Saturday, September 10, 2016

Navy Surrenders

Since the day the first LCS was announced, observers have analyzed the fundamental LCS concept and found it to be badly flawed.  I won’t bother reciting the litany of flaws inherent in both the ship and its operational concept (to the extent that the Navy had an operational concept – the lack thereof being one of the flaws!).  They are legion.  My general sense is that 90% of observers outside the Navy viewed the vessel as badly flawed.  The Navy, however, steadfastly ignored observers and pressed forward, undeterred, in the face of an endless series of failures of the ship, the modules, and the concept.  Actual deployments only solidified and reinforced the critical observations.  Still, the Navy trumpeted the “success” of the program, going so far as to falsify conclusions about the Fort Worth’s failed deployment to make it seem like a success.

Now, the Navy has come out with the results of an internal review and are going to make fairly sweeping changes that effectively end the LCS concept and tacitly acknowledge that the program was a complete and utter failure.

Here are the specific changes that have been announced (1, 2) in a public statement released by VAdm. Tom Rowden, Commander, Naval Surface Forces (3).

Manning – The vaunted 3:2:1 manning arrangement which would, supposedly, have produced previously unseen increases in actual deployment time while minimizing crew fatigue and without jeopardizing ship maintenance is being abandoned in favor of a blue/gold dual crew manning arrangement like the SSBNs use.  Two crews will alternate on each ship every four or five months.

Modularity – The entire concept of modules being swapped out on a frequent basis as needs dictated is being abandoned.  Each ship will be initially equipped with a given module type which will be permanently embarked for the life of the ship.

Crew Size – The minimal manning effort has been abandoned.  The new crew size will be 70 core crew plus 23 aviation crew for a total of 93 crewmembers per ship.

Retirement – The first four LCSs (two of each version) are being removed from regular deployments and will be used as test/training platforms. 

Organization – The remaining LCSs will be organized in four-ship divisions.  All the Freedom variants (3 divisions) will be home ported on the east coast and the Independence variants (3 divisions) will be home ported on the west coast.  Each division will be composed of four of the same type of ship (ASW, MCM, or ASuW).  Presumably, this means that on each coast there will be one division of each type of function.  Each division will have one ship designated as a training ship with a single crew.  The remaining three ships will operate on the blue/gold crewing system.

Deployment – Ships are planned to be forward deployed for 24 months and then rotate back for refit and maintenance.  The ships are planned to be operationally available for 50% of their life.

Maintenance – Additional Maintenance Execution Teams will be established within the division organization to augment the preventive and corrective maintenance efforts of the individual ships

Ownership – The statement by Adm. Rowden makes it clear that one of the underlying problems with the program was the lack of ownership caused by the 3:2:1 manning construct.  The blue/gold manning is intended to increase the sense of ownership by the crews.  By implication, it is hoped that increased ownership will help prevent the crew-related mechanical failures that have plagued the ships.

Now that we see the changes, let’s look at some of these in a bit more detail.

Manning – Do you remember the initial claims that the LCS would be crewed by a core of 40 sailors and a total of around 75 with module and aviation crews?  Remember how the Navy crowed about how much smaller the crews were compared to the Perry FFGs?  Of course, that was a false claim.  Given the 3:2 manning concept, the Navy had 3 crews for each 2 ships which meant that it actually required 225 sailors to man two ships which is an average of 112 per ship compared to the 175 or so for a Perry.  Even that ignored the dockside crew requirements that the LCS maintenance model required.  So, the actual land and ship crew size was actually just about the same as the Perry. 

Now, with the 2:1 crewing and the increased crew size of 93, it requires 186 sailors to crew one ship.  That’s actually more than a Perry!  And, that still doesn’t take into account the dockside maintenance crew and the newly created Maintenance Execution Teams.  Those additions likely put the crew size up around 200 or so – well above a Perry.

So much for the vaunted minimal crew concept.

Modularity – Remember the claims that the LCS would be able to swap functions (modules) at a moment’s notice thereby making the LCS the most flexible and powerful ship in history? 

So much for modularity.

Aside from the satisfaction of thumbing our noses at the Navy, there’s a bigger, lingering issue.  What are we left with now that each ship will have a single function for its entire service life?  We’re left with ships that are not optimized for whatever role they have.  This has been the biggest problem with the entire LCS concept.  By being modular in design, the ship is not, and cannot be, optimized for any particular function.  The seaframe is sub-optimal (ill-suited) for whichever function it has.  The LCS is far too loud to be a good ASW vessel.  It lacks acoustic isolation of machinery, the water jets are hideously noisy, the self-noise precludes hull mounted sonars, etc.  Similarly, the LCS is ill-suited for MCM or ASuW.  We now have a  class of ship (actually six classes – a Freedom and Independence variant of each of the three ASW, MCM, and ASuW ships) that is, by design, ill-suited for its function(s).  This is a fatal flaw that will become painfully and bloodily apparent in combat.  Unfortunately, there is nothing that can be done about it but this really drives home the inherent flaw in modular designs.

Endurance – The LCS was only sized for about a two week endurance since the maintenance model had it pulling into port every two weeks for maintenance.  However, as the crew size has increased, and now with the even larger crew (93), the endurance has got to decrease due to limitations in food storage, cold storage, fresh water capacity, etc.  This is a ship that is going to spend very little time at sea during a deployment.

Lifespan – A target of 2 years continuously deployed between refits is absurd, especially for a lightly built vessel that is undermanned and has deferred maintenance built in to its operating concept.  These ships will wear out very fast due to programmed systematic neglect.  Expect to see these ships retired early – quite early.

Organization – The described divisional organization presumably means 8 LCS of each function type:  8 MCM, 8 ASW, 8 ASuW.  That’s a very poor outcome.  The LCS was envisioned as the replacement for the Avenger MCM vessels.  There were 12 of them and now it looks as if we’re going to replace 12 MCM with only 8 (and no functioning MCM module, as yet !).  This is a major blow to our MCM efforts that no one is talking about yet.

Well, the Navy has finally surrendered and admitted that the LCS was a colossal failure and is now correcting those aspects that it can.  That’s nice but it would have been a lot cheaper and easier to do so from the beginning.  They can’t even claim the problems were only apparent in hindsight because all these problems were apparent to everyone else from day one.

Unfortunately, many LCS problems remain.  The basic seaframe has fundamental flaws built in.  These ships will never amount to anything and will be retired early.  What a shame.  What a waste.

Navy, I accept your ignominious surrender.  Maybe next time you’ll listen to the critics up front?  Who am I kidding?  No, you won’t.


(1)USNI News website, “Results of New LCS Review is Departure from Original Vision”, Sam LaGrone, 8-Sep-2016,

(2)Breaking Defense website, “Navy Sidelines First 4 LCS; Overhauls Deployment, Crewing”, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 8-Sep-2016,


  1. Think of it this way. While the Navy loses a great fighting ship and more than a decade's worth of resources, it gains an over qualified TORPEX target.

    The training value is off the charts.

  2. any international frigate designs that you like out there? I'm curious as a Canadian who's gov't is taking bids on a design on our own flawed ship building program.

    1. I'm not an expert on international frigate designs but I especially like the Russian Gorshkov or various of the MEKOs. I don't like the Danish Absalon or the Swedish Visby. They're generic naval support ships rather than focused frigates.

    2. Anon,

      Noting the above by CNO Re: the Absalon, linked below is an AAW/GP FFG version.

      Excellent range. Decent speed. Aviation facilities. Excellent CIWS, 5" gun. APAR with 32 Mk41 VLS cells (SM-2/ESSM illumination by APAR, so freed from limitations of separate mechanical illuminators).

      A few more VLS cells would be nice. But it is the vessel I wish the RAN had purchased instead of the Spanish F100 FFG (3 are costing us about $10B).

      Plus some Absalons, for the missions we actually do on a daily basis.

      One can dream.

  3. The design is fundamentally flawed and cannot be fixed, and explained here:

    Specifically this part:

    "5. Who thought up this maximum speed of 40-50 knots? This isn't a cigarette boat for teenagers. A 2003 analysis by David D. Rudko noted that the Navy has stated the LCS must incorporate endurance, speed, payload capacity, sea-keeping, shallow-draft and mission reconfigurability into a small ship design. However, constraints in current ship design technology make this desired combination of design characteristics in small ships difficult to realize at any cost. Speed, displacement, and significant wave height all result in considerable increases in fuel consumption, and as a result, severely limit LCS endurance and weaponry.

    When operating in a significant wave height of six feet, regardless of the amount of fuel carried, the maximum endurance achieved for an LCS outfitted with all modular mission packages is less than seven days. Especially noteworthy is that when restricted to a fuel reserve of 50% and a fuel carrying capacity of Day tanks, the maximum achieved endurance is only 4.8 hours when operating at a maximum speed of 48 knots. The LCS can achieve high speeds, however, this can only be accomplished at the expense of range and payload capacity.

    The requirement to go fast requires a seaframe with large and heavy propulsion systems. The weight of the seaframe, required shipboard systems (weapons, sensors, command and control, and self-defense) and modular mission packages accounts for 84% of the full displacement, and as a result, substantially limits total fuel carrying capacity. Since initial mission profiles required the high-speed capability less than 5% of the time, the end result is a ship that has very little endurance and a high-speed capability it would rarely use. Refueling, and potentially rearming, would require the LCS to frequently leave littoral waters and transit to Combat Logistics Force ships operating outside the littorals for replenishment.

    In addition, big engines and a heavy frame make a coastal ship far too big. All other modern coastal ships around the world are half its size. Twice the size means twice the target and twice the cost, all this for high speed? The LCS is the size of modern frigates and bigger than destroyers of World War II, yet has the armament of a patrol boat in order to accommodate the mysterious ultra high-speed requirement.

    1. Please don't copy someone else's work to here. I wouldn't want someone to do that to my work. Feel free to offer a link or to summarize their points. Thanks.

      Did you have a specific point to make?

    2. Why don't we build a fuel barge that gets towed behind the gas guzzling LCS. When the SHTF, the barge is jettisoned and the ship is free to maneuver.

    3. I know you're joking, but,
      The Ruskis tried that on their T-72's... carry couple of drums of diesel on the back of your tank, dump when entering the frey... another fine idea shot to hell :)

  4. Given one ship in each division will be used for training and have a single crew, the Navy will really have 6 MCM, 6 ASW, and 6 ASUW platforms to deploy.

    And, it's simply outrageous that 10 of the first 28 builds, about $7B when you factor in the modules and everything else, will be used for training and testing.

    1. The entire training/testing ship concept is baffling, to be sure. The statement seemed to make it clear that the training ship in each division would be the same function as the others so the 8,8,8 allocation seems to hold. Whether the training should could or would ever deploy remains to be seen. The suggestion is that it won't which, as you note, drops us back to the 6,6,6. We'll have to wait and see how unfolds in practice.

      You make an excellent observation about the 10 of the first 28 ships being dedicated to training/testing. That seems bizarre.

    2. I don't know if it's a manning issue or something else, but one would think the first two of each class would be more than sufficient for training and testing. Even with just one ship of each variant, you could rotate the modules every 2 months or so and conduct training on each module twice a year.

    3. I re-read the Breaking Defense article and the 4th ship in each division will be based stateside for training leaving the other 3 forward deployed. Presumably, each division will periodically rotate a ship back to the states for training. The Navy will really only have 6 MCM, 6 ASW, and 6 ASuW ships to deploy.

    4. The memo is far from clear. It implies that crews will not rotate among ships other than the blue/gold. So, if a ship rotates back, the crews will all have to rotate which violates the ownership intent. It remains to be seen how it will all work out.

      The statement also makes it clear that all ships in a division will have the same module installed. Thus, 8,8,8. So, presumably, the training ship will only be for the single function that the division is engaged in. Again, 8,8,8. However, in terms of deployable ships, it will be 6,6,6. I suspect, like every aspect of the LCS program, the Navy has not completely thought this through.

    5. Its also a totally unrealistic strategy. Not to mention unaffordable.

      I dont know who thinks they can pull a fast one like that, but first 4 ships of class not going to be deployed, and be test beds... at the public expense, not the developers... And no one losing their jobs.... This is simply untenable.

  5. If there was a change in civilian leadership, could a new president and congress kill the LCS? Or are we stick building another 30 or so of these ships. It is evident that the resources could be put to better use.

    1. Congress controls the funding. They can kill the program at any time, regardless of what the President wants.

  6. The Navy has not surrendered on LCS, they are still kicking the can down the road, its just a road in a slightly different direction and using different foot work

    You will know when the Navy surrenders when they order up a real frigate, a real mine sweeper, a real coastal sub hunter and a real surface guns ship. Some of these jobs might be combined, the frigate and surface gun ship, the mine sweeper and coastal sub hunter but they probably should be dedicated ships for the jobs.

    The biggest problem with LCS is that it started as test ships, but due to the sinking/scrapping of \the US DD and FFG’s the Navy only had the LCS under construction for anything smaller then a Burke DDG and at one point even the Burkes construction was being cancelled and the DD 1000 was the only other ship in the plans the Navy made the stupid decision of turning these test ships into a major shipbuilding program before the tests were even halfway done on the ships and before the modules were anywhere near ready

    The second reason for making an early decision to build more LCS is that the two shipyards probably would not survive or at least most of their workers keeping a job if they did not keep on past the first four ships

    Does anyone know of any plans to build a real frigate or mine sweeper or anything?

    The only thing I have heard is the bad idea of turning the LCS into a frigate by welding some of the sensors and weapons in place rather then being module? Even though the Navy has spent the last 10 years swearing up and down that the LCS was not a frigate in any shape or form.

    P.S. In regard to the point above about ten of the ships being used as training/test ships, this brings the program back to the original R&D ships but with ten vessels instead of the original four.

    1. "You will know when the Navy surrenders"

      You are correct that the Navy has not totally surrendered on the LCS. They've surrendered about all the aspects that were supposed to make the LCS a unique wonder-weapon but they have not completely surrendered or they would cease producing it.

    2. "brings the program back to the original R&D ships but with ten vessels instead of the original four."

      Ten R&D ships seems a tad excessive, don't you think? Also, what purpose do R&D ships serve if you've already committed to the entire production run? The ships that could be improved on by operating R&D test ships have all either been built or are under contract already. The opportunity to improve the class is gone. Therefore, R&D ships serve no purpose, at this point. I suppose there might be some small chance of incorporating an improvement into the "frigate" version but those are going to be significantly different in both structure and concept so I'm not sure how much overlap and, therefore, benefit there is to be had from R&D ships as they relate to the "frigates".

  7. Now, with the 2:1 crewing and the increased crew size of 93, it requires 186 sailors to crew one ship. That’s actually more than a Perry!

    possibly, but wouldn't a Perry require two crews as well (2*176? :)

    1. Huh??? A Perry, and every other ship in the Navy except SSBNs, has one crew.

  8. Is anyone suspicious of the timing. The elections are being held in two months and facing a Trump presidency where waste and abuse is dealt with by firing the admirals.

    The navy is facing the real possibility that a review of their actions over the past decade are going to be reviewed and dealt with in a manner consistent with waste.

    It just seems that when faced with the potential for real oversite concerning the use of funds for fighting they are all of a sudden acknowledging the programs shortcomings to save their own jobs

    Look for more of the same via the f35 over the next few months

  9. With all the "sweeping" changes, I can't believe the Navy is still insistent on building two hull designs! Kill the trimaran hull! The Navy never learns from its own history; odd shaped ships have short production/life. Examples: MHC's, PHM's, and now the Edsel of all Edsels, rivaled only by the Homer Simpson designed car, the DDG-1000 behemoth.

  10. Out of curiosity: the USN seems now to intend to put all the trimaran designs on the west coast, all the monohulls on the east. from the maintenance point of view, that simplifies things. But why are trimarans better suited to the West, and vice versa?

    Out of further curiosity: the Google web page shows a Freedom class ship in dazzle camouflage. Correct me if I am wrong, but I thought that scheme was abandoned after WWI? Which potential adversary could be deceived by it?

    1. The choice of east/west coast was supposedly determined just by available pier space, the Independence needing more.

      The cammo schemes are just a crew "fun" project and are not actually intended as functional cammo. Some type of painting was needed to cover the diesel exhaust areas and the crews asked if they could expand it to a complete "cammo" scheme. Other crews have done different schemes. Just fun, no function.

    2. So the USN is short of pier space? I never knew. Doubtless that is due to the recent enormous expansion in the number of USN vessels.

  11. Anyone seen a new weight allocation for these pigs? The report at on page 24 shows BOTH subclasses are overweight with n room for expansion.

    The "new" ASW package is too heavy, MCM is back on the drawing board, and the SUW Guns are at the limit. The increase in berthing weight has gotta come from somewhere. What about cooling for food? The increased crews gonna eat MREs?

  12. Does anyone know how well the ship has done with flight ops? Even if the ship is bunk at SUW and ASW, a good helicopter could go a long way. Seems like the real tragedy here is mine sweeping/hunting, which has basically ceased to exist and will be painful to reconstitute when those with knowledge have retired.

    1. I'm not sure what you're asking. They have a flight deck and a hangar, just like almost every other surface ship. I would assume they do the same. No better, no worse.

      Am I missing your point?

    2. I think the point is that helicopters can be very good at SUW and ASW (and other things), even if the platform is marginal, so long as it has appropriate command/control, maintenance, and flight deck capabilities. So maybe the LCS is not great, but it could carry great helos. But I don't think you can fix them for MIW that way, and there is no other potential replacement. This is a real problem.

    3. Helo downtime is an issue, as others have pointed out. But beyond that, if that is what the main strength of the LCS is its hilariously over priced. $400 million for a go fast helo pad? SuperTankers are 1/4 the cost.

      I actually don't mind the LCS nearly as much if it costs $50 million with a 30kt top speed, 6000 NM range, and the same weapons kit.

      At least it could do those anti-piracy and presence missions the Navy likes and to it economically.

  13. I've always said that the best use for the Freedom LCS was a replacement for the Cyclone PC's. Hopefully this will bring that dream one step closer to reality. I honestly don't know what to do with the Independence variant, but it is incapable of ASW, ASuW and MCM.

    The question I pose to you CNO, is do you think the Navy needs a Frigate? Supposedly, the major benefit of FFG's are that they are cheap and can focus on ASW. But LCS proves what the Navy can accomplish with with a constrained budget. And while the Nat'l Security Cutter has potential, converting it to Naval standards might mitigate any potential savings. At the end of the day, I think the solution ends up being more Burke's.

    1. My question to you is do you think the Navy needs any more Burkes?

      The Navy has all the Aegis ships it needs. The Navy does not need a frigate, at least not in the sense that most people think of it - as a mini-Burke. Instead, the Navy needs a small, dedicated, cheap ASW vessel, lot's of MCM assets, both ship and aircraft, and a few other small, dedicated types that I've covered in past posts. In short, we need to drastically curtail our high end builds and start building small, cheap, numerous, dedicated vessels that can actually help in combat and are "expendable".

      The worst solution is more Burkes. Burkes do not get us MCM, mine warfare, amphibious capability, ASW, or shore support.

    2. But we've seen what the Navy can do with small and cheap and everyone hates it. And I've yet to understand why that is the only way ASW can be done when DD's were lauded for what they could do in that role.

    3. We've already got DD's (actually DDG's - the Burkes) that have theoretical ASW capability. As a commander, would you rather risk a $2B Burke playing tag with a sub or a $400M small, dedicated ASW vessel (kind of like the WWII corvettes) do the job?

      ASW is a very risky business. We should not risk $2B Aegis AAW ships doing ASW.

    4. Have we really seen what the Navy can do with small and cheap? I don't agree with that. We've seen what the Navy can do by wretchedly managing a project for a small and cheap ship.

      But look at what they've done with a ship that's big and expensive (The Ford, or the Zumwalt, take your pick).

      Both of those are horrible too.

      I agree with CNO, we need something focused and cheap. Some sort of new DE type ship. If you keep the focus I think you'll find you can make a decent ship.

    5. I was a ASWO on a DDG so I can tell you all about how much AAW ships loath the undersea mission. But as it stands, we have $2B subs that will be playing tag with $400M Diesel Electric boats and the USN only has $2B ships capable of conducting the mission right now.

      Sure, I would love to be wrong and see the US produce $400M alternative, but I look at CONUS manufacturing and simply don't see it. The changes from LCS to FF should have brought the platform closer to a Perry, but that does not appear to be the case.

    6. Hmmm .... I'm not sure you're grasping the concept of a pure ASW vessel, at least as I envision it. Let me try to describe in a bit more detail.

      What does a ship need to conduct ASW? It needs a multi-freq sonar, a streamable array and/or VDS, ideally an ASROC, and a helo. What does that require in terms of ship size? Basically, a tugboat with a flight deck so something along the size of an oceangoing tug or icebreaker. In other words, not very big which translates to not very expensive. This would be a simple, single function ship. My guess is $400M or thereabouts.

      We can produce $100M supertankers. We can produce a $400M oceangoing tug if we don't pile it up with non-essential capabilities.

    7. "Hmmm .... I'm not sure you're grasping the concept of a pure ASW vessel, at least as I envision it. Let me try to describe in a bit more detail."

      I understand that perfectly. But Big Navy has determined that Surface Combatants need to be multipurpose. Such a vessel won't be acquired until a DDG or CVN is at the bottom of the drink.

      When ADM Mullen was ranting about the 1000 ship Navy, he envisioned foreign partners filling that particular mission. Obviously, that dream failed.

  14. "The question I pose to you CNO, is do you think the Navy needs a Frigate?"

    You know, that's a great question. I had started on a long answer based on some of my own thoughts, however right or wrong they might be... but then I came to the conclusion it is kind of a moot point.

    Suppose we find a way to build the best, cheapest FF in the world. So what?

    'So what' because I'm not sure what the Navy sees as its mission anymore.

    Do we need good ASW for the CVN's? YES! But, if the CVN's air wing is composed of old Hornets with short legs and new F-35's with slightly longer legs but horrible maintainability and questionable use, they have pretty limited ability in a peer war anyway.

    And if the 'Burkes are going the way of falling apart due to poor maintenance, or being close to overweight and underpowered with the new flt III's, how much real utility/dollar do they provide?

    And the Virginias. How good are they? Subs are one of the things we do best but we don't know how good these are.

    So before we can say 'What is the best Small Surface Combatant' I think we need to ask 'What is our goal for a Navy' and 'What weapons systems best fit that goal?'.

    Because right now it seems like we are burning national treasure for not much in return on the naval front.

    1. My estimate of the Navy's missions are that it is the Peacetime patrol force, essentially 'walking the beat'. In times of war it controls the blue water and clears the way for ashore replenishment.

      What the Navy and USMC can't do is initiate a war or engage in one for any extended period of time without immediate support from the Army and Air Force. The current force structure just does not lend itself to sustained littoral operations IMO.

    2. "My estimate of the Navy's missions are that it is the Peacetime patrol force, essentially 'walking the beat'. In times of war it controls the blue water and clears the way for ashore replenishment."

      Jay, you've lost sight of the fundamental reason for having a navy. To quote, "The seat of purpose is on the land". A navy exists to support land operations, directly or indirectly. That can take the form of escorting resupply, direct land attacks, establishing local aerial superiority, conducting amphibious assaults, etc.

      Peacetime patrols are not a core navy mission. They are just something for the navy to do while they wait (and hopefully train and equip) for the next war.

    3. "Peacetime patrols are not a core navy mission. They are just something for the navy to do while they wait (and hopefully train and equip) for the next war."

      Fair point, but it looks like maybe the Navy has lost sight of its mission? How many times have we heard of admirals talking about 'presence' missions? FON missions? etc. while our ASW capability has withered.

      What really gets my goat is that we're spending billions on a Navy that is neither fish nor fowl.

      It has huge gaps in a peer war, but is so expensive its lousy at the 'presence' side.

    4. "Jay, you've lost sight of the fundamental reason for having a navy. To quote, "The seat of purpose is on the land". A navy exists to support land operations, directly or indirectly. That can take the form of escorting resupply, direct land attacks, establishing local aerial superiority, conducting amphibious assaults, etc."

      I'm just calling it like I see it. You might believe that peacetime patrols aren't a large part of the USN's core mission, but as Jim Whall alluded to, it is a major focus of Big Navy.

      Can the current force composition support all those functions you've listed with the assets on hand? Not directly IMO, and it can only do so indirectly when coordinated with other services.

    5. "You might believe that peacetime patrols aren't a large part of the USN's core mission"

      They are absolutely not part of the core mission. That's not a matter of opinion - that's fact. The Navy exists to fight wars. It does not exist to patrol in peacetime - that's just what it does to pass time.

      The core mission is eternal and never changes. Navy leadership may, mistakenly and unwisely, emphasize other missions, as they are now, but that doesn't change what the core mission is. Never lose sight of that.

    6. "The core mission is eternal and never changes. Navy leadership may, mistakenly and unwisely, emphasize other missions, as they are now, but that doesn't change what the core mission is. Never lose sight of that."

      I haven't lost sight of the fact that the job of the military is to kill people and break things. But that is not the answer you would get from most flag officers IMO. And they are the ones charged with equipping the fleet and training the sailors.

    7. "But that is not the answer you would get from most flag officers IMO."

      And that is why I do this blog - to try, in my own small way, to effect change and fix the problems in the Navy.

      Half of the posts are about what is (usually pointing out problems) and the other half are about what should be (usually proposing better solutions).

    8. I know...which is why I'm happy to be here and proud to serve. Cheers!


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