The cruiser’s six 8” guns trained and elevated, aimed at an uninhabited
piece of rock rising from the ocean. The
guns paused, ever so briefly, and then roared as a salvo of six 260 lb high
capacity (HC) shells exploded out of the barrels and arced towards the rocky
target some 30,000 yds (17 miles) away. This was just a routine daily function
check but within the next 24 hours it would be real.
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| 8" Guns of the USS Des Moines |
The US and China were at war after China had initiated the
long anticipated ‘reunification’ assault on Taiwan. The two sides were now locked in an ongoing
battle for Taiwan that was eerily reminiscent of Guadalcanal as both sides
sought to reinforce the island. While it
might not be Ironbottom Sound, the waters to the east and west of the island
were littered with the sunken hulks of dozens of naval vessels of both sides.
As part of the invasion, China had seized the large northern
Philippine island of Luzon and established naval and air bases on the northern Philippine
islands, thereby protecting the southern flank of their Taiwan assault.
The US was determined to eliminate the Philippine bases and
sites so as to open the southern flank of the Taiwan invasion to counterattacks. The mission cried out for massive cruise
missile strikes but the US cruise missile inventory had been severely depleted
during the first four weeks of the war.
Though it should have been easily anticipated, it had come as a shock to
the Navy that much of the missile inventory depletion had been the result of
ships being sunk with most of their inventory still aboard and so it was that much
of the Navy’s cruise missile inventory was sitting at the bottom of the ocean
in unexpended VLS cells on sunken ships.
Any available cruise missiles were dedicated to the main Taiwan
defensive effort and, as a result, there were none available for the Philippine
operation.
The Chinese bases in the Philippines were heavily defended
by SAM batteries and aircraft and the few US aircraft attacks had been
failures. As with the cruise missiles,
the bulk of available US aircraft were dedicated to the immediate Taiwan action
and only an occasional raid could be mounted against the Philippine bases. China was managing to rebuild and repair the
bases almost as quickly as the US could inflict minor damage.
With insufficient cruise missiles, and industry being unable
to supply new stocks in any useful time frame, the US decided to attack the
Chinese forces in the Philippines using the old fashioned method of large
caliber naval guns, an option made possible by the recent – and much maligned -
construction program of a small class of 8” gunned cruisers.
A task force of 8” gunned cruisers and Burke escorts was
assigned to approach the Philippines from the southeast while a carrier group provided
an electromagnetic ‘beacon’ to the northeast as a diversion. By working its way up the Philippine islands,
the cruiser task force was hidden, to an extent, in the electromagnetic shadow
of the islands. Along with strict EMCON,
the cruiser group was as well hidden as was possible.
The task force cut across the Philippines south of Leyte,
through the Surigao Strait, then north into the Visayan Sea and then west to
emerge around the southern tip of Mindoro, 150 miles south of Manila where the
Chinese were operating a large logistics and naval base. The group then headed north, hugging the coast
of Mindoro until reaching the small island of Lubang and rounded it on the
eastern side, finally emerging just 60 miles south of Manila.
At this point, the escorting Burkes split off from the
cruisers and proceeded at full speed for Manila, tasked with shooting up the
various port facilities and ships and, most importantly, to act as bait for the
main Chinese naval force tasked with protecting the Taiwan assault’s southern
flank.
About 30 minutes into the Burke’s high speed dash for
Manila, they were finally spotted by a patrolling plane which was approaching Manila
to land after returning from a patrol.
Having finally succeeded in attracting the Chinese attention, one of the
Burkes promptly activated its radar and shot the plane down with a Standard
SM-6. The entire group then began
radiating and shooting any aircraft that appeared, thereby ensuring that the
Chinese would take notice and respond.
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The Chinese task force protecting the Philippines and the
southern Taiwan flank and operating about 300 miles to the northwest of Manila,
was surprised at the reported appearance of a US surface group closing on
Manila. They immediately turned south,
racing to meet the US destroyer group but it would be about two hours before
the Chinese group would be close enough to launch their few anti-ship cruise
missiles. China was suffering from the
same shortage as the US although superior industrial production allowed them to
allocate at least a few cruise missiles to the Philippine portion of the
invasion operation.
Arriving at Manila, the Burkes sailed into Manila Bay. A Chinese Type 052D destroyer (roughly
equivalent to a smaller Burke) was docked, undergoing emergency repairs from
damage received supporting the Taiwan assault.
The Burkes spent about ten minutes concentrating their 5” fire on the
helpless destroyer but had no weapons capable of quickly sinking the ship,
however, their concentrated fire did leave the ship a blazing hulk. Having accomplished that, they quickly
shifted their focus to other targets.
Dozens of merchant ships of various types lined the docks
and piers but, again, lacking heavy torpedoes or large caliber guns, the Burkes
could not do serious damage to them and opted, instead, to concentrate on the shore
facilities. The facilities, being
largely ‘soft’ targets were susceptible to 5” gunfire but the fact that the
Burkes only had a single 5” gun each severely limited the amount of damage they
could do. Nevertheless, the Burkes moved
as close as possible to the shore, shooting targets of opportunity with their
5” guns at near zero range.
As the Chinese task force reached its maximum launch range
of around 250 miles the commander faced a difficult tactical choice: should he shoot his limited supply of
anti-ship cruise missiles first with a good general location of the targets but
no precise targeting or wait until he had precise targeting and risk the US
getting in the first shot?
The commander opted to shoot first, believing that the
missile’s on-board intelligence would find and prioritize the targets. Better, he thought, to get in the first shot,
even if it was less effective than it might be if he waited.
About three dozen of YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles were
quickly launched and began their 20 minute, Mach 0.8 cruise toward the US ships
in Manila.
Having received a near real time launch warning from one of
the few remaining dedicated surveillance satellites, the Burkes used the intervening
fifteen minutes to release floating decoys into the harbor and then, literally,
sailed up against port facilities, physically touching docks and shore
facilities as they waited for the incoming missiles to arrive.
As the attacking missiles reached the target area and began
their Mach 2+ terminal sprint, their electronic brains were confused and
overwhelmed by the many dozens of decoys and ships of all types in their fields
of view. Worse, their IR and
Electro-optical sensors were overwhelmed by the sheer number of heat sources
and large, potentially valid images presented by the burning buildings and port
facilities. The terminal Mach 2+ speed
worked against the missiles by hugely reducing the amount of time the missile’s
onboard processors had to discriminate the intended targets. In the handful of seconds the missiles had to
find a target, only one missile locked on to a Burke (probably just by random
chance). The missiles began impacting on
merchant ships and dock facilities. The
single targeted Burke launched two ESSM defensive missiles, one of which
exploded near enough to deflect the attacking missile into the water.
After launching their anti-ship missiles, the Chinese task
force continued at high speed towards Manila to mop up whatever US destroyers
survived the initial attack. Having
survived the Chinese attack unscathed, the US destroyer group opted to remain
in the harbor rather than emerge to meet the on-coming Chinese task force. This denied the Chinese ships any clear
targeting and forced them to close to visual distance for identification and targeting
for both anti-ship missiles and the Chinese 130mm (5.1”) guns.
As this was happening, the US cruiser group had been
sprinting up from the south at maximum speed.
The Chinese commander, his attention completely focused on the US
destroyers and the battle in front of him, did not detect the cruisers
approaching from his rear. His sensors,
helos, and UAVs were all directed towards the destroyers he believed were now
trapped in Manila harbor. The first
inkling he had of the presence of the US cruisers was the sudden sprouting of
enormous water columns as the initial 8” salvos arrived from about 20 miles
away.
The Chinese group was now caught between the rapidly closing
cruiser group to the south and the island to the north. There was nowhere to run and any attempt to
do so would only grant the US cruisers, with their longer ranged guns, a
sustained range advantage. The Chinese
commander turned toward the cruisers, attempting to close to within gun range
of his ship’s 130 mm guns. Outranged and
having expended all their anti-ship missiles in the failed attack on the
Burkes, the Chinese ships were reduced to firing surface to air missiles in
surface mode until they could close the range.
A few of the missiles got through the ship’s defenses but
the cruiser’s extensive armor and redundant systems mitigated damage to little
more than an annoyance. The cruiser’s
fire control sensors, in particular, were redundant several times over and the
loss of an occasional sensor caused no problem.
The Chinese would get no easy mission kill by disabling the cruiser’s
sensors.
As the opposing groups continued to close, the naval gun
battle that the US Navy (and, to be fair, the rest of the world) believed could
never occur, took place. Each US cruiser
was armed with three dual 8” gun mounts totaling 6 guns per ship. Each cruiser, firing 10 rds per minute per
gun, rained 60 shells per minute on its selected target. Within minutes, 8” hits were carving out huge
chunks from the thin-skinned Chinese destroyers. The Chinese, firing at extreme range,
registered hits but, as was the case with the missiles, the 5” shells did
little significant damage to the heavily armored US ships. In contrast, the Chinese ship’s unarmored 130
mm guns, protected only by thin weather shields, were quickly put out of action
by simple shrapnel and the Chinese ships were rapidly rendered toothless.
The US destroyers, by remaining inside the harbor,
eliminated the possibility of friendly fire concerns and the cruisers were free
to fire at any target they could detect.
This kind of simple battle plan eliminated the otherwise certain
confusion of identification in battle and ensured the cruiser’s maximum
effectiveness.
By the time the cruisers closed to within a few miles, there
was nothing left of the Chinese task force except a few burning, sinking hulks.
With the Chinese task force eliminated, the Burkes rejoined
the cruisers and the task force began its main mission of shelling the various
Chinese bases, weapons, and sensors in the area, to devastating effect.
Using numerous, small cruiser-launched UAVs for
reconnaissance, the task force deliberately trolled for shots from the Chinese
thereby enabling the cruiser’s counter-battery radars to pinpoint any sites
that were previously unknown. The sites,
both artillery and missile, that attempted to fire on the task force were
quickly silenced by the cruiser’s counter-battery capabilities which almost
instantly dropped a rain of 8” shells on the offending sites.
While the cruisers were kept busy methodically eliminating
Chinese sites, the escorting Burke AAW destroyers provided a protective anti-missile
umbrella for the group.
For thirty hours, the group rampaged along the various
coastlines, expending their nearly 1000 shells per cruiser and opening the
southern flank for US forces to counterattack the Taiwan assault.
________________________
Disclaimer: As always (and always ignored!), this is not a true combat simulation. It is simply a more entertaining way to illustrate various points.
- Depletion of cruise missile inventory in the first few weeks of war and the inability to replenish in any useful time frame is a vital aspect of any future war and one that is ignored by the Navy and overlooked by most analysts and yet will have profound impacts on strategy, operations, and tactics. This story attempts to illustrate the issue and provide one consequence and adaptation.
- Missile inventory loss due to sunken ships is another factor that is ignored by the Navy. How many VLS cells should a ship have? Where’s the balance between enough missiles for operations and too many, leading to inventory loss on sinking? WWII ships were generally sunk with most of their shells unexpended in their magazines but the cost of replacement was low and the time required was short so the inventory loss due to sinking was acceptable. Is that the case today?
- In the story, guided gun rounds were ignored which, if they existed, would make the naval guns all that much more effective though at an increased cost. Is guidance worth it? We’ve seen we can’t maintain a sufficient guided missile inventory due to cost so why would we think we can maintain a sufficient guided, large caliber, naval shell production rate? In the story, most rounds were expended against area targets which, again, leads one to question the value of guided rounds. Guided shells specifically for anti-ship use might be warranted although one has to wonder what form of guidance would be practical during ship-to-ship combat?
- The tactics presented in the story are a sharp departure from anything the Navy practices in its set-piece, worthless exercises. We must begin exercising our tactical minds and expanding our tactical thinking. Of course, this requires realistic exercises with free-thinking participants instead of exercises whose sole purpose is checking a box on a pre-deployment workup sheet or validating a pre-determined outcome and conclusion.
