The LVT Family

WWII saw the birth of the Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT) amphibious assault vehicle, known variously as the "amtrak", "amtrac", "alligator", or "buffalo", among other nicknames.  The vehicle was the answer to the Marine’s need for a protected transport capable of traversing surf and coral.  The development of an armored version with a 75 mm howitzer provided anti-infantry and anti-fortification firepower available in the initial assault wave.  Later, a flamethrower capability was added. 

 

The personnel carrying LVT was the forerunner to today’s standard Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV).  Indeed, the AAV was initially designated the Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Personnel-7 (LVTP-7).

 

We see, then, that during WWII, the LVT variants included transport, flamethrower, and armored “tank” versions.  These developments were critical to the Pacific war island assaults and were impressive enough in their own right.  However, after the Korean War, the LVT underwent yet another round of development resulting in an entire family of functional variants.

 

The base vehicle for the subsequent LVT family was the 35 ton LVTP-5.  The variants, designed by Borg-Warner Corp., included (1),

 

LVTP-5 – personnel carrier rated for up to 35 troops (though not in practice) 

 

LVTP-5

LVTH-6 – armored amphibian with fully stabilized armored turret housing a 105 mm howitzer with storage for 151 rounds plus an additional 150 rounds in the cargo hold, a 0.30 cal co-axial machine gun, and a 0.50 cal anti-aircraft machine gun

LVTH-6

LVTC-5 – command vehicle with extensive communications suite for battalion or regimental command;  could send and receive on 7 channels and monitor 4;  space for seating and map boards

 

LVTAA-1 – anti-aircraft vehicle fitted with the M42 Duster turret housing twin 40 mm Bofors;  Note: It appears that the LVTAA-1 never entered production after prototype testing.

 

LVTR-1 – recovery vehicle with two winches, each capable of pulling 45,000 pounds, a welding rig, crane and other maintenance equipment (2)

LVTR-1

LVTE-1 – combat engineer and breaching vehicle with an angled blade plow for mine clearing that could clear a 12 ft wide lane to a depth of 16 inches; also included a top mounted, rocket-propelled demolition line charge launcher for mine and obstacle clearance

LVTE-1

The really noteworthy aspect of this bit of amphibious vehicle history is that we still need the same functions today!  The absolutely astounding aspect of this bit of amphibious vehicle history is that most of the required functions are still unmet, today!  

AAV

 It is also interesting to note how little the base vehicle has changed.  If we could simply, magically, transport these vehicles to our time, we’d find them quite welcome and useful.  That illustrates how little improvement has occurred in amphibious assault – arguably, we have regressed since we now lack any kind of amphibious heavy firepower which we commonly had in WWII !

 

The AAV/ACV (ACV – Amphibious Combat Vehicle) that is currently being produced has barely changed, functionally, from its historical predecessors and lacks the various variants that are required for a fully functional amphibious capability.  The Marines have discussed adding ACV command and 30 mm gun variants but nothing has happened as yet and budget constraints suggest that few, if any, variants will be produced.

 

This raises the larger question, are the Marines actually serious about amphibious assault?  The statements, doctrine, acquisitions, and budget allocation present a very mixed bag of answers.

 

Statements by various Marine leadership claim that amphibious assault remains a core capability, that a line of AAVs assaulting the beach will never be seen again, that traditional assaults are a thing of the past, and that the AAV/ACV is vital for the Marine mission.  An astounding bit of mixed messaging, for sure!

 

Doctrinally, the Marines/Navy call for a standoff distance of 25-50+ miles for an opposed assault.  This suggests that the Marines are not serious about amphibious assault since they have no landing craft capable of conducting effective 25-50+ mile transits.

 

Marine acquisitions and budgets are heavily focused on the aviation – and now missile – side of things.  The lack of importance attached to assault is evidenced by the decades spent meandering around the AAV replacement issue (recall the failed EFV?).  Even now, with new ACVs being procured, the utter lack of amphibious firepower and anti-air capability is startling and sends the message that amphibious assault is not a priority and may not even be feasible (if so, why are the Marines even procuring ACVs?).

 

One final bit of evidence about the degree of likelihood and seriousness with which the Marines view amphibious assault is that the Marines have never conducted an exercise using their own doctrine of assaulting from 25-50+ miles – because they know it can’t be done with the capabilities they currently have.  Further, there is no serious investigation of 25-50+ mile connectors being conducted.  Recall any photo you’ve ever seen of Marine amphibious exercises.  The AAVs are pictured coming ashore in neat rows with a giant amphibious ship parked just offshore so that the AAVs had a very short ride to the beach (barely getting wet in the process!).  Great photo op but worthless training.

 

Amphibious Assault Exercise - note the proximity of the host ship

If the Marines are serious about amphibious assault – and that’s a huge ‘if’ – they desperately need a complete family of vehicles identical in function to the post-WWII LVT family.  If the Marines are not serious about amphibious assault, as the preponderance of evidence suggests, then they need to stop wasting money on ACVs which will never be used.

 

 

 

 

_____________________________________

 

(1)”Marines Under Armor”, Kenneth W. Estes, Naval Institute Press, 2000

 

(2)http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/content/issues/1993/MAR_APR/ArmorMarchApril1993web.pdf , p. 13

Marine’s AAV – High and Dry

The Marine’s Amphibious Assault Vehicle, AAV, is now just the Vehicle, V.  The amphibious part is gone as the Marines have announced that the AAVs will no longer be used for water operations.

 

… given the current state of the amphibious vehicle program, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has decided the AAV will no longer serve as part of regularly scheduled deployments or train in the water during military exercises; AAVs will only return to operating in the water if needed for crisis response.  …  The AAV will continue to operate on land; 76 percent of its tasks are land-based. [1]

 

AAV - Now Just 'V'

Well, they always have the new ACV, right?  Well, no, at least not at the moment.

 

The ACVs are under their own restrictions from waterborne operations. [1]

 

The Marine Corps in early September announced the pause to ACV water operations due to the problem with the towing mechanism. [1]

 

ACVs were temporarily suspended from open ocean waterborne operations as we worked to solve an issue that was identified with the towing mechanism. We expect that issue to be resolved soon and for ACVs to return to the water early in the New Year. [1]

 

So, currently the Marines have no means to get ashore in an assault since the LCAC is doctrinally excluded from initial assaults and has been relegated to follow on support.  Of course, the Marines have stated that they’re out of the amphibious assault business so I guess this isn’t really a problem.

 

This does, however, lead to a potentially serious question.

 

Is the AAV the best vehicle for land tasks?  Presumably, the newer ACV also has the same 76% land tasks so the same question applies.  The AAV/ACV is not an armored personnel carrier (APC) like the Israeli Namer nor an Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) like the Bradley so what tasks is it being asked to perform? 

 

Land combat vehicles are intended to go in harm’s way and are armed and armored appropriately.  The AAV/ACV is not.  As best I can tell – not being a land combat expert – the AAV/ACV was intended as a poor man’s APC, though without the armor – thus making it a very lightly armored personnel carrier.  As such, it is unsuited for modern battlefield combat.  It could, perhaps, function as a rear area personnel carrier but does that role justify the expenditure on the new ACV?  I would think not.

 

The amphibious nature of the AAV/ACV led to a compromised vehicle that is optimized for neither water nor land tasks.  This was possibly acceptable if the Marines were going to conduct amphibious assaults (no, it really wasn’t but we’ll set that issue aside for now).  Now, since the Marines are abandoning landings from the sea they should seriously re-evaluate whether the AAV/ACV is suited for strictly land tasks. 

 

The AAV/ACV seems to have no role in the new Marine Corps so why are they continuing to purchase ACVs?

 

 

On the bright side, the Marines have no viable mission so I guess none of this matters but, wow, this is some top notch embarrassing fumbling and incompetence on display for the world to see.  China has to be wetting themselves laughing about this.

 

 

 

________________________________

 

[1]USNI News website, “Marines Keeping AAVs Out of the Water Permanently”, Sam LaGrone, 15-Dec-2021,

https://news.usni.org/2021/12/15/breaking-marines-keeping-aavs-out-of-the-water-permanently

Amphibious Assault Vehicle - Survivability Upgrade

The venerable Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) is undergoing a Survivability Upgrade (AAV-SU) while development of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle is proceeding.  The current plan is to upgrade 396 AAVs to the AAV-SU standard.

From the SAIC product brochure (1), upgrades include,

• integral aluminum underbody and crew compartment armor
• buoyant, ceramic-composite flank and roof armor
• integrated spall liner
• individual blast-resistant seats
• upgraded engine with increased horsepower and torque
• new, electronically-controlled transmission and Power Takeoff (PTO)
• new axial-flow water jets
• external fuel tanks
• upgraded vehicle controls and driver interfaces

AAV-SU

Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is planned for 2019 with Full Operational Capability (FOC) following in 2023.

So, how is the project coming?  There’s some good and some bad.  Let’s take a quick look at the DOT&E 2017 Annual Report.

• Test units demonstrated desert and littoral operability – not exactly a surprise as the legacy AAV could already do that.

• Reliability is an issue with Mean Time Between Operational Mission Failures at 10.7 hrs versus the required 25 hrs.

• The transmission rapidly overheats when the vehicle’s tracks are used for swimming.

• The transmission operation requires the vehicle to slow and pause during the transition from sea to shore creating a vulnerability during a critical moment.

• The braking system is subject to a condition that can cause loss of hydraulic power and lock the brakes which necessitates remedial action that takes place outside the vehicle – undesirable in combat!

• The vehicle was able to accommodate 17 troops.

• The troop commander could not egress with the troops, instead having to egress out a top-side hatch and then down the side.

• The AAV-SU median egress time was 29 seconds, which exceeds the user requirement of 18 seconds.

• The vehicle met its force protection requirements.

AAV-SU

Here’s an interesting recommendation from the DOT&E,

“Reduce the troop capacity threshold …”

The legacy AAV supposedly carries 21-25 Marines, depending on the source.  Whether that’s true in practice, I don’t know but derating the AAV to 17 with a recommendation to further reduce that capacity is noteworthy.

In short, the survivability upgrade has some problems but nothing that appears unfixable in a reasonable time frame.

The biggest negative would seem to be the time frame for the project.  Five to six more years to get a relatively simple upgrade to full operational capability seems excessive.

There’s no particular point to this post – just informational. 

____________________________________

(1)SAIC product brochure, “Assault Amphibious Vehicle Survivability Upgrade”,

https://www.saic.com/media/126753/17-0353-aav-su_f.pdf

WWII LVT(A) Amphibious Tank

In WWII, the military quickly realized that amphibious assaults would require efficient and effective means of getting men, machines, and supplies ashore.  More to the point, they quickly learned from bloody experience that they needed to get heavy firepower ashore in the initial wave and they needed to provide better protection for the assault troops than the open and unarmored Higgins boat, the iconic landing craft.  The solution to both needs, firepower and protection, was found in the Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT) family of amphibious, armored vehicles.

I’d like to examine the armored firepower version, the LVT(A), of which there were several evolutionary variants.  The end result was the LVT(A)-4, essentially an amphibious light tank.  Take a look at the specifications.

LVT(A)-4 (1)

• Armament – M8 turret with 75 mm M3 howitzer or Canadian Ronson flamethrower plus 1x 0.50 cal machine gun or 3x 0.30 cal machine guns
• Armor – 6-38 mm
• Weight – 20 tons
• Speed – 20 mph land, 7.5 mph water
• Range – 150 miles land, 75 miles water
• Length – 7.95 m
• Engine – gasoline radial, 250 hp; 12.5 hp/ton

Around 1890 LVT(A)-4’s were built during the war and continued in service until the mid-1950’s.  They were first used in combat at Saipan in June 1944.  Being in the initial assault wave and then used at the front line of combat once ashore, the LVT(A)-4’s often experienced high loss rates.

LVT(A)-4

A few things jump out when looking at this vehicle.  First, the LVT has essentially the same specifications as today’s Marine Corps Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV).  That we have been unable to produce a significantly better vehicle in seventy some years is depressing and disturbing. 

For comparison, here are some specs on the AAV.

AAV (formerly LVTP-7)

• Armament – turret with Mk19 40 mm grenade launcher and M2 0.50 cal (12.7 mm) machine gun
• Armor – 45 mm
• Weight – 29 tons
• Speed – 20 mph land, 8.2 mph water
• Range – 300 miles land, 20 miles water
• Length – 7.94 m
• Engine – diesel, 400 hp; 13.8 hp/ton

Now, before anyone starts pounding out replies disputing some specification, just relax.  The exact specs are all over the map depending on exactly which version of the AAV we’re talking about and which upgrades it’s had.  The point of this comparison is not to discuss exact specs but to note the lack of significant improvement since WWII.

The most notable aspect of the comparison lies in the armament.  The LVT(A) had a heavy 75 mm howitzer whereas the AAV has only machine guns and grenade launchers.  To be fair, today’s AAV is not intended as a “tank” whereas that was exactly the purpose of the LVT(A).  The AAV is simply an armored personnel carrier and is not meant to provide heavy firepower.

LVT(A)-4 at Okinawa

While today’s military continues to flounder around with the dilemma of firepower in the initial assault wave the WWII military solved the problem with a light amphibious assault tank.  Today, China has developed light amphibious assault tanks and the US military views that as cutting edge and a controversial concept.  Hey, it’s just reinventing the WWII wheel.

We also need to keep the role of a light amphibious tank firmly in mind.  It's role is not to stand toe-to-toe with main battle tanks - no light tank can prevail in such a match up.  The role of the amphibious light tank is to provide heavy infantry support with suppressing fire and to reduce enemy strongholds, fortifications, and emplacements.  Thus, an amphibious light tank does not need to be a water-going Abrams - though figuring how to get an Abrams ashore in the initial assault wave would be great!

LVT(A)-4 Providing Infantry Support

We lack any kind of significant firepower in the initial assault wave and the Navy has doctrinally stated that they will not risk ships close enough to shore to be able to use even the small 5” guns.  Airpower, against a peer, will be only sporadically available and, in any event, is unable to provide the sheer volume of sustained heavy firepower needed to support an assault. 

The only viable solution is to provide heavy firepower in the assault wave and the only way to do that is with a tank of some sort.  We would do well to consider the lesson of the WWII LVT(A)-4 as we continue to ponder our amphibious assault doctrine and operations.

___________________________________

(1)World War II Database,

http://ww2db.com/vehicle_spec.php?q=301

Future Connectors - The Marine Corps View

As mentioned in the previous posts (see, "Out Of The Business"), CSIS hosted a Q&A session with BGen. William Mullen (1).  He covered several topics that are noteworthy and deserve some additional attention.

Mullen addressed the major limitation of the current connectors,

“Because the connectors we have, the LCACs, the LCUs, the Joint High Speed Vessel, none of those things will go into an unprotected beach.”

The consequence of that, according to Mullen, is,

“We have to have the ability to have that thing [connectors] bring us in to just outside small arms range and then get off it and swim ashore.”

That’s a major doctrinal statement there.  He’s saying that the Marines do not view the current connectors as survivable in an opposed landing, hence, the Marine’s focus on an armored amphibious vehicle (AAV/ACV/EFV/whatever).  You’ll note that this is somewhat at odds with the emphasis on aviation assault but that’s just one of many contradictory views the Marines currently hold.  If this is true, then the armored amphibious vehicle is the key to the Marine’s future (again, at odds with the aviation emphasis) and makes the decades long dithering over such a vehicle almost incomprehensible.

This statement from Mullen gives us the Marine’s view of an amphibious assault.  Connectors will transport armored amphibious vehicles to a point short of the beach and the vehicles will swim the rest of the way.  What this vision doesn’t allow for is the transport and landing of heavier assets like tanks and artillery, at least in the initial wave.  That makes the initial combat somewhat problematic and, at the very least, requires close co-ordination with Navy and aviation assets for the missing heavier punch.  Unfortunately, given the probable lack of air superiority in a contested landing against a peer, aviation support will probably be sporadic, at best, and naval support is doctrinally non-existent, at the moment.

Referring to connector alternatives, Mullen made sure to emphasize the importance of the traditional amphibious ship,

“Anything we do alternatively can’t replace any of those gray hulled ships.”

That sounds like a scripted Navy-Marine talking point!

Mullen noted that one of the significant differences between the Army and Marines is that the Marines have never used an armored fighting vehicle (AFV) whereas the Army has, in the form of the Bradley.  He gave no impression that a Marine AFV is under consideration and stated that Marines use armored vehicles as transport.  Again, a significant doctrinal point whose wisdom is highly debatable.

The Marines have requested that the LCAC replacement, the Ship to Shore Connector (SSC), be given the ability to launch AAVs or a similar vehicle while at sea rather than having to wait to get to the beach since the SSC is not going to land on a hostile beach.  That makes sense given the previous statements.

Mullen addressed a question about interim AAV upgrades and responded by stating that an upgrade program is in progress but won’t start “turning wrenches” until 2019.  I’m not an expert on combat vehicles but a relatively simple upgrade program requiring 5 years to even begin seems absurd.

The Marine’s plans for the near future seem to be centered on the ACV 1.1/1.2.  He stated that the ACV 1.1 would be purchased in small quantities to experiment with and then the 1.2 version would incorporate the lessons learned and constitute the bulk of the procurement. 

Mullen had this to say about the focus on the ACV over the AAV,

“Frankly, we had such problems with our AAVs in Iraq that we stopped using them outside the gate and we never even took them to Afghanistan.”

Well that’s interesting!



EFV/ACV - Key To The Future?



Mullen noted the relationship between aviation based assault and ground/amphibious assault.  He acknowledged that the aviation assets had only a limited ability to transport vehicles and then only in a permissive environment.  The difficulty in achieving a suitable permissive environment provides the rationale for the continued need for a ground/amphibious capability, according to him.

Addressing the general need for an AAV type vehicle, Mullen stated,

“To us, we see the ability to have an independent deployer that swims ashore without any connector as a service defining capability.”

Mullen addressed the connector issue shortcomings,

“With the route we’re taking, LCUs and LCACs probably aren’t going to be enough.  What else is there out there?  What else can be done?”

So, the Marines apparently recognize a serious shortcoming but are doing little about it beyond a few paper studies and investigations.  With such a significant problem, one can’t help but wonder why the Marines budget and focus is so skewed to the aviation side especially given the previous statement recognizing the vulnerability of aviation transport.

He went on to cite the JHSV with an at-sea ramp capability as an option that the Marines are requesting.  The JHSV would transport vehicles to just outside small arms range and discharge the vehicles into the sea.  Of course, the JHSV is built to purely commercial standards and operating it to just outside small arms range still leaves it squarely in rocket and missile range.  That’s a questionable use of the JHSV.

Of course, one could ask why, if the Marines see the combination of LCAC and LCU as insufficient, are we pursuing a simple replacement of the LCAC and a perhaps somewhat more capable LCU rather than far more capable and robust replacements that would be sufficient?

Responding to a question about the vulnerability of connectors to shore based missiles, Mullen noted that the Marines would operate with the Navy and Air Force who would suppress shore based anti-access (A2) fire.  However, he then went on to say that the Marines see their role as getting a “bubble” of capability ashore to aid in the counter A2 operation.  That’s fine, but there’s a Catch-22 at work:  how do the Marines get ashore to aid in the counter A2 operations if the counter A2 operations haven’t yet succeeded?  - and, if the counter A2 operations have succeeded enough to get the Marines ashore then their assistance in the counter A2 operations isn’t really needed.  He did not acknowledge that logical inconsistency.  He also cited the V-22 as aiding in getting the Marines ashore to help with the counter A2.  Again, he did not address the vulnerability of the V-22 to air defenses in a counter A2 environment.  I’m sorry but the Marines doctrine and concept of operations seems heavily dependent on wishful thinking!

Finally, although this was not his closing statement, it should have been.

“As the fiscal environment gets more constrained, we have to think harder.”

Please, Marines, think a LOT harder than you currently are!!

(1) http://csis.org/event/future-amphibious-connectors-getting-ship-shore, Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Future Amphibious Connectors:  Getting From Ship To Shore”, Brig. Gen. William Mullen, Director, Capabilities Development Directorate, 15-Jul-2014

Amphibious Connectors

An amphibious assault?  We all have the mental image of hulking amphibious ships lurking on the horizon and Marines storming the beach.  But how did the Marines get from the ship to the beach?  Well, a variety of ways, I guess, from the futuristic (though they’re actually getting quite dated!) looking Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) hovercraft to the ubiquitous Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) to helos and now MV-22 Ospreys among other means.  All of these vehicles can be collectively referred to as connectors.  Simply put, the connector is the transport between the ship and shore.

The connector has the potential to be both a potent enabler of the amphibious assault force as well as a  bottleneck and vulnerability.

As an enabler, the connector should be able to transport Marines and their gear quickly, safely, and, ideally, with a little bit of inherent firepower to provide some support at the point of landing.  The Marines should land in good physical shape and intimately integrated with their gear.  In other words, they should be landed in peak physical readiness for battle.

As a weakness, the connector represents a potential bottleneck if there are too few connectors to transport sufficient numbers of Marines and weight of gear in a given time frame.  Marines and gear sitting piled up on ship waiting around for connector transport are a recipe for disaster. 



LCAC



Similarly, the connector represents a possible vulnerability.  Just as naval tacticians recognize that it’s far better to shoot archers than arrows, so too would any enemy recognize that it’s far more efficient to kill loaded connectors rather than deal with landed Marines.  Unfortunately, current connectors are slow and unarmored for practical purposes relative to the modern missile age.

The current connectors are aging rapidly and most are only marginally suited for the modern battlefield.  The AAV has been serving since the early 1970’s.  The AAV’s long anticipated replacement, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is now a dead program with no other replacement in sight.  The LCAC entered service in the mid 1980’s and only 91 were built.  In addition, they’re large, slow (relative to missiles), attractive targets.    MV-22s are great for rapid transport of troops but can’t carry heavy gear.  The CH-53E heavy lift helo entered service in 1981 and airframes are being used up rapidly.  And so on …

All right, so the existing connectors are aging and ill-suited.  Can’t we just design new ones?  Well, therein lies the initial problem and the crux of this discussion.  What basic conceptual design is needed?  Do we need a traditional short range amphibious vehicle or do we need a very long range, way-over-the-horizon vehicle?  Are we doing traditional beachfront assaults or airborne, inland, maneuver warfare assaults? 



Cancelled EFV



The Marines tried to develop the EFV which is a short range beachfront assault vehicle despite the fact that both the Navy and Marines have stated that amphibious ships can’t survive within 50 miles of a defended beach due to the proliferation of shore launched anti-ship missiles.  In fact, for a decade or more, the Marines have embraced behind-the-lines, bypass-the-beach, maneuver warfare doctrine.  That being the case, why have they been fixated on the EFV?  Even now, with the cancellation of the EFV, they seem to be looking for yet another short range, slow, AAV-like replacement, suggesting a continued emphasis on short range beachfront assaults which is at odds with public statements regarding assault distances. 



On the other hand, the Navy is currently building a new class of amphibious ship (LHA-6) that doesn’t even have a well deck!  OK, so that means we’re going to be doing long range airborne assaults, right?  That’s fine except how do you transport M-1 Abrams tanks and all the other Marine combat vehicles and tons of gear and supplies by air?  The MV-22 can carry troops but not much more.  But wait a minute, didn’t the Navy just build an entire class of new LPD-17 class amphibious ships with well decks?  So, I guess we are doing beachfront assaults.

You see the problem?  I don’t think the Navy and Marines currently have a clear consensus on what type of assault operations they want to conduct in the future.  Of course, they could just opt to try and cover all possible scenarios but the cost of that would be staggering.

The Navy and Marines need to agree on how amphibious assaults will be conducted in the future and then start designing new connectors that complement that vision.

On a related note, here are some capacity/range figures for aerial connectors as cited in an NPS thesis (1).

MV-22

5 ton external, 50 nm range

10 ton internal, 100 nm range

CH-53E

18 ton external, 215 nm range

15 ton internal, 230 nm range

(1) Naval Postgraduate School, Thesis:  Cost Benefit and Capability Analysis of Sea-Base Connectors, Justin Dowd, Sep 2009, p. 17-18