What’s A CNO To Do?

We have become an apologist society.  We excuse and rationalize every failure, often doing so even before the attempt is made.  For example, in past criticisms of CNOs (Chief of Naval Operations), I’ve encountered the apologists who say that the CNO can’t really do anything so I shouldn’t blame them.  ‘The System’ is at fault, not the individual. 
 
Nonsense!
 
From a comment I made a while ago to a reader who was apologizing for a specific CNO’s lack of accomplishments, comes this (note, I won’t identify the reader as I have no wish to embarrass them):
 
 
"is our current system such that even the best qualified CNO will be limited as to how much change they can affect?"
 
My answer … Of course not! A properly motivated and directed (meaning focused on the proper priorities) CNO could turn the Navy around in a heartbeat. Here's a few day one items that could be implemented with no input from Congress or anyone else:
 
1. Eliminate the use of waivers. Period. No exceptions. That, alone, would immensely improve training, safety, new ship completion, ship quality, and readiness by forcing actions to be completed instead of waived.
2. Mandate the elimination of rust on ships.
3. Move sailors from shore billets to sea to fill the at sea gaps.
4. Mandate that dry dock work be COMPLETED prior to leaving dock regardless of the consequences to subsequent scheduling.
5. Eliminate minimal manning and bring crews back up to full strength.
6. Reinstitute onboard maintenance capabilities (machine shops and trade skills).
7. Eliminate most crew comforts.
8. Enforce training standards and demand that individuals and ships fail when warranted.
9. Refuse delivery of incomplete, non-functional ships from industry.
10. Mandate physical fitness standards and separate all non-complying sailors.
11. Set ONE, identical standard of physical fitness for males and females.
12. Eliminate 80% of ship's paperwork and return the focus to combat training.
13. Stop building Fords.
14. End the obsession with unmanned.
15. Eliminate the zero-defect mentality.
16. Reinstitute old fashioned liberty.
 
Day two items that might require some input from others:
 
1. Fire 80% of flag officers
2. End deployments and say no to the Combatant Commadners incessant requests.
3. Obtain legislative regulatory relief or waiver on "non-green" corrosion prevention coatings.
 
I could go on endlessly but you get the idea. All it takes is a Trump-like CNO who has a clear, combat-focused mentality and has the courage to act.
 

Leadership and the CNO

Everyone thinks they’re an interior decorator and you see the results almost every time you visit someone’s home.  They’re generally pretty poorly decorated.
 
Similarly, everyone thinks they’re a leader or know what makes a good leader … but they aren’t and don’t.
 
Breaking Defense has an article on the Navy’s vacancy at the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) position which attempts to point out the problems with a vacancy for CNO.[1]  Consider the following statement
 

“It’s not good,” Wills [Steven Wills, naval historian and associate at the Center for Maritime Strategy] said flatly, “to be operating without a CNO.”[1]

Think about that for a moment.  How has having a CNO worked out for the Navy these last several decades?  The Navy’s CNOs have guided the Navy straight into the toilet.  I’m not going to bother listing all the problems.  You read this blog so you know what they are.  If that’s what having a CNO gets us, maybe we’re better off without a CNO?
 
We have an acting CNO, Adm. James Kilby, Vice CNO.
 
Wouldn’t that be a great opportunity for Kilby to give us an on-the-job audition?  After all, he was/is the VCNO so he should be more than capable of stepping in and showing outstanding leadership, right?  Here’s what Breaking Defense and Mr. Wills think,
 

But even with Kilby in place, Wills and others said major strategic or programmatic decisions will likely be postponed with no empowered, confirmed CNO to back them up.[1]

Why would decisions need to be postponed?  If they’re good decisions, they should be implemented immediately and decisively.  Why hesitate?  If they’re not good decisions then you shouldn’t be in the position.
 
Take bold, decisive action until someone stops you.  Don’t cower in fear that someone might disagree.  Don’t wait for approval from above.  You’re the highest ranking Naval officer there is.  Act like it.
 
Here’s yet another person who doesn’t understand what leadership is.
 

Even the best acting leaders are reluctant to make tough calls on hard issues,” Erik Raven, former under secretary of the Navy, told Breaking Defense.[1]

If you’re reluctant to make tough calls then you shouldn’t be in that position.  Step aside and let someone else take over the acting CNO job.
 
Congress doesn’t understand leadership or how bad the Navy’s CNOs have been, either.
 

Sen. Tim Kaine, the top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services seapower subcommittee, told Breaking Defense he was “nervous” about the lack of a CNO.[1]

Nervous about the lack of a CNO????  Given their record, I’d be more nervous about having a CNO!  Heck, paralysis would be better than the incompetence we’ve seen from our CNOs.
 
Here’s a few sentences that should tell us everything we need to know about Navy leadership and officer ranks.
 

To cope with the strain of doing two jobs at once, the acting service chief must delegate tasks to subordinate officers, who then do the same as they become overburdened with new responsibilities. Those officers also become reluctant to act when asked to make decisions that are historically above their paygrade.[1]

Isn’t the entire idea of the Navy (or any military combat structure) that you’re always ready to step into the next highest job, at a moment’s notice?  Sure, you may lack experience and maybe you’ll make a mistake but hesitation shouldn’t be one of your problems.  If you’re a professional warrior, you’ve been studying naval warfare your entire career.  You should know what needs to be done.  If not, you’re a failure and in the wrong line of work.
 
There’s nothing magic about being CNO … as our string of abject failures confirm.  CNOs have no special knowledge or capabilities.  They’re just the guys who played politics better than the rest.
 
Consider this damning statement,
 

“When Adm. Franchetti was the vice chief, and acting as CNO, she was hesitant to roll out a plan for the Navy under her term of leadership,” Wills added.[1]

Shouldn’t that have told us what kind of CNO she’d be?  ComNavOps predicted her pathetic failure almost on day one because ComNavOps understands what leadership is and can recognize the glaring lack of leadership qualities in others.
 
Where’s the next Halsey?  Where’s Nimitz?  Where’s Willis ‘Ching’ Lee?  Instead, we get Franchetti and Kilby.
 
I’m not worried about the absence of a CNO;  I’m worried about having a CNO … another stinking, steaming pile of CNO since no one around the Navy seems to understand what real leadership is.
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “What a historic absence of its top officer means for the Navy”, y   Justin Katz and Valerie Insinna, 23-May-2025,
http://breakingdefense.com/2025/05/what-a-historic-absence-of-its-top-officer-means-for-the-navy/

The New CNO’s To-Do List

Here’s a to-do list for the new CNO, Adm. Lisa Franchetti.  I’ve broken it into two lists:  the ideal list that she ought to do but, realistically, wouldn’t even consider and the more realistic list of limited, but useful, items.
 
 
Ideal List 

• Eliminate NavSea.  They’re not performing their function and appear to be staffed by total incompetents.
• Reconstitute the General Board and BuShips.
• Terminate the Navy’s involvement with, and purchase of, the F-35 and accelerate the next generation fighter.
• Refocus the carrier role on long range air superiority instead of strike.
• Eliminate the demon-spawned concept of ‘strike-fighter’ and return to separate, optimized aircraft for each role.
• Retire the entire LCS class and eliminate that black hole of operating costs for a vessel with very little combat capability.
• Eliminate deployments, institute home-porting and missions.
• Cut 80% of Flag positions
• End the Ford class debacle (cost and performance) and return to conventional Kitty Hawk type carriers.

  
Realistic List 

• Stop issuing ship trial waivers.  All ship trial waivers must be personally approved by the CNO.  Simply stop doing that.  Make every ship meet all its trial requirements.
• Forbid the use of waivers, in general
• Stop all early retirements of ships (except the LCS!).
• Reinstitute scheduled maintenance and do not deviate from it.
• Abandon any form of reduced manning.
• Eliminate 10% of the Navy’s shore personnel jobs and transfer the people to sea billets.

Navy SUPSHIP and Waivers

Congress has recently been exercising their mandated oversight responsibilities over the military.  This is all for the good and I commend them, as a group, while noting that they should be much more vigorous, rigorous, and punitive in their actions.  Still, it’s an improvement. 

 

Congress requested that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) review the Navy’s Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP) organization which functions under NAVSEA (which I have previously stated should be eliminated as a completely worthless organization).  To that end, GAO has released a report examining the role of SUPSHIP.  As the report notes, SUPSHIP

 

… serve as the Navy’s on-site technical, contractual, and business authority for the construction of Navy vessels at major private shipyards.[1]

 

These are the people who should be ensuring that ships are built properly and to specification.  The reality, however, is that ships are routinely delivered significantly incomplete, non-functional, and, in some cases, damaged.  Clearly, SUPSHIP is failing and failing badly.  For example, GAO

 

… found in 2018 that the lead ships for six Navy programs experienced delays in providing the ships to the fleet, ranging from 6 months to 6 years, and cost growth as high as 154 percent.[1]

 

As the report states,

 

Collectively, these results have raised questions about the Navy’s ability to effectively oversee shipbuilder performance throughout the construction of new ships.[1]

 

GAO was commissioned to find out why.

 

Think about the concept embodied in SUPSHIP. 

 

While prime contractors are responsible for controlling the quality of their work, the Navy relies on the SUPSHIPs, as the government’s primary on-site representatives, to perform quality assurance oversight during ship construction at private shipyards.[1]

 

These are supposed experts in ship construction and they are emplaced in the shipyards that the Navy contracts with.  They see the ships being built on a daily basis.  There should be no surprises, no quality issues, no incomplete ships, and no construction failures  …  and yet there are.  In fact, failure is the norm.  How can that be?  Well, peruse the following quotes from the report that point at various SUPSHIP issues. 

 

Note, in the following quotes, ‘we’ refers to GAO.

 

… we found in 2013 that, while the number of significant deficiencies generally had dropped, the Navy continued to accept the delivery of ships with open deficiencies that lingered after ship delivery.

 

We recommended in 2013, among other things, that the Navy clarify in its policy when contractor-responsible deficiencies should be fully corrected during the acquisition process for shipbuilding programs and ensure the policy is followed. In response, DOD indicated that it would monitor whether additional guidance was necessary but took no further action to implement our recommendation. [emphasis added]

 

In July 2017, we found that problems with quality, completeness, and reliability persisted when ships were turned over to the Navy’s fleet.  Although a certain number of deficiencies can be expected for something as complex as a Navy ship, we found that the Navy’s routine acceptance of ships with significant unresolved deficiencies and reliability problems consumed limited resources, diminished ship performance, and added to sailors’ workloads.

 

… we recommended that the Secretary of the Navy revise the service’s ship delivery policy to clarify what types of Supervisors of Shipbuilding deficiencies need to be corrected and what mission capability must be achieved at acceptance of ship delivery from the shipbuilder and when the ship is provided to the fleet. DOD did not agree with this 2017 recommendation and has yet to take action to implement it. [emphasis added]

 

We found that the Navy infrequently uses specific quality incentives in contracts, and that, when used, they have minimal effect on the SUPSHIPs’ quality assurance activities …

 

… SUPSHIPs traditionally perform limited or no on-site quality assurance of the ship systems and components developed and produced away from the shipyards.

 

… for key complex systems that must be integrated into the ships, the SUPSHIPs’ lack of involvement prior to the [Government Furnished Equipment’s] arrival at the shipyard reduces opportunities to leverage their expertise to address known problems.

 

We found that the Navy largely limits the SUPSHIPs’ involvement in key decision-making activities for shipbuilding programs prior to contract awards.

 

 

 

Waivers

 

As regular readers know, ComNavOps is death on waivers, believing they are unjustified, regardless of circumstances, during peacetime.  Indeed, the report repeatedly addresses the use of waivers as a detriment to successful ship construction and delivery as evidenced by the following quotes.

 

Prior to the [Ford] acceptance trials, the CNO also approved a waiver for the advanced arresting gear that excluded the system from inspection during the trials.

 

We found that five of 12 case study ships used deficiency waivers approved by the CNO—50 waivers in total—to proceed with acceptance trials.  Additionally, the Navy’s subsequent acceptance of ship deliveries for five of the ships was supported by 59 waivers for starred card deficiencies identified by INSURV during the trials.

 

… we found that the Navy has received standing waivers for some deficiencies with Virginia class submarines that will never meet Navy specifications or cannot be completed prior to acceptance trials due to time restrictions.

 

… waiving incomplete or deficient equipment through trials and delivery reduces the SUPSHIPs’ ability to hold the shipbuilder accountable for timely correction of deficiencies by allowing shipbuilders to deliver ships that have yet to meet requirements.

 

The Navy’s use of waivers and the corresponding limits to the SUPSHIPs’ shareable knowledge of the condition of waived systems also have the potential to mask construction problems with longer-term quality and performance consequences.

 

 

 

 

Here’s a table showing a couple examples of the use of waivers in Acceptance Trials and Delivery (table adapted from report [1]).

 

	Acceptance Trial Waivers	Delivery Waivers
CVN-78	15	36
DDG-1001	29	18

 

 

Waivers are tossed around like confetti.  Is it any wonder that ships are delivered incomplete, non-functional, and damaged?  All waivers must be personally approved by the CNO.  That makes this entire mess solely and personally his fault.  Congress needs to immediately fire SecNav and CNO.  Of course, if either had an ounce of integrity, they’d resign in shame.

 

NAVSEA and SUPSHIP need to be eliminated since neither perform an effective, useful function.

 

 

 

_______________________________________

 

[1]Government Accountability Office, “Navy Shipbuilding, Increasing Supervisors of Shipbuilding Responsibility Could Help Improve Program Outcomes”, April 2022

CNO Gilday Remembers The LCS

Let’s be honest, after many years of enjoyable LCS-bashing, we’ve kind of forgotten about them, haven’t we?  They can’t do anything.  The Navy has pretty much given up boasting about their single-handed, war-winning capabilities.  They don’t deploy.  They have no useful modules.  Four have already been designated for very early retirement in an admission of uselessness by the Navy.  The rest just sit pier-side and pass time waiting for their own early retirements.  We’ve moved on to other, more relevant issues.

Well, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Gilday seems to have suddenly remembered the LCS and wants to see them deployed a few more times.  Of course, what they would usefully do on deployment, he didn’t say and I can’t imagine but at least it might give the crew some sea time.

We’ve known the LCS has had major reliability and maintenance problems, all along, despite the Navy’s constant glowing affirmations about the miracle of the LCS maintenance model – you know, the model that involves no at sea maintenance and requires excessively costly dock side maintenance every couple of weeks.  Well, CNO Gilday now acknowledges the problems.

We know enough about that platform [ed. the LCS] and the problems that we have that plague us with regard to reliability and sustainability, and I need them resolved.” (1)

LCS reliability problems have impacted deployments with some stunning failures and the specter of systemic propulsion problems looms large for future deployments.

“The propulsion architecture’s unreliability means you are going to have to come up with a different way to deploy the ship that doesn’t require every deployment to be transoceanic,” Clark [Bryan Clark, a retired submarine officer and senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.] said. “By the time the ship gets to Singapore, it needs a lot of work done to it and your deployment time is cut down by the fact that you have to repair the ship once it arrives. (1)

What does this systemic inability to transit tell us about the Navy’s fantasy vision of distributed lethality operations deep inside enemy waters?  It tells us that it’s pure fantasy.  If we can’t even transit from one port to the next, how can the LCS operate for extended periods in combat?  Oh wait, we can’t because even if we can get to the operating area without breaking down, we have to return to port every two weeks for dock side maintenance.  Seriously, who came up with this maintenance model and then what genius ignored the model and decided it made the LCS ideal for distributed lethality?

Reliability and maintenance aside, there’s also the matter of the non-existent modules.  The only module that exists in any semi-functional form is the anti-surface warfare (ASuW) module and it’s only semi-functional because the original specifications and requirements have been downgraded so completely.  The anti-submarine (ASW) and mine countermeasure (MCM) modules have been in development for decades and show no signs of being ready in our lifetimes.

CNO Gilday acknowledges the modules failures.

“I have to deliver ... both the mine and ASW modules.” (1)

Good luck, CNO!  You’re running out of time.  Four of the ships are being immediately retired, never having seen a module, and the rest are rapidly running through their lifespans, again without any functional modules.  We’re going to see more LCS retiring without ever having carried a useful, functional module.  That’s just embarrassing.

Just Park It Off To The Side Somewhere 

And We'll Dispose Of It When We Get Some Time

Without modules, the LCS is barely a Coast Guard cutter.  Gilday acknowledges this,

The Navy deployed the LCS Detroit to South America — the 4th Fleet area of operations — last year on a counternarcotics mission, and it returned earlier this month. Those are the kinds of missions for which the LCS is perfectly suited, Gilday said.

“I can deploy these things with a [law enforcement detachment] and a signals intelligence capability, and I can do that on LCS with carry-on gear,” Gilday said. “It’s the right kind of platform for that. (1)

So, CNO Gilday acknowledges that the Navy built a supposed warship whose only suitable purpose is low end, Coast Guard type missions.  Nicely done, Navy.

One of the major problems for the LCS is that it no longer offers anything unique.  For example, the new frigate will offer superior ASW capability – that actually works when the ship is delivered, one hopes!  That said, why would the Navy continue to pour money into the LCS and ASW module when the LCS is only marginally deployable and will begin retiring soon?  It is not hard to foresee the Navy deciding to suspend LCS ASW funding. 

Similarly, the LCS ASuW module offers nothing that the new frigate doesn’t offer ten times over.

The LCS MCM capability would be useful since there is no alternative but it’s still years away and, again, the ships are going to begin retiring before the modules start showing up!

Gilday sums his LCS objective up, thusly,

“LCS for me is something, on my watch, I’ve got to get right.” (1)

Seriously, the opportunity for the LCS to ‘get right’ was before the program started, when it was still a concept.  That was the time to develop a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and understand what you would and would not get from such a ship.  The opportunity for the LCS to ‘get right’ was before you committed to using non-existent technology.  The opportunity for the LCS to ‘get right’ was before you conceived an idiotic no-maintenance-at-sea concept.

I’m sorry, CNO Gilday but the opportunity for the LCS to ‘get right’ ended on day one of the program when the Navy committed to 55 ships with no CONOPS, non-existent technology, and an idiotic maintenance plan.  There’s nothing left to ‘get right’.  The best thing that can be done, at this point, is to stop kidding yourself that this class has anything to offer, retire the entire class, and move on to more pressing matters.  Stop pouring money into an acquisition money pit and acknowledge what all the rest of us could see from day one – that the program was an ill-conceived, dismal failure – and take your lumps and move on. 

_________________________________

(1)Defense News website, “US Navy prepares major surge of littoral combat ship deployments”, David B. Larter, 1-Aug-2020,

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/07/31/the-us-navy-is-preparing-a-major-surge-of-lcs-deployments/

New CNO Approved

Adm. Bill Moran has been confirmed by the Senate as the next Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).  Here’s a bit of background.

He assumed duties as the Navy’s 57th chief of naval personnel, Aug. 2, 2013. Serving concurrently as the deputy chief of naval operations (Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education) (N1), he is responsible for the planning and programming of all manpower, personnel, training and education resources for the U.S. Navy. …  His responsibilities include overseeing Navy Recruiting Command, Navy Personnel Command, and Naval Education and Training Command. (2)

Here’s some bio information per the official Navy website.

As a flag officer, he has served as commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Group; director, Air Warfare (N98) on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations; and most recently as the 57th chief of naval personnel.

His operational tours spanned both coasts, commanding Patrol Squadron (VP) 46 and Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 2. He served as an instructor pilot in two tours with VP-30 and as a staff member for Commander, Carrier Group 6 aboard USS Forrestal (CVA 59).

Ashore, he served as executive assistant to the chief of naval operations; executive assistant to Commander, U.S. Pacific Command; deputy director, Navy staff; and assistant Washington placement officer and assistant flag officer detailer in the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

Moran assumed duties as the Navy’s 39th vice chief of naval operations, May 31, 2016. (1)

Patrol squadron, staff, personnel, executive assistant, recruiting, education, placement officer, detailer …  What about this resume screams warrior?  Where’s the strategic and tactical expertise?  Where’s the hands on command of ships, carriers, and combat aircraft? 

He sounds like a staff guy with a heavy emphasis in personnel organizations.

Now, I don’t, for a moment believe that the only way a coach can be good is if he was a former player – but it’s gotta help! – and I don’t believe that a good CNO must have been a fighter pilot or ship commander – but it’s gotta help!  The thing is, out of the entire Navy, is this the best we could come up with?  What about him jumps out to make someone say this is the guy to be CNO of a warfighting organization?  This is the guy to lead a combat organization?  I’m not seeing it.

We couldn’t find a warrior?

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(1)https://www.navy.mil/navydata/bios/navybio.asp?bioID=483

(2)https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS02/20140325/101943/HHRG-113-AS02-Bio-MoranW-20140325.pdf

CNO Richardson Incriminates Himself

CNO Richardson just issued the most self-incriminating statement imaginable.  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) just issued a report on the submarine maintenance problems. (1)

… a recent Government Accountability Office report that found the Navy has lost more than $1.5 billion and thousands of operational days over the past decade due to attack submarines caught in maintenance delays or sitting idle while awaiting an availability. (1)

Soak up those numbers … $1.5 BILLION and THOUSANDS of operational days lost !!!!!!!!!!!

Did you catch how long it’s been going on?  - From the quote, ‘over the past decade’.

CNO Richardson’s reaction?

Richardson, in a media call on Thursday during his Thanksgiving visit to USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75), told USNI News that he found “no surprises in that report. Every bit of information in that is information we’re very, very aware of. (1)

So, CNO Richardson, you have a massive, massive problem facing the fleet, you weren’t surprised by any of it, and you’ve been “very, very aware” of it?  So what in the hell have you been doing about it besides sitting on your ass?  Talk about dereliction of duty!  This is incompetence on a massive scale.

CNO Richardson’s statement is about as self-incriminating an indictment of his incompetence as is possible to imagine.

What does the GAO have to say about the Navy’s pathetic efforts?

The Navy has started to address challenges related to workforce shortages and facilities needs at the public shipyards. However, it has not effectively allocated maintenance periods among public shipyards and private shipyards that may also be available to help minimize attack submarine idle time.

So, even after a decade or more, the Navy’s effort at a solution is feeble and ineffective.

Why does CNO Richardson still have a job?

______________________________________

(1)USNI News website, “CNO: ‘No Surprises’ in GAO Report on Submarine Readiness Challenges”, Megan Eckstein, 26-Nov-2018,

https://news.usni.org/2018/11/26/cno-richardson-no-surprises-gao-report-highlighting-attack-sub-readiness-challenges

CNO Richardson Must Be Fired

Since the report came out about the lapsed certifications among the deployed 7^th Fleet ships and crew, I’ve been trying to find out more about the mechanism by which this state of affairs was sanctioned.  The mechanism was the “risk assessment and management plan” (RAMP).  Apparently, RAMP was used to directly and consciously bypass mandatory Navy training and certifications.  Among 7^th Fleet deployed destroyers and cruisers, around 40% of crew certifications in damage control, navigation, flight operations, and basic seamanship had lapsed (1)

Despite my efforts, I’ve been unable to find any mention of RAMP as an official Navy program.  It appears that it may have been a locally (local to the 7^th Fleet) devised and implemented program that lacked official Navy sanction.  Whether it was universally know throughout upper Navy leadership and unofficially sanctioned is unknown.

The conclusion from this is obvious.  The program has led to disasters, deaths, and horribly damaged ships.  Someone must be held responsible and pay the price and, indeed, VAdm. Joseph Aucoin, commander of the 7^th Fleet, has been relieved.  Of course, the firing may have been largely symbolic since he was due to retire in a few weeks, anyway.

There is another person who must pay the price and that is current CNO Richardson.  

If he did not know about an unsanctioned program intended to bypass mandatory Navy readiness certifications for an entire major fleet then he should be fired for incompetence and obliviousness.  

If he knew about the program then he should be fired for violating the trust of the country, the Navy, and the sailors serving under him and hazarding the military preparedness and security of the country.  

Either way, he has to go.

Get used to it.  You’re going to hear me continue to harp on this.  CNO Richardson is the Captain of the Navy and the Captain is accountable for everything that happens on his ship – his ship being the entire Navy.  I have lost confidence in his ability to command.

Richardson has allowed, and may have actively aided and abetted, the readiness and basic seamanship of the Navy to fall to dangerously low levels.  If our Navy is no longer capable of basic navigation, anchoring, and other acts of basic seamanship, how are we going to fight a war?  If we no longer have a grasp of basic seamanship, what are the odds that we’re tactically trained and proficient?  Through actions and inactions he has endangered the security of the country.  That’s tantamount to treason.  Further, he is directly responsible for the deaths of sailors and hundreds of millions of dollars of damage to US military assets.  He should be court-martialed and punished severely.

Let’s be fair.  This didn’t all happen on Richardson’s watch.  His predecessor, Adm. Greenert is at least equally culpable.  He should be recalled to active duty and court-martialed. 

A Chinese or Russian mole agent could not do more damage to the Navy and our nation’s security than our own Navy leadership is doing.

____________________________________________

(1)Defense News website, “US Navy worked around its own standards to keep ships underway: sources”, David B. Larter, 7-Sep-2017,

https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2017/09/07/us-navy-worked-around-its-own-standards-to-keep-ships-underway-sources/

CNO Richardson Disappoints

Long time readers know that ComNavOps was not a fan of recently retired CNO Greenert.  In fact, it’s fair to say that ComNavOps viewed him as the worst CNO in a long, long time.  Thus, it was with cautious optimism that ComNavOps greeted incoming CNO Richardson.  The optimism had less to do with any knowledge of Richardson’s accomplishments or abilities and more to do with the belief that a tree stump would do a better job leading the Navy and Richardson could only be an improvement, no matter how bad he might be.

Alas, those giddy, hopeful days have slowly given way to disbelief – disbelief that anyone else could rival Greenert’s incompetence and yet we seem to have a contender in the making. 

Consider all the problems facing the Navy and all the issues that the CNO could have chosen to take on and fix.  I won’t even list the problems.  You know the litany as well as I do.  So, what has CNO Richardson chosen to focus on?

His latest focus and apparent best use of his time is to ban the acronym “A2/AD” (anti-access/area denial). 

“We’re going to scale down the mention of A2AD,” Adm. John Richardson said Monday, referring to the acronym for anti-access area denial, a warfighting approach with, he said, a variety of definitions. 

“It’s a term bandied about pretty freely and lacks the precise definition it probably would benefit from, and that ambiguity sends a variety of signals,” Richardson said. “Specifics matter.” (1)

The term does not have a variety of definitions.  In fact, as military acronyms go, it’s one of the most specific and well understood ones!  Richardson may not understand it but the rest of us do.  Recognize, though, that my complaint and derision stem not from the fact that he’s banned the acronym but that he considers that to be a priority issue over all the other challenges the Navy faces.  Is this the best use of his time?

What else has he accomplished in his short tenure?  Well, he appears to have prioritized the long standing system of Navy ratings as more important than warfighting, training, maintenance, etc.   His solution to the non-existent problem is to eliminate the time honored and specific rating system in favor of a generic rank label (2).  I’m not going to debate the merits of this but, rather, point out that if this is the best use of the CNO’s time and the most pressing issue he believes he faces then we truly have a contender for Greenert’s position of worst CNO in recent history.

Richardson also seems to have inherited his predecessor’s naïve views regarding China.  He has met with his Chinese counterpart five times already and, apparently, sees a rosy future in our relations with China.

“Despite rising tensions in the South China Sea, the US Navy’s top admiral says his Chinese counterparts “by and large” behave professionally, not provocatively, when the two nations meet at sea. And precisely because of those ensions, Adm. John Richardson said, it’s all the more important to emphasize cooperating with China, not confronting it.”

How’s that cooperation working out, there, Adm. Richardson?  We’ve ceded the entire South China Sea, gotten nothing in return, and are now watching the Chinese preparing to expand their territory still further, including annexing the disputed Scarborough Shoal which is also claimed by the Philippines.

“In March, U.S. Navy chief Admiral John Richardson said the United States had observed “survey type activity” around Scarborough that could be a precursor to reclamation. A month later, South China Morning Post added fuel to the fire by citing an anonymous source “close to the PLA Navy” as saying that China would carry out reclamation work at Scarborough “within this year.” (3)

Again, the point is not whether China ultimately will or will not seize the reef (they will) but, instead, the complete absence of a grasp on reality being demonstrated by Richardson.  China has already proven that they will use any means, including illegal acts, to further their expansionist agenda.  Richardson’s attempts at appeasement paint a picture of a man with no grasp of geopolitical or strategic reality or, indeed, any remembrance of very recent Chinese actions.

In addition to what Richardson has done (and disappointed in the doing) consider what he hasn't done.  He hasn't killed the LCS, he hasn't killed the Ford class, he hasn't laid out a solid F-35 CONOPS and acquisition strategy, he hasn't developed a viable amphibious assault doctrine in conjunction with the Marines, he hasn't prioritized warfighting, maintenance, training, and tactics.

Whether you look at what he's done or what he hasn't done, it's all the same: disappointing.

My cautious, feeble hopes for Richardson are gone.  The only hope I have left is that he proves to be only the second worst CNO I’ve seen rather than supplanting Greenert as the absolute worst.

______________________________

(1)Defense News website, “CNO Bans ‘A2/AD’ As Jargon”, Christopher P. Cavas, 3-Oct-2016,

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/cno-bans-a2ad-as-jargon

(2)USNI News website, “Navy Eliminating 241-Year-Old Rating System in New Enlisted Rank Overhaul”, Sam LaGrone, 29-Sep-2016,

https://news.usni.org/2016/09/29/navy-eliminating-241-year-old-rating-system-new-enlisted-rank-overhaul

(3)The Diplomat website, “China Building on Scarborough Shoal? Don't Hold Your Breath.”, Shannon Tiezzi, 9-Sep-2016,

http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/china-building-on-scarborough-shoal-dont-hold-your-breath/

Well, That Didn't Take Long

Well, that didn’t take long. 

“Retired Adm. Jon Greenert, a former chief of naval operations, has been named to the board of directors of BAE Systems Inc, the company announced this morning.” (1)

We’ve decried the practice of recently retired Admirals taking positions in the very defense industry companies that they previously had a business relationship with.  Now, we learn that recently retired CNO Greenert has taken a position on the board of directors of BAE Systems, Inc.  This stinks of kickback and impropriety.  While it’s possible that there is no quid pro quo at work here, the conflict of interest and the appearance of cooperation having been bought is impossible to ignore.  In these kinds of cases, the appearance of impropriety is as damning as the reality.  It calls into serious question every decision Greenert and the Navy, at his direction, made regarding BAE Systems during his tenure.

Regular readers know my opinion of CNO Greenert was about as low as it could get and this merely solidifies that opinion.

This practice has got to stop.

______________________

(1)Defense News website, “Former CNO Greenert Named To BAE Board”, Christopher Cavas, 19-Apr-2016,

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense-news/2016/04/19/greenert-cno-bae-navy-chief-naval-operations/83224862/

CNO's Design

The old CNO, Adm. Greenert, has left and the new CNO, Adm. John Richardson, has taken over.  Regular readers know that ComNavOps has been highly critical of Greenert, considering him to be one of the worst CNOs ever.  Will Adm. Richardson be an improvement?  Time will tell.  Let’s take a look at his first formal effort, his vision for the Navy as laid out in his “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority” document (1).

The document begins by identifying three global forces that he claims are impacting the environment in which the Navy must operate.  They are,

• Maritime traffic
• The global information system
• Technology

There’s nothing wrong with that list and certainly they do impact the global security environment but the list omits a couple of key forces that have a greater impact.

Competition for Resources – the competition for resources is increasing and since the world’s land masses are essentially 100% claimed, new resources can only be obtained by taking them from someone else.  China, for example, is seizing the South and East China Seas and working to subjugate surrounding countries in large measure to obtain more resources.  Russia is working to secure more resources from surrounding countries and the Middle East.

Evil – Evil is a palpable human force and is on the rise as evidenced by ISIS, Russia, China, Iran, and NKorea.  Evil does not behave as we do, does not honor agreements, does not respect boundaries, and does not hesitate to engage in barbaric acts.  Left unchecked, evil expands – always.  To paraphrase, all that is needed for evil to succeed is for good men to do nothing.

So, the document stumbles right out of the gate by failing to recognize a couple of the major forces at play which are shaping the global environment and should be shaping our response.

Moving on, the document then proceeds to explicitly name our potential enemies:  Russia, China, Iran, and NKorea.  Interestingly, Islamic Jihadism is not named.  Well, this is a vast improvement over CNO Greenert who refused to name China as even a competitor let alone an enemy and refused to discuss incidents out of fear of escalating tensions.  At least now we’ve mustered the courage to speak our enemy’s names (excepting Islamic Jihad). 

Next, CNO discusses “Lines of Effort” through which the Navy will meet its requirements.

• Strengthen naval power
• High velocity learning
• Teamwork and leadership
• Partnerships

Strengthening naval power comes close to the mark but the discussion gets bogged down in information warfare rather than recognizing that, ultimately, it’s about explosive power and numbers.  Warfare has not fundamentally changed throughout history and failing to recognize that cannot lead anywhere good.

The other three “Lines” are just buzzword bingo.  High velocity learning - seriously?  All in all, a very poor effort at “Lines of Effort”.

In summary, this is a better effort than his predecessor’s but still weak.  CNO Richardson is not off to a strong start.  We’ll keep watching and hope for better.

(1)http://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/CNO_STG.pdf

Burke Upgrades Cancelled

The Navy has cancelled planned ballistic missile defense (BMD) upgrades for five Burke class destroyers due to budget constraints (1).  The ships will not receive the Baseline 9 Aegis combat system upgrades.  The cuts in modernization funding will save around $500M over five years.

The cuts also impact the ship's networking and target data sharing capabilities.

"Additionally — without the Baseline 9 upgrade — the ships will not be wired into the Navy’s emerging Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA (pronounced: nifk-kah)) that would allow destroyers to download targeting information from assets outside of the range of their SPY-1D radars to attack air and BMD threats with the Raytheon Standard Missile 6 (SM-6)."

Well, that’s very unfortunate that we can’t afford those upgrades but as CNO Greenert said,

"When asked about the reductions following a House appropriations hearing on Thursday, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Jonathan Greenert told USNI News the cuts were a result of hard fiscal choices and reflected the service’s priorities."

Well, CNO Greenert is right.  When you have a limited budget, you have to make hard choices based on your priorities and …  wait … let me go back to that cost number …  $500M ?!! … to get 5 BMD and network capable Burkes? … $500M – isn’t that the cost of a single LCS?  So, CNO Greenert is telling us that the Navy’s priorities are that they would rather have an LCS than five BMD/network capable Burkes?  Does that make sense to you?!  I’ve said all along that Greenert is completely focused on low end and peacetime activities at the expense of warfighting and readiness and this just proves it.

I recently posted that, for reasons totally obscure to me, the Navy considers the LCS untouchable and this yet another example.  The Navy would rather pass on five BMD/network capable Burkes than give up one LCS. 

However, according to the article,

"Currently, the Navy’s number one priority is the $100 billion design and construction effort for a new nuclear ballistic missile submarine to replace the aging Ohio-class boomers (SSB)."

I'm not sure if the Navy's internal top priority really is the replacement SSBN.  As I’ve pointed out, the LCS looks to be the Navy’s top priority.  Still, it demonstrates the domino effect that occurs when a program, the SSBN replacement, in this case, is so expensive that it not only limits itself but cripples other programs.  The F-35, for example, is gutting the Marines and Air Force by forcing those services to cancel other badly needed programs to pay for the F-35.  Similarly, the SSBN has long been predicted to gut Navy shipbuilding, operating, and maintenance funding and now we're seeing the first concrete results.

We’ll continue to watch the SSBN funding play out but I predict that we’re going to see many more examples of early retirements, deferred maintenance, cancelled upgrades, and truncated shipbuilding to pay for the SSBN unless the Navy can get the funding shifted to a higher DoD level (of course, that just means that every service will have its budget cut a bit more to pay for the SSBN – there are no free lunches).  This is further evidence that the Navy’s 30 year shipbuilding plan is pure fantasy.  Many future ships will have to be cancelled to pay for the SSBN.

Seriously, how do you defend prioritizing the LCS over five Burke BMD/network upgrades?  Every time I think the Navy has hit rock bottom in decision making they dig a trench and lower the bar a bit more.

(1) USNI, "Navy Again Reduces Scope of Destroyer Modernization, 5 Ships Won’t Receive Any Ballistic Missile Defense Upgrades", Sam LaGrone, 3-Mar-2015,

http://news.usni.org/2015/03/03/navy-again-reduces-scope-of-destroyer-modernization-5-ships-wont-receive-any-ballistic-missile-defense-upgrades

CNO's 2014 Position Report

CNO Greenert has issued his latest Position Report (1).  If you’re interested in reading it you can follow the link below.  I’m not going to critique it.  It’s largely a work of fiction and spin combined with a handful of trivial facts – not worth ComNavOps’ time to write about.  I simply offer the link as a courtesy to readers.

(1) http://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/141104_positionreport.pdf

CNO's Focus on Peace

CNO Greenert is a prolific writer and speaker.  Unfortunately, he is also a prolific purveyor of pacifistic policies (a little alliteration, there).

Greenert has authored another of his frequent Proceedings articles (1).  This one espouses the global networked navy, a variation of the 1000-ship Navy idea.  He describes a loose network of navies that form a global force for good (couldn’t resist that one) and whose individual members come and go as their individual national interests presumably come and go relative to specific issues.

Aside from the obvious problem of trying to count on network members who may or may not participate depending on what the issue of the moment is, the main problem is that this concept is dependent on a group of navies that are, frankly, not very capable.  While this may be fine for dealing with pirates or providing humanitarian assistance on a small scale, it fails utterly when it comes to actual combat against  even a moderately capable enemy. 

This focus by CNO Greenert illustrates his main failing.  He is a peacetime, peaceful activity oriented leader.  We've previously discussed his failure to follow his own tenets (see, "CNO's Tenets - Walking or Just Talking?").  His focus is on the very low end of the naval mission spectrum.  He wants the LCS because it’s a smaller ship that won’t intimidate the navies of other countries and can better engage with them and their small vessels (he has actually stated that).  The Pacific Pivot seems to consist of sending LCS’s to Singapore.  He wants generic platforms that can accept any payload (we’ve already debunked that idea - see, "Payloads Over Platforms?") which is an accounting approach to combat rather than a warfighting approach.  He’s sacrificing ship maintenance, flight hours, and readiness in favor of humanitarian assistance.  He’s focused on building JHSVs, MLPs, AFSBs, etc. – and counting them as warships! – rather than MCMs, combat capable frigates, strike cruisers, and whatnot.  If push comes to shove, he’s already indicated that he’ll retire a carrier rather than halt LCS production (or the LCS follow on).  I can go on but you get the idea and you know the litany as well as I do.



The Navy Uncaged?



While peacetime activities make up 98% of the Navy’s tasking, it’s the CNO’s job to feed and care for the gorilla that only gets let out of its cage 2% of the time.  Do that and the 98% will take care of itself.  Fail to do that and the 2% will not take care of itself.  Instead, the Navy will find itself lacking and in desperate trouble when we need the gorilla and find we have only a tiny, but cute and cuddly monkey.



The Navy desperately needs a warrior as CNO.

(1) US Naval Institute Proceedings, “Forging a Global Network of Navies”, Adm. Johathan Greenert, USN and RAdm. James Foggo III, USN, May 2014, p.22