LCS Scorecard

The LCS production run is nearing an end and the ships have been in service for over a decade so let’s take a moment and see how the promise of the LCS has panned out.

 

 

 

LCS Attribute	Result	Comment
Speed	fail	Arguably the number one design attribute of the LCS, the speed has been steadily reduced to a pedestrian 35-37 kts despite so much being sacrificed at the altar of speed.
Module Swapping	fail	This was abandoned when stability and other issues were found to preclude rapid swapping.  The LCS is now a single function, non-swappable vessel.
Minimal Manning	fail	The original minimal core crew of around 40 has ballooned up to 50-60 and now two crews per ship put the total core crew at well over one hundred.  Add in the module crew, helo detachment personnel, and shore maintenance crew and the manning figure is around 200+ per ship.
Deployment	fail	The rotating crew concept was supposed to enable extended forward deployments but the reality is that very few deployments of any kind have occurred.  Most LCS have remained pier side on a nearly permanent basis.
Affordability	fail	The LCS was originally targeted at $200M each which then increased to $220M and then on up to $750M or so before steadying out around $500M-$600M without modules.
Modules	fail	After nearly two decades of development, no LCS has yet deployed with an effective module of any type despite each module having been dumbed down to nearly ineffective levels.
Numbers	fail	The initial plan called for 55 LCS.  The number was steadily reduced and currently stands at 35 vessels built, under construction, or on order.  The first four LCS have already been retired, leaving a current total of 31 and several of those have been designated non-deployable training vessels.

 

 

 

The LCS is the very epitome of a failed program.  Not a single promised capability has materialized and most capabilities have been significantly dumbed down.  The original concept has been completely abandoned and the entire LCS fleet has been reorganized multiple times along with total revamping of the crew training program.  Speed, range, and endurance have been downgraded.  The modules, which are the main weapon of the LCS, have failed completely and have been continually revised downward.  The ASW module was completely abandoned and re-conceptualized when the original concept was deemed a mistake.  The ASM and MCM modules are struggling with performance and weight issues.  The ASuW module has been hugely downgraded and has still not been fielded in any useful, combat-effective form.  The Freedom class variant is plagued by a systematic propulsion design flaw severe enough to cause the Navy to halt ship deliveries.  Most LCS that have put to sea have suffered major propulsion plant failures and many have suffered multiple failures.  The first four LCS have already been retired.  And the list goes on …

 

The promise of the LCS has utterly failed to materialize.  This is the very definition of abject failure.

Navy Surrenders

Since the day the first LCS was announced, observers have analyzed the fundamental LCS concept and found it to be badly flawed.  I won’t bother reciting the litany of flaws inherent in both the ship and its operational concept (to the extent that the Navy had an operational concept – the lack thereof being one of the flaws!).  They are legion.  My general sense is that 90% of observers outside the Navy viewed the vessel as badly flawed.  The Navy, however, steadfastly ignored observers and pressed forward, undeterred, in the face of an endless series of failures of the ship, the modules, and the concept.  Actual deployments only solidified and reinforced the critical observations.  Still, the Navy trumpeted the “success” of the program, going so far as to falsify conclusions about the Fort Worth’s failed deployment to make it seem like a success.

Now, the Navy has come out with the results of an internal review and are going to make fairly sweeping changes that effectively end the LCS concept and tacitly acknowledge that the program was a complete and utter failure.

Here are the specific changes that have been announced (1, 2) in a public statement released by VAdm. Tom Rowden, Commander, Naval Surface Forces (3).

Manning – The vaunted 3:2:1 manning arrangement which would, supposedly, have produced previously unseen increases in actual deployment time while minimizing crew fatigue and without jeopardizing ship maintenance is being abandoned in favor of a blue/gold dual crew manning arrangement like the SSBNs use.  Two crews will alternate on each ship every four or five months.

Modularity – The entire concept of modules being swapped out on a frequent basis as needs dictated is being abandoned.  Each ship will be initially equipped with a given module type which will be permanently embarked for the life of the ship.

Crew Size – The minimal manning effort has been abandoned.  The new crew size will be 70 core crew plus 23 aviation crew for a total of 93 crewmembers per ship.

Retirement – The first four LCSs (two of each version) are being removed from regular deployments and will be used as test/training platforms. 

Organization – The remaining LCSs will be organized in four-ship divisions.  All the Freedom variants (3 divisions) will be home ported on the east coast and the Independence variants (3 divisions) will be home ported on the west coast.  Each division will be composed of four of the same type of ship (ASW, MCM, or ASuW).  Presumably, this means that on each coast there will be one division of each type of function.  Each division will have one ship designated as a training ship with a single crew.  The remaining three ships will operate on the blue/gold crewing system.

Deployment – Ships are planned to be forward deployed for 24 months and then rotate back for refit and maintenance.  The ships are planned to be operationally available for 50% of their life.

Maintenance – Additional Maintenance Execution Teams will be established within the division organization to augment the preventive and corrective maintenance efforts of the individual ships

Ownership – The statement by Adm. Rowden makes it clear that one of the underlying problems with the program was the lack of ownership caused by the 3:2:1 manning construct.  The blue/gold manning is intended to increase the sense of ownership by the crews.  By implication, it is hoped that increased ownership will help prevent the crew-related mechanical failures that have plagued the ships.

Now that we see the changes, let’s look at some of these in a bit more detail.

Manning – Do you remember the initial claims that the LCS would be crewed by a core of 40 sailors and a total of around 75 with module and aviation crews?  Remember how the Navy crowed about how much smaller the crews were compared to the Perry FFGs?  Of course, that was a false claim.  Given the 3:2 manning concept, the Navy had 3 crews for each 2 ships which meant that it actually required 225 sailors to man two ships which is an average of 112 per ship compared to the 175 or so for a Perry.  Even that ignored the dockside crew requirements that the LCS maintenance model required.  So, the actual land and ship crew size was actually just about the same as the Perry. 

Now, with the 2:1 crewing and the increased crew size of 93, it requires 186 sailors to crew one ship.  That’s actually more than a Perry!  And, that still doesn’t take into account the dockside maintenance crew and the newly created Maintenance Execution Teams.  Those additions likely put the crew size up around 200 or so – well above a Perry.

So much for the vaunted minimal crew concept.

Modularity – Remember the claims that the LCS would be able to swap functions (modules) at a moment’s notice thereby making the LCS the most flexible and powerful ship in history? 

So much for modularity.

Aside from the satisfaction of thumbing our noses at the Navy, there’s a bigger, lingering issue.  What are we left with now that each ship will have a single function for its entire service life?  We’re left with ships that are not optimized for whatever role they have.  This has been the biggest problem with the entire LCS concept.  By being modular in design, the ship is not, and cannot be, optimized for any particular function.  The seaframe is sub-optimal (ill-suited) for whichever function it has.  The LCS is far too loud to be a good ASW vessel.  It lacks acoustic isolation of machinery, the water jets are hideously noisy, the self-noise precludes hull mounted sonars, etc.  Similarly, the LCS is ill-suited for MCM or ASuW.  We now have a  class of ship (actually six classes – a Freedom and Independence variant of each of the three ASW, MCM, and ASuW ships) that is, by design, ill-suited for its function(s).  This is a fatal flaw that will become painfully and bloodily apparent in combat.  Unfortunately, there is nothing that can be done about it but this really drives home the inherent flaw in modular designs.

Endurance – The LCS was only sized for about a two week endurance since the maintenance model had it pulling into port every two weeks for maintenance.  However, as the crew size has increased, and now with the even larger crew (93), the endurance has got to decrease due to limitations in food storage, cold storage, fresh water capacity, etc.  This is a ship that is going to spend very little time at sea during a deployment.

Lifespan – A target of 2 years continuously deployed between refits is absurd, especially for a lightly built vessel that is undermanned and has deferred maintenance built in to its operating concept.  These ships will wear out very fast due to programmed systematic neglect.  Expect to see these ships retired early – quite early.

Organization – The described divisional organization presumably means 8 LCS of each function type:  8 MCM, 8 ASW, 8 ASuW.  That’s a very poor outcome.  The LCS was envisioned as the replacement for the Avenger MCM vessels.  There were 12 of them and now it looks as if we’re going to replace 12 MCM with only 8 (and no functioning MCM module, as yet !).  This is a major blow to our MCM efforts that no one is talking about yet.

Well, the Navy has finally surrendered and admitted that the LCS was a colossal failure and is now correcting those aspects that it can.  That’s nice but it would have been a lot cheaper and easier to do so from the beginning.  They can’t even claim the problems were only apparent in hindsight because all these problems were apparent to everyone else from day one.

Unfortunately, many LCS problems remain.  The basic seaframe has fundamental flaws built in.  These ships will never amount to anything and will be retired early.  What a shame.  What a waste.

Navy, I accept your ignominious surrender.  Maybe next time you’ll listen to the critics up front?  Who am I kidding?  No, you won’t.

________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “Results of New LCS Review is Departure from Original Vision”, Sam LaGrone, 8-Sep-2016,

https://news.usni.org/2016/09/08/results-new-lcs-review-departure-original-vision

(2)Breaking Defense website, “Navy Sidelines First 4 LCS; Overhauls Deployment, Crewing”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 8-Sep-2016,

http://breakingdefense.com/2016/09/navy-sidelines-first-4-lcs-overhauls-deployment-crewing/

(3)https://www.scribd.com/document/323410610/VADM-Tom-Rowden-Media-Statement#from_embed

The Death of Modularity

The Death of Modularity

Modularity was always an impractical fantasy for combat platforms and the LCS in particular.  A cursory thought exercise makes clear that the concept is fundamentally flawed.  The odds that a given LCS would happen to have the correct module for a given tactical situation are poor – 33% to be exact.  Further, requiring the vessel to retire from the combat zone for a couple of weeks to get its module changed not only weakens the overall naval force for that period of time but presupposes that the tactical situation and need will have remained unchanged until the LCS returns.  That’s a degree of situational rigidity that naval warfare has rarely or never exhibited.  Further, the Navy’s concept that modules would be warehoused and available in only three locations around the world was another flaw which could only serve to increase the transit times for ships wanting to change modules.  Worse, these warehouses would have presented lucrative and vulnerable targets.

This blog has also debunked the modularity myth from a combat performance standpoint.  I won’t bother repeating the analysis.

Despite all those easily seen flaws in the concept the Navy was adamant that modularity was the way of the future.  Come hell or high water the LCS would be modular.  So, how has that worked out?

Well, due to cost overruns in the LCS program and general budget concerns, the Navy quickly dropped the idea of purchasing extra modules and limited the module buy to just about a 1:1 module to ship ratio.  There would be no extra modules to swap out.  Of course, there were other problems like the instability of the Freedom variant that was unable to move module weights around without very careful and time consuming weight compensation efforts so as to avoid exceeding the vessel’s incline limits.  The swap which was envisioned to occur in hours was found to require several days.  So much for quick swaps!

Regardless, even though the Navy eventually acknowledged that LCS would rarely, if ever, change their modules, modularity was still touted as proper approach.  The fact that budgets and a few unlucky physical characteristics of the ship precluded implementing modularity didn’t sway the Navy’s opinion about the benefits of modularity.

That brings us to the present day.  The new LCS’s will be built with no modularity whatsoever.  As USNI website reports (1), the new LCS will be a conventional, non-modular, multi-mission ship capable of performing surface and anti-submarine warfare simultaneously.

The Navy must be disappointed, huh?  Their vaunted vision of future combat platforms has been completely abandoned.  I’ll bet they still believe modularity is the right approach, don’t you think?  I mean, they were so adamant that it was the only way to design a ship, they must still wish they could implement it.

Or, maybe not  ………….

Huh?

According to the USNI report the Navy now claims that multi-mission is superior.

“Instead, he [Capt. Dan Brintzinghoffer, frigate program manager] said the frigate will be more lethal, more survivable, and will be able to conduct surface warfare and ant-submarine warfare simultaneously, whereas the LCS had to choose only one mission package to work with at any given time.”

So now the multi-mission capability of the frigate version of the LCS is a benefit?  Ah, wasn’t that what the LCS critics said years ago?  It’s certainly what ComNavOps has always said.

The Navy’s ability to positively spin either side of an issue is awe-inspiring to behold.  Really, though, what’s the alternative – to admit that modularity was an abject failure?  That would lead to some rather awkward questions about the continuing construction of modular LCS’s.  Say, now that I mention it, why are we continuing to build modular LCS’s when we’ve abandoned the modular swap concept and are now claiming that multi-mission is superior?  Only the Navy knows the answer to that.  Well, the Navy and ComNavOps.  The answer is that the Navy’s goal is not to build ships that are operationally and tactically useful.  No, the Navy’s goal is simply to get as many hulls in the water as possible in order to preserve their slice of the budget pie.  The fact that we’re continuing to build a ship whose operational premise has been abandoned and discredited does not matter to the Navy.  The only thing that matters is that the budget monies continue to flow.

You know, we should look at saving some money by seeing whether the LCS manufacturers would be willing to scrap the vessels as soon as they’re built.  That would be way more efficient and cost effective than having to wait 15 years or so and then find a company to scrap them.  It’s not like the LCS’s will do anything worthwhile while we wait.  But, I digress …

The Navy now officially recognizes what the rest of us have known all along – modularity in combat platforms is a bad idea.  Modularity is dead.

(1)USNI, “Navy’s Future Frigate Will Be Optimized For Lethality, Survivability; Will Not Retain LCS’s Speed”, Megan Eckstein, October 15, 2015,

http://news.usni.org/2015/10/15/navys-future-frigate-will-be-optimized-for-lethality-survivability-will-not-retain-lcss-speed

LCS - Looking for a Few Good Missions

Several people have brought this article (link below) about the Navy's assessment of the LCS to my attention.  It's from the people at Defense News and it's well worth reading.  It discusses the various problems that the Navy is encountering with the LCS.  None of that is new.  However, what is new and, in fact, startling is that the Navy appears to be finally coming to the same realizations that most of us have had since day one.  Better late than never, I guess.  Now, if they'll only terminate this badly flawed program before all 55 ships are built maybe we can save a bit of money and move on to something more useful.

Defense News LCS Article

LCS Module Concept

I often encounter people who concede that the LCS has problems but that they like the module concept and see it as the wave of the future.

With that in mind, recall that we previously looked at the LCS’s mission module status.  Now, let’s examine the module concept, itself.

Right up front, there is an obvious penalty to having a warship based on a modular approach and it’s that the warship can only have one capability active at a time.  If the tactical circumstances happen to match the installed module then the warship is well positioned to succeed.  On the other hand, if the tactical circumstances don’t match the installed module then the warship is, at best, ill suited to the tactical scenario or, even worse, a liability requiring protection from other ships or aviation assets. 

Yes, but isn’t that the whole point of modules that they can be rapidly switched to match the tactical situation?  That modules provide tactical flexibility?  In theory, yes.  In practice, no.

Let’s consider whether a modular ship can actually achieve tactical flexibility.  As an example, an LCS(ASuW module) receives a report of a sub heading for its area of operation and due to arrive within 24 hours.  If the LCS can't swap its ASuW module for an ASW module in 24 hours, then it's not tactically flexible.  The reality is that module swaps require 2-3 days pierside plus whatever travel time to and from the LCS’s area of operation and the module warehouse location.  In the interim, the enemy is able to do as they wish.  And, of course, the farther the module warehouse location is from the area of interest, the longer the LCS has to abandon the area.  The point being that tactical requirments change in a shorter cycle than module swapping.

Strategic flexibility remains a potentially valid claim.  Swapping an LCS to ASuW for the next several months because you're going to escort ships through waters threatened by small craft is not a problem.  The several days it will take to make the swap are not critical compared to the several month time frame of the operation.  So, I can see that the module concept offers a potential strategic flexibility but not a tactical flexibility.

Still, though, there’s no getting around the inherent desirability of a multi-purpose ship.  The only way the single purpose module makes sense is if the module offers a capability so far beyond the multi-purpose ship’s corresponding capability that the loss of other functions becomes worth it.  If the LCS modules were the transformational, littoral-dominating, generationally advanced examples of technology that the Navy promised then the modular concept might be advantageous.  Unfortunately, there is absolutely no sign of that on the horizon.

Another overlooked aspect of modules is that they become a single point of failure.  Since the modules can't be changed at sea, they must be warehoused at the installation sites.  The problem with that is that it makes for a single point of failure.  Take the Middle East, for instance, if Iran wanted to cripple the LCS effectiveness, all they'd have to do is destroy the Bahrain (the proposed warehouse site for the Mid East) installation site cranes or warehouses and the LCSs can't acquire the needed modules.  I assume Iran has their own equivalent of SEALs or other SOF.  It would be an ideal SOF type mission.

Also, remember that the module consists of equipment and specialized crew.  Without the specialists, the module is useless.  This raises the logistical issue of what to do with the specialists while their particular module is in storage.  Assembling the specialists (assuming we don't warehouse them, too!), when needed, from around the world will be a time consuming exercise.  And, of course, the specialists themselves offer a tempting target. 

I'm not sure the Navy thought all this out very well prior to embarking on the LCS program.

Danish Absalon - A Different Module Concept?

The LCS modularity was clearly patterned after the Danish StanFlex model conceived in the early 1980s.  However, the Danish model differs significantly.  Until recently, the Danish "LCS" operated only in home waters, the modules are swappable at sea in a matter of hours, home ports are close at hand, and the native ship's company operates all the modules (no specialists).  These differences appear to have escaped the Navy's attention.

It seems clear, then, that the very concept of modules is highly suspect, at least for a Navy that operates around the world rather than mostly in home waters.  The loss of flexibility by being able to operate only a single function at a time can only be justified  by having exceptionally technologically superior modules and there is no indication that this will happen anytime in the near to moderate future, or ever for that matter.

LCS - Mission Module Status

Setting aside the question of whether the LCS is a worthwhile program or not, the value of the LCS, as designed, was the ability to swap mission modules.  This flexibility at a tactical level would be the core of the LCS’ strength according to the Navy’s vision.  Well, it’s time for an assessment of the state of module implementation.

As a frame of reference, 24 LCSs have been procured or scheduled through FY2015.  That’s nearly half of the total anticipated build of 55 ships.  Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect that module development should be mature and production modules should be plentiful relative to the number of hulls in the water by FY2015.  If this were not the case, the LCS’s main design feature, tactical flexibility via swappable modules, would be nullified.

As of Mar-2012, the two MCM modules, 2 ASuW modules, and 1 ASW module have been delivered (1).  Note that these modules are partial, developmental modules intended for testing and evaluation. 



RAM Launched Griffon?

ASuW Module – The main component of the ASuW module was to have been the NLOS missile system for use in land attack and in anti-swarm (small boat attacks) defense.  The NLOS has been cancelled and the current replacement is the Griffon missile although work has already been initiated to replace it due to its unacceptably short range.  Further, the Griffon has no land attack capability comparable to the intended role of the NLOS.  Griffon is scheduled to be operational in 2015 and its successor in 2017.  Interestingly, Griffon has been test fired from a RAM launcher.  Whether this means that Griffon will be fired from the existing LCS RAM launcher, thereby diminishing the already minimal AAW capability or be launched from additional, dedicated, RAM launchers remains to be seen.

MCM Module – RAMICS was intended to provide a mine destruction capability but failed to perform and has been cancelled.  The unmanned surface vehicle and associated sweep system have also been cancelled.  The Navy is now trying out various adaptations of existing or developmental equipment but does not currently have a well defined module.  Given that this module is nothing more than a wish list of capabilities, any forecasts of IOC must be seen as pure wishful thinking.

ASW Module – LCS was originally designed to be a mothership to an array of off-board sensors carried by various unmanned air, surface, and subsurface vehicles.  Thus, the LCS would deploy its sensors and then stand off from the danger area.  There is nothing inherently wrong with this concept other than the fact that none of the anticipated unmanned vehicles and sensors have panned out.  From the GAO report (2),

“In 2008, the Navy took delivery of one partially capable ASW module at a cost of over $200 million, but subsequently cancelled plans to continue procuring the module and is redesigning it. According to program officials, the new design includes a variable-depth sonar and towed array, unmanned aerial vehicle, helicopter, and torpedo countermeasure.” 

So, the original ASW module, termed Increment 1 by the Navy, failed completely and the LCS is now moving towards on-board sensors and weapons in a module termed Increment 2.  This approach now dictates that the LCS operate in physical proximity to enemy submarines.  Again, there is nothing inherently wrong with this approach other than the fact that the LCS was not designed to stand into combat and is not considered combat survivable by the Navy.  Also, this now gets away from the original LCS design concept and makes the LCS a traditional frigate. 

I know, you’re asking yourself why we’re retiring the Perry class frigates which already exist and already have towed arrays, torpedo countermeasures, helos, Fire Scout UAVs, and anti-submarine torpedos?  Good question!

LCS Mission Bay - Anything To Put In It?

The module status summary points out both the strength and weakness of the LCS.  The strength is that modules can be continually developed over the lifetime of the seaframe.  Hence, the lack of any current, fully functioning module is not a permanent and fatal flaw.  On the other hand, the lack of any current, fully functioning module means that the LCS is just an incredibly expensive and virtually unarmed and non-functional seaframe until such time as a useful module becomes available.

The Navy attempted to jump one or more generations on the technology ladder and, not unexpectedly, failed totally.  The scramble is on now to find something, anything, that can be used as a module until such time as the envisioned modules become technically feasible, if ever.

The next major issue that has, so far, received little attention is the number of modules.  Current plans call for 55 LCS sea frames and 64 LCS mission modules:  16 ASW, 24 MCM, and 24 ASuW (3).  When we do the arithmetic, if all 55 seaframes have a module installed, that leaves just 9 modules available for swapping.  Given that the LCS will have at least two main bases, one in the MidEast and one in Chinese area, that means that there will be only four or five extra modules at each location for swapping and the odds that the desired module is in stock become very low; more so, if multiple LCSs wish to swap at the same time.  This issue, alone, almost totally invalidates the LCS concept of tactical flexibility.

In summary, none of the modules exist in finished form and the closest, probably the ASuW, is still four or five years down the road.  The MCM and ASW modules are probably looking at 2017 to 2020 for IOC of any useful version, at best.  Even when the modules become available, the limited numbers almost totally negate the LCS concept.

(1)   Congressional Research Services (CRS), Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, April 6, 2012, p. 4

(2)   Government Accountability Office: Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-12-400SP, March 2012, p. 110

(3)   CRS, p. 2

LCS - Module Swapping



ASuW Module - 30 mm Gun

The LCS was envisioned to be a flexible and rapidly adaptable seaframe carrying customizable mission modules.  In fact, depending on which reports are to be believed, the LCS's high speed was less about tactical uses and more about high transit speed to and from the module swapping location.  Unfortunately, module swapping (not that there are any!) has proven to require two to three days of continuous work which kind of negates the flexible and rapidly adaptable portion of the concept.

Related to module swapping comes this tidbit from the Department of Defense Developmental Test and Evaluation and Systems Engineering FY2011 Annual Report, March 2012, p.67.

"While the MM [mission module] swap aboard LCS 1 was completed within the threshold time period, the stability limitations and tight quarters aboard the mono-hull seaframe became evident. In order to maintain the allowable list angle during movement of the 15,000 lb Remote Multi-Mission Vehicles (RMMV), the ship’s force needed to balance the ship by emptying a JP-5 fuel tank on the port side of the ship, and by placing a weight equal to that of an MH-60S helicopter on the starboard side. Changes have reportedly been incorporated into the LM design for LCS 3 and beyond that will increase stability and should eliminate the need for adding weight to accommodate mission packages."



Note that movement of a 15,000 lb object was sufficient to cause unacceptable list angles.  The LCS displaces 3000 tons.  A 15,000 lb object is 0.25% of the total displacement.  That's a pretty insignificant object to be causing stability issues.  One has to wonder how the movement of helicopters around the flight deck will be accomplished.



Testing the Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Module

So, once again we see a vessel that has serious weight (remember, buoyancy tanks had to be added to the stern) and stability issues which further complicate an already difficult and time consuming module swap procedure.

I think we're going to see far less module swapping than envisioned in the original concept.  In fact, there are signs that the LCS is moving towards a single purpose vessel with module swaps occuring only rarely.  More on this at a later time.