Surface Ship Aviation

It has been some 80+ years since WWII and in that time we have seen some truly remarkable advances in tank design, aircraft design, missile development, sensors, etc.  One would think that ship design would have advanced at least as much and yet this is clearly not the case.  Not only has ship design not advanced, in many respects it has regressed.  Armor, weapon density, survivability, redundancy, endurance, sailing range, etc. have all regressed.  Well, at least we can say that surface ship aviation has advanced with the development of the helicopter … right?  Or has it?  Let’s look.
 
As a reminder, WWII US cruisers typically carried four seaplanes operated from two catapults and recovered with one or two cranes.  The seaplanes they used included, primarily, the OS2U Kingfisher and, at other times in the war, the Curtis SC-1 Seahawk and Curtis SOC Seagull.  Today, Burke class destroyers Flt IIa and beyond carry one SH-60 type helo (theoretically capable of two but never done, as far as I know) and provision for a small Fire Scout type UAV which have rarely been used and are being phased out (see, “Fire Scout Status”).  Flt I/II Burkes, have no hangar and carry no helos.  The Constellation class carries one SH-60 type helo and one Fire Scout type UAV.  The LCS carries one SH-60 type helo and one Fire Scout or smaller UAV.
 
 
Aircraft
 
Just as the value of an aircraft carrier is wholly dependent on the size and abilities of the air wing, so too is the surface ship aviation value dependent on the aircraft they carry.  Following is a comparison of the primary aircraft from WWII surface ships and today’s surface ships.

OS2U Kingfisher

Discussion

 
The main function of ship’s aviation both in WWII and today is scouting/targeting.  In WWII, ship’s planes, with a few hundred miles of search radius and an enemy ship speed of advance of only 30 kts maximum, a ship/scout could ensure the ship’s safety for the better part of a day.  Today, with enemy weapons having a speed of advance of several hundred miles per hour or more, long range searches are more critical than ever and yet today’s shipboard aircraft have around half the range of WWII aircraft.  Does that make sense?  What ship designer thought, “Hey, let’s cut the range of our shipboard aviation in half and go with that.”  and everyone agreed with him instead of laughing him out of a job?
 
The other notable regression is in the number of embarked aircraft.  A WWII cruiser carried four aircraft.  Today’s ships carry one full size helo and a small UAV.  Quite a drop!  Admittedly, a WWII cruiser is a bit bigger than even a Burke but the WWII cruiser also didn’t have the 100 ft flight deck and enormous hangar that a Burke has.  Approximately one third of a Burke’s total length is devoted to aviation.  WWII ships devoted almost no length to aviation.  Catapults were placed wherever there was a small amount of room available, including on top of gun turrets!  

The one area where an argument can be made that aircraft have significantly improved is anti-submarine warfare (ASW).  Helos have proven quite useful and effective at this thanks to sonobuoys, dipping sonar, and air-dropped torpedoes.  Unfortunately, the reduction in number of embarked aircraft have rendered the ASW helo only marginally useful unless several ships can pool their aircraft.  As the saying goes, if you have one helo, you have none.  This is recognition of the very high maintenance demands of helos and their inability to maintain a high readiness rate.
 
So, while ASW helos are theoretically significantly improved, the reality of reduced numbers and readiness rates have rendered any theoretical improvement only marginally useful.
 
As with so many other aspects of ship design, today’s surface ship aviation capabilities have not significantly improved and have, in many ways, regressed.  Today’s ships carry fewer (half or less) aircraft with significantly shorter ranges.  
 
How can we address the shortcomings in surface ship aviation?  We have, potentially two possible alternatives to today’s aviation problems:
 
1. Revert to shipboard seaplanes.  With modern engines, enhanced aerodynamic designs, stealth shaping, etc., we should be able to design a ship’s seaplane with range in excess of a thousand miles and a reasonable degree of stealth for survivability and the ability to scout without being instantly detected.  Four (to use the historical number) such aircraft would go a long ways towards providing ships with effective situational awareness and target detection.
 
2. UAVs.  We’ve discussed the use of small, stealthy UAVs for shipboard surveillance many times.  Operated by the dozens at a time, small UAVs can be quite effective while representing little financial risk if some are lost (see, “UAV’s – Numbers Matter”).

Comment Quality

Comment quality has nosedived, recently.  I’m seeing far too many uninformed, unsupported, argumentative, pedantic comments.  As a reminder, and as stated in the Comment Policy page, the reader is responsible for knowing the basics of military history, strategy, and tactics.  Also, any statement of fact that is not commonly known should be supported.  Finally, the purpose of the blog is to discuss and learn.  Arguing for the sake of arguing is not allowed.
 
I suspect that many/most of the offending comments are the work of one or a few newer readers and, if so, I will weed them out in relatively short order.  I want productive comments or no comments.  I’m happy either way.
 
Once again, I urge commenters to append a username to the end of comments to avoid confusion about who said what.
 
Discuss, learn, and enjoy or find another blog.

Note: This is a closed post.  No comments.
 

Naval Marines

A reader recently suggested using detachments of Marines on Navy ships to conduct small land actions and, further, to supplement them with sailors who have been give some land combat training.  The reader noted that this was once a common practice.
 
The idea is intriguing and I’d like to run with it a bit. Is it a feasible idea, today?  Would it be effective?
 
Let’s do a brief review of some historical naval Marine actions to remind ourselves how they were used.
 
 
Sandwich – In May 1800, at Puerto Plata, Commodore Talbot, aboard the USS Constitution, sent a raiding party of 90 sailors and Marines under the command of then Lieutenant Isaac Hull to ‘cut out’ the Sandwich, a French privateer that had been plaguing the area and was being refit under the protection of the nearby Spanish fortress.  They quickly surprised and overwhelmed the Sandwich but needed time to prepare the ship for sailing.  Hull ordered the Marines to seize the nearby fort which they did with no casualties, ensuring the safety of the operation.  The Sandwich was successfully sailed out of the harbor.
 
Barbary Pirates – In Feb 1804, at Tripoli, Captain Stephen Decatur led a small unit of Marines in a clandestine night attack on the previously captured frigate Philadelphia, now being used as an enemy gun battery.  They successfully boarded the vessel and burned it, thus denying its use to the enemy.
 
Marquesas Islands – In Dec 1813, a detachment of Marines and sailors from the frigate USS Essex, Captain David Porter commanding, landed on Nukuhiva and secured the island to enable refit and R&R operations.  They established a small fort and mediated a cessation of a local tribal war.
 
Cape Antonio - On December 16, 1821, USS Porpoise, conducting anti-piracy operations under the command of Lieutenant James Ramage, located five pirate vessels and the merchant brig Bolina. Forty sailors were lowered into five boats and Ramage led an attack which burned the vessels and freed the Bolina.
 
Matanzas – In Nov 1822, near Matanzas, Cuba, USS Alligator, commanded by Lieutenant Allen as part of the Navy’s West Indian Anti-Piracy Campaign, launched small boats carrying 40 men to attack a group of three pirate schooners and five prizes.  The pirates were routed although Allen was killed in the action.
 
 
It is interesting to note that shipboard Marine detachments ended in 1998.  Beyond that, the Marines did, at one time, experiment with a Company Landing Team (CoLT) concept.  I don’t know what became of that.
 
 
Analysis
 
Now, let’s analyze the historical examples to understand why they worked and whether those same conditions for success would apply today.
 
In earlier times, the absence of timely long distance communications meant that ship’s captains had to act as an arm of the country’s diplomatic efforts, often creating policy on the spot.  This offered captains a great deal of latitude in the choice of options and force was often a preferred and effective choice.
 
Another major factor that allowed the success of these small naval Marine actions was the localized nature of affairs.  An enemy couldn’t respond quickly to bring reinforcements to bear.  Indeed, it would often be days or weeks before the enemy’s higher command or nearby forces even learned of the action.  Thus, if the naval Marines could overcome the local resistance, they and their host ship were assured of safety for days or weeks.  Today, with instantaneous communication, aircraft, missiles, long range artillery, etc., any local operation can potentially be countered with overwhelming force in a matter of minutes or hours.  A very lightly armed raiding force simply cannot withstand aircraft, armor, missiles, etc. and, further, the ship that they operate from is placed in immediate danger as well.
 
Today’s instantaneous communications means that the entire world will hear about an action almost on a real time basis which means that any action will have global political repercussions, good and bad.  This, among other factors, has made today’s leaders extremely reluctant to engage in the kind of ad hoc naval Marine actions we’re considering.  In earlier times, communication lags meant that it would takes months or years for an action to become known around the world and, by then, it was a past event and limited global consequence.
 
Along this same line, small actions generally mean small consequences.  A small naval Marine action would, almost by definition, have limited physical consequences – the political repercussions being a separate concern, of course.
 
Manpower was another reason why naval Marine actions were feasible.  Sailing warships carried large crews both for manning the labor-intensive cannons and to make up boarding and prize crews.  Thus, ships had an abundance of sailors and Marines available for off board actions.  Today, with minimal manning compounded be extensive at-sea billet gaps, there simply aren’t enough personnel to even consider such actions.
 
Yet another aspect of these actions is the defensive weapons that an enemy could bring to bear.  In earlier times, the attacking naval Marine force would face only weapons similar to their own with the exception of cannons which had limited, if any, mobility.  Thus, the attacking force could not be overmatched in weapons.  Today, with highly lethal, mobile, and often armored tanks and vehicles along with artillery, missiles, rockets, and aircraft, the attacking force, with only light weapons, is quite likely to face far superior defensive weapons.  Thus, even a small, local defense force may well possess superior firepower compared to a naval Marine force.
 
Finally, the most important factor in any potential naval Marine action is the willingness to take decisive, forceful action.  In earlier times, we were willing to use force as a part of war or as an arm of diplomacy.  Contrast that with today’s timid policy of avoidance and appeasement.  Even if we had naval Marine forces, we wouldn’t use them.
 
 
Potential Uses
 
Understanding why earlier actions were successful and the limits imposed on today’s potential actions, where/how could we use naval Marine forces, today, if we did have them?  Here’s a few examples.
 
Anti-Piracy – On any number of occasions, a naval Marine force could have used small UAVs to track today’s pirates back to their bases of operation and then conducted raids to eliminate them.
 
Anti-Small Boat – A raid against any of Iran’s swarm boat facilities would be a potential use for naval Marine forces.
 
Illegal Islands – As China attempted to build their illegal islands in the South China Sea, naval Marine forces could have conducted raids to destroy the island building efforts.
 
Cutting Out – Chinese vessels that violate allied nation’s territorial waters could be ‘cut out’ and seized.  China has repeatedly, and illegally, sent swarms of fishing vessels and “Coast Guard” vessels into Vietnamese, Philippine, and other waters.
 
 
Conclusion
 
Naval Marine forces for off board actions have been an historically useful and fairly common occurrence.  Today, for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is timidity, this is no longer practiced.  There are, however, situations that could benefit from such actions if we had the mindset and wished to allocate the required resources.
 
Timidity aside, the main drawback would seem to be the potential for the attacking force to run into a level of weaponry that it cannot handle.
 
As an alternative, many of the contemplated actions might seem worthy of SEAL involvement although the need to transport SEALs to the action site would largely negate the benefit of having an organic action party always at hand.
 
It seems that there are situations that could benefit from a naval Marine force but the infrequency of such combined with the cost in additional manning and resources would seem to preclude the practice.  A much better alternative would be to make greater use of SEALs on carefully planned, small missions.  Of course, that assumes a level of fortitude we have not exhibited for many years.

Chinese Tariff Riots

Many have criticized Trump’s policy of rebalancing trade arrangements with China through tariffs but they’re working.
 
Many have claimed that the mighty Chinese economy is impervious to US actions and can overwhelm the US in a war.  We now see that isn’t quite the case.
 
Daily Caller website reports riots by disgruntled workers throughout China.
 

Workers throughout China are flooding the streets in revolt as U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs slam the fragile Chinese export economy.
 
The wave of unrest follows a brutal plunge in China’s export orders, now at their lowest since the COVID lockdowns. Goldman Sachs estimates up to 16 million Chinese jobs could vanish as Trump’s tariffs bite deeper into the regime’s weak underbelly.[1]

The tariffs are accomplishing the same thing that a war would do.  China would be isolated and its export-centric economy would collapse as the world halted all manufacturing orders.  On top of that would be blockades restricting imports of vital raw materials, further impacting manufacturing.
 
ComNavOps has often said that China has far more to lose, economically, in a war than the US and the tariff ‘war’ is providing ample proof of that.
 
This is not to trivialize the Chinese economy.  It’s powerful, to be sure, but it’s not the all-powerful, unassailable behemoth that so many fear.  Just as the US has some glaring strategic weaknesses, so too does China and their export-dependent economy is one of them.  Of course, in a war, China could always force workers to produce as unpaid slave labor but that would create additional problems.
 
This, as much as any other factor, may be what’s staying China’s bid for Taiwan for the time being.
 
This also demonstrates the potential of true all-domain warfare which, as an example, we are not applying to the Houthi conflict.
 
 

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[1]Daily Caller website, “China Erupts: Furious Workers Riot As Factories Collapse Under Trump’s Tariffs”, Floyd Buford, 1-May-2025,
https://dailycaller.com/2025/05/01/china-erupts-riot-factories-trump-tariffs/

Reaper Losses

ComNavOps has long stated that UAVs, especially the larger ones, are utterly ineffective, unsuited, and non-survivable over the battlefield and the Air Force has publicly agreed with that assessment.  Despite my statements, many (including the Navy) continue to believe that UAVs will provide omniscient awareness about our enemies.  Well, we’re finally starting to accumulate some real world data.  We know that Iran has downed multiple UAVs in the past [2] but now we have combat data from the Navy’s engagement with the Houthis in Yemen.  What does the data show?
 

Seven Reaper drones have been brought down by the Houthis since the beginning of March, with six of them occurring since March 15 and three of them over the past week, the official said. At least 15 Reapers have been brought down by the Houthis since October 2023 … [1]

Bing’s AI search engine reports (unsourced),
 

Houthi rebels in Yemen have downed seven US MQ-9 Reaper drones since March 31, 2025. Since November 2023, the Houthis have claimed responsibility for downing fourteen MQ-9 Reaper drones. Yemeni forces have shot down seven US MQ-9 Reaper drones this month and 22 since October 2023. Each MQ-9 is worth about $30 million, so that means the US has lost $660 million worth of drones over Yemen in about a year and a half.[1]

Other sources have similar or larger reported loss numbers.  The point is not the exact number of losses but the fact that this proves that larger UAVs are not survivable over the modern battlefield.  In this case, the conclusion is even more emphatic since the Houthis are far from a modern, top tier military force like the Chinese and because these losses are occurring in the face of supposed high intensity attacks on the Houthis – and yet they somehow manage to routinely shoot down our UAVs?  I guess our attacks aren’t very effective, are they?
 

MQ-9 Reaper

How is it possible that the Houthis can manage to operate radars and SAM launchers while supposedly being overwhelmed by US military attacks?  We can’t stop the Houthis from doing this but we think we’ll take on the Chinese?

 
I don’t have a target list for this anti-Houthi campaign but, clearly, we’re not hitting the right targets.  Our UAVs are being shot down and drones/missiles are getting close enough to our carrier to make it take evasive action.  Against a tenth tier military force with no air force, aren’t we supposed to own the air?  A mosquito shouldn’t be able to fly from Yemen without a missile heading up its backside.
 
All of this is screaming at us that we need to re-evaluate our ideas about how to fight China.
 
 
_____________________________

 
Fun fact:
 
The U.S. Air Force has about 280 Reapers in its inventory, each costing about $28 million, according to the Congressional Research Service.[1]
 
Cost aside, these losses are starting to cut into the military’s inventory of Reapers and we can be sure that we are not seeing all the operational losses from around the rest of the world.
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]ABC News website, “Houthis shoot down growing number of US drones”, Luis Martinez, 23-Apr-2025,
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/houthis-shoot-growing-number-us-drones/story?id=121099082
 
[2]As one example, on 20-Jun-2019, Iran shot down an RQ-4A Global Hawk BAMS-D with a Khordad SAM. 

Where Did I Leave That Plane?

A F-18 Super Hornet being towed rolled off the deck of the carrier Truman and fell into the Red Sea.[1]  No, this is not an April Fool’s post.

I know the Navy has real problems with competency but this is bad even by Navy standards.
  

___________________________

 
[1]Redstate, “New: F-18 Rolls Off Side of USS Harry S. Truman, Sinks to Bottom of the Red Sea”, Ward Clark, 28-Apr-2025,
https://redstate.com/wardclark/2025/04/28/uss-harry-s-truman-loses-aircraft-tractor-overboard-n2188441

Small Potatoes

I’ve previously stated that I am, thus far, disappointed in SecDef Hegseth.  I had hoped he would come in and clean house and, while he has fired a handful of people, the vast majority of incompetent military leaders are still firmly in place.  Similarly, SecNav Phelan has disappointed me.  An example is his latest announcement that he is cancelling some $570M in various DEI, climate, and AI-logistics contracts.  While I applaud these cancellations, they are incredibly small potatoes.  They are the kind of thing that could have been done between bites of his sandwich at lunch on the first day.  How about going after some large, truly catastrophically wasteful programs?  Can’t think of any?  Well, how about cancelling the rest of the Constellation class?  How about terminating the Ford class in place?  How about retiring the entire remaining LCS class and saving billions in operating and maintenance costs?  How about terminating all unmanned contracts until someone comes up with a viable CONOPS that demonstrates that they have any combat value?  How about firing 90% of the flag officers and returning their hundreds of staffers to sea duty?  I could go on all day but you get the idea. 
 
There are unimaginable savings to be had but SecNav Phelan is, so far, focused on the nearly trivial and almost free items (on a relative basis).  Come on, Phelan, do something significant.  It doesn’t require years of study groups.  If you can’t come up with tens and hundreds of billions of dollars of savings off the top of your head, you have no business being Secretary of the Navy.  On the other hand, if you can come up with the list … START CUTTING !!!

Joke of an Amphibious Exercise

Japan and the US just recently conducted an amphibious assault exercise, Iron Fist 2025. 
 
“Iron Fist” !!!  Yeah!  Visions of crushing, overwhelming, amphibious firepower swarming ashore from dozens of amphibious ships loaded with troops and equipment.  Aircraft carpet bombing the assault site.  Naval guns roaring.  Stunned defenders, shell-shocked, cowering and watching in disbelief.  Explosions, devastation, domination!  “Iron Fist” !!!
 
The exercise lasted one hour. 

… hourlong amphibious landing exercise carried out by the Marines and Japan’s Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade … [1]

One hour … to master amphibious assault.  Wow.  That’s some serious dedication to training, isn’t it?
 
What did the exercise consist of? 

200 U.S. Marines and sailors along with 200 Japanese soldiers executed four waves of beach assaults. Equipment utilized therein included: combat rubber reconnaissance craft in the first wave; six Japanese amphibious assault vehicles (presumably the AAV7A1) in the second wave; followed by a Japanese air-cushioned landing craft (presumably the Landing Craft, Air Cushion built by Textron Systems) in the third wave. Meanwhile, two USMC AH-1Z Viper helicopter gunships (the successor to the legendary AH-1W Whiskey Cobra chopper) provided aerial reconnaissance and firepower.[1]

Let’s total up the immense amounts of amphibious equipment used in this exercise:
 

• Some rubber boats
• 6x Japanese AAV
• 1x Japanese LCAC
• 2x US helos

 
If that didn’t prepare the US Marines for amphibious operations, I don’t know what could.  The ground must have shaken under the weight of that kind of force.  The Chinese had to be quaking in their boots (or peeing their pants laughing), witnessing that exercise.  Seriously, is this the best we can do with our training time?
 

Amphibious Assault Force

This is an April Fool’s post, right?  Sadly, no.  This is what passes for a major exercise today.
 
 
 
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[1]The National Interest website, “Iron Fist 2025: USMC and JSDF Troops Train for Amphibious Warfare”, Christian D. Orr, 9-Mar-2025,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/iron-fist-2025-usmc-and-jsdf-troops-train-for-amphibious-warfare

Northrop B-21 Financial Loss

Northrop has, so far, totaled more than $2B in losses on the B-21 program.[1]
 
Can no one estimate a program anymore?  Are the people running industry and the military really as stupid as the evidence demonstrates?  It would appear so.
 

 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “Northrop logs new $477M loss on B-21 bomber due to higher manufacturing costs”, Valerie Insinna, 22-Apr-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/04/northrop-logs-new-477m-loss-on-b-21-bomber-due-to-higher-manufacturing-costs/

USS Massachusetts vs. Jean Bart

One of the lesser known engagements of WWII involved the gun duel between the US battleship USS Massachusetts and the French battleship Jean Bart.  The allies wanted to deny the use of the French battleship to the enemy and executed an attack by a small naval force.  Here’s a brief summary of the engagement.
 

At about 0700, as the Massachusetts, Wichita, and Tuscaloosa were preparing to engage French shore batteries, Tuscaloosa approached the entrance to Casablanca Harbor and reported that her scout plane was being fired upon, two French aircraft were closing, and two submarines were standing out from the harbor.
 
The cruiser subsequently shot down one of the French aircraft. The formidable French shore battery known as El Hank (four 8-inch guns) opened fire and straddled Massachusetts with its first salvo.
 
The unfinished and immobile French battleship Jean Bart opened fire with her operable forward quad 15-inch turret from pierside in Casablanca Harbor and hit a couple hundred yards from Massachusetts. Massachusetts received the “play ball” code at 0704, and she and Tuscaloosa concentrated their fire on Jean Bart. Massachusetts fired nine full 16-inch gun salvos (9 x 9 = 81 rounds) and hit Jean Bart five times within 16 minutes. The first shell hit in an empty magazine.
 
The last shell to hit glanced off the number 1 turret’s armor and bounced into the city, apparently without exploding, as it later became a souvenir at French navy headquarters. The hit, however, jammed the drive train of the turret and put Jean Bart’s main battery out of action for eight hours. Jean Bart’s 15-inch guns had sufficient range to reach the landing area at Fedala, but Massachusetts’s quick action eliminated that threat. El Hank, however, was not easily silenced and would dog U.S. ships all day, despite hundreds of rounds fired its way.[1]
 
The French warship able to fire just seven rounds at the U.S. battlewagon before the turret rotating mechanism jammed. USS Massachusetts‘ heavy 16-inch projectiles caused significant damage to the Jean Bart, although few actually exploded because they had been fitted with fuses manufactured a generation earlier. Had they had exploded; it is likely Jean Bart would have been crippled.[2]

This action again demonstrates multiple lessons such as the value of concentrated firepower, armor, etc.  I won’t belabor those as we’ve covered them many times.  Instead, I’d like to focus on one aspect of this action that jumps out and that is the concept of risk and reward.
 

USS Massachusetts

Jean Bart post WWII - note the unique 4-gun turrets

 
Risk/Reward – There is no avoiding the fact that risk and reward go hand-in-hand in combat.  People and equipment must be exposed to risk in order to accomplish anything worthwhile.  We’ve forgotten this and have come to believe that we can conduct wars without risking anything. 
 
For example, the idea of sending a ship to conduct a one-on-one duel with another ship that is supported by land batteries, is highly risky and not something we’d even consider today.
 
The corollary to risk/reward this is that losses will occur and we have to be willing to accept them and be able to absorb them.  This is the polar opposite of today’s military philosophy.  Today, we’re building staggeringly expensive ships and aircraft that we are loathe to risk because we can’t absorb their loss and can’t replace them in any useful time frame.  This risk aversion means we can’t accomplish anything worthwhile.  We have expensed ourselves into an almost unwinnable position.
 
We need to stop building ‘unriskable’, irreplaceable assets and return to simpler, single function assets that can be produced quickly and in quantity and that we’re willing to send in harm’s way.
 
 
 
_____________________________

 
[1]Rebellion Research website, “Operation Torch : The Naval Battle Of Casablanca, 8–10 November 1942”, Admiral Samuel J. Cox, USN, 17-Oct-2021,
https://www.rebellionresearch.com/operation-torch
 
[2]The National Interest website, “Navy Battleship Massachusetts vs. France’s Battleship Jean Bart: Who Won?”, Peter Suciu, 15-Jan-2024,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/navy-battleship-massachusetts-vs-frances-battleship-jean-bart-who-won-208607

Riddle Me This ...

Question:  What has 5000 thumbs, no tanks, and 4 howitzers?
 
Answer:  A MEU.
 
 
 
This highlights the problem with the current Marine MEU: it’s not capable of anything but very light, low end combat.  It just doesn’t have the firepower.  No tanks.  No heavy mortars.  Very few artillery and what there is, is towed which is not considered survivable on the modern battlefield.
 
Tell me again, why do we have MEUs?

China Halts Rare Earths Export

As part of the ongoing trade war between the US and China, China has halted exports of rare earths, those raw materials that are such a vital component of so many US military weapons and sensors.  If the halt is protracted, this could cripple US military manufacturing.
 
I love it!
 
This is exactly what the US needs to get us off our complacent, vulnerable, regulatory-constrained asses and start producing our own rare earths.  We have them.  We’ve just bound ourselves in so much regulatory constraints that it’s not economical or feasible to produce them.  We need to unbind ourselves, reduce our regulations to a more reasonable level, and recognize that certain strategic materials need to be not only exempt from some regulations but actively supported and encouraged.  Congress should put a such a bill on the President’s desk today.
 
Yes, I know, we’ve previously begun to build a rare earth mining/refining facility but it’s nowhere near enough.
 
This is a losing proposition for China.  They’re depriving themselves of a market, hurting their own industries, and forcing the US to become more self-reliant.  It’s the very definition of stupidity.  This is what happens when your geopolitical goal is global conquest instead of peaceful coexistence.  Evil invariably defeats itself.  We just need to help it along when the opportunity presents itself..
 
If exploited properly, this is a winning proposition for the US.  We could develop a new industry, create jobs, keep monies ‘in-house’, weaken China, and reduce one of our major strategic vulnerabilities.  We should send China a thank-you note.  Trump should be on TV explaining this to the American people.
 
I love it!

UK Airborne Early Warning

Despite glowing claims by some UK carrier fanboys, the UK’s carriers are not, and have never been, capable of meaningful roles in high end combat scenarios due to the lack of Airborne Early Warning (AEW), tankers, and electronic warfare (EW) aircraft.  The small size of the air wings (even after surging – a dubious concept) and the fact that the aircraft are the ‘B’ models of the F-35 further diminish the combat capabilities.
 
Now, though, the UK is beginning to explore the possibility of enhancing their carrier AEW capabilities.
 

The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has issued a Request for Information (RFI) notice seeking feedback on the solutions offered by the manufacturers to replace the airborne early warning (AEW) systems currently operated by the Royal Navy to protect its carrier strike groups (CSG).
 
The new systems would replace those currently operating from the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers, and would have significantly enhanced capabilities. Indeed, the MoD is looking for a system capable of operating from the carriers and providing “persistent 24 hours surveillance” with significant detection capabilities to spot both surface and airborne threats, including anti-ship missiles.
 
Currently, the Royal Navy operates Merlin helicopters fitted with the Crowsnest radar as an airborne surveillance system. However, this system should be decommissioned at the end of the decade, despite entering service in 2021.[1]

Merlin AEW Helicopter

While this is a nice step in the right general direction, no one should be under the impression that this will solve the UK’s AEW problem.  There will still remain two severe, unsolvable problems:
 
1. Lacking catapults and arresting gear, the UK’s carriers are constrained to operating helos in the AEW role which means that the size of any radar and operator station is severely limited.  Further, helos have significant altitude limits.  The Merlin, for example, has a service ceiling of 15,000 ft as opposed to the US E-2 Hawkeye which has a ceiling of 35,000 ft.
 
2. AEW, as practiced by the UK, is only half of what is needed.  US AEW E-2 aircraft are not just early warning aircraft, they are battle management assets.  The operators direct the air battle and it is this function that is as important or more so than the early warning function.
 

US Navy E-2 Hawkeye

E-2 cabin for a crew of five

 

 
Conclusion
 
The UK’s decision to go with a ski jump carrier instead of a conventional cat/trap approach consigned its carriers to lower end combat roles due to the inability to operate the crucial AEW, EW, and tanker support aircraft.  A new, better AEW helo radar system would be nice but won’t significantly alter the limited reality of the UK’s carrier capabilities.  Those who would advocate using the UK carriers as models for the US Navy are failing to recognize the requirements for high end aerial combat.

 
 
________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Royal Navy seeks new airborne early warning capability for its carrier strike groups”, Martin Manaranche, 12-Apr-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/04/royal-navy-seeks-new-airborne-early-warning-capability-for-its-carrier-strike-groups/

One Standard, High Standard?

Since Pete Hegseth was confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I’ve been waiting for him to do something meaningful.  In my mind, that would be firing large swaths of flag officers.  He hasn’t done that and I’m disappointed.  However, he’s just announced something that may be significant … if he implements it correctly and ruthlessly.  He’s announced that all personnel in combat specialties will have to meet a single physical fitness standard. 
 

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth ordered the military services to require everyone who serves in a combat specialty to meet the same physical fitness standard.[1]

The obvious potential flaw in this is that, yes, the military will establish a single standard but that it will be  watered down so that women can pass it which is what has happened in the past.  Here’s exactly what he had to say,
 

I'm signing this memorandum today. The services will review and see that we have nothing but the highest and equal standards for men and women in combat.[1]

A single standard is useless unless it’s a high standard.  Will he hold the military to a high standard?  I doubt it but I’m willing to be pleasantly surprised.
 
As the article notes,
 

Every time a gender-neutral physical fitness test is rolled out, it has two results: Most men aren't challenged, and most women can't pass.[1]

If Hegseth establishes a single, high standard, it will have the effect of virtually eliminating women from combat roles – as I’ve been calling for all along.  Will Hegseth have the courage and fortitude to stand up to the inevitable outcry from the Democrats in Congress?  Again, I doubt it but I’m willing to be pleasantly surprised.
 
 
Fair warning:  we’re not going to address the political or social aspects of this – only the impact on military effectiveness.  Comment accordingly.
 
 
 
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[1]Redstate website, “Pete Hegseth Requires Everyone in Combat Units to Meet the Same Physical Fitness Standards”, streiff, 31-Mar-2025,
https://redstate.com/streiff/2025/03/31/pete-hegseth-requires-everyone-in-combat-units-to-meet-the-same-physical-fitness-standards-n2187346

A Stealthy Carrier

Reader ‘SRB’ recently wondered about how to make a carrier stealthy.  What a great thought exercise!  Let’s have some fun and explore the idea a bit.
 
At first glance, it would seem difficult or impossible to make a carrier stealthy and still retain its full functionality.  The sheer size, alone, makes it a challenging task.  In addition, the sponsons add all kinds of non-stealthy protuberances.  Sprinkle on the multitude of weapons, masts, radars, domes, etc. and the task seems impossible.  Well, that means we’ll need to think outside the box to design a stealthy carrier.  In no particular order, here are some design characteristics of a stealthy carrier.
 
Aircraft Elevators – Conventional external, side opening elevators would be eliminated in favor of internal elevators that momentarily open at flight deck level to load/unload aircraft.  This eliminates the non-stealthy openings and external elevator gear and allows a smooth, uninterrupted hull whose shape can be maximized for stealth.
 
Sponsons – Sponsons, whose purpose is to mount weapons out of the way of the flight deck, would be eliminated and the weapons converted to forms that are embedded in the hull (side angled VLS cells, for example) or retractable (under the flight deck, for example, as flight ops would not be conducted while firing weapons).  A carrier is mammoth and it’s not as if a carrier has lots of weapons.  We should be able to find plenty of room.
 
Island – The island, if it is still needed, would take the form of a typical slanted superstructure of a surface ship like the LCS or Visby.  In fact, the Ford class has a slightly stealthy island with a couple of slanted faces.  Of course, it then totally negates any benefit by festooning the island with protruding bridges, catwalks, masts, domes, etc.
 
Even better than a stealthy, slanted superstructure would be no superstructure, at all.  Why not have the functions buried inside the ship?  The only possible legitimate need for an island is to provide an elevated overwatch from which to direct flight deck activities and movements.  However, I’m thinking that we could function without this by using extensive camera views from many dozens of angles with the views being assembled into an ‘overhead’ view via software manipulations. 
 
Antennae – All antennae (Satcoms and the like) would have to be flush mounted into the superstructure just as radar panels are now.
 
Aircraft Spotting – Assuming a stealthy carrier would only operate stealthy aircraft, deck spotting should not be a major problem as far as impacting radar signature since the aircraft are, inherently, stealthy. 
 
Overhangs – I don’t know whether deck overhangs negatively impact stealth but I suspect they do.  A stealthy carrier would need a smooth hull that joins the deck all around – no overhanging decks.
 

An artist's concept of a stealth carrier

Discussion
 
One obvious implication from the preceding is that we’ll need a lot more internal ship’s volume to contain the many external functions that need to be internalized.  Just as it is a challenge to find room for internal weapon bays on stealth aircraft, so too, will it be a challenge to find room for the carriers external functions that now need to be moved internally.  This dictates that we ruthlessly eliminate any current function that is not directly combat related.  That means eliminating crew comforts, non-essential functions such as the extensive and powerful radar fits (carriers don’t radiate in combat), one or two aircraft elevators, and so forth.
 
Clearly, any attempt at a serious stealth carrier would result in a design well outside the conventional box but, why not?  There’s nothing inherently impossible in the task.  The basic carrier design hasn’t changed since pre-WWII.  Perhaps it’s time.  What do you think?  Could we build a stealthy carrier with enough stealth to be worth the effort?

This is Why I Provide References

I wouldn’t believe this stuff if I didn’t read it myself.  This is a bit of news I pulled from my own research archives and, no, it’s not an April Fool’s joke.  It’s real.
 
The Marine’s 3^rd Littoral Regiment [MLR] conducted a major exercise in late 2021 and early 2022 called Spartan Trident.  Okay, that sounds mildly aggressive and slightly belligerent.  Might be interesting.  Ought to involve some combat skills.  Let’s see what they did.
 
From the official Marine website, Spartan Trident was a three part exercise.[1]
 
Part 1
 

The first part of Spartan Trident consisted of a series of interactive discussions … This portion of the exercise took place from Dec. 6 to Dec. 10, 2021[1] [emphasis added]

Yes, you read that right.  Part 1 of the exercise consisted of discussions.  That’s not really an exercise, is it?
 
 
Part 2
 

The second part of the Spartan Trident Continuum took place from Jan. 11 to Feb. 11, 2022 and consisted of one week of planning … [1] [emphasis added]

Yes, you read that right.  Part 2 of the exercise consisted of planning.  Again, that’s not really an exercise, is it?
 
 
Part 3
 

The third and final part of the Spartan Trident Continuum took place from Sept. 12 to Sept. 30, 2022. This phase was focused on refining standard operating procedures … [1] [emphasis added]
 
During the scenario, the 3rd MLR organized into three command and control elements displaced across Marine Corps Base Hawaii to rehearse sustaining expeditionary sites, enabling fires, supporting maritime domain awareness, and supporting the joint campaign across the competition continuum.[1]

Apparently, some people ‘rehearsed’ procedures that supported the “joint campaign across the competition continuum”.  Seriously?  The ‘competition continuum’?  What is this, the rhythmic gymnastics event in the Olympics?
 
Did you also note that the activities were confined to the Marine base in Hawaii as opposed to out in the field?
 
I have no further details but this sounds suspiciously like a nine to five working day with some table top work to ‘rehearse’ procedures.  Don’t you ‘rehearse’ procedures out in the field, under enemy attack, for days on end as if you were … you know … in combat?

Conclusion
 
There you have it.  A major, 3-part exercise that consisted of talking and, apparently, some paperwork about standards.  You probably thought a major exercise required some degree of field work and combat simulations but you’d be wrong.  A little talking and a little paperwork is all we need.
 
How valuable was the exercise?  Incredibly so … according to the Marines.
 

… the unit has redesignated as an MLR and has proven its value as a joint force enabler. The progress is incredible.[1]

That’s all it takes to prove a unit’s value as a ‘joint force enabler’:  some discussions, some planning, and some standard operating procedures!  Do that and you’ll be incredible!
 
If I didn’t provide references for this stuff, you wouldn’t believe me, would you?
 
 
 
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[1]https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/3180415/3rd-marine-littoral-regiment-concludes-spartan-trident/

Just Make a Decision

Naval News website reports that Japan is interested in co-producing SM-6 Standard missiles. 
 

Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani has announced that Tokyo proposed joint production of the Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) ship-to-air missile during his meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth on March 30.[1]

Japan has previously agreed, to some nebulous extent, to co-produce AMRAAM and PAC-3 missiles although no action appears to have come of that, yet.
 

… the U.S. and Japan in Tokyo in July 2024, both governments had already agreed to “pursue mutually beneficial co-production opportunities to expand production capacity of AMRAAM and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3 MSE).
 
Nakatani’s [Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani] proposal this time will not only include joint production of AMRAAM and PAC-3 MSE missiles, which have been under consideration since the previous Joe Biden administration, but also include the long-range ship-to-air missile SM-6 … [1]

What is the US reaction/response?
 

… the U.S. side responded, by saying “We would like to continue to discuss the joint production of missiles that are mutually beneficial for both Japan and the United States, including the SM-6, as well as AMRAAM, and PAC3 that we have discussed so far, even at an administrative level. We understand the importance, so we would like to deepen the discussion at the administrative level in the future.”[1]

Good grief.  What a bunch of wishy washy nonsense.  Make a decision, already.  Endless studies and discussions benefit no one.  This is what’s wrong with modern government.  They’re incapable of acting, instead defaulting to never ending commissions, studies, reports, and discussions.  A major reason China is outproducing us their ability to make a rapid decision and then get about implementing it.  We, in the meantime, continue to study the issues to death.
 
I don’t have all the details on this particular issue but it certainly seems like a win-win proposition.  As the Ukraine war has demonstrated, we lack the weapon production capacity to meet our needs.  If Japan can help fill that need, where’s the downside?
 
Do it or don’t do it but make a damn decision!
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Japan proposes co-production of SM-6 missiles to the U.S.”, Kosuke Takahashi, 3-Apr-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/04/japan-proposes-co-production-of-sm-6-missiles-to-the-u-s/

SecNav Phelan

Businessman John Phelan has been confirmed as Secretary of the Navy and I have severe anxiety about this pick.
 
Phelan has no military experience or even exposure, as far as I can ascertain.  While I firmly believe that a non-military person can succeed in the position by leaning on the subject matter experts that are available to him, I have grave misgivings in this situation.  Who will Phelan look to for honest assessments of the Navy’s problems, needs, and possible solutions?  Will it be the admirals who created and continue all the current problems?  Will it be Congress who has abetted the current situation and refused to exercise effective oversight?  I’m concerned that Phelan has no subject expertise and, far worse, no one to turn to for guidance in the areas he is not knowledgeable about.
 
Beyond that, some of his public statements do not inspire confidence.  For example, here’s something he told the Senate Armed Services Committee about his plans: 

The Navy and the Marine Corps already possess extraordinary operational expertise within their ranks. My role is to utilize that expertise and strengthen it to step outside the status quo and take decisive action with a results-oriented approach.[1]

That’s just buzzword bingo gibberish.  That does not sound like a decisive, focused, knowledgeable Secretary of the Navy.  I hope I’m wrong but what’s the odds of that? 
 
 
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[1]Newsmax website, “Senate Confirms Phelan as Navy Secretary, Landau at State”, Mark Swanson, 24-Mar-2025,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/senate-phelan-navy/2025/03/24/id/1204177/

USS Constellation to be Retired Early

In a move eerily reminiscent of the LCS, the Navy today announced the retirement of the not yet completed USS Constellation, first in its class of a new frigate.  Apparently, the Navy’s concurrency construction approach has resulted in so many unique modifications that the lead ship of the class has lost sufficient commonality with the subsequent class members to justify its retention. 

“Constellation has become such a unique, one-of-a-kind vessel that it would be cost prohibitive to operate and maintain the ship compared to its forthcoming sister ships”, explained Adm. Pete ‘Ketchum’ Inalie.  “In hindsight, we allowed too many change orders and had to make too many one-off modifications to accommodate the change requirements”, he went on to say.  “We now estimate that Constellation has only a 27% commonality with the subsequent ships of the class and that makes the ship unsustainable logistically.”
 
“We’ll complete Constellation’s construction as a means of finalizing the design and trying out new construction techniques but, ultimately, the only economically viable option is immediate retirement of the ship”, Inalie said.
 
“There is ample precedent for this move”, the Admiral stated.  “This is essentially what happened with the first LCS-1 and LCS-2 vessels.”

So much for the parent design eliminating problems, huh?  Another multi-billion dollar failure by the Navy.

 
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[1]Naval Industry News website, “Constellation to Retire Early”, Jacob S. Latter, 1-Apr-2025
https://navalindustryfakenews.com/constellation-pretend-retirement.com

Hypersonic Intercept … Well, Not Really

ComNavOps never ceases to be amazed at the deceptive spin (I’ll refrain from using the word fraud, in this case) put out by manufacturers, the Navy, and complicit ‘news’ sources.  As you know, the ability of defensive systems to intercept hypersonic attacking missiles is questionable.  Well here’s a headline from a Naval News website article that sounds like a piece of great news:
 
Aegis Combat System Demonstrates System’s Capability to Counter Hypersonic Threats[1]
 
A Burke class destroyer, USS Pinckney (DDG-91) conducted a successful intercept of a hypersonic missile.  Well, that certainly sounds like good news.  Aegis performed a successful intercept of a hypersonic missile.  Great!
 
However, as we read a bit further into the article, we note the following: 

The USS Pinckney (DDG 91) successfully completed Flight Test Other 40 (FTX-40), also known as Stellar Banshee, using Lockheed Martin’s Aegis Combat System to detect, track and perform an engagement against a live advanced hypersonic Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) target using a simulated SM-6 Block IAU.[1][emphasis added]

Wait, what now?  The intercept used a simulated SM-6 defensive missile????  So, in reality, all the destroyer’s Aegis system did was track the hypersonic target.  It didn’t engage.  No actual intercept occurred.
 
Well, that changes the tone of the article and essentially refutes the headline, doesn’t it?
 
So, what did the test actually accomplish?  I don’t know the test objectives but it certainly didn’t demonstrate a successful intercept.  At best, it demonstrated the ability to track a hypersonic target which we already knew we could do.  At worst, it was a purely theoretical, software exercise that proved nothing.
 
The main thing all of this demonstrates is the need for us to be very careful and diligent in our reading of articles.  Take nothing for granted.  Assume whatever you’re reading is deceptive and make sure you really understand what you’re reading.
 
Congratulations Lockheed and Navy.  You theoretically shot down a target drone with a theoretical missile.  Theoretically … good job.
 
Congratulations Naval News website.  You managed to parrot a Lockheed press release without adding any analysis or value whatsoever.  You’re a credit to news reporters everywhere.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Aegis Combat System Demonstrates System’s Capability to Counter Hypersonic Threats”, Carter Johnston, 25-Mar-2025, Lockheed Martin Press Release
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/03/u-s-navy-downs-maneuvering-hypersonic-missile-in-sm-6-block-iau-test/

Visby As The Model

ComNavOps has frequently cited the Swedish corvette Visby as the model for future WARship designs based on the extreme (compared to current standards) radar stealth of the ship.  Radar stealth, while not the be all and end all of WARship design, is, without a doubt, the minimum price of admission to the modern naval battlefield.  Stealth, alone, won’t guarantee success or survival but the absence of stealth will guarantee failure and destruction.  Visby is the only existing, functional high stealth WARship that I’m aware of.  Yes, there are other experimental prototypes that claim high stealth (Sea Shadow, for example) but they aren’t functional WARships – they’re experiments that emphasize one attribute not the entire WARship package.
 
What does it mean to call for Visby as the model for future US Navy WARship design?  Well, it doesn’t mean to make an exact copy and just add a hundred feet of length – though that would likely produce a much better ship than what we have now!  What it means is to take the conceptual attributes of the Visby and incorporate them into a clean sheet design.  However, even that is not the end of it.  Visby, while decently (not great) equipped and armed for a corvette, lacks many attributes that a high end WARship will need for the future naval battlefield.  So, what should we take from Visby and what do we need to add? 

 

Visby

Stealth – Visby’s radar stealth is due in large measure to its angular, uninterrupted shape with very few protuberances.  Compare Visby’s look to our latest Burkes and the Constellation and you’ll instantly see just how obsolete the Burkes and Constellations are in this regard.  They’re jokes and will stand out on the battlefield like the radar beacons they are.  Several decades ago, the Burke was notable for its stealth but that time is long since passed.
 
Electromagnetic Stealth – Radar stealth is not enough, by itself.  We need extreme emissions control across the entire spectrum.  Not a single stray electron can be emitted if a ship hopes to survive.  Visby may or may not have this – I suspect not.
 
Acoustic Stealth – This is how you gain a degree of immunity from submarines.  A ship cannot allow any avoidable noise to escape.  Note that this likely means downgrading other attributes such as speed (no giant waterjet trumpets – looking at you, LCS).  I have no idea to what extent, if any, Visby has this.
 
Visual Stealth – This is an ignored aspect and we need to incorporate modern coatings and processes (electrochemically reactive coatings, for example).  Old fashioned camouflage, adapted to disrupt optical seekers, is necessary and we’re not talking about the idiotic, crew-designed camo schemes on the LCS.  Visby does not have this, at all.
 
Infrared Stealth – Modern ships cannot emit a significant infrared signature.  Active cooling systems are mandatory and engine exhaust must be significantly cooled even is this means downgrading performance (underwater exhaust, for example, which creates backpressure and decreases engine performance).  The current nuclear washdown systems, adapted to infrared cooling, would be a good start towards heat signature management.  Non-heat absorbing coatings and materials should be developed.  Visby does not have this.
 
Weapons Density – We’ve talked at length about the extremely sparse weapons density on modern ships and Visby is as guilty of this as anyone.  We need to load the new ship with weapons appropriate for its size and purpose.  To offer one ballpark example, no major WARship should sail without a minimum of 8 close in weapon system (the Burkes have 1 – what a joke).
 
UAV – We’ve talked at length about ships needing to be able to operate many dozens of small, stealthy UAVs for situational awareness.  This means the ship needs a small catapult/launcher of some sort, a recovery mechanism, and storage for many dozens of UAVs.  Visby has no such capacity.
 
Electronic Warfare – Todays EW is a joke.  We need ten times the capacity, antennae, power, and sensitivity of existing SLQ-32/SEWIP systems.  We also need to emphasize offensive/active EW, not just detection and defensive.  Again, this means output power.  Visby does not have this.
 
Optical/Passive Sensors – To emit is to die.  The modern WARship’s sensors must be optical/passive and incorporate automated search/tracking and fire control … in other words, an optical/passive Aegis system.  Visby does not have this.
 
Range of Weapons – The modern trend towards nothing but VLS missiles is idiotic.  Naval warfare demands flexibility which demands a wide range of weapons.  The modern ship needs missiles, of course, but it also needs large caliber guns (appropriate for its size and role), medium caliber guns, and small caliber guns, heavy torpedoes, ASW RBUs, small anti-drone weapons, lasers (because, they’re just around the corner of being ready, right??), etc.  Visby does not have this to an effective degree.
 
 
Conclusion
 
It is obvious from the preceding discussion that Visby is the only logical starting point for modern WARship design but it is not the end point.  It lacks many of the required attributes for a survivable, effective WARship.  Think of the Visby as the USS Monitor - it’s a great first step towards a truly modern WARship but nowhere near the end product of the required development.