaframe were respectively only 20 percent and 15 percent complete.” (2)



Designs that were only 20% and 15% complete at the start of construction?  So, that’s what, the keel that was designed and that’s about it?



Concurrency is not just a ship phenomenon.  The JSF suffers from concurrency, as well.  From the recent GAO report, comes this summary statement,

“Most of the instability in the program has been and continues to be the result of highly concurrent development, testing, and production activities.  …  In addition to contract overruns, concurrency costs of at least $373 million have been incurred on production aircraft to correct deficiencies found in testing. The manufacturing process is still absorbing higher than expected number of engineering changes resulting from flight testing, changes which are expected to persist at elevated levels into 2019, making it difficult to achieve efficient production rates. More design and manufacturing changes are expected as testing continues, bringing risks for more contract overruns and concurrency costs. Even with the substantial reductions in near-term production quantities, DOD still plans to procure 365 aircraft for $69 billion before developmental flight tests are completed.” (1)

This says that 365 aircraft will be purchased before testing has been completed to identify what changes are needed in the final design.  All 365 aircraft will need to be reworked to incorporate the changes and that will cost additional money to remove existing equipment and then add the new or modified equipment. 

So, we see that the practice of concurrency results in triple payments;  one, to build it the first time, two, to remove installed equipment to accommodate the changes, and three, installation of the new or modified equipment.  Can you think of a less efficient way to build something?  And it shows!  The cost of the LCS, LPD, JSF, etc. have ballooned beyond belief.  At what point and with what twisted logic did this seem like a good idea to someone in the Navy???

(1)   Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Joint Strike Fighter, Restructuring Added Resources and Reduced Risk, but Concurrency Is Still a Major Concern”, Statement of Michael J. Sullivan, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, GAO-12-525T

(2)   Congressional Research Services (CRS), “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress”, Ronald O'Rourke, April 6, 2012